
THE MODERN WORLD

BY

ALICE FELT TYLER

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF HISTORY
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

RINEHART & COMPANY, INC.

PUBLISHERS

NEW YORK

First Printing May, 1939
Second Printing January, 1940
Third Printing January, 1947

COPYRIGHT, 1939, BY ALICE FELT TYLER
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY J. J. LITTLE AND IVES COMPANY, NEW YORK
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

PREFACE

NO ONE can spend more than a decade teaching a general course in European history without developing methods of approach and techniques of handling material. Nor can one maintain a keen interest in the subject itself for an even longer time without having definite ideas as to its presentation and interpretation. This text is the product of years of teaching and of much discussion of texts and teaching problems with both colleagues and students. It has been written with no other person in mind than the student.

Many students have had few courses in history before coming to college and frequently elect no other work in the European field than a general survey. Their needs are to be met, therefore, by an emphasis upon the evolution of institutions and the development of social, economic, and political structure rather than upon dates, wars, rulers, or other factual details. As far as possible in this book, economic, social, and political factors are woven together to emphasize the fact that, as the story of the past unfolds, the three are not separate but develop together and condition one another. Since American students will be interested in the influence of European events upon the Western Hemisphere and, in turn, of America upon Europe, an unusual amount of space and attention is given to American history.

From the three introductory chapters, which summarize the economic, social, and political background for the sixteenth century, the account broadens slowly through the period of the Reformation and the wars of religion to the triumph of parliamentary government in England and of royal absolutism in France. With the rise of Prussia and Russia a larger area is brought in, and the story becomes world-wide in scope with the expansion of Europe overseas. Through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries detail is subordinated and general development stressed. Greater detail is introduced for the eighteenth century and the approach of the French Revolution, and a more intensive treatment characterizes the period 1789 to recent years. Approximately one half of the book is given to the period since Napoleon, because the story itself grows more complex and because

one of the major objectives of the study of history is an understanding of the problems and conditions of the confusing present.

If the past is to live again for the student, it must be observed from the point of view of the men and women of the period under discussion. The impact of events upon their lives, the motives for their actions, and the nature of the institutions which they developed under the pressure of economic forces are the stuff from which history is made. There is constant emphasis, therefore, upon those economic forces. Whenever the material has lent itself to such treatment, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the problems and development of Europe are considered as a whole by a process of cross-sectioning rather than by a chronological treatment of individual countries. For greater unity and coherence a discussion of the smaller countries of Europe is omitted except where their story has some direct bearing on the whole fabric of the history of the period.

Appended to each chapter is a list of readings designed especially for the student, for which the needs and interests of students have been the sole guides. Interesting and relatively recent books have been chosen, but no attempt has been made to draw up an exhaustive bibliography or to provide materials for the specialist. General accounts for background, more detailed treatments of various subjects, biographies, and memoirs or firsthand accounts have all been included with some brief comment classifying or describing each. There are few things more personal than a list of books drawn up for a field of special interest; hence it is obvious that these lists are but a beginning to which instructors and students may add at will. The choice and the comments of the author of the text are offered for the sole purpose of stimulating an interest in the literature of a period so fascinating that attention should not be confined to textbooks alone. A brief general bibliography of working tools for the student of modern history may be found at the end of the text.

A. F. T.

Minneapolis, Minn.
March, 1939

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

IT would be impossible to make adequate expression of my gratitude to all of those friends who have given me aid of one sort or another in preparing this book. Among those who have read parts of the manuscript are Professors Herbert Heaton, A. C. Krey, Lawrence Steefel, and Harold Deutsch of the University of Minnesota. Dr. Rodney Loehr, Miss Adah Grandy, and Mrs. Renata Wasson have read the entire manuscript and have constantly defended the interests of the college students whom they know so well. All of these friends have saved me from many errors and have given loyal aid and encouragement. They are not in any way responsible for any mistakes in fact or errors in judgment which their eagle eyes have failed to detect. I am indebted, also, to a galaxy of teaching assistants, composing past and present staffs of "History I" at the University of Minnesota, for with them many practical problems of teaching have been discussed. Their judgment as to whether or not a line of attack or a method of organization would be effective has often been respectfully accepted. Mrs. Zephyra Shepherd has uncomplainingly reduced strange hieroglyphics to beautiful type-script and has aided in the thankless task of proof-reading and index-making. Dr. Henry David of Queens College has given his extremely valuable editorial criticism and many suggestions.

Acknowledgment should also be made to Harper & Brothers for the use of the map entitled "Europe, Western Asia, and Northern Africa" from Carl Stephenson's *Medieval History*.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	V
CHAPTER I. GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL SURVEY OF EUROPE IN 1500	3
II. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL LIFE—1500	25
III. THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE	49
IV. THE AGE OF THE REFORMATION	88
V. THE PERIOD OF RELIGIOUS WARS	126
VI. THE TRIUMPH OF PARLIAMENT IN ENGLAND	152
VII. THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV	182
VIII. THE RISE OF PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA	209
IX. EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CRISES IN EUROPEAN EXPAN- SION	243
X. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY	275
XI. THE LAST DAYS OF THE FRENCH MONARCHY	306
XII. THE FIRST REPUBLIC IN FRANCE	347
XIII. CONSULATE AND EMPIRE	381
XIV. REORGANIZATION AND REACTION IN EUROPE	421
XV. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY	458
XVI. THE YEAR OF REVOLUTIONS	499
XVII. THE REMAKING OF EUROPE, 1849-1871	540
XVIII. A CENTURY OF RUSSIAN HISTORY	579
XIX. <u>THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST</u>	613
XX. IMPERIALISM	646

XXI. THE PROBLEMS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES, 1870-1914	683
XXII. THE GREAT WAR	717
XXIII. POSTWAR PROBLEMS	759
XXIV. <u>THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS</u>	797
XXV. FASCISM: ITALY AND GERMANY	823
XXVI. THE RECENT YEARS	865
GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY	903
LIST OF EUROPEAN RULERS SINCE 1500	905
INDEX	909

MAPS

	PAGE
EUROPE, WESTERN ASIA, AND NORTHERN AFRICA . . .	4
EUROPE IN 1500 . . .	8
THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISCOVERIES . . .	52
EUROPE AFTER THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA . . .	148
THE GROWTH OF BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA . . .	216
THE GROWTH OF RUSSIA . . .	231
THE THREE PARTITIONS OF POLAND . . .	241
THE WORLD IN 1688 . . .	244
EUROPE IN 1789 . . .	342
EUROPE AT THE HEIGHT OF NAPOLEON'S POWER . . .	404
EUROPE AFTER THE TREATIES OF 1814-1815 . . .	428
THE NATIONALITIES OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY . . .	536
PHYSICAL FEATURES OF THE BALKAN PENINSULA . . .	614
RISE OF THE BALKAN STATES . . .	621
AFRICA-1910 . . .	660
ASIA IN 1914 . . .	672
LINGUISTIC MAP OF EUROPE . . .	712
EUROPE IN 1914 . . .	722
POST-WAR EUROPE . . .	764
EUROPE-JANUARY, 1939 . . .	870

THE MODERN WORLD



GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL SURVEY OF EUROPE IN 1500

THE history of any nation or group of nations is conditioned by factors over which its inhabitants have little or no control, but which, through the ages, have played their part in wars, politics, and economic development. The direction and navigability of a river, the height or location of a mountain range, the lack of adequate rainfall, and the variation of temperature are conditioning factors of great significance in the life of a people and, therefore, in its history. Geography, physiography, and climate have been, and are today, of tremendous importance in shaping the course of European events.

PHYSIOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF EUROPE

Important as Europe is in the history of modern times, its land mass seems small to American students accustomed to the greater areas and distances of the New World. Europe is an extension or a peninsula of Asia rather than a continent in itself. Its land area is one-fourth larger than that of the United States and is less than one-tenth of the total land of the globe.¹

Since Europe is an extension of Asia, one must be rather arbitrary in regard to its eastern boundary dividing Europe from Asia. At times the East has pressed hard upon that line, and Asia has seemed very close. In the thirteenth century Tartar hordes engulfed Russia, and Asia claimed the eastern Russian plains; but in modern times the Eastern European boundary has been considered to be the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea. The other boundaries are more constant: the Arctic Ocean on the north, the Atlantic on the west, and the Mediterranean, the Black, and the Caspian seas on the south. Since the name "Europe" can be made to include the islands near its

shores, the historical necessity of including the British Isles in our account of European civilization has some geographical justification also.

At the eastern end of the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea region, the connection between Europe and Asia is again of importance; while at the western gateway, between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, Europe narrowly escapes being joined to Africa. From the dawn of European history to the present day, the Mediterranean has been a center of European cultures and economic life. The *Mare Nostrum* of the Roman world is again, in the twentieth century, the scene of the activities and ambitions of a latter-day Roman whose eyes see the Mediterranean once more as "our sea." Gibraltar, the Isthmus of Suez, and Constantinople have all been of marked significance in modern European history.

If Europe is, in a sense, a peninsula of Asia, it is also a land mass with many peninsulas. The land mass is divided into great natural areas: the Mediterranean region cut off from the north by mountain ranges, the broad plains of Central and Northern Europe, and the more mountainous region again in the northwest, in Scotland and the Scandinavian peninsula. The peculiar structure of Europe gives it a much greater sea coast than its land mass would ordinarily afford, and makes the ocean ways more familiar to its peoples than is customary in other regions of similar area and population density where the coasts are less highly indented. The significance of that "peninsularity" in the history of the Scandinavian countries, of Spain, Italy, and Greece cannot be overestimated. It is as important in European history as the insular position of England, or as the continental character, on the other hand, of Eastern Europe.

The easy access to the sea afforded by the highly indented coast line is furthered by the numerous rivers which cut across the various peninsulas and across the mass of Europe itself. The Iberian peninsula has five rivers, four to the west, one to the east coasts, cutting their way through the mountainous interior of Spain and Portugal. Of these the Tagus and the Ebro are the most important. The Tiber, the Arno, and the Po are Italian rivers, the first two famous because of Italy's greatest cities, Rome and Florence, the Po watering the richest and economically most important river valley of the peninsula. Of the four famous French rivers, three flow northwestward to outlets in the Bay of Biscay and the North Sea, thus affording French trade Atlantic harbors, while the fourth flows into the Mediterranean

and helps to give France a great stake in the fortunes of that sea.

In the British Isles the numerous short rivers with very rapid fall in their upper reaches give the islands a certain amount of water power. The most important British river is the Thames, significant largely because London is near its mouth. The Thames has its outlet in the North Sea across from the mouth of the Rhine and the Scheldt. It is no wonder that trade and economic interests have bound England to the Continent of Europe, and that the English government has always been interested in the political affairs of that neighboring area called the Low Countries.

Although not the longest, the Rhine is the most important river of Europe; the history of nations would have to be rewritten had it taken a different route to the sea. It rises in the heart of Europe in the Alps within a few miles of the sources of those other mighty rivers, the Po and the Danube, and flows northward and westward to the North Sea. In its lower reaches it waters a broad plain called since ancient times the Lowlands; and it is dotted with the cities of Belgium and Holland which have for centuries been centers of trade and manufacture. The upper Rhine has long been a boundary rather than a waterway; today it separates France and Germany; but since the days when Caesar built a bridge across it for the progress of his troops, the Rhineland has been territory under dispute in nearly every century, a great European battlefield which has been enriched by the blood of all nations.

The other great rivers of Northern Europe, the Weser, the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, have been trade routes of importance throughout historic times. The Baltic outlets of the Oder and the Vistula have been of strategic and economic importance to Germany, Poland, and the Scandinavian powers throughout their history. Of less importance have been the eastern rivers, the Niemen, the Duna and the Dvina, the last being Russia's outlet to the Arctic Ocean by way of the White Sea.

In Southeastern Europe the Danube has always held an unchallenged position. Rising north of the Alps, it has its outlet hundreds of miles eastward in the Black Sea, and for Austria, Hungary, and the Balkan states its significance is as great as that of the Rhine for Northwestern Europe. The rich plains of southern Russia are drained by three rivers, the Dniester, the Dnieper, and the Don, while the Volga and, further east, the Ural flow into the Caspian Sea, and thus help mark the easternmost boundary of Europe.

Those interested in the effect of geography upon history make much of a study of the major river systems in which they maintain that the physiographic nature and the economic resources of the river valleys, the direction which is taken by the river itself, and the possibility of its navigation to the sea are all extremely important factors in the development of the states through which they flow. And certainly the story of the effect of some of these European rivers upon the history of the countries affected by them gives plenty of material in support of this thesis.

The significance of rivers in history may be conceded without lessening the importance of another physiographic feature, the mountain ranges. With the exception of Denmark, the peninsular regions of Europe are very mountainous. The western half of the Scandinavian peninsula is largely a long mountain range with a coast line indented by deep fiords. Only in southern Sweden are there extensive plains. The Iberian peninsula is crossed by a series of mountain ranges parallel to the Pyrenees, the boundary between the peninsula and France. Italy has the Alps for its northern boundary, and a long mountain range known as the Apennines extends the length of the peninsula, ensuring ample water power for Italy but contributing to a poverty of soil and natural resources of great importance in Italian history. The Balkans are mountainous with ranges parallel to the coast and other ranges traversing the peninsula and extending into Greece. The fertile valleys have supported the population and have drawn Europeans southeastward, but the mountains have affected the history of each Balkan state. The Carpathian Mountains of Central Europe have been of great significance in the five hundred years through which we shall trace European history. Russian history has been less influenced by mountains than that of Western Europe. The Ural Mountains are too low, especially in their southern reaches, to prevent the eastward expansion of Russia, while the Caucasus Range forms a natural southern frontier from the Black to the Caspian Sea.

But all of Europe is not mountainous, and the great plains area extending from southeastern England across Northern Europe from France and the Lowlands to the plains of Russia is as important in history and economics as the rivers and mountains. These are the great agricultural areas which have fed Northern Europe and have been such an important factor in her trade for centuries.

The climate of Europe has played its part in history as much as

have the physiographic features. All of Europe lies farther north than an American student might think. The great capitals of Europe, Paris, Berlin, and London, are all farther north than New York. Superimposed upon a map of North America, a European map would show the tips of Spain and Italy at about the latitude of Tennessee, and almost all of Sweden and Norway as far north as the Hudson Bay country. But, although Europe lies so far north, the climate of Western Europe at least is mild. The prevailing winds are from the west and south and are not cut off by coastal mountain ranges. The warm ocean currents and the greatly indented coast aid in moderating temperatures so that much of Europe has a mild moist climate with little sharp variations. Tropical plants grow in the southern areas; the southwestern shore of England scarcely knows frost or snow, and even Sweden and Norway seldom have killing frosts after the first of May. Only where the mass of Europe grows broader toward the east, where the influence of the Atlantic becomes remote, and the rich Russian plains extend from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, does Europe have what is called a continental climate with the same great extremes of temperature and possibility of floods and drought to which the central United States area is subject.

With so much physiographic diversity, with so many natural units each set off by clearly marked frontiers, it was, perhaps, inevitable that the European tendency should have been toward numerous states relatively small in area, and that European history should be largely the account of the rivalries and conflicts of those states.² The Greek city-state of ancient times was one of the first evidences of the effects of this physiographic diversity, and later Rome first developed into Italian dominance before beginning her conquest of the Mediterranean world. The Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees were inevitably to seem the "natural boundaries" of France, the attainment of which was to be the goal of many a war.

THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE

This regionalism, or localism, has been furthered by the great diversity of peoples or nationalities occupying the European scene. There were in Europe, at the beginning of modern times, six general divisions of nationalities grouped according to the type of language

² L. C. MacKinney, *The Medieval World*, p. 202.

spoken by each.⁸ Five of these groups of races were Aryan: the Greeks; the Latin peoples—Italians, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Rumanians; the Celtic races of Scotland, Ireland, Wales, and Brittany; the Germanic or Teutonic peoples of North Central Europe, the Lowlands, and the Scandinavian peninsula; and the Slavic peoples of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and eastward. England had developed a separate nationality of her own composed of German and Latin elements. A Turanian group, distinct from the Aryan “families,” included the Magyars, Finns, Estonians, and Turks. The Basques of the Pyrenees area and the Albanians were peoples with an ancient and peculiar language and background. Moreover various early migrations or conquests had brought into Europe such Asiatic or African groups as the Moors of Spain and the scattered settlements of Jews located in several countries.

These ethnic or language divisions of European peoples had gradually developed into separate states or nations. With the gradual collapse of the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries barbarian peoples, largely Teutonic, had infiltrated or invaded the old Roman world and had eventually formed new nations. The incoming groups varied from one another in tribal allegiance, tradition, and language. They scattered in different areas and mingled with Latin and earlier native stock, in some places very little and elsewhere with varying degrees of completeness. As communications grew more difficult with the decline of Rome, and economic and cultural bonds weakened, new nations, almost new peoples, appeared, and the map of Europe acquired the divisions that characterize it today. The unity and order that had marked the Roman Empire had disappeared. There was a brief attempt at integration once more in the period of Charlemagne, but in less than a century the disruption of that empire was a tacit admission of the fact that Europe’s future was diversity and not unity.

EUROPE IN 1500

The long years following the breakup of empire in the ninth century once bore the name of the Dark Ages, a period which was supposed to have extended for two or three centuries. It used to be regarded as one of little interest—a day of stagnation, ignorance, and gloom. Gradually light has been let into the picture until today little

⁸ C. J. H. Hayes, *Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe*, Vol. I, pp. 38-40.

of darkness remains, and we know that the medieval period was one of tremendous development, of the growth of new institutions, new culture, and new nations. The later Middle Ages saw a Europe highly conscious of itself, a group of small states extending from what is now Russia westward to the Atlantic, very diverse as to civilization and advancement, but intricately bound together by trade, religion, and other common interests. From the days of the crusades onward, the European horizon had been widening and European culture expanding until the fifteenth century witnessed a remarkable culmination in the Renaissance, and began the geographical and scientific discoveries that bridged the transition to the modern age.

The year 1500 was chosen for the beginning of this book, but there is no significance in the exact date. It was chosen because during the preceding fifty years dynamic changes had occurred in the whole structure of European life and thought that were to make the sixteenth century and those centuries following a modern age. And yet one must not forget for an instant that little occurred after 1500 that did not have its roots in the past and that the Middle Ages form the broad basis upon which modern civilization rests. It is the Europe of 1500, therefore, that must be examined as the background against which the persons, events, and movements of the succeeding years must be placed. The political structure of Europe was as diversified as its ethnic and geographical characteristics. There were new nation-states that had been in process of evolution since the period of the crusades, survivals of the old empire theory of Rome, city-states, principalities under religious jurisdiction, and, in the southeast, the Oriental despotism of the Ottoman Turks. In all that diversity and complexity of structure it is safe to make one generalization. If one begins a survey of Europe from the northwest and works eastward and southward, the newer forms of government and cultural ideas which are to be the contribution of modern times appear first in Western Europe, to be adopted, as the centuries roll on, a bit at a time, by those states farther to the east. There is no uniformity in the political structure of Europe; the institutions of one country will be found to differ from those of another because of its economic, cultural, and political background, and the needs and the aspirations of its people.

By 1500, England, France, Spain, Portugal, the Scandinavian states, and several states in Eastern Europe had developed governments that can be called nation-states. This new type of state was the result of several hundred years of development through the later Middle

Ages and can be described, briefly, as states under some accepted government, with some unity of area, whether large or small, the citizens of which usually have a common language, literature, and traditions, and are for the most part of one nationality.

THE BACKGROUND OF SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

There grew up in the British Isles four such states, of which England was the most important and in the early part of the modern era was to dominate and, to some extent, incorporate the others. In the struggle against the Danes before the year 1000, England showed some of the characteristics of a nation-state, but in the development of governmental institutions and culture after the Norman Conquest (1066) the English nation emerged in a form from which there has been no sharp break to the present time.

After the Conquest England adopted feudalism of a French pattern, but instituted by powerful kings it was always subject to royal power and restraints. At the same time many Anglo-Saxon institutions were retained, so that the welding of the two sets of governmental theories and practices produced a form of government which was distinctly English. With every noble owing first allegiance to his king, much of the division of authority prevalent in other European states was avoided. There was friction, of course, and only a strong king could maintain royal authority; but each strong king added what he could of power, and the weaker ones endeavored, if possible, to retain what they had been bequeathed. In 1215 a weak king, John, was compelled by rebellious barons to sign a charter of liberties, *Magna Carta*, which came to be regarded as a guarantee of English rights in case of royal usurpation. Reaffirmed in later reigns, *Magna Carta*, although in no way a constitution, was a safeguard against too great extension of the powers of the king. From older Anglo-Saxon institutions and from the *Curia Regis* (King's Court) of the Norman kings there gradually evolved the characteristic features of English government. By the fifteenth century the court system, the common law, a king's ministry in control of finance and other executive functions, and the English Parliament composed of two houses—lords temporal and spiritual and the House of Commons, representing the lesser nobility and the growing middle class—had come into being.

After the period of the crusades English trade grew, and a middle class appeared which increased rapidly in size and importance. The kings early began to place their reliance upon this class in their struggles with the nobility and in their need for funds for the wars with France. They were therefore impelled to further the trade and industries that could enrich this group and increase its numbers. This alliance between townsmen and crown was reflected, for example, in the appearance of the Commons in Parliament and also in other branches of the government where there were able representatives of the bourgeoisie. The burgesses paid for their position and protection by assenting to taxation that enabled the king to wage wars against the other powers of the British Isles and on the Continent and to maintain his relative independence from feudal control. But the consent of the Commons to taxes was given only in return for "redress of grievances," so that gradually Parliament became a real legislative body, and statute law made by Parliament with the approval or veto of the king became a part of English legal system.

The end of the Hundred Years' War with France in 1453 saw the English kings deprived of their French lands and their claims to the French throne, but freed, at last, from the great preoccupation with the French scene, they devoted every energy toward the affairs of their island kingdom. In England the three decades after the French peace were years of civil war and dissension (known as the Wars of the Roses) in which many noble families were so decimated and impoverished, and the middle class was so war-weary and anxious for the economic advantages of peace and a strong government, that the new line of kings which appeared in 1485 was able to establish a power as nearly absolute as English rulers were ever to attain. This period of civil war and weakness of the executive was, however, a period of strength in the legislative branch of the government, and parliamentary control of finance was firmly established. "Redress of grievances" became actual legislation. Members of Parliament obtained freedom of speech and freedom from arrest during sessions. In fact, the English parliament of the fifteenth century had a distinctly modern cast. The English people were not to forget their heritage in the days of Tudor and Stuart absolutism.

THE TUDOR LINE

The first of this new line, Henry Tudor, could claim to be the heir to both branches of the old royal family which had carried on the civil war, and as Henry VII (1485-1509) he was able to consolidate royal power in his own hands to such an extent that he ruled with little attention to Parliamentary restrictions. The greatly weakened feudal nobility was held in check by a new royal court, the Court of the Star Chamber, and the lesser nobility and the businessmen were delighted with the return of prosperity and quite acquiescent in the increase of a royal power that could be of such great economic advantage to them.

Henry VII, therefore, is the new type of monarch that is to dominate the English scene for a hundred and fifty years and to be the European governmental ideal for a much longer period. Patriotism in the new nation-states was directed toward the monarch as the embodiment of the state. Later a worship of the monarch was to be expressed in the theory of divine right by which he ruled, and the absolutism of the king and the supremacy of the state were to be identified. In a different type of state an Italian, Niccolò Machiavelli, wrote *The Prince*, which was the classic expression of the absolutist theory and the textbook for the new national monarchies.

In England, the older institutions of courts, Parliament, and representative government, and the rugged determination to share in the control of governmental policies, especially in the control of the governmental purse, were too deeply rooted to permit their complete or permanent subjugation to the will of a despotic ruler. With some restiveness, these forces were to remain quiescent during the reign of the Tudors who paid at least lip service to Parliament. Their successors, the Stuarts, in the seventeenth century were to reap the whirlwind and to find themselves broken and discarded before a new nationalism and a new theory of government, based upon something older than "kings by divine right."

During the Middle Ages, England had acquired control over Wales and a somewhat precarious domination over part of Ireland. Numerous conflicts with Scotland had not, however, resulted in English victory. By means of sturdy resistance and French alliances the Scots had managed to maintain their independence, and it was only through the marriage of Margaret, the daughter of Henry VII, to

the Scottish king that the two thrones were united many years later by a descendant of that marriage.

With royal power the fundamental reality in government, it was but natural that dynastic aims should be the core of governmental policy, and that the marriages of royal children should be one of the great matters of state. Alliances were often cemented by a marriage of offspring of the allies, war terms often added a marriage to seal the bargain, territories were augmented and prestige was increased by a network of intermarriages of scions of royal houses. The English kings as well as those of other countries paid due attention to this important detail of royal policy. Henry VII married his eldest son to Catherine, the daughter of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile. Upon the death of that son, the Spanish princess was promptly betrothed to her husband's brother who, as Henry VIII, was to rule England from 1509 to 1547. Thus the valuable European connection was preserved, and the parsimonious English king did not have to refund the Spanish dowry.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRANCE

France did not have the advantage of England's insularity, and was constantly under the necessity of providing for defenses on the eastern and southern frontiers, as well as of protecting herself against the prolonged rivalry with England. The English kings, from the Conquest to the middle of the fifteenth century, were great nobles of France, vassals of the king, and, at times, claimants for the French throne. French royal power was nearly submerged after the disruption of Charlemagne's empire in a wave of triumphant feudalism, and French kings were often less powerful than their vassals. After the tenth century, French royal power grew slowly but steadily as the Capetian kings increased their power in the royal domain, added to that domain by war and marriage, and advanced French prestige abroad as opportunity offered.

The French monarchs did not have the advantages of the Norman kings of England, nor were they hampered by traditions of self-government. The French kings believed in the theory that the king was the source of all power even when it was difficult to put the theory into effect. Early in the fourteenth century a French king called an Estates-General into being to obtain aid in a quarrel with an arrogant pope. The Estates were three: clergy, nobility, and the

Third Estate, made up of leading representatives of the bourgeoisie. The fate of the Estates-General was very different from that of the English Parliament. The Estates were called irregularly and infrequently, usually when a hard-pressed king needed some specific aid; because the two upper estates were always able to outvote the third, the middle class never attained great power; and, finally, the Estates-General never established the principle of control over taxation. During the fourteenth century, however, there seemed a possibility that it might become a real legislative body and a power in France, but that time passed, and longer periods elapsed between its meetings until that time in 1614 when a queen regent was to dismiss an impotent Estates-General with the excuse that the meeting place was needed for a dance! After that, 175 years were to elapse before a desperate monarch requested the historians and antiquarians to unearth the machinery for the calling together of a last great Estates-General which ushered in the French Revolution.

French rulers pressed by dangers of war and by fear of aggression from the nobility early allied themselves with the growing middle class. Bourgeois financiers aided the kings and became their financial advisers. Bourgeois lawyers revived Roman law, which enhanced the power of the central government and aided in the organization of the kings' courts of which the Parlement of Paris was the most important. In return the king aided the towns against the pretensions of the nobles, furthered trade, and gave protection to industry and commerce. The kings, however, always strove to maintain their independence and, at times, fought against the pretensions of the bourgeoisie with all the resources of royal power. Bourgeois office holders and lawyers acquired titles of nobility and formed a new class upon which the king could depend in both civil and foreign conflict. France's exposed frontiers and the constant danger of war made the middle class willing to give financial aid to the monarch in his military preparations. The taxes he was thus able to levy made it possible for the French king to hire soldiers and free himself of dependence upon feudal levies. By the end of the fifteenth century the kings had a tax, the *taille*, or land tax, levied by royal authority, and an army under their own control.

The end of the Hundred Years' War saw royal power at last in the ascendancy in France after long years of weakness, with Louis XI (1461-1483) a king of whom Machiavelli might well have approved. He was wily in diplomacy, but ruthless in action, unscrupu-

lous and grasping, ambitious and powerful. He used the middle class, built up his army, added to his possessions, centralized his government, and aided in making France one of the foremost of the modern nation-states. Industry, commerce and mining all prospered and received government encouragement. All classes except the nobility were relatively satisfied, and governmental absolutism under a despotic monarch became the accepted form of French government. After two short reigns largely occupied in an attempt to re-establish claims to Naples and Milan,⁴ there came to the throne Francis I (1515-1547) who was unquestionably of the modern age, and who continued that struggle for the aggrandizement of dynasty and of nation-state which was so characteristic of the period.

THE NATIONS SOUTH OF THE PYRENEES

South of the Pyrenees lay a peninsula that in medieval times had been in the hands of the Mohammedan conquerors who had crossed over from Africa in the eighth century. Through much of the Middle Ages Spanish history was the story of a crusade against the infidel, and by degrees the Moors were thrust back. Gradually small Christian kingdoms emerged, the most important of which were Aragon, Castile, and Portugal. By a series of marriages culminating in the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile in the fifteenth century, one dynasty ruled over all the peninsula with the exception of Portugal, where a small but strong nation had developed. In the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella royal power was firmly established, and although the local representative bodies, or Cortes, were continued in each state, their power was subjected to royal authority. The Moors were finally conquered at Granada in 1492, and Moslem control was at an end. In that same year, in the name of Spain, Columbus discovered the New World, and thus inaugurated for the dynasty and the country for which he sailed a century or two of great brilliance as one of the most powerful states of Europe.

Spain as a nation-state was, however, conditioned by her previous

⁴In the thirteenth century a French prince, Charles of Anjou, had conquered Naples and Sicily with the consent of the pope. The island of Sicily fell into the control of the royal family of Aragon in 1282. In 1442 Aragon acquired Naples, also, from the French. In the later half of the fifteenth century the French kings took over the dispute and fought with Spain for the Sicilies. Being unsuccessful, they renounced all claims in favor of Ferdinand of Aragon in 1504. The French claim to Milan was the result of a marriage in the fifteenth century.

history. Centuries of religious warfare meant a legacy of passionate allegiance to the orthodox church, and a military nobility of great pride and intolerance. The king might control both church and nobility but only by recognition of that orthodoxy and that intolerant pride of caste. Spain had no highly developed middle class, and although her vast colonies were to make overseas trade of great value, she never developed a commercial and industrial machinery to make the profits of that trade secure for Spain.

As did other monarchs who appear on the scene about 1500, the Spanish rulers surveyed the marriage market. One daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella married the heir to the English throne; another, Joanna, married the heir to the vast possessions of the Hapsburg house, Philip the Handsome, son of Mary of Burgundy, heiress to the rich Low Countries and Maximilian, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and Archduke of Austria. When to Spain are added the rapidly growing colonies of the New World and Spanish claims in both northern and southern Italy, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of the power which descended by right of inheritance to the grandson of the Spanish monarch, Charles. He was elected in 1519 to the throne of the Holy Roman Empire and is therefore best known as Charles V (1519-1558).

Portugal in 1500 had been for some time a state powerful beyond its European size and population. Inevitably Portugal had turned toward the sea as soon as the Moslem yoke had been thrown off. In the latter half of the fifteenth century Portuguese vessels appeared in every harbor, and Portuguese trade grew rapidly. A member of the royal family, Prince Henry, carved for himself the title of "The Navigator" and for his country vast new possessions by his active interest in the science of navigation and the discovery and acquisition of new routes and territories. Under the Portuguese flag, intrepid navigators sailed to the Azores, the Madeiras, and Cape Verde, and claimed them for Portugal. Later they sailed farther down the African coast; by the end of the century Bartholomew Diaz and Vasco da Gama had rounded the Cape, and the latter had reached India and gained access to the marvels of the Eastern trade by a new route. For a time Lisbon was one of the greatest trading centers of Europe, and the colonial possessions of Portugal in Africa and Asia formed an empire second only to that of Spain. In 1580, when Portugal fell for a time into the hands of Spain and her initiative was stifled, it became apparent that her European position was too precarious, her natural resources

too scanty, and her power too negligible to enable her to retain the proud estate to which her wealth from the Oriental trade had entitled her.

THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

Far different had been the history of the Scandinavian countries, but they too had become nation-states by 1500. Their proud day of conquest had come early in the Middle Ages when the Norsemen and the Danes swept the seas. The Viking boats, incredibly small for the seas they traveled, visited Ireland, Greenland, and even the coast of North America. England, France, and Sicily were invaded and colonized by the Northmen, and the Swedes penetrated deep into Russia, where they established in the ninth century a state that was to furnish one of the elements of modern Russian civilization. These Northmen were not only warriors but traders as well. They were amphibians—fighters, sailors, farmers, and men of commerce—who enriched the heritage of many European states and made themselves feared and respected everywhere.

The Scandinavian countries were united in 1397 by the Union of Kalmar and were under the political control of Denmark for more than a century. Under Gustavus Vasa in the early sixteenth century, Sweden broke away and thereafter maintained a separate existence, while Norway remained with Denmark. The Swedish and Danish kings endeavored to assume the same sort of position as did the monarchs of other nation-states, controlling church, army, and middle class for their own advantage and subjecting the feudal nobles to royal dictation. They were rivals for the control of the Baltic and intervened in European wars when it seemed to their advantage to do so.

EASTERN EUROPE IN 1500

Southward from the eastern end of the Baltic in the later Middle Ages were four states that seemed to have the characteristic features of the nation-states: Lithuania, Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary. Poland and Lithuania were Slavic states united under one crown since 1386. In the period of their greatest power they occupied a vast area in Eastern Europe extending from the Baltic almost to the Black Sea. They had ample man power and were of considerable military importance, but internal friction, foreign wars, lack of a strong middle class, and backward economic de-

velopment prevented them from becoming a strong modern state. The kingship was elective, and a proud nobility paralyzed the government with a veto power over all legislation and dominated a poverty-stricken and servile peasantry. German and later Russian enmity made the situation more dangerous, and the kingdom disappeared in the eighteenth century.

Bohemia, partly Slavic and partly German, had a proud history in the later Middle Ages, but in 1500 her kingship was still elective, and the power of the nobles was not subjected to royal control. In the last years of the fifteenth century her king was elected king of Hungary also; less than fifty years later, Bohemia and that part of Hungary that had been saved from Turkish aggression selected as their ruler a member of the house of Hapsburg, Ferdinand, brother of Charles V and heir to his Austrian possessions. Bohemia then came under Austrian control and remained so until the breakup of that empire, in the twentieth century, permitted the creation of the new state of Czechoslovakia.

Hungary might well have seemed in medieval times to be developing into a nation-state similar to France, but several factors blocked that advance, and the history of Hungary has been little more prominent than that of Bohemia or Poland. The Magyar aristocracy was able to dominate the Slavic peasantry, but was not, in turn, subjected to strong royal control. There was no extensive development of trade and no prominent middle class. The advance of the Turks after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 was disastrous to Hungary, and after the battle of Mohács (1526) the kingdom was dismembered, part of it remaining for the time in Turkish control. For the rest of modern times until the Great War (1914-1918), the history of Hungary is tied up with that of Austria and with the persistent pressure against the power of Turkey in Europe.

Eastern Europe, from the Lithuania-to-Hungary line eastward to the Ural Mountains, was the home of the Slavic states known as Russia. In the years preceding 1500 these states had been struggling to free themselves from the control of the Asiatic invaders called Tartars who had conquered them in the thirteenth century. By the time our story begins the princes of Moscow had been successful and were establishing themselves as absolute monarchs of a despotic cast over an extremely backward but vast and potentially powerful state.

A glance at the map will show that we have so far avoided mention of two European areas that were destined to be of very great

importance in the twentieth century, Germany and Italy. The governments of those regions were so different at the beginning of the sixteenth century from the nation-states just described that it is necessary to treat them separately.

THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE

The old Roman idea of empire did not die with the fall of Rome, nor did it disappear after the breakup of Charlemagne's empire. In the Byzantine or Eastern Roman Empire and in the organization of the Roman Catholic Church, Europe had models and reminders of Rome, and men's minds reverted again and again in the Middle Ages to the idea of a universal empire. When the grandsons of Charlemagne divided their inheritance according to Germanic custom, a separate kingdom of Germany was formed only to fall a prey in the ninth and tenth centuries to powerful feudal barons. This eastern region had been the most completely German of Charlemagne's domains and the least touched by Roman institutions. The old tribal or "stem" duchies remained the real governmental units, and the heads of those duchies kept the selection of their ruler in their own hands. In the middle of the tenth century the head of one of the duchies, a powerful and ambitious man named Otto, drove back the invading Hungarians, brought the other duchies under control, and went down into Italy, in imitation of Charlemagne, and established the Holy Roman Empire of the German people.

For three centuries and more his successors tried to maintain the union of Germany and Italy and thus so divided their strength that they were unable to make a nation out of either region. The German nobles resisted the establishment of royal power in the northern area and clung to the right to elect the emperors and control the empire. The Italian cities and the papacy defied the emperor and wrested from him even the shadow of control in Italy. German cities copied the political structure and independence of their Italian models and made themselves practically independent of both emperor and nobles. After 1300 the position of emperor, although still elective, was usually held by the head of the Hapsburg family, which had by that time acquired for itself the province of Austria, and which was to use every opportunity for aggrandizement of wealth and territory. The

power of the emperor, therefore, was largely dependent upon his position as archduke of Austria and head of the House of Hapsburg. He no longer pretended to dominion over Italy as Holy Roman Emperor although he had some family claims to Italian territory. As emperor he was chief, by election, of the now numerous German states, more powerful than any one of them but impotent in case they united against him. Those German states were of all varieties, several hundred in all, large and small, kingdoms, city-states, ecclesiastical principalities—a German patchwork quilt. Localism and particularism were the order of the day, and a man was not a German but an Austrian, a Saxon, or a Brandenburger.

The government of the empire did have, however, many of the outward characteristics of the nation-state. There was an Imperial Diet, but it never became a real legislative body, remaining always a sort of diplomatic assembly or group of assemblies representing the rulers of the various states. There might be taxes and levies of troops for the empire but only when the states so desired; the decisions of imperial courts were put into effect under the same circumstances. A strong emperor might exert great power, but only because his position as sovereign in Austria and his other possessions made him feared and respected.

MEDIEVAL ITALY

Italy, on the other hand, after the brief period of power of the Holy Roman Empire, developed along quite other lines, although the result in particularism and the independence of smaller units was much the same. City life had never died out in Italy, and the city-state idea of the classical period could be revived easily. Even in the most unsettled period of the Germanic invasion, the cities of Italy, sacked and despoiled though they might be, maintained a genuine urban life and surrounded their citizens with the trappings of an almost forgotten splendor and the records of a complex cultural and economic life which could serve as texts and example in a later, more progressive generation.

Rome, with all of her tradition and somewhat bedraggled glory, became the seat of the papacy and the center of the temporal authority of the pope. In the Middle Ages, Rome was once more the great city-state dominating the central part of the peninsula as she had in the early days of the Roman Republic. Naturally, it had been to the

advantage of the papacy to discourage a united Italy and to resist German domination.⁵

Other city-states grew up as trade revived in the later Middle Ages. Some of them were survivals of old Roman cities, some were new towns coming into existence at strategic places along trade routes or in localities otherwise advantageous for urban growth. In southern Italy, Naples, the great port and center of trade, became a part of Norman possessions in the eleventh century, only to fall to the German emperors and later into French hands in the thirteenth. After 1282 the ruling house of Aragon claimed the island of Sicily while Naples remained precariously under French control until the fifteenth century. In 1504 the French king renounced all claims to southern Italy, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies came into the possession of the Spanish ruling house, which retained it for two hundred years. The Two Sicilies were to have a troubled history; backward, misgoverned, economically undeveloped, southern Italy remained under essentially foreign domination until the middle of the nineteenth century.

Northern Italy presents a much brighter picture. In the rich valley of the Po and along the Mediterranean and Adriatic coasts, cities early developed, for the stirrings of new economic life were felt in this area. Trade with the Byzantine Empire and with the East, through the passes of the Alps and along the European coast line, naturally centered in these Italian towns. Bitter rivals of one another, they could yet unite energetically against a common foe. They threw their influence against the German emperors and on the side of the papacy when those two foes struggled for Italian supremacy, but they did not permit papal domination within their own gates. The country districts surrounding each town fed and served it, were exploited by it, and profited richly because of its growth. Real city-states developed and were dominated by the wealthy merchants and manufacturers whose creations they were. Venice was a great maritime empire of republican form, controlled by a powerful oligarchy. With less political stability but usually republican in form, Genoa, the great rival of Venetian trade, dominated the commercial life of the western coast. Florence was for many generations a republic with freer institutions for its traders, manufacturers, and workers, and a glorious tradition of arts and culture. In the fifteenth century the city came under the control of the great Medici family whose wealth had been made in trade and

banking and who, although dictators, preserved republican forms. After a brief period of French control at the end of the century, the Medici returned, and Florence, with somewhat diminished glory, was known until the nineteenth century as the Duchy of Tuscany.

In 1500 Milan owed allegiance in theory to the Holy Roman Empire, but had been for generations dominated by despotic rulers from two famous families. The importance of Milan in trade and in culture was great, and when, in the late fourteenth century, marriage into the Visconti family gave the French king a claim to Milan, northern Italy became the battle ground upon which Charles V, as head of the House of Hapsburg and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, contended with France for the domination of Italy.

The Italian city-states carried on all the activities of a modern government. They made alliances, conducted wars, and negotiated peace; they coined money, sent out fleets, and protected trade; and they developed a vigorous cultural life and a thriving and highly specialized industry and commerce. Life in these Italian cities in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was brilliantly colored, scintillating, and attractive in a degree unequalled in any age. They were, in short, the logical and inevitable scene of the Renaissance. But there is a darker side of the picture. They were also the prey of their own ambitious and greedy ruling classes. There were sharp contrasts between wealth and poverty, brilliance and ignorance, civilization and cruelty and debasement. Particularism, local rivalries, and intrigues were rife. Italy became the scene of foreign wars and a pawn on the chessboard of European diplomacy. Glory and dishonor, pride in tradition and achievement, degradation and decline were the heritage of modern Italy. Not until the nineteenth century was there to be unity and national development.

The city-state was not confined to Italy alone. With trade it crossed the Alps and became the favorite political unit in German Rhineland areas and in the Lowlands. By 1300 the towns of that region which is now Belgium and the Netherlands were centers of economic life for Northern Europe, and it was but slowly that any sort of national government arose in that area. The upper Rhineland towns were under the Empire and led a precarious existence of semi-independence through the medieval and early modern period. The cities of the Lowlands were the scene of French aggression, French-English rivalry, and in the fifteenth century fell into the control of the famous Duke Charles of Burgundy, who was able to hold them for his daughter, Mary, who later lost much of her possessions to the wily Louis XI of France.

Through Mary's son, they came into Hapsburg hands and were a part of the inheritance of Charles V in the early sixteenth century.

SOUTHEASTWARD TO THE STRAITS

There remains of our political survey of Europe in 1500 only that southeastern area conquered by the Ottoman Turks who had appeared upon the horizon a few generations earlier, accepted Mohammedanism, and rapidly changed both church and government as they set out upon a period of vigorous conquest. Since the fourth century the Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire had maintained its capital city in Constantinople and had more or less controlled the region from the Danube around the eastern coast of the Mediterranean.

Beset by many enemies, the Byzantine Empire had managed to prevent the conquest of Constantinople by Persian, Arab, Serbian, Bulgar, and Turkish forces for a thousand tumultuous years. Eastern Roman culture, gradually becoming more and more Greek and Oriental, remained intact for centuries, a storehouse open to Western Europe when attention was again turned to cultural pursuits in the later Middle Ages. From Constantinople spread the religion of the Eastern or Greek Orthodox Catholic Church and the culture, literature, and art of the Byzantine period. Russia and the Near East, which owe their civilization to Constantinople rather than to Rome, have many characteristics distinct from Western Europe even today.

In the early fifteenth century, a bit at a time, the Turks conquered parts of that Byzantine Empire, until Asia Minor and much of the Balkan peninsula were in their hands. In 1453 Constantinople fell, and the great basilica of St. Sophia became a mosque, the crescent took the place of the cross, and Southeastern Europe became the prey of the vigorous Turkish imperialism. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were the era of Turkish expansion. Once more, as in the early days of the Moslem faith, holy wars were preached, and Turkish conquests from North Africa to the gates of Vienna created a vast empire for the sultans.

Of immense significance to European history was this Turkish advance. Greece, the Balkans, and part of Hungary fell into Turkish hands. For more than four hundred years Turkish domination colored the history of Southeastern Europe. To throw off that yoke was the problem of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The advance toward Vienna shocked all Europe, and the career of Charles V, as

ruler of Austria and emperor of the Germanies, was largely concerned with resisting that attack. The presence of Turkey at the outlet of the Black Sea brought into existence the "Question of the Straits" and complicated Russian history.

READINGS

A very brief general bibliography and a list of European rulers, useful in connection with all chapters, may be found at the end of the text.

For this chapter as well as for all those to follow C. J. H. Hayes's *Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe*, 2 vols. (1932) will be most useful. G. B. Adams's *Civilization during the Middle Ages* (Revised edition, 1922) will furnish an excellent survey of the institutions of the Middle Ages. Of the recent medieval textbooks L. C. MacKinney's *The Medieval World* (1938) and Carl Stephenson's *Medieval History* (1935) are to be recommended.

≡ II ≡

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL LIFE—1500

IT is difficult to make valid generalizations in regard to European economic life in 1500 or in any other year which might be chosen, and it is impossible to show any clear picture of either urban or rural life in the same period. No two regions in Europe were exactly alike, and statements which might be true of northern Italy would be quite false if made of southern Italy; the Netherlands were quite different from the upper Rhineland, and life in the Baltic plains was not like that on those of France. Not only was there great diversity between different regions, but there was widespread variety in the same occupations and institutions in different periods. Beware of those who speak of the "typical" this or that, and thus oversimplify the complex patterns of medieval or of modern life. If it is the part of caution today, when modern science and invention have integrated and regimented the world to an unprecedented extent, to avoid slipshod generalizations, it is, doubtless, just as wise to be equally reluctant in describing the civilization of 1500. We know, for instance, the difficulties which would confront an attempt to describe social and economic life in the United States in our own times, and the difficulty of reconciling, in the same account, the poor whites in the mountain region of the South, the bathing beaches of Coney Island or Atlantic City, Wall Street, southern California, and the life of the North Dakota plains! It is dangerous to put together facts, each one quite true in isolation, and from them build a structure that can be called "typical" of any civilization in any era.

FEUDALISM

With this caution by way of preface, it is permissible to make some sort of general statements about the Europe of the medieval and early modern periods. Between the eighth and the eleventh centuries urban life declined, and Europe became almost entirely a region of rural

people. Urban life persisted vigorously, however, in Constantinople, and to a small extent in Italy and in some other centers of old Roman culture, but over 90 per cent of the population of Europe was agrarian. Aside from a few itinerant peddlers, trade was negligible, and even agriculture was on practically a subsistence level. There were great differences, of course, between Spain and Scandinavia, between England and Russia, but there was probably more similarity than at any other time in several thousand years. Men worked of necessity for food, clothing, and shelter, and the organization of agriculture was adjusted in the different regions of Europe to further the production of those necessities.

The feudal system, Europe's answer to the chaos occurring after the breakup of the Roman and Carolingian Empires, was a method of governing people and of holding and using land. From both Roman and German origin came the elements that made up the feudal structure, but if precedents had not been at hand to aid in its growth, medieval Europe would have found it necessary to invent them. A desire for security, for survival, a mutual sharing of the problems of life in a period of disintegration of old institutions quite logically led to the evolution, invention, or emergence of that which was needed to carry on life and preserve all that it was possible to save of the older civilization. Order and security were fundamental necessities.

The medieval noble was a warrior, a vassal, and a landowner. There was little money in circulation, and land tenure was conditioned on services rendered by both owner and tenant. In much of the settled part of Europe the manorial system was prevalent; that is, the peasant population lived in villages on the estates of landowners, were granted lands by him to till for their own sustenance, used the forests, pasturage, and other resources of the estate, and in return cultivated the domain (*demesne*) which was reserved by the lord for the production of food for himself and his family. The land might not be taken away from the tiller of the soil, but, in the early Middle Ages, he could not leave it to find his livelihood elsewhere. There were all varieties of relationships between the lord and the peasant, who might be anything from serf to free landowner. Where the soil was not fit for tillage, in mountainous areas, or in regions that required special treatment for other physiographic or climatic reasons, the manorial system did not exist, men did not always live in villages, and land tenure and agriculture were adapted to whatever circumstances made necessary.

MEDIEVAL AGRICULTURE


By whatever system agriculture was carried on, sustenance was the chief objective, and there was little incentive to the production of a surplus. The manor attempted to be as nearly self-sufficient as possible, and many of its inhabitants lived and died without having been ten miles beyond its boundaries. Methods were crude, implements were simple and there seemed little progress from one generation to another.¹ Even at its nadir, however, there must always have been some stirring of energy that, given incentive, vision, and imagination, could start the upward thrust of agriculture. Everything could not be produced on the manor, salt and iron, for instance, had to be carried long distances; the church as well as the overlord must be provided for; such cities as there were must be fed; peddlers did tempt the isolated villagers with their goods. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the crusades furnished a tremendous stimulus. Trade grew rapidly, and it was necessary for the agriculturalist to produce a surplus if he wished to purchase the goods now so much desired.² With the

¹ The "three-field system" of agriculture was widely used. A manor was not divided into farms, but wastelands, pasture, and woodlands were held in common while arable land was divided into three fields. Ridges of unplowed turf usually separated the fields into long narrow strips. Each peasant had exclusive right to some of these strips, usually enough to make a holding of thirty acres.

One field of the three was always left fallow while the others were cultivated, one usually sown to a winter crop, wheat or rye, the other to beans, oats, and so on. By this crude rotation some fertility was assured but the return was small. Farm implements were crude, farm animals, herded together, were undersized and poor both for draught and for food. Peasants' homes were mere huts, and their diet was limited and frugal. Plagues and famines kept population down. In the summer and in years of plenty life was easier. See Fileen Power, *Medieval People*, for an interesting sketch of the life of Bodo, a Carolingian peasant.

² "The organization of production for market as well as for sustenance reached its highest level on some church and monastic estates . . . A recent study of Crowland Abbey has shown that those in charge of its lands possessed well-developed ideas on farm management. The abbey itself stood on an island of fairly dry ground in the fens of East Anglia. Beyond the fine waterways which surrounded it were several manors, some of them in grazing lowlands and some in the drier wheatlands which lay to the west. Each was part of a group and none tried to be self-sufficing; the grain villages grew a surplus to feed the graziers and the abbey, livestock went from place to place wherever the grass was best, and all the manors sent produce to feed the abbey and provide a surplus for sale. From 7,000 to 10,000 bushels of wheat came to the central granary each year, along with 5,000 to 6,000 bushels of malt for the monks' ale, and much oats, beans, and peas to feed man, pig or poultry . . . On its big central farm it [the abbey] had . . . over 2,000 sheep, from this farm and the manors the abbot sold over 9,000 fleeces in 1309-10 to Italian, Flemish and German merchants."—Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe* (Harper & Brothers), p. 122.

production of a surplus and the increased use of money, serfdom began to disappear in Western Europe, for it was of benefit to both lord and tenant to have the relationship put upon a money basis. By 1500



From Allsopp, *Introduction to English Industrial History*, Macmillan and G. Bell and Sons.

PLAN OF A MANORIAL VILLAGE SHOWING THE STRIP-FIELD SYSTEM

there were few serfs in England, and from that time on there was a gradual extinction of serfdom in the rest of Europe. Nevertheless it was not until the later nineteenth century that the process was completed, while even today there are many survivals of medieval agricultural tenures and methods. As in the political survey, it should be noted that the progress has been from Northwestern Europe eastward and southward and that there were, and are, great variations in that progress.

The well-cultivated soil and heavy population of the Lowlands soon led to commercial agriculture, and the experience of that region in draining swamps, rescuing soil from the sea, and developing a scientific and more productive agriculture was watched and copied elsewhere. The church, kings, and nobility, as the years went on, encouraged the improvement of methods. Regions especially fitted for pasturage began extensive production of sheep for wool. The growth of towns increased the demand for meat and stimulated the production of livestock. One demand created another in a never-ending process. Before 1500 mining, the exploitation of forests, and the utilization of all natural resources were receiving attention of governments as well as of enterprising citizens, and, although European agriculture was still to a great extent on a subsistence level, there had been tremendous progress in the recent years. This change, sometimes rather erroneously called an "agricultural revolution," did not occur without hardship to many of the agrarian population. The later fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries were years of considerable difficulty. There was a gradual decrease in the amount of communal land, such as pasturage, meadow, and woodland privileges. Commercial agriculture and especially the growth of the woolen industry³ led the landowner to seek ways to extinguish the claims of the villagers upon the resources of his estates. Enclosure by the overlords of common lands formerly used by the peasants was a measure in frequent use in Tudor England and led to the creation of a "new poor" whose vicissitudes form another part of the survey of Europe in 1500. The inflation due to the greatly increased production and importation of precious metals from the New World resulted in a tremendous rise in prices which made all landowners endeavor to obtain the maximum from their estates, and the increasing wealth of the middle class put the old nobility, whose income was more or less fixed, in a defensive position where it made many efforts to increase its income. In the later Middle Ages the frontier of European arable land had nearly been reached.⁴ Only more intensive cultivation, new methods and crops, or extensive drainage and clearance projects would ease the agrarian unrest and provide more arable land. Such projects, moreover, would at first, at least,

³ Sheep raising required the use of large acreage. Few men were needed to care for the sheep. The enclosure of common lands, therefore, reduced the land of the peasants and increased unemployment.

⁴ For accounts of pushing of European agricultural frontier eastwards by colonizing arable land of Prussia, Poland, and other eastern areas, see Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, p. 129.

redound to the advantage of the landowner and not to the landless agricultural laborer or the peasant-serf on his estates. The almost unbelievable willingness of countless peasants to migrate to the New World after 1600 is an evidence of the lack of hope in their outlook at home.

URBAN LIFE IN THE MIDDLE AGES

The transition from medieval to modern times was fraught with difficulties for the bulk of the agrarian population, and had equally significant consequences for the remainder of the population. Urban life, so characteristic of old Roman days, had never completely died out in Europe. Many towns survived through all the years of invasion and chaos, but the invaders were not urban folk and town life declined; some towns were destroyed, others deserted, all suffered. As the invaders settled down, new states were formed and a new culture developed. Trade increased again after (about) the year 1000, old towns came back to life, and new ones grew up. The crusades were a great stimulus to this trade; industry and agriculture endeavored to provide goods for exchange in that trade; and the economic horizon of European folk widened. Ambitious kings, in conflict with their great vassals, early realized the advantages that might accrue to them from the development of trade and the support of the new middle class, consequently they granted charters to towns which provided self-government, protected trade, subsidized new industries, and occasionally even created new towns with especial privileges and advantages.

The seat of a bishopric, the court of a king, a good harbor, the juncture of two trade routes, or an advantageous position in the center of a rich agricultural district might cause a village to grow into an important commercial town. In the period of rapid advance after the twelfth century these towns were not large. Of the four or five which had 100,000 inhabitants by 1400, Paris alone lay outside Italy. Perhaps half a dozen more held about 50,000; to this group belonged London and one town in Germany and one in Spain. There were many more under 25,000 in population, the size of many of the towns of the Lowlands, the Hanseatic League, and the trade centers of England and Central Europe.⁵

⁵ "In spite of their lack of stature, these towns exerted great influence on the character of European life. They whittled away some of the isolation and self-sufficiency of the countryside. They developed division of labor and manual skill such as would otherwise be impossible outside the workshops of great courts and abbeys,

MEDIEVAL TRADE

Trade was at first the townsman's chief concern, and the expansion of markets was the most spectacular phase of the economic development of the later Middle Ages. Trade in agricultural products and articles of local origin could be cared for in local markets usually held weekly, although large towns had almost continuous markets. There was, besides, much private trade. Trade with the outside world made more elaborate organization necessary. Fairs were held in the larger towns, usually under the auspices of king or great noble. Middlemen bought up local produce and offered it for sale to other traders who brought goods from greater distances. Certain specially favored towns held annual fairs which were the scene of interregional commerce to which goods were brought from every part of Europe and where the luxuries of the Orient were offered for sale.

Northern Italy was the first great center of medieval trade; the Low Countries were also a thriving trade region; central France and England and a group of North German towns, bound together in the Hanseatic League,⁶ soon followed. Interregional trade was well under way in the thirteenth century, and by 1300 the expansion of market centers "found every country well equipped for exchange, large or small, wholesale or retail, local and long distance."

The commodities carried in this interregional trade were infinite in variety. Northern Europe exported lumber, fish, salt, furs, cloth, and some grain; Germany and France added wines and beer, various minerals, and other commodities; England's great contributions were

and offered employment to the free artisan as distinct from the slave or serf who occupied these workshops. They transmitted from the Saracen world some of the technical knowledge and ingenuity of the Levant, and added to it. They accumulated supplies of capital, and devised methods of marketing, transport, and finance. They forged bonds of far-reaching interdependence, as when English wool was made into Flemish cloth, sold in a French fair, dyed in Florence with colors from Bagdad and alum from Asia Minor, and sold to a consumer in Cairo. They brought into being a new social class—the bourgeoisie—to rival in wealth and challenge in political power the landed aristocracy and church. They made distinctions of wealth and poverty rest less on real estate, and gave to the individual opportunities for personal advancement which were rare on the countryside. They provided new aspects of the class struggle in the clash of merchant with producer, of master with man"—Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe* (Harper & Brothers), pp. 132-33.

⁶ An excellent account of the Hanseatic League may be found in Chapter V of the *Economic and Social History of Europe in the Later Middle Ages (1300-1530)* by James Westfall Thompson. See also Henri Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, Chap. IV.

wool and woolen cloth in various stages of manufacture. The high Spanish plateaus were sheep-grazing areas, too, and Spain exported wool as well as horses, leather goods, minerals, and semitropical products. Through the Mediterranean region came Asiatic goods in vast quantities; some were necessities, but many were luxuries. But that which is a luxury to one generation becomes a necessity to the next, and European demand for goods introduced after the crusades grew with great rapidity. All important trading centers saw the transfer of such goods, and the Italian cities reaped immense profits as the ports of entry. Jewels, drugs, silks, and other fine fabrics, as well as many other imports of small bulk and great value, came into Europe from the East, but the spice trade was of paramount importance and gave its name to the whole Eastern trade. The amount of spices imported in the later Middle Ages and the early modern period is almost unbelievable, and the cargo lists of ships of the period show startling variety and value for such articles.⁷ Inferior methods of agriculture, lack of properly bred livestock, ignorance of the value of refrigeration, together with the lack of transport of perishable food and the limited use of vegetables and fruits resulted in a diet composed largely of poor grades of meat, the monotony of which was mitigated by the extensive use of spiced sauces and condiments. A medieval cookbook would be a Chinese puzzle in a modern kitchen because many of the spices listed would not be found on its shelves or in the near-by shops.

Regional and interregional trade made necessary the improvement of roads and the removal of obstructions to trade. Kings provided protection from highway robbers; through the regulation of business transactions at fairs a commercial code developed to be administered at first in special courts⁸ and later in the courts of the national governments. Merchants in the various towns bound themselves together for mutual protection and advantage in guilds which were usually the agencies to win and administer town charters. The necessities of trade led to the creation of credit systems and the establishment of

⁷ The question of trade is treated more fully in Chapter III in connection with European expansion. Interesting details on the spice trade may be found in E. P. Cheyney, *European Background of American History*, Chaps. I and II, and in Heaton, pp. 236 ff.

⁸ These courts show their origin in their names. In England they were called "Pie Powder" courts, in France "Pieds poudrés," i.e., dusty feet. Merchants, presumably with dusty feet, came to them, and with a minimum of red tape, disputes were hastily settled and judgment was given.

banking houses. Promises to pay, letters of credit, bills of exchange, and the techniques of modern bookkeeping and business transactions were in existence in some form, at least, by 1500. Naturally enough, the first great banking houses dealing in interregional trade were in Italy, and the first bankers were merchants as well.⁹ Fortunes made in trade were augmented by dealing in money and credits, especially when clients might number kings and popes. Where great profits could be made great risks were encountered; often the failure of a royal enterprise meant the collapse of the banking house as well. The Medici family of Florence, the Fuggers of Augsburg, Jaques Coeur (1395-1456) of France were merchant bankers, financial advisers to those in high places, and men of political as well as economic power in a world rapidly becoming modern.¹⁰

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

This development in commercial opportunity and organization was matched by equally important changes in industry and manufacture. The comparative self-sufficiency of the small medieval units—manor, village, and town—was lessened. The products of industry furnished the goods for exchange and production for profit was the logical result. As trade grew in the period of the crusades, industry organized into voluntary groups or guilds for mutual protection and to further mutual advantage. Makers of each commodity tended to live near together and profited by close association in obtaining raw materials, maintaining certain standards of production, and marketing their finished products. There were guilds of all sorts, weavers, gold- and silversmiths, fishmongers, furriers, hat makers, cobblers, and hosts of others. Including apprentices, journeymen workers, and master workmen, they represented both capital and labor. With industrial establishments very small and machines of little significance, in-

⁹ In London the street where the Italian merchants and bankers had their places of business was called Lombard Street. The *florent* or *florin* of Florence, the *byzant* of Byzantium, and the *ducat* of Venetian origin were coins in common use. The lack of a uniform money system and of a uniform standard for weights and measures were great detriments to commerce. Louis XI of France in 1483 summoned a delegation of merchants in order to devise such a system, but the attempt was unsuccessful. "Louis XI's design slumbered until 1789." See Thompson, p. 494.

¹⁰ Chap. XVIII in Thompson is entitled "Banking during the Renaissance" and gives a good account of the Medici and Fugger families and of the career of Jaques Coeur.

dustry was practically upon a household basis. Guild organization endeavored to provide an orderly and stable industrial society.¹¹

In practice there were great variations, and the period of stability was brief. Before 1500 many industries had outgrown the old guild restrictions; in others diversification had complicated controls; and in still other cases new industries had grown up outside the guild system. English and Spanish wools were manufactured in the Netherlands and in Italy as well as at home, and sometimes only one part of the complicated process of manufacture might be completed in each area. The silk-making industry was highly specialized and practically outside old controls. In the instability of the fifteenth century guilds began to die out in Western Europe, although it was not until the eighteenth or nineteenth that they disappeared.

THE GROWTH OF MANUFACTURING

The increase of wealth and the expansion of production to meet the needs of expanding markets consolidated power over industry in the more wealthy groups. Rich merchants and bankers found it both necessary and advantageous to share their control of town government with the masters of industry, and together they closed their ranks and united against the demands of labor. Workingmen found it necessary to live in industrial centers in crowded districts resembling nineteenth-century slums. It became harder to advance from apprentice to journeyman, and a greater capital was necessary for admission to the rank of master. Journeymen became, therefore, laborers without much hope of advancement and were subject to the same vicissitudes of employment and unemployment that beset the modern workingman.¹² This growing proletariat, in the textile trade and in mining

¹¹ In the absence of machinery the term "manufacture" has its original meaning, "to make by hand."

¹² The clothmakers had one of the most important guilds of Florence in the *arte della lana*. "In the middle of the fourteenth century the *arte della lana* embraced almost a quarter of the town's total population, or about thirty thousand men. Of these only about two hundred were masters and extremely wealthy. They rigidly controlled twenty-five lesser trades. They appointed *consoli*, or overseers, who directed the work. The word of a worker counted for nothing when contradicted by the wealthy *padroni*, or masters. Severe fines and penalties were inflicted; offenders were whipped to death. Wages were withheld, sometimes for years. The least insubordination was punished severely, often by hanging. The unfortunate proletarian members of the towns thus lived under a reign of terror."—Henry S. Lucas, *The Renaissance and the Reformation* (Harper & Brothers), p. 16.

especially, formed its own associations and used such modern means as strikes, riots, and threat of revolution to make their desperate situation easier. They were propertyless, voteless, and without redress except through their own efforts. Neither government nor vested wealth considered their plight unless forced to do so.¹³ The urban proletariat, as well as the dispossessed farmers, was ready to migrate in the age of discovery and colonization.

A large part of this industrial advance was in handicraft occupations and entailed the use of greater capital, larger establishments, and more specialization, but continued to use the traditional simple tools and methods. The application of machinery to industry on a large scale was to await a much later "Industrial Revolution." By 1500, however, some industries were using most complicated equipment. Cranes, hoisting apparatus, wood-turning, wire-drawing, hole-boring are all mentioned in medieval documents. Pumps of various varieties, the ratchet wheel, and different sorts of gears were all known. The windmill, watermill, sawmill, and the application of water power were understood and used whenever possible. Textile machines of a sort were used in the manufacture of silk and in the knitting of stockings by 1600. Great advances were made in mining and metallurgy so that silver mines long abandoned could again be worked by the use of shafts. Pumps were developed to rid deep mines of water, and quicksilver was employed to extract the precious metal from the powdered ore. The increased production of European silver in the fifteenth century had started the inflation and rise in prices that were to be so startling and revolutionary after 1500.

In this period, also, there arose a new system or method in the organization of some industries, especially in the textile industry, which was to continue into the nineteenth century. It is called the "putting out" or "domestic" system and was organized by some entrepreneur,¹⁴ usually a merchant who wished to be sure of getting the quantity and quality of goods he needed for his trade, who was to be of increasing importance in more modern times. The entrepreneur bought the raw material, usually wool, carried or sent it to the skilled workers living in towns, villages, and country districts, and

¹³ There were "progressive" students of society in the sixteenth century who gave considerable attention to the problems of the poor. Sir Thomas More put his idealistic theories into the *Utopia*; others were more practical. Poor laws were passed, and governments endeavored to solve the problem of relief.

¹⁴ The entrepreneur was the "undertaker"—the man who undertook to get the goods made.

they, in their own homes, completed their share of the manufacturing process and took or sent the material back to its owner. Thus spinning might be done in one area, by one group of workers usually women (spinsters) and children, weaving in another, and the various finishing processes in still others. The workers living in country or village sometimes had their own farms or garden plots, would accept low wages for such piecework, could not organize, and were as much at the mercy of the entrepreneur and the fluctuation of employment as were their urban fellow workers. In industry as in commerce, the beginning of the sixteenth century, by an agglomeration of changes, marked the transition to a new, or modern, era.

THE EFFECT OF THE RISE OF CAPITALISM

As a matter of fact, much of this economic development was quite outside, or beyond, the medieval conception of society and political structure, and disjointed or outmoded much that was characteristic of medieval civilization. The king was no longer a great (in theory, the greatest) feudal lord, the apex of the feudal pyramid based upon a mass of agrarian peasantry and working upward to royal power through successive layers of noble warrior castes. The merchants, bankers, and manufacturers formed a new class outside that medieval organization, and its alliance with royal power threw the whole system out of balance. Money economy released the government from feudal control, and bourgeois aid in wealth and brains further reduced the importance of the nobles. Feudalism in 1500 was for a large part of Europe an anachronism, and its vestiges were destined to be brushed aside as the years went on; a valuable contribution to order in an age of disintegration and chaos, it was no longer needed in either of its main functions—government or land tenure. The distinctive economic aspect of the new age was to be the beginning of modern capitalism.¹⁵ The organization of the chief factors of production—land, labor, and capital—by entrepreneurs for purposes of creating profits was outside the scope of medieval economy.

Rising capitalism and the new middle class also attacked the other

¹⁵ Capitalism has been defined "as the organization of business upon a large scale by an employer or company of employers possessing an accumulated stock of wealth wherewith to acquire raw materials and tools, and hire labor, so as to produce an increased quantity of wealth which shall constitute profit." J. A. Hobson, *Evolution of Modern Capitalism* (Charles Scribner's Sons), 1926 edition, p. 1

great institution of the medieval period—the church, Roman, Catholic, and universal. Production for profit, the spirit of gain, and money economy in general were foreign to the teaching of the church, which expressed horror at taking advantage of human needs, frowned upon interest rates and usury, and believed in a “just price.”¹⁶ Business organization grew up in opposition to religious teaching and lived in harmony with it only by compromising or subordinating the issue. “Business is business” was as satisfactory a solution of the conflict then as today, and fifteenth-century businessmen could, like their modern counterparts, differentiate between Sundays and weekdays without too great qualms of conscience. The church, too, in a world of new standards and money economy sought larger revenues and became, in its way, a great financial institution with affiliations with the new order. Its revenues, its taxation, and its vast wealth and resources became major interests of the church, and its steadily increasing worldliness weakened its hold over the souls and lives of men. Anticlericalism became apparent in the attitude of governments and citizens toward church courts, church control over education, taxation of church property, and toward the taxes and fees exacted by the clergy. The modern era opens with the Protestant Reformation or Revolt as well as with the Renaissance and the discovery of the New World.

This secularization of society was shown also in the tastes of the *parvenu* wealthy classes. Chivalry decayed, and the arts were put to the uses of man rather than God. Town halls, houses, and country homes, rather than churches and castles, attracted the architects. Landscape and portrait painting won artists the patronage of merchant princes as well as of sovereigns. Many observers noted a decline in the old virtues of feudal days, and manners of a less formal and a cruder nature were apparent, although condemned by the books on

¹⁶ The church held that usury was wicked but was forced to admit certain exceptions. The church itself borrowed vast sums of money in the later Middle Ages and could scarcely condemn the taking of interest. Interest-taking was justified on the basis of risk, and in case the lender gave up possible gains in making the loan. However, the church regarded capital as essentially unproductive and did frown on interest. That interest-taking was allowed in some cases was a compromise, not the first or the last in the history of the church. Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274) held that trade was essentially undesirable but that it might be tolerated if a “just price” contented the trader, i.e., one which covered outlay for material and payment for labor. Gradually business outgrew and generally disregarded such criticism. A fourteenth-century Italian said, “He who takes usury goes to hell; he who does not, goes to the work house.”

etiquette which grew in popularity as the bourgeoisie endeavored to acquire the polish of an aristocracy.

This survey of economic and social conditions in 1500 cannot be concluded without emphasizing the fact that conditions varied in the different parts of Europe and even in different sections of each country. Northern Italy and Western Europe from Rhineland to England were the most economically and culturally progressive areas. Russia, for instance, was to remain in a medieval state well into modern times. The unevenness and diversity of European civilization increase its interesting nature and illustrate quite vividly the fact that continuity and constant change are two of the laws of history.

THE MEDIEVAL CHURCH

The rise of capitalism and the beginnings of urbanization thus led to the growth of new institutions. If the later Middle Ages saw a breaking down of feudalism, they also witnessed a marked change in the position of the Roman Catholic Church, which had been the dominant cultural and the sole religious institution of Western Europe in the medieval period. With the end of the Roman Empire in the West, the bishop of Rome came to be a leader of importance not only in the church but in the Western world during the confusion caused by the barbarian invasions. A mutual need bound the church to the rising Carolingian empire, and the founding of that empire saw the pope, or bishop of Rome, the leading clerical figure in Western Europe. In the succeeding centuries that position was consolidated; the church preserved in its organization much of the governmental theories of the Roman Empire, and in its tradition, its archives, and its monastery libraries kept for a future civilization the records of the ancient world.

The church became in many areas the sole source of education, the great charitable and cultural institution of the Middle Ages. Through its Peace of God and Truce of God,¹⁷ it endeavored to alleviate the burden of constant feudal strife, and through the crusades it strove to protect and advance the cause of Christianity against the

¹⁷ The "Peace of God" required the nobles to take an oath not to harm the persons or property of noncombatants. The "Truce of God" forbade private wars during certain seasons—from Friday to Sunday of each week and during Lent. Later the "Truce" was extended to include the harvest season. Neither device was very successful.

infidel. Its hold upon its members was increased by the universality of its acceptance, by its doctrines, and by the sacraments which kept the Christian in close touch with the church from the cradle to the grave.¹⁸ The power of the priest was enhanced also by the fact that he was a part of a hierarchy of vast extent, great power, and effective centralization. The parish priest was subject to the control of his bishop and under canon law administered by the church. Bishops were subject to their archbishops; the pope, elected by the college of cardinals, was the head of the whole intricate system. This hierarchy from priest to papacy constituted the *secular* clergy (those in contact with worldly affairs). The *regular* clergy (those who lived by monastic rule) were under a parallel system leading up to the pope in the same fashion. Through the weapons of excommunication, interdict, and the Inquisition, the church endeavored to hold the powers it had acquired, and in its great wealth it found additional means toward that end. In the Middle Ages no other institution could exhibit so much power, provided a strong pope controlled the papal see.

With the growth of feudalism the church, too, had become a feudal institution, for the church owned vast estates. Churchmen as well as laymen were faced with the problems of land tenure, government, and protection. Bishops and abbots were tenants, vassals, and overlords, and some of the more doughty of them were willing to answer in person the call to military service. As nation-states grew kings endeavored to win the aid of churchmen against rebellious nobles, and at the same time found it to their advantage to limit the independence of the church within their realms. The long struggle between the popes and the Holy Roman Empire brought out all the inherent difficulties and antagonisms in the relations of ruler and pope. The dualism of the church in the feudal world, where the clergy owed obedience to both pope and king, was apparent from the eleventh century on. The problem was solved in most countries by compromise; it was decided in Germany in 1122 that king might nominate and pope invest in case of election to church offices, each side thus holding a check upon the other. France, England, and even Spain faced the problem of papal interference with victory going at

¹⁸ The sacraments of the church were baptism, confirmation, marriage, extreme unction, ordination, penance, and the Mass. Under ordinary circumstances the sacraments could be performed only by the priests (confirmation and ordination required a bishop); with the exception of ordination, they touched every individual at each crisis of his life. The Mass, or Holy Communion, or Eucharist, was the culmination of the church service and the heart of religious doctrine.

times to king and at times to pope; in general some compromise was reached. A French quarrel with the papacy led in the fourteenth century to the Babylonian captivity of the papacy (1307-1377) and many years of papal residence in France. That episode greatly weakened the international prestige of the church, and made it easier for other nations to dispute papal pretensions. England, for instance, by a series of laws endeavored to bring under governmental control the election of church officials for England, the transfer of cases from English church courts to Rome, and the shipment of money from England for the use of the papacy. This residence of the church in France was followed by the Schism, a period in which disputed elections resulted in a rivalry of two or more popes. Naturally, the Schism (1378-1417) caused a further weakening of the position of the church. Both clerical and lay authorities united in efforts to heal the Schism and to reform the church, which in the Captivity had become more concerned with luxury and the maintenance of its wealth and its income, with papal politics and Italian affairs, than with matters of religious importance.

Through the fifteenth century, therefore, there was a series of great church councils, representative of clergy and, to some extent, of the lay authorities of all Christendom. It seemed for a time as though the church was to be democratized and the position of the papacy subordinated to that of an international representative body, but when the Schism was healed, only one pope, his prestige somewhat damaged by the internecine war, governed, and again from Rome. The restored papacy fought vigorously against any diminution of papal power and blocked reforms that might have removed the very real evils within the church and stilled complaints that were to increase in volume and bitterness as the sixteenth century opened.

The councils also struggled with the problem of heresies and with only moderate success. Ever since the establishment of the church, heresies had occasionally appeared as evidence of men's newer vision of religious belief, or of their protest against evils into which they felt the church had fallen. A church is a living organism and subject to the constant change of all institutions. At times those who desired change of doctrine or practices were absorbed into the church, new religious orders were created, and compromises were reached; at times the church rose in its majesty and, aided by lay authority, crushed the heresy and the heretics. In the fifteenth century only partial success

was achieved by the councils in their war upon the Hussite movement, and in almost every country of Europe there were indications of religious unrest and dissatisfaction with the existing order. The tendencies of the time were against submission to papal authority and the unity of Christendom.

MEDIEVAL CULTURE

The same stimuli that had altered the political, economic, social, and religious life of Europe in the later Middle Ages were operating with equal force upon the cultural phases of European civilization. No phase of life remained unchanged. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries produced a cultural revival that has been called a "Renaissance." Travel, widened horizons, new experiences, and new wants all stimulated intellectual curiosity and developed interest in a larger world. Great cathedrals were built by the loving labors of the faithful and adorned with characteristically medieval works of painting and sculpture. New schools (universities) of law, medicine, and theology were established, the wandering scholar sang his songs, and a vernacular literature grew up to rival the universal Latin in popularity.¹⁹ In the field of science, it seemed for a time as though scientific discoveries would bring modern achievements ahead of their time.²⁰ But the universities became conservative and "stubbornly resisted the efforts of those who advocated progressive ideas." Scholasticism, clerical control, and disputation sapped creative genius, and what scientific discoveries were made occurred outside the schools. In general the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries saw a decline in interest in the formal

¹⁹ Carl Stephenson, *Medieval History*, Chap. XVIII, and Loren C. MacKinney, *Medieval History*, Chap. XXXII, give adequate accounts of medieval universities and university life. See Helen Waddell, *The Wandering Scholar*, for a fascinating account of the medieval student who wandered from one university to another, and the same author, *Medieval Latin Lyrics*, for beautiful translations of poetry written in the days when Latin was the common language of culture.

²⁰ Roger Bacon (d. about 1300) was a great scholar of the Middle Ages with a scientific imagination if little actual scientific discovery to his credit. In speaking of research he said, "One man I know, and one only, who can be praised for his achievements in this science. Of discourses and battles of words he takes no heed; he follows works of wisdom, and in these finds rest . . . he is a master of experiment. Through experiment he gains knowledge of natural beings . . . he has looked closely into the doings of those who work metals and minerals of all kinds. . . ."—J. H. Bridges, *Life and Work of Roger Bacon* (Williams and Norgate, London), p. 21. Bacon himself predicted the invention of steamboats, automobiles, and airplanes and

institutions of learning. They shared in the effects of the anticlericalism of the rising bourgeoisie.

It is quite natural, probably inevitable, that the phenomenal outburst of diversified genius which we call, for lack of a better term, the Renaissance, should have occurred first in fifteenth-century Italy. There were the thriving energetic city-states with their stimulating and provocative urban life; there the endless contacts with an ever-broadening outer world; there the emancipation from old restraints and a new secularization of society; and there the accumulations of capital which made possible an ambitious and highly intelligent middle class, ready not only to be patrons of arts and letters but to participate in their production and to appreciate their creators. This new culture was essentially the culture of the bourgeoisie, and it was expressed in the needs and experiences of the life of the individual and in an increasingly secular society. Every cultural activity was affected by the genius of the period—literature, classical and vernacular, prose and poetry; historical criticism and historical writing; theories of education and government; scientific knowledge and discovery; and the fine arts, architecture, painting, and sculpture. In all these fields advances were made; everywhere intellectual curiosity was apparent, and a new, or modern, critical spirit made itself felt.

The literature of the Middle Ages had borne the stamp of the ideas and problems then current. Romances of chivalry were popular not only with the knightly class but with townsmen as well. History was largely a mere chronicle of events until the fifteenth century, when Philippe de Commynes wrote of the contemporary scene with accuracy and objectiveness. Sermons, hymns, allegories, and the lives of saints bespoke the hold of the church over medieval civilization, and religious themes dominated the drama in the form of miracle and mystery plays. The work of an Italian poet, Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) marks the summit of medieval literature and the beginning of a new era. He was a Florentine of noble birth who spent much of his life in exile, a political refugee. He wrote prose and poetry both in Italian and in Latin. *The Divine Comedy* was his greatest work, and "is in reality a mirror of the Middle Ages." It was to have tremendous effect upon the humanists of the next century and to remain for all time a masterpiece of Italian literature. In England, Geoffrey Chaucer, and in France, François Villon, wrote poetry in the vernacular, interpreting the age in which they lived. Free from restraint, unhampered by old

limitations of tradition and religion, they were the expression of the new bourgeois civilization.

HUMANISM AND THE LITERARY RENAISSANCE

With the fifteenth century came the development of humanism which was at the same time a revolt against medievalism in thought and literature and a rebirth of interest in the classics and in classical civilization. Through humanism the new middle-class civilization came into its own, and the transition to modern literary forms and ideas occurred. This revolt was in many ways unjust to the Middle Ages and to the church, but its condemnation of the past was to color all judgment of that past until the nineteenth century. The term "humanism" means the revival of interest in the classical civilization of ancient Greece and Rome and the belief that it was the greatest the world had ever known. The term was applied because of the feeling that this study of the classics showed the value of the human, the natural, or sensual elements of life, and disregarded the medieval concepts of the ascetic, the supernatural, and the theological. The humanist stressed the rights and the worth of the individual and cast off any control of religious or moral authority. Experience, the gratification of desire, and an enjoyment of life in all aspects were substituted for older ideas of self-discipline and submission to clerical authority. The "humanities" were the tools of such a new point of view and in the educational field came to mean the study of Greek and of Latin and of secular or "profane" history.

Francesco Petrarch (1304-1374), the first of a long line of Italian humanists, makes the connection between Dante and modern literature. He, too, wrote in both Latin and Italian. His vernacular writing was as important as his contributions to humanism. His sonnets to Laura were something entirely new in literature and represent his beloved as a woman of flesh and blood and not a chivalric ideal. He wrote of nature with an acute sensitiveness, and was more concerned with the affairs of the world about him than with speculation as to a future world. He was a patriot interested in the history of Italy and, led by that interest into a study of the classics, became a collector of old manuscripts and a writer on classical subjects.²¹

²¹ "Petrarch was one of the world's most interesting men. Much of what he did or sought to do, was significant for the history of culture. A rebel against convention and outgrown conceptions, he hated the practicality of medieval education

Giovanni Boccaccio (1313-1375) was the third of the Italian authors usually listed as opening the era of humanism. His fame is based upon romances and poems and especially upon the *Decameron*, a collection of tales supposed to have been told by a group of young Florentines who had fled from the Black Death to a villa near Florence and thus occupied their time in exile. The tales were frankly secular, urban, and sometimes vulgar, irreverent, sarcastic, and sharply critical of both past and present.

After Boccaccio the number of humanists and men of letters was legion. Humanism became the order of the day; wealthy bourgeoisie and ruling families became the patrons of the humanists and established schools where the "humanities" were taught, for the older universities were slow to adopt new ideas. The Medici family in Florence and certain of the popes, undeterred by the open anticlericalism of the humanists, became patrons of the "new learning," and were often classical scholars of note themselves. Vast sums were expended in collecting and copying manuscripts and in building up libraries. The movement swept north of the Alps, and the humanists of Germany, France, the Netherlands, and England became in the sixteenth century the great scholars of Europe. This group, to a greater degree than did the humanists of Italy, directed their attention toward the ills of the church and toward religious and social reform. We shall meet Reuchlin, Erasmus, and Sir Thomas More in another connection; it is necessary here to do no more than to link them with the southern humanists.

Modern education received form and substance from the work of the humanists. Vittorino da Feltre (d. 1446) was invited by the duke to come to Mantua where he opened a new school at the court. Secular learning was emphasized; Greek, Latin, and Italian literature, together with mathematics, music, and drawing, were taught; physical training received attention; and girls as well as boys were admitted as pupils. Nor was the school closed to children from the lower ranks of society; ability and effort were recognized regardless of sex or social status.

which neglected the cultivation of the intellect through the study of classical letters. Disgusted with the uncouth Latin style of his day, he hated the study of Roman law because it was treated in crude Latin and ministered little to the intellect. Above all he loathed the medicine and astrology of the day because it was dominated by quackery and dead tradition. His lyrical soul abominated all these banal and un-intellectual things. He sought a fuller artistic life, a loftier culture."—H. S. Lucas, *The Renaissance and the Reformation* (Harper & Brothers), p. 205.

Vittorino was probably the most effective teacher of modern times. He exercised unusual influence upon his pupils and shaped their moral and intellectual life to a surprising degree. Many of the finest characters of the age came from his school, and some of the ablest scholars of the Renaissance were trained by him.²²

The secular nature of humanism soon became more than mere anticlericalism. Many of the Italian humanists reverted to the paganism of the classical world in which their studies lay and gave up even a halfhearted allegiance to the Christian church. Those without firm enough convictions to cause them to repudiate the church mixed Christian and pagan concepts in their writings with utter disregard for Catholic dogma. The attitude of scientific criticism is shown nowhere more clearly than in the work of Lorenzo Valla (1406-1457) who, in his *Treatise on the Donation of Constantine*, used modern methods of historical research to show that the document upon which the church based its claims to extensive temporal power was a forgery. It is an interesting commentary upon the age that a critic and agnostic such as Valla should have been offered, and accepted, the position of papal secretary under one pope, and should have received a commission from another to make translations of the classics for the papal library.

THE ARTISTS OF THE RENAISSANCE

The artists of the Renaissance period as well as the scholars were influenced by the revival of interest in classical civilization. The Gothic architecture of the Middle Ages gave way to Renaissance Romanesque, and the discovery of old manuscripts was matched by a search for works of art of the classic period. Much excavation was carried on, and both Italy and Greece gave rich yield in masterpieces of antiquity. The intense interest in human life and in secular activities was mirrored in art as well. The versatile artists of the Renaissance studied anatomy, found new artistic mediums, and invented new tools. The formalism and unnatural character of medieval art vanished, and, whether the subject was secular or religious, the result was a representation of life. The Madonna and the Holy Child of the Renaissance were real mother and child. Portrait painting indicated that the wealthy bourgeoisie and the nobility were as much interested in the beautification of their own homes as in the splendor of the churches.

²² H. S. Lucas, *The Renaissance and the Reformation* (Harper & Brothers), pp. 253-56.

Versatility was one of the outstanding characteristics of the artists of the period. Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), one of the most interesting of the men of the Renaissance, was painter, sculptor, architect, scientist, and engineer. He was an author and teacher of note and a great popularizer of all his many interests. His greatest paintings—the “Mona Lisa” and “The Last Supper”—are too well known to need more than mention. Michelangelo (1475-1564), another Florentine, was probably the most wonderful and most prolific of all the great ones of the era. He, too, excelled in painting, sculpture, and architecture, and aided in beautifying both Florence and Rome. Employed by the Medici family and by successive popes, he spent a long life creating works that have made his name endure for all time. It is impossible here to enumerate the many other Italian artists, or trace the spread of the movement into the rest of Europe in order to witness the universality of artistic achievement in other countries. By the end of the sixteenth century literary and artistic fruition had reached all the areas touched by that wave of economic expansion which linked medieval and modern times. The French invasion of Italy at the end of the fifteenth century and the rivalries of France and Spain fought out on Italian soil contributed to the decline of Italian civilization. Anticlericalism and the growth of nationalism, both rooted in the new capitalism, culminated in the Reformation, and the animosities thus engendered often resulted in a new intolerance and formalism stultifying to the creative arts.

THE SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT

The free spirit of the period found expression in scientific and geographical discoveries as well. In these fields there have been constant interest and achievement down to the present time. The invention or discovery of the printing press made possible a hitherto unbelievable extension and democratization of knowledge. Dictionaries, grammars, encyclopedias, herbals, and other books of science spread the new learning and made possible further achievements. Astronomy, physics, and mathematics developed together as closely related sciences. Copernicus, a Polish priest, wrote *On the Revolutions of the Celestial Bodies*, published in the year of his death (1543). He submitted with mathematical proof the thesis that the earth is not the center of the universe but simply one of the planets revolving around the sun. He thus refuted the older Ptolemaic system and involved astronomers

in endless controversy with a church reluctant to accept the new and lesser place accorded to the earth in the solar system. At the end of the sixteenth century, Galileo lectured on astronomy, optics, mechanics, and mathematics and popularized all those fields in the face of ecclesiastical opposition. Medicine, botany, zoology, metallurgy, and other sciences received attention, and advances were made which carried them over into the modern period of scientific achievement. The telescope and the microscope made it possible to prove many theories and gave a new importance and validity to experimentation as a part of scientific method.²³ It is no coincidence that the invention of instruments of navigation, new scientific methods of cartography, and wider dissemination of scientific and geographic information should have aided the economic urge to discover new trade routes and vast new lands outside Europe. The modern age was to be one of expansion, colonization, and exploitation, and the repercussions of these movements upon European civilization form some of the most interesting trends of modern history.

READINGS

GENERAL ACCOUNTS. The list suggested for Chapter I may be extended by the addition of references on various features of medieval life. E. P. Cheyney's *The Dawn of a New Era, 1250-1453* (1936) is an interesting and very readable account of the transition from the Middle Ages to the modern period.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. N. S. B. Gras's *An Introduction to Economic History* (1922) is scholarly and excellently written. *A History of Agriculture* (1925) by the same author is very useful. Herbert Heaton's *Economic History of Europe* (1936) is the best one-volume work in its field. Henri Pirenne's *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe* (1936) is an excellent survey of the medieval period; *Medieval Cities* (1925) by the same author is valuable. James Westfall Thompson's *Economic and Social History of Europe in the Later Middle Ages, 1300-1530* (1931) is interesting and useful. Summerfield Baldwin's *Business in the Middle Ages* (Berkshire Series, 1937) is brief and very readable.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE. Life in the Middle Ages is interestingly portrayed in W. S. Davis's *Life on a Medieval Barony* (1923) and *Medieval People* (1924) by Eileen Power. There are two delightful books by

²³ Sir Francis Bacon, author and statesman of Elizabethan England, published a book called *Novum Organum*, which is the classic expression of the new type of reasoning.

Helen Waddell that give an insight into medieval cultural life. *Medieval Latin Lyrics* (1933) and *The Wandering Scholar* (1934). R. S. Rait's *Life in the Medieval University* (1912) is interesting. J. H. Randall's *The Making of the Modern Mind* (1926) is illuminating. The influence of the medieval church is shown in the *Organization of Medieval Christianity* (Berkshire Series, 1929) by Summerfield Baldwin. An essay by F. M. Powicke, "The Christian Life," in *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*, edited by C. G. Crump (1926), is very interesting. Material on the Renaissance may be found in the standard texts: E. M. Hulme, *Renaissance and Reformation* (Revised edition, 1917), and H. S. Lucas, *The Renaissance and the Reformation* (1934). Paul van Dyke's *The Age of the Renaissance* (1897) and Edith Sichel's *The Renaissance* (1914) are excellent brief interpretations of a fascinating period. The *Men of the Renaissance* (1933) by R. Roeder gives brief accounts of a number of figures important in the period

III

THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE

FROM the later Middle Ages well into modern times there were an increase and a gradual shift in trade that have been called the Commercial Revolution. The changes in those centuries were not merely changes in the importance and amount of trade but were also changes in kind. Medieval trade was local, then regional, and inter-regional in nature. Merchants from the city-states of Italy developed the Mediterranean trade and gained access to eastern commodities which they resold in an extensive interregional trade. The luxuries imported were in great demand, and the profits were high. Every inducement was present to develop competition and to arouse commercial rivalry. Other regions contested the Italian control of the eastern trade; new types of goods were introduced; traders grew venturesome and developed ocean navigation and ocean routes; distant trading and world markets were the distinctive developments of modern commerce. When the total effect of the period of geographical discovery and of commercial shift is taken into consideration the word "revolution" does not seem out of place, and yet it is a question whether such a term should be used in describing a movement whose origin is lost in the past and whose end has not yet been reached. If it can be considered a revolution in any sense, it is so only when commercial activities, organization, and scope of the year 1200, for instance, are compared with those of the year 1600. (It must be added that there is no special significance in those dates; one might as well use 1400 and 1700.¹) Perhaps the word "evolution" would be a much better one, and yet in using it, one loses the effect of stupendous change. The agglomeration of constant changes over a long period produced an astonishing result. But there was no loss of continuity, no break with the past, and no utterly unforeseen or unpredictable

¹ Laurence Packard, in his *Commercial Revolution 1400-1776*, applies the term to four centuries, choosing the dates arbitrarily to cover the mercantilistic theory he wishes to develop. In brief compass, the book is an extremely useful summary.

occurrence. The growth of interregional trade was slow; the decline of the supremacy of the Mediterranean towns covered a century; and the transfer of commercial power to the North Atlantic states still another.

It is necessary to keep in mind, also, that although Western Europe was, in the early Middle Ages, largely an area of sustenance production and local or regional trade, yet trade on a wider basis never completely died out. Constantinople and the Byzantine Empire kept up wide trade contacts until that empire fell, and the Greek and Armenian traders residing in Constantinople continued domination of its trade under the Turks. The Moslem Arabs were great traders and kept in continuous contact with the East. Moslem Spain was much more Oriental than European in its civilization, and in some respects, in the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, it was many generations ahead of the Christian areas of feudal Northwestern Europe. The Scandinavian invaders had a genius for trade, and the Swedes early made contact with Eastern caravan trade through Russia. Increased interest in economic wants which trade could satisfy, in money economy, in civilization—these were all that Western Europe needed to cause a real trade revival through agencies, routes, and contacts already in existence. As soon as the semianarchy of the feudal world should be reduced to something approaching order, and governments with some claim to the name should begin to function, trade and a middle class would develop, and, at whatever tempo circumstances might dictate, the horizons of man would widen.

THE TRADE WITH THE EAST

The crusades accelerated the speed with which progress was made, although that progress had already begun, and its advance was inevitable. They increased contacts with a world outside the narrow limits of manor or feudal barony and introduced the European to new goods and new desires whose fulfillment necessitated trade. No longer could the local markets satisfy the wants thus stimulated, and regional and interregional trade developed. All of the accompanying economic, social, and political shifts mentioned in the previous chapters were the result.

The East provided the luxuries in great demand in Europe. Asia Minor, Arabia, Persia, India, the Spice Islands, and the Far East were names to conjure with. Jewels, spices, dyestuffs, drugs, silks and velvets,

rugs, worked metals, and later tea and coffee all came from the East. Many of them carried in their very names a designation of their origin—Damascus steel, Persian rugs, muslin (Mosul), cashmere, china. It is interesting to note that in the list given almost all parts of Asia are represented, and that many and circuitous routes were used to assemble them for European consumption. Getting goods from producer to consumer was a complicated process, and many and varied were the types of organization of such a trade. Medieval Europeans were very vague as to the almost mythical spots where the goods originated and were slow to learn either sources or routes of the commodities they learned so rapidly to consume. Of all Eastern commodities, spices were one of the chief and most greatly desired luxuries. Pepper is mentioned in the dowry of heiresses and in the gifts of kings. The Venetians at one time had an agreement with Egypt providing for the purchase of 420,000 pounds of pepper annually. Several hundred thousand pounds of pepper as the cargo of one ship was not unknown in the sixteenth century after Europe made direct connection by sea with the faraway coasts of India and the Spice Islands, where pepper and other spices were produced.²

Europe had something to offer in return for these highly prized Oriental and Near Eastern goods. Metals, especially precious ones, wool, furs, wine, cloth, olive oil were all of value in the Eastern trade, and, where commodities could not be offered in sufficient quantity to pay for the less bulky and more valuable luxuries, gold ducats, florins, or byzants were shipped to pay the balance.³ The routes eastward were seldom under European control for any great distance. Constantinople was long an important entrepôt for the trade, although not for spices, and there the ships of the Italian cities made the exchange of cargo. North of the Black Sea and the Caspian, eastward across Turkestan and down into China there was one route; across the Black Sea through Persia to the Indus or further east there was another; the coastal towns of Asia Minor and Arabia were the western termini of several routes leading to the Persian Gulf and by water eastward. The most nearly all-water route found access to the Mediterranean by way of the Red Sea and the Isthmus of Suez. The Arabian cities and later those of Egypt came to rival Constantinople,

² See E. P. Cheyney, *European Background of American History 1300-1600*, Chaps. I and II, for an interesting account of the commodities and routes of this Eastern trade.

³ See above, pages 31-34.

and until the sixteenth century the southeastern Mediterranean was the scene of thriving commerce. The Italian cities grew rich, and the fortunes built up in trade were used in banking and industrial enterprises and expended freely in the patronage of arts and letters. The Italian cities were more concerned with trade rivalries and wars with one another than with the growth of power of the Turks. The difficulties of the routes to the East and the profits they had to concede to the Arab and Eastern middlemen had led them earlier to attempt to find cheaper and easier access to Eastern goods. In the fifteenth century, however, their struggles for supremacy prevented any great expansion of enterprise. Vessels from Genoa, for example, had explored the African coast and reached the Canary Islands before 1350.⁴ Italian trade, however, remained predominantly Mediterranean.

GROWTH OF ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE

Until the middle of the fifteenth century such was the picture of European trade. Even without the tremendous geographic discoveries of the hundred years following, much of the progress of the period would undoubtedly have taken place. European trade is largely European in scope even today. Interregional trade would have developed with greater and greater emphasis upon the new national states of the North. Europe would have continued to acquire Eastern goods in quantities sufficient for its needs. All of the changes in organization, industry, and machinery that characterize the modern world would doubtless have followed whether or not a New World had been discovered. The discovery of that New World, however, immeasurably widened the scope of commerce and opened new opportunities for the expansion of European enterprise, although the total effect, one must admit, was of even greater importance for that New World than for the Europe from which the explorers, conquistadors, and colonists set sail.

Ever since men began to be impressed and intrigued by the results of the series of discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that so greatly changed world history, they have faced the question as to

⁴ After 1300 the coastal trade from Mediterranean to northern European ports was established, and both Genoa and Venice maintained such trade from that time on. But it was inconsiderable as compared with the overland trade and little, if any, less expensive. At the same time the Baltic and North Sea towns (the Hanseatic League area) were carrying on a maritime trade.

why it happened; why Europeans nearly five hundred years ago began to explore, discover, exploit, and colonize; why the modern world was Europeanized. At one time the easy reply was that the Ottoman Turks, in their cruelty, ignorance, fanaticism, and lack of appreciation of the benefits of commerce, cut off the trade routes and forced European seamen out into the Atlantic, across it, around Africa, and into the far seas in pursuit of the goods of which they had been thus deprived. It was a dramatic and satisfying theory, but it was not quite true. The Turks did advance, Constantinople did fall, trade routes from the Black Sea to Egypt did fall into other hands; all of these things were true, but the economic result was not the decline in trade and commodities, nor the great rise in prices that scarcity would have produced. Europe evidently received the goods in demand, traders were prosperous, and the Turk was receiving his share of the profits of a trade that had always been hazardous. The average citizen neither knew nor cared about the designs of the barbarian Turk. The explanation, therefore, must be sought elsewhere in a simpler and less dramatic form. Other areas than the Italian states were becoming aware of the advantages in trade with the East. Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and even France and England were no longer so backward as to be content to pay tribute to Italian enterprise. By the fifteenth century the nation-states were lusty and vigorous, and their rulers were willing to back wealthy merchants in new activities, and to profit by their success. The inventions of printing press and paper popularized the information which spread northward with the growth of trade and cultural contacts. The Mediterranean was too small to be the exclusive center of an Oriental trade necessary and profitable for those in other regions who wished to share in its profits. The decline of Venice, once laid at the doors of the Turks, is now seen to be at least equally due to the rivalry of the Portuguese.

GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE OUTSIDE WORLD

It was fortunate that the rising enterprise of Western states should come in a period in which there had been marked advance in geographical knowledge, in maritime architecture, and in navigation instruments. The equipment of the thirteenth century would have been inadequate for the Age of Discovery. That of the fifteenth barely sufficed. Leif Ericson discovered America centuries earlier, but few

intrepid followers had pushed out in his wake across the cold waters of the North Atlantic to grasp the opportunities that were thus offered. About 1250 began a series of travels which were more or less accurately recorded in widely read narratives and which stimulated their readers to further enterprise for the sake of trade or because of missionary zeal or mere curiosity or perhaps a combination of all three.

The fact that the great Mongol empire founded by Genghis Khan early in the thirteenth century was of vast extent and was united under one ruler made trade contacts easier. Seeing an opportunity for missionary enterprise, the pope sent out Franciscan friars⁵ to convert the Mongols to Christianity. Successive popes continued the practice, and in the next century Christian bishoprics in China were organized. One of these missionaries wandered far afield and visited isolated Tibet; Persia, India, and China were penetrated. The missionaries learned the native tongues and made detailed reports of their own activities and of the conditions which they found, but they were not successful in Christianizing the Orient. The contact was broken in the fifteenth century both because of the disruption of the Mongol empire and because of the troubles of the papacy in the era of the Babylonian captivity and the Schism.⁶

Not all the travelers in the Far East were clerical. The brothers Polo, Nicolo and Maffeo, of Venice went eastward by way of the Crimea and the Volga, then across Asia to trade in China and to be received by Kublai Khan. They were commissioned by the Khan to request the pope for missionaries and teachers and returned to Venice in 1269 only to set forth again with Nicolo's son Marco. They again reached the court of the great Khan, where they resided in high favor until 1295. After their final return Marco, imprisoned by the Genoese, wrote the account of their adventures, a book that had much well-deserved popularity both then and in later days. The civilization, the vast size and resources, the romance of the famed Cathay,

⁵ The Order of St Francis was founded in the early thirteenth century by a young Italian. The movement was one of many in the Middle Ages in protest against the wealth and worldliness of the church, and the order was dedicated to poverty, missionary enterprise, trading, and work with the poor. It was sanctioned by the papacy, given official standing as an order of friars under monastic vows but living in the world. Its members became, often, famous missionaries. In the same period the order of St Dominic was founded which had the added objective of stamping out heresy.

⁶ See above, page 40.

all appealed to the imaginations of Europeans. Curiosity, missionary zeal, cupidity, once aroused, were never stilled, and the increasing trade and information whetted men's interest in the East.

Geographical knowledge had likewise been increasing. The magnetic needle, probably imported from China, made the compass possible. The ascertainment of latitude was the work of the cross-staff and the astrolabe, but navigators waited until the eighteenth century for an instrument to aid them in finding longitude. The theory that the earth was round had been accepted by Greeks and Romans and was known throughout the Middle Ages despite some ecclesiastical prejudice. Columbus wrote,

I have always read that the world, comprising the land and the water, is spherical, as is testified by the investigations of Ptolemy and others, who have proved it by the eclipses of the moon and other observations made from east to west, as well as by the elevation of the pole from north to south.

Whether or not there were unknown lands and peoples on the vast areas of the sphere as yet unexplored was not a matter of much concern early in the Middle Ages, although there was some attempt at estimating the size of the globe. The conclusion was reached that one might find the Indies by sailing west, although the distance was considered too great to make such a plan feasible. There was speculation, also, as to the possibility of a northeast passage around Europe, as well as discussion of the circumnavigation of Africa. All of these projects were to await a time when greater curiosity and hope of gain should send men farther afield.

Sailing charts had long been kept by sea captains, and maps or *portolani* became available. The science of cartography was to be born in the sixteenth century with the work of Mercator, whose invention, "Mercator's projection," made possible the representation of the globe upon maps. But years before Mercator's work the globe had been circumnavigated, and sailors were blithely setting out upon the newly discovered seas with or without adequate maps and charts. Fortunately for them a new type of ship, the caravel, had been developed. It was better fitted for ocean transit than anything heretofore used. Many modifications were made as the new type of boat was tried out, but never thereafter did navigators lack instruments or ships to further their vocation on the seas.

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY

If the Italians were too preoccupied with Mediterranean affairs and too involved in the Levant trade to venture far out upon the Atlantic, the desires of the peoples of the Atlantic states were not to be blocked by the unknown. The Portuguese freed themselves from the Moors in the thirteenth century and inevitably found their way to sea. Crusaders against the infidel for hundreds of years, the Portuguese had missionary enterprise as one of their motives for expansion. The ruling house of Portugal in the fifteenth century was much interested in maritime affairs. Prince Henry, called "The Navigator" (1394-1460), devoted his lifetime to furthering discoveries, advances in navigation, and the training of navigators. His father, brother, and nephew, all kings of Portugal, aided his activities and furthered Portuguese enterprise. Prince Henry was inspired by the enthusiasm of the explorer, the zeal of the crusader, and an acute interest in trade. The Portuguese wished to cut out the African middleman by gaining access to the source of supply of slaves and gold. Prince Henry used all the maps and narratives he could glean from the Italians and acquired new information for his own map makers from Moors, islanders, and from practical experience. His boats advanced southward until the coast of Western Africa was known, and the trade of that coast, largely in black slaves whose capture was justified by the saving of their souls, increased the Portuguese stake and interest. One expedition after another was sent out; the Madeiras, the Cape Verde Islands, and the Azores in mid-Atlantic were reached. The long progress down the African coast was completed in the voyage of Bartholomew Diaz which began in 1486, and at last Vasco da Gama struck boldly across the Indian Ocean and reached Calicut on the western coast of India in 1498.

The work of more than half a century was crowned with success, for the colonial empire of Portugal was the result of generations of patient effort and careful planning. Soon Lisbon became the center of a vast trade with the East, and Portuguese captains disputed the trade of the Spice Islands with the Arabs and established trading posts for Portugal in the heart of the most lucrative trading areas. Portugal's islands and African colonies grew in value and extent. For a brief period, less than one hundred years, Portugal reaped the rewards of her enterprise; then the Portu-

guese throne came into the control of Spain for sixty years, and Portuguese interests were subordinated. After the separation of the two states, Portugal never recovered her proud position, although she still retains parts of her once proud empire. Portugal was too small, of too little European importance, too lacking in urban wealth and a powerful middle class to hold the position she once attained. Moreover, she lacked natural resources, and her geographical position gave her no access to important trade routes except those of the sea.

The school for navigators established by Prince Henry was a training ground for captains who sailed for other nations as well as for Portugal.⁷ Both Bartholomew and Christopher Columbus were trained there. The latter, who lived in Lisbon for many years, married the daughter of a captain general under Prince Henry, and served for several years under the Portuguese crown. Had he not obtained a Spanish subsidy and commission in 1492, either he or some other navigator would undoubtedly have discovered America for Portugal within the decade. In fact the fleet of Cabral in 1500, driven out of its course by storm, discovered Brazil and proceeded onward around Africa to India. It was therefore more or less accidental that the discovery of America was made for Spain and that Spain thus became a great empire. In the earlier history of Spanish exploration there was nothing of the painstaking planning and preparation of Portugal. Barcelona and other ports of Aragon had engaged extensively in the Mediterranean trade, but the preoccupation of the various Spanish kingdoms with the expulsion of the Moors, with their mutual rivalries and their internal problems, had left them little opportunity for the development of interest in problems of trade or navigation. The union of the four kingdoms by the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile (Castile already included Spanish Navarre and Leon) made possible the centralization of Spanish government and the final conquest of the Moors, and left a little surplus of wealth, interest, or energy that, by a narrow margin, enabled the queen to subsidize the voyage of Columbus. Columbus' discovery of the West Indies did not give Spain the greatly desired access to the riches of the Orient, but successive voyages revealed resources in the islands and on the mainland that were to make Spain, for a time, incredibly rich.

Portugal was immediately alarmed by the entry of Spain into a

⁷ The existence of this school has been denied by some modern writers.

field she had looked upon as her own. The pope, asked by Spain to settle the question, in 1493 issued a bull (papal decree) drawing a line of "demarcation." To Spain were assigned the lands "west of the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands to a line from pole to pole one hundred leagues away," and to Portugal all lands east of this line. In 1494 the line was extended 270 leagues farther westward. This division did not settle all difficulties, however, for an unforeseen projection eastward of the coast of Brazil permitted a Portuguese colony in the Western Hemisphere, and the voyage of Magellan (another Portuguese-trained navigator serving a Spanish king) begun in 1519 gave Spain dubious claims in the East Indies, claims to be settled by treaty in 1529 reserving the Spice Islands to Portugal. Spain conquered the Philippines some years later. These voyages and discoveries, these new trade routes and claims to empire, caused the decline in the glory of the Mediterranean cities and the rise to power of those states fitted to take advantage of an ocean commerce.

FOUNDING THE SPANISH COLONIES

Within a half century after the first voyage of Columbus, Spain acquired a vast colonial empire. From the first it was obvious that the spices and other prized commodities of Oriental trade were not to be theirs; but when it was found that the New World could supply them with the gold and silver with which to purchase those and any other goods they might desire, the Spaniards eagerly began the conquest of a hemisphere. The conquistador, with his well-trained soldiers and accompanied by missionary priests, conquered the Aztec government of Mexico, 1519-1521. Cortez was made governor, and within a few years Central America to the south and California and New Mexico to the north were explored and claimed for the Spanish crown. A decade after the Mexican success Pizarro conquered Peru and brought the Incas under the Spanish yoke. From the West Indies to the mainland of South America was an inevitable advance; the discovery of the Isthmus of Panama and the first sight of the Pacific spurred the Spaniards onward; Magellan's voyage increased their knowledge of a world that was theirs for the asking. By the middle of the sixteenth century, the Spanish American empire included South and Central America—with the exception of Brazil—the West Indies, Florida, California, and a vague area north of Mexico and west of the Mississippi River. Practically all the rich, well-developed areas

of the New World were in Spanish hands, areas in which old and magnificent civilizations were now prostrate. Spanish desire for wealth had been satisfied beyond the dreams of avarice; conquest had had its day; cupidity and bigotry were to play their part; and the ultimate result was not to be the permanent glory of Spain. The wealth of the Indies made—but could not keep—Spain a great power in the intense competition of the European stage where, after all, the decision was to lie.

Northern nations, backward in commercial development and occupied by domestic problems, were slow to realize the profit that might be theirs and came into the scene a little late for the richest prizes. After a few futile explorations,⁸ The English and the French desisted, and neither established permanent colonies until after 1600. Nevertheless, in the reign of Elizabeth (1558-1603), English freebooters made the high seas their habitat to the terror of the Spanish treasure ships, and other adventurers explored the far corners of the globe in the name of the queen. Sir Francis Drake, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Sir Walter Raleigh were only a few among many. In their fruitless attempts to find a northeast or northwest passage to the Orient they left their names, after the most bitter hardships, upon the map which still bears witness today to that old belief that such a passage might yield access to the riches they so greatly desired. During the first half of the sixteenth century the Lowlands were one of the most prized possessions of Charles V and shared in the glory and riches accruing to Spain from the Indies. Later in the century the long war of the Netherlands for independence from Spain was furthered by their sea power, and the success of that war made possible the acquisition of their colonial empire and their pre-eminence in trade in the seventeenth century. The Scandinavian countries came still later into the field, but, although they acquired some small colonial possessions in the seventeenth century, they were never to be colonial powers of importance.

⁸ John and Sebastian Cabot sailed for Henry VII of England before 1500 and laid claim to the coast of North America. Verrazano, a Florentine commissioned by France, visited the same coast in 1524, and about ten years later Cartier entered the St. Lawrence River. Believing that the mighty river led onwards to the Orient, he is reputed to have named the rapids that blocked his progress the "China" Rapids.

COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION

Before going on with the expansion of Europe through colonial planting, it is necessary to pause for a discussion of the methods and organization of commerce in the early modern period. The early merchants had been peddlers carrying their goods from one place to another. As a middle class developed and towns grew, markets and fairs offered opportunities for trade. Residing in thriving towns, they found it to their advantage to unite in wresting charters from noble or clerical overlord and in offering aid to kings in return for special favors.⁹ They found, also, that union was advantageous to them in plying their trade and in controlling the government of the towns to which charters had been granted. Merchant guilds were formed, therefore, and remained a part of commercial organization until the complexities of trade and the establishment of stronger national governments brought new arrangements. Kings and city authorities expended great effort in acquiring advantageous trading opportunities for the merchants whose prosperity was closely allied to the prosperity of the state. Roads were built, routes were protected, explorations were made, and treaties were drawn up, all to the advantage of trade. The revival of Roman law in the later Middle Ages was of great assistance to both aspiring monarch and ambitious merchant, for the law of the Roman Empire provided for the rights of private property, freedom of contract, and the principles of absolute government. It was the legal defense of both the new middle class and the new monarchy. This close connection of the middle class with government cannot be too greatly stressed.¹⁰

The individual merchant might be able to conduct his business profitably, but united business enterprise was often of great advantage. As trade grew, a larger capital than one man could assemble often meant greater profit. Partnerships were formed and remained the chief device for business expansion for centuries. Simple partnerships might be formed for longer or shorter times and dissolved by mutual agreement, but often they were family enterprises maintained through several generations, until the family name was known throughout Europe and connection with the family was an open-sesame for recognition and opportunity. The Bardi firm of Florence in 1300 had fifteen part-

⁹ See above, page 32.

¹⁰ For a discussion of these governmental policies, see below, pages 85-86

ners of whom ten were members of the family. Many of the partners lived abroad wherever the firm's interests might dictate. The Fugger family of Augsburg was an outstanding example of such an association. The first Fugger to emerge from obscurity was a peasant of the fourteenth century who became a weaver. His son, Jacob, the head of the weaver's guild, married the daughter of the master of the mint. The third generation, while remaining manufacturers and traders, went into silver mining as well, while Jacob Fugger II (1439-1525) in the next generation became the greatest financier of his age. His firm traded in the Levant, in Spain, and in Portugal. He continued cloth manufacturing and developed the mining of both silver and copper. He formed a partnership with one of the earliest mining engineers to use pumps and a water wheel in the mines. The Fuggers engaged in international finance and made loans to kings and popes. The imperial election of Charles V was financed by their aid—or bribes. In 1514 Jacob Fugger employed a theologian to defend the thesis that it was right for the Christian to receive a 5 per cent interest! He entered into correspondence with Charles V in protest against a futile attempt of the government to limit monopolies. Altogether the House of Fugger was the synonym for power for two hundred years. The bankruptcy of the firm in 1607 brought disaster to hundreds of people.

Whether commercial enterprise was carried on by one merchant or a partnership it was often necessary for established and sedentary merchants to employ as agent, or take into the firm as partner, some energetic individual who could travel with the goods and arrange for their disposal and the purchase of goods the firm desired to import. This was especially true if part or all of the journey was by sea. This junior partner might, or might not, have capital invested in the enterprise, but his return was a share in the profits. Groups of merchants, sometimes as many as a hundred, might pool their capital, buy or rent a ship, and send one of their number, or an agent contributing no capital, on a trading voyage with instructions as to the cargo to be brought back. These groups shifted constantly and were often formed for one voyage only. The English later called such enterprises *ventures* and the group *adventurers*. As the commerce of the early modern world developed, such partnerships became more permanent, and a group of merchants might act together under a definite arrangement for years at a time. The discoveries of the late

fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries led to new devices to care for the exigencies of trade at great distances and under unfamiliar conditions.

Trade at such distances frequently resulted in the stationing of a permanent factor, partner, or agent in the trading area who could, through greater familiarity with local conditions, make arrangements for the transfers of goods more profitably for the European firm. Convenience, common interest, and common danger led these representatives to settle in certain ports, so that in the Orient and in the New World centers for European trade developed. Through these representatives trading areas widened, and new commodities came on the market. Tobacco, tea, coffee, sugar, cotton, chocolate, potatoes, indigo, quinine, rum—all were brought to the European consumer. The trade in negro slaves grew with rapidity when the scarcity of native labor in the New World seemed likely to slow down the production of American commodities.

PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH ECONOMIC LIFE

This distant trading made new requirements upon merchants and governments. It needed the protection of a strong government, new organization, and great increase in capital. The first national states to develop such trade were Portugal and Spain, and they made trade a government concern. The Portuguese monopoly of the trade in the East Indies was for a long time complete. The Arab rivals were weak, and their trade lessened as Portugal supplanted the Italian cities in the European markets. Government regulation covered every aspect of the trade. The trading fleets were controlled and their cargoes determined by the government. Between 1497 and 1612 806 ships were sent from Portugal to India which were equipped by the government and sent out with armed forces. All of this work was done by a government office called the *Casa da India*. The merchants who used these vessels were private traders but were subject to strict government regulation. In Spain a similar system was adopted. All goods were required to be sent from the port of Seville to one of two ports in Spanish America. Attempts were made to send the fleets out twice a year at stated times and to have them follow specified routes. They were given government convoy and protection. Only specially licensed Spanish traders could enter the trade, and all intruders were kept out. A *Casa de Contractacion* (House of Trade) was set up which was the

governmental agency in absolute control over all trade with the New World.

This careful regulation constituted a government monopoly, although in practice, of course, there were loopholes. As long as Spain was strong no foreign merchants could profit by the trade directly. Neither Portugal nor Spain had enough merchants, capital, or energy to manage the distribution of the goods pouring into its harbors. The resources of the colonies were relatively undeveloped, and colonial energy and initiative were restricted. Dutch and English traders in Lisbon and Seville purchased the goods they needed for a thriving re-export business, and much of the profits were lost to the countries of entry. Portuguese prosperity was injured by the union with Spain after 1580, and the constant wars of Spain through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries drained the gold and silver of the Indies out of Spain as rapidly as it could be brought in. The very overregulation of the trade made violations easy, and the treasure ships were the prey of Elizabethan freebooters until convoys were provided. Sir Francis Drake was indeed the terror of the seas when he "sing'd the beard of the king of Spain" in an undeclared war of an earlier day.

The proud hidalgo of Spain would not sully his hands in trade, and the ignorant Spanish peasant, if he had been permitted, would not have known how to make use of the opportunities offered. The middle class in Spain in the period before 1500 was relatively undeveloped, and although rapid progress was made in the sixteenth century, the period of economic advance was pitifully short. In Toledo the number of laborers in the textile trades rose from ten thousand to fifty thousand in about twenty-five years, and merchants were unable to fill orders. The manufacture of silk was begun in Spain; soapmaking became profitable; factories were established to prepare other raw products for market; salt became one of Spain's greatest exports, and over a hundred ships left Spain each year for the colonies and as many more for ports of Europe.¹¹ The producers of raw materials shared in the prosperity, and it seemed reasonable to expect that the thriving energy of the kingdom, united at last and freed from the strain of the long crusade against the Moors, would give Spain a place among the modern nation-states in industrial development. But this economic growth was short-lived. The policy of the government, in the hands of an absolute king and a feudal nobility which had

¹¹ Chive Day, *History of Commerce*, p. 176

no appreciation of commercial problems, stultified Spanish effort and destroyed the initiative and the prosperity of the middle class.¹² The *alcabala*, a tax of 10 per cent on goods each time they were sold, absorbed most of the profits of trade. A sixteenth-century Spanish critic wrote that the manufacturers of certain commodities would have to pay in taxes more than they earned, "hence it follows that he would have gained more by making nothing, and in Spain it is profitable not to work." Since these taxes were largely expended in foreign wars, the prosperity of the country steadily declined. Tariffs both at the frontiers and between provinces were high, and foreigners as a matter of policy were often favored more than native traders. Many of the Moors were expelled from the kingdom and the elaborate system of intensive agriculture they had developed was neglected. Irrigation was abandoned, forests were cut down, and much of Spain was allowed to become semidesert area. When all of these restrictions on foreign and domestic trade, the unwise incidence of taxation, and the neglect of agriculture and essential industries are summed up, it is apparent that injudicious governmental policies were an essential element in the decline of the prosperity and population of Spain after the middle of the sixteenth century.

PORTUGUESE COLONIZATION

In the sixteenth century colonial planting was naturally the province of those states earliest in the field of distant trading. Portugal built up a commercial rather than a colonial empire, and she staked everything on commercial pre-eminence. The failure of Portugal to maintain the proud position she so early acquired can be easily explained when one views that failure from the vantage point of several centuries of European history; at the time the reasons were not so easily apparent. The initial gains of Portugal were due largely to the energy and vision of the dynasty rather than of the people. Moreover, the Portuguese geographical position left much to be desired. She had one great harbor, Lisbon, but no advantages of trade routes to a profitable hinterland and no easy access to centers of distribution.

¹² There was a progressive decline in the character and abilities of the Spanish rulers from Philip II (d. 1598) to 1715. Some of them were mediocre and uninspired, one was almost an imbecile, all of them involved Spain in expensive wars, and none had any comprehension of economic difficulties. Paternalism became downright misgovernment under such rulers. See E. J. Hamilton, "The Decline of Spain," *The Economic History Review*, May, 1938

When, in the latter part of the sixteenth century, Portugal fell under the rule of Spanish kings and Spanish governmental restrictions and taxes were applied to Portuguese trade, a decline was immediately apparent. Only 186 of the 806 vessels which Portugal sent to India between 1497 and 1612 sailed after 1580, although the later period should have been one of the greatest trade, for England and Holland were then only at the beginning of that rivalry which was later to be so disastrous to Portugal.

The same years of commercial decline saw a decrease in population which left Portugal, always too small to send much man power abroad, still further handicapped. The available capital in Portugal had not been adequate, for her commercial enterprise, and much of the progress in distant trading had been accomplished by funds from German and Italian bankers. Foreigners thus reaped a large share of the profits of a trade which was so largely a government monopoly that it did not develop a strong middle class. As the century drew to its close, the Dutch, the English, and soon the French were ready to pour their vastly greater resources of capital, man power, organization, and initiative into competition with those countries earlier in the field; Portugal could not meet the pace.

When she recovered her independence from Spain after 1640 Portugal was forced to admit the loss of control of the Eastern trade and surrendered to the Dutch a large share of her trading posts in the Malay Peninsula and along the coast of India. One hundred and fifty years later there remained to Portugal only two or three posts in the Far East, some unprofitable and unimportant colonies on the east and west coasts of Africa, and her one great American colony of Brazil. In the seventeenth century Brazil, once disregarded, became Portugal's chief colony, and a hundred ships sailed to America each year returning with gold, diamonds, tobacco, hides, valuable woods, and other products. Portuguese influence upon the Far East was relatively slight, but to Brazil she sent a few bona fide colonists, her language, religion, and culture. Brazil was a Portuguese colony until 1822 and an empire with a member of the Portuguese ruling family as emperor until late in the nineteenth century. That American state, many times the area and population of Portugal, today recalls the transitory splendor of the country of Prince Henry the Navigator.¹³

¹³ "In 1754 Portugal scarcely produced anything towards her own support. Two thirds of her physical necessities were supplied by England. England had become

SPANISH COLONIZATION

Spain took very seriously the problems of colonial planting and administration. As in questions of trade, the strictest supervision was set up. The Council of the Indies, established in Seville in 1524, was given the work of framing colonial policy and of controlling colonial planting and government. The records of this famous Council form today the greatest collection of sources for those interested in Spanish colonial history. Lack of success was not due to lack of diligence but rather to causes outside the control of the members of the council. Knowledge of colonial conditions was often faulty and difficult to acquire.¹⁴ Distance as related to time was much greater in the sixteenth than in the twentieth century. One fleet each way each year meant a lapse of two years between orders and reports. Governors rapidly grew so out of touch with authorities in Spain that they tended to establish for themselves almost independent jurisdiction. Spain endeavored to counteract this by moving viceroys and lesser officials from one province to another and by refusing to appoint several members of the same family to office in any one province. Provincial governments were in theory as completely centralized and as despotic as that of Spain. Distances within the colonies, however, were so great, and efficient incorruptible officials were so few, that colonial administration suffered.

The Council of the Indies very carefully supervised and restricted emigration from Spain. Only those in good standing with church and state were permitted to become colonists. Where England suffered thousands of her economic misfits, religious dissenters, and political discontents to migrate, Spain preferred to keep her poor and discouraged at home, to suppress her rebellious subjects, and to permit the Inquisition to deal with her heretics. The number of Spaniards sailing to the New World to make permanent homes for themselves was therefore relatively small, and many settlers became great landlords who

mistress of the entire commerce of Portugal, and all the trade of the country was carried on by her agents. The English came to Lisbon to monopolize even the commerce of Brazil. The entire cargo of the vessels that were sent thither, and consequently the riches that were returned in exchange, belonged to them. Nothing was Portuguese but the name." Statement of Pombal, Portuguese statesman, quoted in Clive Day, *A History of Commerce*, p. 186. For Portuguese economic and political dependence upon England after 1754 see below, Chapter IX.

¹⁴ One governor was appointed in the early period to serve for both Mexico and the Philippines!

operated their estates with natives reduced to peonage or with negro slaves. They remained an aristocratic class small in numbers, as narrow, as bigoted, and as absolutist as their Spanish counterparts.

It was the policy of the Spanish government to Christianize and educate the Indian populations, and thousands of missionaries were sent out by the church and subsidized by the state. Missions established from northern California to the tip of South America were agencies for industrial training, for education and civilization as well as for the conversion¹⁵ of the Indians to the true faith.

At a time when our own Puritan forefathers were acting on the theory that the only good Indian was a dead one, the Spanish priests were establishing schools and even colleges and normal schools for the Indians in Mexico and Peru. It must be admitted, however, that they destroyed as much as they created, for they found a venerable and complex civilization which they ruthlessly crushed because it taught the worship of strange gods. They destroyed temples, burned libraries, and uprooted traditions which they felt obstructed the true religion, and they fastened upon Latin America an incubus of bigotry and a weight of expense for church and priesthood that led to a growth of anti-clericalism and irreligion in the years after the yoke of Spain was thrown off.

ECONOMIC POLICIES IN SPANISH COLONIZATION

Spanish colonists found the desire of the church for the betterment of the conditions of the native population a hindrance to their exploitation of native labor, and a home government anxious for profits often gave way to colonial demands. The Caribbean Indians died in great numbers as a result of the ruthless policies of the conquistadors, and it was necessary to import negro slaves to work the plantations there. The stronger, more highly developed native peoples of the mainland were not wiped out by Spanish exploitation but were reduced to a peonage little better than slavery. The desire of the Indian for a share in government and a chance at economic betterment was not to be granted until the twentieth century when, in some areas at least, it caused a new type of Latin-American revolution. The Spanish colonist was no more loyal to the desires of the faraway home government in the matter of trade restrictions than he was in regard

¹⁵ See such books as Herbert Bolton's account of Father Kino in *Rim of Christendom*, and Agnes Repplier, *Junipero Serra, Pioneer Colonist of California*.

to the treatment of the Indians. The policy of rigid control in order that all profits in such trade might accrue to Spain was often not to the economic advantage of the colonist whose profits might increase if he could trade with the English, French, or Dutch. From the beginning foreigners broke into the trade. The English freebooter pillaged and robbed, but he sometimes brought cargoes of English goods or of slaves from the African coast. The merchants of England and France were "adventurers" in more ways than one, and Elizabeth of England relied on her "cut" in the profits of piracy. As Spain's power in Europe declined in the seventeenth century the trade restrictions that still remained on the statute books were violated with impunity. The colonists were provided with the goods they wished, and neither the Spanish government nor the Spanish merchants had energy or power to restrain or punish the violators of Spanish laws. The Spanish colonial empire was to remain intact, or nearly so, until the nineteenth century, but its splendor was of the past. For Spain as for Portugal, the sixteenth was the century of progress, wealth, and glory.

The paternalism and the careful governmental regulations of trade and colonization which were characteristic of the Spanish and Portuguese enterprises of the sixteenth century were copied in some degree by other European countries. The term "mercantilism" has been applied to such governmental regulation of trade and industry for the purpose of building up the wealth and the power of the state. It is difficult to put any very definite time limits upon mercantilism or to define it with any degree of exactitude. The period of its greatest importance came between the establishment of the Spanish colonial empire and the second half of the eighteenth century. A summary of its objectives may be somewhat more accurate than a definition, and yet such a summary will be rather vague because of the many complicating factors. The rulers of the nation-states were eager for power and always in need of money in order to maintain their governments and to carry on the wars that were necessary to increase the prestige and territories of their realms. The kings extended royal sway over all classes and over all parts of their states and made it a consistent part of royal policy to bring industry and commerce also under the control of the state. The power of the ruler was increased by the control thus established, and the increased wealth of the country made larger state revenues possible. Merchants and manufacturers were not only willing but were, indeed, anxious to further the ends of the state, and asked

for protection and regulation designed to promote their interests. Mercantilism, therefore, was in reality a "phase in economic policy" through a long period of years.

NORTHWESTERN EUROPE AND EXPANSION

With the discovery of direct routes and the growth of water transportation for goods, the maritime states of Northwestern Europe could not be kept out of the greatly expanded trade, and the hegemony of Spain and Portugal was ended. The Netherlands, England, and France came into prominence in commerce and colonization in the later sixteenth century and were to edge out the states that had so proudly divided the world between them. These Northern states had the strong government, the wealth, the middle class, and the initiative necessary for commercial advance, and they evolved new types of organization and a greater elasticity of policy which brought them success.

The towns of the Low Countries formed one of the earliest and most important centers of European interregional trade. Long before the Age of Discovery the Flemish cities south of the Rhine delta and a few Dutch towns farther to the north had led in industrial and commercial enterprise. On the capital and goods from all Europe which flowed through the Netherlands the sturdy burghers exacted their tribute. The Netherlands became Hapsburg territory in the fifteenth century and were a part of the vast patrimony of Charles V. As such they became the center of vigorous commercial life on a world basis. For several generations in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Antwerp was the heart of that commercial area and the great banking center of Northern Europe. The techniques and terminology of commerce became decidedly modern. Speculation in futures, foreign exchange, rates of insurance, "bulls" and "bears" in the market, as well as every variety of competitive method, were the topics of conversation for the man on the street, who might be of any race, creed, or nationality. The Dutch towns to the north developed a little more slowly, but by the end of the sixteenth century, partly because of the wars with Spain,¹⁶ Amsterdam supplanted Antwerp as the financial and commercial center of Europe.

At the same time English trade and maritime interests were ex-

¹⁶ See below, Chapter V. Antwerp was sacked in 1576.

panding. The Tudor period was one of keen interest in commercial advance, and the crown was willing and eager to aid and enrich the merchants upon whose prosperity it depended for support. The sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were years of comparative peace for England, and the English made great strides in commerce and shipbuilding. By the end of the sixteenth century the destruction of the Spanish Armada bore evidence of the fact that Spain was being supplanted by England in supremacy over the seas; it also cleared the way for the English colonial planting in the seventeenth century. France, too, had early developed an active middle class, but the sixteenth century found France occupied with a titanic struggle with the Hapsburgs which lasted half a century, and then torn by religious wars which ended only in 1598 and wrecked much of the prosperity of the Protestant bourgeoisie. French colonies and overseas commerce, therefore, did not develop until the seventeenth century, for France watched the Dutch and the English defeat Spain, and then the English wrest commercial supremacy from the Dutch before she came forward as England's great commercial and colonial rival in the eighteenth century.

COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATION DEVELOPED BY THE NORTHERN STATES

These Northern states believed as did Portugal and Spain that trade should be preserved for the benefits of the home state, but the conditions under which their commerce developed were so different that a very different type of organization grew up. They were not provided by priority of discovery or deed of papacy with title to vast areas of unbelievable richness or with monopoly of access to trading centers where spectacular profits might be obtained.¹⁷ Wherever and whenever it was possible for ingenuity, daring, and private initiative to force an opening, the Dutch and the English pushed their way. The English "regulated company" was an early extension of the merchant guild idea into the field of foreign commerce. Merchants combined, not their capital but their enterprise, to secure markets and favorable trade conditions outside the realm, and sought the aid of the government at home and concessions from the governments of

¹⁷ The voyage of Vasco da Gama paid 6,000 per cent, and the early years of the Portuguese trade showed a similar rate of profit. The first few years of Spanish plunder of Mexico and Peru saw figures fully as startling.

areas in which they traded. These associations of merchants obtained charters from the kings and exerted a very broad control over their own members. Markets were selected, ships provided, and protection sought from the state, but at the same time each company imposed entrance conditions upon its members in order to limit competition, restricted the quantity and regulated the quality of goods, and maintained certain standards to insure the honesty and good conduct of its representatives abroad. The regulated company always strove for a monopoly in importing goods from the area of its commerce and for special privileges on the markets of that area. The individual merchants or partnerships ran their own commercial "adventures" but shared in the advantages gained by united effort. The earliest of these associations were developed in the trade across the North Sea with the Low Countries, but the form was quickly taken over for the control of distant trading when English commerce was extended in the sixteenth century. The English Muscovy Company and the Levant Company were prominent examples of this form of organization.

When combinations of capital as well as of commercial enterprise began to occur, the "joint-stock company" was born. There is no certainty as to its place of birth, but it became popular as soon as distant trading made the Dutch and English feel the need of larger aggregations of capital. Many men of wealth did not wish to become merchant adventurers themselves or to take an active part in distant trading, but they were willing to participate in the profits of such trade by the investment of a portion of their wealth. The joint-stock company was the organization in control of such contributions and, through its agents, entered the trade. These associations were at first for one enterprise only, but it was a short step to permanent organization with specified fields for exploitation.¹⁸ By the end of the sixteenth century the idea had been generally accepted, and commerce and colonization of Northern European countries were carried on largely as operations of joint-stock companies. Their name was legion,¹⁹

¹⁸ Funds were subscribed by a London group in 1553 for the discovery of a northern route to the East. Groups of investors financed Hawkins's slave trade, Drake's expedition against the Spanish, and the explorations of Frobisher and others. Queen Elizabeth herself at times contributed capital to such ventures and received a share of the profits. Some voyages failed, but others made 1,000 per cent or more. One expedition of Sir Francis Drake made 4,600 per cent profit after the queen had received £250,000. Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe* (Harper & Brothers), p. 359.

¹⁹ A partial list in Cheyney's *European Background of American History* covers several pages.

and their activities extended to all quarters of the globe. Men might invest as much or as little as they chose and after a time came to be liable only for their investment; shares of stock were sold freely on the market; and their organization was much like that of a modern corporation, although they were not given a fictitious personality by law. The joint-stock company asked and received aid from the country in which it was chartered; indeed, the lists of directors and stockholders often numbered many of those influential in government circles. Such companies were a compromise between the rigid control of Spain and purely individual initiative.

The greatest of the joint-stock companies were the Dutch and the English—and later the much less successful French—East India Companies. They were all formed between 1600 and 1604, all were granted monopolistic trading facilities by the country of their origin, and all broke into the Oriental trade at the expense of Portugal. They staked out for themselves areas on the coast of India or the islands of the East Indies where they built forts, established agents, and exercised, in accordance with the terms of their charters, functions of government as well as of commerce. The English company started with about two hundred investors but later expanded to over a thousand. After the company was firmly established its stock was bought and sold in the market, and stockholders drew dividends depending in amount upon the profits of the year's undertakings. The company borrowed money when it needed capital and expanded its operations in periods of prosperity until it became a vast organization carrying on trade on a grand scale. Generally speaking, East India Company stock was a gilt-edged investment, for the records show an average dividend of about 18 per cent for almost one hundred years. 1682, a profitable year for the English company, saw a stock dividend of 100 per cent, and a large profit on new stock.

Such returns were not, however, obtained by all joint-stock companies, many of which were failures. Periods of prosperity saw the company promoter active and speculation rife. Periods of deflation—and the business cycle was as recognizable then as now—were years of falling prices, failures, bankruptcies, and collapse of confidence. Governments grew chary of chartering companies without careful investigation and were more reluctant to grant monopolistic privileges than they once were. The English East India Company lasted into the nineteenth century, but the government took over many of its governmental functions before 1800; its monopolistic character was ended

after that date. In general the joint-stock company organization, after its heyday of the seventeenth century, lost its prestige by speculative enterprise.

While they were the accepted form of commercial enterprise, however, these joint-stock companies were turned to divers ends. The activities of the company depended somewhat upon the nature of the area in which it was given trading privileges. The East India companies needed forts, soldiers, factors and agents, fleets for trade, warehouses for storage, and monopolistic privileges both in the Indies and at home. They did not attract settlers or promote emigration; their trade was in the tropics with developed and thickly populated areas. When the enterprising men of business looked toward the New World, however, they saw a different picture. Spain owned the richest areas and closed the coast from Florida to Cape Horn to all foreign trade except that which was illicit. It was possible to break into that Spanish monopoly at certain weak points, especially in the West Indies; and England, the Dutch Republic, France, Denmark, and Sweden all formed companies for that purpose which had some degree of success. The presence of European colonial possessions in the West Indies and on the north shore of the continent of South America today is evidence that Spain was unable to keep out the intruder. On the coast of North America north of Florida there were no Spanish settlements, and the colonies formed by England and France were of a different character. There only by the development of natural resources, and by the planting of colonies whose success would provide native products for European trade and markets for European goods, could any return be found for investment of European capital. Thus the companies chartered for trade with America became colonizing companies.

THE FOUNDING OF THE ENGLISH COLONIES

The three which exerted the greatest influence upon American colonization were the English London and Plymouth companies, the Dutch West India Company, and the French Company of New France. Europeans in 1600 knew little of the problems to be faced and were overoptimistic in their expectations. Because of the riches of the Oriental trade and the profits from looting Spanish treasure ships, they had been led to believe, or had deluded themselves into believing, that gold, access to the East, and great returns could be acquired

from developing trade with North America. The first expeditions showed them their mistake. There were to be no quick profits, and laborious colonization and slow development would be necessary if the enterprises were to succeed. The colony of Virginia which was founded by the London Company presents a case study of the difficulties which attended such efforts. The beginning of the production of tobacco brought some profits, but political difficulties at home²⁰ and financial distress caused the dissolution of the company in 1624 and the establishment of Virginia as the first royal colony. The Massachusetts Bay Colony was founded by a chartered company in 1629 and retained its charter for fifty-five years. Its success was somewhat greater, due to the fact that many of the members of the company went to America themselves and profited with the increase in the wealth and population of the colony.²¹ So far as being profitable ventures for English capital is concerned, neither the colonies founded by chartered companies nor those, such as Maryland, founded by proprietors granted lands by the king, can be said to have been as successful as had been hoped. They did, however, start English colonial planting, gave England a foothold on the continent of North America, and helped found the British Empire.

The continental colonies were not the only British enterprises in the Western hemisphere, and for many years they were far from being the most valuable and remunerative plantings. The Bermuda Colony was founded in 1612 by the Virginia or London Company, and in the next few decades the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica and other islands were added to England's colonial possessions. For many years these islands were more popular than the colonies on the mainland, and their tropical products built up great fortunes for the many settlers who flocked there. Tobacco, cotton, and sugar plantations flourished, many slaves were imported, and West Indian merchants maintained parliamentary lobbyists in London to safeguard their interests. The treasures of the New World came to England through the trade in tropical products and in the slaves needed in their cultivation just as surely as they had to Spain a century earlier in the gold and silver of Mexico and Peru. The economist may believe that the British had rather the better part of the bargain, for the thriving

²⁰ See below, Chapter VI.

²¹ The Puritan exodus from England after 1629 caused the rapid development of New England, the sturdy pioneers made up for the severity of climate and the lack of natural assets by their ingenuity, effort, and industry

triangular trade between Europe, the colonies, and Africa was of profit to thousands of Englishmen and colonials and seemed to be a never-ending source of enrichment. British enterprise turned to Newfoundland as well, for the fisheries trade was almost as profitable as that in sugar or tobacco. Furs from the Hudson Bay region were another valuable addition to British trade. All in all, the British Empire founded in the seventeenth century was a satisfactory one from the point of view of enterprising mercantilistic thinking, for from some part of that empire practically everything of value to British commerce could be obtained.²² Everywhere, except in the New England colonies, England found products and interests that were supplementary to those which as mother country she could provide. New England alone failed to fit into a well-balanced colonial scheme and became a competitor of old England in shipbuilding and in many of the markets of the world.

In its colonial planting and in the control of emigration the English government pursued a policy quite different from that of Spain or Portugal. England wanted colonies and was ready to assume the privileges and burdens of empire, but the seventeenth century was to be a period of struggle and conflict within England. Crown and Parliament, Church of England and dissenting sects, were to struggle against each other, and a new economic crisis was to affect both labor and agriculture.²³ It was but natural that colonial planting should be relatively unsupervised and unregulated. Those dissatisfied with the powers assumed by the crown, those who wished to escape the control of the Church of England, be they Puritan, Catholic, Quaker, or Baptist, felt the urge to migrate, as did those who had lost their land because of new enclosures or were out of work because of economic difficulty. The fact that often the three motives of political opposition, religious dissent, and economic pressure were present in the same individual made that urge more keenly felt. England put no obstacles in the way of migration. Those square pegs that could not adapt themselves to worn and rounded holes in England might at will seek to carve places in the New World into which they might fit. The English colonies became, therefore, the home of a large body of English yeomen, men from approximately the same class, with the same desire for land and security and the same aggressive determination to govern themselves as they wished. By the middle of the eighteenth century there were about

²² See below, pages 85-86, for a discussion of mercantilistic theory.

²³ See below, Chapter VI.

a million and a half of them, with an admixture of Germans, Dutch, and Scotch Irish, living along the Atlantic seaboard from Maine to Florida and extending inland to the mountain ranges. The island possessions added thousands more, so that Englishmen overseas numbered about one-third the population of Great Britain.

Differences within the colonies, between New England, the middle colonies, the plantation colonies, and the new southern colonies were due to factors of physiography, climate, and length of settlement rather than to any differences in type of settler or of colonial government. New England with her fisheries and her commerce differed from tobacco-planting Virginia and sugar-planting Jamaica not in origin but in the developments of the generations following their establishment.

Whatever its origin, a British colony soon came to have a form of government modeled on familiar British precedent: a two-house legislature, the lower elected, the upper usually appointed; a governor sent by king, or proprietor, or elected within the colony; and considerable local autonomy for everything except commercial affairs.²⁴ There could be no greater contrast than that between the Spanish and the English systems.

The vast colonial empire of the Dutch was, and is today, largely in the East Indies. The Dutch East India Company was the successor to the Portuguese in the Spice Islands, and the tea, coffee, and spices that formed the staples of its trade brought the stockholders untold riches. Well into the eighteenth century the Dutch held a leading position in European trade; then they were outstripped by competition although they lost little in actual volume of trade. The Dutch, too, established colonies in the Western hemisphere: New York, lost to the English within a half century before it had become populous or very profitable, and various small posts in the West Indies and on the north coast of the mainland of South America. The Dutch were great traders, carrying not only their own goods but those of many other nations, but they had no great desire to migrate nor did they have any surplus of population for colonization. A series of wars with England in the middle of the seventeenth century, the disasters of the wars with Louis XIV,²⁵ and the steady economic advance of England combined to force the Netherlands to yield commercial supremacy to the British although the Dutch retained most of their vast colonial possessions and remained a great trading power.

²⁴ See below, pages 248 ff

²⁵ See below, pages 168, 174, and 204

FOUNDING THE FRENCH COLONIES

In the seventeenth century France built up her first colonial empire. After the middle of the century the French East India Company was a competitor of the English company. On the east coast of India rival establishments were founded which were to clash in the eighteenth century.²⁶ In America France found her point of entry in the St. Lawrence River, up which her explorers had first sailed nearly a hundred years before. Quebec was founded in July, 1608. Led on by the magnificent inland waterways from the St. Lawrence to the Great Lakes and then to the Mississippi, the French soldier-explorers, fur traders, and missionaries found themselves at the Gulf of Mexico before the end of the century, the claimants to a vast inland empire of great potential value. French colonial policy differed from that of Britain in that she followed the Spanish precedent of rigorous control over emigration. Only good Catholics of unblemished reputation were permitted to migrate, and the minute paternalistic regulations of the government followed them to New France. France had no strong traditions of representative government and therefore never dreamed of providing anything of the kind for the colonies. A bishop in charge of their spiritual needs and commissioned to oversee missionary enterprises, an intendant to direct the only profitable commercial enterprise—the fur trade—and a military governor who was responsible for the garrisons which protected the far-flung settlements were all the colony needed. The French were not easily induced to leave their homes, and under the circumstances the French population increased slowly. France in America had less than one hundred thousand French inhabitants when the colonists of the thirteen English colonies numbered a million and a half. New France was a commercial empire; New England was one of settlements. A glance at the map will show the inevitability of conflict between the two groups whenever the English began to expand over the mountains. Any conflict between England and France in Europe would have immediate colonial repercussions. Nevertheless the French as well as the English probably considered their best Indian sugar islands of more value than the larger but less profitable mainland colonies.

²⁶ See below, Chapter IX and map of the world in 1688 which appears in that chapter.

EFFECT OF EXPANSION ON EUROPEAN
COMMERCIAL LIFE

This expansion of Europe after the Age of Discovery makes a spectacular and fascinating story. In following it through the seventeenth century we have gone ahead of the Europe from which the colonists came. Hence it remains for us to complete the picture by observing some of the effects of the discoveries and the consequent distant trading upon European life. Without the discovery and colonization of the New World many of the changes to be recorded might have taken place: European trade would undoubtedly have continued to grow; new commercial centers would have developed; Northwestern Europe might even have superseded the Mediterranean area. It is equally true, however, that the expansion of Europe overseas had a tremendous effect, both economic and social, on European life, and greatly accelerated changes which might otherwise have occurred. The interaction of the overseas area and European civilization was of such great importance that it is safe to say that modern European history had its birth when that interrelation began.

One class of changes in European life, apparent in the preceding pages, is the change in the fundamental bases of commerce. European commerce escaped from dependence upon overland routes and overland trade. This escape meant a great widening of the areas of exchange. Africa, the Western world, Russia, the Far East were all new fields to cultivate. The opportunities seemed limitless. It is no wonder that men were a little intoxicated with this heady new wine, and that any account of the discoverers, the traders, and the freebooters reads like high romance.²⁷ Trade and the sea offered the young European all that he could ask in the way of adventure and gain. Even today it catches the imagination: capitalism in the first days of its power and the first realization of its opportunities; individual initiative rewarded beyond its dreams by discoveries in hitherto unknown regions; new wants created by new knowledge, and new wealth with which to satisfy them! In brief—a new Europe and a new world.

Along the new trade routes sailed vessels, still small but adequate for transoceanic trading. Sails superseded oars; boats became larger, with greater capacity and room for larger crews and more passengers.

²⁷ J. A. Froude, *English Seamen of the Sixteenth Century*, might be cited as an example.

Columbus' caravels were little vessels not much more than galleys fitted with sails instead of oars, but the caravel was followed by the galleon with two or three decks, and the carrack with five. Columbus' vessels were of less than two hundred tons' burden; a hundred years later ships of a thousand tons were built for the overseas trade. The increase in the size of ships necessitated changing harbors: Seville, well up the river, gave way to Cadiz, and seagoing vessels could no longer pass London Bridge and lie at the old wharves. For long voyages, beset by dangers from pirates and hostile natives, provisions must be made for defense, and merchant vessels must carry armed forces and cannon or be convoyed by a naval detachment. The new seaways were full of dangers: routes must be charted, new instruments of navigation devised, logs kept, and maps made. Navigation became a science and stimulated, while it was aided by, the other sciences of astronomy and mathematics.

The new routes and the new opportunities for commerce had a marked effect upon the commodities exchanged. With the old caravan routes goods changed hands so frequently and transit was so laborious that prices of Oriental commodities had been maintained at a high level on the European market. Although greatly to be desired, they remained largely luxury goods. Ocean transit was far cheaper, and ships could carry much larger quantities than camels. Prices in the Orient varied so little with the increase in demand that the European prices of spices, silks, porcelains, and other Eastern goods dropped, and the European market expanded immensely. New commodities came on the market from both the Orient and the New World. Tea, coffee, and sugar exceeded the spice trade both in amount imported and in their total value. Tobacco, cotton, and cocoa were brought to the European consumer from the New World and became popular by the early seventeenth century. Two other American products were known and their value discussed although the European of the early modern era rejected them: Indian corn, or maize, so valuable to the colonist, has never had much popularity in Northern Europe; and the lowly potato had to wait many years before it captured the diet, if not the heart, of the European peasant. Commodities long known to man became articles of commerce on a much larger scale in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Negro slaves to till the sugar and tobacco plantations, furs and fish, rum and naval supplies swelled cargo lists and accounted for a great increase in trade.

The shift of predominance in trade from the Mediterranean to

Western Europe was a direct and inevitable result of ocean trading. Spain and Portugal were quickly outdistanced in the race by the three Northern powers, England, the Netherlands, and France. For a century the three were rivals in mercantile strength, then England forged ahead and held first place in the eighteenth century. The stakes of enterprise increased enormously. There were more and more ways, and quicker ones, of getting richer. This necessitated a commensurate development in business mechanics and techniques; modern banking, the stock market, commercial exchange, insurance, carefully controlled national coinage, even the national debt became matters of great concern.

EFFECT OF EXPANSION UPON INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE

The reaction of industry and agriculture to the new expansion was a trifle indirect but clearly apparent. Old industries tended to migrate to new centers and to the countries of the Atlantic seaboard. England, for example, became the chief manufacturer of wool. Metals were used in England, France, and Sweden especially in the manufacture of munitions and cutlery. Much of the manufacture of finer goods shifted from South to North, especially to France and Flanders where fine textiles, laces, and the like were now produced. The old industries of shipbuilding, lumbering, salt, and glass blowing were all stimulated by the increase in trade which in turn was due to rising capitalism operating on a world market. New industries came into being based upon both overseas supplies and European inventions. Chinese porcelain was copied in Europe; cotton and silk cloth were manufactured; the whale fisheries provided oil for lubrication and illumination; and sugar refining required new machinery and techniques. In this period clocks, pistols, stocking knitters, and numerous other articles were invented and their manufacture and distribution undertaken. It would be erroneous to attribute all of this expansion to the commercial changes, but it was at least an accompanying development. In agriculture the change was somewhat slower and less pronounced. In England, as more land was put into sheep pasturage for wool, enclosures of common land evicted small farmers and created a class of landless agricultural laborers that later furnished large numbers of colonists. Production of an agricultural surplus for export increased, of course,


but along lines of previous development. Farmers tried to raise some of the new products; tobacco, for example, was produced with some success in England until the government decided to stimulate trade and the welfare of the English merchants by eliminating British production. But until the eighteenth century there was to be no change sufficiently marked to be called an agricultural "revolution."

THE EFFECT OF THE INFLUX OF GOLD AND SILVER

Running through this complex web of economic changes which ushered in the modern era is discernible a thread of silver and gold which is so much a part of the whole fabric that it is difficult to draw it out for separate inspection. And yet that glittering strand had such an important place in the life of the period that the story is but half told if emphasis is not given it. It was both cause and effect. Rising capitalism, expanding trade, increased production from industry and agriculture all were influenced by it, and it produced social and economic changes of major significance. The vast increase in precious metals, gold and silver, produced in and imported into Europe between 1450 and 1600 was looked upon at the time as one of the most beneficent of the spectacular results of the commercial changes, but it came slowly to be recognized as the cause of a rapid rise in prices which had consequences as important as those of the commercial revolution itself.

Long before the discovery of America, the constant drain of Europe's gold and silver eastward to pay the balance due on Oriental goods had been observed with concern. Prices were low, and trade was hampered by the scarcity of money. New methods of mining stimulated the production of metals for coinage, especially silver, and considerably increased the supply of metals after 1450. The consequence was inflation and higher prices. Shortly after 1500 the first installments of precious metals from the New World began to arrive, and by the middle of the century the flood of Mexican and Peruvian silver began. Between 1500 and 1660 Spain received from America more than 18,000 tons of silver and about 200 tons of gold. Added to the amount produced in Europe and imported from other sources, it formed a total unprecedented in world history up to that time, although perhaps small compared with present-day figures. Meanwhile, the governments of Western Europe, hard pressed for funds by constant wars, decreased the bullion content of their coins and thus added to the inflation by

debasing the currency. In studies made of the rise in prices in various countries, the figures, which differ slightly in different areas, show that prices on many items were in 1600 from two to four times as high as they were in 1500.²⁸ The vast increase of money in circulation



WHEAT PRICES IN ENGLAND, 1259-1932

Wheat prices were stable during the first three centuries from 1250 to 1550. They rose about fourfold in the century after the precious metals came from the New World. (Chart from G. T. Warren and F. A. Pearson, *Prices*, John Wiley & Sons, p. 313.)

was at the same time a great stimulant to trade and the cause of hardship to the peoples of Europe.

²⁸ Earl Hamilton, *American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain*, gives a detailed account. For excellent summaries see Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, Chapter XII, and James Westfall Thompson, *Economic and Social History of the Later Middle Ages*, Chapter XXII.

Wages were very slow to follow the increase in prices; consequently standards of living fell and great suffering resulted. Poverty became a problem of government; wage fixing was attempted, doles were experimented with, and vagrancy and poor relief laws were passed. Strikes, riots, and peasant uprisings registered the protest of the poor. The new capitalist prospered through thriving trade and cheap labor; the self-sufficing farmer might profit; but the landlord whose tenants paid fixed charges and those who lived on salaries or had fixed incomes from investments suffered. Widespread unrest and discontent thus provided the social and economic setting of the Reformation and prepared the masses for the migration to the colonies which reached its peak in the seventeenth century.

MERCANTILISTIC THEORY

The thinking people of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were very much aware of the phenomena of high prices, trade expansion, coinage problems, colonial questions, and so on. They realized that all of these problems were connected and that their total effect was of tremendous importance to government and people alike. They examined the governmental policies and legislation in regard to trade and industry. Out of their investigation and their endeavor to understand economic conditions came a conviction that with the increased power of the state there should be the formulation of a national policy which could exert some guidance and control over these new and powerful forces. They were slow to see and reluctant to admit that the increase in gold and silver had resulted in the price revolution which had caused such hardship, for they based their new theory and policy upon the fundamental conception that gold and silver were the great desiderata for national wealth. They realized that all countries could not acquire directly the products of the silver mines in the possession of Spain, but they believed a powerful state, through building up trade and industry, could acquire more wealth and a "favorable" balance in terms of gold and silver. This theory or principle has been known as the *bullionist* theory because it makes the possession of precious metals the basis of prosperity for the state. The various policies these men worked out to bring about that desired end have been included in the wider policy of state regulation which has become known as *mercantilism*. Adopted by most of the states of Europe after 1500, mercantilism held sway in economic theory until the end of

the eighteenth century, and has had a sort of revival as a neo-mercantilism in the policies of economic nationalism in recent years. The mercantilistic policies and practices of European states will be discussed in other connections;²⁹ suffice it to say here that mercantilism was a policy of careful governmental control to ensure a favorable balance of trade. Tariffs on imports to reserve the home market for goods of domestic manufacture, restrictions on exports to keep the state self-sufficing in wartime, colonies in diversified areas from which desired raw products might be procured were all mercantilistic policies. Colonies were valuable, also, as markets for finished products; and a merchant fleet must be built to carry the nation's trade. A navy to protect the fleet and a standing army to defend the state were necessary adjuncts. Industry should be encouraged by regulation and subsidy, and agriculture stimulated by drainage and clearance projects, canals, roads, and other assistance. Altogether mercantilism was a regulated system of first magnitude and entailed co-operation on the part of all concerned as well as governmental regulation. In 1500, Europe was only in the infancy of such a policy, but its development was coincident with the expansion discussed in this chapter.

READINGS

A very brief general bibliography, useful in connection with all chapters, may be found at the end of the text. The student may also find there a chronological list of the rulers for the European states after 1500.

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY. The books mentioned as references for the economic phases of medieval life will be found useful here as well, especially the text, *Economic History of Europe*, by Herbert Heaton and the recent book by E. P. Cheyney, *The Dawn of a New Era*. The increase in knowledge of geography, essential to the Age of Discovery, is interestingly described in two brief books by J. K. Wright, *The Geographical Lore of the Time of the Crusades* (1925) and *The Geographical Basis of European History* (Berkshire Series, 1928). Sir Percy Sykes's *The Quest for Cathay* (1937) is authoritative and readable. The period of discovery and the resulting changes in commercial organization are taken up briefly in the very useful *History of Geographical Discovery, 1400-1800* (Berkshire Series, 1933) by J. E. Gillespie and *The Commercial Revolution, 1400-1776* (Berkshire Series, 1927) by Laurence Packard. W. C. Abbott's *The Expansion of Europe*, 2 vols. (1924), is indispensable, and Clive Day, *History*

²⁹ See below, pages 168, 193-95.

of Commerce (Revised edition, 1922), is the standard text in its field. E. P. Cheyney's *European Background of American History* (1904) is the best brief survey of European conditions in the period of discovery.

PORTUGUESE COLONIZATION. The part played by Portugal in the expansion of Europe is shown in C. R. Beazley's *Prince Henry the Navigator* (1895) and in a broader and very attractive way in *The Portuguese Pioneers* (1933) written by Edgar Prestage, a leading authority in the field.

SPANISH COLONIZATION. A comprehensive account of the work of Spain may be found in E. G. Bourne's *Spain in America* (1904). Herbert Priestley gives an excellent summary of both Spanish and French colonization in America in his *Coming of the White Man* (1929). Recent books dealing with special phases of Spanish colonization are Herbert Bolton's *Rim of Christendom* (1936), a delightful account of the work of Father Kino; *The Spanish Conquistadores* (1934) by F. A. Kirkpatrick, unsurpassed in any one volume account; and the delightfully written *De Soto and the Conquistadores* (1930) by Theodore Maynard. There are two recent books on Magellan that are more than mere biographies: *Ferdinand Magellan* (1930) by E. F. Benson, and *The Conqueror of the Seas* (1938) by Stefan Zweig. The effect upon Spain of the acquisition of a colonial empire is portrayed in the brief and interesting *Imperial Spain: the Rise of the Empire and the Dawn of Modern Sea-Power* (Berkshire Series, 1931) by E. D. Salmon. Earl Hamilton's *American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain* (1934) is a detailed and somewhat technical account of the effect of the influx of precious metals.

== IV ==

THE AGE OF THE REFORMATION

THE most vital institution of the Middle Ages was the Roman Catholic Church. Through its universality, through its spiritual and temporal power, through its wealth and its culture, and, most fundamentally, through the hierarchy of its priesthood, it obtained and held authority over the lives and souls of men for more than a thousand years. There is something epic in the sweep and grandeur of its power throughout those years, and much that is idyllic in the beauty of its service to civilization. Through the church the ideas of unity and authority, bequeathed to Europe by the Roman Empire, were kept alive. Long after political unity disappeared in the Middle Ages, and particularism and diversity appeared as the motifs of European reorganization, Europe paid tribute to the older harmonies by the common allegiance to a universal church.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE CHURCH IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY

There had been heresies within the church such as those led by John Wiclif and John Hus, and there had been extensive criticism through the centuries of many practices and policies of the church. The period of the Captivity and the Schism had been disastrous for papal prestige, and the growth of strong national governments in the same period meant a decreased respect for the authority of the central government of the church.¹ In the latter part of the fifteenth and the early years of the sixteenth century the popes endeavored to re-establish the prestige and authority of Rome, but it is not surprising to find that they evoked resentment and evasion. Nevertheless, the sixteenth century opened with the acceptance of Catholic doctrine and the submission to papal authority still relatively intact. For the masses of Europeans there was never any thought of a severance,

¹ See above, page 40.

for the individual or for the state, of that bond, stronger than life itself and enduring beyond the grave, which held all men to the church. By the middle years of the century that unity was at an end, that authority was rejected by countless thousands, and new creeds and new churches were established for their allegiance. Unlike the old schisms, this breach was not to be healed; unlike the heresies of other years, these new beliefs could neither be absorbed into the body of church doctrine, nor could they be stamped out. Excommunication, the Inquisition, reformation and reorganization within the church, new purification, and new missionary zeal were to be of little avail. The Church universal was a thing of the past, and Christendom must come to mean something other than the jurisdiction of Roman Catholicism. Why this tremendous revolution should have taken place in the sixteenth century, the nature of the change that came about, and why the breach was a permanent one are questions of importance.

The great movements that marked the transition from medieval to modern times have been shown to be the rise of capitalism and a vigorous middle class, the development of nationalism, and a rapidly growing sense of individualism which substituted individual initiative and a sceptical spirit for the former submission to authority in thought and action. All three of these new currents were definitely secular and anticlerical. Business had thrown off the old restrictions of the church; national states were unwilling to pay tribute in money or to be subservient to any authority outside their borders; and the critical or scientific spirit recognized the importance of the individual. The frankly worldly culture of the Renaissance was based upon material prosperity. It adorned and was, in some ways, the possession of the wealthy middle class. The alliance between business and the state was as easily discernible as that between business and the new culture.

The political and cultural power of the church had declined steadily in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in the face of the challenge of the new order. As yet the position of the church in matters of belief was not questioned seriously or often; but the growing scepticism and independence of thought would be dangerous should disputes arise. The church faced the new century with a position weakened by the events of the preceding years and by the presence of recognized and very real evils within itself. The long residence of the church in France (1305-1377) followed by the Schism

(1378-1417)² had weakened the international position of the church. The coincident growth of strong states had led to a limitation within each state of the power of the church in taxation and in legal matters. Monarchs had no desire to share their authority with agents of an international organization which had in the Middle Ages made pretensions to such vast temporal powers. The church councils of the fifteenth century had been an attempt at the control of the papacy through a body representative of all nations, but the failure of the councils to reform the abuses in the church or to establish control over the pope had left the papacy in power though discredited.

After the Schism the papacy was almost wholly Italianate; both cardinals and popes were Italian and as concerned with Italian politics and Renaissance culture as they were with religious affairs. These Italian popes were neither better nor worse than many other princes of their day. Some of them were eminent men of letters; some were patrons of the arts. One was a man of political sagacity with a flair for military affairs. A few of them brought the papacy into disrepute because of serious moral turpitude while in office. They were all worldly men, princes of Rome trained in the intrigues of Italian politics in the period of the Renaissance. They were representatives of the ruling families of Italy; the Piccolomini, the Rovere, and the Medici families each being represented by more than one pope. Papal offices were distributed where the interests of the family dictated, and nepotism was rife.

THE CORRUPTION WITHIN THE CHURCH

Under such popes it was natural that corruption should creep into the church, and that corruption should furnish a cause for attack, although it was nowhere the main cause for the Protestant revolt. The corruption within the church was similar to that in politics in the period, and the priesthood did not fall below its lay contemporaries in personal morality. It was the tragedy of the age that the church rose so little above the level of the day. Both lay and clerical offices were bought and sold. In the case of offices of the church, the offense was called "simony," and high church officials expected to make considerable additions to their incomes by its practice.³ The

² See above, Chapter II.

³ Leo X made 500,000 ducats annually from the sale of more than 2,000 offices. Simony, however, had been prevalent for centuries and had been decried by the church itself as early as the eleventh century.

wealth of the church was very great and was in itself a matter for resentment among the common people while it aroused the cupidity of princes. The church was so thoroughly imbued with money economy that the priesthood charged fees for performing the sacraments. Vast sums of money were drawn to Rome for the support of the papacy each year in the form of "annates" (part of the first year's income of a church office), the revenues from church offices reserved for papal control, church taxes, payments made by archbishops for their offices, and fees charged for dispensations and for trials in the papal court. Since church offices carried large revenues, it was profitable to hold more than one position, and a much-criticized practice called "pluralities" grew up. Since the wealth of the church made the positions it could bestow so desirable, clergymen as well as popes favored their own relatives and friends; thus nepotism became a problem. Princes, nobles, and wealthy bourgeois families hated to see such wealth outside their own control, and therefore sent their younger sons and dependent relatives into holy orders in order that they might have the use of the princely revenues of high church offices. Such churchmen frequently resided at court or in Rome and left the work connected with the office to poorly paid substitutes. Thus many church offices became "sinécures."

THE MOVEMENT FOR REFORM FROM WITHIN

These financial abuses caused much criticism and led many thoughtful and devout Catholics to demand a self-initiated reform of the Catholic Church. Similar periods of laxity and corruption which had occurred before had been followed by periods of reform and renewed dedication to the spiritual duties of the church. In the middle of the sixteenth century the church once more reformed itself, but only after the Protestant revolt had permanently broken the unity of Christendom. The desire for reform had led to revolt partly because the kings, princes, and patriotic middle-class citizens wished to bring religion under national control, and partly because they coveted the lands and the revenues of the church. The fundamental anticlericalism of the culture of the day came to their aid, and when the revolt was crystallized in Protestant doctrine, thus breaking the old unity of tradition and belief, the cleavage was final.

The revolution in the church did not come when abuses were at their worst and when the indifference and laxity of the clergy

were the greatest. The background for the reform movement was long prepared. The Renaissance came relatively late in Northern Europe, and the tendency toward paganism which expressed the interest and delight of the early humanists in the revival of classic literature was no longer prevalent. Scholars from Northern Europe traveled in Italy, studied under such Christian humanists as Pico della Mirandola, and found it possible to reconcile humanism and Christianity. With many exceptions, such as the frankly rational and anticlerical Montaigne, it is safe to say that the humanists of Northern Europe were concerned with religion and with ethical subjects. They wished to return to the real sources of Christianity; and their study of Latin, Greek, and even Hebrew was directed toward that end. They searched for old manuscripts, made new translations, and subjected old ones to critical study and emendation. Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples was the leading Christian humanist in France. He published a treatise on the Psalms, and in 1512 the Epistles of St. Paul with a commentary. Luther owed much to him, for d'Étaples discovered in Paul's Epistle to the Corinthians the doctrine of justification by faith alone. John Colet and Sir Thomas More were English humanists famed for their piety and the beauty of their lives as well as for their learning. They were friends of Erasmus, the greatest of all the Christian humanists.

THE INFLUENCE OF ERASMUS

Erasmus was born in Rotterdam in the Netherlands, but he spent most of his long life in France, in England, in Italy, and in Switzerland. He belonged to that international fellowship of scholars, and in an age of learning was recognized among his contemporaries as the greatest of them all. His correspondents numbered pope, emperor, and kings; his personal friends the learned of all nations. He was a cleric, but it is his work as scholar and author upon which his great reputation is based. He had the humanist's zeal for classical literature, and, unlike many of his contemporaries, he was master of Greek as well as Latin. He was keenly interested in teaching and wrote pedagogical manuals and a famous compilation of excerpts from the classics which he named the *Adages*. He translated Greek classics and edited the works of Latin poets, but his greatest work of classical scholarship was his *New Testament*, a Greek text with a new Latin translation and a commentary. He was liberal as well as

scholar, priest as well as pedagogue, and his greatest work was in the liberalizing of religion. He was genial and kindly, moderate in life and temperament, and imbued with the Greek view of life. His *In Praise of Folly* was a kindly satire, gently ridiculing all the foibles of men, and rebuking them for their superstitions. He was undogmatic and uninterested in theology, and he believed that Christianity had nothing to fear from scientific enlightenment and critical research. It was a way of life and not a body of doctrine. His *Colloquies* were religious teachings in the form of conversations and short stories written in beautiful Latin prose. Without bitter attack but with kindly satire, with great wit and great wisdom he undermined superstition, narrowness, and bigotry, and inculcated his own liberal, moderate, peaceful views. Always searching after truth, probing for fundamentals, rejecting ignorance and hypocrisy, Erasmus was no revolutionary. He remained within the church, a reformer and a liberal in a world which he felt was headed toward revolution and catastrophe.

GERMAN HUMANISTS

It was toward the Germanies that Erasmus looked when he wrote of the "impending" revolution. The impulse of the Renaissance came to Germany through the universities, for German scholars had studied in Italy, and was quickly turned to theological and religious questions. The greatest of the German humanists was John Reuchlin, whose interest was the study of Hebrew and the Old Testament. He got into a serious dispute with the Dominicans over his defense of Hebrew literature other than the Old Testament and was tried on a charge of heresy. The case was appealed to Rome and became a *cause célèbre* of the day. Pamphlets were written on both sides; humanists lined up against old-style theologians; and the German intellectual world was deeply stirred by the controversy. Out of it came a publication that made the debate more bitter and introduced a fatal element of contempt for the church and its teachings. In his defense Reuchlin published a book called *Letters of Eminent Men*, a compilation of the letters of approval which he had received. One of the humanists broadened the scope of the debate by the publication of *The Letters of Obscure Men*, written deliberately in very bad Latin. The letters purported to be from poor and ignorant churchmen, exposing their gullibility and their vices and asking advice from the strict theologians, who were Reuchlin's opponents, on

all manner of questions on religion and in regard to their own problems. They inquired as to the nature of the sin involved in eating an egg with a chick in it on Friday, or, perchance, an apple in which a worm resided. Their ridiculous questions and doggerel Latin, the sharpness of the satire, and the vulgarity and coarseness of the attack on the church made them widely read and popular outside academic circles.

German humanism, however, was evidenced only in the Rhineland and in the Danubian cities. Northern and eastern Germany were scarcely touched by the intellectual awakening, and yet it was in Wittenberg that Luther began his work and in Saxony that he was given refuge when excommunicated and outlawed. Philip Melancthon was the only outstanding German humanist to follow Luther into the new faith, and the revolution broke with the humanists in its earliest stages.

THE MYSTICS

The work of the North European mystics was of as much importance as the criticism of the humanists in preparing the way for the Reformation. For two centuries before Luther they lived and preached a simple faith of utter surrender to God, poverty, self-denial, and piety. It was an intensely individual movement, dependent upon no creed or formalism, and medieval in its asceticism. The mystics remained within the church, unconcerned with dogma, and in their contemplation of the inner light they escaped from the evils which they abhorred. Thomas à Kempis (d. 1471) wrote a book, *The Imitation of Christ*, which was the most influential of all the writings of the mystics. He did not question the doctrines or dogmas of the church; "He just wanted to be saved and tried to love God for that purpose with all his might." In an age of criticism of the church, when old tradition was discarded, and evils in the church were exposed, when humanists undermined the old authority, and simple men seemed torn from their moorings, such a book was seized upon for solace and hope, and was widely read. The mystics contributed their share to the revolt through their belief in personal religion and through their omission of the ceremonies, the sacraments, and the formalism of the church. Implicitly, although never expressly, they denied the necessity of priesthood and hierarchy and prepared the way for new faith.

Neither humanist nor mystic, however, could have caused the

revolt and the disruption of Christendom for they did not have the desire to do so or the following to wage its battles. We come back again to the thesis with which we started—that capitalism, nationalism, and individualism were the underlying powerful factors. The nation-states of North Europe with rulers who had absolute monarchy as their ideal were not averse to challenging papal authority. The petty princelings of Germany were as eager for power and wealth as were the kings. The rising middle class resented the financial exactions of the church and looked on its wealth with greedy eyes. Everywhere men wished to exercise independence of thought and action. The criticism of the evils within the church, the humanists, and the mystics prepared the way; the events of the years after 1517 directed the course; and the trend of the age determined the result.

THE REVOLT OF MARTIN LUTHER

Both Catholic and Protestant historians accept the date October 31, 1517, for the beginning of that succession of events that turned the movement for reform into open revolt. One of the leaders of that revolt was Martin Luther, who was born in 1483, the son of middle-class parents. He was given a good education for his day, above that of the class to which he belonged. He entered an Augustinian monastery and, at the age of twenty-four, became a priest. In 1510 or 1511 he visited Rome on some business connected with his order, but there is little evidence that the worldliness of the papal court had any especial effect upon him at that time. He came back to Germany and resumed his work, which included teaching in the University of Wittenberg. He was a conscientious, well-prepared teacher of theology, although no humanist, and a preacher with a large local popularity.

Luther was inclined to be morbid and introspective and unsure of his faith or of the certainty of his salvation. His great energy and his intensity of emotion could not be satisfied by the doctrines upon which he had been reared. He tried by fasting and prayer to bring comfort to his soul. He read the works of St. Augustine and of d'Étaples and the German mystics and found in them an emphasis upon faith and surrender to the will of God. About 1515 there came to him with the force of revelation the conviction that man himself was helpless, that his efforts were unavailing, but that by faith alone, by the complete submission of his will to that of God, he might be

saved. He became convinced that neither the good works that a man might do nor the good works stored by the saints through the ages were of any avail; justification by faith was man's only hope. This new belief brought peace to Luther and gave him a zeal for reform. In his lectures on the Bible he found opportunity to express his ideas on salvation, which received much attention in the next few years. Neither he nor his listeners seemed to realize that they might be heretical, and he remained, priest and professor, in a quiet academic setting.

In the autumn of 1517 came the occurrence that was to change Luther's life and profoundly alter the lives of countless thousands of men. One of the abuses within the church was the sale of indulgences. The doctrine involved was clear and unquestioned in the Catholic Church. In brief, the merits of the saints far exceeded their needs; this store of good works might, by the authority of the church, be applied to penitent men, not for the remission of sin, but for a shortening of its punishment in purgatory. Contrition might be expressed by the purchase of an indulgence, the money thus acquired to be expended for some worthy church purpose. Abuse had crept in when churchmen used high-pressure salesmanship and vigorous advertising methods in order to increase sales and thus obtain money for their own ends. Men were led to believe that purchase of an indulgence was the sole requisite for their relief from punishment, and even for remission of the sin itself; in short, an absolution. Pope Leo X needed money to build St. Peter's in Rome, and the archbishop of Mayence in Germany needed money to pay for his confirmation in office. The pope declared an indulgence, and the archbishop employed, as his agent for the sales, a Dominican friar named Tetzel who was none too scrupulous in the methods he used. Many devout Catholics were distressed by such a scheme and by such tactics. The cardinal archbishop of Toledo, head of the church in Spain, forbade the sale within his jurisdiction, and in Wittenberg a humbler cleric denounced the practice in ninety-five theses which he nailed to the door of the castle church.

There was nothing unusual in such an act; the same church door had held other theses on subjects their authors were willing to debate. Eminent churchmen have said that almost all of Luther's theses could have been defended by the orthodox. They were translated into German and had a wide acceptance through Germany. The sales of the pardons dropped off, and the authorities were

alarmed, for the excitement aroused seemed out of all proportion to its cause. Luther was asked to retract his theses and refused to do so. He was summoned before Cardinal Cajetan, the papal legate, at the Diet of Augsburg in October, 1518, and appeared there armed with an imperial safe-conduct, procured for him by his own prince, Frederick the Wise of Saxony. The motives of Frederick as well as those of other German princes were mixed, and it is probable that the wealth of Saxon benefices weighed heavily. Again Luther was asked to recant, and again he refused. In July of 1519 Luther met a famous theologian, John Eck, in debate in Leipzig and was maneuvered into a position where he was forced to agree with some of the doctrines of John Hus, the Bohemian heretic who had been burned at the stake a century before. In denying the infallibility of popes and church councils, Luther revealed, to himself and to the world, the latent possibilities of the doctrine of salvation by faith alone.

Once convinced as to his true position, Luther saw clearly that separation from the church was his only course. He spent the next year in writing three great tracts which defined his position and made the break with the church complete. The first was *An Open Letter to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation*. It was addressed to the emperor and called on the princes of Germany to free their country from the domination of a foreign institution. It denied the sacredness of the priesthood and called attention to the wealth of the church which might well be transferred to the state. The second tract was entitled *On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church of God*, in which he attacked the sacramental system and the papal hierarchy. The third, *On the Freedom of a Christian Man*, was the statement of his own faith and the culmination of his soul-searching in the years before 1517. The publication of the three tracts put Luther's position squarely before the world and formed the basis for the Lutheran movement which began when the first adherents expressed their agreement with the ideas thus stated.

In 1521 the pope excommunicated Luther, and a few months later the diet of the Holy Roman Empire declared him an outlaw.⁴ In similar circumstances earlier heretics had been apprehended and executed, their followers dispersed, and their doctrines repudiated. In seclusion, secure in the protection of his patron, the elector of Saxony,

⁴ See below, pages 99-100.

Luther spent the next year writing tracts and translating the New Testament into German. His followers, Melancthon, the humanist, and other professors at Wittenberg, carried on the work of establishing a new church. Why were the church and the emperor successfully defied, and the German heretic left free to complete the schism of Christendom?

THE REFORMATION AND THE EMPIRE

In the first place the Lutheran revolt was not occurring in a vacuum. The general causes for the weakness of the church were as apparent in Germany as in any other part of Europe. The movement gained adherents from many classes of men. It was essentially a German, or national, affair, and the patriotic in each German state found it to their interest to break the connection with Rome. The worldly and the princes looked greedily upon the wealth of the church, while the pious hoped for relief from its abuses. The mystics approved the new doctrine, and the poor and oppressed felt the surge of a new hope.

In the second place, the particularism that had been characteristic of the Germanies for centuries prevented a strong and consistent policy on the part of a central authority. The emperor was the head of the House of Hapsburg and Archduke of Austria; as such he was a powerful figure. The added prestige of his election as Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire brought little increase in power. The Imperial Diet was at no time a real legislative body, but represented the various German princes, lay and ecclesiastical, and the free cities. It was therefore more of a diplomatic body, something of a debating society, in which bargaining might take place, and some sort of policies be determined. That which the emperor could obtain in the way of support and concessions would always depend upon circumstances: his personality, the European situation, the temper of the princes, the vested interests affected.

The first years of the Lutheran movement marked the end of one reign and the beginning of another; thus action was delayed. The Emperor Maximilian was a good Catholic and quite willing to stamp out heresy, but German politics caused him to grant Luther a safe-conduct when he was summoned for questioning, and his death in 1519 prevented immediate action. The election of his successor was

the greatest concern of Europe in the spring of 1519. The electors⁵ listened to the blandishments of various candidates, including the young kings of England and France, Henry VIII and Francis I, and used their candidacies to extract concessions and bribes from the only candidate who was seriously considered, Charles, the grandson of Maximilian and of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. The pope as well as the German princes was interested in the election. Under the circumstances, since some of the electors were interested in Luther, it was no wonder that the question of heresy was momentarily subordinated. Charles was nineteen years of age at the time and already king of Spain and ruler over all the Spanish possessions in Italy, the Netherlands, and in the New World. Since his accession to the throne of Spain as Charles I he had been involved in putting down a rebellion caused largely because the new king, his officers and advisers, and his policy were too Burgundian⁶ to suit the proud Spanish nobles. He was already involved in a war with France over the long-disputed issue of the domination of Italy. The union of the Hapsburg possessions in Germany with the Spanish Netherlands, Spain itself, and parts of Italy made war inevitable. The encirclement of France was complete.

Charles came to Germany in 1520 to be crowned emperor with the title of Charles V. A few months later he held his first Imperial Diet at Worms. Three questions of gravest importance came before it. He asked the German princes for soldiers and money for the war with France. With his scattered possessions it was inevitable that the emperor would find it necessary to be away from Germany much of the time. He therefore arranged for his brother, Ferdinand, to rule in Austria, and the Diet made arrangements for an Imperial Council of Regency, representing emperor and princes. The third matter to be taken up was the Lutheran heresy. Charles V was a devout Catholic and quite willing to use extreme measures against the excommunicated priest, but the princes were divided, and Luther was invited to Worms once more under safe-conduct. His definite refusal to

⁵ The emperors were elected by seven of the German princes (three clerical and four lay). The position of elector was hereditary in the case of the lay princes. The archbishops held theirs by right of their offices. In theory, the election was free; actually, for most of the years since 1273, a Hapsburg had ruled.

⁶ Charles had been born and reared in the Netherlands, spoke neither Spanish nor German and was far more Flemish than Spanish. For the Italian situation see above, pages 20-22.

recant⁷ was followed by the Edict of Worms which made him an outlaw and commanded his surrender to the government. As we have seen, he was spirited away to Wartburg Castle to continue his work in comparative peace. The die was cast; the Lutheran Church had been created.

The willingness of Charles V and his brother Ferdinand to crush the new religion is not to be doubted. The perplexities of empire on the German pattern were not only complicated by the wars with France⁸ over rival claims in Italy which occupied much of his reign but by the menace of the Turks. When the advancing Turks had endangered Constantinople in the early fifteenth century successive popes had urged united action in the form of a crusade to save Constantinople. The princes of Europe were too much concerned with their own affairs, and the international power of the papacy had so diminished that the call was unheeded. The Renaissance gained by the flight of Greek scholars to Italy, and Europe little realized the destruction that might have to be faced from the Turkish Empire, young, vigorous, and in the first flush of victory and triumphant advance. Greece and the Balkan Peninsula fell into Turkish hands, and, in the years after Luther began his work, the young emperor, Suleiman the Magnificent, marched northward with a vast army to attack the states of the Danube basin. At Mohács in 1526 and before Vienna in 1529, he proved that the Turk was the superior of the European in having a large well-trained infantry. His man power was unlimited, and his soldiers were the equal of Europeans man for man. For a hundred and fifty years after Mohács, the Turk was to menace the Austrian possessions, and for another hundred or more they were to control Southeastern Europe. Throughout his reign Charles contended with the Turkish invasions; at the end a truce provided that the Hapsburg recognize the Turkish conquests in Hungary and pay a yearly tribute to the sultan. The great naval battle of Lepanto in 1571, in which a son of Charles V conquered the Turkish fleet, was the only decisive victory of Christian Europe and was the first relief from the Turkish peril.

At no time, therefore, during a long reign of thirty years, did Charles V have freedom from other more pressing necessities to

⁷ "Unless I am convicted by the Scriptures or by right reason (for I trust neither popes nor councils since they have often erred and contradicted themselves) . . . I neither can nor will recant anything since it is neither safe nor right to act against conscience. God help me. Amen."

⁸ See below, Chapter V.

spend the time or to use the influence and pressure which might have crushed the Lutheran movement. In the meantime events in the Germanies took their course. The vigorous leadership of Luther and the inflammatory pamphlets with which he and his followers stirred princes, middle class, peasants, and laborers brought supporters by the thousands. Church lands were confiscated, monastic orders suppressed, and the Catholic churches in many regions were taken over by the new faith. Latin was replaced by the vernacular; the sacraments, except baptism and a modified communion service, were abolished; marriage became a civil contract; and a new body of doctrine was evolved.

THE GERMAN PEOPLE AND THE REFORMATION

The peasantry and the lower urban classes of Germany were in a pitiable condition in the early sixteenth century, although it is probable that it had been worse in earlier periods. Revolts do not commonly occur among the most abject and downtrodden peoples. The rising prices made real wages low; the nobility ground down the peasants on their estates in order to swell their revenues and make their positions more secure; and the exactions of the church had made the burden seem intolerable. The German knights were also in a sorry state. When rulers began to hire professional soldiers, their feudal trade as warriors was gone. Their estates were too small to provide them with living standards commensurate with either their desires or their sense of family pride. They were, in a sense, the "new poor" of that day, and they bitterly resented their position. The princes and the urban classes had supplanted the knights in wealth and importance. Led by Franz von Sickingen, they espoused the cause of Luther and rose in revolt in 1523 in accordance with their tradition of the right of private warfare. With this example and fired by the preaching of fanatics who had acquired a mistaken idea of Lutheranism, the peasants revolted, also, in 1524. Their demands were expressed in twelve articles which seem, from a modern viewpoint, exceedingly mild. The articles included the right of each community to choose its own pastor, the freedom of the serf, the right to hunt and to cut wood in the forests, freedom from forced labor, exorbitant rents, and various burdensome feudal dues. The final article was an offer to submit all their demands to God's Word. The revolt was savagely and ruthlessly put down. It has been estimated that from

fifty to a hundred thousand of the lower classes may have been killed. After the revolt their condition and that of the urban workers was worse than before.

With true middle-class horror at a proletarian uprising, Luther turned against the revolters. In a pamphlet entitled *Against the Thievish, Murderous Hordes of Peasants* he denounced them and urged the princes to stamp out the revolt with the utmost vigor. It was but natural, therefore, that from that time onward Luther lost the support of the lower classes. They did not return to Catholicism but extremists formed sects of their own, such as the Anabaptists, Mennonites, and, later, Baptists and others. These sects provided a great simplification of service, a congregational form of church control, and a complete separation of church and state, and their teachings contained a variety of radical ideas of social and economic as well as of religious significance. They were the expression of the needs and aspirations of the downtrodden, eager for any aid in bettering a state almost unendurable.

Even before the excesses committed by both sides in the Peasants' War the humanists had begun to turn from Luther because his violence and dogmatism violated their ideas of tolerance and fairness. Both Luther and his humanist critics turned to the renowned Erasmus as an arbiter. The gentleness and liberalism of Erasmus were revolted by a movement founded in hatred and advancing in violence to the disruption of Christendom. With Erasmus agreed the other humanists who preferred to continue to work for reform from within, and Lutheranism came to depend more and more on the princes and the burghers. It became the state church through much of north-eastern Germany but was rejected elsewhere except in the Scandinavian countries, where a newly awakened nationalism took advantage of the opportunity to throw off the yoke of a Roman church which had always seemed too remote to command strong allegiance. Wherever it was adopted Lutheranism became an established church closely under the control of the state. The Lutherans denied the importance of the apostolic succession, and their bishops and archbishops were administrative officials of both church and state.

As the years went on Lutheran doctrine crystallized, and the forms of the new church were set.⁹ In doctrine the new movement

⁹ For differences in doctrine of the major Protestant faiths see C. J. H. Hayes, *Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe* (The Macmillan Company), Vol. 1, p. 195.

was more radical in the earlier years when Luther's influence was paramount. He grew more conservative as time went on, and Melanchthon and others of the leaders of the movement remained half-Catholic at heart. The emperor did not cease to try to heal the schism, and at every Diet attempts were made to narrow the points at issue. The attempts were unsuccessful, but each aided in clarifying the situation. In 1526 the princes at the Diet were so divided that they reached the conclusion that each of them should decide for himself in regard to the religious situation in his own state. Three years later the emperor announced that he would attempt to enforce the edict against heretics, and the Lutheran princes withdrew from the Diet and issued a Protest against the imperial policy. From that time on the Lutherans came to be called Protestants. In 1530, after making peace with France and the Turks, Charles V returned to Germany and summoned a Diet at Augsburg to settle the question of heresy once and for all. The Lutherans came armed with a statement of doctrine drawn up by Melanchthon. It was conservative in tone, and, with the exception of some difference as to the nature of the communion, or Mass, there were few deviations from Catholic doctrine. The Augsburg Confession, as it was called, represented the extreme concessions of the Lutherans and in somewhat modified form became the creed of their church. It did not, however, satisfy the Catholics, and the emperor threatened the Protestant princes with coercion.

THE GERMAN SETTLEMENT

United by this threat of force they formed a Protestant league, called the Schmalkaldic League, and for twenty-five years there was intermittent warfare between Catholic and Protestant states of Germany. In the middle of that period Luther died, and the leadership of the church which bore his name passed into other hands. His vigorous support of the convictions forged in the controversy had made him indispensable in the earlier years, but his death in 1546 had little effect upon the trend of events.¹⁰ The struggle in Germany

¹⁰ "Luther's character combined traits not usually found in the same nature. He was both a dreamy mystic and a practical man of affairs; he saw visions and he knew how to make them realities, he was a God-intoxicated prophet and a cool calculator and hard worker for results. . . . His hymns soar to heaven and his coarse jests trail in the mire. . . . He was subtle and simple; superstitious and wise; limited in his cultural sympathies, but very great in what he achieved."—Preserved Smith, *The Age of the Reformation* (Henry Holt and Company), p. 125.

was almost as much political as religious, and it turned on rivalries between states and revolt against imperial policies as much as upon matters of faith. Spun out to the point of exhaustion, it ended in a truce called the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 which was, in brief, an agreement to recognize the division in Christendom. The terms were as follows: (1) A truce was made between Catholics and Lutherans; no other Protestant sects were recognized. (2) The princes of Germany were to be allowed to choose between the Catholic and Lutheran faiths. Their subjects must conform or emigrate. (3) When a Catholic spiritual prince became Protestant his lands were to remain under the Catholic Church by "ecclesiastical reservation." Lutheranism was to be tolerated in such ecclesiastical states. (4) All church property confiscated before 1552 was to remain in Protestant hands. Thus the disruption of Christendom became permanent for many of the states of Northern Europe. The Peace of Augsburg was but the recognition of the facts of the case, and, although there were weak points in the settlement, it served to keep a peace for seventy-five years.

THE ZWINGLIAN MOVEMENT

Had Lutheranism been the only Protestant church organized in the sixteenth century, it is possible that the division in religion might have been healed. Some Catholic historians, indeed, have argued that as yet there were no fundamental doctrinal difficulties, and that the recovery of Catholicism and the removal of abuses later in the century¹¹ might well have healed the schism and reunited Europe in one faith. However interesting that idea may be, it can lead to nothing except speculation, for revolt became epidemic in Europe, and other regions besides the Germanies were quickly affected. From Switzerland came a doctrine and an organization that were to make a far sharper cleavage in faith, and from there the movement was to spread to the far corners of the earth.

In the mountains and forests of the Alps had grown up during the Middle Ages a group of provinces (cantons), protected by nature from outside aggression. They were nominally a part of the Holy Roman Empire but were actually a loose confederation of autonomous states, each republican in form, which for centuries had paid

¹¹ See below, pages 116 ff

no more than lip service to the emperor. The Swiss were in many respects the freest people in Europe. The control over local government was in the hands of well-to-do burghers, and the Swiss cities were not behind those of other lands in their interest in matters of trade and culture. They were beginning to feel the effects, however, of the shift of trade from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. No longer did their position on the main highway from Italy to the Rhine Valley give them as many advantages as it had in the later Middle Ages, and discontent accompanied the economic decline. The Swiss also resented the drain of their most vigorous youths into the professional armies of European monarchs. Humanism had early been carried northward from Italy, and criticism of the church was as apparent in Swiss cities as in other urban centers. Erasmus had lived and worked in Basel for some years, and other men of the Renaissance had sojourned in, or passed back and forth through, Switzerland. Swiss humanism, like that of Northern Europe, turned toward Biblical criticism and religious reform, and the Swiss cities formed a center for a movement of revolt.

Ulrich Zwingli, the early leader of the movement, was a year younger than Luther and, unlike his great contemporary, came from a family of some wealth and position. He was given every opportunity for education and travel, studying at the universities of Vienna, Basel, and, according to tradition, Paris as well. A great admirer of Erasmus, he had followed his example by becoming a priest at the early age of twenty-two more in order to continue his life of study and writing than because of profound religious feeling. His attitude toward the evils within the church and toward the superstition of the age was much like that of Erasmus. A serious illness and possibly a study of Luther's early teachings caused his point of view to change, and he became a reformer.

The course of the movement in Switzerland was different from that of the German reform. Zurich became a city-state dominated by the church of which Zwingli was the head—in other words, a theocracy. Zwingli was more logical than Luther, less of a mystic, more of a humanist, more interested in politics, far more urban. He broke with Rome completely, the clergy refusing obedience to the bishop and renouncing celibacy. Zwingli himself married, as did Luther. In matters of doctrine the break with Catholicism was sharper than in Germany. All sacraments except baptism and the Lord's Supper were done away with. In 1525 Mass was heard for the last time in Zurich.

After that date a simple communion service took its place, purely commemorative in nature. Luther had tried to keep something of the Catholic idea of the Miracle of the Mass by stating that although the bread and wine were not actually changed into the body and blood of Christ (transubstantiation), there was the actual presence of Christ with the elements of the communion service (consubstantiation). Zwingli's teaching cut directly through the age-old controversy and made it as impossible for his movement to unite with Luther's as to come back into the Catholic fellowship. Other sacraments were abolished, such as confirmation and extreme unction. Church services were simplified, Bible lectures were used for the education of the people, and all matters of conduct and morals were regulated by a church which had captured the government.

Other cantons followed the lead of Zurich, and the movement gained many adherents. There was the same loss of humanist support and the same repudiation of the radical movements that occurred in Germany. There was no emperor, staunch in the faith, to attempt to suppress the Swiss movement, and no necessity for union with a group of princes more interested in politics and in their own gain than in religion. Zwingli worked for a decade with almost unbroken success, but a decision to carry the reform by force into cantons where it had not been adopted led to disaster. In the civil war which followed, the Catholic forest cantons defeated Zwingli, who was killed in battle in 1531. In the truce each canton was left to decide for itself in matters of religion, and the tradition of local independence was followed in a settlement which left Switzerland permanently part Catholic and part Protestant.

JOHN CALVIN AND HIS IMPRINT UPON PROTESTANTISM

The Swiss Protestants soon found a new leader in a young Frenchman, John Calvin, who came to live in Geneva in 1536. The young man was a member of the upper middle class and was extremely well educated. He had studied philosophy, theology, and law in various universities, and had become familiar with the works of the humanists and of Luther. He turned more and more away from the Catholic Church and at last left France because of the degree of religious persecution there. For thirty years Calvin dominated Geneva, where he built a true theocracy based on doctrines which,

under the name of Calvinism, or Puritanism, were to form a new church and a new way of life—both the antitheses of Catholicism. It was Calvin, and not Luther or Zwingli, who completed the Revolution.

The doctrines of Calvinism are to be found in the *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, published in 1536. The work was translated from Latin into French and other languages and appeared in many editions worked over carefully by the author who realized its value as the crystallization of Protestant thought. To the modern reader it seems extremely long and didactic, filled with the finespun theories of the logician, but there have been few books that have exerted a greater influence for as long a period of years. There was little that was new in Calvin's theories, for he borrowed from Luther, Zwingli, Erasmus, Melancthon, and other writers, but it was all worked together with his relentless logic into a system which carried authority and put the stamp of finality upon Protestant dogma. The will of an Almighty God expressed in inflexible moral laws enforced by an autocratic ministry formed the core of the system he established. The doctrine of election or predestination might seem to take the matter of salvation entirely out of the hands of the individual and to be a negation of freedom of the will and of the possibility of justification by faith. Since it was impossible to be sure of one's own election or to form an opinion on that of one's fellow men except through the evidence of behavior, the doctrine put a great premium upon conduct and close attention to rigid morality as dictated by the ministers who felt sure of their own election and their absolute authority over the members of their churches. From this emphasis upon daily behavior came the Sabbatarianism, close supervision of details of conduct, extreme sobriety, disapproval of idleness, gaiety, and amusements which we associate with the word "Puritanism." There is an intimate connection between the laws Calvin drew up for Geneva and the Connecticut blue laws a century later. Intolerance and religious persecution came as naturally to the Calvinist as to the Catholic bigot. Their God was the stern Jehovah of the Old Testament, and not the gentle Christ whose name they both bore.

Calvinism was a good standard under which to fight in a day when independence of religious thought could be had only by fighting for it. Its logic and its austerity, the very doctrine of predestination, made its acceptance a driving force. It was no faith for weaklings, but for strong men it made life a challenge and a struggle, the out-

come of which could not be known until death might reveal that salvation which was God's great gift to the elect. Calvin's doctrines were widely accepted in Switzerland and in South Germany. They spread also into Bohemia, where they seemed to be based on the old Hussite ideas. They made headway in France, although the resolute, anti-Protestant policies of the kings put great obstacles in their way. Calvinism was adopted in the northern part of the Netherlands by a large part of the population and became there the Dutch Reformed Church. In Scotland, under John Knox, the doctrines found a peculiarly fertile ground, and the church established became known as the Presbyterian. Across the Channel, and down from Scotland, the doctrines came into England where various groups known as Independents, Separatists, and, later, Congregationalists were formed. Early in the seventeenth century our Puritan forebears carried their faith to New England where it played a large part in forming the character and temper of American civilization.

Calvinism became quite naturally the faith of the middle class. It was in many ways a religion fitting perfectly the new capitalistic, nationalistic age. The conditions of the time which called it forth were in themselves the reasons for its wide acceptance. The Calvinist attitude toward work illustrates this point clearly. Since sign of election can be found only in conduct and in fulfillment of moral law, every man must realize that work is pleasing to God and dislike or avoidance of work a sign of nonelection. He should have a "calling"¹² (profession or occupation) and follow it as a religious duty to the greatest benefit of society. Gain or success, therefore, would be a sign of God's favor, but wastefulness an evidence of his disapproval. Thrift was commendable, and gains should be reinvested in the calling. Poverty thus became evidence of sin and moral weakness, and success was the reward of discipline and hard work. Man must have individual freedom, therefore, to choose his "calling," and to make his bargains, achieve his success. In effect, Calvinism removed all the old restrictions of the church¹³ upon business enterprise and played into the hands of the new capitalism. This linking of theology with qualities essential to the growth of business was not done deliberately. It was but the expression of the feeling and ideas of the age. The growth of world markets, of a middle class, and of great national

¹² This idea of a "calling" is found in Luther's teaching also, but is much more developed by Calvin and his successors.

¹³ See above, page 37

monarchies, of competitive rivalries between merchants and between nations all found justification and a rational philosophy in Calvinism, but only because the doctrines of Calvinism had their roots in the age in which all of them had developed.¹⁴

ENGLAND AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

A third new church of major importance came out of this sixteenth-century revolt against the old tradition. The new faith was the Anglican, and the circumstances which brought it into being form an interesting chapter in political and economic history as well as the story of the origin of the Church of England. England had long maintained a position of semi-independence from papal authority. In the fourteenth century various acts of Parliament had limited the exercise of that authority, and during the residence of the papacy in Avignon the English government had assumed that a papacy under French domination was inimical to English interests. The heretical beliefs of John Wiclif had not been ruthlessly suppressed in England, and the Englishman, William of Ockham (d. 1349[?]), was one of the most severe critics of the church. During the Schism the English governing class had played one claimant to the papal see off against another. In the years following the healing of the Schism the papal endeavor to re-establish the prestige of the papacy was resisted in England as a matter of traditional policy. It was, perhaps, somewhat an accident that England joined the Protestant ranks, although it is difficult to be sure what the ultimate reaction to successive invasions of the new doctrines would have been had Henry VIII (1509-1547) not become involved in a controversy with the Catholic Church. England had a strong monarchy in the sixteenth century, as near an absolutism as English kings ever attained, a semi-isolation from the European turmoil that might have acted as a quarantine from infection with new doctrine, and the long tradition of autonomy and resistance to interference from Rome prevented any keen or widespread awareness of the dangers of the corruption in the church. English humanism was that of Erasmus,

¹⁴ The controversy as to this connection between Calvinism and business enterprise has long occupied many historians. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, H. M. Robertson, *Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism* and R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, are but three among many works on the subject.

who was the friend of the English group with whom he had resided. John Colet, Sir Thomas More, and others were not radicals. Kindly learned men, they were tolerant reformers who had no desire to break with the old religion. The king himself took pride in his association with the humanists and received the title of "Defender of the Faith" for his attack upon the first vanguard of Lutheranism to reach England. Henry's chief minister was for many years Thomas Wolsey, a cardinal of the Catholic Church. But nationalism was strong in England, and there was an equally strong allegiance to a national monarchy in the person of the popular king. A quarrel between crown and church would find Englishmen with a divided allegiance, but with the scales tilted in favor of the crown.

THE PART PLAYED BY HENRY VIII

The circumstances which led to the severance of the English church from Rome were peculiar. Henry VIII had been married for eighteen years to Catherine, the daughter of the Spanish rulers, Ferdinand and Isabella.¹⁵ They had one daughter, Mary, a sickly and not very attractive young girl. Many other children born to them had died in infancy, and it was apparent that there was to be no male heir. The Tudor dynasty had been in possession of the throne for but two generations, and Henry, quite naturally, wished to be followed by a son. This might not have been a motive strong enough for Henry's subsequent action had he not fallen in love with a lady of the court, Anne Boleyn, who although not of royal birth was a member of one of the proudest families of the British aristocracy. A man of determination and self-will, Henry asked the pope for an annulment of his marriage on the grounds that Catherine, having been the widow of his elder brother, could not legally be his wife. Catherine, refusing to consent to her own humiliation and to the illegitimacy of her daughter, fought the annulment with every weapon in her power. The opposing pressures made things very difficult for the pope, for the wars between Catherine's nephew and supporter, Charles V, and Francis I of France had already made the position of the papacy no easy one. The pope therefore played for time, and Henry, urged on by Anne, who refused to be satisfied with any status save that of wife and queen, tried coercion. Between

¹⁵ See above, page 16.

1531 and 1534 he forced the English clergy to pay a heavy fine for the violation of old laws limiting the powers of the pope in England; he stopped the payment of money to Rome in the form of annates; and he appointed bishops to English sees by parliamentary instead of papal authority. Finally, growing impatient and feeling that he had waited long enough for his bride, he named one of his clerical supporters, Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury and demanded from him the annulment not granted by the pope. His marriage with Anne Boleyn then took place (1533) to be followed almost at once by his excommunication by the pope.

The situation was made more tenable by acts of Parliament declaring the king to be the head of the Church of England.¹⁶ Henry had no quarrel with Catholic doctrine, and the severance of the church from the papacy made little difference in the life of the average citizen. There was no immediate acceptance of Protestantism and no substantial change in church services. Nevertheless, the change was not achieved without difficulty; many churchmen and conscientious laymen, including Sir Thomas More, refused to submit quietly to the will of the king and received the punishment accorded traitors. With the king as head of the church dissent became not so much heresy as treason.

Goaded by the recalcitrance of the clergy and by his own pressing need for money and the avarice of his courtiers, Henry, by a series of decrees, confiscated the property of the church in England, dissolved the monasteries, and created a new aristocracy by distributing their estates among his supporters. The schism was complete and final.

ENGLISH PROTESTANTISM UNDER EDWARD VI AND MARY TUDOR

Henry's second matrimonial venture was not a success. The only child of Anne Boleyn was a daughter, Elizabeth. Henry tired of Anne, and her fancy wandered; as a result of both situations she was executed. There followed in rapid succession four more marriages, from one

¹⁶ In 1531 Henry forced the English clergy to pay a fine of over a half million dollars for violating an old law which required royal permission for the reception of papal legates in England. In the same year he forced the clergy to recognize him as head of the church, and Parliament gave him power to stop the payment of annates and to appoint bishops. In 1534 Parliament recognized the king as the supreme head of the church and made it treason to deny him that position.

of which a son was born who succeeded Henry in 1547 as Edward VI. The new king was a sick boy, whose reign lasted six years. During that time Edward's maternal relatives governed for him. Strongly Protestant for political as well as for religious reasons, they did all that they could to carry the English church over into Protestant forms and doctrines. In the meantime, Protestantism spread rapidly among the people.

When the boy king died in 1553, by Henry's will Mary, the daughter of Catherine, came to the throne. Devout Catholic that she was, Mary proceeded without delay to restore the old faith. Her marriage to her Spanish cousin, Philip, the heir of Charles V, who urged her to persecute the Protestants, was unpopular in England and unhappy for Mary. Her religious persecutions revealed an unexpected strength in the Protestant ranks of her subjects, and resistance to the royal policy grew. The martyrs of the reign of "Bloody" Mary increased the hatred for Rome and ensured the reaction toward Protestantism that greeted the accession of Elizabeth in 1558 at the end of Mary's short reign (1553-1558).

THE RELIGIOUS SETTLEMENT UNDER ELIZABETH

The religious policy of Elizabeth was dictated by necessity. She could make no peace with the Roman Church in whose eyes she was illegitimate and a usurper. She had been reared in the semi-Catholicism of her father where orthodoxy of faith was coupled with royal supremacy in church government. The mass of the English people was undoubtedly Catholic at heart in 1558 although the influential, progressive middle class and part of the nobility were Protestant, and a policy of compromise was inevitable. This compromise was characteristic of Elizabeth, who had had ample opportunity to observe the results of the violence of extremists on both sides, for her youth had been spent in evading the dangerous factions that considered her very existence a menace to their plans and their continuance in power.

The House of Commons during Elizabeth's reign was consistently although moderately Protestant; the men of letters and the sea captains who preyed on the Spanish treasure ships were of the new faith. By the end of Elizabeth's long reign the Catholic majority had forever disappeared, and England was securely Protestant. But the Protestantism of the Church of England was far from that of John

Calvin or even that of Martin Luther. Church services were in English, but the service itself was Catholic in nature, much of it a mere translation from the Latin. The structure of the Church of England was more like that of the Catholic Church than like that of other major Protestant faiths. In theory the doctrine of apostolic succession was retained, and with the king as the head of the church and the Archbishop of Canterbury as primate, an episcopal hierarchy was maintained. The Thirty-nine Articles that constitute the body of Anglican doctrine were adopted in Elizabeth's reign and were deliberately designed to avoid offense to either Catholics or Protestants. It is a question as to whether Lutherans or Anglicans stayed closer to Rome, but it may be sufficiently accurate to state that the Anglican church in government and in services was more like the old order, while Lutheranism may have been slightly more Catholic in doctrine.¹⁷ With a broad impartiality Catholics and extremely Protestant dissenting sects were treated with equal severity, and outward conformity was sought without too searching an inquiry as to inner convictions.

If the religious situation demanded a moderate policy, the delicacy of England's European position required great finesse. To Catholic Europe Elizabeth's right to the English throne was questionable, and the claims of Mary, the Catholic Queen of Scotland, formed the basis for intrigue until the death of the Scottish queen in 1587. The situation was unprecedented—a queen of doubtful legitimacy, young and not only unmarried but reluctant to forsake her spinsterhood. For many years Elizabeth conducted negotiations with many states with a view toward matrimony; at first these negotiations were probably sincere, later in life they were doubtless for purely diplomatic advantage. Marriage to any English nobleman would have involved her in the quarrels of English factions, and marriage to a foreign prince would have led to a fatal involvement in the disturbed affairs of Europe. The anti-Protestant policy of Philip of Spain, coupled with the irritation caused by the freebooters who

¹⁷ "Just as the Reformation succeeded in England by becoming national in opposition to Spain, and remaining national in opposition to French culture, so the Anglican church naturally became a perfect expression of the English character. Moderate, decorous, detesting extremes of speculation and enthusiasm, she cares less for logic than for practical convenience."—Preserved Smith, *The Age of the Reformation* (Henry Holt and Company), p. 330. In fact, many modern Anglo-Catholics appear to believe that they represent the old faith from which the Catholic Church saw fit to deviate in the sixteenth century!

haunted the Spanish Main, led to an undeclared war with Spain which ended in the destruction of the Spanish Armada in 1588¹⁸ and the establishment of the supremacy of England on the seas. Elizabeth's reign (1558-1603) covered the long years of the wars in the Netherlands which led to the rise of the Dutch Republic, and the forty years of intermittent civil warfare in France, in which politics and religion were mingled.¹⁹ England could be indifferent to neither situation, and it was with remarkable adroitness that Elizabeth and her ministers steered the English government through all the complications without risk of a major conflict. The political, economic, and cultural life of England in the period will be discussed in another connection. The end of the reign of Elizabeth found England securely Protestant; the religious discord of the seventeenth century was to be the result of strife between the conservative Anglican church and the newer and more radical sects whose allegiance was given to the doctrines of John Calvin.²⁰

THE MAINTENANCE OF CATHOLICISM IN ITALY AND SPAIN

In Italy and in Spain religious revolt made slight headway. The critical spirit of the Renaissance made cultured Italians fully aware of the evils within the church and they did not hesitate in the expression of their opinions. There was no strong national government in Italy to block the progress of revolt as there was in France, and connections with Germany and with Switzerland had always been very close. Italian humanists, however, were relatively uninterested in matters of religion; tolerance rather than devotion to either cause marked their attitude; Italians in general took pride in the papacy and approved its splendor and its Italianate character; and the wars of Spain and France fought on Italian soil through the fifty years when religious changes occurred elsewhere left Italy much under the control of the strongly anti-Protestant Hapsburgs. In Spain and Portugal the governments were Catholic and ruthlessly suppressed any appearance of the hated doctrines. There was, however, little reason for alarm, for in neither country were the people inclined to separation from the church. There was criticism and anticlericalism in certain classes but not mass movement. Few of the abuses which

¹⁸ See below, page 156.

²⁰ See below, Chapter VI.

¹⁹ See below, Chapter V.

had aroused criticism elsewhere were apparent in the Spanish church, which had been vigorously reorganized under Ferdinand and Isabella. The Spanish Inquisition,²¹ created in the war upon Moors and Jews, relentlessly suppressed books containing noxious ideas and persecuted any humanists who might stray from the fold. Heresy wherever found was met by close co-operation between a bigoted king and a resolute clergy. The Inquisition, with its torture chamber and the public auto-da-fé, was an effective weapon in the extermination of heresy and served as a deterrent for any who might feel a desire to criticize either church or state. Portugal came into Spanish control in the latter part of the century, and the same severe tactics were used to suppress heresy there. As a matter of fact, there was little danger of religious revolt, for the people of the peninsula were seldom touched by the outside world, and their allegiance to the church was strengthened by their centuries of crusades against the Mohammedans. Of all the Spanish possessions it was only in the Netherlands that religious revolt gained ground. There every effort of Spain was unavailing, and the Reformation became revolution, political as well as religious. The dramatic story of the war for Dutch independence begins with the abdication of Charles V and is a part of the broader narrative of the religious wars of the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

THE REFORMATION IN FRANCE

The close connections between France and Italy insured the early development of Renaissance culture in France. Leonardo da Vinci and other artists of the Renaissance spent a part of their working years in France; the kings and great nobles of France became patrons of arts and letters; and humanism spread rapidly. The French humanists, like those of other Northern European states, were much interested in Christianity and the reform of abuses in the church. Lefèvre d'Étaples, William Budé, and others were called Christian humanists and devoted their lives to reform and to making religion once more a vital thing in France. This group had adherents among the nobility and in court circles. The sister of Francis I, Margaret d'Angoulême, was fired by their teaching and later, as Queen of Navarre, wrote books based on their theories and acted as their protector and patron.

²¹ The Inquisition became a state tribunal in 1532.

Many other French humanists were as frankly secular as those of Italy and either wrote with scepticism and ironic ridicule of religion or seemed completely indifferent to it. In this group Rabelais and Montaigne were outstanding. Rabelais's *Gargantua* and *Pantagruel* were scoffing burlesques of conditions as the author saw them. Montaigne avoided religious subjects in his essays and confined his attention to secular affairs. The Protestant movement gained few adherents from either wing of the French humanists. Almost all of the Christian humanists and the frankly indifferent freethinkers as well remained within the old faith although their reasons for doing so were widely divergent.

Lutheranism appeared early in France. The pamphlets and tracts of Luther himself and of his followers were the first missionaries and were read eagerly. The University of Paris, traditionally the stronghold of theology and scholasticism, came out in immediate opposition to heretical teaching. King Francis I did not hesitate to undertake suppressive measures, for in France the position of the Catholic Church was as much a matter of state as it was of religion. For many years the real head of the French church, in church control and policy, had been the king rather than the pope. These "Gallican Liberties"²² had been confirmed by a concordat, or treaty of 1516, between king and pope, which placed the power of appointment in the hands of the king. Francis therefore looked upon Lutheranism as a dangerous and schismatic movement and at once issued edicts to prevent the publication and distribution of heretical works and to extirpate the heresy. In 1523 the first French Lutheran was burned at the stake.

Had the king always been thus free to act, French royal policy toward Protestantism would probably have been consistent. But in France as in the Germanies the necessities of war were to interfere with the solution of domestic problems, and policy shifted with the fortunes of campaigns. In the early days of his reign Francis I had given every indication that he intended to resist the encroachment of Hapsburg power. He reasserted French claims in Italy and in Navarre; he showed his intentions of extending French influence in

²² For two centuries the French crown had been endeavouring to obtain control of the church in France. In 1438 the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges had marked concessions by the pope which had freed the church in France from papal tax collectors, and had left much power in the hands of the French church. The Concordat of 1516 confirmed the Gallican—or French—Liberties by agreeing to royal control over appointments to church offices.

the Netherlands; he offered himself as a candidate for the imperial election in 1519; and prepared to defy Charles V with military prowess. Such a program was inevitably followed by war, and hostilities between France and Spain broke out in 1522.

For nearly forty years there was almost constant warfare between the two dynasties. The brief periods of peace which punctuated the conflict were but intervals of truce and preparation for renewal of hostilities. Francis I was often hard pressed and sought aid wherever it might be found. He made alliances with Scotland, Sweden, the Protestant princes of Germany, and even with the Ottoman Turk. Although his elastic conscience might have made it possible for him to reconcile himself to the acceptance of the aid of Protestants and the continuance of the persecution of French heretics, he found himself forced to agree to religious toleration before the wary German princes would sign an agreement to send him aid. As a result the suppression of heresy was spasmodic and ineffective. The death of Francis in 1547 and the abdication of Charles a few years later did not end the war. Carried on by their heirs, it was dragged out until 1559 when the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis brought the long-awaited peace. The Hapsburgs were left in control of Italy, but the French victories in the last years of the war secured them the important and strategic cities of Metz, Toul, and Verdun.

After the publication of the *Institutes* of John Calvin,²⁸ a new doctrine came into France which rapidly gained adherents. Calvinism seemed to fit the French temperament; its militant energy fired its adherents to resist persecution; and its logical dogma eased the transition from a faith to an organized church. At last the reform movement in France coalesced. Calvin himself corresponded with many French leaders and aided in the work of organization. The movement won adherents from all liberal groups and appealed strongly to the middle class. It is impossible to give any accurate estimate as to the numbers of Protestants. They were always a minority in the population, and whether they numbered one-sixth or one-twentieth of the total inhabitants of France is immaterial. In any case their importance was out of all proportion to their numbers, for they were inspired by the zeal of a new religion and constituted a very articulate and influential group.

Henry II was alarmed by the spread of heresy and issued a series

²⁸ See above, page 107.

of edicts early in his reign which were designed to extirpate all dissent in France. New courts were set up, and all the horrors of torture and the stake were meted out to the recalcitrant Protestants. Thousands of the persecuted sect fled from France and settled in Geneva, England, or the Netherlands. Nevertheless persecution increased rather than diminished the numbers of heretics who, more closely organized than before, were attracting supporters from the more influential classes. Officials of both church and state became Protestants, whose ranks were swelled by the conversion of the Bourbon princes, Admiral Coligny, and other great nobles.²⁴ Calvinism showed such strength and the military situation was so pressing that the government was compelled to relax the persecutions at least for the time. The new faith then organized quite openly and became a recognized political group within the state. The great nobles who had become Protestant were opposed to the extension of royal power, and the middle class opposed the inequalities and the oppressive policies of the French government. There was some expression of republican opinion and still more democratic sentiment, for Calvinism had as an essential doctrine the equality of all Christians before God. In May of 1559 there was a meeting of Protestants in Paris which drew up a creed based on Calvin's *Institutes* and adopted a system of church organization on a national basis. About this time the name "Huguenot" came to be applied to the Protestants and was gradually adopted as the name of their church. After the death of Henry II in 1559 the story of the French Huguenots becomes a part of that of the civil-political-religious wars in which France was involved until the end of the century.

THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION

The Catholic Church did not submit to disruption without protest. The sixteenth century is the period of one of the most thorough-going reforms to which the church, which has often cleaned its own house of abuses, has ever submitted itself. This Catholic Reformation would undoubtedly have taken place even if the movement for reform in Northern Europe had not developed into open revolt. Clergy as well as laity had long felt the need of drastic change. The com-

²⁴ Anthony of Bourbon, a descendant of Louis IX, married Jeanne, Queen of Navarre, who was a niece of Francis I. Their son, Henry of Navarre, was to become king in 1589 and to rule until 1610 as Henry IV, the first Bourbon king of France.

mon people everywhere were devoted to the church which had been so much a part of their lives for countless generations. Wherever there was no strong middle class and where there were no ambitious princes to raise the standard of revolt, allegiance to the old order was unshaken. Only in Germany had there been an important rebellion of the peasantry, and there the causes were probably more economic than religious. The humanists, although critical, were in general opposed to violence and preferred reformation to revolution. The gentle pressure of men like Erasmus was a potent factor in leading to constructive change.

The reform movement within the church was slow in getting under way and did not reach any great proportions until after 1550. It was difficult for a privileged order to purify itself even when the abuses were recognized. The wealth, fees, and annates were a sort of vested interest which no churchman and no pope could quite bring himself to surrender. Simony and nepotism were deeply rooted and difficult to eradicate. Repentance and confession, penance and restitution may be good for the individual soul but difficult of achievement for so complex and vast an organization as the church. The popes of the first half of the sixteenth century were not so lax as those a generation earlier. Their personal lives were not matters of public reproach, but Italian politics, the wars on Italian soil, and many secular affairs occupied their attention. The experience of the popes with church councils in the fifteenth century had not endeared the conciliar idea to them, and they dreaded risking their authority once more to a representative movement. Furthermore it was difficult to make a council complete and representative without the aid of the kings and princes of Europe. So the popes were dilatory, and the movement dragged.

In the meantime the Protestant movement passed its peak. After 1560 few new areas were added. Scandinavia and North Germany were Lutheran; Switzerland and parts of South Germany and of the Austrian dominions were Calvinist, a movement which had made a little headway in France and had captured the upper Netherlands and Scotland. England had her Anglican church, although not all Englishmen were Anglican. Elsewhere the revolt had either gained little support or had been suppressed. This check was due in part to the fact that the peculiar circumstances under which the revolt could thrive—the presence of nationalism, individualism, and an active middle class—did not occur everywhere in Europe, and in part to a

genuine reaction or religious revival that stirred the Catholic to a sterner, more vital faith and won back the wavering to their old moorings. Several new monastic orders were organized within the church to spread the revival of faith and to win back the heretic.²⁵ Of these the greatest was the Jesuit Order founded officially in 1540 although the work of its founder, Ignatius Loyola, had begun nearly twenty years before that date. Loyola was a Basque from the kingdom of Navarre, of noble birth, and a soldier, a knight of the Middle Ages rather than a man of the Renaissance. He was wounded in battle and suffered a long and painful convalescence which left him a cripple for life. During the period of his illness he occupied himself in reading lives of the saints and a life of Christ. He experienced a mystical sort of conversion and took a vow to preach the gospel to the infidel. He made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem and came back to Spain to study and to hold what seem to have been revival meetings among students. His education as a boy had been rudimentary, and he spent years in study and self-discipline, often in danger of the Inquisition because of his fanatical teachings. He began to attract followers and to win them by his enthusiasm and his sincerity.

For his adherents he drew up a book which he called *Spiritual Exercises* and which contain his ideas on the ascetic life. The *Exercises* are in four parts or weeks: the first devoted to a study of sin, the second to the mission of Christ, the third to the passion, and the fourth to the resurrection. The whole of the *Exercises* was concrete and pedagogically sound. The solitude, self-discipline, and prolonged contemplation of the life of Christ were designed to produce a sense of mystical exaltation and devotion to the cause to which the author had dedicated his life. The end desired was the complete subjection to the church and obedience to all its teachings coupled with a missionary zeal for its advancement. After being admitted to the priesthood, Loyola organized a small group of students in an order called the Company of Jesus which was military in form.

In 1540 the constitution of the order was accepted by the pope, and the Society of Jesus was officially recognized, the members of

²⁵ A partial list would contain the names of the Sommaschi, the Barnabites, the Ursulines, the Theaunes, the Capuchins, the Observants, the Fathers of a Good Death. New saints arose in older orders and rededicated them to the reform movement. See Henry S. Lucas, *The Renaissance and the Reformation* (Harper & Brothers), Chapter XLVIII.

which, called Jesuits, took a special vow of obedience to the pope and agreed to devote themselves to missionary work among Turks, infidels, and heretics. The general of the order was—subject to papal authority—absolute in power, and the spirit of the Jesuits was one of unquestioning obedience to authority. The Catholic Church now had the new weapon that might make its recovery possible. The order grew rapidly, and within a few years its members could be found in all countries. On Loyola's death in 1556 there were more than a thousand members scattered from Japan to Brazil and working in all parts of Europe where the church was in danger.

While the Jesuit order was being developed, a general council of the church was finally called to meet at Trent in 1545. Pope Paul III, elected in 1534, had been working for serious reform and had exercised care in appointments and especially in those to the college of cardinals. The findings of a commission set up by the pope to make surveys and reports on abuses in the church and the changes needed to correct them, furnished the basis for the reforms instituted in the papal *curia* as well as for the agenda of the Council of Trent. The council lasted for many years (1545-1563), meeting in three periods several years apart. The work of the Council of Trent included doctrinal decisions clarifying religious differences, reform of abuses, and the discussion of a crusade against the infidel, but the rivalry between popes and council and between papacy and emperor delayed action and confused the issues. It was found impossible to heal the schism and win back the Protestants, for the council refused compromises and issued statements reasserting traditional Catholic dogma, denouncing heretical ideas, and reaffirming the authority of the pope and hierarchy. Nevertheless, the work of reform was thoroughly carried out, and the disciplinary statutes made possible a complete reorganization and the eradication of abuses. The council was unsuccessful in the matter of uniting Europe in a crusade, the states most affected being left to fight against the Turk without the help of Christendom.

The work of the Council of Trent revived the church and with the aid of the Jesuits much of South Germany and Eastern Europe was won back for Catholicism. The church made use of the Inquisition in some regions, and through the Index, a list of dangerous and heretical books forbidden to good Catholics, the dangers of contamination were decreased. By the end of the sixteenth century

the lines between Catholic and Protestant territories were drawn in much the same way as they are today.

SUMMARY OF THE REFORMATION PERIOD

Any estimate of the Age of Reformation encounters grave difficulties, for the motives of the period are confused and very complex. Religion and politics, piety and avarice, economic and social ferment all combined to cause revolt. Yet some of the results of the upheaval may be examined, and a few conclusions may be drawn. It seems safe to say that there has been much exaggeration on the part of both Catholic and Protestant historians as to the importance of the revolution in the period in which it occurred. Looking back upon it after several hundred years, we see the breakup of the old unity of the powerful medieval church as a dramatic and momentous occurrence. The average European in the sixteenth century, in all probability, had no feeling of living in the midst of startling change.

Actually the growth of national churches had been going on for some time, and it may have been too difficult to maintain the international character of the church in an age of increasing nationalism. Even without a Luther or a Calvin the old passive submission to authority was gone in the church as elsewhere. The critical spirit, the questioning minds of an age of science, invention, and discovery would have refused the restrictions of tradition, whether or not the organization and doctrine of the church had remained intact. Even without the Protestant revolt it cannot be doubted that the church of the seventeenth century would have been a different thing from the medieval church.

The new churches did bring some innovations of great importance. The rise of Puritanism, with its emphasis upon morals, undoubtedly changed the lives of generations of human beings. The Catholic as well as the Protestant churches felt the influence of that Puritan movement, and its effect was in some respects beneficial and in others very narrowing. It frowned upon the arts, was suspicious of pleasure, and more than a little afraid of any indication of joy of living.

In the period of the Renaissance the humanists had seemed to revive the old Greek way of life, with its ease and tolerance and philosophy of moderation. It was, to be sure, confined to a rather narrow circle, but within those limits a real liberalism and genial scept-

ticism were developed. The religious revolt was the death knell of toleration. Issues were sharpened, persecution of Catholics in Protestant areas and of Protestants where Catholics held sway made it impossible for the liberal to hold to his view that there was merit in both sides and that neither had the sole key to heaven. There is no war so bitter as the conflict between ideologies. Only the small minor sects, oppressed by all larger and stronger groups, could make any plea for toleration, and their feeble wail was one of self-defense.

Where criticism was stilled in both camps by rigid censorship and repression, superstition could not be kept out. In both Catholic and Protestant countries in the seventeenth century there was a tragic and pitiable wave of witchcraft, persecution such as Europe had not known for generations. Education was, perhaps, more injured than aided by the revolt. In Protestant countries the confiscation of church property and the closing of church schools interfered with the old education, and kings and princes were slow to build up Protestant institutions to take their places. Higher education suffered greatly, both from lack of funds and from the censorship of press and the restriction of freedom of thought. The use of the vernacular in preaching, the translations of the Bible, the greater number of books on religious subjects, the greater emphasis upon the educational or propaganda phases of church sermons and services—all made for interest in elementary education. The Calvinist ideal that every child should be able to read and write undoubtedly had some effect on the democratization of learning already begun by the printing press.

The Reformation era had some effect upon government and the economic and social order, although it is a little difficult to tell which is cause and which effect. Nationalism contributed to the movement for religious revolt and was accelerated by it. The absolutism of kings received the support of the churches which they favored. Capitalists also came to the support of national churches, and the new Protestant churches were supported by the middle classes, for their doctrines neatly fitted the middle-class philosophy of many of their members. The democracy of the nineteenth century was based upon the Protestant revolt, but the economic conditions of the later period determined its course. Only in the minor and downtrodden sects, such as the Anabaptists, were there social and economic theories springing from the needs of a proletariat. Neither Catholic nor major Prot-

estant churches went much below the upper and middle classes in their social philosophy. The masses were expected to accept and submit to the ideas of those in power.

In church government and in the relations between church and state there were certain new ideas. Papal hierarchy discarded, Protestant churches built their own forms, varying from the Anglican modeled on the Catholic with a full system of clergy from priest to archbishop, but with the king as the supreme head of the church, to the purely congregational, local, and individual government of the smaller more democratic sects. A union between church and state was the legacy of the era of revolt in many areas. The state church of the Lutheran and Anglican faith was unfamiliar in ecclesiastical history, although national governments everywhere endeavored to be independent of Rome. The desire of the Calvinist for theocracy found expression in Switzerland, in Scotland, and in some of the English colonies. The intimate relation of religion and politics in modern Europe has often been to the disadvantage of both. In conclusion, the Reformation is one of the most interesting and dramatic of the phases of European history, but it is a great mistake to consider it as an entity, apart from its relation to other developments of the period.

READINGS

GENERAL ACCOUNTS. The texts on the Renaissance and the Reformation listed in Chapter II may be used for this chapter and the one following. The best one-volume account of the period for the general reader is *The Age of the Reformation* (Revised edition, 1930) by Preserved Smith. Albert Hyma's *The Christian Renaissance* (1924) is an interesting account of the forerunners of the Reformation. *The History of the Reformation*, 2 vols. (1906), by T. M. Lindsay is a longer standard account. Preserved Smith has written, also, *Erasmus, a Study of His Life, Ideals and Place in History* (1923) and *The Life and Letters of Martin Luther* (1911). Both are valuable and readable.

CALVINISM. The part played by John Calvin is depicted in a group of recent books: G. Harkness, *John Calvin, the Man and His Ethics* (1931); James Mackinnon, *Calvin and the Reformation* (1937); the vigorous and readable *Calvin, a Modern Biography* (1932) by Jean Moura and Paul Louvet; and F. C. Palm's excellent brief *Calvinism and the Religious Wars* (Berkshire Series, 1932). The economic and social phases of the Reformation are stressed in J. S. Schapiro's *Social Reform and the Reformation* (1909); while the following treatments stress the connection between reli-

gious doctrine and the rise of modern capitalism: H. M. Robertson, *Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism* (1933), R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (1926), and Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1930).

SPECIAL STUDIES. Francis Hackett's *Francis the First* (1935) depicts conditions in France in the beginning of the Reformation period, and his *Henry the Eighth* (1931) does the same for England. Hilaire Belloc gives a very biased view of the period in his *How the Reformation Happened* (1928) but deals in an interesting and interpretive way with the eminent English figures in his *Wolsey* (1930) and *Cranmer Archbishop of Canterbury, 1533-1536* (1931). The Jesuits are discussed in the account of the order by T. J. Campbell, *The Jesuits 1534-1921* (1921); and the founder of the order is the subject of a biography, *Ignatius Loyola, the Founder of the Jesuits* (1926) by Paul van Dyke. Some of the work of Catholic missionaries is delightfully told by Agnes Repplier in *Junipero Serra, Pioneer Colonist of California* (1933), *Père Marquette* (1929), and *Mère Marie of the Ursulines* (1931), and by Herbert Bolton in *Rim of Christendom* (1936).



THE PERIOD OF RELIGIOUS WARS

THE Protestant revolt was never a purely religious movement. The life of the state, like that of the individual, is complex; motives are seldom single but are usually a tangle of confused ideas; and close examination reveals qualifying factors that prevent a simple explanation of events. It has been customary to call the wars of the century after the death of Luther the Wars of Religion, probably because the Reformation loomed large in the minds of the early historians who coined the phrase. Religious controversy was undeniably one of the elements of which these were composed, but they came about through an intricate interweaving of causes. It is almost impossible to state whether politics, economics, or religion contributed the most important factor; it is certain that all three were present at the same time to form the background of each of the wars of the period. There is no clear division, either, between civil and foreign war. Each of the three long conflicts to be discussed in this chapter had, at times, both aspects. Starting in local or civil revolt, they furnished opportunity for intervention, and foreign nations were involved in the conflict whether or not war was actually declared. For such intervention political considerations were usually paramount although religious sympathies were more often the announced cause.

THE EUROPEAN BACKGROUND FOR THE "WARS OF RELIGION"

There are certain fundamental aspects of the European situation in the middle of the sixteenth century which underlie the military events of the period. The religious unity of Europe had been disrupted, and both Catholic and Protestant faiths were militant and intolerant in their attitude toward each other. The theory that all the people of a state must submit to the same religious discipline

and accept the same dogma was a fixed idea of the times. Conformity, orthodoxy, and suppression of heresy were as true of one division of Christendom as of the other. Since the idea of monarchical and absolute government was also well established, it devolved upon the ruler of the state to secure that uniformity. Religious dissension within the state savored of disloyalty to both state and monarch.

In the second place, monarchical government meant emphasis upon dynastic interests and rivalries. The outstanding example of dynastic clash was the long conflict between the Hapsburg and the Valois-Bourbon lines.¹ The controversy began in Italy in the fifteenth century when the French kings made claims in southern Italy that caused a war with Ferdinand of Aragon,² and later advanced claims to Milan which was theoretically under the Empire. From both grandfathers Charles V inherited quarrels with France that were to be fought out in Italy. In fact, the European situation seemed untenable to France when the Netherlands, the Empire, Spain, and much of Italy, as a result of that famous series of marriages, were united under the control of one man, Charles V. War between Valois and Hapsburg became practically inevitable, for, apart from the Italian situation, the growth of royal power in France caused the French and their rulers to feel that the Rhine was a natural boundary, and that French interests were of importance in the rich lands near the mouth of the river. In the southwest, also, there was difficulty, for Spain and France were rivals for the domination of the little states along the Pyrenees. An ambitious French ruler naturally felt hemmed in and restricted, and the tenacious Hapsburg could not tolerate the pretension of powerful rivals. Charles V and Francis I spent much of their reigns in futile wars that were broken only by the truces which exhaustion necessitated. Italy was devastated by the armies of both monarchs, whose rivalry was destined to continue in some form or other into the eighteenth century.

The situation was eased to some extent by the abdication of Charles in 1556, and the division of his vast realm between his brother Ferdinand, who acquired the Austrian possessions and, on the death of Charles, was elected as emperor, and his son Philip, who,

¹ The Valois line in France came to the throne in the fourteenth century and died out in the sixteenth. Henry III, the last Valois king, was followed by Henry of Bourbon, King of Navarre, a cousin and brother-in-law. The Bourbon line was on the throne to 1792 and again for a time after 1814.

² See above, pages 21-22.

as Philip II, was to rule over Spain, the Netherlands, Franche-Comté,³ Milan, Naples, Sicily, and the Spanish colonies. The preoccupation of Ferdinand and his successors with German affairs and with the menace of Turkish invasion was a relief to France, but the predominance of Spain continued to be a matter of concern for another century. The ardent and militant championship of Catholicism on the part of Philip II was certain to cause trouble between the two states if there should be religious difficulties in France.

THE NETHERLANDS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

The French resentment of Spanish control in the Netherlands prompted intervention there in case any difficulty should arise between the inhabitants of that region and their Spanish ruler. That difficulty might arise there seems obvious when the situation is analyzed. The Netherlands had been content under the mild Burgundian rule which had been directed toward the furtherance of commerce and industry. The seventeen provinces at the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt were not a nation but a group of semi-independent units forming a part of the Burgundian possessions of Charles V. Each province had its local assembly, and all the provinces were united under an Estates-General which had, however, very little legislative power. They had always been a part of the French-German borderland in culture, language, and race as well as in politics. The northern or Dutch provinces were far more German than French, while the southern group spoke Flemish or Walloon French and had always felt themselves to have a Latin heritage. The Netherlands formed a natural market area in the Middle Ages, and their well-cultivated soil and commercial opportunities made them forge ahead in the early modern period. Manufacturing had long been of importance in the southern provinces. Antwerp and later Amsterdam were the greatest banking and business centers of Europe for many years. The area was thickly populated and inhabited by an active intelligent people.

In this Netherlands area there was a wealthy nobility owing traditional allegiance either to the emperor or to the king of France or to both of them at the same time. The nobles had been deprived

³ Franche-Comté was a part of old Burgundy south and east of the Netherlands and north of the Alps. It had come into Hapsburg possession in 1493.

of political power by the monarchs who had also brought the clergy under their own control. Neither nobility nor clergy was of importance as compared with the rich merchants and industrialists who dominated the city governments. In the struggle with Spain in the sixteenth century many of the nobles found their interests lay with the commercial class, and they became leaders in the fight for independence. The position of the church had been undermined by the widespread humanism and criticism of the period. Erasmus did not stand alone but was the leader of many cultivated followers of Renaissance ideas. The laboring classes and the peasantry had no more consideration or political power in the Netherlands than elsewhere, although both groups were more progressive and less servile than in any other part of Europe.

When Mary of Burgundy died in 1482 it was with some difficulty that her husband, Maximilian of Austria, won the Netherlands to an acceptance of Hapsburg control. His grandson Charles, however, was born in Ghent, was reared in the Lowlands, spoke Walloon French and always considered himself a Burgundian prince. He held as much of loyalty throughout his life as the independent burghers were willing to yield to any ruler and made their interests and aggrandizement a part of his policy whenever there was not too much urgency elsewhere in his vast possessions. Although the loyalty of the Netherlands to Charles may be taken for granted, even in his reign they were restive under attempts at centralization of authority and at the subordination of their local and economic interests, and they resented the exactions upon their purse in the constant wars of Charles's reign. But this restiveness had no focus and no real unifying force. The nobility, the bureaucracy and many of the richest and most prominent burghers favored Charles's policies as opposed to the selfish localism of the city governments and of the many lesser burghers. Dissatisfaction, although widespread, was far from a serious problem. Other factors than local and commercial interests were to make it so.

The religious revolt spread into the Netherlands very early. Trade centers and the meeting places of men of all nations, the cities of the Lowlands were thoroughly cosmopolitan and open to every variety of new idea. Lutheranism was brought in almost as soon as it appeared in Germany and found some adherents among the burghers. Nevertheless, its growth was slow, for there were no princes to espouse its cause there as was the case in Germany. Local authori-

ties, both religious and civil, took immediate action against the heretics, and the young emperor added his influence. Charles was ready in 1522 to establish the Spanish Inquisition in the Netherlands, for religious revolt in that region seemed peculiarly personal and undesirable to him. His councilors opposed the plan, but a compromise was effected by which a similar but local inquisition was introduced, and active persecution of heretics was begun. The suppression of the Peasants' Revolt in Germany brought a flock of Anabaptists and other radicals to the Netherlands, and their preaching spread among the lower classes. New edicts of greater severity made new martyrs whose death for the cause added new converts. Censorship of the press, restriction on public meetings and persecution of heretics were all ineffective and became extremely unpopular among the more tolerant and cosmopolitan Lowlanders. But even the Protestants seem to have been loyal to Charles V, and his reign ended with Catholicism still the faith of a large majority of the population, even in the northern cities where disaffection had been greatest.

PHILIP II AND THE NETHERLANDS

The abdication of Charles V placed the Netherlands under his son Philip II, who was not Burgundian but a Spaniard, and the Netherlands began for the first time to feel a foreign yoke. Rapidly the sense of unity that had needed only a little pressure became active, common interests were found to be stronger than localism, and a vigorous nationalism developed. From Philip's point of view the Low Countries were but remote provinces of the Spain with which he identified himself. Their commerce was subjected to the restrictions which made Spanish trade the most highly regulated in the world, and the individual initiative which had built up Dutch and Flemish commerce and industry was stifled. Taxes had been heavy in the reign of Charles V, but they had been to some extent under local control. They now became higher, more oppressive, and were regarded as foreign in character. In government Philip was an absolutist. The local autonomy and the Estates-General of the Netherlands seemed to him unjustifiable infringements upon his power, and the regents he appointed to govern in the Netherlands were instructed to ignore them. Officials, hitherto locally chosen, were now sent from Spain, and the army stationed in the Netherlands was largely alien, under Spanish officers and with orders from the Spanish monarch.

Philip II had no personal popularity which might have been used to counteract the dislike felt in the Rhineland for his despotic measures. He was a cold, precise, painstaking man; conscientious, devout, bigoted, and absolutist to the core. He had no personal charm, no ability at winning friends, and no comprehension of the point of view of opponents. He was meticulous in administration, petty in supervision, and stubborn in instinctive resistance to new ideas. Without intending to discriminate against the Netherlands, he could not fail to misunderstand and misgovern them. He was, moreover, an ardent Catholic pledged to the extirpation of heresy.

Religious differences furnished an added irritant and made the situation in the Netherlands intolerable. The reform movement in the Catholic Church⁴ was extended to the church in the Netherlands, and the united efforts of pope and king were exerted in the reorganization of the church and in the elimination of abuses. These measures created much discontent among both clergy and laity, and Catholics as well as Protestants began to feel that the religious policy of Philip II was an unwarrantable despotism. At the same time a new Protestant element appeared that greatly changed the situation. Calvinism grown strong in Switzerland was carried down the Rhine and made many adherents in the Netherlands just as it was doing in France in the same period. Its appeal was much greater than that of Lutheranism. It was more logical in doctrine, owed more to the humanists, was semidemocratic in character, and put no dependence upon princes. In general, it made a great appeal to the cultivated middle class.⁵ The northern provinces were more affected by the new doctrines than the southern ones, but religious discontent was rife in both regions. Calvinism aroused republicanism and the energy "to resist tyranny by force." Through that energy came a coalition of all the various elements of discontent, political and economic as well as religious.

The movement of revolt against Spain thus became a national one and did not long lack leadership. The count of Egmont and William, prince of Orange, although nominally Catholic at the time,⁶

⁴ See above, pages 118-20.

⁵ See above, page 108.

⁶ The prince of Orange was first a Catholic, then a Lutheran, then a Catholic again, and at last a Calvinist. His personal beliefs probably remained much the same. He was a disciple of Erasmus, tolerant, and a humanist. He owned estates in France and in Germany and was governor of Holland and Zeeland before the revolt. The counts of Egmont and Horn, after Orange the chief leaders from the nobility, were executed by the duke of Alva in 1568.

were opposed to persecution of dissenters or heretics, and were in complete accord with the protests against Spain on all other counts. They were among the richest and most powerful of the nobility and soon had a wide following from their own and the middle class. Several hundred nobles and influential burghers came together early in 1566 and circulated a petition stating that the situation was intolerable and requesting that a delegation be sent to Philip II to urge upon him the necessity of a more moderate policy in regard to all of the various causes of discontent, especially requesting the abolition of the Inquisition. The advisers of the regent counseled firmness against "those beggars," and the term of opprobrium was proudly adopted by the rebels who, as the Dutch Beggars, were later to win their independence from Spain.

THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC

Philip II equivocated and ultimately refused the requests for leniency, but in the meantime attempts to force submission and conformity upon the more radical Protestant sects resulted in a violent outbreak. The revolt began among the unemployed workingmen in Armentières but spread rapidly to other cities. Catholic churches were entered, altars wrecked, windows and images smashed, and much damage was done. The riots were solely anti-Catholic without any evidence of robbery or baser motive, and were regarded by the authorities as the beginning of a religious war. The Calvinists rallied, soldiers were hired, and the leaders began negotiations with the French Huguenots and with English friends. A clash with the government troops early in 1567 marked the opening of hostilities.

Spanish veterans led by the famous general, the duke of Alva, were sent to the Netherlands. Alva, as great a bigot as his master, was determined to restore royal authority. Suppression of the revolt was both a pious and a patriotic duty.⁷ He set up a court called the Council

⁷ Resemblance often noted between the Dutch and the American revolution is here lost. In William of Orange the Dutch may have found their George Washington, but there is no counterpart for Alva. "With true Anglo-Saxon moderation, the American war was fought like a game or an election, with humanity and attention to rules; but in Holland and Belgium was enacted the most terrible fightfulness in the world; over the whole land, mingled with the reck of candles carried in procession and of incense burnt to celebrate a massacre, brooded the sultry miasma of human blood and tears."—Preserved Smith, *The Age of the Reformation* (Henry Holt and Company), p. 254.

of Troubles for cases of treason and heresy, and this council, called by the people the "Council of Blood," operated with such single-minded devotion to repression that thousands were executed and countless other thousands lost their property. The total figures for Alva's six years in office are mere estimates and vary with different authorities. Probably it is safe to say 8,000 were executed, and 30,000 lost their property. Alva himself boasted that he had added by confiscation and fines 500,000 ducats to the yearly revenues of the Netherlands. It has been estimated that 400,000 emigrated in the thirty years of conflict. The effect was terror, the crushing of prosperity and the spontaneous revolt of the population. When the duke imposed the "alcabala," or Spanish sales tax of 10 per cent, financial panic and economic collapse were added to the disasters.⁸ The Catholic southern provinces, aghast both at the ruthless persecutions and at the catastrophe to industry, rose in revolt. The movement then became genuinely national, and it seemed for a time as though a permanent union of the seventeen provinces might be effected on the basis of freedom from Spain, the removal of tyrannical legislation, and religious toleration.

The possibility of success led to redoubled efforts. In William of Orange a national leader was developed who refused to accept defeat although his troops might be routed. For nearly twenty years he struggled on, obtaining aid from England and from French Huguenots and German Protestants when opportunity offered, and depending upon his own resources when necessity so demanded. The Dutch Beggars were at home on the sea, where they harried Spanish commerce in order both to hamper the enemy and to obtain the money and supplies so needed at home. Realizing the hatred for the duke of Alva and hoping to weaken the revolt by withdrawing him, Philip sent a new regent, Don Luis Requesens, who found no solution except to continue the struggle along the lines already laid down. Requesens' death in 1576 was followed by a mutiny of the Spanish troops, who were left without food or pay. In the horrors that followed, Spaniards sacked Antwerp, the great business center of the southern provinces. This episode, known as the "Spanish Fury," served to effect the long-awaited union of all provinces. An agreement called the Pacification of Ghent was drawn up by which Catholic and Protestant provinces pledged resistance to Spain until the Inquisition

⁸ See above, page 66 This tax fell on each sale of merchandise. In a manufacturing area it frequently meant a tax of 50 to 70 per cent.

should be withdrawn and the old liberties restored. The fundamental difference of religion was left unsettled although the northern provinces agreed to take no action for the time against Catholicism.

The union was not to be permanent, for a few years later a new regent, Alexander Farnese, duke of Parma, succeeded in detaching the Catholic provinces from the coalition and winning them back to Spain. In 1579 the south formed the League of Arras in defense of Catholicism, and the seven northern provinces bound themselves together in the Union of Utrecht which was, in effect, a declaration of independence from Spain. Freedom of worship was agreed upon at the same time, for the Catholic minority was large and union was essential.

The war dragged on for many years. Farnese was regent until 1592. At times the cause of Dutch independence seemed desperate, but the final catastrophe was always averted. The Spanish troops faced the problems that are met by any alien invading force endeavoring to conquer the unyielding resistance of a united people determined upon independence and fighting for survival. The very nature of the country made it easier to defend than to attack. The canals and streams of the river delta, the dykes that could be cut when necessity might dictate, were to the advantage of the stubborn defenders, who avoided battles in the open field whenever they could. Aid came at intervals from the Protestants of the Germanies, the French Huguenots, and from England. The subsidies from abroad were used to hire foreign mercenary troops, and the thriving commerce of the "Sea Beggars" brought some measure of prosperity and kept the spirit of revolt alive. Philip II was beset with troubles elsewhere which culminated in the war with Elizabeth of England and the destruction of the Armada.

William of Orange was assassinated in 1584, and Philip II died in 1598, but the war went on. In 1609 a truce was arranged which for all practical purposes agreed to the independence of the northern Netherlands, but the Dutch Republic was not officially recognized until the end of the 'Thirty Years' War in 1648. The southern provinces remained Spanish until 1713. Catholic, Flemish, and industrial, they developed along lines divergent from those of the northern area. The division between the two has been permanent, and today the kingdoms of the United Netherlands and Belgium are witness to that fact.

The Dutch Republic, founded with so much heroism and blood-

shed in the sixteenth, was to become in the next century one of the strongest states of Europe. Its greatness was based upon distant trading, sea power, and the colonial empire built up in the Far East at the expense of Portugal, whose sun was setting. Amsterdam succeeded to the position of commercial and banking supremacy held by Antwerp. The Dutch East India Company took over much of the spice trade of Europe, and, not satisfied with the riches of the East, in the early seventeenth century the Netherlands established colonies in the Caribbean and on the coast of North America.⁹ The merchant marine grew to such size that the Dutch not only provided for all the needs of their own commerce but became the carriers for the trade of other nations. Their enterprise and well-earned success received a sharp check in the middle of the seventeenth century when rivalry with England led to a series of wars largely commercial in nature. These wars left the Dutch Republic shorn of much of its sea power; New Amsterdam became New York; the vast East Indian colonies remained in Dutch hands; but the glorious days of Dutch dominance were over. The wars of aggrandizement of the French in the reign of Louis XIV aided in that decline, for Louis's determination to win the Rhine boundary for France made the little Dutch Republic his implacable enemy and a member of every coalition against him.¹⁰

The House of Orange remained through every vicissitude identified with the fortunes of the Dutch state. The seven provinces formed a confederacy with a central parliament; each province was self-governing for local affairs and had its own assembly. The governor, or stadholder, was the chief executive, and the office came to be hereditary in the Orange family. For many years there was a constant dispute between parliament and the stadholder in which the burghers supported the former and the nobles the latter. This struggle was to some extent one between middle class and aristocracy, between republicanism and monarchy. The difficulties of the wars with France aided the House of Orange, and the United Netherlands became a centralized monarchy under the stadholder. The sturdy burghers retained much power, however, and monarchy in the Netherlands never became a despotism.

⁹ See above, pages 75 ff.

¹⁰ See below, Chapters VI and VII.

THE RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL SITUATION IN
FRANCE, 1559-1598

The wars between the French and the Spanish over rival claims in Italy had in the last years of the fifteenth century opened a conflict which was to broaden into a great dynastic rivalry when Charles V inherited the claims and pretension of his grandparents as well as their vast possessions. This rivalry was to be an outstanding feature of European international relations for nearly three hundred years. In the first half of the sixteenth century France successfully resisted the strangling pressure which Hapsburg encirclement brought about. The latter half of the century was filled with bitter civil conflict sometimes called the Religious Wars. The Reformation had gained headway in France, and Calvinism became the open faith of many thousands of Frenchmen who, by the middle of the sixteenth century, were called Huguenots. Francis I and his son Henry II endeavored to stamp out the new heresies whenever the wars with Charles V made it possible for them to do so. In the meantime the Huguenots acquired a following among the influential and wealthy middle class and even claimed the support of some of the greatest nobles of France.

The Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559, which ended the war with Spain, freed the king from the difficulties of war, and he prepared for a renewal of the attack upon Protestantism, which by that time had grown to serious proportions both as an organized church and as a political faction.¹¹ The accidental death of Henry II in the same year prevented the carrying out of his plans, and the years which followed were filled with difficulties in which religion and politics combined to confuse the issue. Henry II had married, when he was very young, Catherine de' Medici, a girl of fourteen, the daughter of Lorenzo II of Florence. She was never very attractive or popular, and her position in France was precarious for the first ten years after the marriage because of her childlessness. When Catherine was twenty-four, a son, the first of nine children, was born. Her position became secure politically, but neither marriage nor motherhood could bring her personal happiness. After nearly thirty years in such a difficult position, Catherine was left a widow with a large family of young children, no one of whom seemed to possess either the physi-

¹¹ See above, pages 117-18

cal vigor or the mental and moral stamina necessary for a king in a time of stress. Three of her sons were to rule in succession, Francis II (1559-1560), Charles IX (1560-1574) and Henry III (1574-1589). They were all weaklings, and none of them left an heir to the throne.

Through most of this thirty-year period Catherine was the power behind the throne. At first sight her policy may seem to have been a devious one, but if its central objective is kept in mind its fundamental consistency will be apparent. That great objective was the maintenance of royal power against all assailants, and the preservation of the territories of France and the prerogatives of the throne for her children. Shrewdness, ruthlessness, and an astonishing amount of political acumen marked her conduct of affairs, and in her ability to use any means that might serve her ends she seemed an apt pupil of Machiavelli. The situation was one which required the highest amount of ability. The great nobles of France had been under the control of the crown for less than a hundred years, and a young ruler or a weak king offered them a great opportunity to regain their feudal power. There were several families whose territories were vast and whose relationship to the crown was perilously close. The middle class upon which the crown had relied was weakened in its allegiance by adherence to Calvinism, with its tendency to republican theory, and by its desire for control of royal policy. Catherine could only try to maintain a middle-of-the-way policy, play off her adversaries against one another and hope to maintain herself in power by dominating her weak sons.

The Guise family was one of the most powerful in France. Francis, duke of Guise, was the greatest general of Henry II. Charles, his brother, was the cardinal of Lorraine, and their sister Mary was the wife of James V of Scotland. Their niece, Mary of Scotland, was the child wife of young Francis II. Guise supremacy seemed secure until Francis' sudden death weakened the family's position. Devout Catholics, the family formed the nucleus for many years of the group of Catholic nobility pledged to the control of the throne and the extirpation of Protestantism. This group founded the Catholic League, and before the end of the century conspired with Philip II of Spain to prevent the accession of Henry of Navarre. The Bourbon family was also closely related to the royal house and, being Protestant, led the group of great nobles that had gone over to the Huguenot faith. The Coligny family was of almost as great importance, and its Huguenot head, Gaspard, the admiral of France, was

a man of statesmanlike qualities. The Guise faction relied upon the Catholic majority in the population and upon its own feudal and military power; the Coligny-Bourbon group of nobles could expect aid from the Huguenot middle class. Both factions hoped to circumvent Catherine and control the throne. Further difficulties were added by the foreign situation. The war for independence in the Netherlands led to occasional union of Protestants in both countries for mutual benefit, and the interest of Philip II in the Netherlands and in Catholicism in general made him willing to interfere in France when opportunity offered.

THE "RELIGIOUS" WARS IN FRANCE

Out of that complex situation came the so-called Religious Wars of France. For forty years France had no peace; there were eight periods of war in which all the horrors of civil conflict were visited upon the countryside. The result was exhaustion and compromise. Very little need be said as to the details of that conflict. On August 24, 1572, there occurred the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day which shocked the Protestants of all lands and made the name of Catherine de' Medici odious in history. In order to secure the allegiance of the house of Navarre and to counteract Guise influence, Catherine arranged a marriage between her daughter, Marguerite, and Henry of Bourbon, the young King of Navarre. At the same time she greatly feared the influence of Admiral Coligny over her weak son, Charles IX, for any such ascendancy would reduce her own power and lead to French intervention in behalf of the Dutch Protestants. Hence she made an alliance with the Guise faction to cause the murder of Coligny and a massacre of Huguenots to reduce their numbers and their power. The blow was a devastating one, for it is probable that from ten to twenty thousand Huguenots were killed in August and September of 1572, but their ranks were refilled, and the massacre, although terrible, was but an episode in the long period of conflict.

Charles IX was followed by his brother Henry III in 1574, and Catherine maintained much of her power throughout his reign. The queen mother had no sympathy for either extreme. Religious fanaticism was beyond her comprehension, and she took advantage of the desire for peace on the part of large numbers of the moderate Catholics to favor a party which suited her needs, called the "politiques,"

and to attach this group closely to the throne by giving its members positions of importance in the government. Henry III endeavored to conciliate the Protestants by edicts of toleration and thus drove the extreme Catholics into a league which rapidly became so powerful that Henry reversed his policy and declared himself in accord with the Catholic League. It is not surprising that the king became unpopular with both groups; his unpopularity, moreover, extended to the general public because of the ruinous taxation imposed by the government and the corruption of its officials. The question of the succession to the throne became a pressing one for the king was sickly and had no sons.¹² A war broke out which has been called "The War of the Three Henrys," because the heads of the three rival houses of Valois, Navarre, and Guise all bore that name. Philip II of Spain took part in the war. He had married as his second wife a daughter of Catherine de' Medici and now claimed the succession to the French throne for their daughter. In the course of the war Henry of Guise was assassinated in 1588 by order of the king, who, a year later, was himself assassinated by a fanatic supporter of the Catholic League.¹³ Catherine died in the same year, and her moderate party largely went over to Henry of Navarre.

The war dragged on for a few years because of the reluctance of the extreme Catholic party to submit to the Huguenot king of Navarre. This third Henry, now over thirty years of age, was vigorous, intelligent, and ambitious. His allegiance to the Protestant faith was probably sincere but moderate, and he was determined to end the senseless devastating civil conflict. Whether or not he ever said, "Paris is worth a Mass," he did act upon that principle and made his peace with the Catholic Church. He was crowned king at Chartres in 1594 and entered Paris in the same year. Peace was signed with Spain four years later, and the forty years of civil war came to an end.

¹² A younger brother of Henry III died in 1584, and the Valois line had no direct heir. Henry of Bourbon, king of Navarre, was the nearest in succession, for he was a descendant of Louis IX and the husband of Marguerite of Valois. There was so much objection to him because of his Protestantism that the extreme Catholics proposed his uncle, Charles of Bourbon, and later ventured to support one of the Guise princes.

¹³ It is interesting to note that the third Henry also met death by assassination, in 1610.

HENRY IV, 1589-1610

Henry IV was wise in the measures used to heal the wounds of war. The powerful nobles were placated and bought off, opponents were treated with clemency, and every effort was made to satisfy the Catholic majority and to establish royal authority over all parts of France. The king was equally determined to remove all cause for dissatisfaction on the part of the Huguenots. By the Edict of Nantes in 1598 they were given a very special status in the state, and their rights as a powerful minority were recognized. Liberty of conscience and private worship were granted to all; freedom of public worship was provided in many enumerated towns and in the castles of the nobility; the government promised aid to Protestant schools and legalized the publication of Protestant books; right of assembly and civil and political liberties were guaranteed; and Protestants were made eligible to hold office in the state. The most important guarantee of the permanence of these rights was the grant of complete control over two hundred towns, some of which were fortified and might be garrisoned by Huguenot troops. For some years there was religious toleration in France, and the Huguenots enjoyed the special privileges of the Edict of Nantes as a "state within a state." This toleration and special position was not a matter of conviction on the part of the French rulers but one of expediency. The Gallican church in France was strongly national and supported the monarchy. When the monarchy felt itself secure in power it turned against the nonconformists. When opportunity offered in the seventeenth century the Edict of Nantes was revoked, and the Huguenots were attacked once more.¹⁴

The year 1598 marks the apex of Protestantism in France. The decline in the next century was due to other causes as well as to the continued opposition of the government. The establishment of an absolute government meant the loss of religious toleration. The Reformation came late to France, and the tendency of French civilization was toward the Catholic Church and a secular culture, both under an absolute monarch.

The removal of causes for religious dispute was an important part of the policy of the new king, who had himself at different times sworn allegiance to both faiths. But much more was necessary in order to revive an exhausted France and repair the damage done by nearly

¹⁴ See below, pages 196-97.

a hundred years of almost constant war. Henry IV had sixteen years of life after his coronation in which to rehabilitate France and to lay the foundations upon which her predominance was to rest in the seventeenth century. Henry was not only the debonair "plumed knight" and the brave and dashing soldier about whom almost fabulous stories had been told in the long years before his rise to power. He was dashing and gallant; he was affable and vivacious; he undoubtedly did feel a keen interest in the welfare of his subjects; but there was a cold hard kernel of ruthlessness, self-interest and despotism at the heart of his policy. The throne which he had acquired with so much difficulty was to rest firmly upon a basis of absolutism. He had no idea of sharing his power with nobility, middle class, or with any representative organization such as the Estates-General. In an address to the local estates of Burgundy he clearly expressed his point of view: "Your most precious privileges are the favors bestowed upon you by your king." The theory of the "divine right of kings" was not new and received its classical statement later, but Henry IV constructed the absolutist model for which the theorists contributed the justification.

With the re-establishment of royal authority the nobility was brought back under the control of the crown. Those too powerful to coerce were bought off by concessions or placated by office. The middle class was satisfied with peace and the opportunity to attend to business affairs under the protection of a powerful monarch. The restoration of order throughout the countryside was made possible by the organization of police and military forces to stamp out highway robbery and reduce the crimes of violence that the disturbed times had permitted. The devastation of France had been terrible: roads had been neglected, bridges destroyed, and towns razed. Men were out of work, commerce and industry were at a standstill, and the government was nearly bankrupt. Morale must be restored, trade set in motion and taxes collected, or the crown he had won would be of little value to the ambitious and avaricious king.

Henry selected as his finance minister an able Huguenot, the duke of Sully, and between them the economic reorganization of France was begun. Sully's policy was one of retrenchment and careful supervision. Royal expenditures were cut, the army was reduced, rigid economy was demanded from officials, and tax collectors were watched so that dishonesty became difficult. As a result the treasury showed a favorable balance for each of the last ten years of Henry's reign

(1600-1610).¹⁵ Sully was much interested in the advancement of agriculture. His tours of inspection led to the inauguration of a comprehensive system of aid to the agricultural population. Roads and bridges were rebuilt, and canals were protected. Direct subsidies encouraged stock raising, and the removal of internal, provincial customs barriers was advocated. Henry desired to increase the prosperity of the middle class. Mulberry trees were planted in central France in order to establish the silk industry. Pottery and glassware factories were built. Commerce was stimulated by bounties to the merchant marine, and protection was promised by construction of a navy. In 1604 an East India company was chartered, and in 1608 Champlain founded the first French colony in North America at Quebec. France was ready to take her place, economically as well as politically, as a powerful modern state.

LOUIS XIII AND RICHELIEU

When Henry IV was assassinated by a religious fanatic in 1610, it seemed as though the gains made in his reign might be lost, for the heir to the throne was a nine-year-old boy, Louis XIII, and the regent, his mother, Marie de' Medici, was utterly incompetent, although ambitious and self-confident. She dismissed Sully, and after a few years of extravagance brought France once more into such financial difficulties that in 1614 she summoned an Estates-General to ask for aid. Since the fourteenth century French kings had been reluctant to share their power with this organ of government and had called the Estates together only at long intervals. It had never become a regular legislative body, and its division into three chambers, clergy, nobility, and bourgeoisie, had prevented any united action. The Estates-General of 1614 was as impotent as earlier ones had been; the nobles and clergy refused to tax themselves; the third estate, unpopular in court circles, hated by the nobility and distrusted by the peasantry, could assume no leadership. After a three weeks' session which accomplished nothing, the queen regent dismissed the Estates because the court wished to have a dance in the hall in which they met! There was to be no other session of an Estates-General until 1789 on the eve of the French Revolution.

¹⁵ He saved ten million livres. It is difficult to state the value of that sum in modern standards but a livre had probably about the purchasing value of ten dollars at the present time.

For ten years more there was disorder in France, but in 1624 Louis XIII appointed as his chief minister Armand de Richelieu, a cardinal of the Catholic Church, who was the real head of the French government until his death in 1642. Louis XIII was a man of mediocre ability without the genius for administration his father had developed, but he was wise enough to realize and to depend upon the strength and loyalty of his great prime minister. The policy of Richelieu is best expressed in his own words:

I promise to devote all my energy and all the authority that it may please you to place in my hands to destroying the Huguenots, abasing the pride of the great nobles, restoring all your subjects to their duty, and raising the name of your majesty among foreign nations to its rightful place.

Powerful, energetic, able, often cruel, unscrupulous, and ruthless, he upheld those principles and maintained those policies for many years.

The fact that Richelieu was a Catholic cardinal was not the main motive for his attack upon the Huguenots. He was the supporter of the absolutism of the crown, and the Huguenots, with their fortified towns and special assembly, courts, and other privileges, constituted a state within France but outside the king's authority. They rose in revolt in 1625 and were suppressed with all the force at Richelieu's command. Their famous fortress of La Rochelle, although aided by an English fleet, was captured after a long siege, and the edict which accompanied the restoration of peace deprived the Huguenots of all their fortified towns and special privileges while leaving them freedom to worship as they chose.

Richelieu then proceeded to establish royal absolutism in France. He summoned no Estates-General but, on the other hand, reduced the powers of the local assemblies and brought the law courts under royal control. He subdued the rebellious nobility and razed fortified castles. The powers of provincial governors, who were usually great nobles, were given to new officials, the intendants, who were of the middle class and directly under the authority of the crown. These intendants had authority to supervise taxes, the police, and the courts. There were usually thirty-four of them, and because of their power and energy they were later called the "thirty tyrants of France."

The foreign policy of Richelieu was directed toward one end only—the establishment of French prestige and power in European

affairs. In pursuit of that policy, he quite logically supported the enemies of the Hapsburg family and carefully watched French interests along the Rhine. In order to understand all the implications of French policy under Richelieu it is necessary to go back into the history of the Germanies and study the complexities of the political and religious issues which resulted in the last of the wars of religion, the Thirty Years' War.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR: BOHEMIAN PERIOD

The Peace of Augsburg in 1555¹⁶ had left the German states divided between Lutheranism and Catholicism, with each prince deciding the religious affiliation of his people. This could scarcely be called religious toleration, and it left many problems unsolved; nevertheless, it constituted a working compromise and ended a period of civil warfare. The death of Charles V in 1558 brought the election of his brother Ferdinand as emperor. Ferdinand had long been administering the Austrian domains of the Hapsburg family and as Emperor Ferdinand I he was conciliatory toward the Protestants and too weak to interfere with the independence of the German princes. He was chiefly concerned with Austrian affairs and with the defense of his southeastern estates against the Turks. His successors were men of mediocre ability, and the headship of the House of Hapsburg, for all practical purposes, resided in Philip II of Spain until his death in 1598. The two branches of the family were closely connected by marriage in each generation, and the Spanish rulers were intensely interested in the affairs of their Austrian relatives. Until 1619 there was no emperor of ability, inspired with a desire to champion the cause of Catholicism in the empire or to assert once more imperial authority over the German princes. When Ferdinand II came to the throne it was immediately apparent that a forceful personality had appeared on the scene, and that some solution of the unsolved problems, religious, economic, and political, would be sought. Ferdinand was young, energetic, Jesuit-trained, and devoutly Catholic, and he was determined to bring about the establishment of Hapsburg control in Germany. Under Ferdinand the full effects of the Catholic Reformation were to appear in Central Europe, and it was inevitable that resistance and war should result.

¹⁶ See above, page 104

The situation, in brief, was this. The Lutheran princes who were protected by the Peace of Augsburg lived in northeastern Germany. They were largely indifferent to the fate of the Calvinists who had their churches in southern Germany, in the upper Rhineland and in Bohemia. The Lutheran princes were vulnerable in that they had not paid due attention to the clause in the Peace of Augsburg providing for "ecclesiastical reservation" but had continued to secularize church lands as prelates accepted Lutheranism. They might be expected to evade or resist undue extension of central power and to be anti-Catholic and anti-imperial if their interests were attacked. The German Catholics were inspired by the Catholic Reformation to take an aggressive policy against Protestantism, and the greed of the Catholic princes was aroused by the opportunity to recapture church lands. The Calvinist princes were alarmed and united in 1608 to revise the Peace of Augsburg and to gain concessions from the empire. Their leader was the young prince and elector of the Palatinate, Frederick, who was soon to be the son-in-law of James I of England. The Catholic princes countered by forming a league of their own in 1609 under the leadership of Maximilian of Bavaria. The three groups of princes, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Catholic, had little in common except their determination to resist extension of imperial authority. When Ferdinand II became emperor the maintenance of peace was no longer possible, and since he must rely for aid upon the Spanish Hapsburgs a European war would be inevitable.

The immediate cause for the outbreak occurred in Bohemia, where many of the Czech nobles were Calvinists and feared that the succession of Ferdinand would mean a loss of their local autonomy and religious freedom. Bohemia had long been under Hapsburg rule but had by custom and agreement been granted almost complete self-government and its own Diet, the emperor being represented by envoys. In 1618 a group of Bohemian nobles entered the rooms occupied by these envoys and threw them out of a window, the famous "defenestration." This act was followed by a declaration of Bohemian independence from the Hapsburgs and the election of Frederick of the Palatinate to be king over Bohemia. Ferdinand II was elected emperor in the next year and took immediate and vigorous action against the Bohemian rebellion. The king of Spain agreed to send an army against the Palatinate, and Maximilian of Bavaria sent his general, Count Tilly, to lead the combined forces of Austria and the Catholic League against Bohemia.

The newly crowned Frederick and Elizabeth of Bohemia found that neither the Lutheran princes nor the young queen's father, the king of England, intended to send them aid,¹⁷ and the Bohemian and Palatinate forces were soon overwhelmed. Frederick and his queen fled from Bohemia and lived the rest of their lives in exile in the Netherlands. The first, or Bohemian, period of the Thirty Years' War came to an end with the conquered Palatinate in Bavarian hands, and Bohemia was turned over to the mercies of Ferdinand of Austria. The rebellious nobles were replaced by Catholics who acquired the confiscated estates, religious policy was put in the hands of the Jesuits, and Bohemia became another Austrian province.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR: DANISH PERIOD

Philip IV of Spain took the opportunity thus offered to renew the war in the Netherlands, where he had some minor victories in spite of the fact that England and France both aided the Dutch. The defeat of the Protestant forces in Bohemia, South Germany, and the Netherlands alarmed the Protestant princes of Europe. Christian IV of Denmark came forward as the champion of Protestantism and invaded Germany, aided by English subsidies and the troops of some of the Lutheran and Protestant princes. He expected to reimburse himself by the extension of his control over northern seaports. The empire and the Catholic League sent Count Tilly against Christian IV, and after him an army commanded by a soldier of fortune and military genius who had built up great estates for himself in the confiscated lands of Bohemia. This man was Wallenstein, and Europe has seldom seen a greater general or a more magnetic leader. He was the devoted supporter of the emperor, whose power he felt should be supreme in Germany. The Protestants suffered severe defeats, and many of the German princes deserted Christian. Without a fleet, however, the Catholic forces could do little damage to Denmark, which was protected by Dutch sea power. The Danish period of the war ended in 1629 with a treaty by which Christian gave up many of his claims to German lands.

The Catholics, completely victorious, then proceeded with their

¹⁷ James I had reversed the anti-Spanish policy of his predecessor, Elizabeth, and was engaged in an attempt to secure a Spanish bride for his heir, Charles. This project was unpopular in England and fell through in 1623. England engaged in war against Spain in the early years of Charles I's reign but had little success.

program of reorganization. The Catholic League demanded from the emperor the Edict of Restitution (issued 1629) which restored to the Catholic Church the lands it had lost since the Peace of Augsburg. This edict affected two archbishoprics, twelve bishoprics, and one hundred and twenty smaller districts, many of which had been in Protestant hands for more than fifty years. The Protestant princes were frantic; even those Lutherans who had remained neutral in the first two periods of the war were now ready for action. Wallenstein disapproved the edict and fell from power because he refused to enforce it. The insistence of the Catholic princes, however, forced the dismissal of Wallenstein and the disbanding of his army of nearly one hundred thousand men.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR: SWEDISH PERIOD

With the empire weakened by this dismissal the Protestants suddenly received aid from a new quarter. The young Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus, had started some years before upon the ambitious program of making the Baltic a Swedish lake. He was not only a romantic and an attractive figure, well educated, an able general, an idealist and a champion of Protestantism, but at the same time a very practical and vigorous leader. Having conquered Finland and Estonia, he forced Russia to agree to exclusion from the Baltic and acquired Livonia and the mouth of the Vistula from Poland.

He now invaded Germany (1630) with an original force of about thirteen thousand men. The French government, ever ready to attack the Hapsburg, sent him money and arms, and the Lutheran princes, including the hitherto reluctant electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, came into the war. Count Tilly was killed in battle and the victorious Gustavus Adolphus was ready to invade the Austrian dominions. The emperor made a new alliance with Spain and recalled Wallenstein. The two great commanders met in the battle of Lutzen in 1632. The army of Gustavus Adolphus was victorious, but the king was killed. The war was continued for two years, but the Swedes were without leadership, and energies lagged. A treaty between the emperor and the German princes was signed in 1635 ending the third or Swedish period of the war. The Peace of Augsburg was reaffirmed, and the Protestants were permitted to keep the lands they had held in 1627. The power of the emperor was advanced by an agreement that the

military forces within the empire should be under his direct control, and by the provision that all princely leagues were to be dissolved.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR · FINAL OR FRENCH PERIOD

The Germanies would now have welcomed a much-needed period of peace and recuperation. The whole of Germany had been fought over, and many regions devastated. Vast armies had lived upon the countryside for fifteen years, and the people were tired of war. But peace did not suit the policy of Richelieu, and the continuance of the war for another decade was so much due to the French influence that it has been called the French period (1635-1648). The spectacle of a cardinal of the Catholic Church, prime minister of one of the greatest Catholic kingdoms of Europe, deliberately involving that kingdom in a war to aid the Protestant states against the Catholic Hapsburgs is evidence of the distinctly political character of this religious war. Richelieu directed French attention to the destruction of the power of Spain and relied upon the Swedes and the German princes to exhaust the resources of Austria. The war dragged on; initial Spanish successes were followed by French victories on all fronts; Dutch sea power re-established the independence of the Netherlands; Portugal broke away from the Spanish throne and made a Braganza prince its king; and the Italian possessions of Spain revolted. In the Germanies there was the confusion of constantly shifting allegiances among the princes and an ever-increasing devastation and exhaustion of economic resources. Ferdinand III (emperor since 1637) was ready to make peace in 1641, but France, after victories over Spain, wished to administer a crushing defeat to the Hapsburgs of Austria and kept the war going for a few years longer.

At last negotiations were conducted and the result, bearing the title of the Treaty of Westphalia, was ready for signature in 1648, bringing to an end the conflict in the Holy Roman Empire. The settlement of German affairs was an important part of the treaty. The emperor had endeavored to have purely German questions reserved for a German diet, but the princes distrusted him and preferred to submit all questions to the peace conferences. The result was a triumph for particularism and the petty princes. Each principality and petty republic, numbering about three hundred states in all, obtained practical self-government. They could coin money, raise armies,

make alliances, and exercise all functions of government independently. The emperor could not declare war or make peace without their consent, and only in his own territories was he to have real power. For two hundred years the Germanies were to lack unity, and German national feeling was in the dim future.

The religious issue was settled by a recognition of the *status quo*. Calvinists and Lutherans were to have the same privileges. Religious property was left in the possession of those who held it in 1624. Catholics and Protestants were to have an equal number of judges in the imperial courts. There were few shifts in the religious map of Germany after 1648, and, although there was no mention of toleration, religious persecution tended to diminish, and the storm of religious revolt seemed to have blown itself out.

Many territorial changes were authorized by the treaty. France obtained Alsace, except Strassburg, and was confirmed in the possession of the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, thus securing her position in the Rhineland. Sweden's share of the spoils of war was West Pomerania and the bishopric of Bremen controlling the mouths of the Weser and the Elbe. Brandenburg acquired East Pomerania, expectancy to Magdeburg, and some small bishoprics. The Palatinate was divided between the ruler of Bavaria and the son of the exiled Elector Frederick, each receiving the title of elector. France and Sweden obtained votes in the imperial diet because of their German possessions, and the independence of Switzerland and the Netherlands was officially recognized, the first by the empire and the latter by Spain.

The war between Spain and France lasted for another eleven years, to be ended by the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659. Had the Dutch and the French remained allies, they might easily have conquered the Spanish Netherlands and divided that territory to suit themselves. But the Dutch were alarmed at the growth in French power; Amsterdam feared a revival of the rivalry with Antwerp; and the alliance was broken off. Richelieu's death in 1642 and that of Louis XIII in 1643 left France once more to a minor heir, and to the domestic problems of the regency were added foreign difficulties. Cardinal Mazarin was able to put down revolt in France and to end the war with Spain. The treaty signed in 1659 gave to France a few towns on the border of the Spanish Netherlands and the little Pyrenees province of Roussillon. The young French king, Louis XIV, agreed to marry a Spanish princess.

THE RESULTS OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

The period of the Thirty Years' War ended with the establishment of French hegemony in Europe. The Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Denmark appeared for a brief time as important states but could not challenge the position of France. The Austrian Hapsburgs had been damaged in their imperial position and in prestige, but their possessions in Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary were intact, and the Austrian position as a great power was secure. The Spanish Hapsburgs were impoverished; Portugal was gone, and they had been forced to concede the independence of the Dutch and to grant some lands to France. There was no vitality in Spain to bring recovery from the blow. After 1648 Spain can no longer be regarded as a first-rate power. The havoc caused in Germany by the long period of wars was indescribable. The accounts of contemporary writers show the destructiveness of the war. Villages and towns were destroyed; whole areas became desert territory; certain arts and industries were lost entirely; trade and commerce were damaged; education and culture set back. It took a hundred years to repair the damages done by war. At the same time it must be admitted that the decline in importance of the Germanies in the seventeenth century would have been apparent if the war had not occurred. The stronger state organization, the greater commercial opportunities, and the greater wealth and middle-class initiative of Western Europe were factors sufficiently strong to have ensured predominance.

The complexity of the interests involved in the long conflict and the large number of states that were involved in its various phases led to the development of the modern state theory of the equality of sovereign states. In the course of the Thirty Years' War, modern diplomacy and diplomatic procedures were born. Attention to the circumstances of the war caused students of international affairs to realize the need for some sort of international rules or regulations. The publication of a treatise *On the Law of War and Peace* by Hugo Grotius, a Dutch scholar, was an event of great importance in modern political thought.

READINGS

The list of general accounts cited for the preceding chapter will be useful for the period of religious wars that followed the Reformation. *Europe in the Sixteenth Century* (7th ed., 1928) by A. H. Johnson is a

useful survey. The brief Berkshire volume, *Calvinism and the Religious Wars* (1932), by F. C. Palm might be emphasized again. The standard work for the wars in the Netherlands is J. L. Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic* (new edition, 1909). It is long and detailed but extremely interesting and in some ways incomparable. *William the Silent* (1911) by Ruth Putnam is a much briefer account from the point of view of the leader of the revolt. The French wars of religion centered about the figure of the queen, Catherine de' Medici. The older standard biography is *Catherine de' Medici*, 2 vols. (1922), by Paul van Dyke. There are two interesting recent accounts: *Catherine de' Medici and the Lost Revolution* (1937) by Ralph Roeder and Milton Waldman's *Biography of a Family, Catherine de' Medici and Her Children* (1936). The standard work on the Thirty Years' War is by S. R. Gardiner, *The Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648* (1884). *A Short History of Germany* (New edition, 1927) by E. F. Henderson has excellent chapters on the period. Hilaire Belloc's *Richelieu, a Study* (1929) is an extremely readable biography of a figure prominent in the last period of the war.

≡ VI ≡

THE TRIUMPH OF PARLIAMENT IN ENGLAND

A SURVEY of Europe in the sixteenth century makes it possible to formulate several conclusions or generalizations. In each state or area the reaction to the problem of religious revolt depended upon cultural, economic, and political conditions which were in some respects the cause and certainly affected the results of the religious movement. The rise of modern states was accompanied by, and was perhaps accomplished by, the relentless efforts of monarchs to strengthen their own positions within their states and by their intense rivalry with one another for European power. The struggle for power both within the state and among the various states was the underlying cause for the almost constant warfare of the early modern period. The new elements of the spirit of the Renaissance and the widened horizons of the age of geographical discovery affected both monarchs and subjects, and trade and the arts played their part in international affairs. No European state could meet any of its problems without regard for the world outside its boundaries. The wars of religion in France brought one faction or another interventions and aid from England, the Netherlands, Spain, and the Germanies, each acting as its own interests dictated. The rise of the Dutch Republic was keenly watched by England, and the weakness of the Holy Roman Empire was a matter for rejoicing for France as well as for the Turks. In short, there was a close integration and interdependence of the European states. Problems of religion and war, developments of commerce and industry, and the ambitions of princes were common to all European states. The events in one state were closely related to and often dependent upon those in another.

It is equally true, however, that there have been periods when, in one limited area, a new movement has begun, or a new line of development has been entered upon, that has marked off that period or that area as of especial significance in world history. From them have come dynamic ideas and theories which have influenced other

regions and affected the lives of future generations. The era of the Italian Renaissance was one such period. The seventeenth century in England was another. The events and the constitutional changes of this period produced a type of government in England that differed greatly from that which was characteristic of the European state.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

The tendency of early modern times was distinctly toward government under the control of a monarch who ruled absolutely and by assertion of divine right. The classic expression of the theory held that all power radiated from the throne, and the people had no legal redress from the dictates of the king. God grant that he be wise and good! If for its sins a weak or wicked prince was visited upon a people, it could but pray that the reign be short.¹ England alone among the European states of the period developed a constitutional or limited monarchy and a parliamentary government, a system which was to become the model for many other governments which, reborn in the flames of revolution, were to become a part of the complex dynamic civilization of the present day. The transfer of sovereignty from the king to Parliament² and the foundation of empire were the major achievements of the seventeenth century in England. But the Elizabethan period which precedes it forms an essential part of the background for those changes, and it is necessary to carry the narrative over into the eighteenth century to make the account complete.

Tudor England was robust and vigorous, with the energy of a growing and expanding state. The long preoccupation with the affairs of France was at an end; the English kings and the English people felt the impelling force of nationalism; both were conscious of the possibilities of sea power and overseas trade. Exploration, expansion, and new enterprise seemed natural and inevitable to an ambitious middle class just released from the burden of foreign and civil war. A

¹ The governments of Spain and France are, of course, most typical. The particularism of the German states, however, permitted the rise of a great many monarchs absolute within their own states. The Dutch Republic soon became republican only in name, and the head of the House of Orange ruled as though he were a monarch with absolute power. Even Peter of Russia modeled his court on that of France, and the miserable failure of Poland to maintain its independence was considered due to the lack of a strong monarchy.

² The theory was that the power of the king resided in Parliament. The phrase describing the theory came to be "the Crown in Parliament."

strong monarchy, wholly English, and a people secure in the semi-isolation of an island state, saw no obstacle to greatness and feared no outside power. The creative impulse of the Renaissance was already astir, and the scholarship of the humanists was to be followed by the burst of literary genius of the age of Shakespeare. The dash and verve of the freebooters was to give way to the vision of the empire-minded, but both depended upon supremacy on the sea. The Reformation had taken a purely English line of development, and English interests in European religious and political affairs was spasmodic. Several times in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries England intervened on the Continent, but at no time of necessity, nor did she fail to withdraw when policy demanded.

ELIZABETH AND ENGLAND

The reign of Elizabeth was one of the longest in English history, and the England in which she was crowned in 1558 was quite different from that of 1603 when the reign came to an end. Her birth was coincident with the beginning of the Anglican church, and her accession to the throne marked the end of the attempt to restore Roman Catholicism. Her religious policy was one of moderation with the emphasis upon conformity with the established church. Both extreme Protestantism and militant Catholicism were suppressed, for with the queen as head of the church conformity became a matter of state. At the end of the reign the Anglican minority of 1558 had become a majority.

Elizabeth was a child of the Renaissance. Educated by humanist scholars who were Protestant in faith but broad in their learning, she studied French, Italian, and Spanish, both read and spoke Latin, and, what was more remarkable, continued her study of Greek for some years after her coronation. Her handwriting was exquisite, and she played with skill several of the musical instruments of the day. Her greatest delight was in conversation, and in later life her abilities both as linguist and conversationalist were the despair of those who wished to confuse or influence her. It was no wonder that her court was brilliant, or that the long years of peace and prosperity should have produced a galaxy of men of genius whose writings have caused her reign to be called the "golden age" of English letters.⁸

⁸ J. E. Neale, *Queen Elizabeth*, has several chapters giving a vivid picture of the early life of Elizabeth and of the civilization of the age

Elizabeth lived much in the public eye and was more accessible than many monarchs. She valued her popularity with her subjects and often modified her conduct when their disapproval was expressed.⁴ The needs of the people were always matters of concern to her, although such concern was only in part altruistic. The court was expensive, royal revenues were small, taxation by Parliamentary grant was difficult to obtain, and the queen, therefore, had every reason to desire to increase the wealth of the realm. Commerce was furthered by monopolistic grant and extended far beyond its former limits. The Levant trade became important, and even Russia was penetrated from both the White and the Black seas. Before the end of the reign the English East India Company was organized, and the depredations on Spanish commerce were followed by entry into the Spanish American trade in spite of Spanish laws of prohibition. Exploration was followed by serious attempts at colonial planting, and an interested queen shared in the projects of her people.

Exploration and commerce increased sea power by private initiative. The speed and responsiveness of the small slender English ships and the efficiency of their heavy guns made English vessels greatly superior to the cumbersome Spanish galleon. Freebooting made the English sailor a fighter, and when the queen had need of ships, the navy could be quickly augmented. Elizabeth was quick to recognize the ability of men like Drake and Hawkins. They might be little more than pirates, but when in command of the navy, they were incorruptible and efficient. And they knew they could beat the Spaniard.

ELIZABETH AND EUROPE

The armies of the day were mercenary ones, made up of professional soldiers captained by officers who drew on the royal treasury to pay their men. The system offered every opportunity for corruption, and the queen made great efforts to prevent the draining of the treasury and the exploitation of the soldiers. Chary of the expense of foreign campaigns, Elizabeth intervened in European affairs seldom and then for only three reasons: the possibility of French or Spanish domination of Scotland, the imminence of a Spanish victory in the

⁴ This was most noticeable in the matter of plans for the queen's marriage. The people of England wished it and yet always had some objection to specific candidates. Her final decision that she was the bride of England had some measure of truth.

Netherlands, and the danger that triumphant French Catholics might advance northward to aid Catholicism and further their own ambitions at the expense of the Dutch.

Elizabeth's most persistent foe was Philip II of Spain, and her greatest danger lay in the fact that the heir to the throne, Mary of Scotland, was regarded by the Catholic powers as England's legitimate ruler.⁵ Mary antagonized her Scottish subjects by her Catholicism, by her conduct, and by her marital difficulties. The death of her second husband, Lord Darnley, under circumstances that connected the queen with his murder, led to a revolt from which she fled to England. There she lived in custody for twenty years. The Calvinistic Scots did not desire her return, and Elizabeth could not risk the dangers that would arise if she resided abroad. Her presence in England was a great burden, for the constant intrigues of which she was the center and in which she participated brought danger of civil disruption and foreign wars. Catholic nobles were willing to conspire with Spain for the dethronement or assassination of Elizabeth, the accession of Mary, and their own control of England. The situation became an impossible one, and one of their more desperate attempts resulted in the execution of Mary in 1587.

The antagonism of Spain had a far broader basis than support of the Scottish queen or defense of Catholicism. The growth of English sea power was a challenge to Spain, and the persistent attempts of the English to break into the trade with the New World and the Far East violated the regulations reserving that trade for Spain and Portugal. Priority of discovery and of colonial planting, however, could not prevent competition and rivalry. The loopholes were many, and the Protestant English and Dutch found them all. The wars in the Netherlands increased the difficulties of Anglo-Spanish relations. England could not face the dangers of a Spanish victory in the Netherlands, and when that seemed imminent in 1585, war was the result. In 1588 after long preparation Philip dispatched the Great Armada, the greatest fleet Spain had ever equipped, which was to co-operate with the duke of Parma for the final blow to the Dutch and the invasion of England. English seamen, aided by storms which seemed to them an act of God, defeated the Armada and put an end to Spanish aggression. The defeat marked the failure of Philip's plans for the conquest of England and the extinction of the Dutch revolt.

⁵ Mary was descended from Margaret, the daughter of Henry VII and wife of James IV of Scotland.

The danger from without united the English people, Catholic intrigues were no longer a problem, and the reign of Elizabeth came to an end in a period of nationalism and expansion.

THE ELIZABETHAN PERIOD AND THE ENGLISH PEOPLE

There were aspects of domestic affairs that did not present so bright a prospect. Like the rest of Europe, England felt the economic difficulties resulting from the rise in prices.⁶ The development of distant trade made readjustments necessary, and its monopolistic character prevented any wide extension of its benefits. Industry was both stimulated and dislocated, but the peasantry suffered from the new enclosures when sheep raising and wool manufacturing became the major concern of both agriculture and industry. Unemployment and great hardships were prevalent in both farming and industry. Vagrancy laws were passed; the English "poor laws" of this period were a relief measure of an age suddenly aware of the effects of economic changes. The increased wealth of the merchants and the participation of the middle class in government were to be of greater significance in the next century.

In Elizabethan England there was very little protest against the power of the Crown. The Tudor monarchs exercised much the same power as their Continental contemporaries, and their ideas as to their prerogatives were equally lofty. Elizabeth said little about "divine right," but she felt herself to be the source of authority as well as honor. Parliament, which was an institution firmly fixed in the English system, met frequently in the Tudor period, but its work was mapped out by the queen's privy councillors, and its vote was usually in accord with executive desires. The House of Lords was composed of clergy who acknowledged the supremacy of the Crown and of nobility whose insubordination was promptly met by execution on Tower Hill. In the Commons sat the representatives of country gentry, yeoman farmers, and rising commercial capitalists. They depended upon the Crown for the peace and prosperity that made life worth while. They expected to be the beneficiaries of royal policy and to share in the administration of government. They might grow restive in time, but under Elizabeth they permitted Parliament to serve the Crown.

⁶ See above, pages 83-84.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF JAMES I

The Stuart period which followed was ushered in with the accession of James I, who had been King James VI of Scotland since his mother, Mary, had fled to England thirty-five years before. England welcomed the arrival of James, for it meant peace, the continuance of the Protestant Church, and the end of the fear of foreign intervention. The personal union⁷ of Scotland and England was looked upon as the end of many generations of friction, and the fact that Anglicanism and Presbyterianism were different in fundamental respects did not as yet seem of importance. The peace and serenity of a realm in which country life and intense interest in local affairs were paramount seemed assured, and no one in 1603 could have foretold that they were soon to be rudely shaken by revolt and civil war.

James was a dogmatic pedantic man who came to England without any comprehension of the laws, traditional liberties, or customs of her people, and was perhaps too old to learn those things with which Elizabeth had been familiar from infancy. Extravagant and injudicious in his choice of advisers, he had no knowledge of the functions of Parliament or of how to guide its activities, yet he had decided theories in regard to his prerogatives and rule by "divine right." It is interesting to note that he accepted with relief the position of head of the Church of England, for the Scottish Presbyterianism of John Knox had presented many thorny obstacles to his rule in Scotland.⁸

Early in his reign each of the great problems of the century appeared. In the solution of each, royal policy took a direction that was vital in the difficulties that followed. The religious problem was the first to arise. Within the Anglican church, revolt had grown up against the strict uniformity prescribed by law. Those who wished changes in these laws did not all agree, but the whole group may be classified as Puritan. There were those who wished a Presbyterian form of church control; others asked only a simplification of liturgy and greater emphasis upon preaching; while others demanded a more Calvinistic doctrine. A small minority, outside the church, wished to belong to the independent sects based upon a democratic and individualistic organization by congregation with a complete separation of church and state. The early Stuarts frowned upon them all, and when a group of Angli-

⁷ Both regions were under the same king but had separate governments.

⁸ The Presbyterian Church was governed by lay elders and dominated by an independent clergy. It was somewhat republican in form and tended toward a theocracy.

can clergy presented a petition to the crown in 1603 asking moderate changes in church procedures, James called a conference at Hampton Court. The debates so angered him that he refused any changes and dismissed the conference with a violence out of all proportion to its demands. "If this be all they have to say, I shall make them conform themselves, or I will harry them out of the land, or else do worse."


English Catholicism was divided also between those who wished only to worship privately in the forms of the old faith and those who followed Jesuit leaders in working for the restoration of Catholicism. Neither group was very numerous, but the latter was active in plotting against the government. The most famous Catholic plot was the Gunpowder Treason of 1605. It was a plot to blow up the Parliament House, destroy both king and Parliament, and cause the downfall of the government. The discovery of the plot led to the capture of many of the conspirators including Guy Fawkes, whose name has always been associated with it. The effect of the plot was to discredit the Catholics and to cause the enforcement of the laws for their suppression. Stuart policy was thus established as insistence upon conformity.

The theory of royal absolutism was asserted by James in his first contact with Parliament. In terms as lofty as any used by Continental monarchs, he told the House of Commons that it had no right to act save through his grace, "as to dispute what God may do is blasphemy, so it is sedition in subjects to dispute what a King may do. . . ."⁹ The Parliament thus admonished was to begin the long feud over the constitutional relations between the Crown and the representatives of the nation, a feud in which the Stuarts were to be defeated. As was quite natural, the main issue in the quarrel was the financial question. James was extravagant, and revenues scanty for the parsimonious Elizabeth were obviously insufficient for the Stuarts. Moreover, the functions of government were increasing, and the old feudal exactions and customs duties allocated to the royal purse could not cover the necessities of government. There was no doubt that a new system of taxation was needed, but the House of Commons, alarmed at the absolutism claimed by the Crown, refused to grant a request for a permanent and adequate settlement which would have deprived it of control of the purse strings. Long debates

⁹ Quoted in George Macaulay Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts* (Longmans, Green & Company), p. 105. This volume is one of the best brief accounts of the Stuart period.

on finance and on the religious disputes ended in deadlock, and in 1610 James dissolved Parliament and ruled for ten years almost entirely without its assistance—or interference. This was the first period of Stuart absolutism.

The unpopularity of the king was increased by his extravagance, by the corruption of his court, and, most of all, by his foreign policy which threatened to bring England into the Spanish orbit by the marriage of his eldest son, Charles, to a Spanish princess, while re-



From 1600 to 1800 there was little increase in efficiency, and wages in terms of wheat were comparatively stable. It might be noted, however, that from 1600 to 1660—the period of the struggle between the Stuarts and Parliament—the price of bread was high. The effect of the Napoleonic Wars is marked. Beginning about 1800, there was a rapid increase in the amount of wheat that a day's labor would buy. (Chart from G. T. Warren and F. A. Pearson, *Prices*, John Wiley & Sons, p. 202.)

fusing aid to the German Protestants, now hard-pressed in the first period of the Thirty Years' War. In 1621, with an empty treasury and in danger of war, James was forced to call Parliament, whose temper had not improved in the interval. Its members were not made more amenable by the fact that England was in the midst of a depression period, and that the hard times had aroused public sentiment against monopolies, the granting of which had added to royal revenues. Monopolistic grants of privileges for distant trading were not criticized so severely, but those for domestic trade in articles of general use were considered intolerable. Parliament passed laws against such grants, expressed its disapproval of the corruption in government by the impeachment of venal officials, and then proceeded

to condemn James's foreign policy. When James ordered the debate to cease he was answered by a protest that Parliament was privileged to exercise complete freedom of speech within its own walls. This James answered in turn by dissolving Parliament. When his reign came to an end in 1625 the Crown was distrusted by the people, and the cleavage between its pretensions and those of the House of Commons was apparent. Ideas and leaders developed in these quarrels with James I were to carry over into the next reign, which was to end in disaster.

CHARLES I AND PARLIAMENT

The failure of the prince to secure a Spanish bride ended in a war with Spain in which further failures involved James's successor, Charles I, in renewed quarrels with Parliament. The inefficiency shown in the campaigns was laid at the door of Charles's favorite, Buckingham, and later, when Charles refused to dismiss him, the unfortunate duke was assassinated (1628). In lieu of the Spanish marriage, Charles contracted one almost equally unpopular and ill-omened with the Catholic Henrietta Maria, daughter of Henry IV of France. Within a year or two Charles's bad management of foreign affairs led to a war with France. Over all these matters he quarreled with a Parliament which refused to grant adequate revenues without some control over their expenditure and over governmental policies. Pressing need for funds led Charles in 1627 to attempt to collect money by a "forced loan" which was but a tax under another name, resistance to which was met by imprisonment. To save money the government billeted its troops on the public, threatening a protesting people with martial law. When such measures proved ineffective, Charles called his third Parliament, which met in March of 1628. Public feeling was so aroused that the House elected for the new Parliament was filled with members ready to risk the punishment recalcitrance might cause. They were Puritans but Anglican, reformers but men of great common sense, and they were in opposition to the crown but intensely patriotic and loyal to all that they felt constituted the rights of Englishmen. Their leaders were Sir Thomas Wentworth, Sir John Eliot, and John Pym. The result of their effort was the Petition of Right, which stands next to Magna Carta in its relation to English liberties. It was a brief and simple document declaring illegal the practices which formed the four

specific grievances of the day: billeting, martial law, arbitrary taxation, and arbitrary imprisonment. Charles assented to the Petition, and Parliament proceeded to attack royal policy in religious and foreign affairs. In 1629, without having reached any solution of their differences, Parliament was dissolved, and Charles began eleven years of personal rule during which revolt, although stifled and inarticulate, was steadily growing in popular appeal.

THE PERIOD OF PERSONAL RULE

Charles was a man of personal morality and integrity, convinced of his rectitude and right to absolutism, but pitiless in his suppression of political or religious dissent. He did not doubt his ability to rule and relied upon the efficient Tudor administrative machine. Much of its work was well done; the regular courts, the poor laws, and the administration of local affairs were efficiently and honestly managed, and able ministers were appointed. Thomas Wentworth, who had been a member of Parliament interested mainly in honest and efficient government, now, as Earl of Strafford, became one of the ablest officers of the Crown.¹⁰ William Laud was made archbishop of Canterbury and entrusted with the ecclesiastical administration. His insistence upon uniformity in ritual and doctrine infuriated the Puritans within the church. A Puritan "exodus" from England had begun in the reign of James I when numerous Independents had fled to the Netherlands, and a few had set forth in that tiny vessel, the "Mayflower," upon their famous voyage to the New World where in a New England they founded the democracy and Congregationalism dictated by their faith. In 1629 the Massachusetts Bay Colony was established, and before 1640 twenty thousand emigrants had set sail for New England, many of whom were Puritans of the type so familiar in American history. At the same time the influence of the Catholic queen led to a relaxation of laws against the practice of that faith, and Puritan England had a further grievance against the Crown.

In enforcing the ecclesiastical laws, Laud made use of the Court of High Commission, while the old Court of the Star Chamber, used

¹⁰ "By his former colleagues, he was regarded with mingled admiration, hatred and fear, but principally fear. They felt toward him as an extreme Marxist might feel towards an enlightened, humane and successful capitalist. He was making autocracy efficient and therefore respectable . . . and thereby buttressing that very fabric they sought to demolish."—John Buchan, *Oliver Cromwell* (Houghton Mifflin Company), p. 86.

by Henry VII to restore order after the civil wars, was revived to prosecute disloyal subjects whose cases the administration did not wish to submit to the regular courts. Both of these courts were very unpopular and were looked upon as agencies of despotism.

The major difficulties of the period of personal rule were financial. Additions to revenues must be sought without Parliamentary grant, and Charles's ministers used every expedient to procure funds. Tonnage and poundage—old customs duties—were collected as though they had been authorized by Parliament. Ship money, an old tax on coast towns used for naval purposes, was revived and extended to inland towns and counties as well.¹¹ Feudal dues which had been a part of royal revenues in the Middle Ages were revived after two centuries of disuse. Monopolies, though forbidden by the law of 1624, were granted to corporations. Successful financially, these measures were bitterly resented, and discontent was widespread.

THE REVOLUTION OR CIVIL WAR, 1640-1649

There seemed no legal redress, however, and the English, slow to revolt, endured the oppressive measures for eleven years. It was the king who took the fatal step which led to civil war. Charles I was king of Scotland as well as of England, and when he endeavored to establish the Anglican episcopal system in Scotland, the Scots rose in rebellion in 1638. The English prayer book and system of bishops were incompatible with Scottish Presbyterianism, and the Scottish armies outnumbered and outfought the troops Charles could send against them. Lack of funds to enlist and equip additional troops forced Charles to call Parliament in 1640, and with its assembling revolution began in England.

The Parliament which met in April has been called the Short Parliament because it was dismissed after a brief three weeks during which its only advice to the king was to end the war and remove the evils against which the people were protesting. With Scottish soldiers on English soil, Charles was forced to summon another session in November. This has been called the Long Parliament for it was to last until 1660. Among its members were those leaders who had opposed the king throughout his reign and were now determined

¹¹ The trial of John Hampden for refusal to pay the ship money tax was one of the famous trials of history

to establish Parliamentary supremacy as the keystone of the English system of government.

During the years of tyrannical rule the leaders in the Long Parliament had been laying plans for the reform which they felt must come when the king should at last be forced into summoning the representatives of the people. As in all periods of revolution, this group of leaders was small—Pym, Hampden, Vane, Cromwell, Hyde, and a few other Puritan members of the House of Commons, and a half dozen liberal peers—but it was well organized and had been long engaged in preparation for the time when action could begin. Its members had some party organization and had canvassed the country before the election to secure the Parliamentary election of men known to be Puritan and opponents of royal absolutism. They would not have considered themselves revolutionaries, for they desired only to punish those who had usurped power and to secure the passage of laws which would prevent recurrence of Stuart despotism. Regarding themselves as conservatives wishing merely to restore English liberties and the old constitutional safeguards, they did not realize that they were setting in motion forces that would shortly involve the nation in civil war.

One of the first activities of Parliament was the arrest, trial, and punishment of the chief officers of the Crown, Archbishop Laud and the Earl of Strafford.¹² It then enacted measures limiting the royal prerogative. Bills were passed providing that the present Parliament could not be dissolved without its own consent, and that Parliament should meet at least once in three years. The extraordinary Courts of High Commission and the Star Chamber were abolished. The irregular ways of raising revenues practiced in the years of personal rule were declared illegal. When the king had signed all of these bills, Parliament raised the funds to pay off the Scottish and English armies.

There the movement might have ended had it not been for the dissension which arose over the religious and church question. The bishops were unpopular everywhere and the system made odious by Laud had few defenders, but an attack upon the Anglican prayer-book service raised a cry of disapproval. The Puritans split irreconcilably over church organization. Pym and his followers wished a Puritan state church controlled by lay commissioners appointed by Parliament. The Presbyterians, and there were many, wished the

¹² Strafford was executed in 1641, Laud in 1645.

Scottish system of democratic local organization held together by powerful representative church councils. Each of these factions insisted upon uniformity and refused to tolerate dissent. The Independents, or sectarian groups, advocated a purely congregational system and complete freedom of worship and belief. The introduction of a bill to abolish the episcopal system "Root and Branch" (a term which gave the popular name to the bill) threw open the debate, and, although no decision was reached, the fundamental cleavage in factions was realized.

In the fall of 1641, the Irish Catholics rose in rebellion and killed several thousand Protestants. Suppression of the rebellion made an army necessary, but if it were headed by the king, the danger of its being used for a suppression of Parliamentary opposition was evident. Out of the debates on church and army came the Grand Remonstrance of November, 1641. Pym and those who wished to maintain the supremacy of Parliament drew up this document, which was intended as an appeal to the people, and forced it through Parliament with a slim majority of eleven votes. It advocated, among other reforms, a royal ministry acceptable to Parliament and the submission of changes in the church to a synod of "English and foreign divines." The king's party and the party of Parliament were now clearly defined. The queen was involved in intrigues with France and the papacy for military aid in restoring royal power, and the Parliamentarians approached the Scots for aid in case of attack. Both sides thus exposed themselves to accusations of treason, and the outbreak of armed conflict needed only an immediate cause. On January 4 the king furnished such a cause by his appearance, with an armed force, in the House of Commons to secure in person and by force the arrest of five of its members, including Pym and Hampden. This disregard for law and custom aroused the House to fury.

He had lowered his royal dignity and convinced the ordinary man that neither his honour nor his judgment was to be trusted. He had attempted violence and failed, and had closed every avenue of reconciliation. On January 10 he left Whitehall—not to return to it till he returned to die.¹³

In the civil war which followed, Charles found his greatest support in northern and western England, but there and elsewhere the war was fought by two small minorities. By far the larger part of

¹³ John Buchan, *Oliver Cromwell* (Houghton Mifflin Company), p. 118.

the English people were averse to war, but with the leaders and power so sharply divided, a peaceful majority had no means of expression. As the war dragged on, neutrals were forced to choose sides, and the issues sharpened. Although in general the townspeople were Parliamentary in sentiment and the upper nobility was usually royalist, while the lesser gentry divided as did the farmers and yeomen, it never became a class war. Nor was it a war of districts, for there were strong minorities of opposing opinions in sections where the majority favored one side or the other. It was a war of ideas and of constitutional principles and at the same time a struggle for power by the rising middle class. As compared with European wars of the period, the English civil war was humane; there was no wholesale destruction and no great interference with noncombatants.¹⁴ But in England the king's forces, called "Cavaliers," and those of Parliament, called "Roundheads," met in repeated conflicts without the extremes of violence and fanaticism.

It is not necessary to go into the details of the war. In 1643, to win much-needed support, Parliament made a treaty with the Scots, who agreed to furnish military assistance in return for a pledge of a Presbyterian system for England, Scotland, and Ireland. After they had defeated the king at Marston Moor (July, 1644), the triumphant Presbyterians were willing to permit his return to power on conditions which would maintain their ascendancy and keep their variety of religious tolerance in force. While they negotiated with the king, whose acceptance of power from them could only have been with much mental reservation, among the many protests arising, the loudest were from the army, where a majority of the soldiers were Independents. Their leader was Oliver Cromwell,¹⁵ a member of the

¹⁴ A modern historian, George Macaulay Trevelyan, explains in the following manner the striking differences between the English civil war and the Thirty Years' War which was devastating the Germanies at the same time: The two minority groups were endeavoring to win the favor of all England; it was not a war of religion for both parties were Protestant, and differences in creed were not sufficiently sharp to cause fury; the combatants were all of one race and one nation; and the English were a thoroughly civilian people inclined toward moderation and peace. He calls attention to the fact that wars in Ireland and Scotland in the same decade were not humane at all—George Macaulay Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts* (Longmans, Green & Company), p. 230.

¹⁵ Oliver Cromwell was a descendant of the nephew of the famous Thomas Cromwell who, as minister of Henry VIII, had made his fortune and that of his family by the acquisition of wealth and landed estates through the dissolution of the monasteries. Oliver Cromwell was a well-to-do country gentleman, and he was related to many of the most important men of his day.

House of Commons and an associate of the reform element for many years.

Forty-three when the war began, Cromwell was a man whose life had been devoted to the cause of reform and to efforts to lessen the encroachments of the rich and powerful upon the middle and lower classes. Although he was without military training when he realized early that the cause of Parliament could be attained only by force, he had organized a cavalry regiment of his own which he led with remarkable military genius. The forces opposing the king were gradually made over according to Cromwell's ideas, and the reorganized army was called the "New Model Army." It was this army and its leader, Independents in religion and democratic in politics, that opposed the bargain between king and Presbyterians. Their opposition resulted in a renewal of the war in which they defeated the king at Naseby in 1645. The capture of the correspondence of the royal family disclosed the fact that the king was negotiating for foreign intervention, but the Presbyterian leaders in Parliament still wished his return to power and endeavored to prevent the army and its leader, Cromwell, from dominating the situation. Finally, in 1648, the deadlock was broken when one of Cromwell's officers, Colonel Pride, arrested in the House of Commons one hundred and forty-three of the Presbyterian members. The remaining members, now between sixty and eighty in number, then passed a resolution stating that the people were the source of power, and the House of Commons as its representative was the final authority "although the consent of the King or House of Peers be not had thereunto." Early in 1649 they abolished the House of Lords, and, after long and futile attempts at negotiation, they appointed a Commission to try Charles Stuart for treason. "We will cut off his head with the crown upon it," was the verdict of the reluctant but exasperated Cromwell and the decision of the Commission. The execution of the king occurred on January 30, 1649.

The king had committed no legal crime. His victory and the triumph of his ideas of royal prerogative would have sent dozens of Parliamentarians to the scaffold and thousands of their supporters to the Puritan colonies in the New World, but his death by act of a Rump Parliament dominated by the army lost those in power the support of the masses of the people, and made it impossible for them to succeed in their attempts to establish a more democratic regime. By force they had come into power, by violence they had achieved

their ends, and by the weight of armed force they must maintain themselves.

THE COMMONWEALTH

Cromwell and his remnant of a Parliament thought they were establishing a republic which they called a Commonwealth, but under the circumstances they could not give England self-government, although to achieve it had been the object of the revolution. Parliament did not represent the nation, free elections were not held, and the little group of less than a hundred men left from the Long Parliament formed a sort of legislature which gave its "rubber stamp" approval to the acts of a Council of State selected from its membership. Cromwell was the president of the Council of State and commander of the army. The government of the Commonwealth was therefore a military dictatorship of a pattern which should seem familiar to a twentieth-century student.

As a military dictatorship, the Commonwealth was an efficient government. A rebellion in Ireland was put down with a ferocity whose origin lay in the intolerance which condoned cruelty meted out to Catholic and foreign opponents. A Scottish army led by Prince Charles, the Stuart heir, was decisively beaten, and the British Isles were more firmly under the control of one government than ever before. Foreign wars were equally successful. Cromwell had due regard for sea power and all the well-to-do Englishman's interest in commerce. In 1651 the first Navigation Act was passed, which stated that goods from Asia, America, and Africa must come to England and her colonies in English or colonial ships. Goods from Europe were to be carried either in English or colonial vessels or those of the countries producing the goods. The act was directed against the Dutch, whose carrying trade was in competition with that of England. This was but the first of a series of navigation acts passed in the next seventy-five years, all of which were the product of English mercantilistic policies.¹⁶ The war against the Dutch (1652-53) was the first of three commercial conflicts which were contributing factors in the decline of Dutch sea power and the establishment of British commercial and colonial leadership. A war was waged with Spain also, and the resulting acquisition of Jamaica in the West Indies showed English realization of the importance of colonies and established a

¹⁶ See above, pages 85-86.

precedent in following which England, through later treaties, acquired numerous colonies scattered all over the world.

The Commonwealth had far less success in domestic affairs. It remained in power only with the aid of the army, but even the army was critical and faultfinding, for it disliked the interference of civil authority and had come to regard itself as the source of power. The government had larger revenues than Charles had been able to obtain, but expenditures were very heavy and taxation was high.¹⁷ Censorship of the press and severe suppression of opposition added to the unpopularity of the government. Undoubtedly the stern Puritan insistence upon morality and Calvinistic standards of conduct grew both boring and irksome as the years went on. Society was, perhaps, a little dull, as was much of the literature of the period. The tediousness of sermons, tracts, and pamphlets was relieved by the genius of a few great Puritan poets. The name of John Milton lends grandeur and beauty to the period, but he had no equals, and his influence was greatest in a later age. The Puritan put a stamp of disapproval upon the stage, and all theaters were closed by government order. But it must be admitted that the glory of Elizabethan drama had long since departed, and the Stuart period had produced little that was more than mediocre.

Cromwell and his army were Independents, and they hoped for a united Puritan backing for the religious settlement. Provided the prayer book of the Anglican church was not used, any form of Protestant worship was permitted. The government gave financial support to Presbyterians, Independents, and Baptists. The Quakers and numerous other groups worshipped as they pleased, but paid their own ministers—or had none at all. Catholics were permitted to practice their religion privately, and the old restrictions against the Jews were repealed. The proscription of Anglicanism was obviously due to political causes. England came very close to religious toleration in a period when her own Puritan colony of Massachusetts Bay drove out Baptists and persecuted Quakers. But this very tolerance was a further cause for the unpopularity of the government. It was too advanced philosophically for the temper of the age; the average Englishman found it little to his liking; and there were thousands

¹⁷ In three years forty-one new men-of-war were added to the navy. The army was a standing professional force of about 45,000. England had never before maintained such an army and navy, and their expense was great.

who yearned in deep sincerity for a return of the Church of England which had become deeply rooted in English soil.

Royalist and Anglican gentry, many of whose estates had been confiscated, all the dispossessed Anglican clergy, and the once-dominant Presbyterians were uncompromising enemies. The average Englishman shuddered at the king's execution, hated militarism, groaned over the high taxes, and longed for the old familiar folkways. The radical reformers—whom their contemporaries named "Levelers"—found no satisfaction in Cromwell's moderate policies or any chance to put their extreme views into practice under his dictatorship.¹⁸ The theories and demands of the radicals included democratic ideas for manhood suffrage, representative government with annual parliaments, complete religious freedom, the usual civil liberties such as freedom of speech and press, and equality before the law. These liberal and democratic demands were accompanied by rather inchoate and utterly impracticable and radical schemes of the extreme Left.¹⁹ The difficulty of steering the ship of state in such crosscurrents of opposition is easily apparent.

THE PROTECTORATE

Thus the Commonwealth grew more and more unpopular until in 1653 the army demanded a new Parliament. At that time Cromwell, angered by its corruption and inefficiency, appeared in person with an armed force and dissolved the Rump Parliament. The period which followed (1653-1660) was called the Protectorate, a government in which Cromwell as Lord Protector was a reluctant dictator. Although he had no desire to rule arbitrarily and wished to provide England with a constitution and free elections, yet he had acted in an illegal and unconstitutional manner in dismissing the only legally elected body. He might have made himself a king and thus have won the support of many persistent monarchists, but because he refused that honor, and with abhorrence, he was unable to arrive at any settlement of the vital constitutional question and spent his last years in futile attempts at compromise.

¹⁸ Carlyle called the situation from which the Levelers sprang "the submarine world of Calvinistic Sans-culottism." An interesting account of their theories may be found in G. P. Gooch, *English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century*.

¹⁹ The radical groups were called "True Levelers" and later Fifth Monarchy men. The "Diggers" were a group of extremists who wished to establish a communistic society.

The desire for a constitution led to the drawing up of the "Instrument of Government," which gave legislative power to a body chosen on the basis of franchise reform and vested executive power in the Lord Protector and a council, both appointed for life. The powers of Parliament were slight, and those of the Lord Protector were extensive. After the new system was put into effect, difficulties again arose over the control of the army, and in 1655 Parliament was once more dissolved. Later attempts at constitution-making were failures also, and Cromwell's death in 1658 left the problem unsolved. Government throughout Commonwealth and Protectorate rested not upon the consent of the governed but upon a dictator whose power came from an army which was, in turn, his master. The army's fear of civilian interference and, on the other hand, the deep-seated dislike of the English for both dictatorship and militarism prevented the successful establishment of a republic which would, after all, have been out of tune with the age in which it was born. No man saw these difficulties more clearly than Cromwell, who remained a Parliamentarian in theory and at heart, while he reluctantly wielded the power of a despot in an effort to build up and educate a new England to which he could safely entrust the responsibility of government.

His failure was inevitable, but that failure was in itself a magnificent thing and a prophecy for the success in the future of much for which he and his contemporaries labored. Trevelyan wrote in summary of his career:

There was no active agreement of public opinion between 1641 and 1660; and no human being who ever lived could have made a permanent settlement out of the situation left by King and Parliament in 1648. In that general wreck of powers and parties, Oliver saved the British Empire from partition, the civil liberties of England from Royalist reconquest, the Free Churches and free-thinkers from destruction by those of the narrow way. Those deeds out-lived him, and the lovers of England, of civil liberty, and of free thought will forever be grateful for such benefits, though all else for which he fought perished with him.²⁰

Cromwell's complex character is hard to understand. That his career was full of paradoxes has been pointed out by John Buchan, the most polished and acute of his biographers, who wrote that as

²⁰ George Macaulay Trevelyan, *England under the Stuarts* (Longmans, Green & Company), pp. 327-28.

. . . a devotee of law, he was forced to be often lawless; a civilian to the core, he had to maintain himself by the sword; with a passion to construct, his task was chiefly to destroy; the most scrupulous of men, he had to ride roughshod over his own scruples and those of others; the tenderest, he had continually to harden his heart, the most English of our greater figures, he spent his life in opposition to the majority of Englishmen; a realist, he was condemned to build that which could not last. Even at his death the dream fabric was dissolving . . . 'The joyfullest funeral I ever saw,' wrote Evelyn, 'for there were none that cried but dogs.'²¹

THE RESTORATION SETTLEMENT

With the death of Cromwell the restoration of the monarchy was but a question of time. His son Richard was so incapable of leadership that the danger of a travesty of government through the rule by caprice of military chieftains was a very real one. A realistic policy prevailed and, finally, General Monk summoned back the remnant of the old Long Parliament (December, 1659), which met only to call for elections for a "free" Parliament. In the meantime General Monk began negotiations with Charles II, who, wearied by his long exile, was eager to return to England. Charles's promises of amnesty for those involved in the rebellion, of freedom of worship, and of payment of arrears to the army reassured the new or "Convention" assembly, and it voted for the restoration of the monarchy.

Neither in Scotland nor England was there resistance to the change in government. The desire for peace and order and the deep-seated preference for a king made the new regime popular. The middle class, especially, hoped for advantages from the Restoration. Charles II had far more political acumen than his father; exile had made him more politic; his temperament was easy and his manners were charming; his wit and adaptability stood him in good stead. Had he had a modicum of the integrity of character and the devotion to principles of the Cromwellians, the reign might have been great as well as brilliant. Selfishness, indolence, and hypocrisy are not admirable characteristics, but they made Charles willing to compromise. Whenever possible he imposed his will upon England but, rather than risk conflict and the possibility of revolt and renewed exile, he always gave way when opposition seemed too great. He may have given allegiance in secret to the Catholicism of his mother

²¹ John Buchan, *Oliver Cromwell* (Houghton Mifflin Company), p. 20.

and to the theory of divine right upon which rested the throne of his French cousin whose court had been his refuge in exile. Outwardly, however, the Anglican church and the supremacy of Parliament were given at least lip service.²² Farsighted, wise, in his own interests, and an excellent politician, he was, perhaps, a more successful king than a better man could have been.

There was no terrorism in the settlement of disputed questions. A dozen regicides were executed, and many Puritan leaders fled overseas, but the majority of Roundhead partisans were protected in their lives and property by Parliament and by Charles's pacific policy. Many of the lands of church, crown, and nobility, confiscated by the Cromwell governments, were restored to their former owners without compensation, and the Independent aristocracy was ruined. But the average citizens did not suffer in person or purse and were content with the mildness and security of the new regime.

The restoration turned the clock back, but it was not by any means a full turn. The Cavalier Parliament (1661-1679) was royalist in sentiment but surrendered to the king no great control over affairs. The laws it passed in its first session indicated the direction England was to take: the standing army was abolished; provisions for revenue remained the prerogative of Parliament, and the revenues granted Charles were never sufficient to make him independent; the church was made dependent upon Parliament also; and the extraordinary courts through which the first Charles had ruled absolutely were not revived.

The religious settlement contained in the famous Clarendon Code was a triumph for Anglicanism. By the laws (1661-1665) which made up the code, the Puritans—Presbyterian, Independents, and minor sects alike—were reduced to the status of mere dissenters. Puritan ministers were expelled from the Church of England; non-conformists were denied suffrage and a share in local government; public worship according to any faith other than that of the Established Church was proscribed; and no clergyman or schoolmaster of a dissenting sect was permitted within five miles of city or town. Later the Test Act made it impossible for any nonconformists to hold military or civil office. Since the Puritans were largely urban, the Five-Mile Act, which prevented dissenting clergymen from returning within five miles of their old churches, was a great blow at educa-

²² Charles secretly became a Catholic in 1669. His brother and heir, James, openly acknowledged his own Catholicism in 1672.

tion as well as freedom of worship. The effects of these laws were important: religious dissent became the property of the lower classes, for the wealthy and aristocratic hastened to make their peace with the church and thus avoid deprivation of political and religious rights; where dissent meant social ostracism, Puritan gentry learned to conform; Puritan literature declined in quality and quantity of production, and the polished sophistication of Restoration letters in the period of Dryden and Pope took its place. The shallowness, immorality, and decadent standards of the court were reflected in society and in literature.

THE REIGN OF CHARLES II

Charles, a Catholic at heart, was anxious to secure toleration for the Catholics, and in consequence used his influence to lessen the rigors of the laws against nonconformists. But Parliament, fearing the Catholicism of the queen²³ and of the king's brother and heir, refused any concessions. Although political policy thus caused insistence upon conformity, there was a growing secularization of thought that made for toleration. Scepticism was the fashion of the court, but it was also, and more fundamentally, the product of the growing interest in science and in rationalistic philosophy.²⁴ The persecution of witches declined; the appeal to reason and the growing belief in natural laws lessened the hold of narrow creeds; and a tendency toward indifference to religious issues characterized the latter part of the century. In 1689 the accession of a king whose Protestantism could not be questioned was to be the signal for an Act of Toleration which brought freedom of worship to England. Nevertheless, more than a century was to elapse before all of the civil and political penalties for dissent were removed.

Charles's interest in diplomacy and in foreign affairs was keen but brought little of glory to England. The desire for commercial expansion caused a war with the Dutch early in his reign which afforded England opportunity for the acquisition of the colony of New Amsterdam, given by a proprietary grant to James, Duke of York, who renamed it New York. No other important victories occurred on either side in the war, and it was ended by mutual con-

²³ Charles married Catherine of Braganza, a Portuguese princess who brought as her dowry some of the Portuguese stations in India. They had no children.

²⁴ See below, Chapter X.

sent in 1667. Alarmed by the activities of Louis XIV on the Netherlands frontier,²⁵ England, the Netherlands, and Sweden formed a Triple Alliance in 1668. To ensure his success in the war with the Dutch which was a part of his military program, Louis set to work to break the alliance. Sweden was bought off by concessions elsewhere, and Charles, extravagant and insufficiently supplied with funds by Parliament, was easily persuaded to leave the Dutch to the mercies of Louis. The Treaty of Dover (1670) secured English aid for Louis and contained a secret clause in which Louis agreed to furnish Charles an annual subsidy. For the remainder of the reign England followed the somewhat unnatural policy of viewing with complacent neutrality French attempts to secure control of the Rhineland.

The last years of the reign of Charles mark the development, or renewal, of a partisan spirit in English politics which resulted in the appearance of the two great political parties that were to be important for a generation or more. Charles II had endeavored to govern as far as possible by a small group of ministers and courtiers, called in disapprobation the "Cabal." Its aims, although quite unannounced and never realized, were to obtain a new Stuart despotism based upon Catholicism, toleration, a standing army, and the French alliance. Suspecting these aims of the king's ministers, the group within Parliament that was not subservient to the Crown organized in protest. The immediate issue which caused the division into two parties was that of the succession to the throne. Charles had no legitimate son, and his brother James was an avowed Catholic as arbitrary as he was bigoted. The Whig party, as it came to be called, was a combination of dissenters, Low-Church or Puritan Anglicans, businessmen of the cities, and a part of the aristocracy. The opponents of this group were called Tories and numbered Catholics, High-Church Anglicans, many of the great nobles and the country gentry, and all those who depended upon the Crown for prestige and livelihood. Feeling ran high for some years. The Whigs were unable to secure the passage of a bill excluding James from the throne, but they created an organized party that would be ready for rebellion if, when king, James endeavored to put into effect the principles which they suspected him of holding. In this period of crisis they were able to procure in 1679 the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act which recog-

²⁵ For details as to European wars of this period see Chapter VII.

nized the traditional English claim to protection from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. Charles and the Tories were the victors in the first combat, but when the reign ended in 1685 with the succession assured, the Stuarts were shorn of that popularity and affection which had been theirs at its beginning.

THE "GLORIOUS REVOLUTION"

James II (1685-1688) was to have a stormy three years as king of England. He had no vestige of his elder brother's tact, and a combination of bad tactics and blunders was to make his reign a short one. At its beginning a rebellion led by the duke of Monmouth, an illegitimate son of Charles II, was put down with so much ease that the ferocity with which punishment was meted out to those implicated or suspected of implication in the rebellion startled and disgusted Tories and Whigs alike. All England was horrified by the trials and sentences of the "Bloody Assize" of Judge Jeffreys, and when religious persecution in Scotland was added to these brutalities, unpopularity of the king became heightened. Cruelty to nonconformists accompanied a declaration of indulgence for Catholics. When Anglican bishops protested that such a declaration was illegal seven of their number were arrested and imprisoned, the famous Bishops' Trial becoming a *cause célèbre* in English history.

James appeared to believe that the Tory defense of his claim to the throne signified approval of his choice of religion and of his ideas of a gradual and partial reunion of the Church of England with Roman Catholicism. His appointment of known Catholics to his ministry and to positions in local government and in the universities could only be justified if the king was to have the right to ignore the laws of Parliament. When Parliament protested energetically James dissolved it and endeavored to build up an army under his own control. He attempted to win the support of the nonconformists by including them in the royal decrees or declarations removing all restrictions based upon religious differences, but both Whigs and Tories were anti-Papists and were ready for revolt. The birth of a son to James and his Catholic wife, Mary of Modena,²⁶ ended hope

²⁶ James's first wife was Anne Hyde, an Englishwoman. Their children were Mary, whose husband was her cousin, William of Orange, stadholder of the Netherlands, and Anne, who had married the Prince of Denmark. Neither princess was survived by children

of Protestant succession and was the immediate cause for rebellion.

William of Orange, head of the Dutch Republic, a nephew and son-in-law of James II, was invited to England. The army went over to his standard, and, James, deserted by everyone, fled to France. Parliament declared the throne vacant and offered it to William and Mary in joint rule. So ended the Glorious—and almost bloodless—Revolution of 1688. Parliament, however, made sure of its own supremacy in the arrangements made for the new sovereigns, and assertion of royal absolutism was made impossible for the future by the passage of a series of laws. The Bill of Rights (1689) asserted Parliamentary control over finance, made the army dependent upon Parliament, declared illegal any dispensing or suspending laws by royal authority, condemned various practices of the preceding reign, and stated that the succession could go to Protestant rulers only. The Act of Toleration (1689) granted freedom of worship to Protestant nonconformists. Parliamentary elections every three years were provided by law in 1694.²⁷ The Whig business interests and principles were recognized by the establishment of the Bank of England and the funding of the national debt. A definitely limited and constitutional monarchy had at last been established.

THE LAST OF THE STUARTS

The foreign policy of England under William and Mary was adjusted to William's European position. England took part in the wars against the French hegemony planned by Louis XIV, and thus began a series of wars with France which have been somewhat erroneously called the second Hundred Years' War.²⁸ These wars, which were to have colonial repercussions, form a part of American as well as European history.

The later Stuarts as well as the earlier ones were interested in colonial development and endeavored to bring about some sort of organization of empire conforming to seventeenth-century mercantilist theory. Charles II had granted liberal charters to Rhode Island and Connecticut in the early days of his reign and had rewarded his faithful courtiers by grants of land in the New World with charters that caused the planting of New Jersey and the Carolinas. Later in his reign he had given William Penn, a prominent Quaker to whom he

²⁷ Changed to seven years in 1716, shortened to five in 1911.

²⁸ See below, Chapters VII and IX.

owed a debt, both of gratitude and money, a charter which made him lord proprietor of a colony soon to be planted in Pennsylvania. Additional navigation acts had been passed early in the reign and a committee of the Privy Council had been appointed to manage colonial affairs and to further commercial expansion. In his brief reign James II had endeavored to consolidate colonial control by reducing the number of chartered colonies and uniting such small and troublesome colonies as those of New England in a union with New York to be called the Dominion of New England. In the West Indies and in the Far East centralization of administration and greater control had been objectives of James's policy.

These royal aims were carried further by Parliament after 1689. Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth colonies were united as the royal colony of Massachusetts. New York and New Hampshire were given royal governors and New Jersey and the Carolinas became royal after 1700. By the middle of the eighteenth century only Rhode Island and Connecticut were self-governing under their own charters, while Pennsylvania (including Delaware) and Maryland were the sole survivors of proprietary grants.²⁹ In 1696, the king decided to establish the Board of Trade and Plantations to control colonial trade, to select and instruct colonial governors, and to pass upon acts of colonial legislatures. In the same year, a new Navigation Act was passed to complete the machinery designed to retain for English merchants and shipbuilders the benefits of colonial trade. The English colonial and commercial practices were thus brought into accord with the prevalent mercantile theories, and the colonial structure was set in the form in which it was to remain for nearly a hundred years. Generally speaking, the Stuart period was one of commercial prosperity and the colonial growth was vigorous and healthy. Of the great joint-stock companies of the earlier years, only the East India Company was still carrying on its complex work of trade and administration, but more modern corporations were making fortunes in the colonial trade although they left settlement to individual enterprise, and government to the colony and to Parliament.

The reign of Anne (1702-1714), the other Protestant daughter of

²⁹ Whatever the type of colony, local administration remained in practice autonomous. Governors appointed by crown, proprietor, or elected in the colony presided over and quarreled with legislatures, the lower houses of which were elected by the colonists themselves. Distance increased the feeling of independence, and any assertion of greater power might easily bring revolt.

James II, was marked by little in the way of constitutional development. Parliamentary supremacy was uncontested, and the last royal veto in English history came in this period. Henceforth English kings were "to reign but not to rule." Two acts of Parliament brought solution to difficult problems: an Act of Union created a British government for both England and Scotland, and Scottish members crossed the border on their way to London to take seats in Parliament; the Act of Settlement passed over the son of the exiled James II, and upon the death of his mother, Sophia, who was the granddaughter of James I, George, ruler of Hanover, became the heir to the throne. For the most part, the reign of Anne was occupied with the long war of the Spanish Succession which will be discussed in a later chapter.

THE HANOVERIAN SUCCESSION

In the period between 1714 and 1830, four Hanoverian Georges ruled in succession. The first of them was far more German than English and preferred to remain as much as possible in his German lands, associating when in England with the German favorites who accompanied his court. Since George I spoke no English, it was natural, therefore, that the administration of government should be left largely in the hands of the ministry and that the king should follow the example of William III and of Queen Anne in selecting those ministers from the party or group of factions which could obtain a Parliamentary majority. Although there was no legislation enforcing such a policy, it gradually came to be a custom, as binding as law, that the ministry which advised the king and determined the government's policy should be made up of members of the dominant party or group of parties in Parliament, and that the prime minister should be the outstanding leader of that party or bloc. Since it was hopeless for the cabinet to expect support if the political situation in Parliament altered, it became the custom for the cabinet or ministry to resign if the party it represented lost its majority.⁸⁰ The leader of the opposition then became prime minister at the request of the king, and the cabinet which he headed was made up of members of the

⁸⁰ If such a measure backed by the cabinet (the chief ministers) fails of adoption there are two alternatives—the organization of a ministry by the opposition, or a new Parliamentary election. The cabinet chooses whichever seems to fit the circumstances.

new majority. Thus the English system of ministerial responsibility was inaugurated. Under that system the executive branch of the government was to be but a part of the legislative, and the functions of the king were in large part transferred to Parliament.

The Whig and the Tory parties broke into numerous factions when the crises that had created them were over, and government under the Georges was by combinations of factions, that is, government by *bloc*.³¹ There was to be no extension of suffrage and no further democratization of England until the nineteenth century. The wealthy upper middle class, the landed country gentry, or squirearchy, and the aristocracy ruled the country in their own interests through Parliamentary majorities. Such government was often corrupt; the civil service was honeycombed with nepotism and graft; Robert Walpole, prime minister for George I and George II, admitted that "every man has his price"; but the England of the eighteenth century undeniably had a broader popular basis for government than any European country, and the remedies for its evils lay in legislation and not in revolution.³² For their effect upon later European history, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of the events in England in the period of the Stuarts.

READINGS

GENERAL ACCOUNTS. The chapters in C. J. H. Hayes's *Political and Cultural History of Europe*, Vol. I (1932), on the development of English institutions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are very good. There are any number of brief texts in English history that may be used, for example: W. E. Lunt, *History of England* (1928); A. L. Cross, *A Shorter History of England and Greater Britain* (1921); and G. B. Adams, *Constitutional History of England* (1921). E. Lipson's *The Economic History of England*, 3 vols. (1929-31), covers the economic aspects of this and other periods. R. H. Tawney's *The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century* (1912) is probably the best treatment of the enclosures issue.

THE TUDOR PERIOD. *The Tudors* (1936) by Conyers Read is excellent for the sixteenth century. J. E. Neale's *Queen Elizabeth* (1934) is probably the best biography of the great queen. *Elizabeth and Essex* (1934) by Lytton Strachey gives an interesting picture of certain phases of the history of

³¹ William Makepeace Thackeray wrote an essay called "The Four Georges" which is one of the most delightful accounts of this period.

³² The relations of eighteenth-century England with European balance of power and the long colonial and commercial wars with France will be taken up in Chapter IX.

the period. There has been much interest of late in the life of Mary Queen of Scots, and two recent biographies portray the history of that ill-fated figure: *The Scottish Queen* (1932) by H. S. Gorman, and *Mary, Queen of Scotland and the Isles* (1935) by Stefan Zweig. Two modern dramatizations of her life are worthy of mention: *The End and the Beginning* (1934) by John Masefield, and *Mary Stuart* (1921) by John Drinkwater. W. S. Davis's *Life in Elizabethan Days* (1930) and J. A. Froude's *English Seamen in the Sixteenth Century* (1903) are interesting studies of certain aspects of Elizabethan England.

THE STUART PERIOD. *The Early Stuarts, 1603-1660* (1937) by Godfrey Davies contains five stimulating essays. G. M. Trevelyan's *England under the Stuarts, 1603-1714* (1910) is a longer and extremely interesting account. G. P. Gooch's *English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century* (Revised edition, 1927) will be useful to those interested in political theory. *James I of England, the Wisest Fool in Christendom* (1938) by C. and H. Stechholm is a new biography of the first Stuart king, while Hilaire Belloc's *Charles I* (1936) is a sympathetic treatment of the life of the second. There are two excellent biographies of Oliver Cromwell: one by John Buchan (1934), the other by C. H. Firth (1900). S. E. Morison's *Builders of the Bay Colony* (1930) makes the Puritans who left England under the early Stuarts appear as real people. The later Stuart period is well done in George N. Clark's *The Later Stuarts, 1660-1714* (1934). Hilaire Belloc has written a biography of James II (1928).

≡ VII ≡

THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV

IN 1643, a child not quite five years old became king of France, and began a reign destined to be the longest in French history. For more than seventy years Louis XIV was ruler over a France that had slowly come to be the leading state of Europe. The one hundred and fifty years of competition and warfare with the Hapsburgs were drawing to a close with France in the ascendancy. The great Richelieu who had achieved so much in unifying France, in increasing royal power, and in establishing French prestige abroad had been dead less than a year, and before Louis XIV reached his majority the Treaty of Westphalia bore witness to the fact that the Austrian Hapsburgs were not to build a centralized Germany east of the Rhine. In 1659, shortly before Louis XIV began to rule in his own right, the Spanish Hapsburgs were forced into the Treaty of the Pyrenees in accordance with which they recognized French predominance by slight cessions of territory and by giving a Spanish bride, Maria Theresa, to the young king of France.¹

The child king of 1643 might well have witnessed the collapse of the structure upon which Richelieu had expended such effort, for the great nobles of France had been so recently subdued that they were sure to regard a regency as a period in which to regain the power they had so unwillingly surrendered. Other powers, also, were not to be trusted. Prestige had been achieved at the expense of rivals, and ambitious and predatory rulers had little sympathy or consideration for a child called prematurely to a position that would tax the abilities of a strong man. Anne of Austria, the queen mother and regent, was very unpopular in France, for she and Louis XIII had been estranged during much of their married life, and she was distrusted and disliked by many of those influential in court and governmental circles. The situation was saved from disaster by the presence of another remarkable minister and churchman, Mazarin. An Italian

¹ See above, Chapter V.

by birth, Mazarin had come to France some years before as papal nuncio, and had been invited by Richelieu to enter the royal service. Trained by Richelieu, Mazarin followed in his footsteps. He became a cardinal, and in 1642 upon the death of Richelieu he succeeded as chief minister. Until his death in 1661 he was the real ruler of France.

In foreign affairs the new cardinal minister, continuing the policies and the wars of Richelieu, achieved a success which caused France to be recognized as the foremost state of Europe. The internal problems which faced Mazarin were much more difficult, and their solution taxed every resource of the wily and able Italian. The nobility hated and feared him and won the support of the bourgeoisie by arousing their hatred for the Hapsburg regent and her Italian prime minister. Mazarin's avarice, his rapidly growing wealth, his generosity to a flock of Italian relatives, and his appointment of Italians to lucrative positions, all increased his unpopularity. In 1648 a revolt broke out which raged openly for four years and required constant attention for several more.

Back of this revolt lay a fundamental protest against the royal absolutism that had been growing in France since the accession of Henry IV. Nobility and rising middle class, both suffering from the growth of royal power, united in opposition to its further extension. The protest undoubtedly gained force because of the success of the English revolution of the same period. The years of the French revolt, called the *Fronde*,² saw the execution of the English king, Charles I, and the establishment of the Commonwealth and of the Protectorate. In France there was no legislative parliament like that in England, and no long tradition of representative government. The Estates-General had been dismissed in 1614. But France did have law courts, or *parlements*, that had had a long history and considerable power. After all, the laws of the land, be they the edicts of a despot or the enactments of the representatives of the people, receive their enforcement and interpretation through the courts. An independent judiciary is, perhaps, as great a menace to absolutism as a recalcitrant legislature. The Parlement of Paris, the most important court of France, gradually came to exercise the right to "register" royal decrees. Having acquired that right the Parlement advanced to the position that it could refuse to register, and it maintained that an unregistered decree had no validity in French courts. Royal absolutism

² The name came, probably, from a game played by the street gamins of Paris.

could brook no such check upon its will, and the French kings maintained that an order for the promulgation of a law given to the Parlement by the king in person—a *lit de justice*³—was final, and from such an order there was no escape or alternative.

The assertion by the Parlement of Paris that Mazarin had interfered with its rights was the pretext which began the Wars of the *Fronde*. The Parlement claimed that it should be exempt from royal control; asserted the sole right to authorize taxes; refused its approval of the office of intendant;⁴ and protested against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. Back of its claims lay the selfish ambitions of the nobility, and the desire of the middle class for participation in government, but the majority of the French people were probably loyal to the crown. The return of the French soldiers from the Germanies after 1648 ended the brief success of the movement, and its utter collapse came with the end of the Spanish war, ten years later. This was the last French challenge to royal absolutism until it, too, went down in defeat in the French Revolution.⁵ With the end of the *Fronde* the nobility was discredited and deprived of power. The great nobles became courtiers whose careers were limited to court service and who shone in the reflected glory of the "Sun King." The parlements were forbidden to interfere in political and financial affairs, and Paris itself, which lost all independence, was governed by royal appointees. The suppression of the *Fronde* was a significant step in the development of absolutism in France.

Upon the death of Mazarin Louis XIV assumed personal control over the affairs of France. Never again did he entrust that burden to a prime minister. Through the remainder of the long reign Louis himself was responsible for the government, the diplomacy, and the military policies of France. There is always danger in identifying a period with the name of one individual, for such an identification must ignore many factors which are vital to an understanding of that period. Yet so much of that which is significant in the history of Europe in the latter half of the seventeenth century is most evident in France, where the figure of the king is the center of interest, that there is justification for calling this the "Age of Louis XIV." It is necessary, therefore, to see what sort of a man gave his name to the era and through what theory and system of government he exercised the

³ Literally translated, "a bed of justice."

⁵ See below, Chapter XI.

⁴ See above, page 143.

vast powers and influence that gave him the name of "the Sun King."⁶

The figure that emerges from a careful study of the mass of material on the period is a magnificent one, with so many of the qualities of greatness that neither he nor his contemporaries ever doubted for one moment that he was a great man as well as the "Grand Monarch." Louis XIV was handsome and was endowed by nature with a splendid constitution. His manners were perfect—calm, dignified, and courteous. His majestic mien was such that Saint-Simon felt "he would have been every inch a king even if he had been born under the roof of a beggar." His strength lay in his firm belief in himself, in his sense of duty, and in his devotion to what he called "the business of being a king." A closer study of his life and character shows, however, that he was lacking in many of the qualities of true greatness. He had no originality, no genius, and very little education or training for statesmanship. Vain and arrogant, he took flattery at its face value and resented any form of criticism. He was inquisitive and obstinate; and, while he worked hard and conscientiously, he loved details for their own sake and had little ability in developing or recognizing merit in others. Above all he had a firm and complacent belief in the divine right upon which he based his rule.

The theory of divine right had been slow of growth. Starting with the assertion of royal power in the later Middle Ages, it had gained impetus from the denial of papal power during the Reformation, and was now crystallized and given form by Louis XIV and the political theorists of his day. It may best be studied in the words of Louis himself or those of Bishop Bossuet, whose writings gave classic expression to the Biblical basis for the doctrine. In a letter to his grandson, Philip, who became king of Spain, Louis wrote: "Never allow yourself to be ruled; be the master; have no favorites or prime

⁶ It is possible to obtain a very complete picture of Louis XIV and his court. Louis himself left many revealing statements that have been collected and published. Several of his contemporaries prominent at court wrote interesting commentaries on Louis and his times. The Duc de Saint-Simon wrote his *Mémoires*, Madame de Sévigné wrote her *Lettres*, Bishop Bossuet left many published *Works (Oeuvres)*, Louis's German sister-in-law, the Duchesse d'Orléans, left her caustic comments in her *Correspondence*, and numerous other men and women wrote diaries, letters, and memoirs which make the past live again. Using all of this mass of source material, Cécile Hugon wrote the delightful *Social France in the XVII Century*, and James Eugene Farmer, the even more detailed *Versailles and the Court under Louis XIV*. Arthur Hasall, *Louis XIV*, is still probably the best biography in English. Laurence Packard's little *The Age of Louis XIV* is an excellent brief summary.

minister; listen to, and consult your Council; but do you decide for yourself; God, who made you king, will give you the lights which are necessary to you, so long as you have a right intention.”⁷ On another occasion he wrote: “All power, all authority, resides in the hands of the king, and there can be no other in his kingdom than that which he establishes. The nation does not form a body in France. It resides entire in the person of the king”; and again: “Kings are absolute lords, and have naturally the full and free disposal of all the goods possessed as well by churchmen as by laymen, to use them at all times, according to the general need of their state.” If such vast assertions of power, such claims to control the persons and lives of his subjects, needed any amplification or justification, they received it from Bossuet who believed that:

Royal authority is absolute. The king should render an account to no one for what he prescribes. Kings are gods, according to the language of the Scriptures, and participate in some manner in divine independence. Against the authority of the king there can be no remedy except in his authority. . . . It is not justifiable to rise against kings for any cause whatsoever. To speak against the king is a cause worthy of the greatest punishment, and this crime is treated as almost equal to that of blasphemy against God.⁸

To uphold the full majesty of a monarch ruling by divine right over the world's most powerful kingdom, it was necessary for the French court to provide a setting commensurate with the claims of the king. There grew up in France a cult of majesty which made life a brilliant official pageant in which everyone living at court played a carefully regulated part. The exquisite formality and rigid discipline seem absurd today, but they delighted contemporaries and were eagerly aped at the courts of other monarchs. Louis XIV built himself a magnificent stage in the palace at Versailles and played there the part of the “greatest actor of majesty that ever filled a throne.” He rose in the morning and prepared for the day through a series of levees during which princes and high officials of the realm handed him his shirt and other garments, held his shaving mirror, and offered him a choice of wigs, before an audience composed of those

⁷ Jean Longnon, *A King's Lessons in Statecraft; Louis XIV Letters to His Heirs*, p. 176.

⁸ These quotations are from Louis XIV *Oeuvres*, II, pp. 93 and 121, and Bossuet, *Oeuvres*, IV and V, quoted at length in Faimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 206 ff.

lesser lords and ladies to whom the privilege of being present was a cherished recognition of social eminence. Exposed to pitiless publicity from morning until night, from birth until death, royalty belonged to the court and the public.

The courtiers and their ladies were the audience; the expensive decoration of the court, they were at the same time parasites upon the state. Their lives, spent in fawning service upon the monarch, grew constantly of less value to the nation. Pride would not permit them to enter trade or the professions; even military service must not take them away from court; and lucrative service in the church was of interest only if court attendance went with the office. Tired of gossip, wearied with the endless attendance upon majesty, and footsore from an etiquette that commanded all to stand in the presence of the king, many of the more intelligent luminaries of the court have admitted that the life was an unutterable bore. But there was no relaxation; and no one who was privileged to live at court desired to go elsewhere, for to be away from the glory of the king's presence was banishment to the outer darkness. The glamor and fascination which the pageantry of royalty exerts even in the world today were irresistible in the seventeenth century. Expensive as it was to maintain, the court was popular with the people of France, and the splendor of king and court was gratifying to national pride.

The rigidity of ideas and the formality and precision of their expression were carried over into the artistic expression of the age. Art and literature, as well as manners, were confined within limits prescribed by a king who regarded himself as the source of taste as well as of power. Architects, painters, sculptors, and writers were directed and guided by royal authority. The establishment of the Royal Academies of arts and letters in the reigns of Louis XIV and his father made it possible to set the king's seal of approval upon that which pleased him, and the pensions that flowed from the royal purse further encouraged conformity. The court employed a galaxy of musicians, composers, artists, and architects, and court standards dominated artistic production. Dramatic music developed rapidly as opera came into existence and made music a more social art. The ballet was given especial attention at the French court, and new and better musical instruments were brought into use. Corneille, Molière, and Racine were dramatists who made the French theater famous in their own and succeeding ages, and whose marvelous diction aided in developing the French language into "one of the best vehicles of

expression developed by occidental civilization.”⁹ The letters, memoirs, and diaries of the courtiers were the reflection of the polish and elegance of the period.

The same formalism dominated religion. “Many fine sermons were preached, much penance was self-righteously performed, but gambling and adultery throve none the less. To be intimate with the deadly sins, and at the same time exact in the performance of the outward duties of religion, was found to be practicable.”¹⁰ The blasé courtier who substituted a volume of Rabelais for his book of prayers in order to keep awake at the daily observance of the Mass, was only expressing the sentiment of the princes who congratulated him upon his clever forethought.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the beginning of modern science. Although the Italian Renaissance had contributed little to scientific development, the awakening of intellectual curiosity and the growth of the inquiring critical spirit which also marked the Renaissance, led inevitably to scientific discoveries. The scientists of the age of Louis XIV were both philosophers and men of science. They combined rationalism and the condemnation of dogmatic thinking with momentous discoveries in the realm of physics, mathematics, chemistry, and medicine.¹¹ The movement was not confined to one country alone. France had her Descartes who invented analytic geometry; England had her Newton who discovered the law of gravitation and invented the calculus; Italy produced Galileo, the great popularizer of astronomy and mathematics; and Germany contributed Leibnitz, philosopher as well as mathematician. The invention of the telescope, the microscope, and other scientific instruments made possible still further advance. The interest in and the great development of science in the modern age rest firmly upon the achievements of the seventeenth century.¹²

Away from court life and the reflected glory of the Sun King,

⁹ Laurence Packard, *The Age of Louis XIV*, p. 102.

¹⁰ Cecile Hugon, *Social France in the XVII Century*, p. 15.

¹¹ See Chapter X.

¹² “It was an age when the spirit of investigation and experiment introduced a complete revolution in man’s conception of nature and ushered in the Age of Science. It must be emphasized that during this age, views of astronomy were recast, the principles of dynamics laid down, the science of physics initiated, new branches of mathematics discovered, the theory of mechanics elaborated, much of the theory of fluids established, new theories of light worked out, something done toward creating the theory of acoustics, and the fundamental problems of vibratory motions stated.” Laurence Packard, *The Age of Louis XIV* (Henry Holt and Company), pp. 135-36.

French society presented a different picture. The members of the lesser nobility lived upon their estates in larger houses but often under conditions little better than those of the peasants who worked on the estates. They had none of the sturdy independence, or of the interest in government and politics of the English landed gentry. The provincial French nobility was a discontented class, without hope of a share in the government and little opportunity for advancement. Through the army or the church there might be an occasional outlet, but the best places in each went to the families of the court nobility. The king from time to time "diluted" the nobility by increasing its numbers through ennobling the holders of offices in the government and through the sale of titles of nobility to ambitious and wealthy members of the bourgeoisie. Such noble titles were hereditary, and a class of office-holding nobility grew up—the *noblesse de la robe*. Between this class and the court nobles there was little love lost. The social position, privileges, and pensions of the court nobility made them objects of envy, even though they were regarded as parasites whose importance was out of all proportion to their services. All of the nobility shared in an exemption from most forms of direct taxation.

The clergy, too, was not a unit. The higher offices were largely held by the sons of the upper nobility whether or not they had any vocation or training for a religious life. The wealth of the church made its control far too attractive to those with ambition or avarice, and its great revenues were to a great extent expended in maintaining the lofty and luxurious state to which the holders of its offices felt themselves to be entitled. The members of the lower clergy, on the other hand, were poorly paid and badly educated. The clergy paid no taxes, although the church sometimes made a "gift" to the king in time of need.

The middle class in France was without formal political rights and social position, but the government was fully conscious of its importance and of the value of increasing the prosperity of France. A paternalistic and mercantilistic government could not trifle too drastically with the vital interests of the classes upon whose payment of taxes the government itself depended. A great part of the administrative work of the government was done by officials chosen from the bourgeoisie. The middle class benefited, also, from the regulations placed upon trade and industry. There was, however,

no such protection of private property under French absolutism as had been won in England.

The peasantry in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France was in a position about halfway between that of the English yeomen and that of the peasants of the rest of Europe. Although there were a few landowning peasants, there was no sturdy yeoman class as in England, and there were many more traces of the old feudal system in land tenure and rural government. Some serfdom still remained, and, although there was some peasant proprietorship, the peasants in general owed feudal dues and labor services to the overlord upon whose estates they lived. The *métayer* peasants cultivated noble land on a share basis. The court nobles seldom visited their estates, and were interested in them solely for the revenue the stewards could squeeze from them. The peasants on the estates of absentee landlords were more exploited than any other rural group and had less hope of bettering their condition. For the agriculturalist as for the merchant the government had some regard. His prosperity was of concern to finance ministers and to war ministers as well. A mercantilistic and ambitious France must be able to feed itself and must have man power for its armies. Government could not be indifferent to the needs of a class that produced both wheat and soldiers.

Seventeenth-century France was predominantly rural, and the urban lower classes made up a far smaller percentage of the population than at the present time. The craft guilds still existed in the older industries and tended to restrict their membership and reduce competition as well as to regulate output. But there were many new industries, such as silk-making, glass and porcelain manufacturing, lace-making, and the manufacture of other luxury goods. These industries, grown up in the period since Louis XI, were more modern in organization. Some of them were on a factory basis and presented the problems of capital and labor, housing, seasonal occupations, depressions, and others just as familiar to the modern student. Education, participation in government, and any sort of chance to improve his station were denied to the urban worker as much as to the peasant. The urban unskilled casual laborer was a step lower in the social scale. Pushed too far he could and did revolt; he and his kind were the stuff from which mobs were made; starved he was dangerous; but the rulers of seventeenth-century France regarded him as a necessary part of the animal world and expected to preserve for him a place in that well-regimented social structure in which the workers

formed the broad base of a pyramid of which the king was the remote and dazzling apex.

Much that was true of France was characteristic of all Europe. Greater social mobility and greater vigor and independence characterized the English farmers, gentry, and middle classes. Even the great English nobility were not courtiers in the sense that they were in France. They lived much of the time on their estates and were closely in touch with the gentry, yeomen, and tenant farmers. The younger sons of the English nobility entered the army, the church, government service, or sometimes even engaged in trade. At the same time in Parliament there was constant contact of merchants, gentry, and nobility, and it was much more possible there than in France to consider problems from a general or national point of view instead of primarily from class interest. Wealthy British merchants purchased country estates and retired as gentry. They were willing to permit the marriage of their well-dowered daughters to sons of nobles who were poor but not too proud to accept this means of filling the family coffers. Eastern Europe, on the other hand, was still, in large part, in the old medieval social framework. A feudal nobility and a servile peasantry were the classes most evident, with an emerging national monarchy and a slowly developing middle class. Monarchs everywhere looked to Versailles for their model and copied extensively from the centralized absolutist governmental structure of France. They were inclined to accept without question, also, the economic-political theories of the mercantilism whose operations they could observe in both France and England.

It is well to keep in mind two things: in the first place there was not, in the seventeenth or in any other century, any set form for all Europe; and in the second place even in France, where there was the most regimented social order, there were numerous exceptions. Society is dynamic, constantly changing and made up of individuals of infinite diversity. Attempts to make it static through too close regimentation is often a part of the background of revolution. The elasticity, lack of uniformity, and endless evolution and variation make the study of history seem full of complexities. It is dangerous to generalize or summarize, and difficult to make comparisons, but the very complexities and the puzzling differences increase its fascination and make it of greater interest.

Based upon the theory of autocratic rule, the government of

Louis XIV tended to become constantly more centralized and more comprehensive. Louis himself was methodical; his life was well ordered, and he expected the government to be similarly well organized. He had complete confidence in his own judgment and was averse to delegating authority, so he kept as much as possible in his own hands and spent long hours each day on this "business" of kingship. The authority of the king was expressed through several councils which acted as administrative bodies. They were no check upon the will of the king, but under his direction carried on the work of government. The three most important were the Councils of State, of Dispatches (domestic affairs), and of Finance. In his apartments the king presided over the Councils and made the important decisions. There were several minor councils over which the king occasionally presided, and from which reports were made to him. France had been built up, one province after another, over a long period of history. It had been customary to leave local institutions and government about as they had been, and to add a royal governor as the link with the central government. The office of *intendant*, created by Richelieu, was designed to bring unity and centralization out of the great variations of administration in different parts of France. Louis XIV and later kings kept the intendants and increased the centralization by reducing the power of provincial assemblies and law courts, even though they were never able to eradicate entirely the localism that characterized the provinces until the period of the Revolution.

When Mazarin died and Louis began his personal rule, there were several able and well-trained men in important positions in the state. As long as they lived Louis was well served, and France profited as a result of the efficiency which is possible in a well-managed autocratic state. About twenty years later, after they had all disappeared from the scene, Louis filled their places with second-rate men. He made his own decisions in accord with policies of his own choosing, and involved France in difficulties that were to detract from the success and refulgence of his reign. In 1661, Jean Baptiste Colbert, an ambitious bourgeois who had been trained in the household of Mazarin, was made superintendent of royal finance. Until his death in 1683 he was Louis's most important minister, whose only serious rival in the confidence of the king was the Marquis de Louvois, who became minister of war in 1666. Lionne was minister of foreign affairs during the first decade of Louis's personal

reign, and found an apt pupil in the king, who personally supervised the diplomatic affairs of France after Lionne's death.

Colbert was one of the ablest statesmen of his day. Although usually considered to be the greatest exponent of mercantilism, he may better be regarded as an eminently practical and successful financier who used whatever means seemed best suited to bring the desired ends, for he had relatively little concern for theories. He was utterly ruthless in following the policies he considered essential to build up French prosperity. He worked early and late at his own job and expected from others the same devotion to work. Taxation, commerce, industry, agriculture, and labor—all seemed to him to be the province of a finance minister, for everything that could aid or harm the prosperity of the country—and of the taxpayer—was within his province. When commerce led to consideration of overseas interests, Colbert added colonies and the navy to departments in which he was interested. Education, arts and letters, and even the postal service were directed by him. He aided in the codification of French law and established the Royal Academy of Science.

The most difficult part of his work was to keep the king from ruining the whole edifice by extravagance or war. By a careful funding of the debt and an efficient and honest collection of taxes, Colbert restored order in the administration of finance, and the first year of his tenure of office ended with a surplus in the treasury. The king, however, was more interested in the splendor of Versailles, the establishment of French prestige through diplomacy, and the gaining of new territories than he was in the development of industry and commerce. It was always difficult for Colbert to hold the attention of the king long enough, and to impress the needs of his department firmly enough, to win royal support for his projects. His difficulties can easily be seen from a letter he wrote the king in 1675:

Sire, I entreat Your Majesty to permit me to tell you that neither in war nor in peace have you ever consulted your finances to determine your expenditures, which are so extraordinary that they are certainly without example; and, if you will be pleased to examine and compare the times and years . . . you will find that, although the receipts have greatly increased, the expenditures have far exceeded the receipts, and perhaps this will persuade Your Majesty to moderate and curtail what is excessive, and by this means to put a little more proportion between the receipts and the expenditures.

Louis's sole reply to this reasonable and pathetic appeal was, "The king gives alms in spending largely!"¹³

Colbert wished to make France completely self-sufficient, to increase the resources of the country, and, at the same time, to adjust taxation so that it interfered as little as possible with economic enterprise. Tariffs were imposed to protect home industries, and he endeavored to abolish the internal or provincial customs to make possible the free movement of goods within France. Roads and canals which had been begun by Sully were extended into a network connecting all parts of the country. Manufactures were encouraged and carefully regulated; as a result, the laces, tapestries, china, and glassware of France became famous throughout Europe for their fine quality. Artisans from abroad were encouraged to emigrate to France, and skilled laborers were forbidden to leave the country. Colbert introduced scientific methods of forestry and unsuccessfully tried to initiate French conservation of forest resources. Colbert did not concern himself greatly with agriculture except for the importance of food products to make a self-sustaining France which could, in time of war, avoid the necessity of sending bullion abroad for the purchase of food supplies. He subsidized stockbreeding establishments and greatly increased the numbers of farm animals raised in France. Strangely enough for a Frenchman, he was uninterested in grape culture and the wine industry, but he supported any enterprise for the growth of raw products to be used in industry, and encouraged the growth of flax, hemp, tobacco, and mulberry trees. The use of tobacco increased rapidly in France in the seventeenth century, as it did in England. Smoking spread to court circles, whence comes a delightful story of the curiosity and interest of three of the young princesses who borrowed pipes from the Swiss Guard and endeavored to learn the art after the king and the court had officially retired. They were betrayed by the smoke from their pipes, their peccadillo was reported to the king, and they were roundly scolded for conduct unbecoming young ladies!

Commerce, especially distant trading, was as dear to Colbert's heart as was manufacturing, for it was in "grand commerce" that the prize coveted by all mercantilists—a favorable balance of trade—might be won. Colbert realized that commerce on a scale designed thus to enrich France implied rivalry and war and necessitated sea

¹³ J. E. Farmer, *Versailles and the Court under Louis XIV*, p. 216.

power. Bounties were given to French ships, and heavy tonnage duties were laid upon those of foreign nations entering French ports. The merchant marine was built up, and trading companies were encouraged by liberal new charters. English and Dutch traders, recognized as the great rivals of the French, were discriminated against. Nevertheless, Colbert's grandiose commercial schemes did not meet with corresponding success. The whole structure was too much a creation of the finance minister, too little the result of a need or a demand of the French people. It was all so closely regulated, supervised, and controlled by the government that there was little room for private initiative. The French trading companies, for instance, lacked the vitality and force of the English East India Company and seemed artificial in comparison.

In the same way, the French were little interested in colonization and did not venture forth in search of homes, wealth, religious and political freedom as did their English contemporaries. The minute regulations for the planting and development of French colonies would have seemed as absurd to the English as they do to us. Aside from a few West Indian colonies whose sugar production was the source of wealth,¹⁴ the French colonies were not a great success. French Canada grew slowly; even with much encouragement the settlers numbered but 10,000 in 1683 and only 80,000 nearly a hundred years later. In India trading posts were established which were to be of importance in the struggle with England in the next century, but they were not economically profitable in the day of Colbert. Dutch rivalry both in the East and the West Indies was deplored and feared. England had three wars with the Dutch in the seventeenth century, all based in large degree upon commercial rivalries, and the only one of the wars of Louis XIV of which Colbert approved was the war with the Netherlands which began in 1672.

Colbert's plans for the economic advancement of France were comprehensive, and his scheme as a whole was a magnificent one, although the mercantilistic measures were of dubious value. That the plans did not have great success was not so much the fault of the great finance minister as of Louis and his ruinous wars. In the last analysis Colbert could not succeed because the French people themselves were not ready to co-operate, for at that time they were incapable of taking advantage of his schemes. But even though only

¹⁴ Colbert purchased Martinique and Guadeloupe.

partial success rewarded his efforts, Colbert may be given credit for having made it possible for French prosperity and French finance to survive the wars of the latter half of the reign of Louis XIV. The long period of extravagance and corruption under Louis XV and the French wars in Europe and the colonies in that reign were the final blows that brought France back to the financial chaos and bankruptcy from which Colbert had rescued her.

The religious issue in the France of Louis XIV had ramifications that were social, economic, and political. The problems which it presented were difficult to solve in any way except by an acceptance of the principle of religious toleration. Such a solution would have been most repugnant to Louis, foreign to his religious convictions and his political theories, and, doubtless, unpopular in the country as well. The course which the French government pursued in religious questions was thoroughly consistent with French practice and quite in accord with the current political theories, but it was in many ways disastrous for France.

The situation, in brief, was this: The concordat of 1516 put in the hands of the king much of the control over the filling of ecclesiastical positions in France and thoroughly united church and state. The Catholic Church was very rich, but by far the larger part of its revenues went to the upper clergy while the poor parish priests eked out their meager incomes by tilling their garden plots and charging fees for various services to their parishioners. Besides the income from its vast estates representing about one-fifteenth of the land of France, the church received funds from a tax imposed upon the people of France and collected by the government in behalf of the church. This tax, called the *tithe*, amounted to about one-eighteenth of the annual income of the average man. The property of the church was not taxed by the government, and it had a very privileged position under French law.

The Roman Catholic Church was not the only church authorized by the laws of France. When Henry IV had made his peace with Catholicism and had been accepted by the French Catholic party as king of France,¹⁵ he had made arrangements, in the Edict of Nantes (1598), to protect the Huguenots whose ranks he had just left. In the period of Richelieu the political privileges of that Edict had been revoked, and a Huguenot rebellion had been put down. The Prot-

¹⁵ See above, pages 139-40.

estants were therefore no longer in possession of garrisons, fortified towns, or the special status making them a "state within the state." On the other hand, their freedom of worship had not been denied, and through more than half of the reign of Louis XIV they managed to retain an ever-decreasing amount of that liberty guaranteed them in the Edict. The Huguenots were largely bourgeois, enterprising, industrious, and valuable to the economic life of the state. They were merchants, bankers, manufacturers, and artisans, with some slight admixture of nobles but almost no peasants. The great nobles who had been Huguenots in the days of the wars of religion had, in general, gone back to Catholicism with Henry IV, and Protestantism had never, then or since, much appeal among the French peasantry. Although a relatively small minority in the entire population, the substantial, progressive, and prosperous group which had always been the core of French Protestantism had an importance in the economic life of the state out of all proportion to its numbers. The success of the policies of Colbert depended in large part upon this group and upon Catholics of similar social status, although Colbert himself apparently never realized his dependence upon the Huguenots.

There were differences of opinion among the adherents of the Catholic Church on matters of both church government and doctrine, so that Catholicism did not present a united front. Ever since the Catholic Reformation there had been a strong Jesuit group in France. The confessors of king and court were usually Jesuits, who continually urged suppression of Protestantism and greater regard for papal authority. A party grew up among the French clergy called the "Ultramontanists," which looked across the mountains to Rome and the pope for leadership, and worked for a reduction of royal control in church affairs. At the other extreme there was a Puritan or reform movement within the French church somewhat similar to the contemporary Anglican Puritanism. The leader of the movement in the early seventeenth century had been Jansenius, a Flemish bishop whose name was used to identify his followers—Jansenists. Mystical and spiritual, Jansenism owed something to St. Augustine and to Calvin; and its members advocated reform and decried the worldliness of the French church. Jansenism was fairly widespread in France although it was, like Protestantism, the faith of a small minority. Its headquarters in France were in Port Royal, an abbey outside Paris, and its members numbered many theologians and men of letters, including the famous author Pascal.

To Louis XIV the mere existence of the Huguenot element was in defiance of his belief in absolute authority and his desire for uniformity and complete submission to the royal will. Religious schism savored of political rebellion. That the French people as a whole agreed with him and were opposed to religious toleration is indicated by the fact that the anti-Huguenot acts of the reign apparently met with public approval. Even in England throughout the seventeenth century religious toleration was approved in principle by only a few advanced thinkers and was adopted in practice because it seemed the only peaceful solution of a complex problem. The religious settlement in the Germanies in 1648 had not brought toleration but merely uniformity within small units—again a practical solution in accord with local conditions.

Mazarin had treated the Huguenots with consideration and in 1652 had confirmed the Edict of Nantes, but Louis soon reversed this conciliatory policy. In the year 1661 a survey was made which recommended the limitation of Huguenot privileges on the grounds that they exceeded the exact limits of the Edict of Nantes. Churches were destroyed when it could be proved that their establishment had not been in accord with the letter of the Edict. Fully aware of the animosity of the king and of their danger, the Huguenots began to leave France a few at a time for the Netherlands, England, or other Protestant countries. The semipersecutions continued; daytime burials were prohibited; Huguenot teaching was interfered with, and Huguenot schools were closed; the conversion of Huguenot children became Catholic policy; and Huguenot officers were dismissed from the royal service. These measures resulted in further Huguenot emigration but do not seem to have resulted in any political organization of the Huguenots, who apparently felt themselves too weak to protest. Colbert's death in 1683 left Louis without an adviser of statesmanlike vision, and he fell more and more under the influence of the pious Madame de Maintenon and of the Jesuits.¹⁸ The decision which led to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 was Louis's own, however, although it was in accordance with the advice of the Jesuit

¹⁸ Madame de Maintenon was a woman of a great deal of force of character who had been a governess for some of the children at court. She became the wife of Louis XIV in 1684 and, although never acknowledged as queen, she dominated the life of the court until Louis's death. She was austere and very much interested in religion, and the moral tone of the court was entirely changed after her rise to power. She favored conversion rather than persecution and was herself an ex-Huguenot and a very moderate Jansenist.

wing of the French clergy, and in his eyes it was probably as much a political as a religious step. The result of the revocation was a vigorous persecution of the Huguenots. Some of them went over to Catholicism, but there was a wholesale exodus from France of many who were able to leave. More than three hundred thousand of the most useful citizens of France went to England, the Netherlands, the German Protestant States, and to the New World. Everywhere they were welcomed eagerly, for bringing with them skills, brains and education, crafts, trade and capital, they enriched their new homes at the expense of the old. France could not soon recover from the blow thus inflicted upon her.

A church under royal control, free not only from schism but also from interference from Rome, was undoubtedly Louis's ideal. The Jesuits might have advised the destruction of the Protestants, but they could only have condemned the statement of Gallican Liberties which, in 1682, set forth the position of the French clergy in relation to the position of the king. The power of the pope over temporal affairs was denied, and the superiority of church councils over popes in spiritual questions was asserted. All of the "rules, usages, and statutes" of the kingdom and the Church of France were declared to be "inviolable," and the decisions of the pope in matters of faith were not acceptable in France without the consent of the French church.

With the issuance of the Gallican Liberties and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the only obstacle in the way of the completion of Louis's religious program was the existence of the Jansenists. Many influential French Catholics, including Madame de Maintenon and the archbishop of Paris, were moderate Jansenists. Since they formed the only group left in France that dared express any disapproval of complete submission to centralization of authority in either church or state, all those with any independence of thought sided with them. Louis naturally distrusted Jansenism and suspected its adherents of desiring decentralization of government, greater power of the aristocracy, and the freedom of the church from state control. The Jesuits played upon his fears, and in the last years of his reign Port Royal was suppressed, and many thousands of Jansenists were persecuted or hounded from France. Jansenism lived on secretly, however, and the church remained divided until the Revolution.

Although at the time Louis XIV was successful in producing the sort of religious uniformity which he desired, and his measures

were popular in large measure with most Frenchmen, it is possible now to see in better perspective the evil consequences of that policy. The emphasis upon conformity and lip service, the lack of any reform in church practices or in reorganization of church finance, and the close union between church and state, all combined to lessen the hold of the church as a religious organization and make it subject to any criticism that might be made of the state. The growing worldliness in the upper clergy reflected the low moral standards of the court, while the growing discontent among the lower clergy and the indifference to religion on the part of the intelligentsia came to be characteristic of French Catholicism. All of these things were to lead to the attack upon both church and religion during the French Revolution.

The long reign of Louis XIV was filled with events which marked his intense interest in foreign affairs and his desire for aggrandizement and military glory. Under Louis, diplomacy became an art and diplomatic procedure the concern of European governments. French replaced Latin as the language of diplomacy, and its manners were those of the punctilious court of Versailles. Diplomacy became a career for ambitious statesmen, and all civilized nations began to maintain resident envoys at foreign capitals. French envoys were instructed not to yield precedence to those of other monarchs, and any denial of French pre-eminence was regarded as an insult sufficient to serve as cause for war. Louis XIV was one of the first of modern rulers to discover that national prestige could often be increased and national policies put into effect by diplomatic means short of war. Assertions of power backed by a show of force, arrogance coupled with bullying, and above all the glittering magnificence of Versailles, were diplomatic weapons par excellence. Europe was awed, but it was not strange "that when Louis began to apply his diplomacy to increasing French power and French territory at the expense of other dynastic states, this awe should turn into fear, and eventually weld most of Europe together into resistance against French pretensions and aggression."¹⁷

The wars of the period of Louis XIV have been left to the end of the discussion of his long reign, but it must not be inferred that they were unimportant. To Louis himself they were doubtless the most significant phase of his achievement, and the results which seem so pitifully small to us, as we observe their tremendous cost to all

¹⁷ Laurence Packard, *The Age of Louis XIV* (Henry Holt and Company), p. 60.

Europe, were to him the crowning glory of a brilliant career. On his deathbed he is reported to have warned the small boy who was to succeed him on the throne not to follow the example of his great-grandfather "who loved war too much," but it is to be doubted whether even then the old king felt that his own aggressiveness had not been well worth its cost.

In the wars into which he threw every resource of France Louis XIV depended upon armies which were as good as any in Europe. Military organization had been developing steadily through the years of almost constant warfare, and the medieval feudal armies and tactics were things of the past. In the 'Thirty Years' War the French had learned much of war and had taken over techniques of training and tactical skill from both allies and opponents. The great generals—Wallenstein, Tilly, and Gustavus Adolphus—had furnished lessons that all might read. Richelieu had been energetic and foresighted in adopting for the French armies ideas acquired in the war, and in reorganizing army control. A war ministry was established, the infantry force was developed, and science was brought to the aid of Mars when engineers and artillerymen were added to the older types of armed forces.

The army of France when the young Louis XIV began his personal rule bore little resemblance, however, to a twentieth-century army. Armies of that day, and indeed for another century, were small, composed of professional or mercenary troops, often foreigners, which were, when occasion arose, supplemented by partly trained citizen militia. They were expected to live by foraging upon the countryside wherever they fought, and little provision was made for discipline, for medical care, or for organization. There was no adequate training for officers and little centralization of command. A country was fortunate that discovered a military genius in an hour of crisis who could lead its heterogeneous forces to victory. Forty or fifty thousand men in the field at one time constituted an army of great size. It may be remembered that George Washington, a century later, seldom had fifteen thousand men under his command. King George III, in sending the Hessian mercenaries to fight his rebellious subjects, was but acting in accordance with long-established European precedent, and not wickedly unleashing the fury of aliens upon the liberty-loving patriots who had endured his tyranny to the breaking point.

In a period of the rapid growth of nation-states, when every

ruler wished to widen the boundaries or extend the territories of his realm, the advance of one state could be made only at the expense of others. Dynastic rivalries, competition for trade and colonies, desire for natural boundaries, and sheer lust for power were all good and sufficient causes for war. War itself was looked upon as a legitimate instrument designed for the purpose of aiding ambitious rulers in reaching objectives which were justified by the same "divine right" doctrine upon which the rule itself was based. Too complete or too frequent success on the part of one state led to coalitions formed by several states, for it was better to forget mutual rivalries and present a united front to a common enemy. The theory, put into classic expression by Grotius,¹⁸ of the absolute sovereignty of each independent state, did not imply equality in size or importance, but it did mean some sort of mutual respect for integrity of territories and independence of existence. Any state whose aggressive policy endangered the delicate and recognized adjustment between the various states of the European system might expect alliances to be formed which would bring about a formidable array of opponents in case of war. All states, large and small, were deeply concerned with the maintenance of the "balance of power." Alliances were made and wars were fought in defense of that hypothetical but very real "balance" which has never ceased to be of major interest in the affairs of Europe. For three hundred years general European conflicts have attended any significant attempt to upset that balance. Since trade and colonies have been of importance to all major powers, such conflicts have tended to become world-wide; and when they have been of long duration, few great powers have been able to maintain their neutrality.¹⁹

Louis XIV had an excellent army; in Turenne he had one of the best generals in European military history; in Vauban, whose fortifications made the eastern frontier well-nigh impregnable, he had the cream of military engineers; he quickly established French

¹⁸ See above, page 150.

¹⁹ In a study of the problem of neutrality Professor Quincy Wright has stated that in the last three hundred years there have been fourteen major periods of war lasting more than two years, in but three of which have any major powers been neutral. England stayed out of the war of the Polish Succession (1733-35), Russia stayed out of the American Revolution, Austria and Prussia were not in the Crimean War (1854-56), but each one of those neutrals became involved within two years in a great war some of the causes of which dated back to the war it had been able to avoid.

diplomatic prestige; and in Louvois he was soon to acquire a minister of war who was a genius at organization. Louis was ambitious with a desire for power and prestige that fed upon success and grew more importunate with each victory. The interests and security of France seemed to him to demand the extension of the boundaries of the state to the limits set by nature—the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. The treaty with Spain in 1659²⁰ made the Pyrenees boundary secure and gave France a few fortified towns as a foothold along the southern border of the Spanish Netherlands. The efforts of Louis to reach the Rhine frontier form the background for three of the four wars of his reign, and the battles of those wars were, for the most part, fought in that area from the North Sea to the Alps which has been the scene of European conflicts since the days of Julius Caesar. The reforms of Colbert and his schemes for commercial supremacy, the prosperity of France, and the peace of all Europe were thrown into the discard in pursuit of those presumably more strategic boundaries which had in the days of the Roman Empire been the limits of a province called Gaul. Although a thousand years elapsed between the disintegration of that ancient province and the appearance of modern France, Louis claimed those boundaries on the basis of the Gallic heritage of France with the same specious reasoning which permits more modern rulers to claim a *Mare Nostrum* or the right to unite an entire "race" under one flag!

The immediate cause, or pretext, for the first of the wars of Louis XIV was a claim, made by him in behalf of his Spanish wife, to the Spanish Netherlands.²¹ This war with Spain (1667-1668) was one of pure ambition and alarmed the interested European states of Sweden, the Netherlands, and England into a Triple Alliance designed to prevent the French acquisition of more than a stipulated number of new territories. Louis was cautious as well as ambitious and made the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle with Spain by which he acquired a strip of territory along the northern border of France. The fortification of the towns in that area would make France secure on the north.

²⁰ See above, page 149

²¹ The claim was a very shadowy one. Louis's wife was the daughter of her father's first marriage. A son of a second marriage succeeded to the Spanish throne as Charles II. Louis claimed that the Netherlands should go to the daughter on the basis of a law in one of the provinces that private property in land passed to female children of a first marriage in preference to male children of a second marriage. Needless to say, this was a pretext and not a legal claim.

This relatively minor success served only to whet Louis's appetite for conquest. The next few years were filled with diplomatic efforts to break up the alliance. Sweden and England were won over,²² and the Dutch, who must be conquered if Louis were to gain his objectives, were left to face the French alone. The Dutch War (1672-1678) ended in the Peace of Nimwegen which made a few changes in the northern boundary, and by which France acquired Franche-Comté, a province near the Alpine border. During the war France lost all her allies except Sweden, and the Dutch were able to get help from several German states that had been alarmed by the dangers of the Rhineland policies of Louis.

For many years after 1678 there was a pseudo peace in which Louis endeavored by rather doubtful means to push the boundaries of France eastward. The Treaty of Nimwegen had given him various towns both to the north and the east "with their dependencies," a clause which offered opportunity for chicanery. He appointed special tribunals, called *Chambres des Réunions*, and acquired with their subservient co-operation several important additions of territory. As soon as a tribunal handed down a decision, French troops moved in, and the doubtful legality of the court dictate was bolstered by the "nine points of the law" secured through possession. Force in time of peace augmented gains obtained in past wars and laid the basis for future advances. In the seventeenth as well as in the twentieth century men wondered how long the states of Europe could tolerate such high-handed aggression. The position of France seemed secure, however, for England under Charles II and James II would not aid the enemies of France; the Dutch could not renew the conflict without allies; and the emperor and Southeastern Europe were occupied with a new Turkish advance. But after the Turks were turned back from Vienna in 1683, steps were taken to unite the opponents of France. The League of Augsburg was formed in 1686. The widespread alarm of Europe was evidenced by the number of states that joined the League—the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the empire, several North German states, Bavaria, and a few Italian princes. Had Louis made concessions at this juncture, war might have been averted, but Colbert was dead, and Louvois was the chief adviser. France, after more than a decade of peace, was prosperous. Complete success seemed possible, and ambition and pride could tolerate no back-

²² See above, page 175.

ward step. At this juncture one more circumstance tipped the scales against France. The Glorious Revolution in England in 1688²³ ended the pro-French regime of the restored Stuarts and inaugurated the reign of William and Mary, the inveterate enemies of Louis XIV. War was now inevitable.

Since France, England, and the Netherlands were colonial as well as European powers, the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697) was on a world scale: villages in Massachusetts were raided by the Indian allies of the French in Canada, while the English established their supremacy at sea, in the Channel, and in the East and the West Indies. After eight years of war to exhaustion all participants were ready for peace. The Peace of Ryswick was a blow to the pride of Louis XIV but was of little value to his opponents. He kept Strassburg, which he had acquired in 1681, and made some gains in Alsace, but he acknowledged the right of William III to the English throne and recognized Anne as William's successor.²⁴ The Dutch were permitted to garrison "barrier" fortresses along the northern border of the Spanish Netherlands.

A careful examination of the map (page 342) will show that Louis lost no territory by the Treaty of Ryswick except a part of those areas given to him, with doubtful legality, by the *Chambres des Réunions*. The gains made between 1648 and 1697 had been considerable: France was firmly entrenched on the Rhine, and the fortifications on the northern and eastern frontiers made her practically impregnable. The prestige of France had never been higher, the centralized, absolute government was the model for the princes of Europe, and the glory, the manners, and the morals were slavishly copied at their courts. It had required the united efforts of almost all of the states of Western Europe to block the territorial aggression of France, and the outcome of the war into which they had thrown all their energies was little more than the maintenance of the *status quo*. Had Louis been content with the predominance that France had undoubtedly attained during his reign, and had he devoted the years yet remaining to the rehabilitation of France, his reputation as monarch and statesman, judged by the standards of his own age, might have rested securely upon a firm basis of accomplishment. But through the long years of success and adulation Louis XIV had grown accustomed to seeing himself, in all his glory, as he was re-

²³ See above, page 176

²⁴ See above, page 179

flected in the dazzled eyes of courtiers and diplomats. The unrelieved diet of praise and flattery had so accustomed him to the idea of omnipotence and omniscience that he could not question the ultimate success of his ambitions, however unbridled they might become. The security and prestige of France assured, the Bourbon dynasty must be thrust into a position of power over territories commensurate with those over which the Emperor Charles V had once ruled.

The opportunity for the gratification of this consuming ambition came about through a situation in Spain which was a matter of concern to all Europe and the chief interest of Louis XIV after 1697. Spain, although shorn of much of her glory, was still regarded as a great power because of her vast territorial possessions. In Europe the Two Sicilies, Sardinia and Naples, and the Belgian or Spanish Netherlands were governed from Madrid. The colonial possessions of Spain in the Americas and in the Far East made up an empire of unparalleled magnificence. The Spanish Hapsburg, Charles II, was coming to the end of a long reign, and he had no direct heirs. The fate of the Spanish Empire must soon be decided, and Louis XIV was determined upon a decision in favor of the Bourbon dynasty. The many marriages between the Austrian and the Spanish branches of the Hapsburg family, and between the Spanish Hapsburgs and the French Bourbons, made the situation extremely complicated.²⁵ A matter of so much importance to all Europe, as well as to the parties more immediately concerned, could not be considered on any strictly legal basis. Before the death of Charles all the great states participated in a series of complicated negotiations and arranged a partition of the Spanish Empire. Several states were allotted shares, and no one state was to become overwhelmingly large. Thus the balance of power would be maintained. Charles's Spanish advisers were angered at the prospect of the partition of the Spanish domains, and the king signed a will leaving the whole of the empire and the throne to Philip of Bourbon, grandson of Louis XIV.

When the news of the death of the king of Spain and of the provisions of his will reached Versailles Louis XIV was faced with a problem for which any solution was dangerous. The opposition of Europe to French acceptance of the Spanish inheritance was certain. Austria could not acquiesce in a settlement that ignored the

²⁵ See genealogical tables in C J H. Hayes, *Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe*, Vol. I, pp. 224, 280.

claims of the emperor, and England must inevitably oppose any arrangement that would unite the French and Spanish colonial empires and further restrict English and Dutch trade. The destiny and the glory of his dynasty were at stake, however, and Louis XIV decided to accept the inheritance and to support his grandson in establishing himself on the throne. The peace and prosperity of France were of no significance in comparison with the prospects of empire, and Louis began to prepare for the war he felt was inevitable. If there had ever been a chance that Europe would accept the situation, Louis's actions ended any possibility of peace. He seized the border fortresses in violation of the Treaty of Ryswick; he recognized the son of James II as rightful king of England; he took measures to bring Spanish commerce within French control; and he made hasty alliances and mobilized the French and Spanish forces. Europe countered with a Grand Alliance of which England, Holland, Austria, and several German states were the first members.

The war which began in 1701 is called the War of the Spanish Succession. The fourth and longest of the wars of Louis XIV, ending in 1713, it was fought in Europe, on the high seas, and in the colonies.²⁶ For the first time since the death of Turenne, great generals appeared upon the scene. The English duke of Marlborough and the dashing Prince Eugene of Savoy made some of the battles memorable in military history. For a time the tide ran strongly against France, but in the last years of the war she retrieved some of her advantages and was able to conclude the Peace of Utrecht in 1713 without crushing losses. By the terms of the treaty Philip V remained on the throne as king of Spain and of the Spanish colonies, on condition that the crowns of Spain and France remain separate forever. The Austrian Hapsburgs were given the Spanish Netherlands, Naples, Milan, and Sardinia.²⁷ The Dutch got back the "barrier" fortresses and were permitted to maintain a trade monopoly on the Scheldt River. The elector of Brandenburg was acknowledged king of Prussia,²⁸ and the duchy of Savoy became a kingdom and was given Sicily. England took her share of the spoils of war in colonial and commercial concessions. Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Hudson Bay were taken from France. Spain gave England Gibraltar and Minorca and made concessions for English trade in Cadiz. Spain also agreed to give England a monopoly of the slave trade with the

²⁶ See below, Chapter IX

²⁸ See below, page 214

²⁷ Exchanged for Sicily in 1720

colonies and to permit England to send one ship of merchandise a year to the Spanish colonies. France agreed to withdraw her recognition of the Stuarts and to refuse any assistance to their attempts to regain the English throne.

French prestige was maintained by the Bourbon occupancy of the Spanish throne, but France acquired no territory and no material advantage from the war. Louis XIV discounted his important colonial losses, for it was the European stage upon which his role was played. When he died two years after the end of the war it is probable that both he and his fellow monarchs felt that he had vastly augmented the power and prestige of France. But he had attempted too much, and the drain upon the state had been excessive. Only the greatest wisdom on the part of his successor and many years of peace and rehabilitation could prevent the decline of France.

Any such hopes were futile, however. Louis XV, who followed his great-grandfather upon the throne, was a child, and France was again governed by regents. The boy king attained his majority and ruled until 1774, but he had neither the character nor the ability to prevent the difficulties which befell France. One war followed another,²⁹ and the cost of war, coupled with the extravagance of king and court, brought the government close to bankruptcy. The vigor and the brilliance of the French critics who attacked the various aspects of the "Old Regime" gave force to the demands for reform. The end of the eighteenth century brought the French Revolution which was in part, at least, the result of the career of Louis XIV.


READINGS

The Seventeenth Century (1929) by G. N. Clark is exceptionally good. H. O. Wakeman's *The Ascendancy of France: Europe 1598-1715* (new edition 1915) is an older standard work. Arthur Hassall's *Louis XIV* (1901) is the best of the older biographies; that of L. Bertrand (1928) is more recent. *Louis XIV* (1938) by Hilaire Belloc is a new and brilliantly written biography. *The Age of Louis XIV* (Berkshire Series, 1929) by Laurence Packard is a very useful brief account of the period. The life of the French court is portrayed in J. E. Farmer's *Versailles and the Court under Louis XIV* (1905). Cecile Hugon's charming *Social France in the Seventeenth Century* (1911) gives a broader picture of French society. Jean Longnon's arrangement of some of Louis XIV's letters, entitled *A King's Lessons in Statecraft* (1924), is interesting.

²⁹ See below, Chapter IX.

≡ VIII ≡

THE RISE OF PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA

CCASIONALLY in the history of a nation a date may be used to mark the end of an epoch and the beginning of a new age. For the Germanies, 1648 is such a pivotal date. From the perspective of nearly three hundred years it is possible to discern that for centuries before 1648 German history had one central thread or unifying, dynamic motif and that after 1648 the center shifted, the line of development altered, so that the years from that date to the period of the Great War in the twentieth century cover the history of a different Germany.

THE GERMANIES BEFORE 1648

Through the period of the Middle Ages the Holy Roman Empire had given to the German area a greater measure of unity than existed in many regions of Western Europe until the beginning of modern times. That empire had dissipated its strength and forfeited its chance to build a strong nation-state east of the Rhine by its attempt to control both Germany and Italy and by its failure to subordinate the powerful feudal princes of the German states. The office of emperor remained elective, and the incumbent of that office depended for his power upon his hereditary position as ruler of an important state within the empire. After 1300 it became customary, almost a habit, for the emperor to be the head of the powerful House of Hapsburg, the ruling family of the important duchy of Austria. The Hapsburgs acquired, by the seventeenth century, Bohemia and Hungary and were thus in possession of great family estates upon which lived Czechs, Germans, Magyars, and a half-dozen varieties of Slavic peoples. These Hapsburg possessions formed the bulwark of Europe against the advance of the Turks and were the outpost of Roman Catholic civilization on the borders of both Islam and eastern Slavdom. Through much of the sixteenth century the empire seemed on

the verge of creating, at last, a great nation-state in the Germanies. Had Charles V been more German and less Burgundian, had his interests been centered in the German part of his vast dominions rather than in upholding the Spanish claims in Italy against French aggression, had he not been forced to cope with the Turkish invasion, and had he not been faced with the disruptive forces of the Reformation, he might have been able to create a unified German state in the same century in which the Tudors dominated England and the Valois-Bourbon line created the nation-state of France.

The princes of Germany withstood the attempts at unification and countered by building small national states of their own, striving with one another for position and for territories. In the period of the Thirty Years' War they collided again with imperial ambition and with the idea of centralization implied in Hapsburg efforts to control both religious and political issues. Aided by the ambitious policies of Denmark and Sweden and by the greed of France and her relentless hatred of Hapsburg power, the German princes succeeded in resisting imperial pretension. The treaty of 1648 deprived the emperor of his sovereign powers and distributed them among the princes, bishops, and city-states of Germany. The Imperial Diet and the Imperial Courts were left standing but became more and more impotent, for all the effective powers of government had been transferred to the rulers of the states which made up the empire. 1648, therefore, marks the end of the attempt to unify Germany through the empire. For one hundred and fifty years the electors solemnly proclaimed new emperors, and the Hapsburgs as solemnly assumed the empty honors of the shadowy imperial position, but there was no unified German state. Hapsburg power was a vital force, for it was derived from the realities of the position of that family in Austria and in its other possessions, but the older Germany came to an end with the death throes of the Holy Roman Empire. The rise of Prussia gave a different direction to the history of a new Germany.¹

The Thirty Years' War had devastated much of Germany from the Baltic to Bohemia and from Poland to the Rhine. Cities had been

¹ For the period before 1648 see above, Chapters I, IV, and V. An excellent brief summary of the period 1648-1786 may be found in the first lecture in Ferdinand Schevill, *The Making of Modern Germany*. A longer but interesting account is in E. F. Henderson, *Short History of Germany*, Vol. II, Chaps. I, III, IV, and V. S. B. Fay's *The Rise of Brandenburg Prussia*, and *The Evolution of Prussia* by J. A. R. Marriott and C. G. Robertson give interesting accounts of the work of the early Hohenzollern rulers.

depopulated, peasants had fled from the countryside, and commerce and industry seemed dead. The accumulations of centuries of labor had been destroyed, the total population had been reduced by one-half, and economically the whole of the German area was forced to make a fresh start. The burgher class, which had played so great a part in the economic life of medieval Europe, was crushed, and the revival of commerce was left largely to the Dutch, the English, or the French. The very years of the decline of Germany had marked the great advances of France and Sweden in political and military power. The relative position of the German states was therefore very low. It seemed as though the French acquisition of Alsace and the Swedish seizure of the Baltic seaports might be but a prelude for further dismemberment. Austria was still powerful but was in no position, had she the inclination, to protect those northern and Rhineland states that had thrown off the bonds of empire allegiance. Freed from the restrictions of central authority, the petty states of Germany could develop along whatever lines the ambitions and the abilities of their rulers might indicate.

THE RISE OF BRANDENBURG

Earlier in this narrative there has been casual mention of a little state called Brandenburg.² It is now necessary to discuss the growth of that small and relatively weak state into the energetic powerful kingdom of Prussia, for the destiny of the German people in the modern period has been determined by the history of Prussia. The broad plain across Northern Europe is cut by a series of parallel rivers flowing into the North and the Baltic seas and carrying the trade of the peoples of Central Europe northward with them. Between the Elbe and the Oder rivers the Mark of Brandenburg, throughout the Middle Ages, was a frontier state of the Holy Roman Empire. The name "Mark" indicates that it was founded as a military, and probably a missionary, outpost against the barbarian and pagan Slavs of Northeastern Europe. As a military state its prestige grew, and it became an electorate.³ In 1417 the Holy Roman emperor, into whose control the Mark had come, gave it as a fief to the Hohenzollern family, which

² See pages 147-49.

³ In the Middle Ages the rulers of seven German states had the right to elect the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, the archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier, and the princes of Brandenburg, Saxony, Bohemia, and the Palatinate. In the seventeenth century Bavaria was added; Hanover became an electorate in the eighteenth. In 1778 Bavaria and the Palatinate were united, thus reducing the number to eight.

was to rule in its capital city of Berlin until the twentieth century. These Hohenzollerns seem to have first appeared as worthy of note in the tenth century, when they were counts ruling over a castle on a hill called Zollern in the region just north of Switzerland. Their power grew, and by the twelfth century they were the ruling family in the city of Nuremberg, favored by the emperors for the assistance they were able to give at various times. The acquisition of Brandenburg and the position of elector which went with it made the Hohenzollerns one of the powerful families of Germany.

The reigning Hohenzollern prince became Lutheran during the Reformation and increased his wealth by the confiscation of church property and his prestige and power by the overthrow of papal authority. Early in the seventeenth century two important and widely separated territories came into the elector's possession by inheritance. In the thirteenth century the crusading Order of Teutonic Knights had been entrusted with the mission of Christianizing and governing the heathen Prussian tribes of the region east of the Vistula. In the sixteenth century the Grand Master of the order, a member of the Hohenzollern family, became a Lutheran and secularized the region called East Prussia over which he ruled. East Prussia then became a duchy owing a vague feudal allegiance to the kingdom of Poland which had, in the days of its greatest power, taken West Prussia from the Teutonic Order by war. In 1618 the Hohenzollern duke of Prussia died without a male heir, and the succession passed to the elector of Brandenburg, who had earlier reinforced his claim by marrying a daughter of the duke.

The acquisition of the duchy of Cleves with its dependencies of Mark and Ravensburg came through this marriage of the elector to the Prussian heiress, for her mother had been the daughter of the duke of Cleves. When the male line failed in 1609, the elector claimed Cleves and its dependencies in the name of his wife. This inheritance lay in the Rhineland and was rich and valuable both in soil and trade. The claims of Brandenburg were disputed, and it was many years before the son of the elector who first asserted them actually ruled as duke of Cleves. Once acquired, however, the duchy gave Brandenburg a most important outpost on the Rhine.

The part played by the Elector George William of Brandenburg in the Thirty Years' War was not a glorious or even an honorable one. Yet the Treaty of Westphalia gave his son Frederick William additions of territory which were of great value. Brandenburg acquired

Halberstadt and Minden, bishoprics lying to the south of Brandenburg, the province of Eastern Pomerania which gave access to the Baltic, and expectancy to Magdeburg, which was finally secured in 1680. These gains were achieved more because of the ability of the elector in diplomacy than because of military prowess, and this same diplomatic skill enabled him to induce the king of Poland to renounce in 1660 all claims of sovereignty over East Prussia.⁴ A few years later the elector gave evidence of the rivalry between Sweden and Brandenburg and of his vital interests in the Rhineland by opposing Louis XIV in the Dutch War (1672-1678).⁵ Although in the Treaty of Nimwegen which ended this war the elector was not permitted to retain the territory won by his victory over Louis's ally, Sweden, it was evident that Sweden had a rival for the hegemony of the Baltic.

THE GREAT ELECTOR AND HIS SON

The title of "Great Elector" which history concedes to this Frederick William, who ruled over the widely scattered possessions of the Hohenzollern family from 1640 to 1688, was earned as much by his achievements within his realm as by his ability at acquiring new territories. In his reign one can discern the evolution of all the policies necessary to create a powerful state, and the direction which he took to attain that end was to be followed by the Hohenzollern rulers who came after him. In his youth Frederick William had spent four years in the university town of Leyden in the Netherlands. Here he had seen for the first time a really prosperous state in which commerce and manufacturing thrived, and intensive agriculture made possible excellent crops from soil that had once been as unproductive as that of his own Brandenburg. He went back to Berlin determined to build up agriculture and trade. He drained marshes and built canals. When Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes, 20,000 fleeing Huguenots were welcomed in Brandenburg, and their knowledge and industry aided in the industrial development of the state which had succored them.

The Great Elector's ideas on government were those of Western Europe. Each of his scattered possessions had had its own Diet in

⁴ This gain was made in 1660 in the treaty of Oliva ending a war between Sweden and Poland. During the war the elector had taken first one side and then the other and won the only real reward in the treaty of peace.

⁵ See above, page 204.

the past and its own local government and army. Frederick William centralized the government under his own control and ruled all parts of his realm through a central Council of State. He combined the various local forces into a national army which was greatly increased in size and efficiency during his reign. His energy and ability were of such value in building up the strength of both army and central government that it could be said that, "making allowance for the smaller scale on which he worked, we may unhesitatingly declare that he takes rank with the greatest constructive statesmen of the seventeenth century."⁶

Frederick III who came to the throne on the death of the Great Elector in 1688 was an entirely different man. He was vain, lavish, and extravagant. His grandson Frederick the Great once said of him that he was great in small things and small in great things.⁷ And yet his expenditures and the increases in taxation which they necessitated did not impoverish his people or make him unpopular with them, for the prosperity and the efficient administration brought about by the reforms of the Great Elector carried over through the reign of Frederick. His one great achievement was the acquisition of the title of king won from the emperor as a reward for the assistance of Brandenburg in the War of the Spanish Succession.⁸ He was confirmed in the royal title by the Treaty of Utrecht and after 1701 was known as Frederick I. Prussia was chosen as the name of the new kingdom because that province lay outside the empire, and, since West Prussia was Polish, Frederick I was called king *in* Prussia. His successors, however, dropped that formality and were known as kings *of* Prussia.

THE CAREER OF FREDERICK WILLIAM I

The rapid advance of Prussia after 1713 and its recognition as an important power were largely the result of the efforts of Frederick William I (1713-1740), who resembled his grandfather, the Great Elector, much more than he did his pompous and somewhat ludicrous father.⁹ In matters of government the new king was a paternalistic despot whose remark, "Salvation belongs to the Lord, and everything

⁶ Ferdinand Schevill, *Making of Modern Germany*, p. 27.

⁷ Quoted in Henderson, *Short History of Germany*, Vol. II, p. 29.

⁸ See above, pages 207-8.


⁹ E. F. Henderson, *Short History of Germany*, Vol. II, Chap. III, entitled "The Father of Frederick the Great," gives a charming detailed picture of both king and reign.

else is my affair," is as complete an assertion of power as the more elaborate statements of the divine right theory of kingship. He fully lived up to his own belief that "rulers are put there for the purpose of working," and he completely reorganized and modernized the national government, bringing local administration under its control in such a way that the ideals of the Great Elector were completely realized. In 1723 he produced the "Instruction for the General Upper Finance, War and Domain Directory" which was an outline, or codification, of the system of government to be established throughout his domains. A General Directory was set up, and under it an efficient civil service was established which was to be the pride of the Prussian state for centuries.

The strong central administration bound together the scattered territories of the Prussian state, but the most cursory glance at the map will show why every Hohenzollern felt the need of a strong army with which to defend them. Such an army, therefore, and its attendant militarism in government were an inevitable part of Prussian policy. Frederick William I more than doubled the size of the army—upon his death it numbered eighty thousand men—and in efficiency it probably surpassed anything in Europe. Officers were promoted on merit and were not allowed to purchase their commissions; the sons of nobles were forced to accept military command; the land was divided into districts from each of which a regiment was recruited in a beginning of compulsory military service. The king's one extravagance and his greatest pride was the famous Potsdam Guard of Giants—every soldier of which was six feet or over in height. He called the Guards his "blue children" and gave them liberal pay and many privileges. It was said that his recruiting officers were so anxious to please the king with unusually tall and handsome Guards that they resorted to bribery and even kidnapping when suitable foreign travelers resisted their more legitimate tactics. Devotion to the welfare of his army made Frederick William I reluctant to risk the losses inevitable in war, but he was drawn into an alliance against Sweden as a result of which Prussia obtained the mouth of the Oder and much of Swedish Pomerania.¹⁰ As an integral part of his policy each Hohenzollern king added strategic bits of territory which might fill in the gaps between Prussia's scattered possessions.

Although much of the revenues of the realm went into the army,

¹⁰ See below, page 236.



From Boak, Hyma, and Slosson, *The Growth of European Civilization*, courtesy of F. S. Crofts & Company.

Frederick William carried out the usual mercantilistic policies of his day in aiding industry and commerce and in developing agriculture. He drained swamps, ordered the conservation of forest resources, colonized wastelands, and increased the prosperity of the crown lands by improving agricultural methods. Not a cultured man himself, he did not care to have his court renowned for learning or for luxury, and yet he prescribed compulsory elementary education for his people. His son, Frederick the Great, wrote to Voltaire some years after his father's death that, "Just as the all-shadowing oak springs from the power in the acorn, so does all my later good fortune proceed from the toilsome life and the wise measures of Frederick William."¹¹

With a parsimony that barely escaped miserliness and was sometimes almost ridiculous, Frederick William saved money for his army and his economic reforms. He oppressed and embarrassed his family and his court by his thrift and his petty restrictions and exactions, and he put his eldest son through such a severe and rigorous course of training that the young prince, whose tastes were literary, musical, and artistic, rebelled and engaged in an elaborate plot for escape—a plot which was discovered and for which he was punished with crushing severity. The harshness of this early discipline strengthened the fiber of the prince, and the ten years of rigorous training in government and military affairs which followed stood him in good stead during the forty-six years of his reign. Much of the greatness of Frederick II in his later years was attributed by him to the father who had tried "by good means and by bad" to make him an "honest man." When he came to the throne in 1740 he found a well-trained army, a full treasury, an efficient civil service, and a carefully centralized government, all completely under his own control.

FREDERICK II: THE EUROPEAN SITUATION, 1740

Frederick II also found a European situation in which it seemed possible to use his army and his treasure in the satisfaction of his ambition to extend his territories. The three German states which had seemed to be the equals of Prussia were relatively weak in the middle of the eighteenth century. Hanover was the German seat of a family that had now for two generations ruled over England. The Hanoverian kings of England were interested in preventing any encroach-

¹¹ Quoted in Henderson, *Short History of Germany*, Vol. II, p. 99

ment by Hohenzollern or Hapsburg upon their German possessions, but their policies were inevitably those of Great Britain and the British Empire. Bavaria had been very powerful in the seventeenth century but had lost her strength through too ambitious a role in international affairs. She quarreled continually with the Austrian Hapsburgs and acted as the ally of France in European wars. Saxony had lost her leadership of the North German states by aiding Catholic Austria in the seventeenth century. In order to gain election to the throne of Poland the elector of Saxony became a Catholic, and the disastrous union with Poland throughout much of the eighteenth century weakened the German position of succeeding electors. The rulers of the petty German states conducted themselves as their self-interest dictated and were accustomed to accept the leadership of France, Sweden, or Austria, as occasion directed.

Austria, therefore, was Prussia's only rival in Germany, and the Hohenzollern-Hapsburg struggle for power was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the focus for European wars and diplomacy, just as the old rivalry of the Hapsburg and Valois-Bourbon dynasties had determined the course of European history in an earlier period. The position of Austria had declined in the early years of the eighteenth century. She had acquired, in the Treaty of Utrecht, the Spanish Netherlands and the Spanish possessions in Italy.¹² Spain, quite naturally, resented the loss of these territories, and under her Bourbon kings was willing to ally herself with France against the Austria who had been her ally for centuries. The marriage of the French king, Louis XV, to a Polish princess involved France in the complicated question of the succession to the Polish throne. The Polish kingship was elective, and, in the days of Polish weakness, confusion, foreign interference, and wars were the attendant circumstances of royal elections. In 1733 the rival candidates were the father-in-law of Louis XV and the elector of Saxony. A European war broke out, called the War of the Polish Election (1733-1738), in which France and Spain were allied against Saxony, Russia, and Austria. The Saxon prince retained the throne, but Austria paid a heavy price in the forced cession of Lorraine to the father of the French queen¹³ and in the surrender to Spain of Sicily, Naples, and Parma. The loss of these territories and the consequent decline of Austrian prestige were severe blows to the Hapsburg emperor, Charles VI, at a very critical time. His reign was

¹² With the exception of Sicily which was acquired by Austria in 1720.

¹³ The reversion was to France upon the death of Stanislaus in 1766.

drawing to a close, and his heir was a young daughter, Maria Theresa. The anxious father endeavored to obtain European consent to a Pragmatic Sanction in which he decreed that the Hapsburg possessions were indivisible and might be inherited intact by his daughter. His own dominions solemnly swore to accept Maria Theresa as their ruler, and the rulers of foreign states pledged their word to respect her succession.

Maria Theresa became archduchess of Austria and queen of Hungary and Bohemia in 1740, the year of the accession of Frederick II in Prussia. She was young, beautiful, able, and devoted to her royal duties. Her treasury was nearly empty, her army was badly equipped and disorganized, and her scattered domains were in no condition to withstand attack. Her safety depended upon the loyalty of the European powers to the oath they had taken to respect the Pragmatic Sanction. The situation furnished an irresistible opportunity for the ambitious Frederick II, whose cynicism and calculating self-interest easily justified a disregard of the promise of Charles VI. A pretext was at hand in an old claim of the Hohenzollerns to parts of the Austrian province of Silesia. Frederick entered upon negotiations with Bavaria and France. The ruler of Bavaria was to be elected emperor, and France expected to acquire the Austrian Netherlands. Frederick then mobilized his army and, without formal declaration of war, marched into Silesia.

THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION

The War of the Austrian Succession which followed lasted until 1748. France, Spain, and Bavaria endeavored to dismember Maria Theresa's inheritance further. Her plight appealed strongly to all the Austrian estates, and Hungarians and Bohemians as well as Austrians flocked to her assistance. She found a pseudo ally in Great Britain, already involved in a commercial war with Spain and apprehensive, also, lest France advance in the Netherlands, or Prussia attack Hanover.¹⁴ British subsidies, therefore, aided Maria Theresa, and a British army was sent to the Continent to defend the Netherlands and Hanover. In order to free herself from her most pressing enemy the archduchess signed an agreement with Frederick II by which she surrendered Silesia to him, and he withdrew from an active part in the

¹⁴ The colonial aspects of the war will be discussed in Chapter IX.

war. The Dutch entered the war to protect themselves from France, and Saxony and Sardinia joined the anti-Austrian coalition.

The Austrian forces were astonishingly successful against the great array of states opposing them. Spain would fight only in Italy; Sardinia and Saxony went over to Austria at the first sign of Austrian success; the Dutch were content with the defense of their own borders; and Frederick II did not hesitate to desert his allies in a separate peace. French advances in the last years of the war, however, made the situation a stalemate, and the various parties were ready in 1748 to sign the treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle by the terms of which Frederick II retained Silesia but all else was restored to the *status quo ante bellum*.

The death of the Bavarian ruler, who had held for a short time the position of emperor, made it possible for Maria Theresa to secure the election of her husband, Francis of Lorraine. His election as emperor gave her the title of empress, and brought the title back to the Hapsburg family, where it remained until the empire itself disappeared in 1806. Francis' career had no other element of greatness, for his influence over Maria Theresa was purely personal. He was the father of her numerous children, but he never shared in the government of Austrian possessions over which she ruled in accordance with Hapsburg traditions and the theories of divine right. The stronger character, the greater ability, and the more dominant personality were hers. She was intensely patriotic, indefatigable in attention to the details of government and, according to the standards of her day, an excellent ruler.¹⁵

In the loss of Silesia Austria had suffered the greatest blow resulting from the eight years of war, and the fact that the empress wept when she saw a Silesian was not a sign of feminine weakness but an evidence of her determination to regain the lost province as soon as she dared make the attempt. Frederick II was too powerful to be attacked without allies. English subsidies were useful, but man power was necessary; armies of a caliber to stand against Prussian forces, directed by the military genius of Frederick, must be assembled.

¹⁵ Margaret Goldsmith's *Maria-Theresa* is an interesting new biography, with the emphasis upon the personality and personal life of the empress. An older and more conventional biography is that of Joseph Bright.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

The activities of Frederick had upset the balance of power, and no European state could be indifferent to the rise of a powerful Prussia. Every state with an energetic foreign policy and an ambitious ruler felt the effects of the shift in equilibrium. Russia had emerged in the early eighteenth century as a Western European state¹⁶ and was, inevitably, interested in and adversely impressed by the gains of Prussia. The Empress Elizabeth of Russia was, moreover, the implacable enemy of Frederick, whose unkind and cynical remarks about her abilities, appearance, and personality had been promptly conveyed to her. Nevertheless, there were more important considerations for the Russian government than the personal prejudices of its ruler. Russian advance westward must be at the expense of Poland or Sweden, and Frederick II stood ready to frustrate such progress. When Prussian intervention in a dispute between Russia and Sweden in 1749 forced withdrawal of Russian demands, Elizabeth was ready to make an alliance with any power ready to attack Prussia.

France had been incensed at the calm way in which Frederick had disregarded his French alliance in the war just ended and was somewhat alarmed, also, at the disturbance to the European balance. Colonial considerations loomed large in the eyes of the French government, and France began, therefore, to consider whether the traditional animosity for the Hapsburgs should continue to influence her action upon the European stage, especially since her commercial and colonial rivalry with England seemed to be entering its final and most critical period. England had no real interest in Austria's problems, George II disliked Frederick and feared his designs upon Hanover, but England's paramount consideration was the probable conflict with France.

As for Frederick II, he thought France a slippery ally, feared Russia as he did no other possible foe, and suspected an Anglo-Russian alliance that would be disastrous to him. He therefore opened negotiations with England and signed a treaty of alliance in 1756 shortly after England and France renewed hostilities in the Ohio country of North America.

In the meantime, France and Austria had been carrying on negotiations that were to reverse their relations. The new Austrian minister

¹⁶ See below, page 238

to Paris, the young and brilliant Kaunitz, had persuaded Louis XV to make a treaty of alliance with Austria.¹⁷ The alliance was at first a defensive one but it was soon rewritten so as to contain clauses providing for an offensive agreement designed to accomplish the complete dismemberment of Prussia. Russia willingly subscribed to a similar agreement, and as a result of this "diplomatic revolution" the war which began in 1756 found France, Russia, and Austria lined up against Prussia, supported by English subsidies. Minor powers entered on one side or the other, until the war became a general European conflict.¹⁸ The colonial struggle made it world-wide,¹⁹ and the result was one of the greatest conflagrations the modern world has experienced.

The brilliant generalship of Frederick II, who seized the offensive, invaded Saxony, and began a struggle which he carried on, practically unaided, against the armies of France, Russia, and Austria, makes the military history of the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) more interesting than most accounts of campaigns and battles. But by 1762 even the indomitable Frederick was near exhaustion; Great Britain might be nearing a victory over France and Spain in the colonial combat, but Prussia seemed to be facing defeat in Europe. Then fate came to the aid of Frederick, for the death of Elizabeth of Russia brought to the throne the Tzar Peter, whose unbalanced mind was as ardently pro-Prussian as his predecessor's had been pro-Austrian. Peter renounced the alliance, restored the territory taken from Prussia, and offered to transfer his armies to Frederick's standard. The collapse of France and this withdrawal on the part of Russia were deathblows to the bright hopes of Austria, and Maria Theresa was reluctantly forced to consider peace. The treaty of Hubertusburg (1763) ended the European war on a *status quo ante bellum* arrangement. Frederick II kept Silesia, and Prussia was definitely recognized as a great power with the Hohenzollerns the peers of Hapsburgs and Bourbons. The treaty of Paris of the same year was evidence of the colonial defeat of the

¹⁷ The part played by Madame de Pompadour, the mistress of Louis XV, in these negotiations is an interesting and amusing field for speculation. She always claimed much of the credit, and it is certain that Kaunitz was closely in touch with her and that she hated Frederick as much as did the two empresses. Whether or not he called them "the Three Old Cats of Europe" is also a question, but his dislike for "petticoat" politics is obvious.

¹⁸ Spain made a "Family Compact" with France in 1761 and entered the war.

¹⁹ See below, Chapter IX

French and of the maritime supremacy of the English, who acquired the bulk of French colonial possessions.

After 1763 Frederick II fought no more wars. His reign divides neatly into two equal parts, and the second period of twenty-three years was devoted to the constructive policies of rehabilitation and economic and political advancement.²⁰ Frederick himself considered these years of greater importance than those devoted to war and paid little tribute to his own military ability, saying, "My successes have been largely due to luck and the stupidity of my enemies." For a century after 1763, Prussia and Austria shared in dominating the Germanies—Prussia supreme in the north and Austria in the south, both refusing to countenance any gain on the part of the other unaccompanied by equivalent compensation. An alliance with the Tsarina Catherine II²¹ of Russia made Frederick secure against any new Austrian attempt to regain Silesia and gave him an opportunity for the acquisition of more territory by an aggressive policy in years of peace than he had obtained by twenty-three years of war.

THE POLISH QUESTION

Poland was a very weak state; the monarchy was elective and powerless against a strong feudal nobility; there was no middle class of importance; and the peasantry consisted largely of impoverished and downtrodden serfs. The international position of Poland had been low throughout the eighteenth century, and her territories, which had at one time extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea, had been dwindling for many years. Russia was eager for expansion westward, and Prussia desired nothing more than the Polish province of West Prussia, which furnished the connecting link between the old Brandenburg area and the East Prussia from which the kingdom had taken its name. In 1772 there occurred the first partition of Poland by which Russia and Prussia partially satisfied their ambitions, and Austria was permitted to maintain the balance of power by taking the province of Galicia in southern Poland. (See map, page 241.) After the death of Frederick, Prussia shared in 1793 and 1795 in the further dismemberment of Poland,²² and that unfortunate state disappeared from the map of Europe, not to be revived as an independent state until 1919.

²⁰ See E. F. Henderson, *Short History of Germany*, Vol. II, Chapter V.

²¹ See below, pages 239-40.

²² See below, page 241

DOMESTIC POLICIES OF FREDERICK II

The government of Prussia under Frederick II continued to be the paternalistic despotism characteristic of Hohenzollern rule. The honest efficient bureaucracy and the centralized administrative system set up by his father were continued. The king regarded himself as the first servant of the state and worked more hours out of the twenty-four than did any of his civil servants. He has been cited as the most successful of the "enlightened" despots,²³ and Prussia prospered under his realistic and effective guidance. His court was brilliant, and he surrounded himself with those who were witty, polished, and versatile. Literature and music were the king's hobbies, while economics and statecraft were his major interests. Voltaire was his friend and guest, and the scintillating society of the Prussian court was more French than German in its tone. Frederick himself, who wrote many weighty volumes in French, had little interest in the very real revival of German letters which had been stimulated by the quickened nationalism of his reign. German universities took new life from this intellectual revival, and Kant in philosophy, Goethe and Schiller in poetry, and Bach and Handel in music were evidence of its widespread nature. Frederick, however, absorbed in the elegance and formality of French letters, reproved the German authors, saying that they reminded him of "that uncouth and detestable English barbarian, Guillaume Shakespeare!"²⁴

The primary objective of Frederick the Great was a well-balanced, diversified economic structure for Prussia. He entered eagerly into all the problems of commerce, agriculture, and manufacture. His policies were much like those of his father, and the minute supervision and careful regulation of Frederick William I were amplified and extended under Frederick II. His ideas were those of his times: mercantilistic techniques without overseas possessions, tariffs to encourage industry, the introduction of new manufacturing enterprises, restrictions on the importation of foreign goods,²⁵ scientific farming on the royal estates, conservation of forest resources, draining of swamplands, and the building of roads and canals. In every way the prosperity and the economic interests of Prussia were furthered, but all of these measures

²³ See below, pages 277-81.

²⁴ Ferdinand Schevill, *Making of Modern Germany*, p. 62.

²⁵ One of the most amusing of Frederick's projects was the encouragement of the consumption of German beer by high tariffs on coffee.

were imposed by despotic authority. Frederick's plans called for no participation from his people except that of acquiescence and loyal co-operation. Their success depended upon his own energy and wisdom and the honesty and efficiency of a Prussian civil service subservient to the crown. Without a strong middle class ready to assume the initiative, perhaps no other methods would have served; certainly any others would have been foreign to Frederick's thinking. He was no social reformer, although he reformed legal procedure and made trials and punishment more humane. The Prussian peasants remained serfs, oppressed by the landlord, or "Junker," class upon which the state and the army depended. Taxation was heavy, and the burden upon the people lessened the popularity of the king. Militarism remained a part of the Prussian system, with the army of two hundred thousand kept at a high peak of efficiency. A sort of compulsory service filled the ranks with peasants who accepted without question the authority of officers who came exclusively from the landed aristocracy. Thus a modernized feudal system prevailed in government and army.

There was complete religious freedom in eighteenth-century Prussia. The Lutheran church had a certain favored position, but all faiths were given complete toleration. Frederick told the Catholics to build their churches "as high as they pleased," and he offered to build mosques for the Turks if they wished to come into Prussia! There was some discrimination against Jews, but more because of economic than religious reasons. The king himself was cynical and sceptical, and has by some been called an agnostic, by others an atheist.²⁶ Freedom of speech and of press were characteristic of Frederick's reign, subject always to restrictions and limits set by royal authority. Elementary education interested the king, who encouraged the advances made in educational theory and practice. Frederick was also interested in science and revived the Berlin Academy of Science. In fact, there were few fields of interest to his contemporaries which the tireless monarch did not investigate, and from which he did not extract something which he might apply with value to the Prussian state. Eventually that seemingly tireless machine wore out, and the life of the bitter, disillusioned old king came to an end in 1786. The Prussia in which he died was quite different from that in which he was crowned forty-six years earlier. He left a deeper imprint upon his country than it has been within the power of most monarchs to effect. Any student of the Ger-

²⁶ See below, Chapter X.

many of this generation must go back to the day of Frederick the Great for the origin of many present-day problems and policies.

MEDIEVAL RUSSIA

In this brief outline of the rise of Prussia as a great European power it has been necessary to make constant reference to the neighboring state of Russia, which was coming into prominence during the same years. Between it and Western Europe lay the great Slavic states—or state, for they were united in 1386—of Lithuania and Poland, which reached its greatest power in the fourteenth century. The decline and extinction of the Polish state is an important chapter of later Russian history.

The vast expanse of European Russia was little known in the early Christian era. The eastern Slavic peoples contended with successive waves of barbarian invaders from Asia and slowly managed to build up for themselves commercial cities along the Dnieper River. Each city-state endeavored to control the surrounding countryside and maintain its own independence by the use of mercenary forces. Trade was kept up with Asia, with Constantinople, and with the northern regions, where the Slavs came into contact with Scandinavian traders, who were in the same period sending out Viking expeditions and establishing themselves in England, France, and Sicily. During the ninth century some of these Norsemen, called Varangians and sometimes Rus by the Slavs, came far down toward the Black Sea and settled at Kiev where a thriving city-state grew up. Kiev traded with and sometimes warred against Constantinople. In the tenth century its ruler invaded Bulgaria, and his son made war upon the Slavic states of Poland and Lithuania. This prince, Vladimir, married a Byzantine princess and accepted Christianity for himself and his people. Kievan civilization reached its height in the eleventh century and rapidly declined in the following years. It was composed of Norse, Slavic, and Byzantine or Greek elements, and it owed much of its splendor to its contacts with Constantinople. The government of Kiev was never well consolidated, rival trading cities grew up which challenged its position, and the city was sacked in 1169 and once again early in the thirteenth century when it was left prostrate. The extensive trade and the variety of contacts of this region in this period have been little emphasized in histories of Europe.

Migrations from Kiev led to the founding of nuclei for the White

Russian and the Ukrainian groups. In the upper Volga area Finns and Kievan emigrants mingled to found the Great Russian type. They lived in widely scattered villages, some of which were later to play a prominent part in Russian history. By the middle of the fifteenth century Moscow, which started as one of these villages, was the most powerful principality in the Russian area. The princes of Moscow ruled over a territory as large as modern Germany and added to their power in each generation. They rose to fame in the years in which they threw off the yoke of the Tartars who had swept across Russia in the thirteenth century in the same great Mongol invasion which had led Genghis Khan to build up a vast empire in Central Asia, Korea, and China.

This Golden Horde, as it was called, had subdued the weak principalities of Russia but did not settle extensively among them. The region occupied by the Tartar bands lay north of the Black and the Caspian seas along the Don and the Volga rivers. Annual homage and tribute were exacted from the Russians, but the petty princes were left to govern their little states as they desired. This Tartar invasion meant, however, that Russia faced the East through several centuries of her history and wove into her civilization an Asiatic thread that is apparent even today. Gradually the unity and vitality of the Mongol conquerors declined, civil wars broke out among them, and the princes of the little Russian states stiffened in their attitude toward their oppressors. Moscow took the lead, winning the first victory over the Tartars in 1380. A century of intermittent conflict followed with the fortunes of war shifting back and forth, but in the reign of Ivan III (1462-1505) the payment of tribute ceased, and Russia was finally emancipated from Tartar rule.

THE RISE OF MOSCOW

Russian history has given Ivan III the title of "The Great," as much for his foundation of a Russian empire as for his fame in freeing Russia from the Tartars. His capital city of Moscow was very favorably located, for it was at the junction of the roads and trade routes connecting southern and northern Russia with other routes leading from the great trading center of northwestern Russia, Novgorod, eastward to the Volga Valley. The natural advantages of the city drew colonists, and the population of the principality grew steadily. The military prestige of the princes attracted the feudal nobility of the

surrounding area, and these nobles, or *boyars*, found it profitable to enter the service of Moscow. This same military prestige made Moscow relatively peaceful; the princes were powerful enough to suppress petty disorder; the merchants were prosperous; and the peasants found good markets for their produce. The prestige of the principality was increased when it became recognized as the ecclesiastical center of Russia. The Russian church was a branch of the Greek Catholic Church, the patriarch of which resided in Constantinople,²⁷ but after the decline of old Kiev the head of the Russian branch of the church moved to Moscow, and in the troubled years of Tartar rule the connection with the Greek church became very slight. When Constantinople fell into Turkish hands in 1453, the Russian Orthodox Church assumed leadership and resisted all efforts made by Rome to reunite Christendom.²⁸

Ivan III increased the territories under the control of Moscow and extended its boundaries northward and westward to the Arctic and the Baltic seas. In his progress westward he came into conflict with the great Slavic states of Lithuania and Poland which extended from the Baltic almost to the Black Sea and furnished a broad barrier between Russia and Western Europe. He was unable to make headway against these stronger states, but the keynote of his policy and of every Russian sovereign after him was antagonism to Poland and Lithuania—an antagonism that resulted in the eighteenth century in the extinction of Polish independence. Ivan found Russia unknown and without standing among European nations, and he endeavored to bring her out of that isolation by a vigorous foreign policy. He married a Greek princess and attempted to establish in Moscow the ceremony and etiquette of the Byzantine Empire. He adopted the double eagle of Byzantium for his coat of arms and assumed the title of "Tsar (Caesar), Autocrat, Lord of All Russia, Grand Prince of Moscow, . . . by the Grace of God." One alliance was made with the Holy Roman Emperor against Poland and Turkey; another, which was often renewed in succeeding generations, was signed with Denmark against Sweden.

Two generations later Ivan IV (1533-1584), called "the Terrible,"

²⁷ The division in Christendom between Greek and Roman Catholic churches came in the eighth century. The differences which caused the schism were partly doctrinal, partly in matters of ritual and form, but the fundamental cause was probably the rival positions of the Roman pope and the patriarch of Constantinople.

²⁸ The independence of the Russian church was recognized by the patriarch of Constantinople in 1582.

endeavored to break the power of the feudal boyars and to establish a completely autocratic rule. He brought several states in the Volga Basin under the control of Moscow and fought unsuccessful wars with Poland. Trade contacts with the outside world were increasing, however, even though Russia failed to make gains on the Western front. In the reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth, the English government backed the enterprises of the Muscovy Company, and trading expeditions entered Russia from both the Arctic and the Black seas. The project of a marriage between Ivan and Elizabeth was furthered by some of the English gentleman traders, although it won no favor in England.

The three decades (1584-1613) after the death of Ivan IV are called in Russian history the "Times of Trouble," for they were filled with civil war, the revolts of feudal nobility against autocratic rule, and with disastrous wars against the Poles and the Swedes, the latter enlarging their territories at the eastern end of the Baltic by capturing Russia's outlet and trading center, Novgorod. The Turks moved northward into the Crimean area and shut Russia off from the Black Sea. In 1613 the Russian nobles ended the civil war by electing one of their own number as tsar, a Michael Romanov, who was related to the old royal family, the direct line of which had died out during the preceding century. The accession of Michael brought to the throne the Romanov dynasty that was to rule Russia until the overthrow of tsardom and royal autocracy in 1917.

Throughout the centuries that have been so rapidly sketched, Russian contacts with Western Europe were comparatively slight. She was a distinctly backward country almost untouched by the rise of capitalism, the increase in artistic and literary achievement during the Renaissance, or the scientific and geographic discoveries of that period. Her people, largely illiterate, rigidly orthodox in religion, and feudal in social structure, were centuries behind those of the greater part of Western Europe, and her government, autocratic though it was, resembled the despotism of Oriental potentates rather than the centralized monarchies of the West. There had been a steady expansion, however, of Russia southward along the Dnieper, the Don, and the Volga. The adventurous frontiersmen, known as Cossacks, were followed by peasants and traders. Portages between rivers were turned into canals, and south Russia became a settled area. Russian migration extended eastward as well. The plains north of the Caspian Sea were occupied, and the Ural Mountains were crossed. The prog-

ress across Asia was constant and irresistible, and was Russia's equivalent to the overseas expansion of the Western European powers which occurred in that period. The Russia that emerged in the end of the seventeenth century as a great European power extended eastward to the Pacific Ocean and across the Bering Sea to Alaska and the west coast of North America. Although unaffected by the Portuguese and Spanish exploits of the Age of Discovery, the Russian capture of a continent was an epic story equaled only by that of the movement which led the settlers on the Atlantic seaboard of North America westward to the Pacific Ocean. The tsar came to be called "The Little Father of All the Russias," and the imperial government and the Russian Orthodox Church were extended over the areas occupied by Russian settlers. As Russia grew, trade developed, even in the "Troublous Times." Foreigners came in and settled in important towns. Moscow, for instance, had a suburb that was occupied entirely by foreigners. As diplomacy became important, envoys were sent to Moscow from foreign powers, and contacts with the West were more frequent.

PETER THE GREAT: EARLY LIFE

The grandson of Michael Romanov was Peter the Great, and with his reign (1682-1725) a new era in Russian history begins. The "barbarous Asiatics," as the Western Europeans called them, became a European nation, and the rise of Russia to the position of a great power is a significant part of modern European history. The early life of Peter the Great was a stormy one, for when his father died in 1676 the heirs were all minors. In a semibarbarous country where a feudal nobility was always ready to contend for position and power, and where the royal guard, or *streltzi*, furnished an armed force steeped in palace intrigue and willing to revolt whenever such revolt would advance its interests, any uncertainty as to succession or any weakness in royal authority made trouble inevitable. Peter's father had been married twice; there were two sons and several daughters from the first marriage; Peter and two daughters were the children of the second wife. There was much disturbance during the brief reign of the eldest son, for he was young and weak, and the various factions at the court were not kept under control. Upon his death in 1682, after a palace insurrection his strong-minded sister Sophia had herself made regent for her two younger brothers, Ivan and Peter. The latter was then ten years of age. Sophia was the virtual ruler of



From Boak, Hyma, and Slosson, *The Growth of European Civilization* courtesy of F S Crofts & Company

Russia until 1689, and the boy Peter grew up in an atmosphere of violence and terror. Sophia was determined to rule and quite capable of sacrificing her younger brothers to her ambition, but she obtained little support from the boyars. Ivan was too weak to be feared or to attract the faction opposed to Sophia, but young Prince Peter was strong, healthy, and surrounded by his mother's relatives, who were anxious to raise him to power. As a result Peter's education was neglected, he was ignored at court, sent to live in the country, and his life was in frequent danger because of the plots of the various factions.

Under the circumstances it was little wonder that the boy's interests were warlike, and that he early began to recruit for the game of "playing soldier" many companions who were later to be the nucleus for an army of his own independent of boyars or streltzi. His home was near the "German" suburb, and he made many friends among the Germans, English and Dutch traders who lived there. From them he learned much about boats, trade, and Western civilization in general, and developed the heartiest contempt for the backwardness of Russia. There was little of refinement or culture in his surroundings; his friends were servants, stableboys, and foreigners; but he had a quick and vigorous mind, a tremendously energetic body, and a predilection for despotic rule. He was in many ways a barbarian with a strain of Oriental cruelty, an ungovernable temper, and a ruthlessness and brutality that made Westerners resident at his court in later years shudder. There could be no contrast more sharp than that between the crude realism of the Russian court in 1689 and the exquisite and intricate artificiality of the court of Louis XIV.

In 1689 a revolt staged by Peter's relatives and the boyars was successful. Sophia was sent to a nunnery, and Peter was elevated to supreme power. For some years his chief interests were in his so-called "pleasure" army and in the building of boats. He spent much time at the port of Archangel in the North, where he took lessons in navigation from the English and Dutch sea captains. The Russian nobility was dissatisfied, for things were going badly in a war which Sophia had undertaken against Turkey. In 1694 Peter suddenly decided to take a part in the war and organized his forces, including his personal battalions and his embryo navy, for an attack on the port of Azov on the Black Sea. Two years later the expedition was successful, and the southern seaport was gained.

The success of his enterprise was gratifying, and it convinced the young tsar of the value which the technical knowledge of Western

Europe might have for him. His friends and advisors were Lefort, a Swiss from the German suburb, a Scottish adventurer Gordon, and a Dutchman Timmerman. They had often suggested that he go on a journey to Europe in search of the education that had been denied him. In 1697 an embassy was formed with the additional purpose of obtaining aid against the Turks. Lefort was at its head, and Peter traveled incognito as one of two hundred and fifty students. They visited Brandenburg and Hanover, where Peter's manners shocked the ladies of the court. In Holland he worked in the shipyards as an apprentice, and then the expedition went on to England. Peter also visited Vienna, for there he hoped to enlist the aid of the emperor in an attack on the Turks. When news was received of a serious revolt in Moscow, Peter hastened home through Poland where he found time to visit the king, who was also the elector of Saxony. A friendship was formed there which led to an alliance later between Poland and Russia.

THE POLICY OF WESTERNIZATION

Obviously the "education" acquired by Peter on this Western journey was superficial. That he understood very little of the significance of what he saw, is evident in the superficiality apparent in many of the reforms he instituted later in Russia. His extremely practical mind had, however, grasped many things which his quick genius could use in advancing his own ends at home. The Prussian army, the Dutch and English navies, the centralized and efficient bureaucracies of the Western monarchs were to become the models for Russian development. The young ruler was determined to Westernize his people and to win a place for Russia among Western nations.

The revolt of the streltzi regiments had been put down before Peter's return from his Western travels, but the details of the plot and the punishment of those involved in it were the first consideration of the tsar. The medieval state of Russia and the barbaric nature of ruler and government were shown in the treatment of everyone suspected of connection with the revolt. Sophia, Peter's sister, and his wife, Eudokia, were sent to convents; thousands of the streltzi rebels were tortured and put to death, many of them by the hand of the tsar himself. The very conservative patriarch of the Orthodox Church was found to have been one of the plotters. He was not molested, but

upon his death two years later, the tsar created the Holy Synod—a sort of commission—to which the government of the church was entrusted. In 1721 the patriarchate was legally abolished, and the Synod appointed by the tsar and presided over by a Procurator, a lay official of the government, became the permanent organization of the Russian church which was thus brought completely under state control. This union of church and state made the Russian church an agency of the despotic government; “autocracy and orthodoxy” was the watchword of tsarist Russia until 1917; and in the revolution the church quite naturally shared the fate of the autocracy.

In the midst of punishing those subjects who had revolted against him, Peter found time to initiate the social reforms which he considered the outward manifestation of that which he wished to accomplish in modernizing Russia. Luxuriant beards had through many generations been the pride of Russian manhood. The clean-shaven faces of the men of Western Europe had made a great impression upon the tsar, and he determined that Russians, too, should be beardless. With his own hand he shaved the more important courtiers. An observant foreigner noted in his diary that the day after Peter’s return to Moscow he plied the razor

. . . promiscuously among the beards of those present. . . . Nor can any consider it any disgrace, as their sovereign is the first to show the example. . . . Nor was there anybody left to laugh at the rest. They were all born to the same fate. Nothing but superstitious awe for his office exempted the Patriarch. . . . All the rest had to conform to the guise of foreign nations, and the razor eliminated the ancient fashion.²⁹

Beards became the symbol of conservatism, and a heavy tax was levied upon those who persisted in wearing such hirsute decorations. The long Oriental dress of Russian men was sacrificed next in favor of the conventional attire of Western European courts. Women were brought out of their old seclusion, and court functions bore some resemblance to those of the West except that, after the women withdrew, parties often turned into drinking bouts in which the tsar’s prowess was memorable.

²⁹ *Scenes from the Court of Peter the Great*, based on the Latin Diary of John Korb, secretary of the Austrian envoy at the court of Peter the Great, edited by F. L. Glaser, p. 32.

THE WARS OF PETER THE GREAT

Much of Peter's reign, however, was spent in wars, and his interest in court life flagged. His second wife was a Lithuanian servant girl. They lived in simple quarters, and he always preferred the simplest clothes, which she mended and patched for him. She accompanied him on his travels and acted as a "lightning conductor" for his outbursts of anger, saving his generals, the courtiers, and his relatives from the dire effects of his wrath.⁸⁰

From early boyhood Peter had been convinced of the desirability of a Baltic outlet—a "window to the West," as he called it—for Russia, and the European situation after his return from his Western travels seemed to offer him a chance to realize that ambition. Sweden had been the dominant power in the Baltic during the seventeenth century. Gustavus Adolphus⁸¹ had advanced Sweden's claims in acquiring territories around the eastern end of the Baltic Sea. The Thirty Years' War gave Sweden West Pomerania and Bremen and brought Sweden near the realization of Gustavus Adolphus' dream of making the Baltic a Swedish lake. The middle of the seventeenth century marked the high point of Sweden's glory both as a military power and as a great state. The weaknesses of Sweden are readily apparent: her dependencies were hard to hold for they were occupied by foreign peoples all too willing to join Sweden's enemies; her commerce roused competition; and both dependencies and commerce made necessary a military establishment utterly beyond the power of Sweden to maintain, for her people were poor and her aristocracy loath to conform to the rule of a military monarchy. At the end of the seventeenth century, when a boy of fifteen, Charles XII, came to the Swedish throne, the time seemed ripe for a coalition of jealous powers and the partition of Sweden's empire, after the fashion of the treatment being meted out to Spain in the same years. Denmark, Poland, and Russia, relying upon the preoccupation of Europe with the Spanish situation, drew up an agreement by which they planned to deprive Charles of all of his inheritance except Sweden itself and Finland.

The great Northern War (1700-1721) was the result of this de-

⁸⁰ Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, p. 212. S. F. Platonov's *History of Russia* and R. Beazley, N. Forbes, and G. A. Birkett, *Russia from the Varangians to the Bolsheviks* will be useful also.

⁸¹ See above, page 147.

sign. Charles XII surprised the allies by taking the offensive and proving himself the military genius of his day. He attacked Denmark and quickly brought the Danish king to terms; he then sharply defeated the Russians at Narva and turned his attention to the Poles, for whom he had a vindictive animosity. He dethroned the Polish king and forced the election of another of his own choosing, but he so wasted his time and energies in Polish politics that his enemies were able to reorganize their forces. Peter took several of the Baltic provinces; the deposed king of Poland regained his throne; and in 1709 Charles was decisively defeated by the Russians at Poltava. Charles escaped and took refuge with the Turks, whose aid he solicited. In the war between Turkey and Russia which followed, Peter bought peace by ceding back to Turkey the Black Sea port of Azov. Disappointed in his hope of a Russian defeat, Charles XII returned to Sweden and renewed the Northern war which dragged on until his death in 1718 made peace possible. By the Treaty of Stockholm (1720) Sweden gave up almost all of her German possessions; Denmark received Holstein; Hanover took the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser; Prussia secured the mouth of the Oder and the city of Stettin. The Treaty of Nystad (1721) gave Karelia and Ingria, Estonia and Livonia, and a part of Finland to Russia. Peter had his Baltic "window" and a reason for making St. Petersburg, the new city he had been constructing in the conquered territory, the capital of Russia. The last war of his reign was against Persia and gave Russia territory on the western coast of the Caspian Sea.

RESULTS OF THE REIGN OF PETER THE GREAT

Peter the Great lived for four years after Nystad, years which were filled with reforms in army and government. He increased the numbers of the nobility by ennobling those in government service and tied this new nobility securely to the crown by requiring its members to hold office in the army or in the civil service. He reorganized the government along lines of Swedish and Prussian centralized bureaucratic methods and imported foreigners to aid in its administration. A huge standing army was created by a sort of compulsory military service. Peter had some idea of the necessity of stimulating prosperity and economic development, and he endeavored to build up commerce and manufacturing. But Russia was vast and backward, and the terrible drain of constant warfare made the burden

of taxation intolerable. A Russian historian, in listing the objects taxed by Peter's ingenious financial agents, mentions "inns, mills, land, weights, hats, shoes, coffins, private loans, leather, baths, leases, cellars, troughs, stove-pipes, scythes, fuel, sale of meat, melons, cucumbers, boats . . . beards and whiskers, marriage and even birth."⁸² The burden of taxation fall heaviest upon the peasantry whose position was infinitely worse at the end of Peter's reign than at its beginning. In return for its service to the state the nobility was given control over the peasants, who had been free or semiservile up to that time. During Peter's reign they were reduced to a serfdom more onerous than that which had at one time existed in Western Europe. Peter liked the peasants and, indeed, had much in common with them, but they were to him merely a means to the desired end of making a great state out of backward Russia. Peter's successors continued the oppression of the peasantry. It was more than a hundred years after the death of Peter before they were granted the most elementary phases of freedom, and they were to remain ignorant and ill-treated into the twentieth century.

It is impossible to make a precise estimate of the extent or the value of the achievements of Peter the Great. With tremendous energy and great breadth of vision he endeavored to force Russia through revolutionary changes and to compensate in one lifetime for centuries of backwardness in development. Much that was done was superficial, if not definitely detrimental; social and economic advance could not be hurried beyond the capacity of the people to react to the changes; but there can be no doubt that Peter earned the title "The Great," or that much of later Russian development—good and bad—can be traced back to his reign.

Only a successor with similar ideas and equal ability could have ensured the continuance of the ambitious projects initiated by Peter the Great. His oldest son, however, had been executed because of his connection with a plot which antagonism for those very projects had stirred up, and the throne was to be bandied about, at the whim of the court nobility, among the women and small children of the royal family. During a series of short and troubled reigns the members of the nobility regained much of their independence; the services required by Peter were forgotten; but they continued to enjoy the privileges granted them in return for those services. The lot of the peasants

⁸² Quoted in Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia* (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.), p. 209.

was made more difficult by increased exactions, and the frequent revolts were cruelly suppressed. It was Peter's daughter Elizabeth who brought Russia into European prominence by her alliance with Austria and France against Frederick the Great, and it was her successor, Peter, who overturned that alliance and thus saved Frederick from defeat.⁸³ It was this half-insane Peter whose brief and inglorious reign was ended in a drunken brawl. His successor was his wife Catherine, a German princess, who was doubtless implicated in her husband's murder, and whose claim to the throne lay in her own force of character and her ability to hold that position however she had obtained it.

CATHERINE THE GREAT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA

Catherine the Great ruled from 1762 to 1796. Her reign in many ways was the realization and consummation of that of Peter the Great, and she shares with him the credit and the responsibility for much that has characterized modern Russia. The theory of government upon which Catherine's rule was based was the familiar one of "divine right," with the despotism tempered by a benevolent "enlightenment" derived from the teaching of the contemporary French philosophers. Catherine corresponded with Voltaire, invited Diderot to be the tutor of her son, was a patron of the Encyclopedists, and endeavored whenever it seemed expedient to put into effect some of their principles.⁸⁴ Much of her dabbling in reform measures was, however, done for the effect upon Western Europe, and the people of Russia were little better off at the end of her long reign than they had been before it began. The peasantry remained serfs tied to the soil, and the power of the landed aristocracy was so increased that serfdom seemed but another name for slavery.

She issued a splendid set of "Instructions" for the guidance of the reformers whom she summoned to codify the archaic confused mass of Russian laws. Liberal maxims filled the document, but its purpose was fulfilled in giving Catherine a reputation for enlightenment. The commission sat for a year and a half, criticizing the government freely, but pressure from the nobility led Catherine to dismiss it before any constructive work had been done. Taxation was especially heavy

⁸³ See above, page 222.

⁸⁴ See below, Chapter X.

upon the peasants, who numbered more than 90 per cent of the population. They paid twenty times as much in taxes as the bourgeoisie, while the nobles, who enjoyed all the privileges, paid none at all. Peasant revolts were frequent and were suppressed by a close alliance between crown and nobility that was to last until 1917.

Catherine did much in the way of governmental reorganization along lines suited to Russian conditions. The empire was divided into provinces, and the provinces into districts, each with its own local government controlled by the local nobility. This decentralization permitted some self-government and was better suited to a country the size of Russia than the centralized system of Western Europe. Executive, judicial, and financial functions were separated, and some attempt at administrative efficiency was made. Autocracy was maintained, and all laws were crown edicts issued without reference to a legislative body. Some measure of local autonomy was given to the cities, but almost all power was put in the hands of the wealthiest citizens, and each town council was subject to the authority of the government of the province in which it was situated.

CATHERINE II AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Catherine the Great's chief interest was in European affairs and in the expansion of Russia's territories. Poland and the Ottoman Empire were the states against which Catherine directed her diplomatic and military energies, and at whose expense she acquired new lands for Russia. Both Poland and Turkey had declined steadily since the end of the seventeenth century. With its kingship elective, and its powerful, almost feudal, nobility torn by faction, with only a small and powerless middle class, and a large downtrodden peasantry, Poland was an easy prey for its predatory neighbors. Early in her reign Catherine interfered in the welter of Polish politics to such an extent that the Russian minister to Poland became the real power behind the throne. Secure in her control of the Polish situation and expecting to do as she liked later with Polish territory, Catherine turned against Turkey, where French influence had stirred up anti-Russian sentiment in a move to preserve the European balance of power by diverting Catherine from the dismemberment of Poland. Russian forces won disconcerting victories, however, and the weakness of the Turks was demonstrated. The Russian fleet sailed from the

Baltic and appeared for the first time in the Mediterranean, where it defeated the Turks at Chesme Bay.

So inevitable did a complete Russian victory over Turkey seem that European rulers were willing to try every expedient to preserve the balance of power. Austria, for example, offered to aid the Sultan. In the face of a threatening general European war, which Frederick the Great, as Russia's ally, was very anxious to avoid, he was willing to sacrifice Poland, especially if he shared in the division of Polish territories. He felt, too, that Austria would be rendered less bellicose if she received territorial gains at Polish expense. He began negotiations, therefore, in 1772 with Austria which resulted in the first partition of Poland by which Maria Theresa of Austria acquired Galicia, Catherine took the Polish territories nearest Russia, and Prussia acquired the long-coveted West Prussia. Russia's war with Turkey was ended in 1774 with the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji by which she was granted a moderate increase in territory, including the port of Azov, which had been given up by Peter the Great, and certain concessions in regard to religion which Russia interpreted as a protectorate over all Christians in the Ottoman Empire. This concession furnished an opening wedge for continued Russian interference in Turkish affairs.


After 1774 Catherine gradually drew away from her former friendship for Prussia, and eventually made an alliance with Joseph II of Austria against Turkey. In 1783 she annexed the Crimea, and in a subsequent war with Turkey (1787-1791) she gained some additional territory along the Black Sea. Joseph II died in 1790, and his successor, Leopold, withdrew from the war without gaining any territory. Austrian internal affairs were in confusion due to resistance to the reform policies of Joseph,⁸⁵ and the international situation was alarming, for the French Revolution had begun, and Leopold's sister, Marie Antoinette, had appealed to him for aid.

During the war which Austria and Prussia waged against France in response to that appeal, the wily Catherine found opportunity to advance her designs upon Poland. In fact, she had done all in her power to "push the courts of Vienna and Berlin into the French enterprise, so that she might have her elbows free."⁸⁶ The first partition had reawakened the nationalism of the Polish people, and a

⁸⁵ See below, pages 280-81

⁸⁶ Quoted from Catherine's own words in F. Nowak, *Medieval Slavdom and the Rise of Russia*, p. 110.

genuine revival in energies had occurred which was inevitably anti-Russian in its implications and which led to Russian intervention. In 1793 Catherine and Frederick William II of Prussia forced Poland to agree to the second partition by which Russia acquired much of Lithuania and other provinces, and Prussia took several hundred



From Boak, Hyma, and Slosson, *The Growth of European Civilization*, courtesy of F. S. Crofts & Company.

miles, including the cities of Thorn and Danzig. The Polish hero, Kosciuszko, who had fought under Washington in the American Revolution, led his compatriots in a desperate but futile revolt. To suppress it Russia was joined by Prussia and Austria, who were willing to sacrifice their designs upon France to the immediate objective of sharing in Russia's consumption of the remnant of Poland. The third partition of Poland in 1795 extinguished that state as an independent nation. The sacrifice of Poland may have saved revolutionary France and thus may have permitted the development of those principles that were, after more than a century of bondage,

eventually to make Poland free once more, but for the time, at least, the ruthless disregard of the rights of peoples characteristic of eighteenth-century diplomacy and warfare was triumphant. Catherine the Great died in 1796, fulminating against the Revolution in France, the principles of which she recognized as destructive of the very foundations upon which rested empires such as hers.

READINGS

PRUSSIA. Besides the usual reference to Hayes, mention should be made of E. F. Henderson's *Short History of Germany* (Latest edition, 1927) for this and following chapters. J. A. R. Marriott and C. G. Robertson, *Evolution of Prussia* (New edition, 1937), is very useful. S. B. Fay's *The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia* (Berkshire Series, 1937) is brief and excellent. Ferdinand Schevill's *The Making of Modern Germany* (1916) is made up of interesting brief lectures. An older standard work, *Frederick the Great and the Rise of Prussia* (1904), is by W. F. Reddaway, while two new biographies of Frederick the Great are by M. Goldsmith (1929) and N. Young (1919). Frederick's great contemporary, Maria Theresa of Austria, is portrayed in a new and interesting biography (1936) by M. Goldsmith. An older biography is by J. F. Bright (1897). The latter author has also written a biography of Joseph II (1897). G. Bruun, in *The Enlightened Despots* (Berkshire Series, 1929), gives brief accounts of the careers of Frederick II and Joseph II.

RUSSIA. There are several excellent histories of Russia, useful for this earlier period as well as for later ones: Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia* (1928)—probably the best general history in English; S. F. Platonov, *History of Russia* (1925); George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia* (1929); Sonia Howe, *One Thousand Years of Russian History* (1915); and C. R. Beazley, N. Forbes, and G. A. Birkett, *Russia from the Varangians to the Bolsheviks* (1918). F. Nowak's *Medieval Slavdom and the Rise of Russia* (Berkshire Series, 1930) is a brief account of the early period. There are several interesting recent biographies of important figures in Russian history. Stephen Graham wrote *Ivan the Terrible* (1932) and *Peter the Great* (1929). M. B. Jones is the author of *Peter, Called the Great* (1936). Katherine Anthony's *Catherine the Great* (1925) and Gina Kaus's *Catherine, the Portrait of an Empress* (1935) are recent accounts of the life of that extraordinary woman. F. L. Glaser has edited the *Diary of John Korb. Scenes from the Court of Peter the Great* (1921), the account of a contemporary. The troubles of Poland are discussed in *A Brief History of Poland* (1916) by J. S. Orvis.

≡ IX ≡

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CRISES IN EUROPEAN EXPANSION

THE commercial and colonial rivalry between England and France which flared into open warfare in 1689 was to last until 1815. During those years there were seven periods of war in which the two powers were in opposite camps, and the title "Second Hundred Years' War" has been given to the long conflict. As a matter of fact, although the downfall of Napoleon marked the end of the last Anglo-French war, it was not until after 1900 that England and France agreed to a pacific settlement of their various colonial rivalries and formed a Dual Entente which permitted them to present a united front to the aggressive policies of Germany. In every European war England was interested in the maintenance of the balance of power, and was vitally concerned with preventing any undue increase of French prestige. The hegemony in Europe of any one state has always been regarded as a menace by the English government, and the advance of any strong power into the area about the mouth of the Rhine has for centuries been cause for British intervention. From the days of Queen Elizabeth distant trading and the planting of colonies necessitated sea power. England, a civilian and commercial nation, therefore, while refusing the burden of a large standing army, strove to possess a merchant fleet and a navy unequaled by any of its rivals.

COLONIAL AND COMMERCIAL SITUATION ABOUT 1700

Since no conflict between two great powers could fail to affect the delicate balance of the European states, any such conflict was sure to be widespread. Alliances were formed which lined up all states claiming international strength, and peace conferences were meetings for the bargaining and haggling of diplomats sent abroad.

to acquire as much and to give as little as possible. Since almost all the major powers had commercial interests and overseas colonies, and since they all subscribed to the current mercantilistic theories,¹ European wars became world-wide, and battles on the seas, in India, or in the New World accompanied the march of armies across Europe. By their close proximity to one another and by the urgency of their dynastic or territorial ambitions and problems the continental powers were forced to make the European situation their first consideration in time of war, and their main concern in deciding the terms of peace. Great Britain, protected by the semi-isolation of her insular position and relatively uninterested in the disposal of European territories, could demand her compensation in the cession of bits of her rivals' colonial possessions. However small and scattered these empire gains might seem as each treaty was being considered, they were in the aggregate very significant. The growth of the empire was obviously of primary concern to the British government, regardless of what king or party was in control.

The commercial revolution which had begun in the fifteenth century² had given to Portugal and Spain the first fruits of the Age of Discovery. Enriched by the gains made in the trade with the East and in the exploitation of the mines of the New World, the Iberian kingdoms had their brief day of grandeur. The sixteenth century was the age of the predominance of Spain; a predominance to be attacked in the commercial field by the English and the Dutch, and on the battlefields of Europe by the armies of France. The Dutch, encroaching on Portuguese preserves in the East Indies, built for themselves a vast colonial empire in the islands off the coast of Asia. In the seventeenth century their supremacy in the carrying trade was challenged by England, and the Anglo-Dutch wars, although indecisive, indicated that they were being outstripped by the British. The Portuguese retained a small share of their former colonies and trading posts in Africa and Asia; the Spanish holdings in Latin America and the Philippines were secure until the nineteenth century; and Dutch colonial empire and commerce are still impressive. They were not, however, serious rivals of the English and the French in the eighteenth century.

There is a certain parallel in the development of the commercial and colonial interests of England and France. Their East India com-

¹ See above, pages 85-86

² See above, Chapter III.

panies were founded in the same generation; their first permanent North American settlements were but a year apart; and their interests in the West Indies, in the northern fisheries, and in the violations of Spanish regulations for colonial trade were coincident. An informed and disinterested observer in the early years of the seventeenth century could have discovered little to indicate the outcome of a rivalry, the development of which he might have been farsighted enough to imagine. As the century advanced neither state was able to devote its energies to colonial questions. The 'Thirty Years' War and the militant policies of Louis XIV indicated the greater interest of France in the affairs of Europe, while the long struggle between Crown and Parliament made constitutional issues the center of interest in seventeenth-century Britain. Throughout that century, however, both England and France desired colonies and planned definitely for their planting and development. The interest in trade was fundamental, for the middle class was strong in both countries, and in England, at least, much of the population was dependent upon overseas trade. Mercantile principles were generally accepted, although abstract theories were always modified by practical considerations, and the mercantilistic laws were often evaded or violated. A favorable balance of trade and economic self-sufficiency were the cardinal principles of mercantilism. The constant danger of war increased the desire for economic independence and made advantageous the possession of colonies scattered widely enough to provide goods of all varieties. A well-balanced colonial system was one in which there were plantations or trading posts in the Far East, the Near East, the West Indies, and the mainland of North America. Tropical products, fish, furs, naval stores, and timber were needed by both England and France, and both countries preferred to buy from their own nationals.

THE FRENCH COLONIES

There is contrast as well as parallelism, for the sharp differences in the management at home of matters of religion and government were reflected in colonial control. The centralization and minute regulation of the French autocratic government³ were reproduced in the paternalistic government of French Canada. Since there was no representative government in France, it would be absurd to expect

³ See above, page 195

the French colonists to demand legislative assemblies. The religious wars in France which had resulted in Catholic supremacy ensured the domination of Catholicism in the colonies. Huguenots might migrate to the English and Dutch colonies, but they were not permitted to seek new homes in the colonies of their own country. Jesuit missionaries aided in the empire-building of France, and the church and state were as firmly welded together for the furtherance of autocracy in the far corners of the earth as they were in France. The governor, the bishop, and the colonial intendant mirrored in the New World the accepted order in France, and the careful regulations of French economic life were copied in the colonies. These restrictions upon migration and upon individual initiative tended to limit the number of settlers and to prevent the growth and prosperity of colonial enterprises. It is impossible, however, to determine how extensive French colonization would have been had these restrictions not existed.

BRITISH COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT

The British, on the other hand, have had a genius for colonization, and a surprising ingenuity in the adaptation of their own traditional institutions to new surroundings. Through the troubled seventeenth century thousands of dissatisfied Englishmen sailed for the North American and West Indian colonies to seek their fortunes and to create religious and political conditions more in accordance with their principles than were the conditions which they left behind them. Twelve years after the founding of Virginia a representative legislature of two houses appeared, and the struggle between Crown and Parliament was paralleled in the struggles between royal governors and colonial legislatures. In Plymouth Colony the Mayflower Compact provided democratic government for the humble Separatists who sought religious freedom on the coast of New England. The members of the Massachusetts Bay Company were forced, within a few years after the settlement of Boston, to provide a two-house legislature and extend the privileges of "freemen" to the colonists, who rebelled against the discrimination of a dominant minority. The same thing occurred in the proprietary colonies. Wherever British settlers came in sufficient numbers to cause a demand for participation in government, local representative bodies grew up which took over the business of lawmaking, and, regardless of how he was selected, the gov-

ernor was assisted in his administrative functions by local councils. English common law was carried to the colonies, where it was interpreted by local judges influenced by the new environment. Suffrage in the New World colonies was on a much more liberal basis than in the British Isles. There were property qualifications everywhere, but colonial property was largely in land, and land was to be had almost for the asking. In the Puritan colonies church membership was an added qualification, and in the days of settlement a narrow theocracy was dominant. The increase in population brought colonists of a less bigoted stamp, and the growing rationalism and tolerance of the eighteenth century lessened the Puritan influence. By 1700 there was no religious persecution in the colonies, although there was some discrimination in that several colonies had state-supported churches. Complete separation of church and state and full toleration of all faiths had been achieved in little Rhode Island, and to almost as great a degree in Pennsylvania. Everywhere else there was apt to be social discrimination because of variation from the religious affiliation of the majority.

The interest of the English government in colonial development was constant and was especially strong when the middle-class mercantile interests were exerting their greatest influence. The struggle between Crown and Parliament in the seventeenth century caused thousands of Englishmen to migrate, but prevented close governmental supervision of colonial planting. The century as a whole is sometimes called the "period of salutary neglect" in which opportunism, the circumstances of each colony, and the desires of its inhabitants determined colonial development. Even in this period, however, navigation laws were passed to increase and regulate trade,⁴ and the development of sea power was recognized as essential for the protection of the faraway plantations. The returned Stuarts wished to make colonial governments more uniform and to bring them under royal control. Their pro-French policy kept England at peace and prevented friction between the French and the English in the New World. The triumphant Whigs who called in William and Mary in 1688 were in large part the representatives of the merchant class most interested in the profits of colonial planting, and the political ascendancy of Parliament was indicated when the king felt that he must set up a Parliamentary Board of Trade and Plantations (1696) for the con-

⁴ See above, page 168.

trol of colonial affairs which had formerly been under a committee of the Privy Council of the monarch.⁵ Early in the eighteenth century the importance of the colonies was recognized by the division of the cabinet management of foreign affairs into two branches each presided over by a cabinet official—one called the Secretary of State for the Northern (European) Department, and the other the Secretary of State for the Southern Department—whose duties included the supervision of colonial affairs. Later the office of Colonial Secretary was established. The British government, however, was chiefly interested, at least prior to 1750, in matters of commerce and the development of colonial resources. The colonies prospered under the protection of the British navy, colonial traders shared in the advantages of the navigation acts, and the Board of Trade and Plantations seldom interfered in affairs within the colonies except to restrict colonial manufacturing and to prevent the issuance of paper money. Under such conditions colonial population increased, and the English colonies offered opportunities to settlers of other races. Migration from Scotland and from the north of Ireland was heavy after 1700; some French Huguenots came after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes; and many German settlers, attracted by the advertising methods of William Penn, came to the colony which he founded.

CONFLICT IN THE NEW WORLD

The contrast between the French and the English colonial plantings in North America was complete. Geography had played its part. The French, following the St. Lawrence, had come upon the vast inland waterways of the continent and had been led irresistibly onward to the Lake Superior country in the north and by way of the Ohio, the Illinois, and the Wisconsin rivers, to the Mississippi and southward to the Gulf of Mexico. The missionary, the explorer-soldier, and the fur trader blazed the path of an empire which must be held and defended by the small numbers of Frenchmen in Canada. France knew the uses of war and diplomacy in Europe, and she applied the lessons learned there to the colonial problem. Soldiers, garrisons, and Indian allies, directed by a governor general whose training and functions were largely military, were designed to compensate for lack of numbers. Unity and centralization of control in-

⁵ See above, pages 177-78

creased the efficiency of the system and counteracted the difficulties caused by the extent of the area to be defended.

The English colonies were at once much more compact and far less united. Individualistic in the extreme, they were divided by differences and rivalries of every description. New England, the Middle, and the Southern colonies quarreled much more often than they co-operated, and any united effort could be obtained only when an overwhelming common danger was recognized. Once united, their great superiority in numbers might tell against the French, for they numbered nearly two million by the middle of the eighteenth century to the one hundred thousand French. Nevertheless, the lack of central authority and the lax supervision of the mother country would present difficult obstacles to overcome. The English, too, found Indian allies in the Iroquois tribes of the region west of the Hudson who were to prove of great value when the struggle with the French was most serious. As long as the English remained east of the Alleghenies there was no serious cause for colonial conflict; in fact, the friction which did occur was largely in the use of the fisheries off the Canadian and Newfoundland coasts, and in the fur trade of the Hudson Bay region. The most casual glance at the map, however, will show the inevitable nature of the conflict which must arise when the expanding population of the English colonies crossed the mountains to establish new homes in the Ohio country and met the French fur trader whose prosperity depended upon the preservation of the hunting grounds for his Indian allies.

Both English and French in the New World came into contact with the Spanish colonies but neither found serious danger from the presence of Spanish power. To later colonizing enterprise the chief significance of the Spanish possessions was the fact that their presence prevented other nations from entering areas already occupied. The Spanish in Florida served as a barrier against the expansion southward of the English colonies, and Spain in Mexico limited French claims in the gulf of that name. Both France and Spain claimed the Texas country, although neither established settlements there. In the West Indies prior discovery gave the Spanish many of the best islands, but when the great value of colonies that could produce sugar, cotton, and other tropical products was recognized, neither England nor France hesitated to challenge Spanish possession if the European situation was favorable. England, for instance, took Jamaica from

Spain as a result of a war during the period of Cromwell. All commercial nations made continual efforts to break into the trade of the Spanish colonies and violated Spanish laws with more and more impunity as Spain's European prestige declined.

RIVALRY IN INDIA AND THE EAST

The expansion of Great Britain eastward was of a different pattern. The East India Company did not prove utterly inadequate, as did so many of the companies created for trade and colonization in the Western Hemisphere.⁶ In the Far East there were trading opportunities to be developed that would make men rich beyond dreams of avarice, and wealth to be derived from the control of thickly populated areas where rich and ancient civilizations were declining in the hands of weak and decadent governments. Tropical products, spices, tea, jewels, and all manner of luxuries were brought to a Europe ever more avid for them, and mounting profits accrued to the shareholders in the companies which had been granted monopolistic privileges in that trade. As long as the great Mogul empire in India was powerful, trading posts and trading privileges were all that the companies needed or could acquire. The need of protection from their competitors led to some slight armed force and naval support, but the companies themselves were essentially, and almost solely, trading concerns. Commercial rivalries between the trading companies and the merchant vessels of two countries, however, caused such wars as those between England and the Netherlands in the seventeenth century, and even in the stormy days of Cromwell the English government recognized the need of sea power by greatly increasing its naval expenditures.⁷

The English, the French, and the Dutch, and, to a lessening degree, the Spanish and the Portuguese, shared in the growing and immensely profitable Eastern trade. The Dutch carved a vast colonial empire for themselves out of the islands once claimed by Portugal south and east of the Malay Peninsula; the French and the English traders made India the center of their interests. When the Mogul empire in India disintegrated early in the eighteenth century the European commercial organizations began to seek a territorial basis for their control of trade. Trading posts were fortified, the companies

⁶ See above, Chapter III.

⁷ See above, Chapter VI.

maintained their own soldiers as garrisons which governed the near-by areas. The European companies combined diplomacy and force in their relations with the native princes who ruled over the fragments of the once powerful empire. Resident officials of the trading companies became military commanders and diplomats as well as commercial agents, and many of them, while pushing the interests of the company they represented, were able to amass great fortunes for themselves in their dealings with the rich nawabs. It should be obvious that when both the English and the French companies pursued the same tactics and established fortified posts near each other, commercial rivalry would inevitably be accompanied by rivalry in acquiring territory and in obtaining influence over the native princes. Military alliances were secured with the extension of trading privileges. With native troops (sepoys) augmenting the European forces, news of the beginning of a war between England and France meant conflict in India. The director general of the French company, Dupleix, is credited with being the first European to utilize the friendship of a native potentate, in the period of the War of the Austrian Succession, with the objective of destroying English interests in India. The Englishman Robert Clive was not far behind, however, and, using the methods of Dupleix, the English later defeated the French and made themselves in the end the masters of India.⁸

COLONIAL WARFARE, 1689-1713

In both India and the Americas the stage was set in the seventeenth century. The eighteenth was to be the age of the English rise to predominance in sea power, in commerce, and in the extent of colonies. That rise was to be at the expense of France, and the struggle was to leave France exhausted. The process by which France was despoiled and the British Empire was increased was a simple one. The coming of William of Orange to England in 1688 ended the Stuart neutrality in the wars of Louis XIV and made England a party in the coalitions formed against France in the European wars of the following century. Every European war had its colonial counterpart, and at the end of most of them England acquired some additional colonial regions. The European aspects of these wars have been discussed in preceding chapters;⁹ it is necessary here to men-

⁸ See below, page 256.

⁹ See above, Chapters VII-IX.

tion only the alteration in the colonial situation. The War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697) was called, in America, King William's War. The French and their Indian allies, sweeping down upon the settlements of the Connecticut Valley, roused hatred for the French and made the English colonists feel that their only hope of safety lay in driving French power from Canada. The war in the colonies was indecisive, with the advantage largely with the French, and the Treaty of Ryswick, both in Europe and America, was a *status quo ante bellum* arrangement.

The War of the Spanish Succession was on a grander scale with more parties involved and greater issues at stake. Called Queen Anne's War in America, it was fought here by the French and their Indian allies against the English colonial forces with Iroquois assistance. Neither France nor England sent adequate aid to make the war a decisive one, but the results, although determined largely by the duke of Marlborough on European battlefields and by the English navy in European waters, were momentous in the growth of the British Empire. The acquisition of Gibraltar and Minorca gave Great Britain security in the Mediterranean, the cession of the Belgian area to Austria and the demolition of the French fortress of Dunkirk removed any danger to England from the region across the Channel and the North Sea. In North America France ceded Acadia, Newfoundland, and the Hudson Bay territory to England, recognized British suzerainty over the Iroquois, but retained Cape Breton and various fishing privileges in the Newfoundland region. Spain consented to open the trade of her colonies in the famous *Asiento* by which England obtained a contract to supply the Spanish colonies with slaves. At the same time England also obtained the right to send those colonies one trading ship of not more than five hundred tons' burden each year. This was an opening wedge of great value to the English merchants, who quickly found that the "one" trading ship could be reloaded nightly from sister ships sent with it, for the Spanish colonists wanted English goods and Spanish port officials were venal and acquiescent.

During the War of the Spanish Succession England secured from Portugal concessions in the Methuen Treaty which began the process that was to tie Portuguese commerce to England for more than two hundred years. By it Portugal agreed to purchase her woolen goods from England and to admit them as well as other British manufactures free of duty. England agreed to exclude French wines in favor

of Portuguese, allowing port, for example, to enter from Portugal at a duty one-third smaller than that levied upon French wine.¹⁰ In general, the importation of French goods into England was either prohibited altogether or was subjected to ruinous duties which made legitimate commerce negligible and put a premium upon smuggling. It was not until 1786 that a more liberal commercial treaty between England and France gave evidence of the existence of a new trade policy which will be discussed later under the name of *laissez faire*. The early years of the eighteenth century demonstrated the supremacy of Britain on the sea, and predicted for those who were awake to the importance of sea power the ultimate success of the British in their rivalry with France. Admiral Mahan, an eminent American writer on naval history, has said that before 1700 "England was one of the sea powers; after it she was *the* sea power, without any second"

COLONIAL WARS, 1739-1763

After the Treaty of Utrecht England and France were at peace for nearly thirty years. The Whig merchants and country gentry called in the Hanoverian George by the Act of Settlement, and under their able leader, Robert Walpole, advanced the prosperity and contentment of the English people. The British government was stable, for there was confidence in the financial institutions and in the intelligent if decidedly mercenary leadership of a ruling class which was made up of aristocracy and merchant class welded together by a mutual interest in commerce. The Bank of England, the funded national debt, the modern credit system, the profound respect for property rights, the colonies, and the leadership in the carrying trade, all were a part of British trade supremacy, and all rested upon protection by sea power. The smug worship of property and the commercial outlook upon life furthered England's commercial development and colonial supremacy. In these years of the middle of the eighteenth century began that increased application of machinery to industry which was to result in the domination of Great Britain in the manufacturing as well as in the commercial field.

The period of peace came to an end in 1739 when a squabble

¹⁰ Laurence Packard, *The Commercial Revolution, 1400-1776*, p. 76. Arthur Buffinton, *The Second Hundred Years' War, 1689-1815*, p. 5, for English tariff policies as regards France. These two little books cover in greater detail the events outlined in this chapter.

between English vessels, undoubtedly engaging in illegal trade, and Spanish colonial officials caused the War of Jenkins's Ear (Jenkins, an English seaman, having lost the ear in a fray with the Spanish coast guard). The War of the Austrian Succession began in the next year, and when the two conflicts merged once more England and France were involved in colonial struggle. This time the war spread to India, where Duplex managed to acquire Madras. In America, however, the English colonists rose as they never had before and captured the French fortress, Louisburg, which commanded the mouth of the St. Lawrence. The French merchant marine was badly damaged by the English, and the French navy was almost destroyed. The war in Europe was indecisive, and the general exhaustion was recognized in the unsatisfactory treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), which restored the colonial *status quo ante bellum* but permitted Frederick II to retain Silesia.

The years after 1748 were but a breathing spell. In India Duplex and Clive drilled their native troops and negotiated with native princes. In America the struggle assumed its final phases as the English colonists crossed the mountains, and a young man named George Washington began a survey of the Ohio country which was a preliminary to the sale of lands by a company organized to promote the settlement of that region. The French, too, were interested in the Ohio country, where they had long had fur traders, and sent an expedition to take possession in the name of the king and to build a fort there to serve as an obstacle to English advance. The collision between the French and the English at this Fort Duquesne in 1754 began the colonial French and Indian War that was soon to be merged in the European Seven Years' War. The first years of the war in America were indecisive. It was difficult to arouse or unite colonial effort, and the closer organization and greater military strength of the French had immediate effect. With the rise to power of William Pitt in the British government more troops were sent to America, and greater co-operation with colonial forces was effected. He was the greatest war minister that England ever had, and on all fronts he infused new energy and enthusiasm into the war.

A strengthened navy prevented the French from sending reinforcements to their colonies, and regulations to limit the wartime trade of neutrals brought economic pressure to bear on France. By the so-called Rule of 1756 England decreed that the neutrals that had not had access to French colonial trade in time of peace would not

be permitted to carry colonial products to France in time of war, and the British fleet proceeded to prevent contacts between France and her colonies. In 1759 the French navy was practically destroyed at Lagos and at Quiberon Bay. With the French colonists unable to obtain aid from the mother country, the greater numbers of English colonists in America began to count. British regulars and colonial troops took Montreal and Quebec, the British navy captured Havana and Manila from the Spanish,¹¹ and the war came to an end in 1763 with the English supreme in the Western Hemisphere. In India, too, Robert Clive and his native allies, using troops largely composed of sepoys, won victories over the French. Clive received the aid of the English fleet and was able to obtain necessary supplies. Fort after fort fell into British hands, and the war ended with French power in India completely broken. Pitt wished to continue the war until French colonial and commercial power was so reduced that England would be recognized as supreme in those fields, but his more conservative compatriots were afraid that any such disregard of a maritime balance would result in an anti-English coalition. Moreover the English people generally wished peace and relief from war taxes. The death of George II in 1760 brought in a young king who desired to rule and who was opposed to Pitt, and the great war minister resigned late in 1761. In Europe the hard-pressed Prussian king was relieved by the death of the Russian empress,¹² and the weary European powers were ready for a peace treaty, which was speedily negotiated on a *status quo ante* basis at Hubertusburg in 1763.

In the same year the colonial issues were settled in the Treaty of Paris, a great landmark in the history of the British Empire. France regained her East Indian trading posts but lost the right to fortify them, and thus gave up any attempt at territorial gain in India. In America France ceded all of Canada and her claims east of the Mississippi River as well as several West Indian islands.¹³ Havana and Manila reverted to Spain and Florida was ceded to England. France indemnified Spain for this colonial loss by the cession of Louisiana. England gained Senegal in Africa and regained Minorca. English imperialists criticized the treaty as falling short of gains commensurate

¹¹ Spain entered the war after signing the Family Compact with France in 1761. See above, page 222, note 18

¹² See above, page 238

¹³ It is interesting to note that the English government hesitated for some time as to whether it would be better to take Canada and the fur trade or Guadeloupe and its sugar plantations.

with British war successes, but it is doubtful whether greater rapacity on the part of the British negotiators would have made much difference in the final outcome of the Anglo-French rivalry, which had yet to be submitted to the testing ground of the American Revolution and the European wars of the period of the French Revolution and Napoleon.

BRITISH COLONIES AFTER 1763

The path of empire was not to be an easy one for the British government. In excluding the French from North America and, in large degree, from India, the British took over a greater problem and responsibility than they could handle. So far as the colonies were concerned there was the fundamental problem of the relation of the whole to the parts, of a central authority to many local or regional governments. When colonies were few and the numbers of colonists small, the issue might safely be evaded, and an opportunist and haphazard development might screen a lack of agreement upon principle. The wars which ended in 1763 more than doubled the extent of the British Empire and brought the government face to face with a problem for which an immediate solution must be sought. Any solution must, furthermore, be based upon a realistic consideration of what both central government and colonies believed to be the nature of that relationship and the extent of the control of the center over the distant units.

The problem of empire was one of direct interest, also, to the thousands of Englishmen who had never seen a colony or a colonist, and whose affairs were distinctly insular and provincial. The British debt increased 100 per cent during the period of the Seven Years' War—an increase to be charged up, in large part, to the acquisition of colonies—and the annual cost of colonial administration after 1763 was five times the sum it had been before 1750. Taxes were high and fell heavily upon the landowning and merchant classes that controlled the government. Furthermore, the war was followed by that inevitable postwar depression that has always dogged the footsteps of officials responsible for the payment of war expenditures. The lessons of war had taught the British that they owed their gain to sea power and must hold what they had by the same means. Commerce and colonies, in short, would prevent any postwar reduction

of expenditures for defense; the navy must be maintained, and the bill must be paid

This was the more evident from any study of the European situation, for the growth of the British Empire and the diminution of French colonial possessions and French prestige were European problems of prime importance. The destruction, temporarily at least, of French sea power was as decided a blow to the European balance of power as the Bourbon acceptance of the Spanish throne or the rape of Silesia by Frederick II. The British government could not fail to realize that France would welcome any opportunity to recoup her losses, and that other sea powers would, in all probability, find it to their interest to block any further British gains. Having once attained naval and commercial supremacy, Britain had no alternative save to defend it.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN ENGLAND AFTER 1763

These problems of imperial administration, finance, and European relations had to be met by a British government that faced a new king and a new political situation at home. The domestic situation, therefore, added a third problem—that of adjusting the workings of parliamentary government to a new crown policy. In short, there was a revival, or a new stage, in the old constitutional problem of the relations between Crown and Parliament. The limitations on royal power must be redefined, and the government must meet the need, which was increasingly felt, of a further broadening of the basis of government. No advance had been made in that respect since the series of acts stating English liberties in the last days of the controversy with the Stuart kings.¹⁴ After the opening of the eighteenth century, the Whig party, which had been responsible for the “Glorious Revolution” and for the Act of Settlement providing for the accession of the Hanoverian line, had rested content with its achievements. Representatives of landholding nobility and gentry, meeting in Parliament representatives of wealthy merchants and manufacturers, governed the realm in their combined interests. Since those interests were, in general, felt by them to be the same as those of the rest of the population, there was little protest against their furtherance. The first two Hanoverian monarchs interfered little in administration, and a cabinet made up of men prominent in the majority group

¹⁴ See above, Chapter VI.

in Parliament governed in their stead. The system was corrupt, nepotism was rife, parliamentary majorities were assured by purchase, and the civil service was at its lowest level of morality. Suffrage was on a narrow basis; the "common man" had no vote; and some districts where population was declining were overrepresented while others in which population was increasing had no representatives at all. The demand for reform was audible but not yet sufficiently insistent to bring concessions from the classes already in power. There is little reason, however, for thinking that a broader suffrage or a more honest civil service would have altered the results of the colonial disputes.

The political situation was complicated by the fact that there had been a steady disintegration in both political creeds and political parties. No clear-cut division along lines of principle was discernible, and there were no outstanding leaders whose political beliefs and standards could furnish a rallying point for party allegiance. The old basis of liberty-loving Whigs and Commons on the one side and absolutist king and Tory nobility on the other was a thing of the past, nor did religious issues any longer create political division. The old Tory party had disappeared with the last Stuart rebellion of the first half of the century, and the Whig party had split into innumerable factions when it found itself with no opposition party against which it could take united action. Great Britain, therefore, was governed by bloc, or coalition, of factions all calling themselves Whig. Under such circumstances there was little continuity in policy, and principles counted for less than personalities. A cabinet might fall because someone's relative failed to get a job, seldom because of a vital difference of opinion in cabinet or Parliament over an important matter of policy. The question of the American colonies, for instance, did not cause a single ministerial crisis until 1782.

The political situation was further complicated because the young king, George III, was determined to rule as well as reign. After two generations of Continental-minded, German-speaking monarchs who had been content to let Parliament govern, George III was a distinctly new type of king. His morals were unassailable, he was thoroughly British with the tastes of a country gentleman, he was hard-working and unquestionably patriotic. There was no throwback to the theory of divine right: George was willing to permit the rule of Parliament and the ministerial system provided that he could control the Parliamentary majority and the membership of the cabinet.

The young man knew what he wanted, and got it, even though it cost him an empire. He wished to beat the Whigs at their own game, and restore the power of the Crown, so diminished under his predecessors, by creating and eventually governing through a political party of his own.¹⁵

From 1763 to 1770 the chief struggle in English politics centered about this attempt to create a dominant King's party. In 1770, with the beginning of the ministry of Lord North, that party came into power. It was to last until the disasters of the war for which it was responsible led to its fall and to the end of this new variety of "personal rule." The American Revolution, therefore, had a part in British constitutional history as well as in the evolution of empire and in the long Anglo-French colonial rivalry.

There was no dearth of political ability in English public life, although little of it had much influence in the period between the two treaties of Paris in 1763 and 1783. The party of the king's friends did not include the great Pitt, now Lord Chatham, nor those liberal statesmen, Edmund Burke,¹⁶ Charles James Fox, and Lord Shelburne. During the critical years from 1770 to 1782 they were out of office, and their opposition to royal prerogative and to the American war could be expressed only in obstructionist tactics.¹⁷ There was no animosity toward the Americans on the part of the king's ministers, but their preoccupation with local affairs and their lack of statesmanship were disastrous. Incompetence and "unresponsiveness to crying needs and issues, rather than corruption or deliberate ill will . . . convinced the Americans that their liberties were no longer safe within the British Empire."¹⁸

¹⁵ Samuel Morison and Henry Commager, *Growth of the American Republic*, p. 15 (New ed., Vol. I, p. 16.)

¹⁶ Burke is considered the father of the Conservative party. His conservatism, however, was deepened by the French Revolution. Opposed to the policies of George III in this earlier period, he was liberal on colonial questions.

¹⁷ American historians are no more condemnatory of British politics in the period of the American Revolution than are English writers. G. Grant Robertson, *England under the Hanoverians*, p. 265 sums up an account of blunders by saying: "Nor was it enough to have an imperious King, a submissive Cabinet, and a crushing and docile majority in Parliament. Ministers neither commanded success nor studied to deserve it. With the weakness of mediocrity they overrated their own capacity and resources, as foolishly as they underrated those of the enemy."

¹⁸ Samuel Morison and Henry Commager, *Growth of the American Republic*, p. 17 (New ed., Vol. I, p. 18). Curtis Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization*, has an excellent account both of British colonial administration and of the causes of friction between Britain and the colonies.

THE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES

The difficulties due to this political situation were increased by the fact that the mercantilistic theories, upon which the economic side of imperial policy was based, were losing ground. The colonists had always ignored the provisions of the British navigation laws that seemed to conflict with their interests. The "enumerated" articles, such as tobacco, had not always been sent directly to England from the colony which had produced it, and smuggling had been the basis for more than one New England fortune. As colonial trade grew it was obvious that any attempt at strict enforcement of the restrictive laws would result in friction. The British laws to prevent colonial manufacture of any goods which might be supplied by English merchants grew more irksome as the economic life of the colonies developed. The eighteenth century saw the colonists demanding more and more frequently a currency adequate for expanding trade, and bitterly resenting the persistent royal vetoes of all colonial laws providing for paper money issues. It was only in the illegal trade with the French, Dutch, and Spanish West Indies that the colonial merchants could get the money necessary to meet their overseas obligations, and the pinch of the unpopular laws may have increased their willingness to "turn an honest penny" by trading with Britain's enemies in periods of war! The continental colonies resented also what they considered the favoritism shown by the British government for the island colonies. The West Indian sugar planters had close connections with powerful interests in England, maintained an active Parliamentary lobby, and were generally able to obtain the legislation necessary to protect them even at the expense of the New England merchants.

It was evident that seventeenth-century principles no longer sufficed and that the fallacies of the mercantilistic system were becoming apparent. The term "political economy" was first used in the middle of the eighteenth century, and "economists" in that period studying the effect of trade restrictions came to the conclusion that restrictions and regulations were detrimental, and that a laissez-faire policy of permitting trade to come and go at will would stimulate industrial and commercial activity. Learned treatises on "natural" laws were published, the *physiocrats*¹⁹ developed revolutionary ideas as to the

¹⁹ See below, Chapter X.

sources and distribution of wealth, and the relationships of industry, agriculture, and commerce were subjected to rationalistic criticism. A Scot, Adam Smith, published in 1776 *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, which was a landmark in economic thought. He attacked the very foundations of mercantilistic thought and laid the basis for many nineteenth-century economic ideas. Governments, however, lagged behind economics. Theories developed as a result of scientific research do not rapidly become a part of the mental equipment of politicians, and Adam Smith had no effect upon a colonial struggle which might have been averted by an application of his conclusions.

The problems of the British in North America after 1763 can be reduced into relatively simple form in so far as they affect Empire or European history. There were the problem of the west, the region between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi; the problem of arranging for the government of French Canada; and the problem of finance in which were involved the questions of imperial defense and of trade. The American colonists expected the opening of the West for settlement and recognition of the claims of the various colonies to lands lying beyond the mountains. The sole economic resource of the Western lands, so far as imperial gains were concerned, was the fur trade which would be ruined by the settlement of the area. An Indian revolt in 1763 made necessary an immediate solution of the question, and a proclamation of the British government closed the whole area, for the time being, and thus set up a vast Indian reservation. After a survey of the whole situation, in 1764 a plan was adopted in theory which called for the appointment of Indian commissioners and the establishment of garrisoned trading posts through the whole area. The plan would benefit the British fur interests but would operate against the other interests of the colonists. The possibility of settlement was not specifically ruled out, but no immediate project was indicated. By implication it denied the validity of all the Western land claims of the thirteen colonies. The plan called for a great increase in the military establishment in America and the expenditure of a large sum for its maintenance. It is obvious that such a scheme would meet with colonial opposition. There is no doubt that the removal of the French menace meant the end of the colonial feeling of dependence upon the mother country and weakened the ties that bound the colonies to the central government. The attempt at closing the West to settlement could not fail to be unpopular, and

any endeavor to force colonial contributions toward the expense of frontier garrisons would be resisted. Colonial agents continued to agitate for new Western colonies, and land companies longed for the chance to exploit new areas through speculative enterprise. The tobacco colonies were especially averse to this limitation on Western settlement, for the planters were heavily in debt and looked upon Western lands as a means of recouping their fortunes and of providing funds for the payment of their debts. In the meantime, actual settlers, heedless of imperial restrictions, pushed into the Western country and defied both Indians and British to displace them.

The problem of providing a government for Canada was wisely postponed until after a thorough investigation, and the Quebec Act of 1774, which was the final solution of the problem, was, in many respects, a work of real statesmanship. It came, however, at a critical point in Anglo-colonial relations, contained clauses resented by the thirteen colonies already near rebellion, and served to add to the friction. The act provided for a government for the whole area from the mouth of the St. Lawrence west to the Mississippi and north of the Ohio on the basis of the preservation of French law and institutions, including the Catholic Church. It was an honest fulfillment of the terms of the treaty of 1763, but it denied the validity of the territorial claims of the English colonies and blocked any prospects of the advance of settlement in the Ohio country. It was, however, one of the main reasons why there was no revolution in Canada later in the century.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

The problem of imperial finance was the direct cause of collision between central government and colonies and resulted in a fundamental dispute that involved constitutional relationships as well as taxation. The growth in the national debt, the increase in the cost of imperial administration and defense, and the demand of English landowners and merchants for relief from the tax burden led to a search for new sources of revenue outside England. It seemed logical that the colonists should bear a small part of the expense for their own defense and for the payment of British officials in their midst. Imperial revenues might be increased by altering trade regulations so that customs duties would be productive or by imposing internal

revenue duties such as excise or stamp taxes. The British government in 1764 and 1765 tried both with equal lack of success.

The Sugar Act of 1764, which replaced an old navigation measure of 1733, reduced the tariff to be paid in colonial ports on molasses and raw sugar coming from the West Indian colonies of any nation other than Great Britain, but at the same time provided measures for the strict enforcement of the act. The object was to stimulate importation by the reduction of duty and to make sure that the customs office received payment. The British West Indian sugar colonies were to be safeguarded from competition. The Stamp Act of the next year was the application to the colonies of an old English device requiring that revenue stamps be affixed to all licenses, legal documents, leases, newspapers, notes, bonds, and a number of other varieties of paper. Neither measure caused any excitement in Parliament, both being passed as routine business. For many years the colonies had maintained colonial agents in London to act in their interests and to furnish a vital link with the British government. The most important of these agents in this period was Benjamin Franklin, whose correspondence shows no alarm over either of these revenue bills. He stated that he did not think the colonists would like them but admitted that he knew of no kind of tax which would be pleasing.

The Sugar Act affected the commercial New England colonies and aroused protests that were soon given a legalistic slant. The New England merchants had long been accustomed to disregard the provisions of the Molasses Act of 1733, which had tried to restrict their importation of molasses to that produced in the British West Indies, and they had smuggled to such an extent that five-sixths of the raw sugar coming into New England was from French, Dutch, or Spanish sources. The molasses turned into rum was a vital part of the great "triangular trade" between colony, West Indies, and the African coast, a trade in which the New England merchants were the closest competitors of those of old England. The rum and slave trade was the basis for many colonial fortunes, and the section of it carried on with the non-British West Indies furnished a cash balance necessary to pay for the manufactured goods the colonists must purchase from England. It was not the Sugar Act itself but the enforcement measures that endangered the prosperity of the merchants. The protests against this act, however, were lost in the howl of rage with which the Stamp Act was received. The classes affected were the most vocal in the colonies—editors, lawyers, bankers, importers—and were scattered

throughout the entire colonial area. In a few months all of the arguments against imperial taxation had been developed and expressed. Distinction was made between acts regulating navigation and acts imposing customs duties, between "internal" and "external" taxation, and the slogan of "no taxation without representation" was on the lips of orators everywhere. It must be recognized, however, that the colonists did not wish representation in the British Parliament and that the arguments in regard to "virtual" versus actual representation were largely academic or theoretical. Their emphasis was upon the absence of the right to tax by any method; in other words they implicitly demanded complete autonomy.

It is interesting to note that protest was followed by a representative body, or Congress, which used two methods to gain its end—petition to the king and economic pressure upon English merchants whose influence upon Parliament was well recognized. These two methods were continued in each stage of the quarrel until the Declaration of Independence in 1776. Nonimportation agreements and economic boycotts were effective in 1765, and the Stamp Act was repealed. The same measures led to a repeal of the Townshend Acts of 1767, which had been designed to increase reserves by the imposition of a variety of duties. Only the tax on tea was left, and it continued to be collected along with all other unrepealed duties.

The crisis seemed to be over; moderates on both sides of the Atlantic were content to let returning prosperity ease the economic question and to ignore the constitutional issues that had been raised. Nevertheless, friction continued, chiefly in New England, where violations of customs laws continued. A group of "left-wing radicals," which included Patrick Henry of Virginia and Samuel Adams of Massachusetts, continued their agitation, but they might have had no hearing had it not been for a series of blunders on the part of the British government. In an effort to aid the English East India Company a law was passed which might have given that company an economic monopoly on the American market and permitted it to engage directly in trade with wholesalers and consumers to the great detriment of the independent merchants. The result was the Boston Tea Party and the ensuing "coercive" or "intolerable" acts which caused a union of all thirteen colonies, for the acts punishing Massachusetts removed the guarantees of liberty upon which all the colonies relied. On the other hand, the British government, faced by open revolt against legal authority, found no alternative to the use of force,

and stubbornness and unwillingness to compromise on the part of the royal government were met by the growing recalcitrance of the colonies.

The details of the conflict between 1773 and 1776 are too well known to American students to need mention. The Continental Congresses again attempted economic pressure but found it ineffective against a king and Parliament roused by actual rebellion. The logic of the situation forced the Declaration of Independence upon the Second Continental Congress in July of 1776, although the reluctance with which the step was taken is indicated by the fact that it came more than a year after the first military engagement in the revolt or civil war.

It has often been noted that the fundamental causes back of revolution are of long standing and have little connection with the series of events that immediately lead up to it. The chief difficulties between Great Britain and the American colonies were distance and divergent economic interests and theories of government. Distance must be considered in terms of time and difficulty of communication. It is necessary to note, also, the fact that the colonies had been settled by people who were dissatisfied in England, by dissenters in religion, radicals in politics, and emigrants discontented for economic reasons. The Scotch-Irish, German, Dutch or French Huguenot elements could be expected to have no deeper regard for British imperial problems, and a hundred and fifty years of diverging development made the separation more complete. The removal of the French menace, the growth of population, the development of colonial economic interests opposed to those of British merchants and manufacturers, the desire for Western expansion, and the general feeling of self-sufficiency and self-reliance gave rise to a movement for independence and made submission seem impossible. There were a few statesmen both in the colonies and in England who might have found a common ground for the apparently irreconcilable positions. As early as 1754 Franklin had worked out, in the Albany Plan of Union, a plan which would have given the thirteen colonies a measure of autonomous status somewhat like that of the self-governing dominions of the present day, although he placed more power in the executive than the governor general of a dominion has today. In 1774 Joseph Galloway proposed a similar scheme to the Continental Congress, where it was lost by a majority of one. Pitt, Fox, Burke, and Shelburne in England could have understood and would probably have approved

such a compromise, but for the bulk of people both in England and the colonies it was nearly a hundred years ahead of its time.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

The war was unpopular in England, where it was so difficult to recruit soldiers to fight in the colonies that Hessian mercenaries were hired. It was unpopular, also, in Parliament, and that unpopularity was used by the opposition to the North ministry as a part of the general demand for reform. There was much inefficiency and incompetence in the handling of war measures by both military and civil authorities, and the ineptness of the British was fully as important as any effort on the part of the colonists in the prevention of British success in the early years of the war. The American Revolution was a civil war within the British Empire; it was also a civil war within the colonies. Opinion was divided throughout the war which was fought by a determined minority. John Adams said later that he thought there was a majority in the country in favor of independence by the time the war came to an end. Those loyal to the British government numbered the bulk of the well-to-do in many areas, and the Loyalists contributed both men and resources to the British armies. The success of the revolutionists would mean a further democratization in America and a "New Deal" for thousands of colonists. The war had economic and social significance, for political independence was not its sole objective.

It is probable that Washington was saved from a traitor's fate and was made the father of his country by a very narrow margin. When the American Revolution became a part of a great European war the day was saved for the infant republic. The involvement of France in the war was not unexpected. Since 1763 the French government had maintained observers in the American colonies to watch the progress of the quarrel which the French foreign minister felt might eventually offer to France an opportunity for the restoration of French prestige if not of French colonies. American leaders were fully cognizant of French interest and sent Franklin to France in 1776 as their ablest and best-trained diplomatic representative. There was much sympathy among liberal Frenchmen for the American cause, which seemed to them expressive of the "enlightenment" taught by their own philosophers.²⁰ Franklin, although not officially received

²⁰ See below, Chapter X.

by the French government, became the lion of Parisian society, and money, munitions, and other varieties of aid flowed westward in an ever-increasing stream. The government cloaked its assistance by dealing through a corporation managed by sympathizers of the American cause and waited for a significant American victory before making an open alliance. Such a victory came with the defeat of Burgoyne at Saratoga in the fall of 1777, and the French alliance which followed initiated the European aspect of the war.

Within the next three years Spain and the Netherlands were drawn into the war against Great Britain, and an "Armed Neutrality of the North" was formed by Catherine the Great and the Scandinavian countries to limit the belligerent activities of the British and to protect their rights as neutrals. As the war became a contest in sea power it was extended to the West Indian area, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. Spain hoped to recover Florida and Gibraltar, and the French felt that an uprising of native princes in India might open a possibility for a successful attack upon British power in the East. Thus the war was a contest of endurance in which England had two advantages over America and France—financial resources and her navy, which, neglected in the years of peace, improved as the war went on.

It was everywhere recognized that the fate of America was the most important factor in the war and that the indecisive campaigning there must be ended before any sort of peace could be attained. Washington with his small armies, his lack of economic resources, and his pitiful lack of money could take no aggressive step without assistance. After the Battle of Saratoga, in order to forestall a French alliance, the British government had offered a compromise solution of the imperial problem which conceded everything save independence. Had the United States accepted those terms, the first British self-governing dominion would have thus been created. But it was too late; the French alliance came at the same time and was at once accepted. George III, who was cursed with the virtues of tenacity and obstinacy, refused to concede independence. Hard-pressed everywhere as the coalition against them grew and concentrating their tremendous revival of energy upon sea power and the protection of the rest of the empire, the British found it impossible to send a force to America adequate to end the war. Convinced that defeat there would bring the British to terms and influenced by their own increasing financial difficulties, the French sent a land force to aid Washington and

backed it by a supporting fleet. The result was the defeat of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781. George III was still unwilling to end the war, but the Parliamentary opposition was at last strong enough to defeat the North ministry. The new cabinet contained Shelburne, Fox, and others, who began negotiations for peace.

The negotiations which took place in Paris through much of 1782 were as intricate and as complex as were the interests of the parties involved. England was determined to yield as little as possible and, having brought herself to concede the independence of the United States, was anxious to weaken the bonds of the Franco-American alliance and deprive the French of any fruits of victory. The American negotiators—Franklin, Adams, and Jay—were convinced that Spain, with whom they had been unable to make any alliance, was hostile to the United States and would use her influence upon her ally, France, to limit the territory of the United States to the region east of the Alleghenies. Adams and Jay were also afraid of French interests in the fisheries. Using the discretionary powers which distance and lack of means of rapid communication gave to eighteenth-century representatives abroad, they put their own interpretation upon the Congressional instructions to conduct all negotiations in conjunction with the French government. In what amounted to a separate negotiation, therefore, the United States obtained very liberal terms from the British. Out of deference to their instructions the agreement was not called a treaty but was offered to Vergennes, the French foreign minister, to be made a part of the general treaty signed in 1783. As a matter of fact, the French diplomat found his position as the ally of both Spain and America an impossible one and had no intention of letting the separate negotiations, by which the Americans had done so well for themselves, disrupt the alliance between them and France. The allied campaign against Gibraltar ended in 1782 in an English victory, and, as a consequence, Vergennes found it possible to persuade Spain to sign a treaty accepting Florida and Minorca but containing no mention of Gibraltar, which had been Spain's chief objective in entering the war.

BRITISH EXPANSION AFTER 1783

France asked little for herself: two little fishing islands off the coast of Canada, Senegal, and the right to fortify Dunkirk. Her return for all her vast expenditure was the damage done the British

Empire, the restoration of the maritime balance of power, and the pious hope that the decline of Britain had begun. French optimism on that score, however, had little foundation in fact. The English had not been badly damaged by the war. The American colonies were gone, but nearly 90 per cent of their trade was to go to the British Isles for some years. British finances were far better off than those of France, and the British constitutional monarchy was restored to its balance with the end of the adventure of George III in government. In India the war had offered opportunity for an expansion of British control under the efficient administration of Warren Hastings, the governor general of the East India Company. In this period the commercial activities of the company were declining while its governmental activities were increasing. A working arrangement was evolved which made the company for some decades practically an agency of the British government. During the first third of the nineteenth century the monopolistic trade provisions were withdrawn, and some years later the imperial government took over the other functions of the old company which had contributed so much to the building of empire. The last decades of the eighteenth century witnessed the extension of the British Empire to the Malay Peninsula and to Australia. In 1795 England acquired Cape Town and the tip of Africa from the Dutch, and shortly after 1800 made the first contacts with New Zealand. The French hope of blocking the advance of the British Empire was never realized.

England's isolation from European affairs was satisfactory because the war had made no alteration in the balance of power, there was no danger of French aggression in the Low Countries, and little further danger to peace from the aged Frederick II. Spain and France had their Family Compact; Austria and France were allies; Russia was interested only in Turkey and Poland—European peace seemed secure. The gradual acceptance of the new economic theories of the French physiocrats²¹ and of Adam Smith tended to ease the international situation still further. Commercial rivalry and mercantilism were gradually being replaced by the idea that trade flourished best when not under restriction. In 1786 this new point of view was reflected in an Anglo-French commercial treaty—the first in over a century. The economists were advancing another theory, based upon British experience, that colonies went through a life cycle just as did

²¹ See below, Chapter X

the individual. They were dependent upon the mother country through infancy, but when they reached maturity they must be expected to become independent. Competition for colonies, therefore, was expensive and, in the end, futile. Industrial changes in England were already under way²² which were to make English manufacturers able to undersell competitors for generations, and which were to lead those manufacturers to demand *laissez faire* and free trade, rather than governmental regulation. With all of these easements anyone surveying the European scene in the 1780's might have predicted a long period of European peace. Only a close student of recent French history would have been so astute as to have had a premonition of the French Revolution which was to begin within the decade.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

The American Revolution became not only a part of the European diplomatic and military history but was also of tremendous influence upon that movement for reform and for the liberalization of institutions which was to effect revolutionary changes in every aspect of European life. The Americans had continued to a logical conclusion the English seventeenth-century revolts against royal authority and had discarded both monarch and titled aristocracy in establishing the first large-scale modern republic. In their constitution of 1787 they worked out, for the first time in world history, a federal system in which they solved that old colonial problem of the relation of a central government to the smaller units within its boundaries. But the American Revolution had been a social revolution as well, and the new American constitution, although conservative enough in some respects, provided for a broader basis of popular government than the modern world had ever known. In the Declaration of Independence, in the various state constitutions, and in the first ten amendments to the national constitution the United States offered to the world a dramatic and classic statement of the Rights of Man which summed up the teachings of eighteenth-century philosophy and the aspirations of countless thousands of European liberals. The young Frenchmen who had served under Washington returned to their native land with a rededication to ideas and ideals which had

²² See below, Chapter XV.

come to them from the European intellectual ferment of the eighteenth century, and which now, intensified by the American experience, were to become dynamite in a period when France, too, was to be involved in difficulties. The old regime in Europe as well as in America was doomed.

READINGS

ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY. There are several general accounts for the period of the colonial rivalry of England and France. W. C. Abbott's *Expansion of Europe* (1924) is valuable. A. J. A. Hassall's *The Balance of Power, 1715-1789* (Latest edition, 1925) emphasizes the European aspects of the period, as does R. B. Mowat's *Europe 1715-1815* (1929). C. Grant Robertson's *England under the Hanoverians* (1911) depicts the British government through the period of the establishment of the empire. Laurence Packard's *Commercial Revolution 1400-1776* (Berkshire Series, 1927) covers the commercial phases, and Arthur Buffinton's *The Second Hundred Years' War, 1689-1815* (1929) in the same series discusses the Anglo-French rivalry and wars.

EUROPE AND AMERICA. An excellent history of the United States (beginning about 1760) is the *Growth of the American Republic*, 2 vols. (1937), by Samuel Morison and Henry Commager. Vernon Parrington's *Main Currents of American Thought*, Vol. I, *The Colonial Mind* (1927) is indispensable to an understanding of American points of view. J. T. Adams's *The Founding of New England* (1921) is excellent both for the American settlement and for imperial administration. The best general work for French Canada is G. M. Wrong's *The Rise and Fall of New France*, 2 vols. (1928). C. M. Andrews's *The Colonial Background of the American Revolution* (1924) is excellent for British colonial policy and the causes of friction. Carl Becker's *Eve of the Revolution* (1921) is a charming brief study. J. T. Adams's *Revolutionary New England* (1923) stresses social and economic forces. Carl Becker's *The Declaration of Independence* (1922) is a stimulating essay and excellent for eighteenth-century political thought. C. H. Van Tyne's *American Revolution* (1905), *The Causes of the War of Independence* (1922), and the *War of Independence* (1929) are by a specialist in the field and stress the political and intellectual factors. E. C. Corwin's *French Policy in the American Alliance of 1778* (1916) is a study of French and Spanish objectives. Bernard Fay's *Benjamin Franklin* (1929), Gilbert Chinard's *Thomas Jefferson* (1929), and the biographies of Lafayette by A. A. Latzko (1936), Brand Whitlock (1929), and W. E. Woodward (1938) depict figures of interest to both Europe and America. *Benjamin Franklin* by Carl Van Doren (1938) is a very interesting new biography.

INDIA. *India; A Short Cultural History* (1938) by H. G. Rawlinson is very interesting. P. E. Roberts's *History of British India under the Company and the Crown* (1923) has chapters on this early period. Henry Dodwell's *Dupleix and Clive* (1920) takes up the rivalry with France as do the somewhat earlier volumes by G. B. Malleon: *Lord Clive and the Establishment of England in India* (1907) and *Dupleix and the Struggle for India* (1911).



THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

THERE was a time when the student of European history passed over most of the eighteenth century as a period of very little interest. The grandiose age of Louis XIV came to an end in its early years, and the French Revolution stirred the very foundations of European civilization as the century drew to its close. In 1701 the War of the Spanish Succession, the first World War, began, and in 1799 Napoleon, the greatest military figure of modern history, came into power. The century thus began and ended on a martial note, with the intervening years punctuated by other wars. Close examination, however, shows that these wars were fewer and less destructive than those of the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries.

COMPARATIVE PEACE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Aside from a Stuart uprising in Scotland, the British Isles were tranquil. Professional soldiers and hired mercenaries might be sent off to war on the Continent or to the far distant colonies, but the average Briton was little touched by the conflict unless its undue prolongation caused interference with commerce or brought too great a pinch in the form of heavy taxation. The predominance of English sea power, moreover, protected commerce, and the extension of the colonial empire broadened the opportunities for profits in distant trading. Even the loss of the American colonies was not regarded as irreparable, for England retained her control over trade with the newly recognized United States. Much the same freedom from actual martial disturbance can be found in most of Western Europe; France, Spain, Italy, the Low Countries and the Scandinavian countries experienced peace within their own boundaries throughout most of the century.

The two periods of warfare in Central Europe caused by the seizure of Silesia by Frederick the Great add up to fifteen years, but neither of the wars of Frederick was as devastating or as catastrophic to the German peoples as the 'Thirty Years' War had been. During the longer periods of peace, Frederick II and other rulers made greater, more intelligent, and better planned efforts than had the rulers of earlier periods to restore the prosperity of their realms and to rebuild and reconstruct war-devastated areas. Poland was regarded by Western Europeans of the eighteenth century as an eastern outpost of civilization. The rise of Russia as a great power was recognized, and the importance of the Russian court and crown was conceded, but Russia herself was considered as largely outside the scope of European affairs. From Hungary southward to the Dardanelles lay European Turkey—alien, Moslem, not a part of European civilization. The Europe that mattered to the European was therefore in the eighteenth century relatively tranquil. War has been the curse of every century; it is only as compared with the preceding and the following periods that the years from 1713 to 1792 can be considered years of peace, and yet from that comparison they emerge with a most attractive serenity.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

It was partly because of a desire for peace, and partly in response to the rising nationalism of the age that new concepts relating to international affairs developed. The great religious and dynastic wars of the preceding centuries led to the beginnings of international law and diplomacy. The prestige of the French court under Louis XIV caused other monarchs to follow his example in placing emphasis upon diplomacy as an important function of government and upon the rules of diplomatic procedure. The danger of French hegemony brought a recognition of the necessity for the maintenance of the balance of power, and alliances or coalitions of nation-states were formed to ward off dangers common to all. In short, in the eighteenth century appeared the modern European state system based upon the absolute sovereignty of the independent state unit, no matter how small that unit might be. Within its own boundaries the government of a state was supreme, and in defense of its interests in a world of such sovereign states each state felt free to make whatever wars or alliances its own interests might demand. War and diplomacy were

both functions of sovereignty to be exercised as necessary or desirable for the furtherance of national policy.¹

In the nascent international organization of this period, there was no very high standard of international morality. The cynical disregard of his pledge to abide by the Pragmatic Sanction may have been an evidence of the almost amoral nature of Frederick II, but it was a trait which characterized most of the rulers of his day. His avarice was matched by the greed of Catherine II in the partition of Poland, and neither they nor Maria Theresa, who wept at the fate of the Poles but accepted her share of the sundered territory, stopped to ask the wishes of the inhabitants of the country they so ruthlessly dismembered. The term "self-determination of peoples" had not yet been coined. No one dreamed that the mass of the population could be articulate in matters of government or in the choice of rulers. Consideration of questions of race had not yet been brought into prominence; Prussians and Austrians were both German, but their governments were in irreconcilable opposition; Italians lived under a variety of foreign yokes; while the Belgian area was governed by Spain at the beginning of the century, by Austria throughout its course, and by France in the last decade. Nationality meant allegiance to the government in power much more than to any idea of racial or "nationalistic" unity. Even the insular British kingdom had by no manner of means solved the problem of welding into one national sentiment all of the four main areas and peoples that had come to be governed from Parliament House in London. Nationalism as a deep and moving sentiment of the masses was foreign to the eighteenth century, but it was to be one of the two great motifs of the nineteenth.

THE AGE OF THE ENLIGHTENED DESPOTS

With the exception of Great Britain, where a strong merchant-landlord combination had gained control over the government in the seventeenth century, European states were governed by autocratic despotic rulers. The models had been the Grand Monarch, Louis XIV, the glittering court at Versailles, and the centralized government of France carried on by a bureaucracy drawn largely from the middle

¹ See R. B. Mowat, *European State System*, for an excellent, very brief account of international organization. Geoffrey Bruun, *The Enlightened Despots*, is the best short treatment of the rulers of the eighteenth century and their policies.

class and directly responsible to the king. In the eighteenth century, when the French court was looked upon as somewhat decadent and the French government as corrupt and perilously near bankruptcy, Frederick the Great, the Prussian system of government, and, above all, the Prussian army became the favored patterns of European states.

The eighteenth century has been called the Age of Reason and the Age of Enlightenment. Some despotic rulers of the era have been called the "enlightened" despots. They were enlightened in that they were in touch with all the intellectual movements of their day and were deeply and incessantly concerned with the application of current scientific and economic thought to the problems which they met as rulers. They were despots because they never surrendered one iota of the absolute power which they felt to be theirs by divine right. They might be willing to spend their lives in the service of the state, but all must be done through and by the state for the people. There was nothing of democracy in the rule of the enlightened despots but much of reform. They looked upon themselves as men of a modern age, and they endeavored to keep abreast of their times in constructive ideas and in the correction of old abuses.

In the discussion of the parts played by Frederick the Great and Catherine the Great in the rise of Prussia and Russia some account has been given of their conduct as rulers in this Age of Enlightenment.² Unscrupulous and ruthless, they were at the same time so active in furthering what they felt were the best interests of their respective countries and so closely in touch with the intelligentsia of the day that they earned the right to be called "enlightened" despots. They were, perhaps, the most successful of the group in accomplishing that which they set out to do, but that success came partly because they did not attempt too much. Frederick had Voltaire as his friend and guest but did not hesitate to dismiss the guest when a break came in the friendship. At no time did his devotion to the ideas of the philosophers obscure his keen and cynical view of what he could accomplish with the materials at hand. Catherine called to Russia the French philosophers, d'Alembert and Diderot, and carried on a delightful correspondence for many years with the German author, Grimm, but her sophisticated and intensely practical mind carried very little of their teachings over into the government of Russia. Neither in Frederick nor in Catherine was there a trace of

² See above, Chapter VIII.

the social reformer nor a vestige of real altruism "Enlightenment" was present but shallow, and there was no comprehension or attempt at the solution of fundamental problems.

In states other than Prussia and Russia there were in the eighteenth century rulers who governed in accordance with the principles of "enlightened" or at least "benevolent" despotism. The exact pattern and program and the measure of success or failure in each case depended upon local conditions and the personality of the autocratic ruler. No one of them surrendered any royal prerogative; reforms were for the good of the people, by edict of the despot, and undertaken to increase the wealth, the security, and the prestige of the state. In Austria, in Naples, Tuscany and Sardinia, in Sweden, in Portugal, and in Spain rulers vied with one another in the latter half of the century in instituting reforms that were designed to bring each state into line and into harmony with the trend of the age.³

JOSEPH II. AN "ENLIGHTENED" DESPOT

The career of Joseph II illustrates the difficulties of a thorough-going, consistent, "enlightened," and benevolent despot, who was at the same time a self-acknowledged failure at the tasks which he so enthusiastically set himself. When he was dying, in 1790, he admitted the failure of most of his plans by directing that they be discontinued and ironically proposed that his epitaph should be, "Here lies the man who, with the best intentions, never succeeded in anything." Much of his lack of success was inherent in the nature of the Austrian Empire. The polyglot of races, the multiplicity of old local allegiances, the dominance of the Catholic Church, and the jealousy of his enemies—all were factors contributing to Joseph's failure. With dominions as scattered and as different in government, history, and tradition as Hungary, Lombardy, Bohemia, the Netherlands, Austria, and parts of Poland, and with peoples as varied as Slavs, Germans, Magyars, Italians, Flemings and Walloons, there was little chance of pleasing or, indeed, of benefiting all parts of the empire. Economic interests were divergent; the wealthy burghers of Lombardy and the Netherlands

³ Each of the rulers of the states mentioned is discussed briefly and in a very interesting summary in Geoffrey Bruun, *Enlightened Despots*. Charles III of Naples, and later of Spain, is of especial importance for his policies produced a genuine economic revival in Spain which although short-lived, showed the efficacy of good government in reversing temporarily the long Spanish decline.

had little in common with the feudal aristocracy of Hungary, nor could the condition of the serfs be improved without injury to the overlords. Everywhere Joseph II came into conflict with some local or vested interest which fought in opposition to reforms it felt to be inimical. His failure was due, also, to defects in his own personality: he was irritable and impatient; he was sure of his own theories and intolerant of criticism; as much of a despot as his contemporaries among European rulers, he enforced his reforms regardless of expediency or common sense. By trying everything at once, he made it impossible to accomplish much of anything. Fundamentally, his failure rests upon the difficulty, so great as to be almost an impossibility, of forcing down upon a people reform measures for which they have had no preparation and for which there has been no great and widespread demand. Reforms that cut deep into the social and economic situation can be successfully effected by despotic authority only when that authority has ample time, few distractions, and adequate force. Joseph II had none of these advantages.

His religious policy showed his characteristic disregard for popular sentiment. In a devoutly Catholic country he endeavored to subordinate the church to the state, to suppress superstition, and to break the hold of the church over education. He appointed bishops and decreed that the clergy should be educated in state-controlled schools. Papal bulls could not be published in his domains without royal authorization; many monasteries were suppressed and their property confiscated. Jews and heretics were granted full toleration. Such a program had merits, but it antagonized thousands and was too far reaching to be successful.

Joseph II wished to centralize the government of his realm and to get rid of all the provincial assemblies and old forms of local government. He divided the empire into thirteen provinces, each under a military governor, each subdivided into districts, with the whole directed from Vienna. He made German the official language, and adopted the Prussian army system with its compulsory service. But the new system met with protest in every part of the empire and was a success nowhere. The Austrian Netherlands were in open revolt when Joseph's death brought an end to the "reform." In social reforms his aims were as comprehensive; almost alone among the despots he endeavored to abolish serfdom and to subject the nobility to taxation. Feudalism was to be done away with; free education and aid to industry and commerce were to make the people prosperous.

But the reforms, for different reasons, antagonized nobility, clergy, middle classes, and peasantry. Obstructionism and sabotage met every effort, and Joseph himself admitted, 'After all my trouble, I have made but few happy, and many ungrateful.'

Joseph II was equally unsuccessful in foreign affairs, where he had great aspirations. His attempt to acquire a part of Bavaria while his mother, Maria Theresa, was still upon the throne was prevented by Frederick II of Prussia. Many years later Joseph attempted to exchange the distant and rebellious Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria but was blocked once more by Frederick, who organized a league of small German states against Austria. An alliance between Austria and Russia resulted in a joint war with Turkey which was ended without territorial gains for Austria.

Joseph's successor, his brother Leopold, although no reactionary ruler himself, was compelled to reverse most of Joseph's policies in order to restore order, and he became involved so soon in the wars caused by the French Revolution that he had no opportunity to initiate a reform program of his own. With the beginning of the revolt in France, the Age of Enlightened Despots was over. In France and in the rest of Europe the ultimate result of the Revolution was a broader basis for government. The middle classes, which were as conversant as were their rulers with the doctrines of the Age of Reason, having watched the failure of the autocrats in matters of reform, took matters in their own hands and brought the changes which they desired by securing their own control over the governments of Europe.

COSMOPOLITANISM OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In its social and economic as well as in its political aspects the eighteenth century presents much of interest. For the aristocracy, the wealthy bourgeoisie and the men of science or letters it was undoubtedly an age that was "tranquil, self-satisfied, complete."⁴ Life had for them many attractions: they had letters, art, travel; they were

⁴ Much of Joseph's difficulties and disillusionment can be found in his letters to his brother Leopold, who was for some years a very successful "enlightened" despot, with fewer problems and more discretion, in the duchy of Tuscany. In 1790 Leopold succeeded Joseph II upon the throne of Austria.

⁵ R. B. Mowat, *The Age of Reason*, p. 19. The first three or four chapters of this book present a charming picture of the social aspects of the eighteenth century. The examples of cosmopolitanism listed below are among the many described by Mowat.

tolerant, a little cynical, critical of everything; but they were humanitarian, and they believed in progress and in the perfectibility of man and his institutions; they were optimistic, therefore, and, on the whole, satisfied. Goethe, Benjamin Franklin, and perhaps Voltaire were typical of the age.

There was almost no race consciousness, and little of what we to-day call nationalism. There was an astonishing amount of travel and more genuine cosmopolitanism than can be found in the world to-day. Franklin kept his English friends throughout the Revolution and was as much at home in Versailles as he was in Philadelphia. The English novelists, Smollett and Sterne, traveled in France and Italy; Goldsmith wandered over Europe almost without funds; and even workmen of industry and imagination sought their fortunes in far-off lands. William Cockerill, for instance, was born in England, worked in a cotton mill there, went to Russia in 1794, was employed in Sweden, and moved on to Belgium in 1799 to make spinning and weaving machines. In 1807 he transferred his business to Liège, where he built up a great manufacturing plant. This cosmopolitanism was not entirely confined to Europe; Benjamin Thompson was born in Massachusetts; he was interested in science and was made a Fellow of the Royal Society when he went to England in 1775. He fought in the British army in North Carolina, was knighted by George III, served the Elector of Bavaria as minister of state and was made a Count of the Holy Roman Empire. After some years he returned to England, where he carried on experiments in electricity and wrote treatises on cookery, smoking chimneys, hygiene, and all manner of subjects. He was interested in reforms of all sorts and made many contributions to various scientific societies, hospitals and other institutions, including a substantial bequest to Harvard College. English and colonial youths, scions of wealthy families, often made a "grand tour" of European capitals as a sort of postgraduate course when their school years came to an end. Fully equipped with tutors, servants, and spending money, they traveled extensively, and the tutors, at least, learned much of European life and ideas. Governments took foreigners into their service without regard for their nationality; the English Sir John Acton served in the navy of the grand duchy of Tuscany, was minister of marine for the king of Naples, and ended his career as prime minister of that ruler. The brilliant English writer and critic, Horace Walpole, was completely at home in the *salon* of Madame du

Deffand in Paris, while Voltaire and the other French philosophes spent much of their lives in England, Prussia, Russia, or perhaps Switzerland.

Since armies were composed largely of mercenary troops, professional soldiers were men without a country in the modern sense of the word. One of the generals of Frederick the Great had served in the Spanish, Russian, and Prussian armies, while one of Frederick's tutors had served with the Dutch and with the French. Some of the members of this international military brotherhood were men of letters, poets and philosophers with wide reputation. Nations did not appear to object to foreign rulers: the English were passive in the reigns of the German Hanoverians; Poland had Saxon kings; Charles VI of Austria ruled for a time in Spain; and the Emperor Leopold started his career as grand duke of Tuscany. Rulers thrown out of power because of some disturbance within their realms were great travelers and might easily have kept one another company in Italy at such a dinner as Voltaire describes in his *Candide*, where he brings together an ex-sultan of Turkey, the Tsar Ivan of Russia, Charles Edward Stuart, thought by many to be the rightful king of England, an ex-king of Poland, and an adventurer who had once been a king of Corsica.

There was a great deal of travel for business purposes by the well-to-do. Peasants, artisans, and shopkeepers usually stayed at home, although if they were English, Scottish, or Scotch-Irish they might easily migrate to North America. Even criminals, debtors, and paupers joined the globe-trotters, for it was a good old English custom to ship them off to colonies such as Georgia and, later, Australia.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Life in the eighteenth century was not all travel, however, and the mobility and cosmopolitanism of certain elements in the population did not signify any real fluidity of social classes. Within each class or order there were the widest sort of variations but little crossing over from one class to another. The nobility and upper clergy in most European states were to a great extent a closed corporation defending its privilege and social prestige from any attack. Within the middle class there was chance for the exercise of individual talents. Scientists, men of letters, economists, and political theorists came largely from

the bourgeoisie. This class contributed greatly to government, for the rulers drew upon it for the office holders who carried on the work of government in their bureaucratic systems. The fact that the bourgeoisie did much of the work of government without being in a position to control policies or to enjoy the rewards accruing to such control was one of the grievances of the class as a whole. The peasantry and the urban laborers had less opportunities for advancement and were less articulate, although, as will be noted shortly, the movement for labor organization was under way.

It is well to note again in this connection that there was no uniformity in social distinctions throughout Europe. England and France had the largest, richest, and most influential middle class. In Eastern and in much of Southern Europe this class was much less numerous and important. The position of the aristocracy varied widely also. In England the nobility had social significance but was little more prominent in government than the upper middle class and, in fact, had many contacts with that class in Parliament, in society, and in business enterprise. In France the old nobility was a privileged order in which the court nobles monopolized social distinction but had little significance in government or in economic life except as landowners. The newer office-holding nobility (*noblesse de la robe*) were granted special privileges also. In Prussia the nobility furnished the officers for the army and some recruits for the civil service, while in Russia the nobles were, under the tsar, nearly all-powerful.

COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CENTURY

This same diversity is also apparent in eighteenth-century economic life. Again Eastern and much of Southern Europe was backward. A great deal of the trade of such areas as Poland, Russia, and even Italy and Spain was in the hands of foreigners. These countries manufactured little and exported raw products to be processed abroad. Spain, a sheep-raising region, exported her wool and bought back woolen goods from foreign merchants. England, France, and the Low Countries, and to some extent Prussia and other German and Scandinavian states, were the regions of commercial and industrial significance, with an ever-increasing advantage to the British. When European trade expanded to include world markets, the states with an Atlantic seaboard came into commercial prominence. Distant trading and the acquisition of colonies made necessary new and specialized

forms of organization which could best be provided with government assistance in states which had already achieved national unity and a strong central government. The insularity of Britain and her comparatively peaceful position were very real advantages. A large and active middle class co-operated with the Tudor kings, quarreled with and conquered the Stuarts, and, in the eighteenth century, was firmly entrenched in the government, the control of which it shared with the landowning aristocracy. The very practical and realistic union of the interests of the nobility and the wealthy merchants and many of the leading manufacturers in England ensured governmental policies in the interests of industry, sea power, commerce, and colonies. Rivals for commercial supremacy were eliminated one after another so that, toward the end of the eighteenth century, the predominance of the British was conceded.

With distant trading capital grew rapidly, and those enriched by trading enterprises had a surplus to be used for new enterprises and the acquisition of new wealth. It has been characteristic of the modern age that there has been a "steady and progressive tendency of capital in every country to accumulate in order to produce huge business enterprises"⁶ There were certain obvious results of such a situation. In the Middle Ages foreign trade had been largely in luxuries which had a high value in proportion to the transport space they occupied. With better facilities for transport, articles in general demand were shipped across great oceans with relatively low freight charges. American grain was occasionally sent to Europe; fish, lumber, tobacco, and furs were imported from the North American colonies, while such tropical or semitropical products as cotton, tea, coffee, and sugar became necessities in every European country. Only by the possession of colonies in every clime could a state be considered self-sufficient. Internal trade progressed at least as rapidly. The building of roads and canals and the removal of local restrictions upon trade became the policies of national governments. Customers were sought everywhere, and at least a part of the travel and the cosmopolitanism of eighteenth-century Europe was due to the necessities of commerce. The general increase of prosperity and the relative increase of internal peace, and some important advances in medical knowledge and practice made possible a growth of population and created a greater demand for

⁶ G. Renard and G. Weulersse, *Life and Work in Modern Europe from the XV to the XVIII Century*, p. 348. The concluding chapter of this book furnishes an excellent summary.

goods. The European market itself expanded and the standard of living rose. With rising standards of living business became more active, the purchasing power and the productive power of the individual grew, and the demands for consumption goods increased also. A French inspector of commerce in the eighteenth century reported: "It is notorious that people only buy clothes today with the object of buying new ones as soon as their means will allow."⁷

The great increase in the volume of trade, the great variety of the commodities exchanged, and the multiplicity of the activities and the interests of merchants necessitated new commercial organization. The old markets and fairs were no longer necessary and were largely discontinued except for local disposal of agricultural products. In a way the cities, with their warehouses and shops, were continuous fairs, and the commercial traveler took the place of the peddler. Joint-stock corporations had proved their value in developing trade with the East Indies. Stock exchanges had expanded their activities so that they dealt in bonds and shares. Commercial law became a part of the legal structure of every state, and a common body of maritime law and regulations came into existence. Neutral nations endeavored to gain recognition of the principle that noncontraband goods might be carried freely by neutral vessels in periods of war, and in 1780 united in the "Armed Neutrality of the North" for the protection of neutral trade rights. Standardization of weights and measures, of port regulations and procedures were objectives of modern states, and commercial treaties with mutual tariff concessions facilitated trade. Governments endeavored to provide stable currency and came to realize the dangers of inflationary programs; they established national banks and so funded national debts that they offered a safe investment for capitalists. As trade grew, some of the fallacies of the early mercantile system⁸ became apparent, and eighteenth-century economists advocated the freer policy of *laissez faire* with the removal of tariff restrictions and navigation laws. The transition from governmental control to *laissez faire* was a matter of considerable time and was never complete, but the tendency was perceptible by the latter half of the eighteenth century. The new doctrine was based on the idea that there were natural laws operating in the field of economics and that the rationalistic behavior for governments was noninterference. The two most important of these laws were that of supply and demand,

⁷ Quoted in Renard and Weulersse, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

⁸ See above, pages 85-86.

and that of harmony between the enlightened self-interest of each individual operating freely and the good of the public in general.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

This transformation in commerce presupposed and was accompanied by a similar transformation in industry. When distant trading began, industry was subordinated to commerce and depended upon it for its raw materials and for its markets. Small master craftsmen might make up such locally produced raw materials as wool, but they were not rich enough to undertake the importation of such raw materials as cotton or to go in search of distant markets. Thus the merchant-manufacturers appeared, buying materials, superintending their manufacture, and selling the product. The industry which they developed tended to be concentrated in areas which had easy access to ports of entry for raw materials.

As early as 1600 an English author thus described the establishment of a great cloth manufacturer. Two hundred weavers managed as many looms all in one room, each helped by an apprentice; one hundred women were employed in carding wool, while two hundred girls worked at spinning and one hundred and fifty children sorted wool. There were fifty clippers and eighty dressers, and the cloth was fulled and dyed by twenty and forty men respectively.⁹ This type of manufacture developed rapidly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the same time in some industries, notably textile manufacturing, the "putting out" system developed by which an entrepreneur procured the raw product and carried it to local spinners and weavers who worked in their own homes.¹⁰ Still other industries were always large-scale concerns with centralized production. Mining and smelting of metals, coal mining, munition making, shipbuilding, glass and silk manufacturing, and sugar refining are but examples of such industries. For big machines such as those necessary for the casting of cannon or the making of silk, water power was used, and conditions resembling those of a modern factory were already in existence. A Swedish manufacturer in the early eighteenth century was

an enthusiastic advocate of machine production, the use of power, division of labor, and consequent reduction of costs. . . . He therefore copied

⁹ Paul Mantoux, *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 34, taken from the *Story of John Winchcombe* by Thomas Deloney, published in 1597.

¹⁰ See above, page 35

machines he had seen elsewhere or invented his own, and drove them by water power. He had shearing machines for cutting bars, slitting mills for cutting nail rods, and heavy rollers for pressing iron into sheets or bands. He had machines to cut cogwheels, hammer pans, shape tinware, and make all kinds of household appliances, tools, plowshares and clock parts.¹¹

Other manufacturers also utilized the advantages of specialized labor, and the reduction of the work of each man to a series of simple actions in its turn encouraged the use of machinery. An eighteenth-century observer stated that "workmen occupied constantly on the same process become more skilled and waste less material."¹²

The step from such eighteenth-century conditions to the machine production and the factory system of the present time is only one of degree—more machinery, greater concentration of capital and labor, new types of power. In the eighteenth century that process began in England with a series of changes in the textile industry. The coming of the "Machine Age" was but a matter of time. It is obvious that in such a period the old types of industrial regulations were obsolete. The craft guilds disappeared in England relatively early. On the Continent they remained active in some old industries, but almost all new industries were without craft restrictions. Some new industries came into being as the direct result of government action, which varied from actual monopoly to subsidies, tariffs, and other special privilege; other concerns were individual enterprises and asked only to be permitted to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the demand for the commodities they produced. Some industrialists, eager to get into foreign markets, were won over to the laissez-faire theory, and the end of the eighteenth century found large numbers of them demanding free play of "natural laws," economic individualism, and the right to operate freely in large-scale production. The advantages to the public in the increased amount of goods and the accompanying reduction of prices were apparent, but the less evident disadvantages of machine production and the factory system were left for the nineteenth century to discover.

¹¹ Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe* (Harper & Brothers), p. 345.

¹² Quoted in Renard and Weulersse, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

THE STATUS OF LABOR IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The status of labor was affected by the changes in commerce and industry. Wage labor was the natural outcome of centralization of production, and there already existed in the eighteenth century what may be called a proletariat. Seasonal unemployment, postwar and other periods of depression, the ill effects of periods of speculation and inflation, caused hardship to the laboring classes just as they do at present. It is probably safe to say that relatively little of the increased comfort of the eighteenth century was passed on to the laborer, and that his wages were rising far too slowly to satisfy him. Industrial strife with strikes and occasional violence was frequent in the eighteenth century, and labor organization, although on a small scale and often of a temporary nature, was common. In all countries the government tried to repress this movement toward organization. Labor unions and any attempts at collective bargaining were declared illegal. All through the eighteenth century laws were passed in England and on the Continent to prevent combinations of labor, while other laws attempted to fix hours and wages for the benefit of capital. Neither type of law accomplished very much, and the differences between the interests of capital and labor became more sharply defined as time went on. Child labor was prevalent and was not generally condemned until the nineteenth century, while women were employed in industry, even for underground work in mines. The hours of labor were long, normally from "dawn to dark," and there was little problem of leisure time except as unemployment made leisure compulsory. The proletariat was largely illiterate, and its standards of living were low. For labor relations as well as for industrial control the manufacturer asked for a *laissez-faire* policy.

Again it must be emphasized that there was no uniformity in Europe; large-scale and small-scale production existed side by side; handicraft production was far more common than machinery; and many types of goods now factory-made were in the eighteenth century produced at home. There were some trading and banking corporations, but the usual unit was individual ownership or a partnership, and the average value of industrial plants was small as compared with present standards.

THE AGRICULTURAL "REVOLUTION"

In agriculture as well as in industry the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw such remarkable development that the changes which took place have been called an agricultural "revolution." In general the tendency was toward more intensive cultivation, the use of fertilizers, the scientific breeding of livestock, and the production of root crops—turnips, sugar beets, and potatoes—to provide for man and beast. Swamps and wastelands were reclaimed, forests protected, and common pasture lands enclosed. The extension of markets was made possible by the improvement of roads, and commercial agriculture grew in importance.¹³ In the eighteenth century a great deal of attention was given to the development of new methods in agriculture. Jethro Tull (1674-1741) was an English landowner who conducted elaborate experiments in production and invented or brought into prominence new agricultural implements such as the drill and the horse-hoe, or horse-drawn cultivator. He abolished the old three-year rotation system with its fallows, plowed incessantly, and got better crops than his neighbors. Charles Townshend (1674-1738) was another English landlord with an interest in scientific agriculture. He used fertilizers on his estates, grew wheat, turnips, barley, and clover, and farmed on a larger scale than was customary. With the drill and the horse-hoe he kept down weeds and increased production. Other Englishmen turned their attention to the breeding of better strains of livestock, since the increased production of fodder, especially of root vegetables, made possible the better feeding of larger numbers of animals. Farming and animal husbandry became fashionable; even George III "turned part of his Windsor estate into a farm, trudged about it in heavy boots, and liked to be called the 'Farmer King.'" The famous traveler, Arthur Young (1741-1820) was the publicity agent for the "new" agriculture. After touring England, Ireland, France, and Italy, he wrote volumes on his observations and made recommendations on all sorts of agricultural questions. His works were translated into foreign languages and had a wide sale in

¹³ See Chapters XVIII and XIX in Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe* (Harper & Brothers), for an excellent discussion of English and Continental agriculture. The eighteenth-century enclosures were for the purpose of increasing agricultural lands. The effect upon the peasantry was often disastrous, and farmers formerly independent were reduced to the status of agricultural laborers.

North America and in various European countries as well as in England.

There was great diversity in agricultural tenure and in agricultural production throughout Europe. New methods spread slowly and were put into effect in scattered areas, depending upon the energy, interest, or ability of the landowners. In general, given the necessary enterprise, large landowners were more inclined and better able to profit by the new methods: Frederick the Great, for example, had scientific methods put into operation on the crown lands of Prussia. England, the Low Countries, and parts of France were the most progressive in agricultural reform, while Southern and Eastern Europe were much more backward. In land tenure there was equal diversity; in England there were no serfs, the tendency being toward large estates with many tenant farmers and agricultural laborers; in the Low Countries smaller units intensively farmed were common; in France, where serfdom was disappearing, there were many independent farmers and many others who were tenants on large estates. The great aspiration of the French peasant was to own land, and the tendency was therefore toward small farms. In much of the rest of Europe medieval tenure still existed under which the land was owned by the nobility and was worked by a servile peasantry.

Some economists of the eighteenth century were much impressed by the agricultural changes and by the opportunity for increasing the wealth drawn from the soil. They argued that the real wealth of a nation was in its agriculture and its natural resources and that the promotion of agriculture was more important than the advancement of the interests of industry or commerce. These "physiocrats," as they were called, believed, also, in the operation of natural laws and worked for the removal of restrictions upon agriculture. They desired the free exchange of grain, the removal of all interprovince and local customs barriers, and the right to buy or sell agricultural produce abroad in accordance with the law of supply and demand. In short, they wished the application of laissez-faire principles to agriculture as well as to commerce, industry, and labor.

SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AGE

The claim of the eighteenth century to the title of the Age of Enlightenment rests upon its record in the realm of intellectual achievement. The various trends in politics and economics which have

been discussed in the preceding pages were in large measure the practical results of the work of the members of the intellectual class as they delved into science and philosophy in search of the fundamental standards of truth. And yet it is equally true that this intellectual class which in the eighteenth century devoted its attention to reason and rejected the traditional authorities, which loved science and made astonishing discoveries in all of its fields, and which optimistically endeavored to apply the methods of the scientific discipline to all the problems of men, was itself the result of the economic and political developments of the centuries preceding the Age of Reason. The intellectual class was also the upper middle class, "with sufficient means to buy books, sufficient taste to enjoy them, and sufficient leisure to think a little about them."¹⁴ Tolerant and benign, philosophical and scientific, cosmopolitan and ubiquitous, the eighteenth-century men of letters had somewhat the same position in their day as that accorded in the Renaissance to the great artists and humanists.

Their devotion to pure science was soundly based on the work of the scientists of the preceding centuries, but their interest and their labors bore fruit in great discoveries which laid the foundations for the scientific achievement of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is not possible here to do much more than to mention the names and the principal achievements of the great scientists of this period of intellectual revolution, nor is it possible to draw any sharp line between the scientists of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.¹⁵ Men born in one century lived over into the other, and men working in the later century based their experiments upon the results of the labors of the scientists who preceded them. Between the scientific achievement of the eighteenth century and that of the nineteenth was to stretch the long period of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. The break between the Age of Enlightenment and the century which followed it was therefore unusually sharp and significant.

In the field of mathematics, physics, and astronomy (there was no minute specialization in this age) the work of the Frenchman,

¹⁴ Preserved Smith, *A History of Modern Culture* (Henry Holt and Company), Vol. 2, p. 19. The first chapter of this volume, called "The Background and the Character of the Enlightenment," is a delightful description of the spirit of the age.

¹⁵ For a longer statement as to the achievements of this period see C. J. H. Hayes, *Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe* (The Macmillan Company), Vol. 1, Chapter XI, and Preserved Smith, *History of Modern Culture* (Henry Holt and Company), Vol. 2, Chapters II, III, IV.

Descartes (1596-1650), was the starting point for later development, for in his *Discourse on Method* he stressed the careful observation of facts and appealed to reason, to logic, and to deduction from first principles. Experimentation added to logical reasoning produced modern scientific method. Descartes's mathematical work led to the invention of analytical geometry, and his work in mechanics connected astronomy with physics and mathematics. The Dutchman, Christian Huygens (1629-1693), worked in dynamics, in the theory of oscillation, in optics, and in the wave theory of light. Isaac Newton (1642-1727), an Englishman, was probably the most illustrious scientist of the whole era. In mathematics his work was in the calculus, the binomial theorem, and the theory of equations; he worked in physics and astronomy and made tables for ascertaining the positions of the moon; he created hydrodynamics and worked in hydrostatics, in optics, and in the structure of light. His greatest work was in mechanics, where he discovered and formulated the law of gravitation, which was of revolutionary importance to many aspects of physics and astronomy. His work, *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, commonly called the *Principia*, was considered by contemporary scientists the "greatest production of the human mind." Edmund Halley (1657-1742), a friend of Newton, was a famous astronomer whose name is chiefly known today for the comet which he observed in 1682 and whose return in 1759 he predicted.

The scientists were aided by a number of new inventions, or improvements on old ones, made in the same period. The telescope and the microscope were much improved, the barometer, thermometer, and air pump were invented; and experiments in electricity introduced the Leyden jar which was later of so much interest to Benjamin Franklin. Both science and letters were aided, also, by the founding of numerous academies and institutes. Royal governments and associations of scholars established and endowed societies for the promotion of learning and for the recognition of achievement in various fields of knowledge.

Chemistry was held back by its identification with alchemy in an earlier period and was retarded in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by a misunderstanding of the processes of combustion. In the eighteenth century the work of several men laid the foundations upon which rapid development was to take place. A Scotchman, Joseph Black, discovered carbon dioxide about 1753; one Englishman, Henry Cavendish, discovered hydrogen; and another, Joseph Priestley, dis-

covered, in 1774, a gas which a French chemist, Lavoisier, named oxygen. This Frenchman has been called the "father of modern chemistry," for he combined, systematized, and added to the work of other chemists and developed the principles of quantitative analysis.

Mineralogy had long been of interest to science, but the study of rocks and fossils, or geology, was an eighteenth-century undertaking. In biology and in medicine much advancement was made. The work of Haller, a Swiss anatomist, was of especial significance. The Swede, Karl von Linné, or Linnaeus, was the leading botanist of his day, but he was interested in the classification of fauna as well as flora. He wrote a book called the *System of Nature* in which he placed man with the apes in the list of "primates" and thus foreshadowed ideas to be developed in a later age. The French zoologist, Buffon, wrote a *Natural History of Animals* which summed up eighteenth-century knowledge of the animal world, and he, too, called attention in a tentative fashion to the resemblances between man and other vertebrates. The broad scope of scientific study and the cosmopolitan nature of its achievements deserve emphasis. Every country produced its quota of men interested in science, and there was a striking continuity in their work and a real internationalism in their exchange of ideas and their contacts with one another.

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY

The scientists of the eighteenth and preceding centuries were not concerned solely with the physical universe, but were interested in the nature of man himself, in the mind of man, and in the institutions which he had created. In studying man and the nature of his being, the thinkers of the Enlightenment carried over their scientific ideas into the fields of religion and philosophy, into metaphysics, which is defined as the philosophy of being and knowing, and into speculation as to what lay beyond the physical.¹⁶ The same questioning critical faculty, the same empirical method, and the same appeal to reason that had been used in the development of the natural sciences were applied in these most abstract fields. The authority of tradition was rejected, superstition and prejudice were condemned, doctrines

¹⁶ It is interesting to note that in the twentieth century several of the most eminent scientists have felt the same necessity for the integration of life as a whole. In the realm of pure reason Einstein, Eddington, and others are today working on the fundamental problems of existence and causation.

and dogmas accepted for centuries were discarded, and theology was at last dethroned. In the realm of ideas as well as in that of science old restrictions and old fears were removed, and a fresh new world appeared. Men faced the obvious problem of ascertaining the relation between religion and science and tried to solve it in a variety of ways. Descartes accepted God as a Great Causation, the Creator and starting point of a universe which afterwards operated in accordance with natural laws. Others, including the Englishman, Thomas Hobbes, were frankly materialistic, believing that there was no necessity in the universe for anything other than matter and motion. Spinoza, an Amsterdam Jew, made a reconciliation between science and religion, satisfactory to himself and to many other thinkers, by identifying nature and God—a sort of pantheism. John Locke, an English contemporary of Sir Isaac Newton, carried his rationalism over into political philosophy and into psychology. He wrote an important treatise *On Human Understanding*, another on the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, and many on political affairs, including an elaborate constitution for the colony of the Carolinas. The work of Locke was directly opposed to the medieval and clerical concept that man was innately evil and born to sin unless he adhered closely to the teachings of the church. Locke stated that a man's mind was a blank at birth and that all of his ideas came from experience and from environment. By cultivating his senses and exercising his reason man could bring himself into harmony with nature, whose laws were universal. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), born in Prussia of Scottish lineage, was a physicist as well as a philosopher but was more famed for his work in philosophy in which he was chiefly concerned with the problem of providing moral standards for a universe which was turning from religion to science. He found the solution for his problem in idealism.

All of this soul searching of the philosophers of the Enlightenment had certain practical aspects. In the first place, it caused the decline of theology, weakened the hold of all formal religious faiths, and secularized European thought. In the second place, although the universe might now appear a magnificent if somewhat cold and formal structure, reason, science, and the unalterable laws of nature made progress and perfectibility possible. In the third place, the individual was believed to have natural rights as fundamental as the laws of nature, and since the mind trained by scientific observation had no difficulty in discovering that those rights were everywhere denied by

law and by custom, the enlightened man became a social scientist, a humanitarian, and a social reformer.

RELIGION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In the field of religion it should be noted that the Enlightenment was a period of two very different types of thinking—one decidedly secular and rational, the other mystical, pietistic, and emotional. The critical tendency observed in the preceding paragraphs was away from revealed religion and the old doctrines and creeds. It resulted in a tolerant indifference and agnosticism which in many cases became either outright atheism or ended in an acceptance of an omnipotent God as the first and fundamental Cause and Creator of the natural laws upon which the universe was based. Each of these attitudes toward religion involved the rejection of traditional beliefs and formal religion; the first two were purely negative, and the last substituted for the old doctrines an impersonal natural religion called "deism." Deism was based upon a belief in a God of Nature and was a rationalistic instead of an emotional faith. Whether indifferent, atheistic, or deistic, the intellectuals were not, in any sense, the supporters of an organized church, and it is difficult, therefore, to say which of the three groups was the largest.¹⁷

François Arouet, more commonly called François de Voltaire (1694-1778), was the most famous of the European deists and one of the greatest of the critics of the age in which he lived. He not only attacked every abuse he saw about him but was especially virulent in his attack upon superstition and the hypocrisy in the Christian church, both Protestant and Catholic. Urbane, sceptical, polished, Voltaire was both the delight and the terror of his contemporaries. Exiled from France from time to time, he visited England, where he found institutions and beliefs more to his liking. In his *Letters on the English* he described that which he had observed and attacked the evils of church and society. He lived in Lorraine, Prussia, Russia, and Switzerland, and everywhere he wrote voluminously on all sorts of subjects in plays, histories, letters, books of travel, essays, some bril-

¹⁷ A young American in Paris in the last years of the eighteenth century was asked at a dinner party what he wished to see in France that had not yet been shown to him. He hesitatingly answered that he had never seen an atheist. His host looked about the table at which there were several prelates of the Catholic Church and then answered that his young guest had only to look about him, for he was probably the only man at the table who was not an atheist.

liant and witty, some dull and pedantic. His criticism was more destructive than constructive, but his vitriolic pen stabbed at abuses and popularized the attack upon outworn ideas and institutions. All Europe was his public, and in his *Handy Philosophic Dictionary* he was the publicist and the propagandist of the Enlightenment.

The famous *Encyclopediu* shared with Voltaire the responsibility for the widespread popular interest in the ideas and discoveries of the Enlightenment and was, in a way, the bible of the new secular ideas. This was a work in seventeen volumes made up of articles by mathematicians, natural and social scientists, philosophers, and critics written on every aspect of their respective fields. It was edited by the Frenchmen, Diderot and d'Alembert, and was revolutionary in its effect upon thought. The *Encyclopedia* was one of the first of such compilations and had a startling freshness. Practical and secular matters were emphasized; science was given full recognition; and existing institutions were subjected to rationalistic treatment. It is easy to imagine the dramatic effect of an article on superstition or one on witchcraft. Some of the most important articles were those on law, on methods of punishment for crime, and on economic subjects. Every effort was made to handle controversial subjects calmly and objectively, and to ensure accuracy and complete information.

In sharp contrast to the antireligious phase of, or reaction to, the Enlightenment was a pietistic and mystical movement which occurred in the same period. This pietism had its roots in the same desire to get rid of the superstition, religious strife, and artificial restrictions which had given rise to deism. That essential bond was recognized by Voltaire when he stated that the only organized religious faith in which he could find any merit was that of the Quakers, a sect founded in the later seventeenth century by George Fox. The Swedenborgians¹⁸ of the eighteenth century were mystics with a faith based simply upon "divine love and wisdom." A practical sort of pietism and revival of personal religion which grew up in the Anglican church resulted in the founding of the Methodist Church by John and Charles Wesley. The wave of religious revival spread to America, and Methodism vied with the revived Calvinism of Jonathan Edwards in making religion less formal and more emotional and personal. Thus atheism, deism, and a revival of a deeply emotional

¹⁸ Founded by Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772), son of a professor of the University of Upsala, Sweden, who was himself a famous scientist.

Christian faith were all a part of eighteenth-century religious development.

THE FINE ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

The secularization of the age was reflected in literature and in music. The novel and the drama, relatively new forms of literary expression, were published in ever-increasing numbers during the eighteenth century, when poetry was of secondary importance. Very little, however, of that mass of publication was of enduring value. Voltaire, for instance, wrote innumerable plays, few of which are read at all today. The real literary achievement of the age was the creation of a new prose style, the style of the essay, the journal, or the treatise. With scientific precision the literary men of the eighteenth century were able to express their ideas in classic form. Research, critical method, and this prose style gave the books on history, economics, and politics enduring fame. The opera was popular, and the Italian school dominated its production. Countless songs were written, for the human voice was regarded as the greatest musical instrument. This was the period of Bach, Haydn, Handel, and Mozart, and before the end of the century the mighty Beethoven left the stamp of his genius on it forever. In art, too, the diversity of the period was seen; the merciless realism of the paintings of Hogarth expressed his feeling toward abuses in society; the brush of Goya did not hesitate to paint the half-witted king of Spain as he really was; in contrast are the urbane grace of the portraits of Sir Joshua Reynolds, the delicate artificiality of the shepherdesses of Watteau, and the "back to nature" movement reflected in landscape painting.

The study of history and anthropology as well as physical science led the intellectuals of the eighteenth century to believe in progress and to apply that concept to their study of the social structure. Being optimists and having a touching faith in the power of reason, they believed in the perfectibility of those institutions in which they found so much need for reform. The emphasis of the age upon human values led to the growth of a crusading humanitarianism which was concerned with measures to make the life of the average man more tolerable than it had been in the past. The intellectuals, almost all men of the Third Estate, were impressed by the inequality of the laws and by the harshness with which they bore down upon the underprivileged. Many of the scientists and philosophes suffered from the cen-

sorship of the press; many of them spent some years of their lives in exile. Voltaire, for example, was imprisoned for criticizing the duke of Orléans and was beaten by the servants of a great noble whom he had offended. Injustice, inequality, and cruelty, although they seemed unnecessary and out of date in the Age of Reason, were a very real part of it.

THE CRITICS OF THE OLD REGIME

The philosophes worked for the abolition of torture in trials, for the reduction of the absurd number of offenses punishable by death, and for the lessening of the severity of other types of punishment. They called attention to the need of reforming legal procedure and of scientifically coding both civil and criminal law, for the codes of the day were a hodgepodge in which there were many anachronisms and evidences of barbarism. But above all the philosophes desired the establishment of the principle of the equality of all men and all classes before the law. Their chief spokesman in the matter of legal reforms was an Italian, Beccaria, who published in 1764 *An Essay on Crime and Punishment* which had a wide influence upon both the theoretical and the practical aspects of the subject. The "enlightened" despots of the day found it to their interest to modernize and recodify the laws in their respective realms. Although they were willing to do a great deal toward doing away with torture and with cruel and barbarous methods of punishment, they left practically untouched the vital problem of equality. The vested interests of the day were insistent upon the retention of their privileged position.

Hospitals, prisons, and charitable institutions received attention, and some progress was made in the recognition of the common humanity of the unfortunate. Occasional enlightened employers contributed to the care of the sick, established pensions for widows and orphans, and co-operated with the government in providing relief work for the unemployed. But such instances were few and indicate a tendency rather than a habit. Antislavery societies were formed which were to have tremendous influence in a later day. Thomas Jefferson wrote the equality of man into the American Declaration of Independence and said, in regard to human slavery, that he trembled to think that God was just. Before much of real value could be accomplished in the world at large democracy had to come to the aid of humanitarianism. And yet when the citizens of democratic countries

were able to demand as a right those reforms which despots had refused to grant as a gift, progress was still slow.

The awakened social conscience of the period led to much concern with the question of education, for the philosophes believed that with the right sort of education man could perfect his own institutions. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was deeply interested in education even though he placed his own children in a foundling asylum.¹⁹ Many of the ideas of modern progressive education have their origin in the teachings of Rousseau, and his book, *Émile*, revolutionary at the time of its publication, is still read by students of pedagogy. The cold doctrines of law and of reason were not sufficient for Rousseau; passionate protest against the misery of man and revolt against the rational creed of the philosophes led him to champion the oppressed in a sort of spiritual revolution. He believed that man in a state of nature—that mythical “simple savage”—was good, and that a return to nature would make possible a rediscovery of that goodness. Children, he thought, were essentially good and natural; if uncontaminated by the artificial standards of adults they would choose wisely and learn naturally. In education, therefore, they should follow their own inclinations and study that which was of interest and value to them—in short, *laissez faire* in the field of education.

These pedagogical ideas crept very slowly into educational systems, but they furnished a refreshing contrast to the pious formalism of the preceding age. Not since the days of Vittorino da Feltre²⁰ and of Erasmus had there been a similar ray of light in the general gloom which prevailed in the field of education. In elementary education there had been the piety and stilted priggishness of the Calvinistic tradition. Cotton Mather wrote of a little Elizabeth who at the age of two “lay in her cradle and asked herself the question: ‘What is my corrupt nature?’” John Wesley wrote a set of rules for a school where the children were to arise at four in the morning for an hour of private devotion and included the comment, “As we have no play days, so neither do we allow any time for play on any day; for he that

¹⁹ C. J. H. Haycs, in his *Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe* (The Macmillan Company), Vol. 2, p. 541, characterizes Rousseau in the following words. “Rousseau was a maladjusted person. He was everything he should not have been. He was a failure as footman, as servant, as tutor, as secretary, as music copier, as lace maker. . . . His immorality was notorious. . . . he was dishonest, discontented, and, in his last years, demented. . . . Yet this man, who knew so little how to order his own life, exercised an amazing influence over the lives of others.”

²⁰ See above, page 44.

plays as a child will play as a man."²¹ In enforcing obedience to such rules the teacher found his chief authority in the rod, and the child of that day was not spoiled. The elementary education of the century had little to commend itself to the philosophes.

EDUCATION IN THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT

In the universities the depressing formalism and medieval scholasticism was of little value to the student. In America and to some extent in Europe, universities were largely concerned with the training of ministers. Everywhere their chief subjects of study were the ancient languages and theology. The famous historian Gibbon wrote late in his life, "To the University of Oxford I acknowledge no obligation . . . I spent fourteen months in Magdalen College [1752-3] and they proved the most idle and unprofitable of my whole life." Jeremy Bentham, the English economist, was at Oxford in 1760 and declared, "In mendacity and insincerity I found the effects—the sure and only sure effects—of an English university education." These were earnest students; there were others who were not so critical, for they had the gay time for which they went to college. One of these wrote, "I find no fault with the universities. . . . As for their books and style, I had no leisure to mind them."²²

The striking growth of natural science, of economic and political theory, and of the social sciences, which was characteristic of the Enlightenment, took place largely outside the universities. Toward the end of the eighteenth century came a movement to enlarge the scope of university teaching by adding the new subjects. Benjamin Franklin made a beginning when, in the plan of studies for the new University of Pennsylvania, he included mechanics, physics, chemistry, history, agriculture, and the languages. Medical and professional schools were founded in the same period, but progress was very slow, and it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the broadening influence of the men of the Enlightenment permeated the field of education.

²¹ Both quotations from Preserved Smith, *History of Modern Culture* (Henry Holt and Company), Vol. 2, p. 422.

²² Quoted in Smith, *op cit*, Vol. 2, p. 414.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Outside the universities the progress made in the eighteenth century in the social sciences was as marked as that in the field of natural science. The teachings of the new economics and the work of the physiocrats have already been discussed.²³ Their main achievement was the idea of *laissez faire*, or the application of natural laws to commerce and industry. The lead was taken by French thinkers, who were so impressed by the miserable failure of their own nearly bankrupt government in the solution of economic problems that they led a radical reaction against mercantilistic restrictions which they felt were largely responsible for the problems of French commerce and industry. Quesnay and Turgot²⁴ were the leading French economists. Adam Smith, a Scotchman, learned much from them and contributed much to the economic thought of his day, and Jeremy Bentham developed the theory of utilitarianism which he applied to both government and economics. Numerous other Englishmen working in the same field found it much less difficult to obtain a hearing for their new theories in Great Britain than on the Continent. The government was in the hands of merchants, manufacturers, and landowners who might expect to benefit from the removal of restrictions upon the enterprises from which they obtained their wealth. Modern historical methods and writing were begun in the Age of Enlightenment by such men as Edward Gibbon, whose brilliant *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* made him the foremost historian of his day. But the scholars of the period were more interested in the present and the future than in the past. Indeed, the Enlightenment belonged to them, and to no earlier age!

In political theory, also, there was great achievement. The men of the Age of Reason, believing that "politics may be reduced to a science," applied natural laws to political institutions. They studied history and what was then known of anthropology, and they compared contemporary governments with those of ancient Rome and Greece, and the governments of their own nations with those of China, the American colonies, and, toward the end of the century, with that of the United States. They attacked the theory of the divine right of kings, but most of them did not go to the extreme of de-

²³ See above, pages 286 ff.

²⁴ See below, pages 320-21.

veloping theories of democracy. Reforms could be quickly effected by a monarch sufficiently enlightened to follow the precepts and put into practice the doctrines of the philosophes. The education of a democracy would be a slow process, and the impatient reformers had little faith in the teachability, the wisdom, or the honesty of the masses. The *Treatises on Government* by John Locke were a defense of the principles upon which the parliamentary government and the constitutional monarchy of England were based. Locke defended the Whig Revolution of the seventeenth century and believed in the division of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government, asserting that in case of conflict the legislative branch must be supreme. The English theories of constitutional and limited monarchy vied with the ideas of American Republicanism for the attention of European students of politics. In *The Spirit of Laws*, one of the most important political studies ever written, the French philosopher Montesquieu (1689-1755) used the best sources available and made an elaborate tabulation of all constitutions and forms of government that had ever prevailed. He found much to praise in the English system, although in many respects he failed to understand all features of it. With much moderation and erudition, Montesquieu discussed monarchies, republics, and despotisms, favoring the separation of powers and a system of checks and balances. His ideas had a wide circulation in his own day and a considerable influence upon the constitution-making of later generations.

The passionate defense of the rights of man and the ardent belief in the nobility of man "in a state of nature" which characterized Rousseau alone were in marked contrast to the urbanity of Montesquieu, but it is probable that Rousseau was much more influential in guiding the ideas of both upper classes and bourgeoisie in France where the Revolution was soon to begin. The chief motifs of that revolt were to be Rousseau's. "liberty, equality, fraternity; popular sovereignty; democracy; the republic of virtue; the outlawry of aristocrats and plutocrats, of privilege and priestcraft. From the standpoint of the 'old régime,' France and most of Europe were to become demented like Rousseau."²⁵ Of all the philosophes Rousseau was the only one to appeal to the masses or to be the guiding star of revolution. His two important contributions to political theory were the *Discourse on Inequality* and the *Social Contract*. The latter begins

²⁵ Hayek, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 543.

with the famous statement: "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains"; the remedy he desired to apply was the social compact in which authority and government had no basis except consent. In countries like America and England, where institutions were already relatively free, Rousseau had little following, but in France "men sick with oppression and poverty and despair hailed Rousseau, the enemy of kings, the scorner of nobles, the lover of the lowly, the prophet of imminent revolution, as their champion and defender."²⁶

This rapid survey of the eighteenth century and the Age of Enlightenment comes to a close with a re-emphasis upon its diversity and its complexity. Every sort of inconsistency and paradox was present, but they only served to make it more fascinating.

The age of reason saw many outbreaks of hysteria. The age of optimism now and then fell into black despair. Humanitarians and slave-drivers, Deists and Methodists, philosophers and inquisitors, moralists and mockers flourished side by side. Voltaire was deified for writing the *Dictionnaire Philosophique* and La Barre was decapitated for reading it. Rousseau preached a sentimental religion and Dr. Johnson said he ought to be sentenced to penal servitude for doing it. Pope wrote poetry like prose and Burke wrote prose like poetry. The code of politeness was elaborated to an unheard-of refinement by Lord Chesterfield, and the rudeness of Czar Peter and of Frederick William I of Prussia exhibited genius at its magnitude. Jonathan Edwards based his ethics on hell fire and total depravity; Benjamin Franklin his on happiness and human goodness . . . The most artificial society ever known read with rapture of the noble savage. A world full of misery for the masses applauded Leibnitz for declaring that it was the best possible of worlds, and later applauded Voltaire for ridiculing this thesis.²⁷

It must be noted, also, that the Enlightenment in all of its phases was not for the masses but was the work and the delight of a favored few. It is those few, however, in any age who determine its spirit, give it character, and determine its contribution to civilization and the nature of the period which follows.

²⁶ Preserved Smith, *A History of Modern Culture* (Henry Holt and Company), Vol. 2, p. 214.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

READINGS

GENERAL ACCOUNTS. There are several general studies of the eighteenth century. R. B. Mowat's *The Age of Reason* (1934), P. Russell's *The Glittering Century* (1936); and C. Strykowski, *The Eighteenth Century* (1916). Preserved Smith's *A History of Modern Culture*, 2 vols. (1930-1934), Vol. II, *The Enlightenment, 1687-1776* is an excellent survey of the intellectual trends of the century. Interesting material may be found in J. H. Randail's *Making of the Modern Mind* (1926). *The Enlightened Despots* (Berkshire Series, 1929) by Geoffrey Bruun is useful for the governmental policies of the period. R. B. Mowat discusses the international structure in *The European State System* (1923). E. J. Lowell's *The Eve of the French Revolution* (1892) is excellent for French conditions and for the work of the philosophers. D. Mornet's *French Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (1929) is more recent. A. S. Turberville's *English Men and Manners of the Eighteenth Century* (1926) is useful.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. The economic histories by N. S. B. Gras and by H. Heaton which were cited for earlier chapters are valuable here. Mr. Gras's work on the history of agriculture (1925) is useful, as is E. Lipson's *Economic History of England*, 3 vols. (1930-31). G. Renard and G. Weulersse, *Life and Work in Europe from the XV to the XVIII Century* (1926) is excellent, as is H. Sée's *Economic and Social Conditions in France during the Eighteenth Century* (1927).

THE PHILOSOPHERS. There are many studies of the lives and work of the French philosophers, among them, M. Josephson's *Rousseau* (1931); A. Maurois's *Voltaire* (1932); John Morley's *Voltaire* (Later edition, 1903), *Diderot and the Encyclopedists* (Later edition, 1897), and *Rousseau and His Era* (Later edition, 1923); L. Say's *Turgot* (1888). There is an essay on Turgot in A. D. White's *Seven Great Statesmen* (1927).

SCIENCE. The progress of science may be followed in *A Short History of Science* (1917) by W. T. Sedgwick and H. Tyler, and special fields of scientific achievement are discussed in more detail in V. Robinson's *The Story of Medicine* (1932); the *Story of Early Chemistry* (1924) by J. M. Stillman; and *The Evolution of Physics* (1938) by A. Einstein and L. Infeld. A. D. White's *History of the Warfare of Science and Theology*, 2 vols. (1910) deals with the conflict between the new and the old authorities.

≡ XI ≡

THE LAST DAYS OF THE FRENCH MONARCHY

EACH of the last four chapters has ended with some mention of the date 1789 or of the French Revolution, as though upon that date and with that event European civilization came to an end, or was, indeed, born again in the flames of a conflagration so vast as to consume all traces of the "old regime." There is, of course, no element of truth in such an assumption; 1789 is but one more of those important dates accepted by historical convention as marking off the whole span of the recorded history of man into sections suitable for study. The French Revolution was the climax of a period of transition the beginnings of which can be found in the preceding centuries. The forces set in operation by the revolution were active through the nineteenth century, and the world in which we live today is in many respects the logical outcome of those forces and of the continuing principles upon which the revolution itself was based. The importance of the period is enhanced rather than diminished when it is regarded as a link, and an important one, in the endless chain of historical development.

THE NATURE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Revolutions like that in France at the end of the eighteenth century, or that in Russia in our own day, were more than political upheavals accompanied by force. Social and economic as well as political in nature, they changed institutions, transferred property, and altered the relationships of social classes. They accelerated tendencies already apparent and hastened changes that were due to occur; they were short cuts undertaken by determined men in an attempt to correct evils whose roots lay deep in the past and to hasten the accomplishment of reforms which they had long desired. Such fundamental revolutions work underground for a long time before there is any open or violent demand for change, and the immediate cause

for the outbreak may seem relatively trivial or accidental. The choice as to whether the inevitable change shall be revolutionary and violent, or whether it shall be brought about by a gradual evolutionary process, is largely a matter of the nature of the historical background and of the character and temperament of the leaders. If the need for reform is widespread, there is always the interesting question as to why the revolution occurred at just the time it did and in one locality rather than in another—why, for instance, the year, 1789, and the place, France.

The need for change was everywhere recognized in the eighteenth century. No one could have examined the institutions of the day more minutely than did the intellectuals of the century, nor could criticism and suggestion have been more cogently expressed. And yet the revolution when it came was somewhat of a surprise to those who were responsible for it as well as to those who were to be its victims. The first tumbling stones of the old regime became an avalanche that swept away more than the critics had expected to "reform." It is no wonder that there has been the keenest interest in the period or that a tremendous number of books have been written touching upon every phase of it and describing every important figure that played a part in it.

Few subjects have ever presented such opportunity for controversy as has the French Revolution; its causes were complex, its aspects varied, and the nature of its consequences became confused in the period of reaction that followed. French authors have naturally been profoundly interested in the period and have delighted in the intellectual controversies that have arisen; they, and the writers of other nations as well, have taken divergent points of view in regard to causes, characters, motifs, and results, depending upon their respective predilection for some special variety of interpretation. To some the Revolution has seemed a great catastrophe, the logical outcome of which was destruction and the adoption of communistic doctrines which attacked the very basis of society. To others the French Revolution has seemed the birthplace of democracy and the recognition of the rights of the common man. Some have found in it the Marxian class struggle, while others have regarded it as a period of Bedlam brought about by those who had been driven mad by the ideologies of the philosophes, an outburst of mob violence fanned to a frenzy in opposition to the foreign wars caused by the efforts of European monarchs to restore the old regime. Only an examina-

tion of the period leading up to 1789 can solve these problems, and here, as in most fields of controversy, such an examination will show that there is no simple answer to any question; no interpretation can have exclusive acceptance; each of the controversialists had some basis for his view, and each of them was wrong in claiming too much for his especial theory.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE REVOLUTION

Early in the nineteenth century a French writer, Chateaubriand, said, "The Revolution was accomplished before it occurred," and much more recently another Frenchman, Mathiez, wrote: "The French Revolution . . . had been slowly coming to a head for a century or more. It arose from the ever-increasing divorce between reality and law, between institutions and men's way of living, between the letter and the spirit."¹ These statements are sufficiently abstract and sufficiently provocative to necessitate a survey of the conditions in France which preceded the revolt. Before beginning that survey it is possible to make a few categorical statements the proof of which will be incidental to the examination of the pre-Revolution era. In the first place, in the case of France as in that of the American colonies, there will be found no intention of tyranny or oppression on the part of those in authority. The government was well-meaning and benevolent although somewhat bungling, and those persons in positions of power did not consciously desire to make life intolerable for any other group of Frenchmen. In the second place, France was by no means the most oppressed or least hopeful part of Europe. Revolutions do not occur where conditions are the worst or where courage and optimism are trampled underfoot but rather where there has been a long cultivation of public opinion in favor of change and a development of independence, energy, and initiative widespread enough to create both reform measures and the demand for their

¹ Albert Mathiez, *The French Revolution* (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.), p. 3. Mathiez is one of the French historians who sees in the Revolution the working out of ideas later formulated by Karl Marx. Pierre Gaxotte, *The French Revolution*, on the other hand, is much more sympathetic to the old regime and is in revolt against the spirit of the Revolution and against the whole Marxian thesis. Another great French author, Aulard, was a supporter of the middle-class republic idea and found justification for the Revolution in the rise to power of the bourgeoisie and reason for the Reign of Terror in the danger to the republic in the foreign wars. A fourth modern French historian, Louis Madelin, who has also written a brilliant volume on the French Revolution, is Bonapartist in point of view.

acceptance. In the third place, in France as in America, there was no uniform attitude toward the Revolution; led by a small self-conscious minority in each case, favorable majorities could have been obtained only after the Revolution itself was over. In the meantime changes in government were made, classes were "liquidated," property changed hands, and new bases were laid for political, economic, and social systems. The fourth and last of these generalizations is that, although there were many similarities between the American and the French Revolution, and between the latter and the twentieth-century revolution in Russia, the differences are as striking as the likenesses, and factors peculiar to each place and period made the resulting situations fundamentally different. At the same time the French revolutionary doctrines have lived on and are potent factors in the world today.

THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE IN THE OLD REGIME

France was no exception to the general rule that the government of an area where revolution is imminent has usually been for some time out of touch with, and without real control over, the situation. In theory French government was simple—an absolute monarch ruling by divine right over a centralized government which functioned through a ministry and a Council of State dependent upon the monarch and through a group of intendants representing the king in the provinces. In theory the whole system was centralized with the absolute and despotic ruler as the keystone of the arch. In fact only the greatest strength and efficiency in that central figure, the monarch, could prevent confusion and conflict. There were six ministers, the chancellor, the controller general of finance, and four secretaries of state—for foreign affairs, war, navy, and the royal household. They were all responsible to the king, but no one of them was a "prime" minister with authority over the others or power to direct a unified policy. The chancellor was the chief judicial and legislative authority, and in his office the legislative edicts (laws) were drawn up, but his powers were largely advisory. The controller general of finance could exercise a modicum of power over his colleagues because he could to some extent determine the budgets of their departments, but even so great a finance minister as Colbert found his policies set at naught by the will of the king, and Colbert had no

successors of equal ability and renown. The various departments overlapped; there was no uniformity in policies or measures; jealousies and intrigues were frequent; and there was little regard for public interests. The Council of State² was the chief administrative and legislative body; it was made up of ministers and other appointed officers; and its various sections were, in theory, presided over by the king. Its activities were numerous, but its powers were purely advisory, for the king's will was law. The Council of State selected the intendants from the group of lawyers connected with the work of the privy council, but it had only advisory power over these officials because the reports and appeals from the intendants, in theory at least, went to the king. A weak or indifferent king, therefore, caused disaster, and even a strong king found it difficult to prevent inefficiency, graft, conflict of jurisdiction, and irresponsible short-term policy-making.

Some measure of continuity in the central government was made possible by the stability of the various administrative commissions or bureaus which were attached to each department. Ministers might change frequently, but the lesser officials in the bureaucracy were unaffected. These petty officers carried on the work of administration year after year without any vision or initiative but with due regard for routine and the somewhat cumbersome methods of habit and inertia.

Throughout French history as province after province had been brought under royal control each had been permitted to retain to some degree its local institutions and laws. Royal governors were selected from the upper nobility, and some royal officials had been added, but much of the old structure had remained. While powerful kings gradually succeeded in doing away with local assemblies or Estates in provinces incorporated early in French history, the outlying provinces more recently acquired had their own assemblies down to the time of the Revolution. From the time of Richelieu onward royal authority was expressed through the intendants, and the powers of the governors were steadily diminished. As great nobles

² It was divided into four sections, two for internal affairs, a very small and select group which determined foreign policy, and a large privy council which decided all controversial civil administrative matters. For a good brief account of French government see Louis Gottschalk, *The Era of the French Revolution*, Chap. I, or Leo Gershoy, *The French Revolution and Napoleon*, Chap. I. Gershoy's shorter account, *The French Revolution (1789-1799)*, is an excellent brief survey. Crane Brinton, *A Decade of Revolution, 1789-1799*, is an interesting interpretation.

the governors usually lived at Versailles and spent at court salaries which were commensurate with their lofty titles.

The intendants were called the "thirty tyrants of France" for local affairs were almost entirely under their control: they administered justice in the royal courts (except in the parlements), had control over local finance and economic questions, and controlled religious and educational affairs in their districts. The local police were under their authority, and they had some supervision over military affairs. Such at least was the theory and had been the practice for many years. In the last decade before the Revolution the dissatisfaction with the government in general led to a revival of local resistance to the intendants. Local Estates and parlements began to checkmate the central government whenever possible, and the centralization of government was steadily less complete. Village and municipal governments were gradually brought under the control of the intendants. In the larger towns mayors were appointed by the kings, in the smaller towns and villages the selection of officials was generally made by the intendant or his subordinates. Local assemblies existed, but their powers over administration were limited, and royal power through the agency of the intendant was, broadly speaking, paramount. Paris alone had a municipal government based upon a traditional independence, but royal supervision made that independence a figure of speech, for the notables of Paris accepted royal dictation in the election of the chief figure in the government of the city, the Provost of the Merchants. In the main, the intendants were efficient and conscientious, and they were, in the eighteenth century, the one force that saved the whole system from chaos. They tended to become identified with the districts over which they "ruled," and they were often involved in difficulties or in disputes with local assemblies, guilds, nobles, and other survivals of feudal days, but, left as they were without much interference from the king's ministers, they managed to keep the government going.

The great weakness of the government of France lay in the fact that the absolute power of the king made any representative government impossible, and substituted the will of the king for any real constitutional system. It lay, also, in the confusion of old feudal survivals and outgrown privileges, prerogatives, and offices over which royal authority had been imposed, and most of all in the chaos and ineffectiveness at the very center of the government. The king could, in theory, do away with this confusion by asserting his authority,

but he was, in fact, usually incapable of cutting through the mass of administrative detail.

The judicial department of the government suffered from the same sort of confusion with which the administration was afflicted. Again in theory, the will of the king was the final authority, and the royal courts had no serious rivals in the old manorial and church courts that still functioned. But the system of royal courts was itself a hodgepodge. Kings had made a practice of selling judicial offices and to some extent offices in the administration of finance. The purchasers thus acquired a vested interest in the position and in the title of nobility which went with it. Both office and title became hereditary and could be interfered with only upon adequate compensation. There was a multiplicity of courts with much confusion in jurisdiction. Besides the thirteen parlements, which were courts of appeal and were vested with supreme judicial authority, there was a jumble of others—courts with jurisdiction over army and navy, police courts, criminal courts, finance, taxation, and commercial courts—more than twenty varieties of jurisdictions, original and appellate. The administration of justice was slow, costly, and, worst of all, not uniform.

The laws were in an even greater jumble than the courts, for there was no single code for all France in either civil or criminal law. Since the time of Colbert no attempt had been made to produce a uniform system. In general the courts of southern France operated on the principles of Roman law, while the old feudal principles produced a sort of customary or "common" law in the north. There was no equality before the law, for special privileges marked the upper classes off from the Third Estate. Nobles and clergy expected and received a treatment different from that given the common people, and since litigation was very expensive men of wealth had a great advantage. There was no jury trial in criminal cases, and the examination of witnesses was often done in secret session. Until the reign of Louis XVI torture was used as a means of obtaining evidence, and capital punishment was inflicted for a multitude of offenses and by barbarous methods.

In the matter of justice, as in legislation and administration, the king could, if he desired, cut across the maze of confused jurisdiction and arbitrarily lift a case from one court to another, decide it for himself, pardon a convicted prisoner, or consign an accused person to prison to be held with no trial at all on a *lettre de cachet*.

The royal prerogative might be used in the interest of justice or to expedite trials; all too often it was the agency of a purely arbitrary power and was used for political or personal reasons.³

The Parlement of Paris and twelve other parlements in the provinces were the highest courts of France. They had appellate jurisdiction over a great variety of cases and had acquired the right to examine and criticize the edicts of the king before registering them and thus making them laws binding upon the courts of France. The Parlement of Paris was considered the most important of these courts, and a refusal by the judges of the Paris Parliament to register an edict necessitated the personal appearance and command of the king in a *lit de justice*. Louis XIV had denied the parlements this right of "remonstrance," but several times its exercise in the reign of Louis XV had been the cause of difficulty for the crown and of much discussion on the part of the public. Attention was thus centered on the parlements as the defenders of the rights of the people against the full sway of absolutism, and the high courts came to be regarded as institutions of a representative nature with some control over legislation. It was a fallacy, however, to regard them as in any comprehensive fashion interested in the public good, for the *parlementaires*, as the judges were called, were a privileged class of office-holding nobility (*noblesse de la robe*) and were as tenacious as the court nobles of their prerogatives. They protested against the *lettres de cachet*, for instance, but only because such orders interfered with the regular judicial procedure, and their attacks upon various taxation measures were largely in defense of their own privileges and exemptions. They did, however, defy the government, and in helping to discredit it in the eyes of the people they contributed to the downfall of the old regime.

³ 'A *lettre de cachet* sent Voltaire to jail for a street brawl; Diderot for political radicalism, Mirabeau at his father's instigation to keep him out of mischief." "Political opponents of the King's favorites, writers who had attacked the Church Bretons who had been too importunate in their petitions, members of a recalcitrant parlement—anyone who in any way had incurred the royal disfavor directly or indirectly might at any time find himself, without trial, in the Bastille, or Vincennes, or the Conciergerie . . . for any reason or for no reason at all, without knowing why, on whose accusation, or for how long"—Louis Gottschalk, *The Era of the French Revolution* (Houghton Mifflin Company), p. 15.

FRENCH ADMINISTRATION OF FINANCE

The administration of public finance was as arbitrary and as full of confusion as the government and the judicial system. The principle of absolutism operated throughout the financial structure, but there was neither uniformity nor equality in the system of taxation. The privileged classes were exempt from many types of taxes, and the burden fell most heavily upon the peasantry. The methods of collection were inefficient, corrupt, and extremely irritating. From the standpoint of government the chief difficulty in the system was the fact that the total income from all varieties of taxation was inadequate to cover all governmental expenditures. This lack had been apparent throughout the eighteenth century, and the government had had resort to all sorts of devices to augment its resources—devices such as the sale of public offices, loans, debasement of the currency, manipulation of the national debt, and the imposition of new taxes on top of the old structure. All of these measures were unpopular and not only undermined confidence in the treasury but lessened respect for the government.

The royal taxes were of two kinds: the direct taxes paid on specific kinds of income, and the indirect taxes on certain commodities. The general property tax was the *taille* which fell most heavily upon the peasantry, for the nobility was in general exempt from the *taille* whether levied upon land or upon personal property. There was an income tax, the *vingtième*, or the twentieth,⁴ and a poll tax, the *capitation*, both of which were in theory to be paid by all subjects of the king, but in fact the privileged classes were largely exempt. The *corvée* was a tax on the peasantry, payable in labor, for the upkeep of the highways. The collection of these taxes was cumbersome, corrupt, and ruinous, since the tax collectors and the richer peasants were held responsible for the payment of the quota assigned to their locality. The peasants in general preferred a low standard of living and an appearance of poverty that might keep their assessments low. The clergy paid none of these direct taxes, but upon special occasions was asked by the king for a gift (*don gratuit*) which might be considered a tax. The amount was small, however, as compared with what a regular assessment upon the wealth of the church might have

⁴ In the reign of Louis XVI more nearly 11 per cent.

produced, and the clergy seldom made the gift without having extracted concessions from the king by way of compensation.

The indirect taxes were many and their administration was vicious, for they were farmed out to collectors who bought leases which permitted them to collect a specified amount for the government and to retain for themselves any surplus they might be able to extract from the public. The people's only real safeguard from excessive taxation was the realization on the part of the tax farmers that they could not profit by killing the goose which laid the golden eggs. The main indirect taxes were the *gabelle*, or salt tax, the various excise and customs duties, and the government tobacco monopoly. The *gabelle* was the most detested, for it was levied with utter disregard for uniformity. Salt was a government monopoly, and each family was required to buy a specified amount each year. Both the management of the tax and the price of salt varied from district to district and differed with the rank of the purchaser. Some cities and districts were exempt entirely from the *gabelle*, while neighboring districts paid a high price. Under such conditions smuggling was inevitable, and the penalties for violation of the law were shockingly severe. The customs duties were numerous, were levied upon both exports and imports, and at interprovince lines as well as at the ports of entry to France. Some of these taxes had originally been designed for the protection of industry under the mercantile system, some as measures to injure an opponent in time of war, and others in order to make France self-sufficient, especially in respect to food products. Almost all of them were regarded as anachronisms in the light of the new laissez-faire theories of the economists. Smuggling was rife, especially in violation of the *octroi*, the tax on goods entering the cities.

With due allowance for the lack of accurate statistics and for the danger of generalizations, it seems evident that had there been honesty and efficiency in administration and equality in distribution, the treasury would have been adequately supplied with funds without putting an intolerable burden upon any class. As it was, the burden was heavy and dissatisfaction great, while the treasury department labored under ever-increasing difficulties.

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF FRANCE BEFORE 1789

The social structure, like that of the administration, was full of inequalities.⁵ Privilege was concentrated in the possession of the first and second "Estates"—the clergy and the nobility. Together these two classes formed about 1 per cent of the total population of twenty-six million; the Third Estate made up the rest. And yet this division into three classes is an oversimplification, for each of them was sharply divided into groups, and there was little feeling of class solidarity. The clergy had many privileges as a class: a tax of its own (the *tithe*), exemption from taxation, the income from the estates of the church, and trial in the church courts. The connection between the central government and the church was close; the clergy performed many services for the state, such as the keeping of public records and the management of education, public welfare, and charity. The upper clergy numbered about 10,000, the lower secular clergy and the regular clergy (monks and nuns) about 60,000 each. The division between upper and lower clergy was very sharp; the former was recruited almost entirely from the nobility, while the parish priests were by birth men of the Third Estate. By far the larger part of the revenues of the church went to the upper clergy, whose piety and sense of duty were not, in general, commensurate with the income received.⁶

The division within the ranks of the nobility was almost as sharp. The court nobility had come to be regarded by the Third Estate as parasites living upon unearned special privilege, a luxury too expensive for a state whose treasury was empty. The country gentry, or petty nobility, had little in common with the favored few at Versailles and were discontented on their own account for economic reasons. The office-holding nobles, the *noblesse de la robe*, had not the social standing of the court nobles, but many families had had titles of nobility for several generations, and they were as tenacious of privileges as the other members of the Second Estate.

In the Third Estate there was not only division into several groups but also a sharp cleavage between old and new economic

⁵ See above, Chapter VII

⁶ The average income of a bishop was about 30,000 to 40,000 livres, while that of a parish priest was about 500. A livre was worth about 19½ cents. The lower clergy wished an adjustment of salaries and a redistribution of ecclesiastical property. They also wanted a revival of the old practice of elections of church officials.

groups. The obvious separation of the masses into agricultural and urban groups is not sufficient, for neither in the country districts nor in the city was there any uniformity. Political feudalism had disappeared with the establishment of strong national government, but there were many vestiges of feudal organization in the rural districts. Serfdom was no longer common, and some peasants had even acquired title to lands of their own. A greater number were tenant farmers (*métayers*), cultivating their farms under a variety of terms, and there were many agricultural laborers whose lot was as precarious as that of urban workers.⁷ The peasants as a whole were overtaxed and were burdened, also, by feudal dues and obligations that were both onerous and irritating. They resented, especially, the hunting rights of the nobility, restrictions upon their use of the common lands, and the exactions in labor and in kind that made up their payments to the landlords for the use of land which their families had tilled for innumerable generations. The eighteenth century was a period of agricultural revolution,⁸ and the spread of new methods to France accentuated the unrest of the peasantry. The rise of prices was more rapid than the rise of real wages. The French peasant was land-hungry, and, although probably better off than members of his class on the rest of the Continent, he felt oppressed and, led by his parish priest and the village lawyer, was ripe for revolt.

The term "bourgeoisie" was a broad one and covered a number of widely different groups. The big capitalists, merchants, manufacturers, and bankers had grown rapidly in numbers, wealth, and power, whereas the privileged orders were ruining themselves economically. The professional class was prominent and influential, and from the ranks of the bourgeoisie came the philosophes and the scientists. The Age of Reason was of their own making, and from them came the ideas and the propaganda of the reform movement. The petty bourgeoisie included the shopkeepers and the small manufacturers. They, too, were dissatisfied with the old restrictions and inequalities and identified themselves with the program of the upper

⁷ There were about four million adult male peasant "landowners," about 75 per cent of the total adult male peasant population of France. The total amount of land they "owned" was from one-third to one-half of all the land, they were usually perpetual lease-holders of a feudal landlord, and they very seldom owned enough land to support themselves and their families. They became, therefore, tenant farmers to add to their holdings, or worked at some occupation other than farming to eke out a livelihood. See Leo Gershoy, *The French Revolution and Napoleon*, p. 41.

⁸ See above, page 290

middle class and the intelligentsia. The middle class, as a whole, possessed the greater part of the wealth of France, and moral power and influence belonged to it as well. It desired political power and social position in proportion to its economic strength. The Revolution was in large measure the result of the disturbance in the social balance due to the rise of the middle class.

The urban proletariat was growing rapidly as a result of industrial progress, but the economic advancement of the century had been of little benefit to the working class. Prices had risen more rapidly than wages, and the progress of industrialization had brought the individual workingman closely under the authority of the employer and the state. Unemployment was the laborer's greatest dread, for it might well mean starvation. But the proletariat was incoherent, inarticulate, and incapable of leading the movement for reform. The "associations" of workingmen were temporary, disunited, and at times prohibited by law. Skilled laborers were usually docile and looked to their employers for ideas and leadership. Since industry in general was still on a small scale, the craftsmen hoped to become employers themselves and had very little class consciousness except as members of the Third Estate. The unskilled urban laborers, like the lower class of agricultural workers, led a wretched life and might very easily become vagabonds, brigands, or, when assembled in sufficient numbers, a mob of great destructive force.

Such was the social structure of France. But it must be borne in mind that neither France nor the eighteenth century had any monopoly upon inequality and injustice. Division and friction within classes, and the pressure of class upon class are common in virtually all ages. The general impotence and ineptness of a government which could neither suppress nor lead a reform, the acerbity, and the constant attacks of the intellectuals made the inconsistencies of the situation unusually vivid. A severe financial crisis was to force the government to call upon all classes for assistance, and the way was opened for reform—a way that led to revolution.

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE REIGN OF LOUIS XVI

This financial crisis needs some explanation, for the situation was complex. The increase of trade and industry throughout the century created a private wealth greater than before. Colonial trade

was the monopoly of Frenchmen, and colonial produce was of great value; from Santo Domingo alone came more than one-half of the sugar used in Europe. France rivaled England in foreign trade, exporting silk, wines, and other consumption goods to all nations of Europe. The increasing value of her heavy industries made great fortunes for the favored few. As the population grew throughout the century labor became plentiful and cheap. The prices of commodities and of real estate were rising steadily. The standard of living was higher than elsewhere in Europe, and the higher standards were spreading downward, at least to the lower middle class. Business was very active, and speculative enterprise was popular. Money was plentiful, for nearly one-half of the specie of Europe was in France. The crisis arose not because of the poverty of France or because of bad business conditions, but because of the dire situation in the treasury.

The four wars of Louis XIV had laid a heavy financial burden upon France. While none of them had been a decided defeat for the Grand Monarch, the army and the royal treasury had been greatly depleted, with no gain in wealth or new sources of revenue. The many years of peace and careful economy needed to rehabilitate French governmental finance did not occur. During the reign of Louis XV there were repeated wars, but from not one of these did France receive any compensation for the sums expended. The commercial and colonial wars with England left France, in 1763, with a greatly reduced colonial empire and with a prestige damaged by defeat. The extravagance of king and court increased steadily as the reign drew to its close, and the empty treasury was in sharp contrast to the demands laid upon it. The old king was right in his belief that things would last as long as he, and he cynically predicted the deluge for his grandson and heir.⁹

Louis XVI was a plodding, well-meaning, kindly man, not entirely devoid of kingly qualities, but he was far from being prepared for, or equal to, the crisis that came during his reign. The occupations in which he found the greatest personal pleasure were hunting and working with the tools of a locksmith. He had the traditional view of the kingly office but was both genuinely national in point of view and devoutly Catholic in religion. He realized the need for reform and was quite willing to assume the role of "enlightened"

⁹ Tradition credits Louis XV with the remark, 'Après moi, le déluge!' Whether authentic or not, the remark is quite in keeping with his character and the situation.

despot, but he was singularly inept in his handling of the situation. There was little of leadership in his make-up, and he had no ability whatsoever at judging men.

Drafted as a private into a conscript army, he would never have been entrusted with the duties of a corporal . . . The military qualities of La Fayette . . . meant no more to him than does music, good or bad, to a deaf man. . . . Another hole in his character . . . was his inability to grasp in a clear vision any general social problem. Maps he could well comprehend, and he could well retain statistics; but the landscape, as it were, of the Revolution his protuberant and lethargic eyes completely missed. He was quite unable to see where lay danger and where support. . . . He had no working comprehension of Europe.¹⁰

The defects of the king were not corrected, or compensated for, by any special vision or virtue on the part of the queen. Marie Antoinette, the daughter of Maria Theresa of Austria, had been sent at the age of fourteen to marry the French dauphin. Neither in Vienna nor in Paris was there any educative influence that could prepare her for the changes that were coming. Her character was strong, positive, and vigorous, but she utterly failed to understand the French or to make herself beloved by them. She interfered constantly with governmental affairs, and had great influence over the king, an influence that was always exerted in the cause of reaction and was always opposed to any concession to the demands for change. The king's brothers, the counts of Provence and of Artois, were of even less help than the queen, for they were not only confirmed reactionaries but were themselves willing to plot against the throne and to sacrifice both king and queen to their own interests. Neither king nor queen had any wise and farsighted friends among the nobles who crowded about them in a court full of jealousies and intrigues. Queen, princes, and courtiers could be relied upon to block reform if their incomes, pleasures, or privileges met any check.

When Louis XVI became king in 1774, he called in the famous physiocrat, Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, as controller general of finances and pledged his support for the reforms necessary to remedy the situation in the treasury. Turgot had been the very efficient intendant of Limoges, where he had successfully tried out measures he

¹⁰ Hilaire Belloc, *French Revolution* (Henry Holt and Company), pp. 45-47. The chapter on the "characters of the Revolution" from which this quotation comes contains interesting thumbnail sketches of the various leaders of the day. Belloc has written biographies of Marie Antoinette, Danton, and Robespierre.

was now to put into effect in the national government. He removed the restrictions upon the trade in grain, abolished the *corvée*, restricted the guilds, established a government bank, and endeavored to economize in all branches of the government. The privileged classes were alarmed, the queen used her influence against the minister, the general public blamed Turgot for the food shortage due to a bad wheat crop, and the king dismissed him in May of 1776.

A few months later a Swiss banker, Necker, was appointed controller general of finance. Necker had a reputation far in excess of his abilities but far short of his own estimate of his merits. He knew thoroughly, however, all the details of financial administration and did a great deal to modernize details, to simplify accounting, to suppress unnecessary offices, and to supervise the collection of taxes. His task was made infinitely more difficult by the participation of France in the American Revolution. Between 1774 and 1789 the French public debt increased threefold, and the annual interest advanced from 93,000,000 to 300,000,000 livres. Since the total annual income of the state did not exceed 500,000,000 livres, it is evident that the service on the debt absorbed more than half the receipts of the government. Much of the proceeds of the later loans floated by Necker and his successors was used to pay the interest on the earlier ones. After some years in office, Necker, too, turned to reform measures. He abolished serfdom on the royal estates, restricted the use of torture in criminal inquiries, and established provincial assemblies to aid in the government of France. In 1781, in order to answer the criticisms of his many enemies, as well as to ease the way for further loans, he published the famous *Compte rendu*, an account which ostensibly made public for the first time the details of the administration of royal finance, but in which the figures were juggled to show a favorable balance which had no basis in fact. Necker's motives were selfish, for he hoped to whitewash his own administration and to secure a ministerial title for himself, but the effect upon France was electric. One hundred thousand copies of the report were sold, and the French reading public had for the first time fairly accurate information as to the enormous sums paid in pensions to court nobles and the huge sums owed by the government of France. Again the privileged classes were alarmed, and they forced the resignation of Necker.

The moneyed classes were so shocked at the revelation of the financial situation that their confidence in the credit of the govern-

ment was shaken. Interest in politics was aroused, and the need of reform measures was discussed everywhere. Innumerable pamphlets were published, reading and debating clubs were formed, and the ideas of economists, would-be economists, and political scientists were aired. Public discussions were carried on in the cafés and even in the streets of the cities; Marat was said to have read aloud Rousseau's *The Social Contract* to the crowds in the streets of Paris. The illiterate lower classes in city and in country listened, and those who could read bought books and pamphlets from the peddlers, who in response to the public demand, were including such items with the "notions" in their packs. Above all, in Paris and throughout the provinces there were the seven hundred or more Masonic lodges which had long been anticlerical and now became political in their interests as well. Rousseau's doctrines of *liberté*, *égalité* and *fraternité* appealed especially to the Freemasons, although there was little radicalism in the political reforms which they advocated. The success of the American Revolution and the Constitution of the United States in 1787 had tremendous effect upon French opinion. The young nobles who had fought in America brought the ferment of the new ideas into court circles where Lafayette, for example, found many with opinions like his own. An incongruous assortment of advocates of reform—court nobles, upper middle-class liberals, and a few members of the parlements—formed a party known as the American party, or the Patriots, and began to advocate a constitutional monarchy and a representative legislature. The continuation of the financial crisis was to make them more vociferous.

The successors of Necker, struggling with the problems of finance, were unable to find any solution, although they did avert bankruptcy for a half-dozen years. Calonne, a very resourceful former intendant who was appointed in 1783, endeavored to restore public confidence by expanding credit, spending widely, and borrowing heavily. Before 1786 he had added 653 million livres to the public debt. The inflationary policy, coupled with the cessation of war, brought a brief period of prosperity, but the situation was even more serious when deflation followed. The commercial treaty with England in 1786 let in English textiles, caused distress to French manufacturers, and threw thousands of operatives out of work. Capitalists refused to back further loans, and the annual deficit mounted to 100 million livres. Calonne, also, forced to turn to reform, presented the king with a comprehensive plan in which he proposed to de-

crease the burden of the *taille* and the *gabelle*, to remove the internal customs barriers, to permit free grain trade within France, and to replace the income tax (*vingtième*) with a land tax paid by nobles and clergy as well as by the Third Estate. The plan was referred in 1787 to an Assembly of Notables which represented the privileged orders and which, as might have been expected, refused to consider a surrender of privilege and exemption. Instead, pretending a defense of public interest, they organized an attack upon Calonne's whole career as finance minister and forced the king to dismiss his minister. In the meantime, however, the whole situation had received the widest publicity and had contributed its share to the popular discontent.

Louis XVI then turned to Loménie de Brienne, archbishop of Toulouse and a leader in the Assembly of the Notables. Brienne was forced to take the same position as Calonne as soon as he fully understood the situation in the treasury, and he proposed the same reforms with the addition of a stamp tax upon legal papers. When the Notables continued to refuse their assent to these reforms they were dismissed by the king. Brienne then presented his proposals to the Parlement of Paris in the form of laws. The *parlementaires*, nobles themselves, accepted only the minor reforms and refused to register the laws providing the land and stamp taxes. They then proceeded to demand an Estates-General¹¹ as the only authority with power to alter the taxation system. When the Parlement of Paris continued its refusal even after a *lit de justice*, Louis exiled it to Troyes. That did not end the difficulty, for the lower courts and the provincial parlements followed the lead of the Paris *parlementaires*, and the new taxes could not be collected. The higher nobility (*noblesse de l'épée*), seeing an opportunity to undermine royal absolutism and to defend its own privileges, then turned against the king and demanded an Estates-General. After several months of bickering the king gave in. The Parlement of Paris returned, and finally, in the summer of 1788, before he issued a decree summoning the three Estates to meet in Paris in May, 1789, the king ordered an investigation of the history and the process of election of the Estates-General, for none had been elected in a hundred and seventy-five years. In the same summer of 1788 the minister of finance found himself at the end of his rope and was compelled to suspend treasury

¹¹ The last one was held in 1614.

payments. Realizing the necessity of action, the financiers joined with the *parlementaires* and the other groups demanding reforms. Brienne was forced to resign, and Louis XVI yielded to popular demand and recalled Necker, in whom there was enough confidence to make possible the flotation of loans to tide the government over until the Estates-General should meet.

THE CALLING OF THE ESTATES-GENERAL

The calling of the Estates-General did not quiet the reformers. The Patriots realized that the nobility, clergy, and *parlementaires* had joined the attack upon the authority of the crown for their own ends and would block any move that might lead to a written constitution or toward thoroughgoing reform. They pledged themselves to a program which called for (1) double representation for the Third Estate in order that its voting strength might equal that of the combined privileged Estates, and (2) for a vote by head rather than by order so that by counting individual votes the reform members might be able to utilize their full strength. Having made their platform, the Patriots started an active propaganda campaign of speeches, pamphlets,¹² and petitions in order to influence the elections, to educate the public, and to persuade the future delegates to demand a constitution.

The unrest in France was augmented by the increasing economic distress; the impending change and the empty treasury made business unstable, the commercial treaty with England had increased unemployment, nature added a crushing blow for the grain harvest was almost a failure, and the price of bread climbed to famine levels. As though that were not enough, the winter of 1789 was unusually severe, and the plight of the poor was pitiable. Had there been no acute and widespread fear and distress the government might have been able to weather the storm, and the middle class would undoubtedly have had greater difficulty in gaining control of the situation.

There was practically no censorship of speech or press in the winter and spring of 1788-1789, and the arrangements for the elections

¹² The most famous pamphlet was one by Abbé Sieyès, *What Is the Third Estate?* in which he asked and answered not only that question but two others, "What has it been hitherto in the political order?" and "What does it ask?" The answer to the first was "everything," to the second "nothing," and to the third "to become something."

were very liberal. The methods of election were complicated, and the three Estates did not choose their delegates in the same way, but suffrage was practically on a manhood basis. The clergy elected nearly 300 deputies, about 200 being parish priests. Of the 250 deputies elected by the nobility, a large majority was opposed to reform, but nearly 90 were liberal. The Third Estate elected nearly 600 deputies most of whom were lawyers, publicists, or members of the other professions. They were, in general, very able men and the pick of their class in society. The French bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century had much to its credit in brains and ideas. The deputies of the Third Estate were the heirs of the philosophes and the spokesmen of millions of the lower classes that were still untouched by the ideas and idealism of their leaders.

At the same time that the elections were held, the three orders, at the request of the government and in accordance with French tradition, prepared *cahiers*, or memorials, containing lists of grievances which they wished the Estates-General to redress. These *cahiers* form one of the most valuable sources for our knowledge of conditions in France in the years preceding the Revolution, for they are numerous (about 50,000) and are explicit and detailed both as to the evils noted and to reforms demanded. Several generalizations may be made in regard to the *cahiers*. First, any examination of them furnishes ample evidence that France was to have a constitution and a complete reorganization of government. The belief of Necker and the court that the Estates-General would grant new taxes and then consider its work done was utterly without basis. In the second place, there was a surprising uniformity in the general character of the *cahiers*. If there was no machinery in France for the management of elections and if no parties in a modern sense yet existed, some persons, or groups, were actively directing the campaign. As Madelin ironically remarks, "By some miraculous chance, peasants, middle classes and parish priests all express the same unanimous desire, and that frequently in exactly similar terms!"¹³ "Models" for *cahiers* were distributed throughout France—who drew them up and who paid for their distribution is not known. In the third place, since the public had been asked for criticisms and complaints, the *cahiers* present a rather dark and pessimistic picture of French life. Even if every statement in every *cahier* can be considered as true, the total effect is probably not an accurate view of the whole situation. Finally,

¹³ Louis Madelin, *French Revolution*, p. 40

the *cahiers* do not give evidence of any desire for violence or destructive upheaval. They are filled with expressions of loyalty to king and state, and with respect for property, for religion, and the traditional sanctions of French life. Reform, even radical reform, was advocated, but without destruction of anything worth saving and without "revolution."

The *cahiers* differed for the three Estates, but there was much agreement on constitutional issues. They advocated, in general, a constitutional monarch, whose ministers were responsible to a legislative body, a representative legislative assembly, "equal" taxation and the abolition of exemptions, the fundamental civil rights—freedom of speech, press, jury trial, freedom from arbitrary arrest, religious toleration—and some sort of decentralization of administration. The *cahiers* of the nobility evidence a determination to retain as much as possible of its old privileged position while conceding the surrender of exemption from taxation. The reforms demanded by the nobility were very different from those which were a part of the program of the Third Estate. Many of the *cahiers* of the nobility explicitly demanded that the three orders sit and vote separately when the Estates-General should meet. In the *cahiers* of the clergy the grievances of the parish priests were aired, and it was evident that they wished democracy in church as well as in state. The *cahiers* of the Third Estate condemned privilege and inequalities but differed according to whether they were the expression of the middle class or of the peasantry. The demands of every economic and social subdivision within the Third Estate were written into the *cahiers*. The peasants demanded the abolition of the feudal dues; the merchants condemned the English treaty; the manufacturers objected to the old guild restrictions; and the wishes of the various varieties of producers were amply represented. There was no expression of "labor" opinion—as such—

. . . the urban proletariat had as yet no voice in affairs. . . . The [middle] class which was about to lead in the Revolution was fully conscious of its strength and its rights. It is not true that it allowed itself to be led astray by an empty ideology; it had a thorough knowledge of realities and possessed the means of adapting its interests to their exigencies.¹⁴

¹⁴ Albert Mathiez, *French Revolution* (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.), p. 39.

MAY 5 TO JUNE 27, 1789

In the meantime, the financial and economic difficulties occupied the attention of Necker and his colleagues, whose lack of vision prevented any comprehension of how far the situation was already out of their control. The division of opinion among the court nobility, the slowness and inertia of the king, and the unprecedented nature of the whole movement prevented any policy or action on the part of the government. The deputies to the Estates-General were allowed to assemble in Versailles without any decision having been reached as to how they should sit or vote, and without any program or agenda having been prepared for their consideration.

As the deputies assembled it was evident that king and court were cold toward the Third Estate and had no intention of leading a reform movement. At a reception for the deputies (May 2) and at the formal Mass which opened the Estates-General (May 4), the Third Estate was discriminated against in various ways. The opening session (May 5) was inauspicious also. The king kept the assemblage waiting for four hours and then spoke briefly without disclosing any program or indicating any leadership. The keeper of the royal seals, a high official in the government, then spoke somewhat more to the point: he asked for a redistribution of taxes and offered changes in the criminal codes and freedom of the press, but he urged the avoidance of all "dangerous innovations" and suggested that the Estates vote by head on financial matters but by order on all political questions. Necker, on whom the reformers vainly pinned their hopes, was the third speaker. Although he spoke for three hours, he confined his attention to financial affairs in an attempt to prove that there was no bankruptcy and that the deficit was about one-third its actual size! He asked for a loan and for new taxes but was vague on the method of voting and on political changes. At last Necker was revealed as without qualities of leadership or imagination. This first session could not fail to be a serious blow to the high hopes of the deputies.

On May 6 the three orders met in separate rooms. The Third Estate, refusing to verify the credentials of its members or to organize, sent invitations to the other orders to return to a joint session where a general assembly might be organized.¹⁵ For five weeks there

¹⁵ This invitation was rejected by both orders—the clergy 133-114, the nobility 188-47.

was bickering, negotiation, discussion, and the slow emergence of leaders and programs. The most brilliant of the leaders who appeared in the session of the Third Estate was Mirabeau, a noble who had been repudiated by his own family and his class because of his scandalous life and the radical opinions which had won him election as a provincial deputy. The Abbé Sieyès, also a member of the Third Estate although he was a dignitary of the church, advised, with Mirabeau, that pressure be concentrated upon the lower clergy. In the meantime, the commoners organized to the extent of selecting a president (Bailly, a well-known scientist) and a secretary for their body. On June 10 they formally invited the clergy and the nobility again to meet with them, and two days later they proceeded to verify their credentials, not as an order but as a national assembly. The next day three *curés* joined them, and each day after that more came in until there were nineteen of them by June 16. On June 17 the Third Estate declared itself a National Assembly, which was, in effect, a defiance of the authority of the king. From that time the Assembly passed laws as though it had the authority of a representative legislature. On June 20 the members of the Assembly found that their temerity had not been unnoticed—the door of the room in which they met was locked on the pretext that workmen were preparing it for a royal session. The deputies retired to a near-by building used as a tennis court, where they took a solemn oath not to disband until they had given France a constitution. When they agreed that wherever the representatives might meet there was the National Assembly, the revolution might be said to have begun.

At the next session the Assembly was joined by one hundred and fifty churchmen and two nobles. June 23 was the date set for the royal session at which royal disapproval was at last to be expressed, and at which by royal command the turning back of the clock was to be attempted. At last the fears of the court and the urging of the queen were to force the king to decision—but, characteristically, too late. The Estates were ordered to meet separately, and the subjects upon which they might act were strictly limited. The king was apparently willing to concede considerable financial powers, equality in taxation, and the abolition of various feudal dues, but the changes were not to go much further. Had he set forth this fairly liberal program and issued his commands six weeks earlier, he might have been successful in restricting the activities of the Estates-General, but on June 23, when the order that each Estate withdraw to the separate

room provided for it was obeyed by the nobles and the clergy, it was answered for the Third Estate by Mirabeau's famous cry, 'Go and tell them that sent you that we are here by the will of the people and that bayonets alone shall drive us hence!'¹⁶ When the defiance was reported to the king he had no reply save, 'They mean to stay' . . . Well, then, . . . let them stay." And stay they did, to be joined each day by more members of the clergy and the nobility. On June 27 the king yielded, and the three Estates were amalgamated. One Frenchman wrote, "The Revolution is over! It will not have cost one drop of blood!"

THE SPREAD OF THE REVOLUTION

Such optimism was but an illusion, and violence was to come far sooner than the jubilant deputies dreamed. The king's acquiescence was meaningless, for the court was even then winning him over to a policy that aimed at the suppression of the reform movement. Troops were called to Paris—Swiss and German mercenaries, since the king could not rely on French troops sympathetic to the Assembly. Early in July they began to arrive, and on July 11 a further ominous step was taken in the dismissal of Necker, whose popularity had grown with the public when it became known that the queen and the court were working for his dismissal. In the meantime, Paris was hungry. The new crops were not yet harvested, and the unemployed of both towns and countryside had drifted into the capital throughout the year in search of work, bread, or plunder. With the same problem apparent in every city in France, a great fear spread through the country, a sort of mass hysteria that is very difficult to explain but whose roots lay in the suffering of the lower classes and in the dread of changes that had shaken foundations of the old order without, as yet, providing any security for the future.

Paris had been restless for weeks, and the most revolutionary element gathered in the Palais Royal,¹⁷ where it listened to the incendiary speeches of radical leaders. When the news of the dismissal

¹⁶ Mirabeau undoubtedly spoke at this time. His exact words, however, are in dispute. The quotation above is a translation of that which Mirabeau himself, some time later, said that he had said.

¹⁷ The Palais Royal was a center or square in the heart of Paris, composed of gardens, cafés, shops, and promenades. It belonged to the Duke of Orléans, who was a leader of the opposition to his cousin Louis XVI and was outside the control of the Paris police.

of Necker and of the arrival of the troops reached the Palais Royal, the mob set out on a search for arms that led to riots and the pillaging of shops, especially bakeries and food stores. The bourgeoisie, terrified at the destruction of property and momentarily expecting the arrival of the more or less imaginary "brigands" from the country districts, took over the government of Paris and formed a sort of civic guard, or special deputy organization, for the preservation of order. The example of Paris was followed elsewhere, and these new local governments and local militias were to become in a few months the "communes," or independent town governments, and the new National Guard of France. For two days the mob roamed Paris until on the morning of July 14 it found an objective in the Bastille, where it was rumored a supply of arms had been stored. The Bastille was an old fortress, long used as a state prison and regarded as a symbol of tyranny. It should have been impregnable for its commander was well armed and prepared for defense, but a series of tragic accidents led to its fall. As the mob gathered around it the commander let down the drawbridge to permit the withdrawal of a committee of bourgeois citizens who had called upon him asking for arms to protect the city against the mob. The vanguard of the mob crowded in, the drawbridge was raised, and the trapped and unarmed men were fired upon. The mob outside, led by the French Guard which had mutinied and joined them, turned cannon on the Bastille, which might still have held out had it not been for a mutiny on the part of the garrison. At last the commander, under a pledge of safety for himself and his men, opened the gates only to find that the mob honored no pledges but massacred all the defendants of the old fortress. Such was the fall of the Bastille and the first armed combat of the Revolution; on the night of July 14 it was an act of brutality and a blot upon the fair name of reform, but by the next morning it was acclaimed as a triumph for the people against their oppressors, a symbol now of the success of the Revolution.

Louis XVI again accepted the *fait accompli*; he sent the troops away and recalled Necker, recognized the new government of Paris, and accepted Lafayette as commander of the National Guard. But the court knew that the crown had lost control of the situation. One of the king's brothers and some of the great nobles fled from France to become the first *émigrés* at the courts of other monarchs, whom they urged to come to the rescue of France.

The provinces had had their introduction to violence even before July 14, but in the weeks following almost every provincial city saw the destruction of some "Bastille." There were riots among the unemployed and considerable destruction of property. The panic spread to the peasantry, and the days of the "Great Fear" brought terror all over France. The peasants feared famine, the aristocrats, the *émigrés*, the "brigands," and they rose to join the only "brigands" they could find—the poor, unemployed, and starving vagabonds—in an attack upon their own symbols of oppression, the châteaux of the landed proprietors. Their objective was the destruction of the books in which were kept the records of the feudal obligations and the rentals due from the peasantry. Wherever the books were given up quietly there was little violence, but any delay, or the presence of an especially hated steward or servant, was the signal for fire if not murder. It was the only sweeping agrarian revolt of the whole revolutionary period. The proprietors, many of them nobles, but quite a few of them bourgeois landowners, united to defend their property and to restore order. They backed the new local governments and used the new units of a National Guard in defense of private property. Both in the towns and in the rural districts the uprisings were ruthlessly suppressed. The middle class, determined not to surrender the rights of property, fought to restore security and order. It could not permit the fruits of its victory over the old privileged classes to be dissipated in the violence of a class war. The peasants and the urban proletariat lacked the strength and the leadership to go on, and the wisdom of some of the leaders at Versailles was sufficient to prevent a fruitless continuation of the struggle.

THE END OF THE OLD REGIME

The old order was gone; a timely recognition of that fact might act as a solvent for the difficulties. On the night of August 4, the liberal nobles led the way in a series of proposals that amounted to an abolition of the feudal system. The personal dues of the peasantry were abolished outright without compensation, but the landlords were to be compensated for the property dues pertaining to the land. Hunting rights, tithes, and all varieties of minor vestiges of feudalism were wiped out. The principle of fiscal exemption was discarded, and the long-awaited equality before the law and the tax collector was decreed. All night long the wave of sacrificial generosity swept

over the Assembly, and thirty or more decrees were passed. It is easy to say that much that was given up with so much enthusiasm was already gone; that the old regime had been doomed from the beginning. There can be no doubt, however, that those deputies who had spent the night in an intoxication of renunciation felt that they had created a new heaven and a new earth, and that, when they all went into the chapel to hear a *Te Deum* sung, they felt, as one of them wrote, "in a transport of joy and delirium."

Many of the measures voted so rapidly were to require weeks of careful examination before laws could be passed to put them into effect. True, the personal dues were gone, but there was the difficult question of the compensations due to the landowners for the surrender of the land dues. The peasants, reassured by news of the decrees of August 4, stopped the burning of the châteaux but were thrown into confusion again by the announcement that they still had money payments to make, and disturbances continued in 1790 and 1791. The final abolition of the feudal rents was gradually brought about, but not until after the fall of the monarchy in 1792. In other fields, also, supplementary legislation was necessary, but it is safe to say that the August decrees formed the basis for a comprehensive program of reform measures of a social, economic, and political nature, and that the agrarian lower class revolt which brought them about greatly accelerated the destruction of the old regime. It is also true that for many the decrees did not go far enough. The urban workers were neglected and were soon to find that the Assembly had little sympathy for the propertyless. They were denied the rights of organization, of collective bargaining, or of using strikes to obtain remedy for intolerable conditions.

THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN

After the excitement of August 4, the Assembly settled down to work on the new constitution, the foreword of which was the Declaration of the Rights of Man which was published on August 20. The Declaration owed much to the French philosophers, something to the earlier English charters and to the Bills of Rights of the constitutions of the American states, and certainly more than a little to the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution.¹⁸ In any

¹⁸ The Declaration may be found in Leo Gershoy, *French Revolution and Napoleon*, pp. 142 ff.; also in F. M. Anderson, *The Constitutions and Other Select Documents Illustrative of the History of France, 1789-1901*, pp. 58 ff.

case its terms were a product of the thought of the age and came as naturally to the members of the French Assembly as to American liberals. Freedom of the press,¹⁹ a partial religious freedom, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and trial by jury were granted. Equality before the law, in taxation, in the franchise, and in opportunity for holding public office were a part of the Declaration, although the constitution which was to follow did not fully carry out these promises. The Declaration was definite in its statement of property as a "sacred and inviolable right" and pledged the separation of powers and a representative government.

The work on the constitution proceeded slowly. Division appeared within the Assembly itself, for the moderates—and there were several on the committee working on the form of government—wanted a monarchy on the English style with a House of Lords and with a king provided with the power of vetoing acts of the legislature. Those Patriots who distrusted the king, court, and aristocrats were alarmed at the prospect of a strong monarchy. The ultraconservatives opposed the plan also because they feared that it might work, and their dearest desire was the failure of the whole new regime. The debates and the friction in the Assembly were watched with apprehension by the people of Paris. The poor knew nothing of constitutional terms but made a farfetched connection between the veto and the high price of bread. Agitators who feared the "stagnation" of the Revolution worked popular anxiety to a fever heat. Business was bad, unemployment was at its highest level, and near-famine conditions prevailed. Garbled news of the activities of the émigrés added to the distress. There were plots and counterplots at the court, and the king assembled troops once more. When the Flanders regiment reached Versailles their officers were given a banquet at which the white cockade of the Bourbons and the black cockade of Austria were worn, while the red, white, and blue national colors were trampled underfoot. The most revolutionary of the newspapers of Paris used the episode as a pretext for incendiary counsel; the mob was stirred up by agitators, and, led by thousands of women from the poorest districts of Paris, it marched on Versailles on October 5.²⁰

¹⁹ There were some reservations.

²⁰ The king's cousin, the duke of Orléans, called Egalité, was spending money freely during the period between July and October in an attempt to destroy the popularity of the royal family. He apparently hoped to lead a triumphant populace and make himself king. It is uncertain how much he influenced the events of October 5 and 6.

The hungry angry crowds visited the Assembly and the palace, demanding that the royal family return with them to Paris. Alarmed at the violence, the king yielded; agreeing to sign the decrees of the Assembly and to see that Paris was fed, he and his family went back to Paris with the cheering mob. A few days later the Assembly followed, and from that time on the deliberations were carried on amid the excitement of Paris.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The difficulties of the Assembly were many, for the forces of conservatism fought every step of the way, and the new laws and new institutions required time and infinite care for their successful inauguration and development. The National Assembly had the double duty of governing France and of making a constitution—either one a difficult and anxious task in this period of confusion. The harvests of 1789 and 1790 were good, however, and the fear of hunger and chaos gradually disappeared. The new local governments and the National Guard were successful in restoring order and in putting the new laws into effect. Lafayette, as commander of the National Guard, lent his great reputation for liberalism to the new regime, and the Assembly developed leadership and organization. The conservative element in the Assembly sat on the right of the hall of the Tuileries Riding School, the more radical members sat on the left, while the hundreds of moderates occupied the center seats. Thus originated the Right and Left and Center that have become so familiar in later political parlance. In the National, or, as it came to be called, the Constituent Assembly, the Right was composed of unswerving royalists—angry nobles and upper clergy who wished the restoration of the old order. By the fall of 1789 they attended the sessions of the Assembly infrequently, and many of them soon became *émigrés*. The liberal nobles and clergy, the “men of the Enlightenment,” and many of the richer bourgeois members composed the Center. Their leaders were Mirabeau, Lafayette, Sieyès, and Bailly, and they wished a constitution like that of England. It is difficult to draw any accurate line between that group and the Left, but at the extreme Left were to be found a group of leaders who were advocates of the doctrines of Rousseau. Their most famous leader was a young lawyer, Maximilien Robespierre. Until his death in April of 1791, Mirabeau was the outstanding man of the Assembly. Lafayette was looked upon out-

side the Assembly as the guiding star of the Revolution, almost a dictator, but it is probable that his abilities and his devotion to the cause of reform were somewhat overestimated.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE REVOLUTION

The revolutionary clubs came to be of as much influence as the Assembly itself and furnished the nucleus for a powerful political organization. The Society of Friends of the Constitution was the most important of the clubs that were formed in 1789. Its better known name was the Jacobin Club—a name derived from a convent in which its first meetings were held. By 1791 the Jacobins had several hundred local branches throughout the country which were closely connected with the mother club in Paris and with one another. They were all, in a sense, debating societies with educational and propagandist activities, but they were also the training ground for political leadership and an agency for political control. In short, they furnished the political or party machinery which France had never before possessed. Their membership was made up of the liberal middle class with some representation of the rich and the poor, and their leadership came from the intellectuals. The Jacobins were, in general, a respectable group from all walks of life representative of the position of the militant segment of the bourgeoisie. The Revolution came to have for them, for a time at least, a semireligious significance, and they built up a “cult” of patriotism. The clubs had an elaborate ritual of Masonic and Roman Catholic origin—dues, slogans, hymns, classes for children, oaths of allegiance. They conducted public festivals and fetes, and some of them eventually went over to the worship of a Supreme Being, while a few made a deity of Reason. They held trials of backsliding members and conducted purges. Jacobin influence reached its height in 1793; after that date the clubs and their members gradually declined in importance. Not until ideological-political parties with a similar emotional appeal developed in certain European countries in the twentieth century was the world to see anything resembling the Jacobins in organization or methods.²¹

There were other clubs of less importance, more or less radical than the Jacobins. The Cordeliers Club was led by Danton and Marat;

²¹ *The Jacobins* by Crane Brinton is an excellent account of the clubs and their members.

the Club of 1789 had Lafayette as its most important member. None of them had any official newspaper of its own, but the journalists and the new newspapers served them all. The transition from pamphleteering to the development of newspapers came in the early days of the Revolution. These papers were small, badly printed, almost entirely political and not newssheets at all in the modern sense of the word. The *Moniteur* gave the most careful account of the debates and represented fairly well the views of the moderate monarchists. The *Ami du Peuple*, edited by Jean-Paul Marat, a bitter and increasingly radical physician, was the best-known revolutionary newspaper. The *Père Duchesne*, edited by Hébert, pleased the working classes with its violent and often vulgar language. There were also papers hostile to the Revolution, the most famous of them being the *Actes des Apôtres*.

The many "fetes of federation," or celebrations of the success of the Revolution, which were held all over France were another publicity agency. The most important of these fetes was held in Paris on July 14, 1790. Delegates were sent from the provinces, the National Guard led the celebration, an oath of allegiance to the king and nation was taken by all participants, and patriotism was fanned high.

THE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The monetary problem, the cause for the calling of the Estates-General, was to be the first concern of the Assembly. New loans were voted several times, but they were hard to float and the returns were insufficient for the needs of the government. Taxes came in slowly, many people did not pay them, and the machinery for collection was badly organized. Patriotic gifts brought in a large amount in jewels and money, but the relief was temporary, and the practice could not be expected to continue. Some new source of revenue was necessary. Men's minds turned toward the wealth of the church for the confiscation of which there was some precedent. In November, 1789, the Assembly took over the obligation of paying the salaries of the clergy, of paying for the services of the church and the care of its buildings, and of providing for the poor. The property of the church was declared at the disposal of the nation, a part of the lands was placed on sale, and a bond issue was floated to facilitate and anticipate the actual sale. These bonds were called *assignats* and were intended to be payable in land instead of specie. They were to

be used to meet the most pressing obligations of the government and were designed to be retired when exchanged for church lands. A little later, in order to get the assignats into circulation, the Assembly declared the church estates national property and made the assignats legal tender. For some time the new paper money did not depreciate badly, and the financial situation was easier. Indeed, there was a brief revival of business due to the new currency. But since the budget remained unbalanced, one issue of assignats followed another, until there was a dangerous inflation²² of what finally became mere fiat paper money. Eventually much of the lands were sold, and the purchasers²³ had a very real stake in the success of the Revolution, but from a financial point of view the assignats were disastrous. Inflationary prices were high and the poor suffered as a consequence; the assignats depreciated and were in the end repudiated; the public debt continued to be a serious problem; and the credit of the government was low throughout the revolutionary decade.

THE CIVIL CONSTITUTION OF THE CLERGY

The Civil Constitution of the Clergy (July, 1790), which was the answer of the Assembly to its obligation toward the despoiled church, was a part of the new national constitution. As the name indicates, the doctrine of the church was untouched. The number of bishoprics was reduced from 139 to 83, to correspond to the new departments of the government. The salaries of the clergy were to be paid by the state, and, like state officials, the clergy was to be elected by the people. The pope was denied the right of confirming the elections. Under the new regime bishops were to be paid less and parish priests more than before the revolution.

The clergy protested more vigorously against the Civil Constitution than against the confiscation of church lands. The old priests continued to care for their people and administer the sacraments even when supplanted by the newly elected incumbents of their parishes. The pope, after a delay, refused to accept the Civil Constitution and ordered the clergy to disregard it, declaring it "heretical and schismatical." Louis XVI accepted it very reluctantly, and his loyalty to Catholi-

²² See table and graph for the value of assignats from 1789 to 1796 in Leo Gottschalk, *The Era of the French Revolution*, pp. 161-65.

²³ At first the purchasers were mostly of the bourgeoisie, but many of the estates were subdivided and peasant proprietors grew in number.

cism led him to grow steadily more averse to the whole constitution of which it was a part. An oath of allegiance was required of the clergy late in 1790; the few who took it were called the "juring" clergy, while the many who refused became the "nonjuring" clergy. Only four bishops took the oath, and many of the old prelates became *émigrés*. Thousands of parish priests remained in France to carry on their work in secret and to lead their flocks into opposition to the revolution. The upper classes of France may have been rationalistic and anticlerical, but the masses, especially the peasantry, were devoutly Catholic. From 1790 to 1801 there was a sharp cleavage in the state as a result of the religious issue.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1791

The main body of the constitution was ready in the summer of 1791. The product of two years of deliberation and much compromise, it reflected the necessities and the principles of the middle-class deputies who drafted it. The lofty sentiments of the Declaration of the Rights of Man were far from realization in the constitution, for those responsible for it were afraid that the ignorant masses might be influenced to defeat the ends for which the reorganization of government had been brought about. Mathiez says:

Its work of political and administrative reconstruction was inspired by a single idea, arising out of the situation: that it was necessary to prevent a return to despotism and feudalism, and secure the peaceful domination of the victorious middle class.²⁴

France, under the Constitution of 1791, was to have a hereditary king who was to have a regular income but no control over the treasury. The king was to choose his own ministers from outside the Assembly, who were to be held strictly accountable to the Assembly for the administration of their offices. No act of the king was to be valid without the signature of a minister. The king was to appoint many officials of the administration, the diplomatic corps, the army, and the navy, but he could no longer declare war or sign treaties without the control of the Assembly. The bulk of the administrative officers and even the judges were to be elected by the people. The king of France was "to reign but not rule" in the country over which he had formerly held despotic sway.

²⁴ Albert Mathiez, *French Revolution* (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.), p. 82.

His share in legislation was important but restricted. He had a veto of a suspensory nature and could thus postpone the operation of laws passed by the Assembly. The Assembly could, however, address the people by proclamation in times of emergency, and such proclamations were not subject to veto. The king's control over the army was limited, also, and even the royal guard was to take the civic oath. Under the constitution legislative power was centered in one house of about 750 members. The Legislative Assembly was to be safeguarded from executive interference and to have all of the privileges and immunities of such representative bodies. It was to be, in fact, the supreme power of France.

The franchise promised by the Declaration of the Rights of Man was not granted by the constitution. Frenchmen were divided into two classes, "passive" and "active" citizens. The former were the propertyless and largely illiterate lower classes who were believed to be incapable of taking part in public affairs. The active citizens were those who paid direct taxes to the value of three days' work at the rate paid in their localities. In 1791 the active citizens numbered about four millions out of the twenty-six millions of the whole population. Even among the active citizens there were grades, for those granted the franchise voted for primary assemblies which then chose electors who paid taxes amounting to ten days' work. These electors chose the deputies, judges, and department officials, including bishops, but the deputies to the Legislative Assembly could be chosen only from among citizens who paid taxes equal to a silver mark (fifty francs) and who possessed some real estate. There were less than fifty thousand who could qualify under this provision. The active citizens alone could belong to the National Guard; the passive citizens were to be unarmed. Wealth had replaced birth as the standard for governmental control.

Local government was completely reorganized into eighty-three new departments in order to decentralize the government and bring it as close to the people as possible. Each department had an unpaid council with a salaried executive committee. Its duties were those formerly attached to the office of the intendant. The departments were, in effect, little republics, acting autonomously without much co-operation with the national government. The departments were divided into districts and the districts into cantons, each with its own functions. It was the urban or municipal government, however, which had the most pronounced political life. The communes, as they were

called, had extensive powers over local affairs and were governed by mayors and local assemblies.

The judiciary was entirely reorganized, and the old evils were done away with. The judges were to be elected, justice was to be free for all citizens alike, and jury trial was provided for. The courts were to be independent of both king and ministers. Each district was to have its courts; below these were the cantonal courts, presided over by justices of the peace. Provision was made for departmental courts of appeal whose judges were to be obtained from the district courts. A National High Court might be formed for cases of impeachment brought by the National Assembly and for cases against the state. No supreme court was provided to decide upon the constitutionality of laws passed by the Assembly.

The French historian Mathiez says that under the forms of a constitutional monarchy France became for a brief time a bourgeois republic. The Constitution of 1791 was far from a perfect document, but there was in it no fundamental defect making inevitable the failure of the government which operated under it. Peace and time, patience and the co-operation of those in whose hands France placed the government in the elections of 1791 might well have brought success. It is easy for us now to point out that the king was probably given either too much or too little power, that the ministers should have been chosen from the dominant group in the Assembly, that a one-house legislature of 750 members was sure to be cumbersome and inefficient, that the suffrage was too limited—or that a half-dozen other defects existed. But that is no reason why the government under the constitution might not have been successfully established and its defects removed by amendment or revision whenever the people of France were ready to apply those remedies. The reasons why the Constitution of 1791 remained in effect less than a year must be sought outside the document itself.

THE OBSTACLES TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

Within France there had been continued disorders in connection with the settlement of feudal claims. In the Rhineland area, especially, the landlords had found it difficult to accept the laws providing for the abolition of dues, for many of them were nobles whose allegiance was not to France but to the Holy Roman Empire, and whose main

estates were outside French territory. Most of the sales of the lands of the church had been made to bourgeois investors who were able and glad to exchange the assignats for land which had a more real and constant value. Urban workers, finding little of value to them in the acts of the National Assembly or in the Constitution of 1791, were restive under the mounting prices and the slowness of economic readjustment. The Catholics, especially in the rural districts, were influenced by the anti-clerical aspects of the Revolution and were under the guidance of their priests who were, in turn, forbidden by the pope to obey the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. By 1791 open rebellion broke out in the Vendée and also in southern France, where the revolt had some economic causes as well.

There was not, however, enough weight in any of the economic difficulties to cause disaster to the new government. The assignats had not yet depreciated to a dangerous degree, trade was picking up, business was reviving, and the new taxes were at last beginning to come in. There seemed no reason, in 1791, to be anything but optimistic in regard to the possibility of economic recovery.

The greatest obstacle to the success of the Legislative Assembly lay in the monarchy itself, and it is probable that the attitude of the king toward the new regime and that of the revolutionary leaders towards Louis XVI were alone sufficient cause for failure. In the death of Mirabeau in April, 1791, the king lost one of his ablest advisers. Mirabeau had no very high standards of political morality and accepted payment from the court, the king, and various factions in the Assembly. He said himself that although he often was paid he never was bought, and was, in fact, paid to do that which he wished to do. But his advice was sound and conservative, and he was a moderate constitutionalist who might have held the king in line—although there is some doubt whether his measures could have discredited the extremists and made the king popular. After his death, however, the restraint was gone. In June of 1791 the king, the queen, and their children attempted to escape to the eastern frontier, expecting that once outside the boundaries of France they would be able to dictate the terms of their return. Captured almost within sight of their goal, they were brought back to Paris and from that time on were little more than unwilling prisoners of the Assembly and plotters against the state. This flight to Varennes exposed the fundamental weakness of a constitutional monarchy unable to rely on the loyalty of the monarch, and many patriots became openly republican even before

the election of the Legislative Assembly. In July of 1791, when a petition for the deposition of the king was presented, a riot occurred, and the National Guard fired upon a mob in the Champ de Mars. After this "massacre," order was restored, and the National Assembly made a very neat job of glossing over the relations between the king and the new government and closed its sessions at the end of September.

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

On October 1, 1791, the Legislative Assembly convened, a new and inexperienced body, for the outgoing Assembly had passed a self-denying regulation that prevented any of its members from accepting a seat in the new legislature. The effect of this abstention has been greatly exaggerated because there was ability in the assembly, and the old leaders were still guiding the revolutionary clubs. In fact, many of them remained in Paris and were closely in touch with all events. There were no parties in the Legislative Assembly in the modern sense, but there were sharp divisions of opinion. Quite obviously the old Right group had no representation. Many of the reactionaries were already *émigrés*, and more were to leave France during the year. Through the revolutionary years the pressure was constantly from the Left, and in each successive governing body from 1789 to 1794 the old Right was pushed out and its place was taken by a group which had formerly been considered radical but was becoming conservative as further radicalism developed. The new Right was composed of the constitutional monarchists who, having achieved the form of government which they desired, were now "satisfied" and hence conservative. This group found its national leader in Lafayette (not now a member) and had a club of its own, the *Feuillants*, an offshoot of the Jacobins. The Left in the Legislative Assembly was composed mostly of men who were out-and-out republicans and who were members of the Jacobin or the Cordeliers clubs. The Left was not, however, a unit, for a group of provincial republicans called Girondists²⁵ often worked in opposition to the Paris Jacobins. The Right and Left together numbered about one half the Assembly; the Center (Moderates, Plain, or Swamp) voted with one extreme or the other as circumstances dictated. It must be noted, however, that even the extreme Leftist members were not in any economic or

²⁵ Some of their leaders were from the province of the Gironde.

social sense radical, for they were elected from that small number of about fifty thousand Frenchmen who paid sufficient taxes to be elected to high office.

EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The general European scene was not, in 1791, especially menacing, but the elements which were to mean war during the following year were apparent. The immediate effect of the Revolution in 1789 had been the open expression of approval by European liberals. The cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century plus the long cultural hegemony of France led to an intense interest in the French experiment, and every detail of it was discussed wherever there were liberal groups. The greatest approval and desire for emulation was, probably, in the Rhineland and in the Austrian Netherlands. In England, approval had a rather complacent cast, for the English felt that the French were in many ways copying their institutions. Before the end of 1792,²⁶ however, the approval of England began to turn first to alarm and then to deep antagonism as the French left English precedent far behind. Two brothers and a nephew of Marie Antoinette were the rulers of Austria and emperors in the years from 1789—the opening of the French Revolution—to the end of the century. The reign of Joseph II was beset with difficulties²⁷ and came to an end in 1790, in a reaction against too extensive reform. When his brother Leopold came to the throne he found his hands full restoring order in the Austrian dominions and winding up a war in which Austria and Russia were allied against Turkey. Leopold had a reputation for ‘enlightenment’ and was not at first very sympathetic with the plight of the French monarchs. Strangely enough, the rulers of European states were slow to see any menace to monarchy, in general, in the changes taking place in France. It was not until a certain missionary zeal appeared in the public addresses of French leaders and the open expression of republicanism laid bare the danger to the French crown that the monarchs became alarmed. Frederick

²⁶ The English conservative statesman, Edmund Burke, had foreseen the course of events and had in 1790 published his *Reflections on the French Revolution* which had great effect in creating antirevolutionary feeling. Burke was answered by Thomas Paine, whose *Rights of Man* was a stirring defense of France.

²⁷ See above, pages 279-81.

William II of Prussia seemed to have more interest in the suppression of the Revolution, but the threat of Catherine II's renewed concern with Poland was of more importance to him. The second partition of Poland in 1793, and the final partition in 1795, did, in a sense, contribute to the salvation of the French Revolution.²⁸

The animosity that existed toward France was aroused by the interference with property rights along the Rhine, by certain revolutionary missionary activities along the Belgian frontier, and most of all by the fulminations of the *émigrés* who had taken up their abode on the German side of the Rhine. The antagonism of the papacy was a factor in European opinion, and the agitation which led to the French annexation of the papal state of Avignon²⁹ was an indication to Europe that the new France might be aggressive or imperialistic. European intervention, however, would wait upon French events. As long as they could discern no immediate harm to themselves or to monarchy as a ruling principle, European rulers could look with complacency upon a weakened France whose king was powerless. Such a France might become another Poland to be despoiled to their advantage.

There remains for consideration a brief examination of the progress of events from September, 1791, to August, 1792, when the monarchy was suspended. From the beginning of the Legislative Assembly the trend toward a European war was steadily stronger and more apparent. The Girondists in the assembly wanted war as a means of discrediting the monarchy and establishing a republic. They hoped, also, to start a revolutionary and republican crusade against despotism outside France. King and court at first hoped for a mild intervention that would restore at least a part of the power of the monarch. The failure of the flight to Varennes and the reluctance of European monarchs to aid them led the French monarchs to favor a war which they hoped would end in defeat for the revolutionary government of France. The Jacobins, especially Robespierre, saw the danger in the situation and worked for peace, but without success; for war was declared by France on the ruler of "Bohemia and Hungary," April 20, 1792.

²⁸ See above, pages 241-42.

²⁹ Avignon had been the seat of the papacy in the fourteenth century and was an enclave, i.e., entirely surrounded by French territory.

THE EUROPEAN WAR AND THE FALL OF THE
FRENCH MONARCHY

France was in no sense prepared for war. The old army, which had been staffed from the nobility who were now *émigrés*, had lost more than half of its officers. Insufficient numbers and inadequate training and supplies made it impossible for the National Guard to conduct foreign wars and suppress disorder at home. When volunteer forces were raised they were brave enough, usually, but lacked officers, training, and equipment. The only thing that saved France in the first months of the war was the lack of harmony between Austria and her ally, Prussia, and their joint preoccupation with the Polish situation. The Prussian army was far from the efficient machine of the days of Frederick the Great, and the pressure upon France was not too great.

In the meantime, the king had shown his colors by vetoing acts of the Legislative Assembly. He was perfectly within his constitutional rights, although tactless and shortsighted in antagonizing the Assembly and the general public. The Assembly voted severe measures against the *émigrés*, ordering them to return to France within a specified time or suffer confiscation of their property and forfeiture of their lives if they came within the borders of France. Tolerance for the refractory priests ended with a measure which required an oath of allegiance to the constitution and proscribed penalties for nonjuring priests. The vetoes might have been expected, but were none the less unpopular. Later, after the war began, the Assembly was further antagonized by the king's veto of its measure to establish a camp of 20,000 men near Paris.

The king was pressed into accepting several Girondists as ministers and after repeated difficulties asked for their resignation. The situation was aggravated by disturbances fomented by the nonjuring priests, and by the increasing depreciation of the assignats. Toward the end of June, 1792, a mob broke into the Tuileries and threatened the royal family. It is possible that those who stirred up the mob intended to end the monarchy at that time, but the mob was dispersed and the monarchy, although tottering, still remained. The allied armies were approaching Paris, and their commander, the duke of Brunswick, issued a proclamation bitterly attacking the revolutionists and threatening to destroy Paris if the king was again attacked. The

situation was desperate; the Assembly proclaimed France in danger and called for volunteers who came to Paris bearing requests for the deposition of the king. The French were convinced that the king and queen were betraying the French armies to the invaders, and resolute men prepared for decisive action.

The extremists in Paris and the Leftists in the Assembly laid their plans well. They called in the troops that had come to the capital, captured the government of the city and, on August 10, directed the attack upon the palace. The Swiss guards were cut down and the king was taken prisoner. A provisional government was set up, and the Legislative Assembly called for election of a new Constituent Assembly on a basis of manhood suffrage. The excitement in Paris was intense, for the capital was completely in the hands of the new revolutionary government of the city. When news came of further gains on the part of the invading forces, the mob turned upon those suspects lodged in Paris prisons. During the first week in September over a thousand victims were taken from the prisons and massacred on the pretext that the soldiers dared not go to the front and leave such enemies behind. Responsibility for the massacre has never been fixed, and the atrocity can only be understood and forgiven as a part of the inevitable hysteria of the crisis. The last session of the Legislative Assembly and the first victory of French arms at Valmy occurred on the same day, September 20. The Convention which assembled the following day was to govern France until 1795 through a turbulent period which was the logical outcome of the forces set in motion in the three preceding years.

READINGS

The readings for this chapter are combined with those at the end of Chapter XII.

≡ XII ≡

THE FIRST REPUBLIC IN FRANCE

FOR nearly a thousand years the French monarchy had had its place in the affections and the loyalties of the French people. It had been identified with the increase in the wealth and prestige of France. For it Frenchmen had fought and died; to it they had looked for aid, protection, and glory. For generations the nation-state had developed with the monarchy as its nucleus, and patriotism had meant devotion to the king. The theory of rule by divine right had been carefully instilled into the people almost as a part of their religious belief. A good king was an evidence of God's favor; a bad one must be endured as any other affliction beyond man's power to avoid; but a France without a king was something which was beyond the comprehension of the average Frenchman.

THE END OF THE MONARCHY IN FRANCE

The growth of the middle class, with its interest in science, in economics, and in political theory, had made possible a culture in which rationalism was directed toward institutions as well as toward theology and metaphysics. In the eighteenth century the middle and upper classes had been exposed to the ideas of the philosophes. Their own desire for participation in government and for a greater share in the formulation of economic and political policies made the bourgeoisie advocates of the limitation of the prerogatives of kings. Until August of 1792 the Revolution was conducted along the lines laid down for it by the liberal and "enlightened" middle-class deputies who drew up the Constitution of 1791 and who had, in the Legislative Assembly, endeavored to make it effective. Had they been successful in that attempt the French Revolution would, perhaps, have been over, and the transition in government and in social order effected with relatively little violence. France would then have been, like England and the United States, a country where the basis of government had

been broadened to include the middle class whose rise to power had been one of the outstanding characteristics of early modern times.

The recalcitrance of king and court, the break with the Catholic Church, the foreign war, dissension within the camp of the reformers—all had contributed to the failure of the Legislative Assembly. The men of the Revolution had had no time to consolidate their position and to build an enduring structure; they must advance or accept defeat. A republic was forced upon them by the logic of the situation. The king was known to have betrayed France to her enemies and to be actively opposed to the new regime. His son was a child, and his brothers were *émigrés*. The suspension of Louis XVI on August 10, 1792, meant that the monarchy was overturned.

It must be kept in mind, however, that the bulk of the French people probably remained monarchical at heart, just as they remained Catholic, throughout the whole period of the Revolution. The secularism and republicanism of the intelligentsia did not extend downward to the rural masses of the population. In the urban working classes a responsive chord might be struck through some combination of interests, but the peasantry felt a profound dislocation and in the end went back to the old loyalties.

THE PARTIES WITHIN THE CONVENTION

The first session of the newly elected Convention was held on September 21, 1792, and on that day the republic was made legal by an act abolishing the monarchy.¹ The Convention, like the first National Assembly, had the double function of governing France and of making a new constitution. Both must be done in the midst of foreign war and internal dissension. This new Convention was, like the other, a large body, and its 783 members were divided from the

¹ A year later the Revolutionary calendar was decreed which made September 22, 1792, the first day of the first year of the new era "The year was divided into twelve months of thirty days each, and each month into three ten-day periods called *décades*." The five or six additional days were called *sans-culottides* and were to be holidays. New names were given to both months and days. Autumn months were named Vendémiaire, Brumaire, Frimaire; the winter months, Nivôse, Pluviôse, Ventôse; the spring months, Germinal, Floréal, Prairial, the summer months, Messidor, Thermidor, Fructidor. The days of the year were named for the "true treasures of rural life," and the holidays for Virtue, Genius, Labor, and so on. The calendar was used until 1806. In this text there is no attempt made to follow the revolutionary calendar, and, when a law or event is given a name in accordance with that calendar, the month and year of the usual reckoning will be given also.

beginning into three groups or parties. The steady pressure from the Left which characterized the Revolution had eliminated the old Right. It was inevitable that no royalists had been elected after August 10. Lafayette was an *émigré*, and the old Constitutional Monarchists were gone. The Girondists, numbering about 165 members, were the new Right. They had been staunch Jacobins in the beginning of the Legislative Assembly but had broken with the club over the question of the war with Austria. The break had been complicated by a number of personal quarrels and rivalries, and the Girondists had left the Jacobin Club altogether. A further cause for the division between the two groups was the resentment of the Girondists, who were largely provincial deputies, at the predominance of Paris in national affairs. The Jacobin leaders represented Paris, were closely connected with the revolutionary Paris Commune (the local government), and shared in the responsibility for the September massacres. The Girondists were suspected of "federalism," that is, of a desire to make the provinces practically autonomous and France a confederation of small states. They were known to be anxious to have the Convention removed from Paris to some other city. Although both Girondists and Jacobins were republicans, and there seems to have been little fundamental difference between them in aims or in background, when the Girondists took the Right position, the Jacobins, who had about the same number of deputies, went over to the Left. Since their seats were raised they came to be called the "Mountain," or the *Montagnards*. The great majority of the deputies belonged to neither Right nor Left, but were moderates voting on each measure in accordance with its merits or the amount of pressure exerted by the more positive groups. The Center was called, upon occasion, the Plain or the Marsh. At first inclined toward the Girondists, the Center gradually veered toward the Jacobins and, after the trial of the king, usually voted with them.

Each group or party had its own leaders, many of whom had had experience either in the National or the Legislative Assembly. The outstanding leaders of the Girondists were Brissot, Vergniaud, Buzot, Condorcet, and Roland. They were from the provinces, and their favorite meeting place was the *salon* of Madame Roland, a more important figure than her husband in their consultations. The Jacobin leaders were the group already famous in the Revolution—Marat, Danton, Robespierre, with Camille Desmoulins, the journalist and friend of Danton, Saint-Just, and several others who rose to fame

in the period of the Terror. The leaders of the Plain were men of less distinction and less violence. One of them, Abbé Sieyès, had a reputation of long standing as a somewhat pedantic and pompous reformer.

All three groups were composed of men of the middle class who believed in the sanctity of private property, and yet there was a difference of much importance in social outlook between the Girondists and the Jacobins. The Girondist leaders were lawyers, well read in the ideas of the philosophes, and convinced of the validity of the laissez-faire doctrines of Turgot and the physiocrats. They had little understanding of, or sympathy for, the peasants or the urban proletariat and were intensely individualistic, fearing any government action that might in the slightest degree injure private property. The Jacobin leaders were the men who dominated the Jacobin Club of Paris, were representatives of that city, and were closely in touch with its governing Commune which, in turn, was very responsive to the needs of the populace. They had gathered about them many decided provincial republicans who had been prominent in local Jacobin clubs. Less doctrinaire than the Girondists, they were followers of Rousseau. Politicians and, at the same time, reformers, they had managed to acquire some insight into the problems of the lower middle class and of the poor in both city and country. They were willing to legislate for the benefit of the poor, and for political reasons, even more than because of a sympathetic point of view, they took over some of the demands of the masses. Government regulation of prices and wages became a part of the Jacobin program, and was heartily condemned by the conservative groups.

The struggle of both Jacobins and Girondists for the support of the Plain began with the opening session, and the debates of the first few weeks were the occasions for heated attacks of each party upon the aims and the leaders of the other. The newspapers and the clubs carried on the battle, and the views of both sides were well aired. The Girondists accused the Jacobin leaders singly and collectively of desiring to establish a dictatorship and of depending upon the mob for their support, specifically blaming such a combination for the September massacres. Rather illogically they accused the Jacobins of being at the same time monarchists and socialists. The Jacobins replied with similar personal abuse and with accusations of "federalism" and of luke-warmness toward the republic. Quarrel followed quarrel with the Jacobins growing more radical and the Gi-

rondists more bitter in their condemnation of the masses. From September of 1792 to June of 1793 the struggle for a parliamentary majority was the greatest issue in the Convention.

THE EARLY SUCCESSES OF THE FRENCH ARMIES

Through their ascendancy over the Plain in the early days of the Convention, the Girondists obtained a majority sufficient to ensure them the control of the ministry selected by the Convention to act as an administrative or executive body. The war had been looked upon by the Girondists as of their own creation, and they took upon themselves the credit for the successes that came to French arms after the Battle of Valmy. During the winter of 1792-1793 the Prussians withdrew from France, and the French troops under Dumouriez advanced northward into the Austrian Netherlands. The French were successful also in a campaign against Savoy in the southeast in which Nice was taken. The friendly enthusiasm of the people of the Rhineland German states for the principles of the revolution led to a campaign in their behalf which resulted in the flight of the Rhineland princes and the capture by the French of several important German cities along the river. The French successes were due almost as much to the weaknesses and the preoccupations of the European states as to the superiority of French arms. Catherine the Great was no friend of the French, but her sole concern was with the Polish question. She was perfectly willing to have the attention of Prussia and Austria diverted to the French situation while she disposed of Poland. The king of Prussia was so occupied with securing for himself a fair share of the ravished territory that his support of the allied armies in France was lukewarm in 1792-1793 and was to be withdrawn altogether in 1795 before the final partition of Poland.²

The success of the French armies aroused great alarm abroad and much enthusiasm in France. The campaigns resulted, however, in new problems both for the French government and the people of the invaded territories. The French had publicly renounced wars of conquest, and yet they could not abandon the revolutionary leaders of Savoy, the Netherlands, and the Rhineland who wished to copy their reforms and who had invited their aid. Success in the acquisition of the "natural" frontiers for which Louis XIV had struggled led

² See Crane Brinton, *A Decade of Revolution, 1789-1799*, Chaps. III and VII, for an excellent account of Europe and the French Revolution

to a wave of enthusiasm for expansion. Success in the attainment of their own revolutionary ends led, also, to a growth of missionary zeal. In two "propaganda decrees" on November 19 and on December 15, 1792, the Convention promised aid to all peoples who wished to "regain" their liberties, and decreed the establishment of the French system in the areas occupied by the French armies. Both decrees were a tocsin of alarm to the crowned heads of Europe, but the second was no unmixed blessing to the peoples of the occupied territories. Savoy and Nice were annexed to France, and the Rhineland and the Netherlands felt the French yoke when they were forced to receive the French assignats and were required to make contributions to repay the costs of intervention.

THE FATE OF LOUIS XVI

The alarm of European rulers was increased by the action taken by the Convention in regard to the imprisoned Louis XVI. The situation was quite without precedent. There seemed no doubt of his guilt, and proof was at hand of his plots against the constitutional regime and of his connection with the schemes of the *émigrés*. He was suspected—and the suspicions were well grounded and later proved correct—of being in correspondence with the enemy and of betraying French military movements to the leaders of the invading forces. Public opinion, at least the opinion of the classes with political power, was in favor of punishment. Had he been a private individual the traitor's penalty would have been his after the most perfunctory of trials. In the case of a deposed ruler neither law nor procedure was clear. The only precedent was the case of Charles I of England, but the English situation of the seventeenth century had been quite different. The Girondists were reluctant at first to bring the king to trial, for feeling that the result would be the sacrifice of the monarch, they feared that his execution would play into the hands of the Jacobins, who were openly asking for it as the only sure means of maintaining the republic. When the secret correspondence between the king and the *émigrés* and other proofs of his part in counterrevolutionary activities were discovered, however, the Girondists could hesitate no longer, and a formal trial before the deputies was decided upon.

The trial began early in December and continued into January. The Girondists used every possible device to delay action and to

save the life of the king, but the proof offered for the charges made against him was sufficient to satisfy a majority of the deputies. The king had able counsel and appeared in person twice during the trial. His kingly dignity, good humor, and poise made an excellent impression which was irreparably damaged by his blanket denial of all charges, even when the documents upon which they were based bore his own signature. The Girondists were too afraid of public opinion to oppose the death penalty openly after the proofs furnished by the prosecution, but they endeavored to obtain the passage of a measure referring the matter to the people. Secretly the Girondists were in correspondence with Spain and with England to obtain some sort of diplomatic intervention to save the king, and still more secretly they endeavored to buy votes in the Convention for the same end. All their efforts were unavailing, and the voting on the questions set for consideration began on January 14 and dragged on for several days. The vote was taken orally by roll call. Each deputy in turn mounted the steps of the speaker's platform and announced his vote, making whatever explanation he chose. The king's guilt was voted unanimously. To the question of a referendum to the people there were 424 negative votes and 287 in the affirmative. The third question, "What penalty will be imposed?", was the climax of the long days of vote taking. For twenty-four hours the deputies recorded their votes—361 unconditionally for the death penalty, 26 for death with some equivocation, 334 against the death penalty. After rejecting a motion providing for a reprieve, the deputies finally voted 387 for, and 334 against, the death penalty.³ On January 21 the execution took place. Louis XVI met death calmly and with the courage that characterized him in times of crisis. The Convention which had openly accepted responsibility for his death was now bound by the strongest personal reasons to put forth every effort to prevent the restoration of a monarchy which would condemn them as regicides. One of the deputies, on the eve of the execution, wrote: "We have now started on our way; the roads behind us have been torn up. We must go on whether we will or no, and now, above all, is the time when we may say: 'We must live in freedom or die.'"⁴

³ There is, therefore, very little in the old idea that Louis XVI was condemned to death by a majority of one.

⁴ Quoted in Albert Mathiez, *French Revolution* (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.), p. 265.

THE ENTRY OF ENGLAND INTO THE WAR

The execution of the king and the advance of the French armies convinced the rulers of Europe that the Revolution had become a menace. England used the death of Louis XVI as a pretext for breaking off diplomatic relations with France, but the causes for the war which began on February 1, 1793, were complex and in many respects similar to those which influenced other European governments. Repercussions of the Revolution in both England and Ireland had led to repeated demands for reforms. The French, in pursuing an aggressive policy of conquest and annexation that could not fail to disturb the balance of power, were openly promising aid to any oppressed minorities that might call upon them. The advance of Dumouriez into the Netherlands was an intolerable blow to established British policy and to British commercial interests. He opened the Scheldt River to navigation and threatened the invasion of Holland, England's ally. An aggressive powerful France in possession of the Lowlands and in control of the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt would not only damage English commerce but would be a menace to British prestige and safety. Upon the return of the French minister from England, the French government declared war upon Great Britain and Holland and ordered Dumouriez to invade the Dutch provinces and capture Amsterdam. Within a few weeks France's enemies were increased by the entry of Spain,⁵ Sardinia, and Naples into the war. In 1794 the Holy Roman Empire declared war and thus involved the smaller German states. William Pitt, the younger, the English prime minister, made treaties of alliance and subsidy with Prussia, Austria, Spain, and the lesser states. Thus the first great coalition against France was formed.

The successes of the French armies in the fall and winter were followed by serious reverses in the spring of 1793. The Spanish crossed the Pyrenees, the Austrian and Sardinian troops attacked along the Alpine frontier, in the Netherlands the French met English, Dutch, and Austrian troops, and in the Rhineland the Prussians were joined by still more Austrians. The English navy was able to blockade the coast and was used to cut off foodstuffs from the West Indies and to interfere with neutral trade which might supply France with food-

⁵ Spain had been bound to France by the "Family Compact," now broken by the execution of the king.

stuffs. Surrounded by enemies, France at first seemed quite unable to withstand their attacks.

THE UNITED STATES: ALLY AND NEUTRAL

France had one ally, the United States, but could find little of comfort or assistance in that alliance. The infant republic in the Western Hemisphere had neither army nor navy, and was still heavily in debt to France for aid given in the American Revolution. The Girondist, Citizen Genêt, was sent to the United States as the first minister of the French Republic, but he neither wished nor expected that the Washington administration would be able to fulfill the terms of the Treaty of Alliance which had been signed in 1778. The neutrality proclamation issued by the president of the United States when news of the Anglo-French war reached Philadelphia was not resented by France, for a friendly neutral might be expected to render greater service than a faraway and weak ally. France wished certain definite things from the United States, some of which could be done without violation of American neutrality. She wished advance payment of the installments on the debt owed to her, the money to be used to supply the French West Indies and to facilitate the shipments of their products to France. There was no valid reason why this request might not have been granted, but the Anglophile sentiments and policies of the American secretary of the treasury, Alexander Hamilton, stood in the way.⁶ Genêt expected, also, to be able to use the ports of the United States for the purpose of fitting out privateers commissioned to attack British commerce. He hoped to enlist volunteers in the Western states to attack Spain in Louisiana. Neither of these objectives could be reconciled with American neutrality, and when he persisted in violating that position, Washington asked for his recall.⁷

⁶ In 1793 Hamilton went so far as to advise Washington that the treaties with France were no longer binding, because they had been made with the French monarchy and were abrogated by the creation of the French Republic. This reasoning was not in accord with international law and was condemned by Thomas Jefferson, the American secretary of state, who was as pro-French as his colleague was pro-British.

⁷ By that time the Girondists were out of power and the Jacobins were quite willing to recall Genêt in disgrace in order to bring about his trial and execution. Under these circumstances he was permitted to remain in the United States as a private citizen. He married a daughter of Governor Clinton of New York and lived for many years after his fellow Girondists had been "liquidated."

In order to obtain supplies, especially sugar, from her West Indian colonies and also to keep the planters from bankruptcy, France opened those colonies to neutral trade and offered every inducement to the merchants of the United States to enter that trade. England at once countered by invoking the "Rule of 1756" which she had enunciated in the Seven Years' War in order to prevent trade normally closed in time of peace from being opened to neutrals during a war. Since France in years of peace did not permit other nations to trade freely with her colonies, under this "Rule" English vessels captured neutral merchant ships engaged in the carrying trade between France and her West Indian colonies, brought them before prize courts in the British West Indian ports, and had both vessels and cargoes condemned. The British used their sea power, also, to enforce an extension of the contraband lists to include foodstuffs and captured American vessels carrying American wheat to France. As soon as the scope of the European war was enlarged, therefore, neutrals were involved, and from that time on there was friction between belligerents on both sides and commercial neutrals.

THE PROBLEMS OF 1793

The position of the Girondists in the French Convention had been badly damaged by their conduct during the trial of the king. The defeat of the French armies was to be a blow from which they could not recover. In the spring of 1792 the war had been largely of their creation, and they had taken to themselves the credit for the victories through the fall and winter of 1792-1793. The defeat of Dumouriez and the retreat of General Custine from the Rhineland were therefore laid at their door. Their prestige was further damaged when Dumouriez, a Girondist himself, turned traitor to the French government, and, failing in an attempt to lead his army against the Convention, deserted to become an *émigré* and an exile.

The French government decreed a levy of an army of 300,000 men and appointed deputies to go to all the departments to supervise the enlistment. There was panic everywhere, and in Paris it took the form of bread riots and demands for immediate relief. In the provinces all of the dissatisfaction due to the violation of the old loyalties to church and king came to the surface in a number of open revolts, the most serious of which was in the Vendée in western France. The peasants there were loyal to the nonjuring priests and were stirred up

by a group of royalist leaders who had been plotting against the Convention. Government troops needed for the frontier had to be sent to the Vendée, where they engaged in a long struggle in which they met with desperate resistance from the royalists. The revolt in the Vendée was but the most serious of the many outbreaks. In Brittany, in Lyons, and in the south of France were revolts that made many observers believe that France was disintegrating and would soon be the prey of her foes.

The provincial revolts and the military disasters came at a time when economic distress was rising. To equip and to feed a new army of 300,000 men presented grave difficulties, the dropping value of the assignats meant an increasing inflation and rising prices; the poor harvest of 1792 and the shortage of imported foodstuffs increased the difficulty of feeding the urban population. Farmers were reluctant to exchange the stores they had for the depreciated assignats, speculators endeavored to corner the grain market, and the hungry clamored for some sort of price regulation and for regulation of the grain trade. In Paris a group of radicals, called the *Enragés*, gained a wide popular following and brought pressure to bear on the Paris Commune and, through the Commune and the populace, upon the Convention. They not only demanded extensive social and economic measures but the expulsion of the Girondists from control of the Convention. Their demands were taken up by the Paris sections, or governmental units, and the troops raised by the sections were known to be at the disposal of the radical party.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JACOBIN CONTROL

In the meantime, as the Convention attempted to meet the emergency, the quarrel between the Girondists and the Jacobins went into its last phase. In March and April, 1793, a series of measures was passed which indicated that the Jacobins had won over the deputies of the Center and were able to control legislation designed to provide for the safety of the republic. Aside from the decrees in regard to army enlistment, the following action was taken: a Revolutionary Tribunal was set up for the trial of cases of conspiracy; a surveillance or "watch" committee was appointed for each canton to prevent plots against the government; refractory priests were ordered deported; *émigrés* were declared legally dead and their estates confiscated; a press censorship was set up. After the desertion of Dumouriez the

rather ineffectual Committee of General Defense (erected in January) was changed into the Committee of Public Safety of which Danton was to be the chief figure for some months. The deputies sent out to supervise enlistment were called *Representatives on Mission* and were given arbitrary powers. Early in May came evidence that the Jacobin leaders had made a political "bargain" with the *Enragés* by which the Mountain promised to take over the radical social program in return for the support of the Paris sections and of the troops which they controlled. The assignats, now worth one half their face value, were legal tender, and commodity prices were high. The government acted to relieve the distress and on May 4 established a maximum price for cereals.⁸

By these laws the machinery was set up for what was soon to be a dictatorship of the *Montagnards*. Early in April the Jacobins sent out a circular letter to the clubs all over France asking for petitions for the expulsion of those deputies who had tried to save the traitor-king. The Girondists answered this challenge by an attack on Marat who, although popular with the masses in Paris, was hated and feared by many of the Convention because of his violence, his caustic tongue, and his radical opinions. He was sent to the Revolutionary Tribunal which, unfortunately for the Girondists, was thoroughly in sympathy with the Mountain. Marat was triumphantly acquitted and was carried back to the Convention on the shoulders of a cheering crowd. The sections and the Commune then began to present petitions to the Convention for the expulsion of the Girondists, citing specific members as traitors. The Girondists failed in an attempt to have the Convention moved to some city other than Paris but were able to obtain the appointment of a committee to investigate the activities of the government of Paris. This committee ordered the arrest of several local leaders, among them, Hébert, an official of the Commune and the editor of a newspaper widely read by the radical group. The Commune protested only to be answered by a Girondist leader, Isnard, in the following words:

Listen to the truths which I am about to tell you. . . . If ever the Convention were to be humiliated . . . if ever it so happened that these constantly recurring insurrections were to do any injury to the national representative body, I declare to you in the name of the whole of France,

⁸ Usually stated as a maximum price for "corn" but the term meant wheat and other grains used in the making of bread.

that Paris should be annihilated, men would soon be searching the banks of the Seine to see whether Paris had existed.⁹

As might have been expected, Paris answered this vain and foolish threat by violence. The sections forced a reorganization of the Commune government and then with eighty thousand armed men marched against the Convention. The Convention tried to force its way out of the Tuileries but was turned back and forced to vote the arrest of twenty-nine Girondist deputies. The Gironde had fallen and the victorious Mountain was left in possession of the field. War and civil disturbance had resulted in the creation of a dictatorship which the Mountain shared with the populace of Paris. It remained to be seen whether the dictatorship would be able to reduce the anarchy in France and drive out the foreign invaders.

After the arrest of the Girondist leaders there was a general exodus of the members of the party to their departments, where they led what was in reality a federalist revolt against the central government. The early summer of 1793 saw France aflame with civil war with sixty of the departments in revolt. The Jacobin leaders hastened to win over all who were loyal to the republic by completing the work on the constitution, the first draft of which had been drawn up by the Girondists. The new version was designed to satisfy the masses and at the same time to relieve the fears of more conservative groups. Provision was made in it for manhood suffrage without property qualification, for direct elections, and for social relief. The vote on the constitution in the departments was very favorable, and the federalist revolt collapsed. There remained, however, the royalist-Catholic revolts in various parts of France, the urban uprisings in Lyons and a few other industrial cities, and the foreign war. The radical faction in Paris was clamoring for lower prices¹⁰ and for further economic reforms.

ORGANIZATION FOR THE EMERGENCY

The Committee of Public Safety was reorganized in July, and Danton, who had been endeavoring to conciliate the members of the coalitions fighting against France, was eliminated. The new com-

⁹ Quoted in Albert Mathiez, *French Revolution* (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.), p. 321.

¹⁰ The Law of the Maximum of May 4 had not been enforced because of the civil disturbances.

mittee, more strongly Jacobin and more eager for a vigorous war policy, was to keep practically the same membership (twelve deputies) for more than a year. The delegates from the departments who came to Paris to bring the votes on the constitution were well aware of the difficulties facing the government and were easily satisfied when told that the document could not be put into operation until after the crisis was over. These delegates had been commissioned, also, to ask for a general call for all loyal citizens to come to the aid of the state. This resulted in a law (August 23, 1793) that was of great significance, not only for France and the Revolution, but for all of Europe in the century and more that followed. The decree was for a levy *en masse*, based on the theory that in time of war every citizen owed his services to the state:

The young men shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothing, and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to the public places in order to rouse the courage of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.

Europe had never before seen such mobilization of the resources and man power of a nation. Provision was made for food, granaries and storehouses were brought under national control, and the new army was got ready for action with all possible speed. A new maximum was set for the price of grain, and an income tax, or forced loan, was levied by which the state took all income over and above nine thousand livres. The Revolutionary Tribunal was divided into four sections in order to expedite the work of trying those accused of counterrevolutionary activities, and the deputies sent to the departments saw to it that revolt was suppressed there. The Jacobin clubs went through successive purges to weed out all disloyal members. The Committee of Public Safety became a tireless machine in which every man had his own task. Carnot was in charge of the army, Prieur de la Côte d'Or controlled munitions. Robespierre directed public instruction, two others took over foreign affairs, yet another endeavored to solve financial problems, and so on. The Committee of Public Safety, with the consent of the Convention, named a second great committee—the Committee of Public Security—which became responsible for the preservation of order in France.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TERROR

Between June and the end of September, 1793, there had gradually been brought into being a form of government that was to bring order out of chaos in France and victory out of defeat in the war against the allied nations opposing France on all the frontiers. Its central dynamic executive body was the Committee of Public Safety which worked through the Committee of General Security, the Representatives on Mission to the army and to the departments,¹¹ and the Revolutionary Tribunals. This organization is often called the Government of the Terror, and certainly terrorism was one of its weapons. Terror became the order of the day when the Convention, in October, 1793, voted that "the provisional government of France is revolutionary until the peace."¹²

The Law of Suspects in September greatly increased the facility of the police and courts in apprehending and trying those who were thought to be opposed to the government. A new and more comprehensive price-fixing law was passed, as well as another law that made an effort to fix wages. Confusion and waste, perhaps some graft, certainly some inefficiency attended the effort to get all of this mass of new legislation into operation and to enroll and equip the new armies. But in general the work was effective. The generals, urged on by the deputies who accompanied them, hurled their troops against the enemy in an alarming new type of mass attack. By December, 1793, the Spanish and the Sardinians withdrew beyond the southern frontiers, the Prussians were thrown back on the Rhine, and the French were victorious over the Austrians and the English on the north. In the same period the revolts within France were suppressed save for sporadic fighting in the Vendée.

All of these measures might have been expected of any nation thoroughly aroused and fighting with its back to the wall against

¹¹ Those deputies sent to the departments were soon displaced by regular officials appointed for the purpose of centralizing the French government. They somewhat resembled the old intendants but were more nearly like the prefects of the Napoleonic regime. Revolutionary committees in the departments and communes practically took over local government.

¹² On December 1, 1793, all of the earlier measures setting up the revolutionary government were unified in a comprehensive decree which has been called the Constitution of the Terror. By it the government of France was thoroughly centralized with the Committee of Public Safety as the source of power. The Committee was responsible to the Convention.

such odds. Foreign war, civil war, economic and social unrest were faced, and the measures taken were those that seemed necessary and adequate to men working desperately hard under terrific strain. The crisis was not met without violence; terrorism was used deliberately to restore order and to enforce the will of the dictatorship. It is impossible to condone or commend the Terror, but it is possible to understand why it occurred, and it is well not to exaggerate its horrors. During the summer and fall of 1793 the government of France, that is, the Convention working through the various new committees and agencies, adopted a terroristic policy that within a year sent twenty thousand Frenchmen¹³ to the guillotine or to death in some other form. Twenty thousand is a large number, but the population of France was more than twenty-five million, and the Terror was effective in suppressing a civil war in which many more lives might have been lost. During the year of the Terror the invading forces of the coalition were driven out of France; in part, at least, the Terror must be accredited with the success of the armies. When the cautious and realistic Abbé Sieyès was asked what he had done in this period, he replied, "I lived"; and he was speaking for millions of other Frenchmen! Whole areas of France were scarcely touched by the Terror, which varied in intensity of application with the degree of disaffection in each district.¹⁴

The number of executions mounted rapidly in the fall of 1793. At first they were almost all for counterrevolutionary offenses, and could be justified by the crisis and by the operation of the Law of

¹³ Louis Gottschalk, *Era of the French Revolution*, p. 260

¹⁴ It is on this point of the Terror and of the motives and relative importance of the leaders in the period in which it operated that there has been much historical controversy. The French historian Aulard regarded the Terror as made necessary by the civil and foreign war. Other countries, however, have put forth great efforts in similar crises without a Terror. Another school of historians has followed the teachings of Mathiez, who found the final cause for the Terror in economic conditions, the class struggle which appeared when the newly awakened proletariat found a champion in Robespierre and then attempted to solve the economic and social problems of the Revolution in a way satisfactory to themselves. Crane Brinton, a modern American historian, asserts, however, that the men who were responsible for the Terror were not thinking in terms of economics. He explains the continuance of the Terror after the suppression of the civil revolt in terms of political struggles, hatreds, and zest for power and, even more fundamentally, in terms of a fanaticism which inspired the Jacobin leaders, especially Robespierre, with a fervor which led them to take steps that were quite unnatural to them and at variance with their own interests. Probably there is some measure of truth in all these interpretations, and none of them need be exclusive.

Suspects.¹⁵ One of the early executions was that on July 17 of Charlotte Corday, who, stirred by Girondist propaganda, had murdered the Jacobin leader, Marat. In October, Marie Antoinette was sent to the guillotine, and within a few weeks she was followed by many of the Girondist leaders. Through the departments and in Paris many men and women of aristocratic lineage, suspected of counterrevolutionary sentiment, were executed after the most perfunctory trials. The elimination of the Girondist influence and the successes of the French armies aided in the suppression of civil disorder, and the Terror might have been discontinued so far as its original objectives were concerned.

THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS

The reasons for the continuation of terroristic measures in the winter of 1793-1794 must be sought in the economic situation. The earlier price- and wage-fixing legislation had not eased the difficulties of the urban population, for it had not been adequately enforced. Late in October the Committee of Public Safety appointed a food commission which was given full powers to requisition supplies and to command transportation facilities. It was later given control over export and import trade, and its program and orders were enforced. Speculation, profiteering, hoarding, and any other infractions of the new laws were severely punished and came to be considered "counter-revolutionary" offenses. The national debt was funded, new issues of assignats were forced into circulation, and further "capital levies" were made. It came to be assumed that the "poor" favored the Revolution and that the "rich" were of aristocratic opinion and thus suspect. There was much injustice in this distinction, but undoubtedly the patriotism of the well-to-do was badly strained when increasing financial hardships fell upon them. The Committee was determined that there should be no profit in war and that the working classes upon which it depended should be satisfied.

In February and March, 1794, the Convention voted in favor of a measure which was the climax of the social program of its radical members. By its terms the estates of the suspects were to be set

¹⁵ This Law of Suspects was long regarded as an unjustifiable and terroristic measure. Leo Gershoy states that its weakness was not in its severity but in the vagueness of its terms. *French Revolution and Napoleon*, p. 265.

aside for distribution among the poor. The measure was a bid for popular support, was in accord with Robespierre's theories which were based on Rousseau, but it was not thought to be a violation of the rights of private property because the suspects, as enemies of the Republic, were deprived of citizenship. It was, in effect, a measure for the sequestration of enemy property to be used for the good of the state. Its practical effect is dubious, for many of the "suspects" had little land, and no adequate list of "poor" was ever made. The peasants were much more anxious for the abolition of the share-cropping system and for an extensive subdivision of large estates. The Convention, essentially bourgeois in membership, made no effort to satisfy these demands, nor did it meet the desires of the urban poor in regard to the fixing of prices and the distribution of grain. The "socialism" of the Jacobin regime has been greatly exaggerated, and it seemed much more inclined toward laissez faire than toward social experimentation. Two necessities led the Convention to accept a part of the radical program of the *Enragés*: providing for a nation at war, and winning support from the proletariat. Economic conditions did improve somewhat in 1793-1794, but probably largely because confidence in the government was increased by the military successes. The continued inflation of the currency and other financial devices kept things going for the time, assignats even rising in specie value from late July, 1793, to the following July, although collapse and depression were not to be avoided for long.

DISSENSION IN THE CONVENTION

The great Committee of Public Safety had shown tremendous powers of successful organization, evidenced by the restoration of order and by the victories of the new armies. In the crisis of 1793 its powers were adequate for the work it had to do, and the willingness of the Convention to accept its measures made the government of France seem a dictatorship of the Committee. As soon as the great strain of war and civil disorder began to ease, however, friction and dissension were evident in the Convention, and distinct factions or parties appeared. The Committee itself was not a unit; each member had his own work and almost complete control of his own field or department; but there was no "prime" minister and no real unity of policy. Carnot and Prieur, for instance, were army men, efficient and energetic in the mobilization of troops and supplies, but they were

relatively unconcerned with matters of policy. Gradually Robespierre, the theorist, came to be an outstanding member of the Committee, not so much because of the value of the work which he did as because of his convictions, his hold over Paris, and his prominence in the Jacobin Club and in the Convention. When the Convention began to lose the unanimity that characterized it after the expulsion of the Girondists and through the darkest days of the crisis, Robespierre was the logical leader of one of the factions.

The opposition to the Committee and to Robespierre fell into two groups which might be called radical and conservative, or left and right wings. Since Robespierre was a complete doctrinaire, opposition appeared to him in the nature of heresy, and he could not credit opponents with patriotism or with loyalty to the Revolution. He maintained, therefore, that his opponents were counterrevolutionary and in the pay of the enemy. The left-wing group, known as the *ultra-revolutionnaires*, was led by Hébert, one of the officials of the Paris Commune. These Hébertists advocated a vigorous war policy and the most severe measures against the suspects. Although they were men of the middle class themselves and were not, in theory, radical, they worked for the enlargement of the scope of social legislation and played for the support of Paris. The members of the right-wing faction, led by Danton, were called *citra-revolutionnaires*. They were moderates, patriotic but sick of the Terror for which they felt there was no longer any justification. Danton and most of the other moderate leaders were accused of being speculators, grafters, and venal politicians. These accusations were undoubtedly in most cases well based, but it did not follow that the leaders were in any way disloyal, and their wide following was composed of those who hated radicalism and violence and were anxious to resume a normal life. Dantonists, Hébertists, and Robespierrists were all bourgeois in background, relying upon the same social groups—the petty bourgeoisie and the artisans. There was a bitter hatred among the leaders of the three groups, and the general violence and tension of the period made compromise or co-operation impossible.¹⁶ The primary objective of

¹⁶ Just as in the case of the reasons for the Terror, historians differ in their estimate of the leaders of the factions. Aulard looked upon the Terror as a war necessity and found in Danton the sensible practical leader of a moderate republican party. Mathiez, believing that the Terror had become a necessary policy in the struggle between the classes, proved the venality of Danton and built up Robespierre as the great figure of this period. Both have been condemned by the school to which Gaxotte belongs, which at the same time condemns the whole Revolution. Again,

each group was, naturally, to keep whatever power it had and to attack its enemies, for the conflict was one of a life-or-death character.

The Hébertists were eliminated first and were sent to the guillotine as enemies of the Revolution in March of 1794. The charges against them were that they had plotted to establish tyranny, destroy the Convention, and deprive Paris of food. The Dantonists were attacked next. Their newspaper, *Le Vieux Cordelier*, edited by Desmoulins, had openly advocated clemency and the ending of the Terror. Its attacks upon Robespierre were somewhat veiled. The Committee under Robespierre's guidance attacked the Dantonists—or the Indulgents, as the party was called—in the Convention, accusing them of graft, of "royalism," and of complicity in plots with the enemies of France.¹⁷ The Convention voted their impeachment, they were allowed no counsel, and, when Danton tried to speak in defense of himself and his followers, the trial was abruptly ended with the verdict of guilty. They were guillotined early in April, 1794, and Robespierre was left in possession of almost complete power.

THE DICTATORSHIP OF ROBESPIERRE

He was not, however, to enjoy that power for long, for the measures he felt it necessary to take in establishing his Republic of Virtue both antagonized and terrified large numbers of people. Essentially religious man that he was, he felt the need of the French people for a faith to take the place of the old Catholicism sacrificed to the

there is probably much of truth in all three interpretations. Danton was venal and self-seeking, without any of the austerity or lofty idealism of Robespierre, but he was loyal to France, moderate, and able. Robespierre was a fanatic and a doctrinaire, logical and dogmatic, and anxious to force the Revolution through to the establishment of a victorious and lofty regime. He was "incorruptible"—but also, perhaps, somewhat inhuman. Hébert has been credited with less of the qualities of leadership, with greater lust for power, with greater coarseness, and, especially, with a violent atheism. It was he who inaugurated the festivals for the worship of the goddess of Reason in the winter of 1793. His newspaper, *Le Père Duchesne*, was a scurrilous sheet but widely read in Paris.

¹⁷ There is an anecdote told of Danton and Robespierre which is illustrative of the irreconcilable points of view of the two men. It is quoted in Louis Gottschalk, *French Revolution*, p. 256, with the comment that it is "probably too good to be true." The story runs that a mutual friend endeavored to reconcile the two and invited them both to dinner. Danton introduced the subject of the Terror, saying that he did not object to the punishment of the guilty but only to the involvement of the innocent. Robespierre asked coldly, "And who told you that a single innocent man has lost his life?" To the zealot all suspects were guilty, and every difference of opinion was a crime against the cause.

Revolution. The cult of patriotism, *la patrie*, had been carefully built up since 1789, but, even with the aroused nationalism of wartimes, it did not bring the satisfaction of a religious belief. Robespierre wished to establish a "national, revolutionary, and republican sect" and endeavored to do so in instituting the worship of the Supreme Being in June of 1794. There was an elaborate series of ceremonies ending in a great festival on the Champ de Mars. Whether or not the new religion could have satisfied Frenchmen can never be known, for the dictator's next move was the first step in his downfall. He turned upon those he felt to be insincere and unpatriotic; in short, those who were unsympathetic toward his aims or restless under his sway. The Terror was to be continued until every obstacle had been removed from the path of the Republic of Virtue. Then, and then only, would it be safe to end the dictatorship. Robespierre pushed through the Convention on June 10 a law which was called the Law of the 22nd Prairial. It provided a death penalty for all enemies of the people and so defined "enemy" as to make it impossible for anyone to escape who fell into disfavor with the Committee. The accused were to have no counsel, and the prosecution need call no witnesses if the Tribunal was convinced of guilt. The Revolutionary Tribunal was purged of its moderate members, and members of the Convention itself were to be subject to the regular court procedures.¹⁸ Immediately the number of executions began to mount as the Terror went into its last and most fanatical stage. The executions in Paris in June and July, 1794, numbered one hundred and sixty-six a week, as compared with three a week for April to August, 1793, and thirty-two a week from September, 1793, to May, 1794.¹⁹

Even Robespierre could not hold the Committee and the Convention to such a drastic policy. When the Committee split into factions, he lost control over the majority. The members of the Convention were terrified lest they be the next victims, and those whose reputations for "Virtue" were the most vulnerable started a conspiracy against the "Incorruptible." A speech in the Convention on the policy of proscription initiated the attack, which was followed by a decree of outlawry. The Mountain had destroyed itself, and the Plain now

¹⁸ Hitherto they had been impeachable only by the Convention and free from the jurisdiction of the courts unless sent to the Tribunal by their colleagues.

¹⁹ Louis Gottschalk *French Revolution*, p. 260 note. Mathiez says that during the World War there were more people unjustly shot in France than the total number executed by the Revolutionary Tribunal in the Terror.

rose to take over the government. Robespierre attempted to defend himself, but outmaneuvered, he misjudged his strength and influence in attempting to lead an insurrection. He was captured and sent to the guillotine on July 28 (10th Thermidor).

REACTION AFTER THERMIDOR

The fifteen months which followed the death of Robespierre are called the period of the Thermidorian Reaction. With the Moderates in control the Terror came to an end and France had a chance to relax from a strain that had grown intolerable. The ultimate aims of the Revolution had not been reached, but much had been accomplished, and time was needed for a consolidation of the gains that had been made. The recapture of Toulon late in 1793 by the young artillery officer, Napoleon Bonaparte, had marked the end of the federalist revolt. The armies of the coalition were forced out of France in the same period, and in July, 1794, the French army entered Brussels and Antwerp. The Prussian forces withdrew from the Rhineland, and France was victorious everywhere except against England on the high seas.

There was a widespread reaction against the Jacobins as well as against the Terror. The condemnation of the rich ceased, as did the exaltation of the poor. The "sans-culotte" was no longer the personification of the Revolution, cockades and toy guillotines went out of fashion, and the use of the terms "citoyen" and "citoyenne" was no longer the necessary sign of revolutionary zeal. Gradually the harsh measures were softened or repealed. Freedom of press and speech was restored. The Committee of Public Safety was deprived of power, the Revolutionary Tribunals were reorganized, and the Jacobin clubs were closed. The laws regulating prices and wages were repealed as well as those of Ventôse which had been designed to transfer land from the suspects to the poor. Several of the Terrorists were condemned to death, and every effort was made to wipe out everything connected with the organization upon which the Terror had depended.

The results of the new policy might have been anticipated. As the political trend toward the Right became more pronounced the *émigrés* began to come back. The Girondist members who had fled in 1793 returned and were readmitted to the Convention. They were followed by a few venturesome royalists who stirred up plots for the restora-

tion of the monarchy. The Vendée broke into open revolt, and a "White Terror" was initiated in the disaffected areas. Many of the old priests came back and were permitted to remain and to carry on their work although the churches were not officially opened. The economic results of the reaction were disastrous to the masses, and it is doubtful whether there had been as much suffering in any period of the Revolution. The harvest of 1794 was bad, and the winter severe; the assignats were down to 8 per cent of their par value; and the government did nothing for relief—even less than the Bourbons had been accustomed to do. The common people swung back toward the Jacobins, and the peasantry became alarmed lest the return of the royal aristocrats mean the loss of their newly acquired lands. The Convention, itself, was aghast at the prospect of a swing toward monarchy, for as regicides they could expect no mercy from the Count of Provence, the reactionary brother of Louis XVI and the heir to the throne.²⁰

It was necessary for the Convention, for all of these reasons, to take a positive stand, to hasten the settlement of the outstanding issues, and to establish a constitutional regime. The royalist plots collapsed when an expedition of *émigrés* and English against Brittany was defeated. The Convention was able to detach Spain and Prussia from the coalition, and treaties were signed at Basel in 1795 ending the participation of these powers in the war. Prussia agreed to aid in the adjustment of territorial difficulties in the Rhineland, and Frederick William was free to share in the third partition of Poland. Spain also recognized the French Republic and retired from the war. Tuscany settled her differences with France, and Holland was forced to make an alliance with France against England. Even England might have been willing to recognize the French Republic and to sign a treaty of peace had her ally Austria not rebelled against a French imperialistic policy which demanded that Austria cede the Netherlands and yield the Rhineland provinces to France.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1795

The Convention at last proceeded to draft a constitution and thus bring to an end its third year as the sole governing body of France. Too many changes had taken place since the people had voted upon the Constitution of 1793 to make it seem feasible to put that docu-

²⁰ Louis XVI's son had died in prison.

ment into effect. The new Constitution of 1795 was less democratic than that of 1793, but it fell far short of the desires of the royalists. It left intact the revolutionary confiscation of church and *émigré* lands and made no attempt to alter the ecclesiastical situation, although freedom of worship was guaranteed. In all other respects property rights were securely protected. There were no provisions for the right of revolution or for the right to subsistence. Only those Frenchmen who paid a direct land or personal property tax and were properly registered in their cantons were considered citizens. Those who were illiterate and those who had no trade or calling (including agriculture) might not register. No one could be considered a citizen who was not enrolled on the reserve lists of the National Guard. Conscription was ended, in theory, and the regular army and navy were to be made up of volunteers. All citizens were to be allowed to vote for electors, and those who were made electors must fulfill higher property requirements. The electors were to choose departmental officials, judges, and representatives to the national government. These property and literacy qualifications were relatively low, and the basis of government was broader than anywhere else in Europe.²¹ Nevertheless, over a million adult Frenchmen could not vote, and a still greater number could not be electors or hold office.

The national legislature was to be made up of two houses—the Council of Five Hundred and the Council of Ancients, which was to number two hundred and fifty. The members of the lower and larger House were required to be at least thirty years of age and to have been residents of France for the past ten years. They were to initiate all legislation. The Ancients were to be at least forty years of age, married, and fifteen years resident; they were to have the right to veto acts passed by the Council of Five Hundred. The executive power was to be in the hands of a board of five directors elected by the upper house from a list of ten names submitted by the lower. The directors must be at least forty years of age and must have been ministers or deputies. Each was to have equal authority, and together they were to appoint ministers and diplomatic and administrative officials. Their power over war and treaty making was limited by the vote of the legislative body. One director was to retire every year, and a new one was to be elected. The essential conservatism of the new constitution is apparent. Every possible check and balance was

²¹ It is to be remembered that none of the states in the American Union had complete manhood suffrage in 1789.

provided to prevent a dictatorship and to prevent any radical legislation. There was, however, no provision that could ensure harmony among the directors, or between them and the legislature.

Fearful lest the first elections return men who might undo their work, anxious to retain their political position, and alarmed as to their fate as regicides in the event of a royalist uprising, the members of the Convention passed a supplementary act which required that five hundred of the members of the new legislature should be chosen from the rolls of the retiring Convention. The people ratified the constitution itself by a plebiscite, but indicated their thorough disapproval of the supplementary decree. So emphatic was the popular dislike of the decree and so decided was the distrust of the members of the old Convention that there was grave danger in October of 1795 that an uprising in Paris would prevent the first election under the new constitution. The Convention, however, was familiar with the means of suppressing revolts and called to its aid the young artillery officer, Napoleon Bonaparte, who defended the Convention and broke the ranks of the insurgents by a "whiff of grapeshot." His reward was the confidence of the new directors and the command of the Army of the Interior.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE DIRECTORY

Under such chilly auspices the new regime was inaugurated. The task of the Directory was a hard one in any event and was made much more difficult by the character of its personnel. The men from the Convention were unpopular from the start and were wary and apprehensive. They were moderate men who had managed to live through the Terror largely because they had had no prominence and had exhibited no leadership. They wished to consolidate the results of the Revolution, to maintain order by a middle-of-the-way compromise policy, to improve business conditions, and to make France once more peaceful and prosperous. Most of them were honest and hard-working, but they had no illusions and little enthusiasm. The directors chosen by such a legislative body were men of the same sort, and the ministers appointed by the directors could but reflect the same point of view. Carnot, the "Organizer of Victory," was a director. The only one against whom there were well-founded charges of dishonesty was Barras, the friend of Bonaparte, but the popular estimate of the whole group was colored by his bad reputation.

In general, the Directory was disinclined to make innovations or formulate new policies. The achievements of the Convention had been many and were to be preserved and carried on. The Convention had begun the reorganization of the school system and the codification of the laws, and it had built the new army and centralized the government. The metric system of weights and measures had been devised. The feudal system had been destroyed, and the gradual acquisition by the bourgeoisie and the peasantry of the confiscated estates of church and aristocrats was well under way. Literature, music, and the arts had reflected, to some extent, the changing revolutionary sentiment. The life of the average individual had been irrevocably changed by the half-dozen years since the old regime had tottered into oblivion. No backward step was taken in any of these fields.

It was immediately necessary to establish order and prevent uprisings from either the Right or the Left. There was no royalist revolt in the first years of the Directory, but it was early called upon to suppress a socialist uprising led by a young Jacobin named Babeuf, who was the editor of a paper called *Le Tribun du Peuple*. Babeuf himself was of the middle class, but most of his fifteen or twenty thousand followers were *sans-culottes* and workingmen. The armed uprising was relatively small and was suppressed in the fall of 1796, some months after Babeuf and his main followers had been arrested. In the spring of 1797, Babeuf was executed. This was the only extreme Leftist revolt, but the Jacobin element in the Council of the Five Hundred and the Jacobins scattered through France were never satisfied with the policies of the government and agitated for radical legislation whenever there was an opportunity.

THE MILITARY SUCCESSES

The war with Austria was continued when Napoleon Bonaparte was sent to Italy in 1796, and two other armies invaded the Germanies. The first Italian campaign of Bonaparte was uniformly successful; Sardinia made peace, gave up Savoy and Nice, and agreed to pay an indemnity. The Austrians were then attacked, and their Italian allies were forced to sue for peace. Bonaparte set to work to reorganize the conquered parts of Italy upon a republican basis, levied assessments in cash upon them, and sent many of their works of art back to Paris. In the same period Spain, Sardinia, and the new Cisal-

pine Republic became allies of France, and the papacy was forced to consent to the French annexation of Avignon and to the payment of an indemnity.

In the spring of 1797 the Austrian forces were driven back to Vienna, and the Emperor agreed to an armistice. Some months later the Treaty of Campo Formio was signed. By it France obtained title to the Austrian Netherlands and the Ionian Islands. Austria was compensated by being given the old republic of Venice. In addition she agreed to a somewhat vague clause which provided for the settlements of the claims of German princelings on the left bank of the Rhine in order to clear French title to that region. Before leaving Italy, the victorious French general set up a new republic in the old state of Genoa, named it the Ligurian Republic, and at once made it the ally of France.

FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES

In the meantime the Directory was involved in troubles of its own making. The Convention had been quite willing to recall Citizen Genêt from the United States late in 1793, but had not given up its expectation of receiving substantial help from the Western ally as a neutral. France expected the United States to carry French goods to the West Indian colonies, to provision them, and to bring the colonial products back to France. Such services could be rendered only if the United States endeavored to defend the rights of neutrals against the interference of England. The relative power of the two states made the situation difficult, and the French expectations were to fall short of fulfillment.

For a number of reasons, including British interference with neutral trade, the impressment of sailors, the incitement of Indians on the frontier, and the retention of garrisoned trading posts within areas given to the United States by the Treaty of 1783, the United States was close to war with Great Britain in 1794. The threatened break was prevented by a treaty negotiated by John Jay, who had been sent to England by President Washington to obtain a settlement of all the outstanding difficulties between the two countries. The treaty was very unsatisfactory, for Jay had been forced to give way on almost all points connected with neutral rights, but the pro-French Jeffersonian party in the United States was unable to prevent its ratification. Un-

popular as it was, it did prevent a war with England and was therefore of great value to the weak United States.

The effect of the Jay treaty upon the European relations of the United States was twofold. On the one hand, Spain was alarmed lest England, angered by Spain's withdrawal from the coalition, might unite with the United States in an attack upon Florida or Louisiana. To prevent such a combination, Spain hastened to settle her disputes with the United States over the navigation of the Mississippi and the boundary of Florida. The Pinckney Treaty of 1795, which was a great boon to the United States, was the result. The French reaction to the news of the treaty was far from pleasing to the sister republic. France felt aggrieved, for the United States minister, James Monroe, had assured her that Jay would insist upon recognition of the rights of neutrals. The absence of any such clauses in the treaty was regarded as a blow to France, who depended upon neutrals to carry on her trade with her West Indian colonies. Monroe was recalled, and the Directory refused to receive the minister sent in his place. In October of 1796 the French government answered a British blockade of the French coast by a decree prohibiting the importation of goods of English manufacture and commerce and classifying a large number of articles of common use as English, "whatever their origin." In effect this was another paper blockade on the basis of which France began to capture American vessels. A commission sent to France to negotiate was met by a suggestion from Talleyrand,²² the French foreign minister, that a large bribe to the French diplomats might secure the concessions which were desired. The sum asked was too large, and the Americans withdrew. In their report presented to Congress the letters X, Y, and Z were substituted for the names of the French agents. The excitement in the United States was great, for it was felt that an insult had been suffered. Although war was not declared, privateers were fitted out, and there were several engagements between vessels of the two countries. The dispute was not settled until 1800, after the Directory had been overthrown and Napoleon had come into power.

²² Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord was Bishop of Autun under the old régime; one of the "juring" clergy, he left the church altogether during the Convention. He was foreign minister for the Directory, served in the same capacity under Napoleon, and left before the collapse of Napoleon's power. He served Louis XVIII as foreign minister, and died at the age of eighty-four in the reign of Louis Philippe. A recent biography of this interesting statesman by Crane Brinton is called *The Lives of Talleyrand*.

DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE DIRECTORY

The difficulties of the Directory were not confined to foreign affairs. The preceding years of revolution and war had afforded no opportunity for the settlement of the financial question which had been the immediate cause for the calling of the Estates-General in 1789. The assignats steadily declined in value as they increased in number; by 1796 they were practically worthless, and business was conducted on a gold or silver basis. Early in 1797 the government decided to recognize the situation by repudiating this worthless paper currency. The face value of the issues repudiated was about forty million livres, but, staggering as the amount was, the disturbance to business was relatively slight, for the assignats had already been virtually written off by the business world as a dead loss. During the revolutionary years there had been little opportunity to reduce the national debt. Indeed, with the war expenditures, it had increased instead, until, in 1797, the total was about two and a half billion livres. Unable to pay either the interest or the principal of the debt, the government tried to ease the situation by issuing new bonds to replace the old. This new issue was equal to about two-thirds of the total national debt and was receivable in payment for public lands. It thus took on something of the character of the assignats, and the bonds soon depreciated as the currency had done. The total effect of the measure was the virtual repudiation of two-thirds of the debt. The other third fared little better, for no payments were made on it, and the financial situation remained precarious throughout the period of the Directory.

The moral standards of European society in the latter part of the eighteenth century were not high. War, inflation, and the disruption of the economic order contributed their share to make life precarious and more or less of a gamble. The stabilizing influence of a settled social order and of at least the formal observance of the standards set by an authoritative religion disappeared in the changes of the Revolution. Patriotism, the cult of *la patrie*, and a devotion to Robespierre's Republic of Virtue might furnish an incentive for high ethical standards and lead to a stern rigidity of conduct—but only for the crisis, and for the few. When the pressure was removed by the restoration of domestic order and by the military successes, there was a marked relaxation in standards. The *jeunesse dorée* (gilded youth) were elegantly dressed young fops who led the Paris reaction against

all Jacobin standards after the fall of Robespierre. Their feminine counterparts—somewhat resembling the “flappers” of our own postwar period—were called by their contemporaries the *sans-chemise*. Their costume, or lack of it, was a scandal in other parts of Europe and in England, and their conduct was unconventional to say the least. Whether or not the social standards of French cities in the period of the Directory were higher or lower than those of European or American cities in the 1920's is a question about which there may be some speculation but for which there is no answer. It is well to note, however, that most of France was rural in those days, and that the country districts were little affected by the fluctuation of urban standards. Everywhere there was some return to the Catholic faith when religious toleration was decreed; the priests came back, and church services were once more the comfort of the faithful.

The Directory was unpopular from the beginning, and the first elections for the legislative body held in 1797 indicated that the hold of the members who had been in the Convention²³ was slipping. Fear of royalist plots and apprehension about their own political future led the directors to call for help from the army. In September of 1797, the three Conventional directors used the troops, commanded by one of Napoleon Bonaparte's generals, against the legislative body and deprived more than a hundred of the opposition deputies of their seats. One opposing director resigned and the other fled from Paris. This episode bears the name of the *coup d'état* of Fructidor.²⁴ The reputation of the Directory was further injured by its abuse of power, and its claim to a constitutional and popular basis for its rule was very slight. Its safety depended upon the army and Bonaparte. A free election would, in all probability, have thrown out the whole regime.

General Bonaparte, returning victorious from Italy, found no place for himself or for the advancement of his career in Paris. The Directory, too, found his presence embarrassing and yet had no desire to end the war by a treaty which England was quite ready to negotiate, for peace would mean a demand for the reduction of the size of the army upon which the Directory depended, presenting the difficult problem of providing for the ex-soldiers, and any election

²³ They were called “Conventionals” or, in contempt, “Perpetuals.”

²⁴ A *coup d'état*—blow of state—is usually defined as a change in government produced by the illegal use of force without the violence or bloodshed of a revolution.

thereafter would mean the end of the political careers of directors and legislators alike. Bonaparte was made commander in chief of an expeditionary force, therefore, that was to invade England, but the general had other plans. When in Italy he had shown his interest in the East in his capture and retention of the Ionian Islands. He now obtained the backing of Talleyrand, the minister of foreign affairs, and turned the expedition designed for the invasion of England against Egypt, a dependency of Turkey. His plans included the conquest of Egypt and the cutting of a canal across the Isthmus of Suez which would injure England's commerce and endanger her position in India. The Egyptian campaign was successful enough, but one undertaken against the Turks in Syria was a failure. In the meantime the French fleet had been almost completely destroyed by the English under Nelson in the Battle of the Nile, and the French army was imprisoned in Egypt.

THE SECOND COALITION AGAINST FRANCE

The news from France was filled with the disasters of the Directory. In an attempt to extract from the neighboring states every penny of tribute that could be obtained and to bind them closely to France, the Directory sent out agents who created a large number of little republics as dependencies of France. The Dutch state became the Batavian Republic, and Switzerland, the Helvetic Republic. In Italy the papal states became the Roman Republic, and Naples was made over into the Parthenopean Republic. With the Cisalpine and the Ligurian Republics created by Bonaparte there were now but four Italian states. Each republic was bullied into sending gold to Paris, and its loyalty and gratitude to France quickly disappeared. Austria and Russia²⁵ were encouraged by England to come into a second coalition against France, and war began again on the Continent in 1799. The Sultan of Turkey and the Italian states of Naples and Piedmont²⁶ came into the coalition. The French armies were uniformly unsuccessful; Italy was lost, Switzerland was invaded by the allies, the French bank of the Rhine was attacked, and the Batavian Republic collapsed before an Anglo-Russian attack. All the gains since 1792 seemed to have been lost.

²⁵ The tsar had been angered by Bonaparte's seizure of Malta, for he was Grand Master of the Order of Malta.

²⁶ These states overthrew the governments set up a year or two before.

Political disorder accompanied the military reverses; both poor and rich, and both the royalist and the radical republican factions were restive. The directors tried repressive measures and violated the constitution but failed to improve their position. The Vendée broke out once more in open revolt, and civil disturbance mounted. Sieyès was taken into the group of directors and was led, by his survey of the situation, to the conclusion that the time had come for a revision of the constitution in order to strengthen the executive power and to meet the crisis. A military leader was sought to bring about the *coup d'état*, and, when the French troops were successful in the fall of 1799 in campaigns in Switzerland and in Holland, the time was ripe for the change. The Jacobins, also, were plotting a *coup* and selected General Bernadotte for their leader, but he hesitated, and the group led by Sieyès finally made its choice of a military collaborator—Napoleon Bonaparte.

THE COUP D'ÉTAT OF 1799

Just at this juncture General Bonaparte escaped from Egypt and returned to France, where he was received with the eagerness accorded a conqueror, for no word of his expedition had been permitted to reach France except the news of his triumphs. Soon in touch with Sieyès, Bonaparte laid his plans for the great moment toward which he had been directing his career. The plans had ample support, for influential interests were eager for a change of government, and the army could be relied upon to approve. Fear of a Jacobin plot was stirred up, the legislative body was induced to withdraw to Saint Cloud, where the Paris workingmen could not intervene. Lucien Bonaparte, the general's brother, was president of the lower house and one of the plotters. Three directors resigned, and the other two were held by military authority. Thus the executive power came to an end, and the way was cleared for Bonaparte, who took an oath of allegiance to the republic. The next day the legislative body in Saint Cloud was surrounded by troops, and General Bonaparte appeared before each house. In the lower house the Jacobin deputies shouted him down as he started to speak, and for a few moments the *coup* seemed about to fail. But Lucien Bonaparte saved the day by calling in the soldiers who dispersed the house. That night the three directors and the deputies favorable toward the *coup d'état* met and authorized a new constitution naming Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Roger-

Ducos as provisional consuls. They were to be assisted by a legislative commission of fifty and were entrusted with the solution of the five major problems which stood in the way of the peace and tranquillity which France desired more than anything else. These desiderata were the conclusion of a satisfactory peace with Europe, the suppression of civil disorder, the settlement of the financial problems, the codification of revolutionary legislation, and the drafting of a constitution which would ensure a stable and effective government.

The French would be content with any government able to provide an answer to these difficult problems. The Consulate was to be a period for the gradual emergence first of a dictatorship and then an empire, but the relatively satisfactory solution of the problems which had been set for it caused France to accept the substitution of the "Man on Horseback" for the "Men of the Revolution." The career of Napoleon I was to be built upon the foundations laid by General Bonaparte and by the First Consul.

READINGS

FRENCH BACKGROUND. The French background for the revolution is interestingly given in E. J. Lowell's *The Eve of the Revolution* (1892). Sophie Maclehose portrays the early phases of the Revolution in the *Last Days of the French Monarchy* (1901) and *From the Monarchy to the Republic in France* (1904). The English historian and essayist, Hilaire Belloc, has a number of vivid works on this period, *The Last Days of the French Monarchy* (1916) is both brief and readable. Shailer Mathews's *The French Revolution* (Revised edition, 1923) is usable, especially for the early years of the period.

THE REVOLUTION. The brief *French Revolution, 1789-1799* (Berkshire Series, 1932) by Leo Gershoy is extremely useful, and the longer *The French Revolution and Napoleon* (1933) by the same author is very good. Hilaire Belloc's brief *French Revolution* (1910) contains vivid character sketches. Louis Gottschalk's *The Era of the French Revolution* (1929) is excellent. Crane Brinton is the author of two interpretive studies, *The Jacobins* (1930) and *A Decade of Revolution, 1789-1799* (1934). Four French writers who have contributed extensively to our knowledge of the period are A. Aulard, *The French Revolution: A Political History*, 4 vols. (1910); Pierre Gaxotte, *The French Revolution* (1932); Louis Madelin, *The French Revolution* (1916); and Albert Mathiez, *The French Revolution* (1928).

BIOGRAPHIES. There are innumerable biographies of the outstanding figures of the period of the Revolution. Hilaire Belloc has written several (dates of latest editions given): *Danton, a Study* (1928); *Marie Antoinette* (1924); and *Robespierre: A Study* (1928). Crane Brinton's *The Lives of Talleyrand* (1936) is a brilliant study. Geoffrey Bruun has written the interesting *Saint-Just, Apostle of the Terror* (1932). Louis Gottschalk's *Jean Paul Marat, a Study in Revolution* (1927) is excellent. The three most recent lives of Lafayette are by A. A. Latzko (1936), Brand Whitlock (1929), and W. E. Woodward (1938). Louis Madelin has contributed a volume called *The Figures of the Revolution* (1929). J. S. Schapiro's *Condorcet and the Rise of Liberalism* (1934) is a recent study. P. F. Willett's *Mirabeau* (1898) is older but still useful. The recent biography of Marie Antoinette by Stefan Zweig (1935) is very interesting.

SOURCE MATERIAL AND SELECTED READINGS. A. N. Cook's *Readings in Modern and Contemporary History* (1936) begins with this period, as does F. M. Anderson's *The Constitutions and Other Select Documents Illustrative of the History of France, 1789-1901* (1904-1908). There were new editions in 1935 of two works which appeared in the period of the Revolution and had a great effect upon opinion in that day: Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man*, and Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the French Revolution*.

≡ XIII ≡

CONSULATE AND EMPIRE

A SHORT time before her death in 1796 Catherine the Great of Russia predicted that if France survived the Revolution she would gladly submit to the rule of a strong man. The rising tide of French nationalism and the traditional French love of glory found great satisfaction in the military victories of the First Republic. The army and its commanders were popular and trusted, whereas the popularity of the civil government declined steadily after 1794. A military commander was the logical candidate for the fulfillment of the Tsarina's prophecy, but it must be a military commander whose popular appeal was untainted by earlier connections with the discredited political regime which he was to succeed.

Of all the generals of the new armies Napoleon Bonaparte was the one who most nearly measured up to the requirements of the situation, and the one whose personal qualifications were such that success might well attend his efforts to establish the stable government for which the French people yearned. Regardless of the fact that the Directory had been inaugurated with his assistance and had owed its continuance in power to the intervention of a military force furnished by him, his own absence in Italy and in Egypt through much of the four years during which it governed France freed him from any share in its disgrace. The brilliance of his military exploits and the striking ability he had displayed in politics and diplomacy, when he reorganized Italy and negotiated with Austria, were all known. His forceful personality and driving energy were soon to add conviction to the popular belief that he was the man of the hour. His followers became legion, and their faith in his destiny matched his own and became a part of their patriotism.

THE EARLY CAREER OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

The Napoleonic tradition has been so effective, and the story of Napoleon's military genius, of his spectacular rise to power, of his domination of Europe, and of his dramatic fall has been so well known that there is little need to do more than outline the facts of his career. It is probable that there has been more written about Napoleon than about any other historic character; his appearance, features, and stature are better known than those of other men of genius, and his personality and character have been the subjects of more discussion if not of better understanding. The Bonaparte family¹ was Italian in origin and had its beginning, so far as the earliest records show, in Tuscany, but the branch from which Napoleon was descended settled in Corsica early in the sixteenth century. The Buonapartes were of noble blood; they were poor according to the standards of European urban centers, but were among the most prosperous citizens of the patrician society of Ajaccio, the rude and primitive metropolis of the rocky island of Corsica. Napoleon was born in 1769, the second son of Carlo and Letizia Buonaparte, whose eight sons and daughters played such a prominent part in European events in the early years of the nineteenth century. Napoleon and the younger members of the family were born French subjects, for the island which had belonged to the Republic of Genoa became a possession of France in 1768.

The Corsicans had the same fierce independence and the same strong clan feeling as the Highlanders of Scotland or the American mountain whites, and their feuds were as dramatic, their loves and hates as intense as those of other isolated mountain folk. The Buonapartes were the friends and supporters of the Corsican patriot, Paoli, who led the islanders in a revolt to win their independence from France, nevertheless, the family had sufficient influence to obtain an appointment which enabled young Napoleon to obtain a military education in France at the expense of the state. He was sent to a military school at Brienne at the age of nine and from there went to another in Paris, from which in 1785, at the age of sixteen, he was commissioned a sublieutenant of artillery in the French army. Had the Revolution not occurred he would, in all probability, have

¹ Spelled Buonaparte until Napoleon himself changed the spelling during the Revolution.

remained miserably poor, unhappy, and undistinguished. A lieutenant at twenty-two, twelve years later a captain, retired on half-pay in later middle age, he would have had little to show for a life which had been devoid of romance, achievement, or glory. Wars in which France was a party might have given him opportunity for active service, but the rigid caste system of the old army would have denied him opportunity for the development of his military genius, and his name might well have been unknown outside the narrow circle in which he lived and died.

As a minor officer on garrison duty young Napoleon had ample time to read the works of the French philosophes, and he became an admirer of Rousseau. Serious, unsocial, and retiring, his leisure was spent in reading and in writing—essays, stories, and a history of Corsica. When the French Revolution began he was twenty and about to take an active part in a Corsican revolt for independence from France. The French National Assembly in November, 1789, made Corsica a department under the new constitution of France. Satisfied with this status for his beloved homeland, the young lieutenant went back to France in 1791 to rejoin his regiment, assuaged under the new regime of a career commensurate with his talents. He joined a Jacobin club and definitely threw in his lot with the French Republic in 1792, deserting the cause of Corsican independence and moving his entire family to France. His opportunity for advancement as a soldier came in December, 1793, when he was able to force the Spanish and English to withdraw from the harbor of Toulon. Officers of marked ability were advanced rapidly in those days of the great crisis, and early in 1794 he was sent to the Army of Italy as a brigadier general of artillery. General Bonaparte was a friend of the younger Robespierre and was known to be a supporter of the Jacobin cause. After the fall of the Robespierriest faction in July, 1794, his career seemed at an end. He remained in Paris through 1795, and his friendship with Barras led the Convention to call upon him, in October, 1795, for aid in preventing a revolt in Paris in protest against the notorious "two-thirds" decree whereby the Convention sought to perpetuate itself in the legislative body of the Directory.

The reward given General Bonaparte by the grateful directors was the command of the Army of Italy, and his career there and in Egypt was a part of the history of the period of the Directory. The *coup d'état* of November, 1799 (19th Brumaire, year VIII), made the

popular young general² one of the three consuls pledged to procure for France peace, financial stability, and the consolidation of the work of the revolutionary period in a constitution and in legal codes embodying the reforms made since 1789.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULATE

France was in no danger of invasion in the fall of 1799, for the Russian forces were retreating through Switzerland, and the French campaign in the Netherlands had been a success. The three consuls and the commissions appointed for that purpose turned their attention, therefore, to the making of a new constitution. The document which was the result of their efforts was a compromise between the widely divergent desires of Sieyès and Bonaparte. The former represented the revolutionary oligarchy and "was concerned to seek for his followers that security, permanent political office, and adequate income which was the goal of their desires."³ Neither Sieyès nor his followers could have obtained the political security they desired by popular election or without Bonaparte's support, for his strength was derived from his control over the army and his popularity with the people. Since Bonaparte was indispensable to them, Sieyès and his friends were forced to yield to him the greatest power under the new constitution, retaining for themselves lucrative positions in the administration. Bonaparte had risen to power at their invitation but was soon to become their master. They were to depend upon each other throughout the following years, but there was to be no real friendship or loyalty between oligarchy and dictator.

In December, 1799, the new constitution was ready for the approval of the French people. Executive power was vested by the constitution in three consuls named in the document. Their term was for ten years, and they were eligible to succeed themselves without

² There are several excellent biographies of Napoleon in English. The shortest and yet one of the most interesting is by H. A. L. Fisher. A. Fournier, *Napoleon I*, is an excellent longer account. J. H. Rose, *Life of Napoleon*, is largely political and military. Lord Rosebery's *Napoleon, the Last Phase*, is an excellent account of the last years of his life and of the Napoleonic legend. A more recent biography is that of F. M. Kircheisen and is an abridgment of his monumental biography of which nine volumes are completed. The most recent account is Geoffrey Bruun, *Europe and the French Imperium*. The sections given to Napoleon in Louis Gottschalk, *Era of the French Revolution*, and in Leo Gershoy, *French Revolution and Napoleon*, are adequate summaries.

³ Geoffrey Bruun, *Europe and the French Imperium*, p. 15.

restriction. Authority was centralized in the First Consul; the other two were assistants with consultative functions only. Bonaparte was named as First Consul. The other two were Cambacérès and Lebrun: the former had great legal ability and was of assistance in codifying the laws, while the latter turned his attention to financial matters. The First Consul had the right to promulgate laws, to appoint and dismiss the Council of State, ministers, ambassadors, and other government officials, including officers of the army and navy, to appoint judges, and, in general, to act with powers approaching those of a dictator.

Sieyès and his followers obtained the right to name a majority of the new Senate, which drew up a list of one hundred men to form a Tribunal and another of three hundred to form a legislative body. The salaries of these three groups were considerable, and Sieyès was thus able to control the appointment of over four hundred officials whose annual income would amount to several million francs. The reward for submitting to the rule of the First Consul was a substantial one. After this first organization of the government, the lists from which such officials would be chosen were to be drawn up by a complicated process of popular vote.¹ Although democratic forms and terminology were retained, there was little popular control over the government of the Consulate. The Council of State initiated legislation, the Tribunal debated the projects sent to it and selected a committee to present its opinion on each before a legislative body, which voted by secret ballot and without debate. The Senate decided upon the constitutionality of each measure. Such was the Constitution of the Consulate. The only obstacle to the power of the First Consul was the Senate, in which the oligarchy had entrenched itself, but with its complicated machinery and liberal terminology the constitution seemed to provide the necessary guarantees for a parliamentary government. A national plebiscite gave the constitution 3,011,007 *yeas* to 1,562 *noes*, and indirectly expressed the popular approval of a Bonapartist regime and an acquiescence in the arbitrary filling of the lists of eligibles and the government offices by the Sieyès group. France seemed willing to exchange her democratic

¹ Citizens of each commune were to choose one-tenth of their number to form a "communal list," which was to choose one-tenth to make up a departmental list. One-tenth of that list was chosen to make up a national list of "The Notables of France" from which the Senate would choose all legislators, tribunes, consuls, and so on. For the first voting for the "communal lists" manhood suffrage was permitted, but after that original vote there was little popular participation in the government.

ideals, which had never really been put into operation, for the stability promised by a government whose popular basis was the confidence of the public in Bonaparte.

When the appointments for the ministry, the Council of State, and the diplomatic and civil offices were announced it was found that Bonaparte had kept his promise to act without bias or party. The government was founded on a broad base with Jacobins, Girondists, and Royalists represented. Fouché, the ex-terrorist, was minister of police, and Talleyrand was again minister of foreign affairs. In the service of the state all petty animosities and political differences were to be forgotten. The laws against the *émigrés* were repealed, and religious toleration was decreed. The administration was efficient, hard-working, honest, and moderate. The First Consul set the pace, and it was not an easy one, for he could upon occasion work eighteen hours out of the twenty-four. Fisher says of him,

. . . and so he went his own way, trusting to his intuition, to his exact and capacious memory, to his exquisite lucidity of mind, snatching, as he went, with savage rapidity, the scraps of intellectual food which were auxiliary to action. In finance and account-keeping he was the most vigorous and exacting of masters, and every clerk who drove a quill in a Government office knew at once that the day of the sloven was over, and worked with treble energy as if the stern eye of Napoleon were glaring down on his desk.⁵

The energy, imperiousness, and administrative genius of the First Consul permeated the whole system. In these years of his rise to power Napoleon displayed remarkable elasticity of mind, a great capacity for educating himself in the techniques of government, and the most vivid interest in every problem that required solution.

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE CONSULATE

I. RESTORATION OF ORDER AND ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The restoration of order and the pacification of the western and southern areas in which royalist rebellions had broken out were primary demands upon the new government. Armed bands, financed, in part at least, by English funds, were moving back and forth through the country, and local officials were afraid to intervene.

⁵ H. A. L. Fisher, *Napoleon* (Henry Holt and Company), p. 82.

Bonaparte offered negotiation and conciliation, but when the royalist leaders refused to meet his terms, he sent General Brune into the disaffected area with an army of 60,000 men. By April of 1800 the entire West was pacified, in some places for the first time since the Vendée uprisings in 1793. The restoration of order was made permanent by the decrees which restored citizenship to the relatives of the *émigrés* and to ex-nobles. With the disappearance of civil disorder, agriculture, commerce, and industry could resume development, and the awakening confidence in the government made possible a general economic revival.

One of the first undertakings of the Consulate was to reorganize local government to harmonize with the principles upon which the national administration was operating. A law was passed on February 17, 1800, which became the permanent basis of French administration. The chief official for the department was, and is, a prefect, for the *arrondissement* a subprefect, and for each commune a mayor. All of these officials were appointed by the central government (the First Consul) and were responsible to the minister of the interior. The departmental and local councils were no longer to be elected but were appointed by the prefects, who were, in effect, as Napoleon himself said, "First Consuls in miniature." The decentralization of government apparent during the early years of the Revolution disappeared entirely, and a rigid centralization took its place. The new system had its roots in the past, for the prefects were in essential characteristics the intendants of the days of Richelieu, with this difference—the Napoleonic regime was simple, direct, and efficient.

II THE FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT

Every government of France since the days of Louis XV had found one of its greatest problems in the difficult question of national finance. No real solution had been found during the years of war and revolution, and the Directory had taken the desperate step of repudiating the inflated assignats. In the same period the government recognized the impossibility of undertaking the payment of the swollen national debt, and that, too, was in large measure repudiated. These acts discredited the already unpopular Directory but cleared the way for a restoration of national credit. The Consulate found the treasury empty and the bankers unwilling to lend money to the new government. It was not until the restoration of order at home and of peace abroad that confidence in the credit of the government was

sufficiently strong to make it possible to sell French government bonds at a price and interest rate comparable to those of English bonds. The Consulate endeavored to meet the situation by a complete reorganization of the taxation system and by strict economy in every government department. As business improved it became possible to collect the taxes, which were carefully assessed upon the principle of equality. After 1801-1802, when the budget was balanced, the Napoleonic regime had little difficulty with finance. Such lands as remained in the possession of the government were carefully administered, a sinking fund was established to guarantee the interest on the debt, and the Bank of France was created to facilitate the financial operations of the government. The coinage was standardized, and a decimal monetary system was established. The government, coming to the assistance of industry with a system of protective tariffs, gave up *laissez faire* for a sort of modified mercantilism. It is difficult to make any accurate estimate of the effect of all of these measures, for the constant wars of the Napoleonic period make it impossible to separate military from economic measures either as to cause or result.

III THE CODES NAPOLEON

The consolidation of all the changes and achievements of the period of the Revolution had been pledged by those who assumed power by the *coup d'état* of 1799. There was never any thought of a revival of the legal distinctions and inequalities of the old regime, nor was there any intention of introducing any considerable amount of new legislation. France had an immense number of laws—a chaotic mass—but no unified code. The philosophes of prerevolutionary days and every French assembly since 1789 had been fully convinced of the necessity for a codification of the laws. Had such a codification been made in 1792-1794, it is possible that much of the radicalism of that day might have been perpetuated in the French legal system. The Napoleonic period was one of authoritarianism, and the close centralization of control was reflected in the codes that were drawn up during that period. The work begun in 1800 extended through the next half-dozen years. The most eminent jurists were employed, and the First Consul himself presided over many of the sittings of the commission. The Civil Code has quite justly been called the *Code Napoléon*, for he devoted much time to the legal problems, and his insight and ability were recognized by the experts

with whom he worked. It was his constant insistence that each law under discussion be left in such shape that it would be both just and profitable.

The interests of the propertied classes were amply protected in the Civil Code, and all details of land legislation were well worked out. Titles to land acquired during the Revolution were confirmed, and, as a consequence, the peasantry looked upon Napoleon as their protector. The First Consul and the jurists had no vision as to the potentialities of the technical changes that were beginning to come in industry, and the wage-earning classes could find little protection for their interests in the new codes. Workers were denied the right to organize or to bargain collectively, and no provision was made for the unemployed. It must be remembered, however, that the new French codes were no different, in this respect, from the codes of other countries. The Code Napoléon was widely adopted by European states, by Latin American countries, and by Louisiana, where it still remains in force in modified form.

A penal code and a code of penal procedure were drawn up in the same period and were published in 1810. Reflecting the growing despotism of the Empire, they were again a compromise between the liberalism of the revolutionary period and the military dictatorship of the Napoleonic regime. The burden of proof in criminal cases rested upon the accused. Jury trial was still provided, but the jurors were chosen by the prefects; and a simple majority sufficed for decision. The criminal code and the centralized police system which was developed in this period have endured down to the present time. A commercial code (1807) completed the legal structure. In its entirety the legal system was a compromise, but the codes did contain the chief demands of the revolutionary program, and they did provide for civil equality and religious liberty.

They recognized no privileges of birth, opened all careers to men of industry and talent, promoted the distribution of property and discouraged the accumulation of large landed estates. In this sense they were a summary of the Revolution, and were so regarded in neighboring states which attacked or adopted them.⁶

⁶ Geoffrey Bruun, *Europe and the French Imperium* (Harper & Brothers), p. 28. A. Fournier, *Napoleon I*, Chapter IX, and F. M. Kirchessen, *Napoleon*, Chapter IX, give excellent accounts of the period of the Consulate.

IV. THE CONCORDAT

In the foregoing activities of the Consulate, Napoleon was only carrying out the pledges made when he assumed power in 1799. The settlement of the long dispute with the Catholic Church was his own contribution to a durable and permanent peace. Although an agnostic himself, Napoleon did not underestimate the strength of religion among the great masses of the French population. He understood fully, also, the necessity for removing one of the fundamental causes for unrest and dissatisfaction, especially among the peasantry. The *émigré* bishops and the nonjuring priests were the core of that unrest, and for their pacification he had to have the co-operation of the papacy. Negotiations were carried on in Paris for nearly two years before a satisfactory solution was reached.⁷ Even then the pope came to terms only because it was quite apparent that the military position of Napoleon was such that the papal states might easily be interfered with in case no concessions were made. When Austrian opposition to the French armies collapsed and a treaty favorable to France was signed in 1801, the pope capitulated.

The Concordat which was the result of the negotiations was another compromise solution, and it, too, was based upon French history and tradition. Evidence of the essential soundness of the compromise may be found in the fact that it governed the relations between church and state in France for a hundred years. The pope recognized the "constitutional" clergy, the reduced number of bishops, and the land settlement of the Revolution. The French government re-established the Catholic Church and acknowledged it to be the religion of the majority of Frenchmen. Payment of clerical salaries was assumed by the state. Bishops were to be nominated by the First Consul and consecrated by the pope. The lower clergy was to be chosen by the bishops. The French government made the Concordat more popular with the people as a whole by providing for the Protestant churches as well, and in addition reaffirmed the old Gallican Liberties by a decree excluding papal bulls and legates. On April 18, 1802, a solemn *Te Deum* was celebrated in the Cathedral of Notre Dame, after which the archbishops and bishops pledged their allegiance to the First Consul.

⁷ The Concordat was signed July 15, 1801, and announced April, 1802.

THE MILITARY SUCCESSES OF THE CONSULATE

The day of the celebration of the reconciliation with the papacy was also the day of the announcement of the Peace of Amiens, which concluded the decade of war with England. For the first time since April of 1792 France was at peace both at home and abroad, and the popularity of the First Consul reached its highest point. Peace might have been obtained in the fall of 1799 had Bonaparte been willing to accept peace on terms of natural boundaries of France. The victories of Masséna in Switzerland and of Brune in Holland would have made possible a peace with the preservation of the Rhine frontier even if Napoleon had remained in Egypt. The success of the *coup d'état* prolonged the war and ensured an imperialistic policy. Napoleon wanted more than the natural frontiers of France. His ambition and pride demanded that control of northern Italy which had been acquired in his first Italian campaign. Russia withdrew from the coalition in 1800, and Napoleon managed to win over the unbalanced Tsar Paul, who had succeeded his mother Catherine the Great in 1796.

In the first days of the Consulate, Bonaparte satisfied the peace party in France by insincere and inadequate proffers of peace to England and Austria, and followed their refusal, which he had fully expected, with a brilliant campaign against Austria in both Italy and Germany. He led the Italian army himself, and Moreau was dispatched through the German states toward Vienna. The battles of Marengo (June, 1800) and Hohenlinden (December, 1800) were so disastrous to Austria that a peace was concluded at Lunéville in February, 1801, which, in general, reaffirmed the provisions of the Treaty of Campo-Formio. Austria once more recognized the French conquest of Belgium, accepted the Batavian, Helvetic, and Cisalpine republics, and agreed to co-operate in a reorganization of the Rhineland states. A peace so humiliating to Austria could be little more than a truce, but it was received with joy in Paris where the prestige of the First Consul was rapidly mounting.

While engaged in the immediate practical undertaking of conquering Austria, Napoleon had been elaborating the details of one of his vast and complicated dreams for the subjection of the British Empire and for the advancement of France as a world power. His first move was to isolate Great Britain, which was accomplished in

part by making use of his friendly understanding with the Tsar Paul to bring about a League of Armed Neutrality,⁸ composed of Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden, which would block England's policy of interference with neutral commerce. Spain was persuaded to make a treaty (October, 1800) ceding Louisiana to France in return for a pledge that Tuscany would be turned over to a Spanish prince. Napoleon planned to make Louisiana the center of a vast move to destroy British colonial power in the West Indies and in Canada. This was but a part of the plan, for the king of Naples agreed to close his ports to English ships and to admit French troops into his kingdom. Napoleon's plans, apparently, included the transport of French troops through Italy and Spain to Egypt as a preliminary to a campaign whose ultimate objective was India. Portugal was persuaded (June, 1801) to cede a part of Portuguese Guiana to France and to pledge herself to bar English ships from her ports. In the fall of 1800 the United States agreed to a treaty settling all outstanding difficulties with France, thus ending the XYZ episode famous in American history.

Great Britain appeared to be completely isolated, and, choosing not to fight on entirely alone, opened negotiations with France in the spring of 1801. Negotiations dragged, however, and the grandiose schemes of Napoleon began to collapse almost as soon as they were formulated. The Tsar Paul was assassinated, and his successor, Alexander I, was unwilling to carry on his father's policy. The English won a victory in Egypt, Lord Nelson destroyed the Danish fleet at Copenhagen, and the Armed Neutrality collapsed. The desire for peace both in France and in England was strong enough, however, to lead to the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens in March, 1802, but it was evident that this peace, also, would be no more than a truce. Great Britain could never be satisfied with French possession of Belgium and French control in Holland, nor could she look with pleasure upon a French colonial enterprise that included the possession of Louisiana, the reconquest of Haiti, and the enlargement of a foothold on the mainland of South America. But a respite after almost ten years of war was desirable, and Great Britain agreed to abandon all of her colonial conquests except Ceylon and Trinidad, to turn Malta back to the Knights of St. John and Minorca to Spain, while Napoleon agreed to evacuate Egypt, Naples, and Portugal.

⁸ Such an armed neutrality had been of some importance in 1780

The dissatisfaction felt by many of the republican and atheistic army officers with the Concordat, with the terms of the peace, and with the great power assumed by the First Consul was met by a decree in March, 1802, creating a new order, the Legion of Honor, and providing handsome annuities for its members. The decorations were given by the First Consul and were granted largely to military men. A few generals who refused to be placated were sent to military or diplomatic posts outside France, while some of the most republican of the regiments were dispatched to Haiti to suppress a negro revolt on that island.

With the Peace of Amiens the pledges made at the inauguration of the Consulate had been fulfilled, and a grateful France honored the First Consul by a vote of 3,568,885 in favor of the question, "Shall Napoleon Bonaparte be Consul for life?" Only 8,374 intrepid souls voted against the measure which was a public acquiescence in the dictatorship of the First Consul and a prelude to the creation of an empire. With so emphatic a mandate from the people Napoleon assumed greater powers. The oligarchy which had elevated him to power gave up any opposition, the few Jacobins in office were defeated in carefully managed elections. A series of decrees altered the constitution and gave Napoleon the right to name his successor, to make treaties, to alter judicial decisions, to amend the constitution, to dissolve the legislative bodies, and to appoint a majority of the Senate. The press was carefully censored, and the police under Fouché were active in the suppression of the plots of the dissatisfied. It was in this period that the name "Bonaparte" was less and less frequently heard, and the use of "Napoleon" gave the First Consul the dignity of royalty. Further successes, or a new crisis, might easily serve as an impetus to the establishment of an empire.

THE REORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE

The brief period of the Life Consulate was filled with the problems of the reorganization of Italy, Switzerland, and the Rhineland. Europe as a whole could take no satisfaction from that reorganization, for it was evident that the First Consul was not content with limitations, that he did not feel that treaties were binding, and that war was a necessity for the dictatorship. In Italy, Elba, Piedmont, and Parma were added to France. Switzerland was given a more

centralized constitution than it had ever had, and was made a French protectorate. A much more difficult work was undertaken in the Rhineland, where the settlement of French claims necessitated compensation for the rights of the princelings of the Holy Roman Empire. That shadowy empire was composed of over three hundred lay and ecclesiastical states, most of them very small. In the treaties of Campo-Formio and Lunéville it was indicated that German princes whose estates lay on the French side of the Rhine might find their compensation in the ecclesiastical lands on the German bank. In 1803, Paris was the scene of a series of negotiations presided over by Talleyrand. The result of these negotiations between France and the German princes was accepted by the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire and given the formidable title, "Reichsdeputationshauptschluss." The number of German states was reduced by one half, and all but three of the ecclesiastical states disappeared. Since Napoleon wished to lessen the importance of Austria in the German states, Bavaria, Prussia, and three or four other states were strengthened out of proportion to their concessions on the left bank of the Rhine. A long step had been taken toward unification, but the states which benefited thereby lost a considerable measure of their independence, and were made to feel their dependence upon France.

RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES, 1802-1804

England did not look upon events in France and in Central Europe with equanimity. Parliament voted a mobilization of military resources; the fleet, which had been greatly augmented in the previous period of war, was kept in readiness; and the surrender of Malta to the Knights of St. John was delayed. The menace to British commerce resulting from the French hegemony in Europe and the danger to British colonies and sea power caused by the ambitious designs of Napoleon led the British government to declare war on France in May of 1803. England proceeded to capture the few remaining French colonial possessions while Napoleon took Hanover and promised aid to the Irish patriots in a revolt against England.

In the meantime, the collapse of the plans for the suppression of revolt in Haiti⁹ and the imminence of the renewal of war led

⁹ The Haitian rebels carried on war by guerilla tactics and could not be speedily put down. In the meantime yellow fever, endemic in Santo Domingo, took so many

Napoleon to discard his colonial designs. Fundamentally, they depended upon sea power, and if he were to be involved in a war with England he could not expect to control the seas sufficiently to succeed in his plans. In May, 1803, therefore, he concluded a treaty with Robert Livingston and James Monroe by which the United States purchased the whole of the Louisiana area for fifteen million dollars. The United States had been alarmed at the rumors of the retrocession of Louisiana by Spain and was willing to take any action necessary to prevent the closure of the river to the trade of the Western states. President Jefferson, pro-French though he had always been, went so far as to write that the day the French flag appeared in New Orleans would witness the marriage of the United States to the British fleet. American offers for a small area at the mouth of the river were met by Talleyrand's astounding proposal that the United States buy the whole territory, and the representatives of the United States overcame their surprise and exceeded their instructions in accepting the offer. Napoleon had sold that which he had not paid for, had agreed not to sell, and had no right to sell under the French constitution, but the dictator was a law unto himself, and Spain was too weak to make effective protest. From the viewpoint of the United States it was an excellent bargain, and the dubious constitutionality of the purchase was ignored in the general satisfaction over having, at last, acquired control of the Mississippi from its source to its mouth.

The renewal of the war with England was in a measure the cause for new royalist plots in France. British officials and *émigrés* resident in England were implicated in a vast plot to stir up a revolt in Normandy and to assassinate the First Consul. Two of the most famous of the French generals, Moreau and Pichegru, were arrested, as was Georges Cadoudal, a Breton who had taken part in earlier uprisings in the Vendée. The Bourbon princes, the brothers of Louis XVI, were undoubtedly aware of the plot, but neither of them appeared in France. Napoleon, however, seized the young duke of Enghien, who resided in the neighboring state of Baden, and had him executed after a travesty of a trial. There seems no justification for the suspicions against the duke, and Napoleon's sole reason for

lives among the French forces that the enterprise ended in failure. The negro general, Toussaint L'Ouverture, was captured and taken to France, but the French commander, Leclerc, Napoleon's brother-in-law, and 24,000 of his 33,000 men died of yellow fever. In 1804 the colony declared its independence.

the execution was that he wished to make an example of a Bourbon prince and thus discourage any further plots.¹⁰ The excitement over the royalist plot convinced the French people that only Napoleon could save the state from disaster caused by enemies at home and abroad, and even the branches of the government that had protested most against the dictatorship agreed to show the opponents of France everywhere the approval of Frenchmen for the Napoleonic regime. The First Consul was therefore offered the imperial crown, and in the spring of 1804 a plebiscite confirmed the offer by the usual overwhelming majority.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FIRST EMPIRE

The establishment of an imperial court offered opportunity for the creation of a new nobility and the rise to positions of great power of the members of Napoleon's family. The matter of the succession to the throne became of great importance, for the position was made hereditary, and Napoleon had no children. During the period of the Directory he had married Josephine Beauharnais, a young widow who was the mother of two children. There is no doubt that on Napoleon's side, at least, it was a marriage of love, and that he was a devoted husband for some years. He was fond of the Beauharnais children but did not desire to adopt them as his heirs. He was willing to provide magnificently for his many brothers and sisters but, in founding a dynasty, wished to have a son of his own as heir to the throne. Neither he nor Josephine was faithful to their marriage vows, but had it not been for dynastic reasons there might have been no open break. The acquisition of the imperial title made the divorce and remarriage inevitable, but Josephine was crowned empress in December of 1804 when Napoleon became emperor in a magnificent ceremony at Notre Dame.

¹⁰ There has always been a difference of opinion on the justifiability of the execution of the duke of Enghien. Geoffrey Bruun states flatly that Enghien was innocent, and Napoleon responsible for the violation of Baden's neutrality. Kirchsen, whose biography is somewhat eulogistic, says: "It is clear that by all the usual laws of war Enghien had deserved his punishment, not only because on his own admission he had taken money from the enemies of France, and was waiting for orders from England to invade French territory with an army at his back, but also because he had actually, at the end of 1800, fought with the army of Prince Condé. That Napoleon violated foreign territory in time of peace is quite another matter, and concerns no one but the Margrave of Baden."—F. M. Kirchsen, *Napoleon* (Harcourt, Brace and Company), pp. 257-58.

The organization of the government under the Empire was in form the same as that under the Consulate. In practice, the executive branch of the government exercised complete power. The emperor, through the Council of State, and in consultation with the Senate, governed France in accordance with the principles of an enlightened and paternalistic despotism. The legislative groups declined in importance, and the Tribunate disappeared altogether in 1808. The heart of the whole organization was the Council of State, composed of the ministers and a varying number of councilors, and presided over by the emperor.

THE NAPOLEONIC SYSTEM OF EDUCATION

The ground for the transition from Consulate to Empire had been well prepared, and after becoming emperor, Napoleon continued to use every possible agency of propaganda to maintain the prestige and popularity of the new regime. The educational system founded in the days of the Convention had from its birth been permeated with a propagandist spirit, for the revolutionists knew the value of popular support. The outline of the system had been drawn up in the early days of the Revolution, but, aside from the creation of three or four professional schools, very little of the plan had been put into effect before the advent of Napoleon. In 1802, provision was made for primary schools, secondary schools, and professional schools to be maintained at national expense. The system was not fully worked out under the Empire, for war expenditures always encroached on the rest of the national budget. The whole structure was permeated with propaganda tending toward an empire cult. School children pledged their allegiance to the emperor; disloyal teachers were dismissed; and catechisms exalting the emperor were required as texts. Napoleon preferred a military organization and discipline for the schools, and the control of the central government was well developed. In 1808, the University of France was established as a sort of governing body for the whole school system. Since relatively little was done for the primary school, the mass of the French people was less affected than might appear from a study of general principles. Private initiative and clerical institutions made themselves responsible for elementary education.

There was no freedom of press or speech during the Empire, and the number of journals and newspapers decreased steadily. The

Moniteur was the sole official journal after 1799, and Napoleon threatened, upon occasion, to make it the only newspaper of France. "Let them [the editors] comprehend," he said, "that the era of the revolution is closed, that there is now but one party, and that I shall never suffer the journals to say or do anything contrary to my interests."

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE EMPIRE

In financial and economic policies the Empire moved on much the same lines as the Consulate. Napoleon had a great horror of heavy national indebtedness, and endeavored to avoid long-term obligations as much as possible. French bonds were floated at a steadily rising figure, reaching 93 in 1807 and falling only to 45 at the time of Napoleon's abdication in 1814. Five per cent was the normal interest rate. Taxes were carefully levied and honestly and efficiently collected. The burden on the French public was lightened as far as possible by exactions on the conquered territories and dependent states. Times were, in fact, better in periods of war, and the two most serious depressions followed years of peace. Until the last few years of the Empire there was little economic distress.

Napoleon's ideas of the state might with some justice be suggested by use of the modern term *totalitarian*. In regard to commerce he was a mercantilist in policy, with attention to military as well as to economic necessities. The constant factor of war with England meant the practical disappearance of the colonial trade which had been so profitable under the Bourbons. Neutral trade was increasingly interfered with, and the seaport cities, declining in prosperity, were bitter in their discontent. Trade with the other Continental areas was stimulated, however, and was carefully regulated to the advantage of French enterprise. Inland and border cities grew as a result. Napoleon was a firm believer in the paramount importance of agriculture. The peasantry was, in general, prosperous and contented. Substitutes were sought for colonial products, and some of these substitutes, especially beet sugar and chicory, a coffee substitute, were produced to great advantage by the peasantry. For military purposes, as well as for the use of the general public, many miles of road were built, and the free movement of grain and other commodities was facilitated.

Machine technology advanced rapidly in France during the twenty-five years from 1789 to 1814. The increased use of machinery, the utilization of water power and steam power, and the factory system were characteristic of industrial development of the period after 1750, particularly after 1800. The shift in industry, begun in England, had spread into France before the Revolution. It is profitless to speculate here whether those changes known as the "Industrial Revolution" were accelerated or delayed by the wars of the Napoleonic period. It should be noted, however, that the French dictator was anxious to stimulate industrial development, and that the war policy of excluding English goods from the Continental market protected French manufacturers from their most serious competitors. Governmental assistance was given to chemists, inventors, and those willing to take the risks of establishing new industries, for Napoleon relied upon French manufacturers for aid in keeping Europe content and in bringing England to terms. With industry thriving and the price of bread relatively low, the working classes appear to have approved the imperial regime in France, at least for the first half-dozen years. Since almost nothing was done by the government in the way of relief and there was no great wave of protest, it seems safe to infer that the lower classes were sufficiently content to retain their affection for the emperor. Even after Waterloo the crowds cheered him, and it was in the artisan and peasant classes that the Napoleonic legend found its most fertile soil. He became the personification of the benefits brought to the common man by the Revolution.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1805-1807

The ten years of the Empire were years of war, of great victories for Napoleon, and of the broadening of the field of action to encompass all of Europe. In retrospect it is easy to see the seeds of ultimate disaster in the period of greatest glory and to point out with great perspicacity the reasons for the collapse of the Napoleonic control of Europe. At the time, there were few who had any inkling of the instability of the system or of its weaknesses.

The war which began in 1803 found the relative positions of England and France little changed since the Peace of Amiens. England's supremacy on the sea was as great as before. She not only had twice as many armed ships as France, but she could produce additional vessels twice as rapidly and had no dearth of officers for them

when they were completed. The British merchant marine had an even greater superiority over the French, and, properly convoyed, British commerce was safe on the high seas. One of the great pre-occupations of the British government was to make adequate use of that naval and maritime supremacy to prevent damage to British shipping and to maintain the prosperity and the taxpaying power of the British merchants. The French armies were admittedly superior, and British soldiers were not entered in the lists against them, except in the war in Spain, until the British regulars took part in the last campaigns of 1814 and 1815.

In 1803, Napoleon massed troops, called the Army of England, in northwestern France, and began the building of a vast number of flat boats for the transportation of an invading force to England. Such an invasion could not take place without the protection of a fleet sufficiently strong to hold off the British fleet. For that reason many of Napoleon's contemporaries believed that the whole plan was a ruse to cover his designs for a Continental campaign. It seems more probable that there were two plans: an invasion of England if the English fleet could be diverted and divided by French feints in the Mediterranean, and a sudden campaign eastward if the first scheme failed. The catastrophic defeat of the French fleet at Trafalgar in October, 1805, when Lord Nelson destroyed two-thirds of the French vessels, meant a complete and permanent abandonment of all plans to land a force in England.

In the meantime, a new coalition, the third since 1793, had been formed against France. When Napoleon assumed the imperial crown and, shortly thereafter, had himself crowned king of Italy (May, 1805),¹¹ Austria and Russia in August, 1805, answered Pitt's invitation to join England in an alliance.¹² Knowledge of the existence of the coalition caused Napoleon to dispatch the splendid Army of England across Europe. He joined the army at Strassburg late in September, and four weeks later, a few days before the Battle of Trafalgar, he defeated the Austrians severely at Ulm in Bavaria. On December 2 the Austro-Russian forces were decisively defeated at

¹¹ The Ligurian Republic had become a French military department in April, 1801.

¹² The first coalition ended in 1797 with the Treaty of Campo-Formio, the second had a brief existence 1799-1801. The fourth coalition followed Austerlitz, when Prussia and several of the German states joined Russia, the fifth was formed before the campaigns of 1809, the sixth, or Grand Coalition, came after 1812. In the earlier coalitions England's share was largely to furnish subsidies and sea power.

Austerlitz in a battle which Napoleon himself said was "the most splendid of all I have fought." Austria sought an armistice which on December 26 ended in the Treaty of Pressburg, by which Austria was compelled to give up Venetia, Istria, and Dalmatia to France. She ceded, also, some of her German possessions to Baden, Wurttemberg, and Bavaria, thus binding those South German states to France.

Russia was left to be dealt with later while Napoleon vied with Pitt to obtain the support of Prussia, a state that had managed to remain neutral for ten years. Her weak king, Frederick William III, had refused to be drawn into the war when Napoleon flouted Prussia's independence by sending troops through Prussian territories, and had even attempted mediation before Austerlitz. Napoleon now forced Prussia to accept Hanover, which was then in his possession, and thus to antagonize England. He followed this act by demanding that Prussia close her ports to English goods. The Prussian king accepted the dictation of Napoleon, but the people were thoroughly aroused, and the dearly bought peace was a precarious one.

Napoleon occupied himself through the spring of 1806 with a further reorganization of Italy and of the Rhineland states. Naples was occupied by the French, and Napoleon made his brother Joseph king of Naples. The Batavian Republic was turned into the Kingdom of Holland and given to his brother Louis. In August, 1806, Napoleon abruptly announced to the Imperial Diet of the Holy Roman Empire that he no longer recognized the existence of the Empire. Francis II consented to give up the title of Holy Roman Emperor and was thereafter known as the Emperor of Austria. For more than eight hundred years the Holy Roman Empire had been the one bond that held the Germanies together. For centuries the emperors strove to make that bond strong enough to permit the development of a strong nation-state, a Germany instead of "the Germanies." Their failure was recorded in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The surrender of the empty title in 1806 but recognized the fact that there was no life in the old imperial organization. For it Napoleon substituted the Confederation of the Rhine, made up of sixteen states in southern Germany and bound to France by an agreement whereby the Code Napoléon was adopted and Napoleon was named Protector. In turn the Confederation pledged itself to furnish 63,000 soldiers for the armies of France. As in the settlement of the left

bank question, Germany gained in unity but lost independence in becoming a satellite of France.

The great English prime minister, Pitt, died early in 1806 and was followed by Charles James Fox, who began peace negotiations with Talleyrand in the course of which France suggested the return of Hanover to England in return for certain British concessions. The negotiations, as fruitless as similar ones with Russia, both ended in the fall of 1806, and Prussia was duly informed by England of Napoleon's duplicity in regard to Hanover. A further irritant was provided by the attempt on the part of Napoleon's brother-in-law, Murat, who had been made duke of Berg and Cleves, to increase his territory by annexing parts of the Prussian domain. Urged on by the patriotic Queen Louisa, the Prussian king at last rebelled and issued an ultimatum immediately followed by war. In October the battles of Jena and Auerstadt marked the defeat of Prussia, and Napoleon entered Berlin. Early in 1807 a campaign against the Russian army was opened with the bloody Battle of Eylau, but it was not until June that Russia sued for peace after her defeat at Friedland. In the meantime French diplomacy won a victory in the Levant, when the sultan of Turkey joined forces with Napoleon. The Turks prevented a British fleet from landing in Egypt, and the sultan declared war on Russia to block Russian aggression in Rumania.

THE TREATIES OF TILSIT

The tsar of Russia was ready to make peace, and he found Napoleon more than amenable, for the emperor of France wished to draw Russia into the orbit of a policy designed to ruin English commerce. The two emperors met on a raft on the Niemen River (June, 1807) and drew up the Treaty of Tilsit (signed July 7) by which Russia agreed to close all Russian ports to English goods, to agree to any changes Napoleon might make in Italy, Spain, or Portugal, and to form an alliance with France. Napoleon agreed to permit the Russians to take any measures they liked against Turkey, in spite of the fact that the sultan was his ally, to abstain from resurrecting the Kingdom of Poland, and to acquiesce in the Russian acquisition of Finland. Prussia was then forced to sign a treaty which provided for the creation of the Duchy of Warsaw from her Polish territories, and for the organization of the Kingdom of Westphalia, which was made up of Prussia's western provinces plus several small north-

western German states. The king of Saxony became duke of Warsaw, and Napoleon's brother, Jerome,¹⁸ became king of Westphalia. Prussia, too, was forced to close her ports to British trade.

Many historians have regarded the Treaties of Tilsit as the summit of Napoleon's career and the beginning of the end of his glory. It is true that he was to add more territories to France in the next two or three years, and that there were to be further victories for the armies of France, but after Tilsit he was "attempting the impossible." Talleyrand, always shrewd and a keen student of history and diplomacy, was in charge of the negotiations before the Treaty of Pressburg and urged the lenient treatment of Austria on the grounds that a permanent European peace could never be obtained if France forced all other powers into opposition. Crane Brinton, in his *Lives of Talleyrand*, asserts that the break between Napoleon and Talleyrand may be traced from that date although the foreign minister did not resign until 1807, and then because of his disapproval of Napoleon's Spanish policy. All of the members of Napoleon's entourage who had any regard for historical precedent felt that the attempt at the domination of all Europe could not succeed. At Erfurt in 1808 Talleyrand assured the tsar that in the attainment of the natural boundaries of France the policy had been truly French, but that beyond that point all had been Napoleon, nothing France. Throughout the many phases of his career Talleyrand was loyal to his conception of what constituted the interests of France, but "he was no man to follow a master through to a well-earned defeat." At Pressburg, at Tilsit, and again in the settlement imposed upon Spain steps were taken that led to disaster.

THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

The realization of Napoleon's dream for the domination of Europe could not be complete without the subjection of England. After the French defeat in the naval Battle of Trafalgar there was no possibility of the invasion of England or of further dispute of Britain's command of the seas. Until the Peninsular campaign in Spain English troops were kept out of the conflict. Her opponents, therefore, were forced to use other methods than direct attack, and out of that necessity came the grandiose scheme which Napoleon

¹⁸ Jerome was required to give up his American wife, Elizabeth Patterson, and to marry the daughter of the king of Wurttemberg.

himself called the Continental system. By it he expected to ruin England's prosperity and destroy her political influence, but the effect upon England was far below Napoleon's hopes, and he was led on to measures which were fatal to his own power.

The ramifications of the Continental system were numerous and complex, but in origin, at least, the plan was simple and based on traditional French policy. Through the later seventeenth and much of the eighteenth century France and England had been engaged in wars in which each belligerent used tariffs, blockades, embargoes, and attempts at the regulation of neutral trade. The destruction of the commercial prosperity of the enemy had long been recognized as a valuable war measure. To force its own goods upon the enemy and to prevent the sale of enemy exports were policies logical for a belligerent familiar with mercantilistic principles. The extension of such tactics to cover the whole of Europe was the innovation of Napoleon. Neutrals had always suffered from such commercial conflict, and, as the scope of operations widened, neutral distress increased. The wide extension of English commerce had made much of Europe dependent upon English trade, and every war meant an opportunity to further English commercial interests. As English manufacturing developed, English goods were carried to all European ports, and British trade became vital to the economic welfare of European countries. Napoleon not only hoped to ruin England through the destruction of her commerce but also to substitute French-manufactured goods for those of England and thus establish a French economic hegemony of Europe to supplement the political control extended by his victorious armies.

From the renewal of war with England in 1803 commercial weapons were used by both belligerents. It was, in fact, a new French tariff law disadvantageous to English commerce that made the war inevitable. When the French occupied Hanover the English government retaliated by a blockade of the coast from the Elbe to the Weser. After Austerlitz Napoleon was free to put his plans against England into effect, and the French tariff of April, 1806, excluded cotton manufactured goods and laid heavy duties upon colonial products. In the same period France forced Prussia to close her Baltic ports to English trade, and England again retaliated by Orders in Council, known as the Fox blockade (May, 1806), which closed the ports from Brest to the Elbe. This blockade was largely "paper," for Fox let neutrals know that it would be enforced only from Havre to Ostend.

But it was the first of a long series of Orders and Decrees that were to result in the downfall of Napoleon and in a conflict that included not only all of Europe but the United States as well.

It was not until November, 1806, after the Battle of Jena that Napoleon was free to announce his policy of "conquering the sea by the land." The Berlin Decree declared all of the British Isles in a state of blockade, made all British products liable to seizure, ordered the arrest of British subjects in territory occupied by the French, and refused access to Continental ports to all vessels coming from ports of Great Britain or her colonies and to any vessels calling at such ports after the proclamation of the decree. Since there was no strong French fleet, Napoleon had no intention of attempting to enforce the blockade of the British Isles. The chief effect of the decree, therefore, was the damage done to neutral trade. The decree worked hardship, also, for the merchants and manufacturers of France and other European countries, but Napoleon considered that the expected damage to England would more than compensate in the end. Once again British reprisals took the form of Orders in Council (January, 1807) which forbade neutrals to engage in the European coasting trade. This was another blow to American merchants, for the coasting trade was lucrative, and many American vessels were in the habit of picking up considerable profits visiting various European ports, after disposing of their cargoes of American and colonial products, and before loading for their return voyage.

In the summer of 1807 Napoleon completed his plans for the establishment of the Continental system by the Treaties of Tilsit, which drew Russia and Prussia into its orbit. Austria was forced to close her ports as well. Learning that Denmark was about to be drawn in also, an English fleet sailed into the Baltic, bombarded Copenhagen, and captured the Danish fleet. Denmark, furious at the insult, became a loyal ally of France and enforced the French decrees in Danish ports. When Sweden refused to accept French dictation, a Russian army invaded Finland, and closed the eastern Baltic ports. Napoleon then turned to Southwestern Europe to bring Portugal and Spain into line. Spain had been a more or less willing satellite of France since 1795 and was now involved with Napoleon in a plot to partition pro-English Portugal and to close all ports of the Iberian Peninsula to British trade. France was to control Lisbon, the northern part of Portugal was to go to the young Spanish prince, who had been promised the kingdom of Etruria when Spain re-ceded Louisiana

to France in 1800. Etruria was to be taken over by Napoleon. The southern third of Portugal was to be given to Godoy, the prime minister of Spain. A French army was then dispatched to Portugal to capture Lisbon and the Portuguese royal family. Marshal Junot reached Lisbon in November, 1807, but found that the Braganza family had escaped with British assistance and was safely on its way to the Portuguese colony of Brazil. In the same period Napoleon, finding that British trade was seeping in through the Papal States and through some of the old Hansa towns of North Germany, took over the territories of the pope and the commercial cities of Hamburg and Bremen.

In theory, at least, the whole of the European coast from the Adriatic to the eastern Baltic was now under the sway of Napoleon and closed to British ships, and goods of British manufacture could not reach Europe even in neutral ships. England retaliated by another Order in Council (November, 1807) declaring that all ports from which the British flag was excluded were to be considered closed as though they were "actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner." This statement was followed by an exception which permitted an indirect trade with Continental ports if neutral vessels stopped en route at an English port and obtained a special British license. By this device Great Britain endeavored to compel all trade to go through British channels and to force the British goods on the Continental market through licensed trade. Napoleon immediately countered by the Milan Decree (December, 1807) which stated that any vessel stopping at a British port or carrying a British license would be considered British and subject to capture. In his eyes there were no longer any neutral states, and England was now cut off from the Continent and from all trade save with her own colonies.¹⁴

Such, then, was the structure of the Continental system upon which Napoleon staked the fate of his empire. By isolating England economically he hoped to break the power of the island empire and make possible the realization of his dream, of the acquisition of India and the establishment of a French colonial empire. He expected, also, to build up French industry and commerce to supplant English goods

¹⁴ There are excellent accounts of the Continental system in Louis Gottschalk, *Era of the French Revolution*, Part II, Book I, Chap. IV, and in Leo Gershoy, *The French Revolution and Napoleon*, Chap. XVII. Samuel Morison has done a very interesting history of the United States for English readers which he calls the *Oxford History of the United States*. Volume I contains a good account of the Napoleonic wars from an American point of view.

and traders permanently in the European markets. England's tactics, therefore, were to frustrate such schemes by maintaining the prosperity of her merchants by every usable device and by insinuating goods into every possible loophole in Napoleon's cordon around Europe. It was, to a great extent, a contest of endurance, and the next five years were years of strain on both sides. The pressure upon neutrals and upon Napoleon's allies and the dependent states became intolerable. In France and in England there was less danger of an open break, but discontent and unrest were evident.

THE UNITED STATES AS A NEUTRAL, 1805-1812

As the control of Napoleon was extended to include almost all of Europe, the only commercial neutral of any importance was the United States. Between 1793 and 1795 the young Western republic had had its first experience with the difficulties which might involve neutrals when great maritime powers were belligerent. The British practices of the impressment of American seamen, the enforcement of the Rule of 1756, and the extension of the contraband lists to include foodstuffs had brought the United States close to war in those years. The Jay Treaty and the gradual easement of war conditions after 1795 relieved the tension, and there was a decade of prosperity for the merchants of the United States. The British courts eased the Rule of 1756 by ruling in the case of the "Polly" that a vessel which broke its voyage from the French West Indies to France by stopping at a United States port acquired a neutral character for its cargo and was thus free from molestation. After the war was renewed in 1803 the situation grew steadily worse. In the case of the "Essex" in 1805 the British courts reversed the "Polly" decision, and the capture of United States commercial vessels was resumed.

Sailors were a prime necessity for the maintenance of British naval supremacy, but the life on British ships of the line was hard, and desertions were many. The British navy made use of its belligerent right of visit and search to impress British seamen found on American merchant vessels, and when it was difficult to be sure of the nationality of members of the crews, able-bodied seamen were often taken regardless of their American citizenship. There were illegal practices on both sides: the United States ports harbored deserters who were often able to acquire fraudulent citizenship papers before taking lucrative jobs in the service of the thriving Yankee merchants.

The officers of British boarding crews disregarded all papers, and filled their quotas so arbitrarily that nearly 10,000 American seamen were impressed. The question of impressment caused a bitter anti-British sentiment in the United States, and might easily have caused a war in 1807 after the "Chesapeake" and "Leopard"¹⁵ affair, had President Jefferson not been determined to avoid war.

An English squadron hovered off the coast of the United States in order to capture vessels putting out for French ports. At this point, when merchants of the United States were already harassed in their efforts to take advantage of trade opportunities that promised extraordinarily rich returns, began the battle of Orders in Council and Imperial Decrees by which Great Britain and Napoleon each endeavored to use economic weapons to reach an adversary too powerful to be attacked in its own sphere.

In 1806 Congress passed a nonimportation act and vainly endeavored to obtain a treaty with England to ease the situation. In 1807 after the "Chesapeake" and "Leopard" affair the harbors of the United States were closed to British naval vessels, and an embargo act kept all United States vessels in home harbors in an effort to bring economic pressure to bear upon the belligerents and to force a relaxation of the Orders and Decrees. The belligerents, however, found the embargo an aid to their own policies, while its effect upon American commerce was destructive. Even under the worst conditions there were great profits to be had in the European trade. The commercial centers of the Northeast, badly hurt by the embargo, evaded its provisions to such an extent that supplementary enforcement acts were necessary. Many ship captains, learning of the act, did not come back to a United States port but traded under British license, running the risk of capture in order to profit by the great gains to be made in the carrying trade. The agricultural Southern states were hurt, also, for the prices of staple crops dropped, and land values fell. The chief damage done by the Embargo Act was to citizens of the United States. In 1809 it was repealed to be followed by a nonintercourse act that opened trade with all countries except France and

¹⁵ The "Chesapeake" was an American naval vessel which was fired upon by the British vessel, the "Leopard." Several American seamen were killed and others "impressed." Whatever legality the British could claim for ordinary impressment did not apply in this case, for the "Chesapeake" was a national and not a merchant vessel. The British government was willing to make reparations for the act of which she recognized the illegality but refused to surrender either the principle or practice of impressment in general.

England. A year later that act also was repealed to be followed by a new law which provided that as soon as either France or England revoked its decrees against American commerce the Nonintercourse Act would be renewed against the other country.

In the meantime, both France and England captured American vessels. England's control over the seas made her depredations more numerous, but many American vessels operated with profit under the license system. The British West Indies were opened under license, also, and American vessels were admitted to British trade wherever it seemed to the advantage of Great Britain. French interference came through privateers and at European ports. By the Bayonne Decree in 1808 and the Rambouillet Decree in 1810 Napoleon confiscated American ships in European harbors on the grounds that, since the Embargo Act prohibited such trade, the vessels were presumed to be British. In 1810 Napoleon deluded the American government into believing that he had repealed the Berlin and Milan Decrees. President Madison, under pressure at the same time from groups of Western congressmen who desired a war with England in order to acquire Canada and Florida, was led to consider British persistence in maintaining the Orders in Council and the British refusal to give up impressment as causes for war. The United States became a pseudo ally of Napoleon (June, 1812) in a war which had little effect upon the European conflict, then in its last phase, except to divert a little of England's attention from the European scene. The war was very unpopular in the United States from the first, especially in New England, the home of the shipping interests in defense of which, ostensibly, it was undertaken. Neither in England nor the United States was there much enthusiasm for the war, and peace negotiations were under way from the first months of conflict. Neither side made any remarkable military showing. The American navy gave a good account of itself, and there was one memorable land battle—that under General Jackson at New Orleans—but it was fought a month after the treaty of peace was signed. The United States was unable to acquire the desired Western and Southern lands or to force the British to agree to the limitation of belligerent rights. The Treaty of Ghent (1814) did little except end what had been throughout a most unnecessary, inglorious, and profitless war.¹⁶

¹⁶ It was one of the ironies of this war that Great Britain voluntarily repealed the Orders in Council just five days after Congress declared war. Had there been an Atlantic cable, war would probably have been avoided. The reasons for the British

EUROPEAN REVOLT AGAINST THE NAPOLEONIC
DICTATORSHIP

A desire to make the Continental system complete and effective caused Napoleon to become involved in an adventure in Spain that was to be one of the major causes for the collapse of his power. The Spanish monarchy was weak, and by exercise of Machiavellian tactics, Napoleon in 1808 persuaded both Charles IV and his son Ferdinand to abdicate. He then placed his brother Joseph¹⁷ on the throne of Spain and kept the Spanish royal family prisoners in France until the end of the Empire. The result in Spain was a genuine nationalistic uprising accompanied by persistent guerilla warfare. Instead of the mere garrison Napoleon had thought necessary for the command of the Spanish situation, he had to go there himself in the winter of 1808-1809, at the head of an army of 200,000 men. The opposition was driven back into the mountains only to reappear when the French troops were diminished. The English took advantage of the situation, and in 1808 the Peninsular campaign began which was to end only when the English and the Spanish crossed the Pyrenees in 1814.

The next break in the close control of Europe came in the east. Tsar Alexander I had never been satisfied with the Treaty of Tilsit. There was much protest in Russia because of the effect of the Continental system upon an economic setup geared to English trade. Alexander I was convinced that Napoleon was insincere in his promises of help against Turkey and that he would never back Russia's interests there. The fact that Russia had acquired Finland and was permitted to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia was not considered adequate compensation for her loss of independence of action, and Alexander was irritated further by Napoleon's harsh treatment of Prussia. In September, 1808, Prussia was forced to agree to an amendment to the Treaty of Tilsit by which she was forbidden to have an army of more than 42,000 at any one time. Napoleon endeavored to bring the tsar to a greater enthusiasm for his French alliance during a conference at Erfurt in October, 1808, but he found the task difficult and came to the conclusion that Russia could not be relied upon. The best

action were the need for foodstuffs for the Peninsular campaign and the increasing need of the manufacturers for markets. The absence of the Yankee ships might benefit the merchants of England, but the manufacturers had suffered.

¹⁷ Joseph had been king of Naples and was followed there by his brother-in-law, Murat.

that he could obtain was a renewal of the terms of Tilsit with additional French concessions in regard to the Balkans.

Only half reassured as to the situation in Eastern Europe, Napoleon hastened back to direct the campaign in Spain, only to be summoned from his successes there by an intrigue against him in Paris and by news of warlike preparations in Austria. In Paris Fouché and Talleyrand had joined in a plot for the deposition of Napoleon; they were betrayed, and Napoleon's return ended the conspiracy. Talleyrand resigned¹⁸ after a scene in which the language of the emperor was such that those who were present did not dare report it in full. Talleyrand is reported to have remarked after the interview, "What a pity that so great a man has been brought up so badly."

The news from Austria was serious and could not be treated solely with invective no matter how unprintable. Napoleon's treatment of the Spanish ruling house was looked upon as an insult by all those who wore crowns themselves, and the difficulties of the French in Spain were regarded by Austria as an opportunity for an attempt to free herself from the French yoke. In the three years since Austerlitz, Austria had been preparing for such an opportunity. The Archduke Charles, who reorganized the Austrian army, Count Stadion, the new chancellor, and a young man named Count Metternich worked together to prepare Austria for the contest. England promised aid in this fifth coalition, but Prussia and Russia remained neutral. Napoleon swept across Europe with an army that was far inferior to the troops he had led at Austerlitz. Three hundred thousand veterans had been left in Spain, and the army against Austria was made up largely of young conscripts. It was, however, victorious at Wagram, and by the Treaty of Vienna in October, 1809, Austria lost her western provinces to Bavaria, and Trieste and the coastal strip at the head of the Adriatic to France.¹⁹ Austria gave up the provinces she had taken from Poland in the eighteenth century—the eastern portion to Russia, the western to the grand duchy of Warsaw.

The humiliation of Austria somewhat restored French prestige, but was a hollow victory for Napoleon, who realized that the tsar's

¹⁸ His position as grand chamberlain. He had left the foreign office in 1807. His motives both in the 1807 resignation and in the conspiracy were apparently his thorough disapproval of and lack of confidence in Napoleon's plans for empire.

¹⁹ They were added to Dalmatia to form the Illyrian provinces of the French Empire.

refusal to send troops in fulfillment of his treaty obligations meant that he could no longer be depended upon. One more addition to French territory was made in 1809, however, when Napoleon annexed the estates of the church which he had held for a year. When the pope excommunicated the French emperor, he was seized and carried off to France (in 1812) to the amazement and horror of every devout Catholic in France.

THE FAILURE OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

Had the Continental system been successful in eliminating English goods from the Continental markets and in stimulating French industry and commerce, all of the troubles in which it had involved Napoleon might have been considered worth their cost. It is doubtful, even in that event, that it could have reduced England to starvation and surrender. As it was there were so many loopholes and so much evasion that the total effect was deleterious for France. The commercial war failed for several reasons—the extensive smuggling by every known device and method, the lack of adequate means of enforcement and of officials anxious to make it effective, and the extensive system of licensed trading on both sides. Prices of imported goods were high to the consumer, and smugglers and corrupt officials grew rich in the profits of such trade while the French treasury suffered. English manufactured goods were sold in sufficient amounts to keep English factories going, and new markets opened up in the Spanish colonies which revolted against the French regime in Spain. Ship captains learned the fine art of carrying double papers and faked licenses of both the French and the English governments in such a way that their trade was but another form of smuggling.

In 1810 Napoleon was forced by the failure of his "System" to take further steps which not only antagonized Europe but played havoc with French merchants and manufacturers. By tariffs and regulations he endeavored to make the government rather than the smugglers benefit by the trade with English and neutral vessels and admitted British colonial goods under very high duties provided that an equal value in French goods be carried out of France. He ordered the destruction of all British-manufactured goods everywhere in the Empire and used military corps and special courts to carry out his orders. The public burning of English textiles infuriated the popu-

lation, especially in the German states, without having any noticeable effect upon England.

In general, it may be said that British exports were not seriously affected by the Continental system, although British shippers suffered somewhat by having to permit neutral vessels to handle much of the trade under license. New markets were found in South America and the West Indies. British control and British trade were advanced in India and in South Africa, and Great Britain picked up small additions to her colonial empire as the war went on. France did develop many substitutes such as beet sugar, and the chickory used as a substitute for coffee, and started the extensive cultivation of potatoes and tobacco. The French silk industry was thriving, and a few other industries gained some advantage from the restriction of imports. These slight benefits were more than offset by the hard times that came after 1810. Both England and France suffered in the last years of the war, but it would be difficult to prove that the economic depression in England was caused by anything other than the unavoidable difficulties caused by the prolongation of the war. In France prices rose, banks curtailed their loans, the credit situation was strained, and manufacturers closed their establishments. The harvests of 1810 and 1811 were poor, and unemployment increased. The last three years of the Empire were years of economic paralysis.

At the time when economic difficulties were increasing and the "running sore" in Spain was sapping the strength of the Empire, Napoleon's personal prestige and the geographical extent of his realm were at their highest point. The French Senate granted him a divorce from Josephine, and in April of 1810 he married Marie Louise, the daughter of the emperor of Austria. A year later the birth of a son, who was called the king of Rome, at last established the dynasty. In 1810, in order to stop infractions of his commercial decrees, he annexed a part of Hanover, the cities of Bremen, Lubeck, and Hamburg, a part of the western Prussian provinces, and all of Holland, and in 1811 he added two or three more small areas to France. The Empire was then at its greatest extent—and within a few years of its collapse.

THE REGENERATION OF PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA

The rising tide of nationalism was nowhere stronger than in Prussia, where, after Tilsit, a genuine spiritual regeneration was re-

flected in all branches of the government. In 1807 Prussia gave up nearly half of her territory to Napoleon and agreed to enforce the Continental system and to maintain French garrisons in her fortresses.²⁰ The burden was intolerable, for the restrictions upon trade ruined the merchants, and the financial exactions of the French played havoc with the national treasury. Prussian patriots realized that thoroughgoing reforms were necessary before Prussia would be in any shape to throw off the French yoke. Army and government alike had deteriorated steadily since the days of Frederick the Great. The French menace furnished the impetus necessary for drastic and liberal reforms and for the creation of an intense national feeling. The reforms of the French Revolution came to the Germanies in the train of a strong anti-French sentiment! The movement presented many aspects. Philosophers such as Kant (who died in 1804) and Fichte wrote and lectured on ethics, religion, and politics in their effort to develop a sense of German unity and of patriotic zeal for the state. Public-spirited Germans came into the Prussian civil service and gave their time and energies to making a new Prussia ready to lead in the cause of liberation. Baron Stein, Hardenberg, and Scharnhorst were among these civil servants. They abolished serfdom, began to free the state from medievalism, secured funds for education, reorganized the army, and reformed the bureaucracy. Becoming alarmed at the extent of the reform movement, Napoleon forced the king of Prussia to dismiss Stein and made Prussia agree to limit her army to 42,000 men. Nevertheless the work went on. By training 42,000 men, and sending them home as reserves while other recruits received their training, the army built itself up to nearly 200,000 by 1812, and Prussia was ready to play her part in the War of Liberation.

Austria's first attempt at regeneration had led to a premature trial of strength in 1809, but the work went on after the humiliating Treaty of Vienna, and Austria, too, awaited an opportunity to strike. Napoleon's work of consolidating the smaller German states played its part in his downfall, for a desire for unification spread throughout the Germanies, and a genuine German nationalism was felt. The movement was liberal as well, and, in general, the reforms of the French Revolution were the aspiration of German patriots. In order to bring Sweden into line, Napoleon, after Tilsit, had thrust his gen-

²⁰ Part of the time 150,000 French troops lived off the Prussian resources.

eral, Bernadotte, upon the Swedish king as the heir to the throne. Sweden shared in the general restlessness, and Bernadotte, more loyal to his new country than to his former master, was to swing the Swedish forces into the war against Napoleon in 1813. Denmark and Saxony were to be the only allied states to remain loyal to the emperor until the end of his career. Elsewhere the foundations of the Empire were crumbling even when the superstructure appeared most magnificent and Napoleon's prestige was yet high.

THE BREAK WITH RUSSIA

The economic strain caused by the Continental system, the psychological effect of constant warfare, and the rising tide of nationalism all contributed to the collapse of Napoleon's empire. It was becoming apparent after 1810 that another vital factor was the disintegration of Napoleon's own character and leadership. The overwhelming egotism and faith in his own destiny that had carried him to power were now so exaggerated, because of the years of success and power, that his judgment, formerly so acute, played him false. Adulation, not criticism, was expected of courtiers, ministers, and marshals. His military genius was still beyond question, but he was willing to take risks that were far too great, and he fatally underestimated the forces that had been aroused against him. France itself was tired of despotism and desperately war-weary. Economic stagnation, revolt against conscription, and disillusionment were enemies against which there was no defense.

The fatal step was the break with Russia in 1812. Relations between the two emperors had been strained since 1808. The creation of the duchy of Warsaw and Napoleon's encouragement of Polish nationalism antagonized the tsar, as did the harshness with which Prussia was treated. The antagonism became more bitter when it became apparent that Napoleon had no intention of furthering Russia's designs against Turkey. The Continental system, however, was the main cause for the break. It could not succeed without Russia's co-operation, and its effects upon Russian trade and economic well-being were disastrous. In 1810 the tsar refused to exclude neutral vessels from Russian harbors. Later in the same year he raised the tariffs on the main French exports to Russia to such a point that importation almost ceased. After this, war was looked upon by both monarchs as inevitable, and they made extensive diplomatic and military prepa-

rations. Prussia and Austria were not yet ready to take part in a campaign against Napoleon and were forced instead to aid the French. The Poles blocked any Russian advance toward the west. Only Sweden and Turkey came to the aid of Russia—Sweden in an alliance, and Turkey with a benevolent neutrality which freed the Russian troops for service in the north.

There was no formal declaration of war, and the campaign began with the advance of Napoleon's army into Lithuania in June of 1812. This was the largest army that had ever been assembled. About two-thirds of the six hundred and fifty thousand men were not Frenchmen but were contributed by the allied, dependent, and subject states of the Empire. Before any great battles had occurred the army had lost one hundred thousand men by desertion, disease, and fatigue. Again it was apparent that the magnificent fighting machine of Ulm and Austerlitz was a thing of the past. Napoleon had intended to winter at Smolensk, but, deciding that progress had been rapid and that there were some months of favorable weather ahead, he marched on to Moscow. At Borodino Napoleon and the vanguard of the French, about one hundred and fifty thousand men, met a Russian force of about one hundred and thirty thousand in one of the bloodiest battles of modern times. Moscow was entered on September 14, but it was a profitless achievement, for, by order of the governor of the city, fires had been started before the Russians left, and much of the city was destroyed. With winter approaching and the city uninhabitable, Napoleon ordered a retreat. The story of the agonies of that winter march are too well known to need repetition.²¹ Cold, hunger, and constant attacks from the rear steadily reduced the ranks of the polyglot French forces. The Niemen was recrossed in December, and the disorganized, exhausted remnants returned to the point from which the Grand Army had started out six months before. Between three and five hundred thousand men had been lost. The Russian campaign was a disaster of major proportions, a calamity from which there could be no recovery.

²¹ The recently published diary of the duke of Caulaincourt, who was Master of Horse and one of the members of Napoleon's official entourage, contains a most dramatic account of the years 1811-1815

THE GRAND COALITION OF 1813

And yet Napoleon made almost superhuman efforts to bring about a recovery. Leaving the army under Marshal Murat, he hastened back to Paris by carriage and found that news of the disaster had preceded him and that Paris was in the throes of a republican conspiracy. The plot was suppressed, and a new army was called together. Conscripts not yet of age for service and forced levies on his allies made up an army of two hundred and fifty thousand which must meet the sixth coalition. After the retreat from Moscow Prussia and Austria took heart. Stein was sent back to Prussia, and an alliance was made with Russia. The spring campaign of 1813 was indecisive, but in June Russia, England, and Prussia made an agreement not to make a separate peace with Napoleon. England pledged the usual subsidies. Austria came into the alliance on June 27, after having failed in an effort to persuade Napoleon to agree to terms that would have cut his possessions to France, Belgium, the Rhineland, and part of Italy. Napoleon has often been condemned for this refusal, and yet he could not risk the effect upon France of such an admission of defeat. In the meantime, the Spanish and English forces under the duke of Wellington crossed the Pyrenees in the fall of 1813. Spain was lost irretrievably, and no compromise terms of peace could restore the prestige of the emperor.

By September of 1813 the allied forces had between eight and nine hundred thousand men, while Napoleon could muster less than seven hundred thousand. At Leipzig in the middle of October came the final great test of arms in a great struggle called the Battle of the Nations. The defeat of Napoleon's forces was complete, and the War of Liberation was won. Napoleon returned to Paris to make an attempt to rally France, only to find that the docility of the French people was a thing of the past and that they answered his entreaties and demands with a sort of sullen resistance that boded ill for the future. Early in 1814 the allies entered France, and, against terrific odds, Napoleon fought in northeastern France what has been considered one of his most brilliant campaigns. But all his effort was of no avail, for all Europe was massed against him. The allies offered terms on the basis of the boundaries of 1791, but Napoleon refused to listen. In the meantime jealousy and dissension nearly broke up the united front of his opponents. The English foreign minister,

Castlereagh, was able, however, to restore some measure of concord, and early in March the allies signed the Treaty of Chaumont by the terms of which each power agreed to furnish a specified number of men for the campaign, to refrain from making any separate peace, and to protect each other against France for twenty years. England pledged additional subsidies. Fighting was renewed, and on March 31 Paris surrendered.

THE END OF THE FIRST EMPIRE

Talleyrand used the months of the spring of 1814 for intrigues with the allies by means of which the restoration of the Bourbons was agreed upon. Talleyrand arranged for the deposition of Napoleon and obtained the pledge of the allies that France should receive a liberal constitution. After the capitulation of Paris events moved relentlessly to the prearranged conclusion. The Senate was called together, a provisional government was formed and Napoleon was deposed. He then abdicated in favor of his son, but the brother of Louis XVI was called to the throne. On April 11, Napoleon announced his unconditional abdication and accepted the terms of the allies—he might retain his title of emperor and reign in full sovereignty over the little Island of Elba which he might never leave. Ample financial provision was made for his “court” and his family. The Empress Marie Louise was given the duchy of Parma for herself and her son.

By the Treaty of Paris (signed May 30, 1814) the French boundaries were fixed as of January, 1792, and there was to be no indemnity and no army of occupation. Talleyrand had done his work well, and the returning Bourbons were not to be penalized for the evils committed in the name of France during the years of their absence. By the construction of strong barrier states on the north and east, the treaty endeavored to protect Europe from any further aggression on the part of France, and England made sure of her command of the Mediterranean and of the routes to India. All the rest of the necessary reorganization of Europe was left for a great international Congress which was to meet in Vienna in September of 1814. The returning Bourbons met with no enthusiastic welcome, and it was obvious that France would tolerate no restoration of the old regime. Louis XVIII found it necessary to make his compromise with the Revolution and to accept the changes that had come to France during

his twenty-five years of exile. In the Charter of 1814 France obtained a constitution which ensured the fundamental results of the Revolution.

The fall of 1814 found Napoleon on the Island of Elba, the diplomats of Europe in Vienna, and the Bourbons back in France. But there was much unrest. The soldiers of France were dissatisfied, many of them discharged, the officers retired on half pay. High taxes antagonized the wealthy classes, and the manufacturers suffered from the revival of competition from abroad. The peasants were alarmed because of rumors that the *émigrés* were to receive such confiscated estates as still remained unsold. Liberals were disturbed at measures restricting freedom of the press and of speech. The whole process of readjustment was difficult, and there were evidences of an ominous unrest. The overthrow of the throne was discussed, and already men were looking to Elba for some move that might crystallize the discontent. Before the end of 1815 an astute observer might have warned the diplomats quarreling at Vienna that Elba was far too close to France for the safety of the principle of legitimacy upon which they were building the treaty that was to redraw the map of Europe.

On March 1, 1815, Napoleon landed in France, and two weeks later he was in Paris, welcomed by the peasants and the ex-soldiers but looked upon with dread and dislike by the other classes. Once more the Bourbons fled, and France was for a few weeks an empire. The allies rushed troops against the army hastily assembled by Napoleon. Wellington came back from Vienna to lead the troops at the Battle of Waterloo, and by the middle of June the hopeless attempt ended in failure. The eagle left France for the last time, and the deposed emperor ended his life a prisoner of England, on the little Island of St. Helena off the coast of Africa. The Hundred Days were costly ones for France, for the second Treaty of Paris reduced French boundaries almost to a 1789 status, inflicted an indemnity, and left an army of occupation on French territory. In the same month the signing of the Treaty of Vienna announced to the world the terms upon which Europe was reconstructed after the generation of revolution and warfare.

READINGS

GENERAL ACCOUNTS. Leo Gershoy's *French Revolution and Napoleon* (1933) and Louis Gottschalk's *Era of the French Revolution* (1929) con-

tinue to be extremely useful. Two additional general treatments of the period are Geoffrey Bruun's *Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814* (1938) and Louis Madelin's *Consulate and Empire* (1934).

BIOGRAPHIES. There are many biographies of Napoleon. A few of the outstanding ones are the brief *Napoleon* (1924) by H. A. L. Fisher; *Napoleon the First*, 2 vols. (1911) by A. Fournier; F. M. Kircheisen's *Napoleon* (1932); *Napoleon* (1926) by Emil Ludwig; and *Napoleon: The Last Phase* (1900) by Lord Rosebery. The biographies of Condorcet and of Talleyrand, mentioned for the preceding chapters, contain material of interest here. G. S. Ford's *Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia* (1922) and A. D. White's essay on Stein in *Seven Great Statesmen* (1927) take up the regeneration of Prussia. Philip Guedalla's life of Wellington (1932) and his *Hundred Days* (1934) are extremely interesting. The Memoirs of the duke of Caulaincourt, one of Napoleon's officers, were published in 1935 and 1936; they deal with the Russian campaign and the disasters of 1813-1814.

DIPLOMACY OF THE NAPOLEONIC PERIOD. R. B. Mowat's *The Diplomacy of Napoleon* (1924) and Harold Deutsch's *The Genesis of Napoleonic Imperialism* (1938) cover the relations between Napoleon and the rest of Europe. Samuel Morison's the *Oxford History of the United States* (1927) has some brilliant chapters on the Continental system and its effect on the United States. *The Diplomatic History of the United States* (1936) by S. F. Bemis and *American Foreign Policy* (1934) by John Latané are standard texts.

≡ XIV ≡

REORGANIZATION AND REACTION IN EUROPE

THE NAPOLEONIC LEGEND

IN October of 1815 a little group of exiles, accompanying one who was not only an exile but a prisoner, was landed on the rocky Island of St. Helena in the south Atlantic. For six years the lonely emperor, now once more "General Bonaparte," was to drag out a life of inactivity and slowly increasing illness and suffering. On St. Helena in 1821 he died and was buried, but not before he had deliberately laid the foundation for the Napoleonic legend which was to be, through the rest of the nineteenth century, a myth more potent than fact.¹ In his memoirs, carefully dictated through those years, Napoleon left the record of his career as he wished it to be remembered by his own generation, and as he meant it to be taught to their children. He was no mean student of men and affairs, and he knew intimately—and had no high opinion of—those in whose hands lay the task of the reorganization of the Europe which he had controlled. Foreseeing that the reaction against his rule would lead to repression, and that the liberalism and nationalism which had been a part of his own legacy from the French Revolution would lead to further revolts against new oppressors; he wished to prepare the ground for a movement that might culminate in the rise to power of his own little son. In his memoirs Napoleon stands revealed as the lover of peace and concord who was forced into wars in defense of the fundamental principles of the French Revolution, and as the true liberal who spent his life working for a federation of free, peaceful European states.

Europe did not accept the defeated emperor quite on his own valuation, but it did gradually forget the tragic loss of life and waste of war, the despotism, and the restrictions upon liberty. There remained the romance, the glory, the memory of his genius, kept alive

¹ Lord Rosebery, *Napoleon: The Last Phase*, gives a picture of these years.

first by the veterans of his wars, veterans of his own armies and of those that had opposed him. The masses, finding no freedom and no easement of their burdens in the period of reaction, took the "Little Corporal" back into their hearts as the child of the Revolution and the embodiment of their hopes. For France his name was a reminder of glory, and a solace in days when glory had departed. When a bourgeois king in a prosaic period wished to increase the popularity of his drab reign, he had the ashes of the dead dictator, now hero and patriot, brought back to France to repose on the banks of the Seine in a great national shrine.² A short thirty years after the death of the defeated and disgraced exile, a mediocre man was able to create in France a Second Empire for the sole reason that he, too, was named Napoleon Bonaparte.³

EUROPEAN PROBLEMS, 1814

In 1814 and 1815 the victors had the task of reorganizing Europe. For more than twenty-five years maps had been made and torn up, new states and new rulers had appeared and disappeared, treaties and coalitions had followed one another in bewildering succession. Europe, desperately in need of peace, security, and stability, was acutely aware of that need. Whether, as Metternich said, Europe wanted peace far more than liberty, was another question, and one that only the future could answer. That future was to be determined in part by the decisions of those who made over the Europe which Napoleon had left. One of Napoleon's biographers has remarked: "Napoleon came and vanished like a meteor. He had destroyed more than he created, but at least he had roused the old Europe from its lethargy, and pointed the way to a future union of the nations."⁴ How far the triumphant "old Europe" would follow along the way thus pointed out was the story of the Congress of Vienna.

The Treaty of Paris in 1814⁵ ended the long period of war and settled the terms by which France might be restored to her "legitimate" place among the nations. The arrangements for France were astonishingly generous. It was a peace dictated by victors in the capital of the vanquished, and yet there was no vindictiveness, no puni-

² Louis Philippe, 1840, and the following years.

³ See below, page 517.

⁴ F. M. Kircheisen, *Napoleon* (Harcourt, Brace and Company), p. 723.

⁵ See above, page 418.

tive measure, no indemnity, no army of occupation. The powers were convinced that a strong France governed by the restored Bourbons was necessary for the stability of Europe. Napoleon had been the "Usurper," the French Revolution a temporary aberration; the France of the Bourbons, of the philosophes, of the language of society and diplomacy, the France to which the monarchs and ruling classes of Europe had looked for their standards was not hated in 1814. A restored Paris might become once more the capital of European culture. The Treaty of Paris provided a solution for a few other immediate problems. The House of Orange was restored in the Netherlands, dignified with a royal title and promised Belgium. A money compensation brought Dutch consent to England's retention of the African Cape Colony and of Ceylon. Prussia and some of the other German states were promised compensation in the Rhineland where they could guard against any French aggression. Austrian control in northern Italy was extended to the Mincio River, and the king of Sardinia returned from his island to regain Piedmont, Nice, and a part of Savoy. Thus France was to have no opportunity for another successful Italian campaign. By the Treaty of Paris the question of France was settled, and guarantees against French aggression were secured.

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

There were many other problems facing the rulers and diplomats, and a Congress was summoned to meet in Vienna in the fall of 1814 to consider the whole question of the reorganization of Europe.⁶ The most casual comparison of a map of Europe in 1789 with another dated 1810 will suffice to indicate where those problems would arise: the duchy of Warsaw, the Rhineland, Hanover, Westphalia, the Illyrian provinces, Venice. How were the allies to be rewarded or compensated? How were Napoleon's friends, Saxony and Denmark, to be dealt with? How were the rival aspirations of the victors to receive satisfaction? What principles were to guide those who made the final decisions? It was obvious, moreover, that the allies had been united only in their common antagonism to Napoleon, and now might be expected to disagree. Early in September the diplomats began to assemble in the capital of the Austrian Empire. The rulers of several of the European states each came with a brilliant entourage made

⁶ This was not a peace conference, for the peace terms had been fixed in Paris.

up of their ministers, and of courtiers and ladies. Other governments sent ministers plenipotentiary who came prepared to join in the gay social life of Vienna as well as to take part in the deliberations of the Congress. Representatives of the smaller states, whose princes, deposed by Napoleon, had returned upon his defeat, came to arrange the boundaries, compensations, and the permanent status of their respective states. Even the princes of the petty Rhineland states that had disappeared in the period of the Consulate came to Vienna in the hope that, in the general scramble, they might win back their lost estates.

The Austrian minister of foreign affairs, Prince Metternich,⁷ played a prominent part in the small group upon which the work of the Congress depended. Castlereagh, the foreign minister of England, having secured ample colonial concessions for Great Britain, was chiefly concerned with the restoration of a balance of power, protection against French aggression, and the creation of what he called a "just equilibrium." Tsar Alexander I of Russia was one of the six monarchs present in Vienna, and the only one of them to play an active part in the Congress. A mystic and a visionary who thought himself a liberal, he felt that upon him depended the fate of Europe. He had a large corps of able advisers including the Baron vom Stein, who had been connected with the Russian government since his exile from Prussia. Frederick William III of Prussia was in Vienna, but his chancellor, Hardenberg, presented the demands of Prussia. Since France had been turned over to the restored Bourbons, she was entitled to representation in a general conference dealing with European affairs, and Louis XVIII sent his versatile and experienced foreign minister, Talleyrand. The ministers, rulers, and agents of the other states "cluttered up the streets of Vienna," but they had little influence on the decisions of the Congress. They and their ladies shared in the gaiety of Vienna, where every variety of entertainment was provided for them by the Hapsburg emperor at a cost which Austria could ill afford. The hard-working diplomats of the great powers attended the balls, masques, tableaux, and card parties, when at leisure, and often transacted bits of important business under the cloak of

⁷ Metternich was born in 1773 of an old and aristocratic family. His father had been in the diplomatic service, and Metternich himself selected diplomacy as a career. He married the granddaughter of Count Kaunitz and rose rapidly in the service of the emperor. He was passionately opposed to revolutions and, in his opposition to Napoleon, came to oppose all modern ideas.

a social event. Spies were everywhere, for no one trusted anyone except himself; letters were read, intrigues were unmasked, and new ones entered upon—all the while, as one cynic said, "*Le congrès dance, mais ne marche pas.*"

If the Congress as a whole seemed to make no progress, it was in large part due to the method of procedure adopted by the great powers before the time set for the assembling of the Congress. The four great allies had determined that the Congress should be presented with a *fait accompli* of their own devising, and that a final ratification was the sole function of the Congress as a whole. No formal meeting, therefore, was necessary, and the Congress, as such, was to meet only that signatures might be affixed to the Final Act. The four allied powers had decided, also, that they should settle all important matters, consulting France and the smaller states only when it seemed useful to do so. Deep-seated rivalries among the allied powers themselves and the diplomatic skill and wisdom of Talleyrand were to prevent the exclusion of France from the inner councils, and before the Congress was over Europe witnessed the strange spectacle of the representative of the vanquished nation holding what was, at times, a balance of power between the factions into which the victors had fallen. Committees upon which some of the representatives of minor states were placed were appointed for such matters as international rivers, the slave trade, Italian affairs, and population statistics. The ministers of the great powers met every morning for an informal conference, and there were numerous private conferences at all hours. The half-dozen sovereigns met pompously upon occasion, and the tsar consulted often with Francis II and Frederick William III.

TALLEYRAND AT VIENNA

When he reached Vienna, Talleyrand found that there was more anti-French sentiment among the diplomats than there had been in the spring when the Treaty of Paris had been negotiated. He set to work quietly to convince the representatives of the smaller powers that the France of the restored Bourbons was not the France of Napoleon, and that France in 1814 was the logical champion of the rights of the smaller countries because, of all the great states, France alone could expect no spoils from the remaking of Europe. Before the official opening of the Congress Talleyrand had accomplished this miracle. "France, the ogre, the devourer of small nations, had now

become their protector."⁸ His next task was to use this valuable prestige with the smaller powers to force his entree into the inner circles of the great powers. He wrote in his memoirs that he made use of the personal influence he had acquired in previous years. "Prince Metternich and the Count Nesselrode, not wishing to be disobliging to me, both had me invited to a conference at the office of the minister of foreign affairs." With this foothold Talleyrand continued his climb back to power. He secured recognition of the fact that the Congress was not a peace conference, and that the negotiators were therefore no longer "allied powers" dictating terms. In order to prevent France from being a minority of one in the meetings of the five powers, he constantly urged broadening the basic group to include Spain, Sweden, and Portugal.

Talleyrand's great opportunity to re-establish French prestige and influence came, as he had predicted, through the dissensions in the conference. Alexander I had been determined to obtain all of Poland in order to make it a Russian dependency where he might experiment with constitutionalism, and from which he might extend his plans for a sort of European federation. Such a settlement of the Polish question had been a part of several secret treaties or understandings in the years 1812-1814. As compensation for her surrender of Polish territory Prussia expected to secure all of the kingdom of Saxony whose ruler had been so unwise as to remain a faithful ally of Napoleon to the end.⁹ Both Metternich and Castlereagh at once opposed the Russo-Prussian plan. Austria could not consent to so great a Prussian aggrandizement, and England was already entering upon the long period of apprehension in regard to Russian power and possible aggressiveness that was to mark British foreign policy through the rest of the nineteenth century. In such troubled waters a skillful diplomat might fish with profit. Austria was willing to fight to prevent Prussia's control of Saxony, and England was determined that peace should not be broken. Talleyrand worked for a compromise solution and the restoration of the prestige of France. In January, 1815, Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand signed an agreement providing for a common army in case of Russian or Prussian attack.

⁸ Crane Brinton, *The Lives of Talleyrand*, p. 168.

⁹ Talleyrand, who was noted for his witty and ironic remarks, was able to deal effectively with the tsar's argument that the king of Saxony "had betrayed the cause of Europe" by saying, "That, Sir, is a question of dates." In the troublous years from 1803 to 1814 England alone had not made terms with Napoleon at some point.

Thus isolated, Russia and Prussia were forced to withdraw from their positions and to agree to a settlement short of their original demands. Russia was permitted to organize about five-sixths of the duchy of Warsaw as the kingdom of Poland over which the tsar ruled as king. Austria retained her part of old Poland, Prussia kept all that she had acquired by the first two partitions, and Cracow was made a neutralized free city. Prussia acquired about two-fifths of Saxony.

THE TREATY OF VIENNA, 1815

The other territorial terms of the treaty were important, for Europe was to keep for many years most of the boundaries then drawn. In the acquisition of lands at the head of the Adriatic and in northern Italy, Austria received ample compensation for the loss of the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium). Lombardy-Venetia became a province of Austria, and the Tyrol and the Dalmatian coast were returned to the Hapsburgs. Prussia obtained not only part of Saxony, but also Swedish Pomerania and valuable additions to her Rhineland provinces, making her the chief German power bordering France. Bavaria also received new Rhenish territories, and Luxemburg was erected as an independent duchy under the sovereignty of the king of the Netherlands. Switzerland was neutralized and her independence guaranteed. Hanover, enlarged and strengthened, was regained by England. Norway was taken from Denmark and given to Sweden in compensation for the loss of Pomerania to Prussia and Finland to Russia. In Spain, the Bourbons were restored, and the Braganza family was invited to return to Portugal. In Italy the possessions of the House of Savoy were enlarged and became the kingdom of Sardinia; princes of Austrian blood received the duchies of Tuscany, Modena, and Parma;¹⁰ the pope regained temporal authority over Rome and the Papal States; and, after Waterloo, the Bourbon king, Ferdinand, was restored in Naples. The idea of Italian unification, introduced by Napoleon, was, for the time, discarded, but its disappearance was only temporary, and Italian nationalism was to be of growing importance as the century progressed.

England was confirmed, at Vienna, in the possession of the colonies promised in Paris—Heligoland, Ceylon, Malta, Mauritius, Cape

¹⁰ Marie Louise, wife of Napoleon, became duchess of Parma, but the succession was not secured to her son. Napoleonic blood was too great a taint

Colony, several small islands in the West Indies, part of Dutch Guiana, and a foothold in Honduras. She received, also, a protectorate over the Ionian Islands, and was able to persuade the powers to agree to the internationalization of certain rivers. Taking all English interests into consideration, the share was one quite satisfactory to the British lion. The English representatives were instructed to procure common European action for the prevention of the African slave trade but were able to get little more than an expression of a united and pious hope.

One of the major problems of the Congress was the organization of some sort of German union or confederation. The Holy Roman Empire was definitely dead, and few desired to revive it. The widely expressed longing for a German national state was an embarrassment to both Prussia and Austria. Neither could contemplate a united Germany in which the other was dominant, republics were out of style and not to be considered, and the age-old particularism of the German states was still a potent obstacle to unity. The best that seemed possible was a loose confederation, not much stronger than the old empire, with a Diet which would meet annually at Frankfort under the permanent presidency of the representative of Austria. The members of the Diet were to be appointed by the rulers of all states holding German possessions, and they represented only such part of the realms of those rulers as lay within the confederation. Only parts of the Austrian Empire were within the boundaries of the confederation, for example; and the governments of England and Denmark had votes in the Diet for their German provinces. The Diet was, in reality, little more than a debating society of diplomats, and all important measures required a unanimous vote. Each state retained all the functions of complete sovereignty; thus the nationalistic aspirations of "Young Germany" were frustrated. The work of Napoleon, however, was recognized in that the confederation was composed of thirty-nine states instead of the two or three hundred that had made up the old Holy Roman Empire. The liberal German patriots might extract what comfort they could from a vague recommendation that constitutions be granted by the rulers of the respective states to their people.¹¹

News of the return of Napoleon from Elba hastened the completion of the work of the Congress, and the Final Act was signed on

¹¹ In the end, few of the rulers made good this promise.

June 9, 1815, within a few days of the Battle of Waterloo. The principles upon which the treaty was based were those of the restoration, wherever it seemed wise, of the legitimate rulers, of proper compensation for those who had borne the brunt of the long struggle with Napoleon, and of the erection of barrier states to isolate France and render a repetition of her aggression impossible. The balance of power was restored on a slightly new basis, and every effort was made to make a recurrence of war improbable. There was very little vindictiveness on the part of the diplomats; bred in the cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century, they tried to see Europe as a whole; and they were, in general, "reasonable, fair-minded, and well-intentioned." The fact that the settlement made at Vienna lasted, in large part, and without undue discontent and criticism, for nearly a half century is an indication of its essential wisdom and of its compromise character. It used to be quite the thing to hold the Congress of Vienna up to disapproval and to accuse its members of selfishness, reactionary ideas, general shortsightedness, and disregard for both national and liberal aspirations. It is true that the Poles were left under Russian rule, Italians under Austrian dictation, that Norwegians reluctantly accepted Swedish control, and that nothing was done to settle the problems of the Near East. Since 1919 there has been a great deal of comparison of the Treaty of Vienna with that of Versailles—and the parallelisms are many—but to a generation that has witnessed the European dissension owing to the badly drawn, unwise, or unjust clauses in the latter treaty, the work of the statesmen of Vienna seems, by contrast, permanent and sound.¹²

THE QUADRUPLE AND THE HOLY ALLIANCES

The dreams of European statesmen of a Europe at peace were rudely shattered by the return of Napoleon from Elba, and after Waterloo they wished for some guarantee against any recurrence of

¹² The accounts of the era of Napoleon mentioned in the preceding chapter contain excellent descriptions of the Congress of Vienna. Arthur May, *Age of Metternich*, is very useful. Frederick B. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1852*, is a recent book on a period frequently neglected and is especially full in its treatment of the factors other than political. E. F. Henderson, *Short History of Germany*, and C. D. Hazen, W. R. Thayer, and R. H. Lord, *Three Peace Congresses of the Nineteenth Century*, have interesting accounts of the Congress of Vienna. C. K. Webster has a brief account of the Congress as well as a long and detailed history of the policies of Castlereagh.

such a shock. On the same day that the second Treaty of Paris was signed¹³ (November 20, 1815) the four great powers signed another agreement which bound them together into a Quadruple Alliance to maintain for twenty years, by force if necessary, the arrangements made in regard to territorial boundaries in the treaties signed in 1814 and 1815. They agreed, also, to prevent the return of Napoleon and his dynasty to France. The treaty provided for periodic meetings of representatives of the signatory powers for a discussion of affairs of common interest and of measures for securing the peace of Europe. On the foundation of this Quadruple Alliance the great powers of Europe declared the ascendancy which they had tacitly assumed at Vienna, and the Concert of Powers which was to play a prominent part in European affairs throughout the nineteenth century came into being.

Somewhat earlier in the autumn of 1815, Tsar Alexander I presented to the European monarchs a document which came to be called the Holy Alliance. The mystical and religiously emotional nature of the tsar had been deeply stirred by a feeling that divine assistance had helped the powers defeat Napoleon. With similar assistance and a united devotion the powers might, the tsar believed, carry on their domestic and foreign affairs in accordance with the precepts of the Christian religion. Europe would thus become a great federation of states pledged to "Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace." At Vienna the diplomats had looked with little favor upon the visionary schemes of the tsar. At Paris, however, Metternich was anxious to gain the tsar's adherence to a more practical plan and accepted the Holy Alliance. All the monarchs of Europe signed the tsar's document with the exception of the pope, the sultan of Turkey, and the prince regent of England. Castlereagh called the Holy Alliance a "piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense," another statesman referred to it as a "Holy Humbug," while the pope ironically remarked that "from time immemorial he had been in possession of Christian truth and needed no new interpretation of the same."¹⁴ Aside from the tsar and, perhaps, the king of Prussia, no one of those who signed the Holy Alliance had any confidence in the sincerity of his fellows or in the efficacy of the agreement. It was, however, to have some effect for a decade in binding the powers to a common platform for the suppression of liberalism.

¹³ The treaty imposing penalties upon France for the 100 Days' Campaign.

¹⁴ Quoted in E. F. Henderson, *Short History of Germany*, Vol. II, p. 326.

RESTORATION AND REACTION

The Europe for which all of these arrangements were made was so war-weary that peace seemed a boon worth many concessions and compromises. Glad to have reached the end of the Napoleonic period and to have thrown off the alien rule, the peoples of the various nations received the returning monarchs with a joy that did not necessarily spring from love for them as individuals or as representatives of the old ruling classes. As for the monarchs, they were in many cases the same men who had been deposed when Napoleon came to power; and they had learned little in exile except a hatred for all that had encompassed their humiliation. Anything Napoleonic in origin, or revolutionary in nature, must be rooted out, and everything restored to a state as near as possible to that of the "good old days." Not only the monarchs but their advisers and the aristocracy of their courts were either old men or the children of *émigrés*, brought up in exile, embittered by charity, and determined to turn the clock backward as far as society and government were concerned. In states like Austria or Prussia, where the old monarchies had weathered the storm, the force of reaction was just as strong, for the overthrow of the "usurper" and the suppression of the expansion of revolutionary France had come about largely through their efforts, and they felt that upon them rested the preservation of Europe from any recurrence of the fevers of revolution and war. They stood for the old order and desired security, quiet, and stability. No concessions were to be made to progress; youth must remain within the confines and limits set by their reactionary elders; and innovations were frowned upon. Only that which had precedent and was of proven value to them and their caste could be tolerated by the members of this gerontocracy.

This attitude had expression in many ways. During the dark years of war-weariness and economic strain there had been a revival of interest in religion in all countries and all faiths. The anticlericalism of the French control of Europe and the conflict between Napoleon and the pope had tended to develop ultramontanism¹⁵ in the Catholic countries. After the repeated shocks of the period since 1789, the papacy was, quite naturally, extremely conservative and ready

¹⁵ "Ultramontanism" means "beyond the mountains" and therefore implies a dependence upon the papacy.

to lead the reaction against rationalism and irreligion. There was a distinct revival movement within the Catholic Church after 1815. The Jesuit order was re-established, and missionaries were sent not only to heathen lands but also to countries such as France where anti-clericalism had been strong. The missionaries in France used all the techniques of intense emotional appeal that usually characterize revivals—out-of-door mass meetings, hymns set to popular tunes, public processions, and fervent preaching.¹⁶ The revivals served a political purpose, also, for the heroes of the Revolution were condemned, and the crowds were urged to support the restored Bourbons and the government which they had set up. Societies of Catholic laymen were organized under the supervision of, or in affiliation with, the Jesuits. Prominent state officials, princes, and great nobles became members and aided in extending the movement to include groups from all classes of society. These lay societies worked quite openly to bring about the election or appointment of officials who were acceptable to the church. In Italy Catholic secret societies were formed to counteract the development of the nationalistic, liberal, secret organizations called the *Carbonaria*. In Spain a similar movement gained considerable influence. Its very title shows its temper, for it was called the Society of the Exterminating Angel. The brother of the king was an active member in this stronghold of the forces of reaction. Closely allied with the government, these movements had educational and propagandist policies, and aided in the control of the press and in exposing revolutionary plots.

In Protestant as well as in Catholic countries there was a marked return to religion. Wherever there was an established church its influence was thrown to the side of the government. Members of the upper clergy were also frequently members of the nobility and lived the lives of that class. The dissenting sects led in the revival movement, and the number of converts was great. Quakerism, Congregationalism, and, above all, Methodism, flourished in England until the membership of the dissenting sects included about half the population. Their appeal was to the urban lower middle class, farmers, artisans, and laborers. Their leaders preached the Christian virtues as taught by Luther, Calvin, Knox, Fox, and Wesley, but they did not advocate political action or radicalism. Submission and sublimation rather than revolt were the proper attitudes to take toward the difficulties of exist-

¹⁶ F. B. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution*, p. 14.

ence. Missionary activities furnished an outlet for religious zeal, and Societies for the Propagation of the Gospel sent missionaries to far-off India and Africa. Even in the United States this world-wide movement of revival and interest in missions had its effect. Before 1815 the American Board of Foreign Missions had been organized, and soon other churches followed the lead of the Congregationalists in establishing both foreign and home missionary societies.

STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN SOCIETY AFTER 1815

Generally speaking, European monarchs were aided by both nobility and clergy in their desire to re-create the old regime. In France and in the Rhineland the nobles and clergy worked for the return of their confiscated estates or for compensation for their loss. The clergy worked, also, for the return of its former control over education, while both orders exerted every effort to establish political dominance.

Although the middle class acquiesced in the restoration of the old monarchs, and, for the time, in the measures of the Tory, or conservative, administrations, the harmony could be no more than a temporary one. The desire for peace and security was at first stronger than the demand of the bourgeoisie for political control, but as the middle class grew in wealth and strength, with the rapid growth of industrial capitalism the pressure upon the governments grew strong once more. Only in areas slow to develop industrially and, therefore, lacking in a strong middle class, was the sway of the aristocracy unchallenged. In England¹⁷ there had long been an amalgamation between the nobility and the wealthy merchants and bankers¹⁸ which resulted in a governing class of comparative elasticity and broadness of base. To it the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and the laissez-faire theories¹⁹ of Adam Smith made a great appeal, and the result about 1830, broadly speaking, was the formation of the Liberal party which vied for popular support for nearly one hundred years with a Conservative party composed chiefly of landlords, the church, the army, and founded on the teachings of Edmund Burke. Shortly after the downfall of Napoleon, England was back upon a two-party

¹⁷ G. M. Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century*, is a standard one-volume account of great interest and value.

¹⁸ See above, pages 259 ff.

¹⁹ See above, page 302.

system somewhat resembling that of the seventeenth century when Whigs and Tories had struggled for control of the government.

In the owners of the new factories the middle class found new recruits in the early nineteenth century.²⁰ These sturdy captains of industry often were men who had by drive, ruthlessness, and native ability risen from the laboring classes and had acquired wealth because of their invention of new machines or their success along other lines of industrialization. The changes in industry, however, were not uniform, and no one industry was completely mechanized in this period. The old handicraft methods and the new machines existed side by side for several decades before the transition was accomplished. In the Lowlands and in France industrialization advanced rapidly after 1815, and the demand of the bourgeoisie for an important share in the government was insistent. Eastward and southward capitalistic development was much slower, and the middle class was small and less vocal.

The agrarian population varied in much the same fashion. In England the agricultural revolution of the eighteenth century had been sweeping,²¹ and the enclosure of land continued until by 1845 there was no land left to enclose. The yeoman class found itself in difficulties, for the amount of land which small farmers received when enclosures took place was insufficient to produce a livelihood. Men who had formerly owned their own land were forced to become tenant farmers, or agricultural laborers, or to leave the rural districts altogether for work in the new factories. In Ireland the agrarian distress was in large part caused by an absentee landlordism that exposed the peasantry to the shortsighted rapacity of the agents of the nobility. Agricultural production in England increased, however, under the new system, and the country gentry prospered. There were smaller farm units in France and the Rhineland, but the peasantry was conservative and too poor to put agricultural reforms into effect. Serfdom, disappearing in the Germanies, was still characteristic of rural life in Southeastern Europe and in Russia. In Italy and Spain there was little actual serfdom, but the peasantry owned little or no land, agricultural production was medieval in method, and the peasantry was illiterate and uninterested in the government or its policies.

The urban proletariat had good grounds for dissatisfaction in the age of reaction. Unions were everywhere illegal, and in general the

²⁰ See below, Chapter XV.

²¹ See above, page 290

governments of Europe combined with the employers in suppressing any agitation for the amelioration of the very obvious evils. As might have been expected, it was in England that the first changes were made in this policy, for it was there that the first laws were passed to protect the workers and to permit them to better their own condition.²²

EUROPEAN CULTURE IN THE PERIOD OF REACTION

Such, in general, was the structure of European society in the post-Napoleonic period. Culturally, an Age of Romanticism followed the eighteenth-century Age of Reason. Rationalism in philosophy was rejected when men turned back to religious emotionalism, on the general principle, apparently, that too much reason had led the world astray into the evils of revolution. In literature the coldness and objectivity of scientific writing and of philosophical, political, and economic treatises were followed by a romanticism expressed in novels, in poetry, and in the arts. The historical novel-romances of Sir Walter Scott had great vogue—a vogue shared with Alexandre Dumas in France, whose *Comte de Monte Cristo* was as widely read as Scott's *Ivanhoe*. Rousseau was almost the only one of the philosophes whose works were still widely read, and the appeal of his emotional individualism was evidenced in the numerous reprintings of his books.²³ In poetry Chateaubriand, Lamartine, and Victor Hugo led the Continental romantic school, while in England Keats, Byron, and Shelley made the age immortal. These romantic poets were not all of them conservative in politics. Keats may have been chiefly a lyricist of consummate ability, but Shelley was deeply interested in revolutionary philosophy and action; Byron, a champion of the underdog everywhere, was a militant individualist.

In the fine arts romanticism and the classicism of the eighteenth century struggled for supremacy. There was a revival of the Gothic in architecture, and a wide use of medieval subjects in sculpture and painting. The romantic love of nature was seen in the popularity of landscape painting; Corot's paintings were first shown during the

²² See below, pages 477-79.

²³ In France alone during the Restoration period his works were reprinted thirteen times, of which a single publisher is said to have sold a million copies. Arthur May, *Age of Metternich*, p. 84

reign of Louis XVIII. In music the songs of Schubert and Schumann and the compositions of Mendelssohn expressed the sentiment of the romantic movement. Romanticism may have meant a reaction against rationalism, but in the arts—as, for example, in literature—it was not necessarily a conservative movement. Much of enduring beauty was created.

There was a great increase, also, in historical research and scholarship. The dramatic sequence of events in the years 1789 to 1815 had focused attention upon history; in seeking an antidote or substitute for revolution, men found refuge in tradition and in the idea that the present could be understood only in the light of the past. There was something less frightening in the theory of the slow evolution of political ideas through many generations, and revolution was rejected in favor of a theory of the evolution of social and political institutions. This attention to history had important results in archeology, in the publication of thousands of historical documents, in philology, and in the development of scientific methods of historical research. The romantic movement was reflected in historical writing.

The historians of each nation, partly through the use of documents but more by a glowing literary style, followed in the path of Walter Scott and Chateaubriand and tried to evoke a living picture of the great ages of past national glory.²⁴

This interest in the glories of the past led to an ever-increasing emphasis upon nationalism, and the study of progress ultimately led many to a renewed interest in liberal movements and to a rejection of reactionary policies.

Scientific achievement progressed after 1815, and scientists slowly advanced toward the remarkable discoveries of the later nineteenth century. In the natural sciences, Lamarck, and other forerunners of Darwin working on the various aspects of the problem of evolution, encountered the opposition of the orthodox and conservative. It was in this period that science came to be applied to industry and mechanical advances revealed the various fields of engineering. Electricity advanced from the stage of being a curiosity and the plaything of the scientifically curious as its importance in the new and more practical phases of science was recognized.

²⁴ F. B. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution* (Harper & Brothers), p. 191.

THE METTERNICH SYSTEM

It was in a Europe thus marked by such striking contrasts between conservatism in politics and religion, on the one hand, and creative genius in intellectual fields, on the other, that Metternich and his fellow statesmen endeavored to enforce a rigid supervision of all ideas and all thinking in order to prevent any change which might lead to revolt. With liberalism, nationalism, and progress confined within the narrow limits set by a reactionary autocracy and a rigidly orthodox church, outward conformity and peace covered a seething undercurrent of protest against repression. Eventually the "cake of custom" and the crust of conservatism were broken in recurrent waves of revolution. Prince Metternich worked out for Europe a system of repression carefully designed to prevent any expression of liberal sentiments. To Metternich democracy meant disorder, and liberal ideas bred revolution. Quarantine and isolation were remedies to prevent the spread of such diseases. Censorship of the press, restriction on public gatherings and upon freedom of speech, careful supervision of teachers and of educational institutions, limitation upon travel, and a rigorous passport system for any foreigners coming into the country were all devices used to immobilize the Austrian Empire and to prevent the entry or expression of incendiary ideas.

Wherever Metternich and Austria had any power or following, the "Metternich system" was established after 1815. The Austrian provinces in Italy, the estates of the papacy, and the other small Italian satellites of Austria soon adopted measures of similar nature.²⁵ Metternich said that Italy was a "geographical expression," and he fully realized that it must remain so if Austria was to continue to control it. Liberalism and nationalism went hand in hand, and, with the application of Metternich's system, they were driven underground and found expression in secret societies, such as the *Carbonaria*, which were hounded by both the church and the secret police. Vaccination, gas street lights, and botanical gardens—all innovations of the French period, fell into disrepute upon the restoration, and nowhere was there more drastic limitation on speech and press. In southern Italy,

²⁵ Hapsburg influence was dominant in Italy. In the states not directly under Austrian rule dynastic connections favored Austria. The wife of the king of Piedmont was a cousin of Francis II of Austria; the duke of Tuscany was a brother; the duchess of Parma was a daughter, the queen of Naples an aunt; and the duke of Modena a cousin.

where conditions were medieval, violent, and terroristic, outbreaks occurred, but in the more prosperous north, although the method of attack upon it was more educational and intellectual in nature, Austrian rule was fully as unpopular.

In Spain Metternich needed to exert no pressure. The returning Ferdinand VII had learned nothing from his years in France.²⁶ He had spent his time in embroidering altar cloths rather than in studying the nature of the liberal and nationalistic movement in Spain after 1808. A powerful obscurantist and bigoted clergy aided in devising methods for the suppression of noxious ideas, and Spain outdid Metternich. The tsar of Russia began his career as a liberal of a moderate type. He granted a constitution to Poland and had ideas of reforms for Russia, where he refused to yield any of his prerogatives. But the first evidence of revolt in post-Napoleonic Europe was sufficient cause to throw Alexander into the arms of Metternich. For the rest of the reign of Alexander and the thirty years of the reign of his son, Nicholas I, Russia was "frozen" in a mold that was the acme of "Metternichism."

In the Germanies Austrian influence was powerful, and Metternich early looked for an opportunity to stamp out any liberal tendencies. Although the German Confederation was weak, the individual rulers were powerful in their own realms, and few of them had surrendered their absolutism by granting their people the constitutions promised before 1815. Zeal for reform in Germany was strong in the secret societies of the German universities—such as the *Burschenschaften*, whose watchword was "honor, liberty, fatherland." They constituted a "youth movement" of an exalted and patriotic nature. A similar movement came through the *Turnvereine*, which were gymnastic associations where young liberals met for discussion as well as for physical exercise. In 1817 the *Burschenschaften* held a meeting at Wartburg of all its chapters, representing sixteen universities. The occasion was the anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig, which was also the three-hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the Reformation. Wartburg was within the realm of the duke of Weimar, at that time the only prince who had kept his promise to grant a constitution. There were liberal speeches, addresses by the professors of the University of Jena, and religious services consecrating the delegates to the cause of reform. On the night of October 18 an incident occurred

²⁶ See above, page 410.

which gave ammunition to Metternich. A group of the wilder spirits, in imitation of Luther's burning of the papal bull,²⁷ built a bonfire and threw upon it, with appropriate speeches, various reactionary books, as well as symbols of the aristocratic militaristic regime. The reports of this exploit were, of course, exaggerated, and the conservative authorities began a strict investigation of all student activities. Repression made the student movement more violent, and in 1819 a somewhat unbalanced and emotional theological student convinced himself that it was his duty to murder a writer and dramatist named Kotzebue, who was suspected of being a spy in the pay of the tsar of Russia. This murder struck fear into the hearts of the princes, and Metternich had little difficulty in persuading them to meet at Carlsbad and accept a series of decrees which brought the Germanies under the restrictions of his system. The secret societies were ordered to disband, censorship of every variety was introduced, and the secret police was strengthened. University professors and liberal pastors were especially watched, and many lost their positions on the thinnest sort of charges.

REACTION IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND AFTER 1815

In France the Metternich system was never adopted in its entirety. The Charter of 1814 was granted by the "restored" Louis XVIII as a gift and not as the right of the French people, but neither king nor people had any intention of quibbling over details. The king had grown weary in exile and was well aware of the necessity for recognizing the fundamental changes the twenty-five years had brought about. The church could not expect to return to its pre-Revolution position of wealth and domination, nor could the *émigré* nobles be indulged in their fantastic dream of receiving their old estates long since confiscated. The major results of the Revolution had been fixed and made permanent by the years of the Consulate and the Empire. The Napoleonic codes, the Concordat, and the organization of local government must not be touched. It was a restoration of the Bourbon house but not of the old regime. Louis XVIII showed remarkable shrewdness in his handling of the situation, and the years 1816 to 1820 were quiet ones in France. After some minor "White" revolts of the extreme royalists in the early days of the restoration, and the excitement of the "Hundred Days," attention was turned to the estab-

²⁷ See above, Chapter IV.

lishment of the new government upon a compromise basis. The Charter guaranteed the land settlement of the revolution and continued the arrangements made by Napoleon for local government, the Napoleonic codes, the Concordat, and the educational system. Provision was made for a parliament of two houses consisting of a Chamber of Peers nominated by the king and a Chamber of Deputies elected by the people on a restricted franchise.²⁸ No ministerial responsibility was provided; the king initiated legislation and could, upon occasion, issue ordinances having the effect of laws. The Charter was, however, very little less liberal than the British Constitution of the same period. Louis XVIII quite naturally filled many offices with returned *émigrés*, until a majority of the prefects, Napoleon's "First Consul in miniature," were men with that background. These conservative officials, in collaboration with the reactionary church, endeavored to suppress liberalism, but France soon recovered from her apathy, and the strong bourgeoisie gave evidence of a revived liberalism. In the Chambers the aristocracy and clergy were represented in the Ultra party, which sat on the right in each house; the Liberals took their position upon the left and had in their ranks all those who wished reform. A large Center group of Moderates at first backed Louis and the ministry in a middle-of-the-way policy but veered toward the Left when the monarchy grew more conservative. Each party and faction had its own newspapers, and the relative freedom of the press gave the reading public an opportunity to follow the parliamentary debates. By 1820 the return of prosperity and the wise policies of the central government brought the support of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry, and France seemed to be embarked upon a peaceful regime of representative government in which adjustments could be made from time to time by legal rather than revolutionary methods.

In England the end of the Napoleonic period did not mean the immediate resumption of liberal movements that had been sacrificed to war necessities. The last years of the reign of George III were years of oppression almost as complete as though Metternich, and not the dissolute Prince of Wales, had been prince regent. The Tory government aroused opposition between 1815 and 1830 in many quarters, although there was little union among the various groups of opponents of the party in power. The "radicals" who wished suffrage reform and political democracy of a mild nature worked in conjunction with other "radicals" who wanted thoroughgoing social readjustment.

²⁸ About 80,000 Frenchmen could vote out of a population of 25,000,000.

The years immediately following 1815 witnessed a postwar depression, and the condition of the working classes was pitiable. There was much unemployment, and the Tory government did little for relief. Trade was disrupted by the return of peace, prices were high, and many people were hungry. Bread riots and violence were the accompaniment or consequence of street meetings of political origin.

In the minds of the Conservative party all of the opposition was anathema. Save for their liberalism, Jeremy Bentham, William Cobbett,²⁹ Shelley, and Byron had little in common with the radical reformers, or with each other, but they were all accused of anarchy, atheism, and of plotting "universal ruin." The cause of reform made strange bedfellows. The Catholic and the Protestant dissenters worked together for the removal of political disabilities and against the payment of tithes for the support of the Anglican church. The new industrialists were in opposition, also, for they wished the extension of suffrage and more liberal economic policies, and the workingmen who had been forced into unemployment by the increasing use of machinery aided the cause by open riots and attempts to destroy the machines. There were strikes in the cotton factories and attempts at labor organization. The new industrial towns of the northwest were unrepresented in Parliament, and great out-of-door meetings were held in 1818 and 1819 to protest and to ask for reforms.

The Tory government countered these attacks by legislation similar to the measures of Metternich. These laws were known as the Six Acts and were passed in 1819. They forbade military drill and the possession of arms by unauthorized persons, provided speedy trial and drastic punishment for rioters, authorized search warrants to facilitate the discovery of stores of arms, provided for the seizure of seditious publications, restricted public meeting, and arranged for an indirect censorship of the press. The Six Acts were the climax of the reaction in England. Within a few years the tide turned, and the Tories themselves instituted a group of moderate reforms. Canning, who followed Castlereagh in the foreign office, broke with the Metternich policies abroad,³⁰ and in England, shortly before 1830, the Tory

²⁹ Cobbett was a journalist and pamphleteer of great influence. He advocated political reform but by legal means and not violence. He visited the United States and admired the democratic institutions he saw there. The unrest of the lower classes and liberal championship of their demands came to some extent from the difficulties of war and postwar depression and high prices. See graphs for prices of wheat, pages 84, 160

³⁰ Before his death in 1822 Castlereagh had begun the separation of England from the Metternich policy of intervention.

party removed the political disabilities upon dissenters and Catholics. England ended the fifteen-year period after the fall of Napoleon with a revived faith in liberalism and a political organization fitted to provide for successive democratic changes by means of the ballot box.

THE EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF METTERNICH

Elsewhere in Europe the ideas of Metternich did not go unchallenged. The forces of liberalism and nationalism were eventually to prove too strong for the conservative reaction. It has been very easy for those of a later age to accept his opponents' opinion of Metternich, which was a part of the propaganda they used. His acknowledged gifts of statesmanship were undoubtedly used to suppress liberalism and to maintain an ascendancy over the affairs of Europe which was distasteful to all except those of ultraconservative opinion. It must be granted, however, that within the years of Metternich's life hideous disorders had followed in the wake of liberal movements, and nationalism had involved Europe in devastating wars. To Metternich and the conservative statesmen both ideologies were infinitely dangerous and disruptive. The excesses of the Revolution had been committed in the name of liberty, and the dangers to empires like that of Austria, and to the whole delicate European balance, of the growth of nationalistic aspiration were perfectly apparent to the astute observer. The conservative force in Europe was strong, and in many ways admirable and wholly understandable. But it was fighting a losing fight after 1820 and has had to suffer the loss of presuige which attends defeat. Nevertheless, even though it lost some of its major engagements, conservatism lived on to become a distinct force in the twentieth as well as in the early nineteenth centuries.

"Metternichism" did not necessarily mean either inefficiency or bad government. It did mean regimentation, absolutism, and loss of liberty for the individual. In the regions under Metternich's direct control and in some of the German and northern Italian states reactionary policies were accompanied by honest and efficient administration of the government. Here there was little violence from the opposition, and with peace and a certain amount of prosperity a gradual and moderate liberalization might have occurred, had it not been for turbulence elsewhere. In regions such as southern Italy and Spain the governments were notoriously corrupt and incompetent, and the people

were not only oppressed politically but poor and downtrodden. There it was but a question of time before violent outbreaks would occur.

THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE

In the Quadruple Alliance, the powers had made provision for periodic congresses for the consideration of European problems and the prevention of friction. The first of these congresses was held in 1818 and was called to consider the demands of France to be released from the burden and humiliation of an army of occupation.³¹ The payment of the indemnity imposed by the second Treaty of Paris was arranged for by two great banking houses, Baring of London and Hope of Amsterdam, through which French bonds were floated to complete the transaction. Because it had provided for the fulfillment of its obligation the French government felt that the resident troops should be withdrawn. Thus the diplomats of the allied powers met at Aix-la-Chapelle to settle the details of the acceptance of the indemnity and the withdrawal of the troops. France was then asked to join the alliance, which thus became a Quintuple Alliance.

In the discussion of matters of general interest to Europe there was far less unanimity of opinion, and certain elements of discord appeared which boded ill for the alliance and for Metternich's policies if any crisis should arise. The matter of the Barbary pirates was discussed. The little states of North Africa had long harbored pirates who preyed upon the commerce of the Mediterranean, and the governments of these states levied tribute upon the merchantmen that entered their ports. It was proposed in the Congress that joint action be taken against the pirates. Such action would have meant Russian warships in the Mediterranean, and England at once objected. The project was dropped in deference to British wishes. Great Britain then proposed drastic action in regard to the slave trade which could only be enforced through the activity of the British fleet. The other powers rejected this plan. The tsar of Russia urged a union of sovereigns against revolutions with special reference to the revolutions in the Central and South American colonies of Spain. Castlereagh successfully blocked any such project, for his reports must be made to a Parliament which was suspicious of Russia and much interested in trade with Latin America. The tsar then recommended the adoption

³¹ See above, page 419.

of a principle of intervention in any country in which a revolution might occur. The same negative result met this project. It was obvious that the Concert of Powers could not be considered a unit on important issues, and that the powers differed among themselves even on the scope of the alliance.⁸²

THE REVOLT AGAINST METTERNICHISM

Two years later the answer to the reactionary policies of the governments of Europe began to be heard. In England there were frequent protests against the Six Acts from an opposition on an increasingly broad popular basis. In France the assassination of the duke of Berri, a nephew of the king, alarmed the government and forced the old king into a more conservative policy for the last four years of his reign. The first violent outbreak came in Spain, where the extreme of reaction had been coupled with the greatest economic distress. Ferdinand VII had no genius for government and no insight into the needs of his country. The trade of Spain had been ruined by the revolts in the Spanish colonies, and the country had been devastated by a decade of constant warfare. Nothing was done to remedy the situation, and discontent, driven underground by repression, mounted steadily. The army was a hotbed of intrigue and disloyalty to the corrupt government, and the secret societies, in conjunction with the orders of Free Masons, preached revolt. Matters came to a head when the king determined to endeavor to subdue the rebellious colonies in order to acquire once more the revenues upon which the monarchy had depended of old. The soldiers were badly paid and poorly fed. The ships designed to convey them to Latin America were scarcely seaworthy, and the troops felt that disaster would attend any such expedition. Two regiments about to embark at Cadiz revolted and called upon Spain to rise and demand the liberal constitution that had been adopted under English auspices after the defeat of Joseph Bonaparte in 1812. At first the revolution seemed a failure, but after some weeks it broke out again in northern Spain and swept all before it. Ferdinand, forced to accept the constitution, had no intention of keeping his pledge, and royalist plots and demands for European interven-

⁸² For this and for the other congresses after 1820 see W. A. Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe*, C. K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822*; and H. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827*.

tion were constant during the three years in which it was nominally observed.

The revolt in Spain was followed by one in Portugal. When the Braganza family had fled to Brazil in 1807 the government was left in the hands of a regent, but for much of the time the real power in Portugal was in the hands of a representative of Great Britain, Marshal Beresford. The administration was honest enough but alien, and the Portuguese felt that their country was becoming nothing more than an appendage of Brazil. In 1820 they rose in revolt, demanding the return of the royal family and a constitution. The king returned in 1821 and accepted the new constitution, whereupon Brazil revolted and proclaimed itself an empire with the king's eldest son as emperor. Portugal then fell into anarchy, for the revolutionary forces split into factions, and the reactionary groups had no unity. English intervention in 1826 and 1827 kept the king on his throne and restored some sort of order.

News of the revolt in Spain caused a wave of insurrections in Italy in 1820. The troops of the king of the Two Sicilies revolted and forced this reactionary ruler of one of the most notorious of all despotisms to accept a constitution modeled on that of Spain.³³ Ferdinand of Naples did not consider that an oath taken under pressure was binding and at once communicated with Metternich, whom he asked for aid. The radicals in Naples were members of the *Carbonaria* whose liberal policies were too advanced for the more conservative Parliament elected under the constitution. With the Neapolitan people ignorant and indifferent, the basis for the demands for reform was very narrow, and the revolutionary movement had little chance of success. There were revolutionary flurries in the Papal States, but the well-organized secret police quickly subdued the incipient revolt. A revolt which broke out in 1821 in Piedmont had somewhat greater success. The movement was more popular in nature, and its adherents were patriotic aristocrats and intellectuals as well as army officers. Its objectives were broader, for it desired both a constitution and the

³³ He took the following oath: "I, Ferdinand of Bourbon, by the Grace of God and by the Constitution of the Neapolitan monarchy, King of the Two Sicilies, swear in the name of God and on the Holy Evangelists that I will defend and preserve the Constitution. Should I act contrary to my oath and contrary to any article in this Constitution, I ought not to be obeyed; and every act by which I contravened it would be null and void. Thus doing, may God aid and protect me, otherwise may He call me to account." From E. Poggi, *Storia d'Italia dal 1814 al 1846*, quoted in F. B. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution* (Harper & Brothers), p. 158

foundation of a united Italy under the House of Savoy. The king repudiated the plan and took action against the conspiracy, which had little chance of success without his co-operation.

THE CONGRESSES OF TROPPAU-LAIBACH AND VERONA

Metternich and the tsar of Russia had been alarmed at the news of the Spanish revolt, and the tsar renewed his project of intervention. Castlereagh once more vetoed the idea, insisting that the Quadruple Alliance had never been intended for the supervision of the internal affairs of the European states. News of the series of revolutions in Italy, however, so increased the alarm of the reactionaries that they determined upon action. Italian affairs were very much the concern of Austria, and the tsar insisted upon co-operating in the suppression of the revolts. A congress was therefore called to meet at Troppau in October, 1820. Russia, Austria, and Prussia sent delegates, but England and France contented themselves with sending "observers" only. The first sessions of the conference showed the fundamental cleavage in European politics which was to mark the nineteenth century. The tsar assured Metternich that his earlier liberalism had been a mistake and that he was now ready to stand fast for conservative principles. When a general principle of intervention in case of revolution came up, however, Castlereagh issued a formal protest which was published in the English newspapers and discussed in Parliament. The alliance which had had five adherents since 1818 now had quite apparently dropped back to a four-power status, although there was no open break or withdrawal on the part of England.

The conference left Troppau to meet again in January, 1821, in Laibach nearer the revolting Italian states. At Troppau the representatives of the rulers of the Italian states requested intervention, thus repudiating their oaths to support the new constitutions. It was decided that Austria should intervene in Italy, but no decision was reached as to the Spanish revolt, and all efforts to persuade France and England to adhere to the principle of intervention failed. News of a revolution in Greece against the Turkish government brought new dissension to the alliance, for it was apparent that Alexander I considered the Near East an area in which the interests of Russia were paramount, and that he would tolerate no intervention which might aid his old enemy Turkey. The Congress then adjourned after mak-

ing arrangements to meet in the next year to consider action in regard to Spain and Greece.

Austria had little difficulty in suppressing the Italian revolts; the various constitutions were discarded and the despotic governments were restored. The leaders of the revolutions fled from Italy to various European capitals and, as exiles, began renewed plots against the petty tyrants of their native states. Austria was left in complete control of the situation, but the revolutionary forces had learned one valuable lesson that was eventually to be Austria's undoing: Austria was the enemy, and Austrian control must be broken before either national unity or liberal governments could be obtained.

After the Congress of Troppau-Laibach, Metternich exerted every effort to draw England once more into the orbit of his policies and to reconcile the tsar to an application of intervention in Greece. In neither project did he have much success, but since there was no open break he went ahead with plans for a congress to meet in Verona in 1822. Before the conference met, Castlereagh, exhausted by overwork, committed suicide, and Canning followed him in the foreign office. Canning, a true representative of the English commercial class, had less sympathy than had Castlereagh with the principles of the alliance and a keener interest in economic affairs. Any intervention in Spain might lead to intervention for the suppression of independent governments in the Latin-American states, where England had been conducting a very profitable trade. The re-establishment of Spanish rule would mean the renewal of the old Spanish trade control and monopoly. The English representative at Verona, the duke of Wellington, came provided with the elaborate memorandum left by Castlereagh and with the knowledge that Canning held even stronger views than were expressed in the memorandum. When the conference agreed to a French intervention to overturn the constitutional regime in Spain, England immediately and firmly withdrew, and the value of the alliance was at an end.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

A French army crossed the Pyrenees early in 1823, and aided Ferdinand in restoring his corrupt, inefficient, and despotic regime. The Spanish king's reprisals for the revolt were so atrocious that even the ultraconservative French government was shocked and endeavored to stop the useless bloodshed. England was unalterably opposed

to any project for the restoration of the Spanish colonies, and, in the spring and summer of 1823, Canning took steps to prevent any such action. He conducted rather delicate negotiations with the French government designed to discourage any French interest in aiding Spain, for France had been playing with the idea of intervention, hoping that she might be repaid by a cession of Cuba. Canning conferred, also, with the American minister to England on the subject of a joint Anglo-American policy toward Latin-American republics, which in 1822 had been recognized by the United States as independent nations.³⁴ The British offer was referred to John Quincy Adams, secretary of state in the administration of President Monroe. The president was at first in favor of accepting Canning's plan, but was persuaded by Adams to make an independent announcement of policy. Sympathy for the Latin-American republics had been strong in the United States, and relations between the older republic and her southern neighbors would have been closer had there been wide economic contacts. Great Britain, however, supplied both areas with manufactured products, and there was little occasion for exchange of their similar raw products. The United States was determined that no European state should intervene in Latin America, for such intervention would probably mean a reward in the form of the cession of one of the few remaining West Indian colonies of Spain—Cuba, for example. Both the United States and Great Britain were, at this period, irritated at the tsar because of an attempt to extend Russian control down the Pacific coast of the American Continent from Russia's Alaskan possessions. In December, 1823, President Monroe summed up the whole situation in three short paragraphs in his annual message to Congress. These paragraphs, probably written by Secretary Adams, disavowed any concern of the United States in European affairs, warned European countries away from any project of interference in the Americas, and announced that no part of the Western Hemisphere was open to further colonization. The Monroe Doctrine, later to be so important a part of United States foreign policy, thus came into being.

³⁴ The British phases of this situation may best be studied in H. Temperley, *Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827*. The standard American work is Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826*.

THE GREEK REVOLUTION

Metternich was no more successful in bringing about any concerted action in regard to Greece. Russian opposition to Turkey and a deep sympathy in Western Europe for the cause of Greek independence worked together to complete the destruction of the Quadruple Alliance. Volunteers from England, France, and even the United States fought for Greece—not, at heart, for modern Greece but rather for the ancient Greece whose glories had been a part of their classical education. Russia, England, and France united in a naval campaign against Turkey, the success of which was a contributing factor in the establishment of Greek independence.

RUSSIA, 1815-1830

In the midst of the Greek revolt (1825) Alexander I died. His early liberalism had been followed by a more and more reactionary domestic policy, and the ministry in his later years had been brutal in its repression of any expression of liberal sentiment. The liberal groups in Russia were given short shrift after 1820. The constitution given to Poland in 1815 had permitted an astonishing amount of self-government, but it had been steadily restricted after 1818. The tsar's brother, Constantine who ruled Poland, instituted an increasing number of measures similar to those of Metternich. Polish nationalism and demands for liberal reforms increased under repression, and by the time of Alexander's death relations between the Poles and their Russian rulers were decidedly strained. Finland, also, was presumably under a personal union with Russia and had a constitution of its own. Much more independence was allowed in Finland, although the tsar did not keep his promise to summon a Diet, and Finland was more content and prosperous under Russian rule than was Poland. There had been a strong liberal movement in Russia itself during the Napoleonic period, chiefly among the nobles who were familiar with the writings of the French philosophers. Alexander's early liberalism was popular with this group, and his later conservatism was correspondingly distasteful. The repressive policies of the last years of his reign brought the liberals close to revolt.

When Alexander died in the Crimea in 1825 there was some confusion as to which of his two brothers should succeed to the throne.

Constantine, the elder, had consented to surrender his rights in favor of the younger, Nicholas, but because this agreement was not generally known Constantine was proclaimed in St. Petersburg. The situation was not clarified for more than three weeks, and in the resulting chaotic conditions the liberals saw their opportunity for revolt. In December a conspiracy in Moscow touched off a revolt which was badly planned and poorly supported. It had, however, two important results: the Decembrists, as the revolutionists were called, were looked up to in Russia throughout the nineteenth century as the champions and examples of liberalism; of more immediate importance, the new tsar, Nicholas I, began his reign with a horror of revolution which led him to be more reactionary than his brother had ever been. The revolt in Poland in 1830 intensified this sentiment, which became even more extreme. It was he who coined the phrase, "Russia must be frozen," and the process of "freezing" preserved the Metternich policies in Russia long after they had been discarded by Western Europe.

FRANCE AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1830

It has already been mentioned that Louis XVIII began his reign in France devoted to a policy of conciliation and that he endeavored to follow a path equally distant from both extreme Right and radical Left. The assassination in 1820 of his nephew, the duke of Berry, caused him to listen to the advice of the ultraroyalist group, and his policy became increasingly conservative. A law was enacted to modify the electoral laws in such a way as to disfranchise much of the liberal middle class. This law and measures restricting the expression of liberal ideas led to the formation of secret societies similar to the Italian *Carbonaria*. Their membership was made up of students, lawyers, journalists, army officers, and other liberals. Riots led to further restrictive measures, and it was evident that France was once more seething with unrest.

Louis XVIII died in 1824 and was followed by his brother, the count of Artois, who succeeded as Charles X. The new king, who lacked the wisdom of his brother, had long been known to be one of the leaders of the "Ultras." His accession was the signal for renewed attempts on the part of the former *émigrés* and the clergy to regain their lost wealth and power. In 1825 a law was passed that gave the *émigrés* compensation for the estates confiscated during the Revolution. This antagonized two classes that had heretofore acquiesced in

the conservative regime. The peasants were angered and apprehensive because they thought the law might be a preliminary to an attempt to deprive them of their newly acquired lands. The wealthy bourgeoisie was furious because the plan provided for a reduction in the interest on national bonds in order to provide a fund for the payments to the nobles. Protests were silenced by an ordinance (1827) establishing a more complete press censorship. A further blow to the liberals came in the passage of laws which strengthened the control of the Catholic clergy over education. The Jesuits were permitted to return to France, and more severe penalties for blasphemy and sacrilege were promoted. The total effect of these "Ultra" measures was a nullification of the Charter of 1814 and the establishment of the Metternich "system."

Even under the new restrictions the 1827 elections gave the liberals increased representation in the Chamber of Deputies, and the king made some concessions by appointing a few moderates to office. He ruined the effect of these concessions, however, by appointing as his prime minister Prince de Polignac, who was one of the most hated of the reactionary nobles. It was evident that public opinion and the Chamber of Deputies were being forced to the Left as the king and his ministers became more conservative. The Chamber used its only legal weapons persistently and voted "lack of confidence" in the ministry whenever occasion offered. It made constant reference to the arbitrary changes in the Charter, and criticized the new laws. The liberal newspapers backed the Chamber and published as much as they dared of the criticism of the king.

In the spring of 1830 the demands for the dismissal of the unpopular prime minister led Charles X to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. The new elections brought to Paris a Chamber more liberal than the preceding one, and the fight was about to be renewed. In July the king countered by issuing a set of five ordinances.⁸⁵ These famous "July Ordinances" provided for a new and more drastic restriction of the press; the new Chamber was dissolved; a new electoral law was announced which would deprive of their right to vote three-fourths of those who had had the suffrage; and new elections which could but have resulted in a conservative Chamber were called for September. These ordinances were the signal for open revolt. Adolphe Thiers, a young journalist, appeared upon the scene and drew up a

⁸⁵ Under the Charter the king might issue ordinances having the effect of laws if he considered a state of emergency existed.

protest. Barricades were thrown up in the streets of Paris, and the workingmen, incited by the liberal newspapers and urged on by their bourgeois employers, won a victory over the feeble government forces. Charles X abdicated and fled to England. Once again an attempt at rule by divine right had been defeated.

The revolutionary leaders were little influenced by the radicals who wished to establish a republic and announced their determination to bring about a constitutional monarchy on the English model. Thiers, the wealthy banker Lafitte, and others of the upper middle and professional classes controlled the provisional government and decided to call to the throne Louis Philippe, the duke of Orléans.³⁶ This choice won popular approval, and Louis Philippe became the "citizen" or "bourgeois" king of France. The Charter was made over so as to transfer power from the old aristocracy to the upper middle classes,³⁷ and the revolution was considered at an end as soon as the various restrictive measures were repealed.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1830 IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Moderate as the changes in France had been, the July revolution so encouraged the discontented in other lands that 1830 was a year of revolutions. Those in Italy were uniformly unsuccessful. The one in the Papal States was the most formidable, but the pope called on the Austrian government for intervention, and papal authority was restored. In the Germanies there were popular demonstrations, riots, and sporadic outbreaks, but the rulers, backed by Metternich, issued new decrees similar to those of Carlsbad and put down all revolts. A rebellion in Poland was equally futile although much more extensive and organized. The Poles failed in their effort to secure aid from the liberal Western states and fell back before a huge Russian army sent against them by Nicholas I. By September, 1831, the revolt had been crushed, and the tsar turned to retribution. The Poles lost their constitution and their autonomy and became a mere province of Russia. Restrictive measures crushed the liberal and nationalistic move-

³⁶ He was the son of the duke of Orléans who, although a cousin of Louis XVI, had been a liberal leader in the days of the French Revolution. The younger duke had identified himself with the upper bourgeoisie and pledged himself to administer the government as they desired.

³⁷ The suffrage was extended from about 100,000, according to the early period of Louis XVIII, to about 200,000.

ment, and Poland was quiet under the Russian yoke for more than thirty years.

This dark picture of defeated hopes is lightened in Northwestern Europe. The union between Belgium and the Dutch Netherlands had never been popular in the southern half of the new kingdom. The two areas differed widely along too many lines. The northern state was Protestant, the southern Catholic. The Dutch were a commercial people; the Belgian area was largely devoted to manufacture. Differing languages and racial backgrounds made friction inevitable. Belgian patriots early began to work for national independence, making much of what they called the discriminatory policies of the government in regard to tariffs, taxes, and the church. News of the success of the July Revolution in near-by Paris increased the agitation, and in August there was a terrible riot in Brussels. The Belgian Revolution was very like that of France except for the element of nationalism. The nationalists proclaimed the independence of Belgium and announced an extremely liberal constitution providing for a limited monarchy when they should be able to select a king. The king of the Netherlands determined to put down the revolt by force and asked for aid from European governments on the grounds that the Treaty of Vienna was being violated. Metternich was occupied with the disturbances in Italy and Germany; Prussia was alarmed at the unrest at home; Russia was involved in troubles in Poland; and no one of the conservative powers could send aid. France and England looked with favor upon the aspirations of Belgium. Because of the negative assistance furnished by the tribulations of the Eastern powers and the positive backing of the Western states, the new kingdom was accepted by a conference of ambassadors in Paris. A king was found in Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, and the constitution was put into effect. Holland refused to accept the decision and sent an army into Belgium to re-establish its authority. A joint naval bombardment by France and England and an invasion by a French army were required to end the Dutch insistence on reunion. Holland did not formally recognize the new state until 1839, when a treaty was drawn up which was signed by all the great powers, guaranteeing the frontiers and the neutrality of Belgium. This treaty was the "scrap of paper" torn up by Germany in 1914 when she decided to cross Belgium in her attack upon France.

THE ENGLISH REFORM BILL OF 1832

An aftermath of the revolutions of 1830 was the English Reform Bill of 1832.³⁸ The idea of a change in the English electoral system was not new, for the inequality of representation in Parliament had long been recognized. The southeastern part of England was in many districts overrepresented while the new industrial areas of north-western England were without representation. Some boroughs³⁹ in the districts where population had declined almost to the vanishing point were still entitled to elect a member of the House of Commons, whereas large and growing cities in the north held no Parliamentary elections. The industrial middle class had not been enfranchised. The old adjustment of the seventeenth century still endured, and the governing classes were the nobility and landed gentry, the wealthy merchants and the bankers. An aristocracy, or oligarchy, of birth and wealth controlled England. William Pitt, the Tory, and Charles James Fox, the Whig, had both endeavored to bring about Parliamentary reform before 1789, but the French Revolution put an end to such efforts and dampened all enthusiasms for reform. After 1815 the Tory reactionaries ignored the situation until it was forced upon them by the revival of liberal sentiments. In addition to these defects in the electoral system there were, after 1815, repeated exposures of serious electoral scandals which were as shocking to Tories as to Whigs. Voting was public and by voice, and it was customary to have election periods of one or two weeks with no uniformity in the various districts. Bribery and all other forms of corruption were so rife that the reform of the whole system was demanded by an ever-increasing number of people. The Whigs were determined to redistrict England, the radicals wanted an extension of the suffrage, and even the conservatives admitted the need of reforms in electoral methods.

Several events in 1830 made it possible for the various reform groups to succeed in getting their measure before Parliament. George IV died in June and was followed by his brother, William IV. Neither king was in any sense liberal, but the change made an election necessary, and there was much discussion of reform. Although the Tories won, they had a smaller majority in the new Parliament.

³⁸ G. M. Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century*, gives a good account of this and the later reform bills

³⁹ Called "rotten boroughs."

The July Revolution in France gave an additional impetus to the cause of reform, and the liberal constitution of Belgium added to the effect. Between March and December of 1831, three Reform bills were introduced in Parliament. The Tory prime minister, the duke of Wellington, denounced the whole movement for electoral reform, maintaining that the existing situation was entirely satisfactory and that the English system was the best in the world. This "die-hard" speech added fuel to the flames, and Wellington was forced to resign. The unfranchised working classes joined in the protests, and there were thousands of public meetings. A Whig ministry was formed, and the first Reform Bill made such a good showing in its preliminary readings that Grey decided to dissolve the House and have new elections. A Whig majority was returned in 1831, and the bill was passed by the Commons only to be voted down by the Lords. The new king refused to create enough new Whig peers to pass the bill in the House of Lords, and Grey resigned. Wellington was unable to form a ministry which could obtain the confidence of the House, and the king was forced to yield. The Lords preferred the Reform Bill to the calamity of a flock of Whig peers and voted for the bill when it came before them in 1832.

In the meantime all England was aroused. The liberal Whigs and the radicals united in what was to be the Liberal party. William Cobbett, the journalist, the economist, James Mill, the liberal manufacturer, Richard Cobden, the brilliant self-educated, "self-made" intellectual, Francis Place, and the Quaker, John Bright, backed the reform. Earl Grey, Lord John Russell, and other leaders from the old Whig families supported the bill. The reform group stirred up demonstrations in industrial areas and threatened nonpayment of taxes, financial panic, and civil disturbance. A little alarmed at the violence of their allies, after the passage of the bill the Whigs united in emphasizing its finality and the lack of need for further change.

The Reform Bill which caused such excitement now seems, one hundred years after its passage, to have been an extremely moderate measure. The "rotten" boroughs were largely done away with, and some overrepresented areas were each deprived of one of the two seats. The 143 seats thus taken away from the thinly populated districts were given to the underrepresented areas and to Ireland and Scotland. The qualifications for voting were altered and made uniform. The property qualifications were retained but lowered so as to

increase the electorate by one-half.⁴⁰ Changes were made in the election laws to shorten the election periods and to prevent bribery, although the secret ballot was not introduced. The government of England after 1832 was still a political oligarchy but on a broader basis, with the middle class fairly adequately represented and satisfied. Industrial as well as agricultural and commercial interests were represented. The Tories now accepted the Reform Bill as "final" and took over the name Conservative for their party. The Whigs kept up their union with the "radicals"; and the Liberal party took its place in British politics. A landlord versus industrial balance was struck which represented British interests fairly well, and the English complacently accepted the compromise as "the most perfect political system in the world." The settlement of 1832 was to last for thirty-five years, but it was apparent from the first that what had been done could be done again; that England had chosen not revolution but evolution; and that progressive changes would continue to be made when public opinion demanded them. As Trevelyan says, "The principle it [the Reform Bill] involved, when once admitted, could brook no limitation until complete democracy had been realized."⁴¹

The liberal cause, triumphant in the West, was steadily blocked in Eastern and Southern Europe by the reactionary powers. In 1833 Russia, Prussia, and Austria, under the guidance of Metternich, renewed their alliance against liberalism and made arrangements for a program of repression. The lines in Europe were clearly drawn, and the trends of the twentieth century were definitely predicted. It must not be forgotten that, if liberalism was one of the great motifs of the nineteenth century, the effects of reaction were almost as important. The force of conservatism was strong throughout the period. On the other hand, the radicals soon realized that they had used their energies and popular influence in effecting a transfer of power from one class to another and that the masses had gained nothing but a change in masters. The attack, therefore, shifted as well, and the control of political affairs by the bourgeoisie was in its turn challenged by the classes still deprived of political power.

⁴⁰ One out of thirty inhabitants could vote in England. In France, under the Electoral Law of 1831, one out of two hundred had the ballot. In the United States property qualifications were disappearing and manhood suffrage was being ushered in during the Jackson Administration. On the other hand, in most of Europe there was no representative government at all.

⁴¹ G. M. Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century* (Longmans, Green & Company), p. 225.

READINGS

To the usual reference to C. J. H. Hayes's *Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe* (1932) may be added C. D. Hazen's *Europe since 1815*, 2 vols. (Revised edition, 1923), and J. S. Schapiro's *Modern and Contemporary European History* (Revised edition, 1929). All three may be used for succeeding chapters until the period of the Great War. Frederick B. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1832* (1934) is a brilliant analysis of the period. Arthur May's *Age of Metternich, 1814-1848* (Berkshire Series, 1933) is brief and very useful. The Congress of Vienna is discussed in C. D. Hazen, W. R. Thayer, and R. H. Lord, *Three Peace Congresses of the Nineteenth Century* (1917), in C. K. Webster's, *Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815* (1919), and in *British Diplomacy, 1813-1815* (1921) by the same author. British foreign policy is treated in detail in C. K. Webster's *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822* (1925), and in H. W. V. Temperley's *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827* (1925). W. A. Phillips's *The Confederation of Europe* (Second edition, 1919) is valuable for the congresses, 1813-1823. *The Holy Alliance* (1922) by W. P. Cresson is very interesting, and *Diplomatic Portraits* (1923) by the same author is useful. The references to texts in American diplomatic history given in the last chapter may be used for the Monroe Doctrine; the standard work on the subject is by Dexter Perkins, entitled *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826* (1927). J. F. Scott and A. Baltzly's valuable *Readings in European History since 1814* (1930) begins with this period.

≡ XV ≡

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY

THE soldiers of France marching across Europe under the standards bearing the eagle of Napoleon carried with them much of the ideology and the achievements of the French Revolution. *Liberté, Egalité, and Fraternité* may have seemed an incongruous slogan under the dictatorship of the "Man of Destiny," but in some guise or modification those words, coined from the mint of the philosophes, were to permeate much of nineteenth-century thinking.¹ The nations rising to defend themselves against the hegemony of France found their salvation in a spirit of patriotic nationalism similar to that which had swept revolutionary France into crusading fervor. Peoples dominated by Napoleonic rule found that French reforms swept away much that had been archaic and oppressive in their old institutions. Even the revolt after 1815 against all things of French origin did not wipe out the memory of the changes the French had inaugurated, nor did the conservative reaction long remain unchallenged in any part of Western Europe. The French ideas stemmed from a recognition of the necessity for personal freedom and from an attitude toward government which may be called "liberalism." Nationalism was closely linked with liberalism, and the two were outstanding motifs of the nineteenth century. The cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century largely disappeared in the nineteenth, and the rising tide of nationalism deepened the already well-defined patriotism of those who lived in the nation-states and swept away the particularism that had been characteristic of much of the rest of Europe.

¹It is convenient to think of the nineteenth century as the period from 1815 to 1914, that is, from the end of the Napoleonic period to the outbreak of the Great War.

INDUSTRIAL "EVOLUTION" OR "REVOLUTION"?

The political creeds of the century and the struggles of the peoples of Europe for national unity and of the governments for international and imperial prestige cannot be understood without some consideration of the economic and scientific shifts and discoveries that were in the same period completely transforming the life of the average man in Europe and elsewhere. It has been the thesis of some historians that the nineteenth century was conditioned by French ideas of personal freedom and by English techniques, and that all of its complexities and paradoxes had their origin in that union.² This sweeping statement fails to recognize the fact that the English contributed many ideas as well as techniques and that other countries played a part also. French historians, with their interest aroused by their analyses of the French Revolution, had no difficulty in finding a "revolution" in the industrial world in the period following 1750. Impressed by the changes made by machine technology, Englishmen, too, began to call the aggregate of such differences between the old and the new economic system the "Industrial Revolution."³ Every textbook came to have, either before or after the chapters on the American and the French revolutions, one on the industrial revolution and, perhaps, another on the agricultural revolution.

By a very broad definition of the word "revolution" the authors of a very recent text in economic history maintain that its use is warranted. They state that the term "revolution" involves three elements.

In connection with any series of events described as a revolution there is first what may be called the natural, normal process of change and adaptation; secondly, an obstacle or obstruction in the current of change; and thirdly, a more or less abrupt removal of the obstruction with correspondingly rapid and often violent readjustments.⁴

In applying this hypothesis they find that the general trend since the medieval period had been toward the expansion of trade and the creation of world markets. Production lagged behind, for there had

² L. C. A. Knowles, *Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain*, p. viii.

³ Arnold Toynbee (about 1880) popularized the phrase and made the idea famous.

⁴ W. Bowden, M. Karpovich, A. P. Usher, *An Economic History of Europe since 1750* (American Book Company), p. 109.

been few improvements in methods, and means of transportation were inadequate for the profitable use of the vast accumulations of capital made possible by the increase in trade. "The obstacle was removed by relatively sudden changes in the methods of production and transportation, with correspondingly abrupt and radical readjustments in the social structure." The qualified phrases "more or less abrupt" and "relatively sudden changes" make it possible to reconcile this group of historians who still cling to the term "revolution" with those who believe that a movement whose roots go back two or more centuries and whose continuing influence is as evident today as it was a hundred years ago cannot safely be called revolutionary. Perhaps the somewhat facetious comment that at the University of London they tell "pass" students that there was an industrial revolution but insist to the "honors" students that there was none⁵ is as good a way as any other of describing the attitude of the modern historian toward the venerable title. In short, it provides a convenient label for those who wish to discuss the economic history since 1750.

THE NATURE OF THE CHANGES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Whether the term "industrial revolution" is used or not, the path to be followed is quite clear. The last two centuries have seen a striking development in machine technology. As a result, the production of goods received greater attention in the economic world, and the manufacturer became as significant a figure as the merchant prince who had dominated the scene since the Age of Discovery.

During the two centuries following the geographical discoveries the makers of economic history were the merchant, seaman, and financier. With some important exceptions, industry was the handmaid, or at best the butler, to commercial capitalism. The next two centuries turned the tables with a vengeance. Their central theme was production; their hero was the inventor, scientist, and manufacturer; and their story full of changes in the methods of making things, in the discovery of new things to be made, and in the equipment of transportation.⁶

With the enormous increase in manufactured goods came the necessity for improved methods of transportation, and machine technology

⁵ Herbert Heaton, "The Industrial Revolution," in *Social Education*, March, 1938.

⁶ Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe* (Harper & Brothers), p. 502.

was extended to the means of distribution as well as to the manner of production. These changes in production, distribution, and transportation could not have been accomplished without the growth of industrial capitalism. It is necessary, therefore, to pay some attention to the growth of wealth, the organization of capital, and the relations between capital and labor. The effects of the industrial and technical changes were so far reaching that the lives of countless millions of people were affected. The use of heavy and expensive machines and the application of mechanical power made factories necessary. Not only did the population of modern states increase rapidly, but within each industrial state there were significant shifts in population. Although there was, in general, a great rise in the standard of living, these changes brought into existence grave social problems which have been the concern of both peoples and governments through the last century.

Concomitant with this development of industry was an acceleration of scientific discoveries. Scientific study became a vocation or profession, and science and industry together produced the various new fields of engineering and of "applied" science. A modern physicist may find his laboratory in a university or in a great electrical plant; a chemist is as apt to train for industrial work as for the teaching profession; and the great bacteriologist Pasteur worked for years on such problems as the cure for anthrax in animals and the processes of fermentation in the production of French wines.

Industrial capitalism and economic change have had great influence, also, upon political and economic theory. The ideas of the French philosophes—laissez faire, personal freedom, faith in progress and perfectibility, democratic institutions—came into contact with the results of mechanization, and modern life became a composite of their adjustments, compromises, and conflicts. Political theories running the vast gamut from conservatism to anarchism, expressing every phase of individualistic and collectivistic thinking, have won adherents, and political parties have been formed to fight their battles.

There is a close connection between the motif of nationalism which characterized the nineteenth century and the growth of industrial capitalism, and there is a still closer connection between industry and the great revival of imperialism which became so important during the latter half of the century. It may be noted, however, that for much of Europe the nineteenth century was a period of peace. It began and ended in vast military activities, but the intervening

years were less disturbed by war than those of other centuries. It is apparent, therefore, that any survey of the nineteenth century will lead us far afield and must of necessity touch upon a great number of seemingly very diversified topics. It will be found, however, that they all have some connection with the implications of industrial capitalism and with the changes which its development has caused.⁷ Although this fundamental connection can be demonstrated, it is impossible to find any simple label for the century. The terms, "Age of Steel" and "Age of Electricity" are sometimes applied to parts of it for specific purposes; the "Century of Progress" has been used in various connections; but it is safer and more accurate to describe the characteristics of the nineteenth century than to label it. As one writer concludes:

It is difficult to make the nineteenth century come out neatly as a period. . . . It did things in its own way, but somehow failed to do them with the final grace of a style. . . . Its ingredients failed to mingle properly, and remained apart in a kind of hash. The hash indeed is different from any one of its elements and indeed from anything else. It is quite recognizable—as hash.⁸

THE STATE OF INDUSTRY ABOUT 1800

Tools have been used by the human race since prehistoric times, but a tool which is but an aid to the human hand cannot be considered a machine even though it enables a man to do a much greater amount of work and different and more difficult tasks than he could perform without it. A great French student of economic history defines a machine as "a mechanism which, worked by any motive power, executes the elaborate movements of a technical operation, which it had previously taken one or several men to do."⁹

⁷ There are several interesting brief accounts of the industrial changes of the period and their implications. Frederick Dietz, *The Industrial Revolution*, is a short general account; Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, Chapter XXI, is excellent; Paul Mantoux, *Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century*, is readable and very valuable; Henri Sée, *Modern Capitalism*, approaches the question from a different angle. M. M. Knight, H. E. Barnes, and F. Flugel, *Economic History of Europe in Modern Times*, and W. Bowden, M. Karpovich, and A. P. Usher, *Economic History of Europe since 1750*, are useful texts. Both J. F. Scott and A. Baltzly, *Readings in Modern European History*, and A. N. Cook, *Readings in Modern and Contemporary History*, have chapters of selections on economic and social subjects.

⁸ Crane Brinton, *English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (E. Benn Ltd., London), p. 293.

⁹ Paul Mantoux, *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century* (Jonathan Cape Ltd.), p. 194.

Machines, thus defined, were not new or even unfamiliar before the nineteenth century, but machine industry and machine technology are modern developments. The ancients, for example, made elaborate war machines; the water mill and the windmill are very old; and the later Middle Ages saw the use of pumps in silver mines, the invention of the printing press and of the elaborate Italian "silk-throwing" machine. In 1589 an Englishman invented a stocking frame which revolutionized the knitting of stockings and to some extent replaced hand knitting. Glassmaking, ribbon weaving, munitions making, and other lines of industry were similarly changed by new inventions and equipment in the early modern period, but there was no general or marked transition from handicraft to machine industry. As early as the thirteenth century Roger Bacon dreamed of horseless carriages and flying machines, in the period of the Renaissance Leonardo da Vinci sketched power looms, gears, and turbines, and before the American Revolution Benjamin Franklin predicted many uses for his hobby, electricity. Here and there throughout the centuries men were interested, and occasionally caught a glimpse of an era in which science and industry together might create a new world, but the realization of their dreams did not come until the nineteenth century.

The reasons for the slow development of machine industry were many and varied. As commerce expanded during and after the Age of Discovery the chief preoccupation of the mercantile world was with the acquisition and distribution of goods on an expanding market. The luxury goods of one generation became the necessities of the next, and men's wants expanded with the increase of trade. Economic enterprise was largely concerned with the procuring of overseas goods to satisfy those wants, and there was little initiative or capital left over for investment in industry. Goods were made locally much as they always had been, except in new industries, such as the silk industry, introduced to satisfy and to take advantage of a demand created by the distant trading. Not only was the development of industry retarded by a lack of capital for its expansion, but it was held back as well because of the predominantly rural character of the population of Europe. So long as Europe was thinly populated and the 80 to 90 per cent of the population lived in rural districts, there was little incentive for the mechanization of industry. When the isolation of rural life was lessened by a closer linking of the growing towns by a network of improved roads, there was a greater opportunity for industrial development.

The state, too, played a part in delaying the use of machines. The old industries were well established, closely connected with those who controlled governmental policies, and well versed in methods of self-protection. The English woolen industry, for instance, may well be called a "vested" interest, and it fought vigorously against the encroachment of silk and cotton importation and manufacturing.¹⁰

Inventors and men with scientific imagination might envisage a world filled with all manner of machines, but they were for generations hopelessly handicapped by the lack of materials and technical equipment for their production. Most tools and the earlier machines were simply made of wood, iron or steel, handmade or with the assistance of other equally simple tools. Before industry could be thoroughly mechanized precision instruments must be made, new materials brought into use, and light engineering developed. Screws, planing and milling machines, boring machines, lathes, drills, and other precision instruments, all had to be developed and standardized before machines could be made that were at the same time intricate and reliable. It was difficult to bore a cylinder of the same diameter throughout and to make a piston which would fit it snugly. Furthermore there could be no widespread use of machines until durable metals were used for their parts and the parts themselves were not only accurately made but were interchangeable. When the parts of tools and machines could be produced separately in large quantities and assembled later into the finished object, with any individual part replaceable for repairs, modern machines became possible.¹¹

These obstacles to machine technology were not all removed at once, nor was the development of machine industry uniform in any way. Even within the textile industry in England, where there were epoch-making inventions in the eighteenth century, wool was made into cloth by the old methods of domestic manufacture for more than fifty years after cotton manufacturing was thoroughly mechanized.

¹⁰ In England, for example, the woolen interests were strong enough to obtain a law in 1700 preventing the importation of printed cotton fabrics. Angry weavers even went so far as to attack people dressed in cotton material, but the desired goods continued to be smuggled into England until British enterprise was able to supply the demand by the development of cotton spinning and weaving in England. See Paul Mantoux, *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century* (Jonathan Cape Ltd., London), pp 201 ff.

¹¹ It is interesting to note that the first light engineers were the clock- and watch-makers, and that many a clockmaker became the inventor of machines for other industries or the technical aid of some manufacturer.

Stockings were made by machines as early as 1600, and yet countless thousands of hand-knit pairs have been made by nimble fingers from that day to this, and the work of the village cobbler was not superseded by machine-made shoes until after the middle of the nineteenth century. This unevenness and diversity within the progress of the mechanization of industry are duplicated in the unevenness of the spread of machine production throughout the world. The advance of modern industrial methods, from the northwest across Europe eastward and southward, has not yet been entirely completed. In the United States, where some areas are heavily industrialized and where a large part of the population has prided itself on a standard of living based on the widespread distribution of the products of machine technology, other areas have been relatively untouched by the passage of a century and a half of mechanization. The term "our contemporary ancestors" was applied to those who lived in the fastnesses of the Southern mountains because their way of life was much like that of the first white settlers in America.

In the middle of the eighteenth century France had a population of approximately twenty million and a vigorous and growing overseas trade. Great Britain's population was less than half that of France but was rapidly growing, and her control over the seas and ascendancy in colonial possessions and in distant trading were conceded by the end of the century. Before the French Revolution there was little difference between them in industrial development. Both imported colonial raw products, such as cotton and sugar, and made them over into finished products much in demand on the European market. In both states fortunes made in trade were finding in industry a place for investment, and the merchant-manufacturer saw clearly the value of machine and factory production. England may have excelled in the invention of machines and in the development of metallurgy, while France was especially strong in chemical advancement, but the inventions and discoveries of one country soon became known, and used, in the other in spite of the prohibitory laws of the mercantilistic governments. The years of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars blocked French industrial development and gave to England an advantage that lasted well into the nineteenth century.

ENGLAND'S PRIORITY IN INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS

In many ways England had especial advantages which made rapid progress possible when the first steps had been taken. The mild humid climate of the British Isles made sheep raising and textile manufacturing both easy and profitable. The numerous rivers, seldom frozen over, furnished adequate water power to turn the wheels of industry. In the same areas there were ample deposits of coal for fuel and power, and of iron for the steel essential for the new machines. The commercial and colonial supremacy of Britain assured her the raw materials necessary for industry and the markets where the finished products might be sold.

In the seventeenth century England had begun that series of concessions to the middle class which gave its representatives a share in government and a satisfactory position in the social order. The stability of the government and its constant interest in trade and economic development were factors of great importance. In London, England had one of the largest capital cities in Europe, where already a center of financial and banking interests had developed. The joint-stock companies organized for distant trading were to furnish a convenient pattern for industrial corporations, and the introduction of limited liability for stockholders in these companies encouraged investment. The restrictions of medieval guilds were early removed in English industry. New enterprises grew up outside the guild system, and guild control steadily declined in the older industries. After the days of Charles I it was illegal for the crown to grant monopolies, and a basis was laid for modern patent laws.

The necessities of domestic and distant trading directed attention to means of transportation, and England, as well as other countries, put forth great efforts to improve her roads. The mere mention of the name of one of her road engineers, Macadam, is sufficient to call attention to the success in that enterprise. The adequate labor supply necessary for industrial advancement was found in England due to a variety of causes. The agricultural changes of the eighteenth century¹² had caused a great increase in the number of enclosures of land for agricultural purposes. With the loss of the old common lands and with more scientific methods of production the English yeoman was all too often forced into the ranks of the landless agricultural laborers. With the increase of farming for trade and for

¹² See above, page 290.

profit the total food produced on English farms increased, but the old subsistence farmers were often recruits for the employers of industrial labor. In the earlier period many of them eked out an existence in the rural areas by a part-time participation in the manufacture of goods under the old domestic or "putting-out" system of production, only to be driven with their families into the urban factories in the early nineteenth century. The ranks of labor had been recruited also from abroad. Dutch and German immigrants had developed the metal trades, and French refugees had thrown their enterprise and ability into the textile industries in the eighteenth century. As machinery developed, attention was proudly called to the fact that fewer laborers were needed for the making of a given amount of goods or that children could replace men in certain parts of production. Throughout the entire period after 1750 the death rate was steadily lowered,¹³ and the birth rate mounted slowly as the standard of living rose.¹⁴ This natural increase in population resulted in an increasing labor supply for the advancing industries.

THE "REVOLUTION" IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY

Some of these factors were, it is true, present in other countries, but in no other region were they all to be found so favorably assembled in the period when machine technology was under way. The story of advances made in cotton manufacturing after 1750 is, perhaps, too familiar to need repetition and yet it is illustrative of similar contemporary, or later, shifts in other industries. John Kay invented the flying shuttle in 1733 and thus greatly increased the width and the amount of cloth that could be made by one weaver. This invention necessitated further changes.

The various processes of an industry form one whole, and are comparable to a system of interdependent movements all responding to the same rhythm. The effect of a technical improvement accelerating only one of these operations is to break the common rhythm, upsetting, as it were, the balance of the system.¹⁵

¹³ Due to the increase in medical knowledge, control of plagues and epidemics, absence of famines and of devastating wars.

¹⁴ There is something to be said also for the effect upon the birth rate of the demand for the labor of children in factories and for the effect of the new "poor laws" which provided "relief" on the basis of the size of families.

¹⁵ Paul Mantoux, *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century* (Jonathan Cape Ltd., London), p. 212

The acceleration of weaving made it necessary to speed up the spinning process. When ten spinners must labor to provide the weaver with thread, looms must at times stand idle with a resulting dislocation of labor as well as capital. There is some doubt as to the origin of the first spinning machine. Many men were working along similar lines, but the first successful device for spinning several threads at a time was patented by James Hargreaves in 1770.¹⁶ It could be operated by hand and was used for some time in homes as the spinning wheel had been. Richard Arkwright patented in 1769¹⁷ a water frame which applied water power to spinning and which led the way for the transition to factory production in the cotton industry. Neither the spinning wheel nor Hargreave's spinning "jenny" could twist cotton thread hard enough for the warp¹⁸ used in weaving, but in 1779 Samuel Crompton invented the "mule" which produced much finer, stronger thread to be used in the making of muslins, cambrics, and other delicate fabrics. The "mule" and the water frame could be operated by either water or steam power. The various preparatory and finishing processes were mechanized in the same period; the carding of yarns was soon done by machines; chemicals were used in the bleaching of fabrics; and cylindrical machines were invented for the printing of calicoes. Water and steam power were applied to the weaving process early in the nineteenth century, and by 1830 the mechanization of the industry was nearing completion. In the older woolen industry similar changes took place but much more slowly.¹⁹

THE SPREAD OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

The disturbance in the "rhythm of industry" spread rapidly into other fields. After textiles, the "heavy" industries were affected. Railroads were built, and steel and iron tools and machines were manufactured. Mechanization and the factory system demanded new types of power. Coal had been used for many years to supply heat and power for the crude steam engines used in pumping excess water out of mines. The prospect of the limitless amount of power to be derived from a little coal and water was very attractive to the owners

¹⁶ His invention was first used about 1764.

¹⁷ There is some doubt as to who invented it.

¹⁸ Warp had formerly been made of linen.

¹⁹ Not all of these developments were English. Other countries, notably France, contributed.

of the new machines, who found themselves inconvenienced by the variations of water power due to flood and drouth and by the necessity for putting their factories along the streams. Early in the eighteenth century Thomas Newcomen had developed a steam engine with a cylinder and a piston. His invention was widely used in pumping water out of mines, but it remained for James Watt to transform it into a machine that could be used economically to produce power for use in industry. In 1774 Watt acquired a partner in Matthew Boulton, who owned a factory near Birmingham for the manufacture of small metal wares and, with his financial assistance and skilled workmen, Watt finally produced an engine that revolutionized industry.

The possibility of the application of the new sources of power to transportation was quickly recognized. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the changes made in transportation and the effect of those changes on the whole economic development. Steam was used early in the nineteenth century to turn the paddle wheels of boats,²⁰ and the century of progress from the little "Clermont," which went up the Hudson River in 1807, to the "Queen Mary" and the "Normandie" was begun. In the third decade of the nineteenth century in both England and America steam engines were successfully utilized in furnishing power for the first railroad trains. The progress in the use of power was steady, and the development of other fuels than coal and of other sources of power, such as electricity, was an inevitable accompaniment of the broadening of the needs of industry.

It was equally inevitable that mechanization would spread from textiles into every other branch of industry. With precision tools and adequate power, machines were used to advantage in potteries, in printing concerns, and in cutlery establishments. The north and west of England came to be dotted with the tall chimneys of factories, and new industrial towns grew up wherever coal, iron, and good transportation facilities²¹ were in juxtaposition. There was one other

²⁰ French, English, and American inventors worked on steamboats. Robert Fulton, an American, produced the first successful boat and thus has the credit for the invention.

²¹ Canals were constructed in England to aid in getting coal to the points where it could be utilized. In many countries with navigable rivers networks of canals supplemented the new "hard" roads before railroad transportation was possible. In fact, it was not until the later nineteenth century that the railroad superseded the canal in many areas.

hurdle to be taken, however, before industrial progress in the nineteenth century could get into its stride. For the new tools, machines, and railroad trains all required iron or steel in large quantities and of excellent quality. Such steel had been produced in the past by the use of charcoal in the smelting process. English forests were largely gone, and the limitless quantities of iron that would be needed made any forest seem insignificant. Coal must be used for steel production, but years of experimentation were needed before the process was perfected. Directly used, coal produced adequate heat but poor steel, for the sulphur and other impurities in the coal ruined the finished product. When it was discovered that the impurities could be eradicated by coking the coal, that problem was solved, although the nineteenth century was far advanced before industry had a metal that satisfied its needs.²²

The by-products of coal have been almost as important in industry as the use of coal for heat and power. Illuminating gas derived from the coking process was one of the first of many valuable derivatives of coal.²³ Coal tar became the basis for aniline dyes, and the industrial chemists have made innumerable additions to the list of commodities to be drawn from coal.²⁴ The union between chemistry and industry is well illustrated in the development of the many uses of coal, but it is equally apparent in many other fields. When, toward the end of the century, the possibilities of the practical uses of electricity were realized, the physicist, too, might find his career in the "applied" sciences. Mechanical, chemical, and electrical engineering developed as the aids of industry and machine technology. Under their combined influence the entire structure of modern life was altered. In the nineteenth century, as in no other century in the history of Europe, the everyday life of the average individual changed so rapidly and so fundamentally that there was little similarity between the beginning and the end of the hundred-year span.

²² For the development of the coal and steel industries see Paul Mantoux, *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century*, Part Two, Chap. III, J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Rise of Modern Industry*, Chaps. VIII and IX, and W. Bowden, M. Karpovich, and A. P. Usher, *An Economic History of Europe since 1750*, Chaps. VI, XIX.

²³ See illustration of "Coal's Family Tree," in Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, p. 531.

²⁴ Fertilizers, sulphuric acid, lubricating oils, perfumes, explosives, disinfectants are among the many derivatives of coal.

INDUSTRIALIZATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Although England led the way in these economic changes, other countries in the Western world were not slow to follow her example. Until the French Revolution there was little difference between England and France in commercial and industrial achievement. France had a larger population and a greater labor supply than England, and her commerce was of about equal extent and value. The long years of the Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, however, retarded French industrial development, and England forged ahead. After 1815 French progress began, increasing rapidly toward the end of the century. Somewhat more slowly the Germanies fell into line, and after the middle of the century the characteristic evidences of industrialization and mechanization were apparent in much of Europe. Russia had been noticeably backward in the early years of the nineteenth century, but in its last two decades made great efforts to increase her industrial output, improve her transportation facilities, and develop her vast natural resources. Much of Eastern and Southern Europe, except for parts of Austria, remained largely agricultural into the twentieth century, with the peoples of those areas relatively untouched by the changes brought into the world by machine technology.

The transition to the factory system came slowly in the United States. Industrialization was delayed by the lack of capital, high labor costs, lack of adequate currency, and by the rivalry with agriculture which could offer the vast frontier lands as inducement. Competition with Great Britain was an added deterrent, and the United States depended almost exclusively upon British manufactured goods until the maritime difficulties of the Napoleonic period. After 1815 industrial progress was rapid, and Yankee ingenuity and enterprise took advantage of the cheap raw materials and rapidly expanding domestic markets. Extensive railroad building supplied the transportation facilities necessary for the development of the country, and the exploitation of the vast natural resources provided opportunity for great capital accumulations. The influx of immigrants in the latter half of the century furnished an adequate labor supply, protective tariffs encouraged the manufacturer, and inventive genius and mechanical skills caused American industry to forge ahead. The United States became, before the end of the century, one of England's greatest competitors.

CHANGES IN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

The industrial changes of the period after 1750 were not accomplished without corresponding changes in the realm of finance and in the entire character of the economic system. Capitalism in some form is as old as trade, or, as Mantoux says, as the distinction between rich and poor. Machine technology which made necessary the factory system greatly increased the use of capital in the production of goods, and with that use capital itself increased so that a class of industrial capitalists came into being. Fortunes which had been made in commerce had been in part invested in banking enterprises and in land, until there was a closely knit relation between the owners of the three types of wealth. From the days of the merchant-clothmaker-banker princes of Florence, the merchant capitalists increasingly turned part of their attention and part of their wealth into manufacturing the goods necessary for their far-flung trade. The cotton importers of Liverpool developed the cotton manufacture that was to become the characteristic industry of that section of England.²⁵ The merchants whose wealth depended upon the sugar of the West Indies invested in plantations and refineries. The importation of new commodities often led to the development of new industries, and merchant capital frequently financed both enterprises. The improvement of transportation facilities was of interest and value to merchant as well as to factory owner, and both owned shares in the new railroads and steamship companies. The part played by the merchant capitalist was of great importance, and the accumulation of capital through trade made possible the rapid expansion of industry.

The mechanization of industry brought a new class of capitalists to the front. From the owners of small establishments who saw the possibilities of a new appliance or a new machine, and from individual workers, who substituted ingenuity, energy, and thrift for capital, there grew a group of hard-bitten, forceful, vigorous "captains of industry." With the development of industry this group found itself on the same plane as the older merchants and bankers, and in its hands rested the control of industrial organization.²⁶ Profits made in the early years of their operations were plowed back into the in-

²⁵ Henri Sée, *Modern Capitalism*, p. 118.

²⁶ The career of Josiah Wedgwood and the development of the great potteries of western England is an illustration. The father of the prime minister, Sir Robert Peel, was a cotton spinner and manufacturer.

dustrial enterprise without regard for the needs of labor, and the increase of capital made possible extensions upon which great fortunes might be built.

In the joint-stock company created by the merchants for the great enterprises of distant trading these industrial capitalists found an excellent device by which the amount of capital available for their expanding enterprises might be increased and their risks might be spread over a larger area. Railroad building and canal construction could be done only by such means or by government enterprise. As the century progressed, individual ownership and partnership gave way to limited-liability corporations in such industries as lent themselves to large-scale production. The rents of landowners, the profits of merchants, the capital of banks and trust companies, and the savings of countless individuals were invested in the stocks or bonds of railroads, factories, and other varieties of industrial enterprises. The tendency of the nineteenth century was toward large-scale units of production, and popular prejudice against monopolies²⁷ did little to deter their organization. Governments vied with business in providing bonds for investment, as they borrowed money for building railroads as well as for waging wars. In 1854 and 1855 Austria and France floated large loans; in 1859 Cavour financed his war against Austria by the public sale of bonds; and in 1861-1865 both North and South in the United States endeavored to finance the Civil War, in part at least, by public subscription. Finance companies and investment bankers appeared in the same period to aid the public in investing its money, and the credit machinery of modern business grew more intricate. Railroads were built on long-term bonds, and capital amassed in one part of the world sought investment and high returns in the development of the resources of other areas less advanced industrially. During the century the discovery of gold in California, Australia, Africa, and Alaska ensured an adequate metallic basis for the expansion of industry, banking, currency, and commerce. Business operated upon the assumption that, although there were frequent crises due to overexpansion or overproduction, the general trend was upward and that it was safe to expect a continuance of growth in accordance with the nineteenth-century pattern.

²⁷ All large-scale production was not monopolistic, although some enterprises, such as telegraph, railroads, power production and the like, tend inevitably to be monopolistic. Some countries, notably Germany, have recognized that fact from the beginning and have encouraged and assisted the formation of monopolies under strict government supervision. As a result, antimonopolistic sentiment has not arisen there.

INCREASE AND SHIFTS IN POPULATION

The steady increase in machine techniques and the rapid growth of industrial capitalism made a tremendous impact upon the lives of all who lived in regions where those changes were taking place. There was a great increase in wealth and in population in the nineteenth century. As industry and commerce piled up wealth for those who achieved success in their service, the population of every industrialized country increased at an unprecedented rate. Until 1750 the population of England, for instance, increased very slowly. England and Wales had about five million inhabitants in 1600, approximately six million in 1700, and six and a half million in 1750. After that date the rapid increase began. In 1821 the population of England and Wales was twelve million, and that of the whole British Isles was nearly twenty-one million. In 1921 England and Wales had almost thirty-eight million inhabitants while the British Isles had forty-seven million. These figures are even more significant when it is noted that Ireland lost two million in population in the hundred-year period and Scotland's increase was from two to almost five million. The tremendous increase, therefore, was in those areas, England and Wales, where industrial changes had been most pronounced.²⁸ In general, the same development was characteristic of other countries, especially those in which great economic advance was being made. The most spectacular population increase was, of course, in the United States, where the advance was from approximately five million in 1800 to seventy-six million in 1900; but this startling development was not due entirely to the causes of population increases elsewhere. The fact, however, that after the middle of the century the immigration into the United States from Europe swelled from a few thousand to about a million each year is of interest for its bearing upon any study of European census figures.

The gradually rising standard of living in the nineteenth century and the increasing knowledge of the principles of sanitation and medical care, as well as the control of epidemics and famines have all contributed to the growth of population. The opportunities offered for migration to new and fertile regions overseas have been

²⁸ The earlier estimates given above are from Mantoux, *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 356. The 1821 and 1921 figures are from C. R. Fay, *Great Britain from Adam Smith to the Present Day*, p. 331.

contributing factors. The size and growth of the population of any state depend upon the birth and death rates and upon immigration and emigration. These are in turn conditioned by many factors, notably economic resources and opportunities.²⁹

Not only was there a great increase in population, but there was, also, a decided shift in its distribution. Again using England as an example, although England may be an exaggerated one, we find that the old thickly settled area had been the region south and east of London; the new densely populated district was west and north. Some towns in the former area steadily declined in population while deserted villages were not unknown. In the north and west great cities such as Leeds, Birmingham, and Manchester grew up. These new industrial areas were in close contact with iron and coal, and at the same time were near seaport towns and supplied with canals, roads, and railroads to make easy transport of their products possible.

The shift in population in England and elsewhere from the rural districts to the towns was as marked as was the shift from one region to another. Even before the widespread use of machines, the rapid expansion of commerce had caused the growth of thriving commercial towns, and many merchant-manufacturers had preferred to gather their workmen into large shops in towns near the seaports in order that they might work more efficiently under supervision and that there might be less waste or theft of raw materials. The advent of the machines, together with the use of water and steam power, made factories necessary, and the tall chimneys of industry became the most marked characteristic of the ugly new towns that marred the modern landscape. The urbanization of Europe, which had long been under way, was greatly accelerated in the nineteenth century. By 1920 nearly 80 per cent of the population of England and Wales was urban; over 60 per cent of the inhabitants of Germany and Austria lived in towns; and even in the United States more than 50 per cent were city dwellers. The peasant way of life was gone for part of Western Europe, and a large share of the population was subjected to all of the advantages and disadvantages of urban life. It must be remembered, however, that outside all of the cities there were great rural areas, and that, in every country, farming remained a major enterprise.

²⁹ See F. Schuman, *International Politics*, p. 268.

THE RESULTS OF URBANIZATION

The new factory towns were ugly things, black with coal smoke, noisome because of open sewers and complete lack of facilities for garbage disposal, crowded with cheap and ramshackle dwellings for the thousands of laborers pouring into them from all sides. It must be admitted that towns had been crowded and dirty, even though small, throughout the Middle Ages. Sanitation and city engineering had not yet been matters of concern to town governments, and, before 1800, no European cities had adequate water supply, drainage, or lighting systems. It is true, also, that there was the same complete lack of sanitation in country villages. Their only advantage lay in the fact that with less crowding, more fresh air, and out-of-door employment their inhabitants had a somewhat better chance for health and physical well-being than the townsmen had. Conditions in the factory towns, in the early part of the century, therefore, were worse than those elsewhere only because of the intensification of the danger and discomforts due to the greatly increased numbers of inhabitants. The miserable huts leaning against the walls of older and more substantial buildings, the tenements crowded back to back to save all possible ground space, and the hovels in filthy courts and alleys housed the laborers and their families in a degradation more complete than could be found in the cottages of the agricultural laborers. The factories themselves were unsanitary, dark, and ugly, and there was little effort to protect the laborers from occupational injury, nor was there any understanding of or attempt to prevent industrial diseases. Some of this insensitiveness to the decencies of life and this disregard of health was due to the indifference of the industrial capitalist, who was endeavoring to make the new machines contribute to his wealth; more of it was due to ignorance and inertia. Sanitation had to wait until cast-iron pipes had been devised for water supply, and cheap pottery had made possible drainage pipes and plumbing fixtures. The assumption that the city government owes those who dwell within its boundaries pure fresh water, sewage and garbage disposal, fire and police protection, lighting facilities and protection from disease came in the latter part of the century. Scientist, engineer, and inventor had to do their work first; philanthropist and publicist had to exert their pressure; and public opinion had to be kept roused by the laborers themselves before the evils of slum living could be alleviated.

Throughout the century the cities grew steadily more attractive from the cultural point of view. The advantages of urban life came to include imponderables as important as the obvious practical benefits.

In England the attention of Parliament was called to the crying need for better housing shortly after the 1832 Reform Bill. Men like Jeremy Bentham and Robert Owen³⁰ led the agitation. They were followed by the Chartists³¹ and other reformers, and their insistence continued until in 1840 a House of Commons committee proposed a bill providing for Boards of Health to look after water supply, burial grounds, and slums, a general housing bill, and a general sewage bill. The efficacy of these bills may be judged from the fact that sixty years later the main evils against which they were directed were still prevalent. The reports of commissions in 1867, 1884, and after 1900 again and again laid bare the facts, but no thoroughgoing reform seemed possible.

Parliament passed Public Health Acts and set up authorities with sharply limited powers, but the fatal blindness to the character of the problem, as a problem in the organization and planning of town life . . . persisted. England learnt sooner than other countries how to cleanse her towns, but towns still continued to grow at the pleasure of the profit seeker. Each generation looked wistfully back to its predecessor as living in a time when the evil was still manageable, and over the reforms of a century could be inscribed the motto "the Clock that always loses." For the creed of the first age of the Industrial Revolution, that the needs of production must regulate the conditions of life, and that the incidence of profit must decide . . . in what kind of houses a nation shall find its home, had cast its melancholy fatalism over the mind of the generations that followed.³²

EFFECT OF INDUSTRIALIZATION ON LABOR CONDITIONS

If standards of urban housing and sanitation rose but slowly in the nineteenth century it was with a similar slowness that conditions of labor were recognized as a part of the responsibility of the government. The machine was looked upon at first merely as a means of increasing the profits its owner might make in an enterprise of

³⁰ See below, page 491.

³¹ See below, pages 503 ff.

³² J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Rise of Modern Industry* (Harcourt, Brace and Company), pp 227-28.

which he was the master. The social results of machine technology were not at first apparent; when they were at last recognized means for correcting the evils were not immediately put into operation. The unsafeguarded machines were responsible for countless injuries, and the liability of the employer was not at first admitted.

The inhumanity of the assumption that the responsibility of avoiding the whirling wheels, the flashing knives, or the rapidly moving belts rested upon the laborer was glaringly apparent when it was shown that it was tiny fingers that were cut off and little bodies that were mutilated by the machines. Child labor was nothing new among the poor of Europe. Children had been early apprenticed under the old guild system, and their labor had been utilized by their parents on the land and at wheel and loom under the domestic system of manufacture. With the coming of the machine, however, employers found that the strength of adult men was not necessary, and that much of the work of feeding and tending the machines could be done far more cheaply by children.⁸³ Into the factories the children went, therefore, by the thousands when the first textile machines were invented. Little more than babies, they were put to work at a minimum wage with the conventional hours "from daylight to dark" applied to their labor as well as to that of their elders. Discipline was savage, food poor and inadequate, and the lives of the unfortunate children often short as well as unhappy. English employers leased as apprentices the entire membership of workhouses and orphanages, and, in the early period, complacent local authorities, glad to be rid of the expense of their care, sold their wards into bondage to "learn a trade."⁸⁴

⁸³ Both women and children were employed in English industry much earlier than on the Continent, but during the Napoleonic period such employment became general in France. After that Continental as well as English mill owners found advantages in the practice.

⁸⁴ "Spinning was quickly learned and needed little strength, while for certain processes the small size of the children and their delicacy of touch made them the best aids to the machines. . . . Their weakness made them docile, and they were more easily reduced to a state of passive obedience than grown men. They were also very cheap. Sometimes they were given a trifling wage, which varied between a third and a sixth of an adult wage; and sometimes their only payment was food and lodging. Lastly they were bound to the factory by indentures of apprenticeship, for at least seven years, and usually until they were twenty-one. . . . The majority of these wretched children were paupers, supplied . . . by the parishers where they belonged. . . . At the beginning, these 'parish apprentices' were the only children employed in the factories. The workmen, very justifiably, refused to send their own. But unfortunately this resistance did not last long, as they were soon driven by want to a step which at first had so much horrified them."—Paul Mantoux, *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century* (Jonathan Cape Ltd, London), pp. 420-21.

The conditions under which women worked were often bad and without supervision or regulation. What conditions were can be found with tragic understatement in the first bills introduced in the British Parliament for their correction. When the legislators felt it necessary to provide against the employment of children under nine years of age and to shorten the working day to nine hours for those over that age, when they expressed their disapproval of the use of women and girls for underground work in mines, and when they endeavored to provide for the most elementary sanitary and safety equipment for factories, the previous condition was obvious.⁸⁵ The first real British Factory Inspection Act bears the date 1833,⁸⁶ and it was the beginning of adequate methods of supervision and inspection. Its importance lies in the fact that it appointed inspectors to see that the law was obeyed. As the years went by, one factory law followed another until by 1867 a comprehensive code was in effect. As other countries were industrialized similar codes were drawn up in answer to the same needs.

THE DEMAND FOR FREE EDUCATION

When public attention was called to the plight of children in industry, the crying need for free elementary education became apparent. The mechanization of industry was concentrating population in crowded cities, and the machines were depriving the workers of initiative and of artistic satisfaction in their work. Science and engineering were making a new world which would be unintelligible to the illiterate. If children were to be freed from the shackles of industry, schools must be provided for them; and if the evils of the slums and the dangers of crime and vice were to be limited, the urban workers must have at least the rudiments of an education. Illiteracy came to be recognized as "the worst disfranchisement a man could suffer." From the day of Adam Smith onward, economists and philanthropists alike had been advocating education as a

⁸⁵ The testimony gathered by the Parliamentary commissions appointed to investigate labor conditions is illuminating. The reports of these commissions were published in 1842 and excerpts from them may be found in Scott and Baltzly, *Readings in European History since 1814*, Chap. 3. A child of twelve who worked in a mine as a coal-bearer stated, "I carry about 1 cwt and a quarter on my back; have to stoop much and creep through water, which is frequently up to the calves of my legs. When first down fell frequently asleep while waiting for coal from heat and fatigue."

⁸⁶ There had been Factory Acts in 1802, 1819, and in 1825. All attempted to protect children in the cotton industry. all were dead letters.

compensation for the narrowing effect of the new specialization in industry. Philanthropists realized that if man was to be a mere cog in a machine, and if his work was to be mechanical, the constantly repeated performance of some motions demanded by the needs of the machine he tended, he must be given some opportunity for a fuller and more interesting life outside his working hours. Eventually—much earlier in America than in England, where attention was concentrated on the foreign market—the upper bourgeoisie, the owners and capitalists, came to feel that the working classes made up a part of that public which furnished a market for the commodities turned out by the factories. It seemed worth while to have a literate public which could appreciate the higher standard of living possible to them with the purchase of the goods which modern industry might supply. As the working classes acquired a voice in determining the policies of governments they were heard in their own behalf. Thus the demand for free schools became widespread.

Only in the United States had the idea of free public education been at all popular before the nineteenth century. The French philosophes and the English reformers all advocated that the state provide for education, but it was not until 1839 that public funds were set aside in England for educational purposes. Before that date voluntary societies, religious institutions, and occasional philanthropists had struggled with the problem, but the results fell far short of the goal set. A report of 1839 showed that in a district in Lancashire where there was a population of more than a hundred thousand there was not a single free school for poor children, and a similar report for Wales a few years later stated that not one man in fifty could read.³⁷ Slowly but surely the British government was forced to a realization of its responsibility for the education of the masses, and the great Education Act of 1870, which laid the basis for universal compulsory education, was followed by others until a fairly adequate system was worked out.³⁸ Other countries took similar steps; departments of edu-

³⁷ J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Rise of Modern Industry* (Harcourt, Brace and Company), p. 231. The whole of Part III of this book, entitled "The Social Consequences," is well worth reading. The same authors have written *The Age of the Chartist*, which has an excellent chapter on education and another on playgrounds.

³⁸ The slow development of state support for education was due, in part, to the opposition of religious factions. Church of England, Dissenters, Catholics. The resulting English system of schools was a composite of church-controlled and public schools with state aid and state supervision of both.

cation in every European government³⁹ directed national enterprise; and as suffrage was extended and the need for a literate electorate was realized, the importance of mass education was undisputed.

THE PROBLEM OF RELIEF

The agricultural "revolution" which had greatly increased agricultural production had also, through the enclosure acts,⁴⁰ forced thousands of English yeomen into the ranks of agricultural laborers or sent them to the new factory towns in search of work. This dislocation of agricultural labor, coupled with periodical industrial unemployment, called attention to the inadequacy of the poor laws, the sole legal agencies for relief. The backbone of the English provision for the indigent poor was the Elizabethan poor law, which had been designed primarily to prevent vagrancy and begging. By it a system of out-of-door relief was provided. Pensions for the aged, house rent, food, and clothing were somewhat inadequately furnished under this law. In 1662 a provision was added which made it possible for a parish to send back to his former home anyone who might become a charge on the parish. The poor were thus deprived of their right to move about freely in an effort to improve their lot. In the eighteenth century a system of parish workhouses was established, the basic principle of which was that the labor of the indigent, even that of little children, might partly recompense the parish for their support.⁴¹

The workhouse system was wholly inadequate for those of the able-bodied poor who could obtain employment but whose wage did not provide subsistence. The enclosures which forced many farmers into the ranks of agricultural labor and the shift to factory production which made it less possible for them to supplement their incomes by some spinning or weaving for an entrepreneur made it necessary for parish governments to supplement the wages of those laborers whose families were large. This form of relief was regulated by the price of bread, and the size of the parish allowance

³⁹ Prussia had long had a comprehensive educational system. It had been a part of Hohenzollern paternalistic policy for generations.

⁴⁰ There were 385 such acts in the decade 1760-1769. They came to 853 in the decade 1810-1819, and then began to decline in numbers. See F. L. Nussbaum, *History of the Economic Institutions of Modern Europe*, pp. 272 ff., for discussion of enclosures.

⁴¹ Dickens held this system up for scorn and shame in his immortal *Oliver Twist*.

was calculated to cover the difference between the laborer's wages and the price he must pay for food for his family. The great disadvantage of this system was that it tended to depress wages since employers expected parish relief to make it possible for workingmen to live on low wages. Seasonal and cyclical unemployment in factory towns added greatly to the problems of parish authorities. In 1834 a new poor law was passed which was designed to furnish uniformity and organization in the administration of relief, but its effect was far less satisfactory than its advocates had hoped. England was, however, earlier than other nations in attempting to solve the problem of relief on a national basis. After the unrest of the 1830's the situation was made less difficult by increasing prosperity and by the absorption into industry, especially into mining and railroad building, of many of the victims of the agricultural and industrial changes. The nineteenth century was to merge into the twentieth before England took further steps to protect the laboring classes from the vicissitudes of illness, old age, or unemployment. Eventually, however, in England as in other countries the responsibility of the national government along such lines was recognized.⁴²

THE FALLACY OF THE DOCTRINE OF LAISSEZ FAIRE

It is apparent from the way in which the problems of child labor, factory inspection, education, and the care of the poor were forced upon the attention of nineteenth-century governments that laissez-faire principles had no sooner been accepted in theory than it was necessary to modify their operation in a variety of fields. In short, there never was a period of pure laissez faire, and government intervention of one sort or another has been continuous. The bonds that had confined industry were removed; the old guild system was abolished wherever it still had vitality; interior customs and tariffs were discontinued; and many other restrictions upon business enterprise were removed. One after another, the old regulations which had fixed the status of the laborer were repealed. In place of such regulations, which, it is true, may have limited his freedom of action but at the same time had served as a protection against too

⁴² See below, Chapter XXI. The United States came very slowly to such steps, either by state or national governments. Circumstances in the period since 1918 have forced a realization of governmental responsibility, and recent social legislation is the result.

flagrant exploitation, he was given under *laissez faire* a complete "freedom of contract," that is, the right to offer his services for hire wherever he chose. The fallacy of such reasoning was shown clearly in dealing with the resulting situation in respect to the exploitation of women and children, and the first English factory act of 1802, futile though it was, was an admission of the failure of *laissez faire*, although, as a part of the poor law, it applied only to wards of the state. The necessity for protecting the helpless from the ruthless operation of the so-called "natural" laws was early recognized even by the advocates of *laissez faire*. The adult male population was, however, for many years considered able to make its own bargains, and labor unions were at first prohibited in England because they interfered with the right of Englishmen to sell their labor where they chose and because they hampered the state in regulating matters concerning labor. It was not until 1824 that they became legal.⁴³

The industrialists themselves expected more from their governments than the removal of old barriers. *Laissez faire* must be backed by positive action to further the needs of the new economic order. A system of business law was developed; national and international regulation of patents, copyrights, and trademarks became necessary; banking and currency remained the concern of government; and the determination of standards of weights and measures, statistical data, and postal services added to the work of governments. Expositions, trade schools, and technical education of all sorts soon supplemented the new free public schools. Government commissions, local or national, supervised the departments of water supply, sewage disposal, public health, and public relief. The most rugged of the individualists among the captains of industry did not hesitate to accept government aid when it was to their advantage; they have raised the cry of government intervention only when the specific government action has seemed opposed to their interests, and when it has seemed to strike at the vital principle of industrial capitalism, the principle of unrestricted profits. *Laissez faire*, therefore, never existed in an unadulterated form, and the broadening of the scope of government activity was continuous.

⁴³ England was the first European country to legalize unions. They were never illegal in the United States.

BROAD POLITICAL DIVISIONS

It has been equally difficult to reconcile the results of the mechanization of modern industry with the idea of the rights and the worth of the individual which was the heart of the doctrine of Rousseau. When that idea is extended to the masses of the people, to society as a whole, the difficulty is even greater. Out of these conflicts, between laissez faire and intervention, between the demands of industrial capitalism and the needs of the individual, and between individualism and collectivism, stem all of the political parties and theories of the nineteenth century. The broad political divisions of the nineteenth century may be said to be the conservative, the liberal, and the socialistic. They shade imperceptibly into one another, and no political parties can be said to represent all of those who belong in any one division, nor can categorical definitions be applied to each of them. The division may be made somewhat roughly on the basis of the attitude of the members of each group toward the problems resulting from that interaction of the ideas of the philosophes and the activities of industrial capitalism which characterized the nineteenth century.⁴⁴

CONSERVATISM

So much emphasis has been laid by historians upon the growth of democracy and liberalism in the nineteenth century that it is easy to overlook the continuing and enduring influence of conservatism. Much of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe throughout the century was in the control of conservative governments, and the influence and continued existence of conservative ideas has been evident in the postwar period. It is impossible to explain much that characterized those areas in the past or to understand their present political theories and acceptance of varying forms of dictatorship unless the strength of conservative ideology is accepted.

Conservatism in the nineteenth century implied the preservation of social organization according to caste, that is, aristocrat, burgher, handicraftsman, and peasant, the retention of privilege, the superior importance of agrarian rural life over industrial urban life, the antagonism to capi-

⁴⁴ The author wishes to acknowledge a debt to a former colleague, Professor Ralph Turner, whose interesting talks and lectures on modern social history stimulated much discussion and some little thinking along the various topics taken up in this chapter.

talism . . . antagonism to bourgeoisie, defense of absolutistic or aristocratic form of government, the retention of the standing army . . . religious orthodoxy, and the union of the throne and altar.⁴⁵

The restored legitimists after 1815, with their reactionary ministers, endeavored to refasten the doctrines of the old regime upon European political thought and institutions. They were aided by the nobles, who had been aghast at the aspects of liberalism presented in the French Revolution, and by a clergy more conservative and ultramontane than ever before. Romanticism in literature and an appeal to tradition in philosophy and history were the expression of their rejection of eighteenth-century rationalism.⁴⁶ In Western Europe the revolutions of 1830 and the English Reform Bill of 1832 were evidence that the bourgeoisie had triumphed over the conservative reaction, and with each decade liberalism gained ground. This was not true in other sections of the Continent. In Russia, in Austria, in Spain, and in much of Central and Eastern Europe, conservatism was strong enough to contest bitterly every demand of liberalism, and the old regime, somewhat battered, altered in many minor ways, remained in existence into the twentieth century.

In those countries where conservatism remained in control, industrial capitalism advanced slowly and remained subject to the dictates of a government dominated by aristocracy and crown. The conservative state had a deep aversion to liberalism and democracy but was not disinclined to provide further education for or to better the lot of the working classes.⁴⁷ Each caste was encouraged and aided in fulfilling the duties of its group to the autocratic state, and a broad view was taken of the government's functions in promoting the interests of its subjects. The same broad view prevailed in the government's willingness to make use of the advantages offered by machine technology. The conservative state and industrial capitalism, however, worked together on terms set by the state, and every effort was made to prevent too great an encroachment of the capitalist upon the field of state activities.

⁴⁵ Eugene Anderson, "Nineteenth-Century Europe. Liberal or Conservative," *Social Education*, May, 1938. The whole article is extremely interesting and pertinent.

⁴⁶ F. B. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution* (Harper & Brothers), Chap. III.

⁴⁷ See Chapter XXI for discussion of Germany after 1870.

LIBERALISM

The overemphasis upon liberalism on the part of historians of the nineteenth century came from their close attention to the development of liberal institutions in England and the United States and in those Western European countries where industrialization advanced rapidly and where political and social changes seemed to conform to the needs of modern life. The advance of liberalism may or may not mean the advance of democracy, although the two are often so linked together as to seem interchangeable terms. Liberalism is based on the freedom of the individual exercising his "natural" rights of life, liberty, and property. It has a fixed goal in the best interests and the highest development of the individual, but it has varied in techniques and has changed with changing situations. Early in the century liberals sought to remove old restraints and emphasized *laissez faire*. They soon turned to a more positive program and advocated suffrage, education, and many humanitarian reforms. The modern liberal goes still further in his desire to free the individual from the domination of those who control the economic factors of his existence. The tenets of liberalism have changed since the days when the middle class first came into power in Western Europe. Then the utilitarianism of Bentham was accepted as one of the fundamentals of liberal belief, and the idea that free individuals, working for their own selfish interests, would also achieve the greatest good for the greatest number was thought to be the logical outcome of the doctrine of utility. It was considered to be the function of government to protect property and to prevent interference with free competition. Economic liberty was believed to be the necessary condition for social well-being. The Calvinistic virtues of self-help, prudence, thrift, and devotion to a calling⁴⁸ were accepted as a part of liberal theory, and belief in his possession of these virtues justified the liberal in his demand for control over the government.

Economic freedom was obviously valueless without political rights, and the liberal demanded freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and a right to vote. Because these rights, and his property rights as well, must be guaranteed by the constitution of the state in which he lived, the liberal was always an advocate of constitutionalism and of the supremacy of the law. If consistent, the liberal pushed the right

⁴⁸ See above, pages 107-8.

to vote to the extent of universal suffrage and thus furthered an extension of democracy that might eventually react against his belief in property rights. The liberal was an advocate of state education and of the overthrow of clericalism. The liberal was a humanitarian; aided by science, he furthered all sorts of plans for the spread of the advantages of modern civilization and built hospitals and charitable institutions of every description.

NATIONALISM AS THE COMPANION OF LIBERALISM

Nationalism and liberalism went hand in hand, and patriotism meant an intense faith in the government in which the liberal felt he had a share. Patriotism was, indeed, but another term for devotion to the common good, and the government which furthered the educational and humanitarian ends dear to the heart of the liberal was worthy of his devoted allegiance. Freedom of political choice and individualism applied to groups of people of one race, tradition, or culture meant a recognition of national differences and the right of "self-determination." The early liberals were neither militaristic nor imperialistic; "live and let live" was the basis upon which they wished to place foreign relations. The state should be pacific, and there should be no exaltation of the military arm of the government through conscription. It was Bentham himself who coined the word "international," and he wished to remove the causes of friction and war between states by the "use of reason; the establishment of free trade; the perfecting of international law; the confederation of nations for mutual defense; international arbitration; and the limitation of armaments."⁴⁹ The liberals of the nineteenth century after Bentham worked out their nationalistic theories to include the ideas that each nationality should be governed by a state of its own choosing and that within such states the citizen should have freedom, all the opportunities implied in their conception of liberalism, and democratic or, at least, representative institutions. This new liberal nationalism was a part of middle-class thinking and found adherents among men of that class in all countries. Nationalism has flourished most where the state has been industrialized. Although industrial states de-

⁴⁹ C. J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (Farrar & Rinehart, Inc.), p. 131.

velop international trade, their domestic trade is immeasurably more important. There is more domestic than foreign intercourse; and news, travel, labor, and credit and banking operate on a national scale. Compulsory military service increases national feeling. The aids of the state to industry in the form of tariffs, subsidies, and the procuring of markets and supplies give added impetus to an increase of what can be described as economic nationalism. When economic development reached a point where industrial capitalism spread overseas into areas which had not yet been exploited, national prestige as well as desire for profit led to the growth of a new imperialism which brought an added strain to international relations and placed far too great an emphasis upon nationalism.⁵⁰

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIBERAL

The nineteenth-century liberal accepted the idea of progress. He looked out upon a world in which wealth and population were increasing, in which there were continual mechanical improvements, constantly increasing literacy, and the prospect of a greater length of life. It was easy for him to forget that there was a fundamental paradox in his liberalism which might in the end defeat him and cause the repudiation of the fundamentals of his creed. This paradox lay in the fact that, with all of the progress, with all of the education, and all of the humanitarianism of the liberal regime, there was little alteration in the essential and fundamental problem which accompanied the pursuit of profits carried on by industrial capitalism in a world where market economy was dominant. It may be open to debate whether or not the problem of poverty can be solved; certainly it received no solution at the hands of the nineteenth-century liberal; he provided methods of ameliorating some of its consequences but found no way of eradicating it. Using England again as an example, we note that throughout the nineteenth century approximately one-sixth of the population lived below the subsistence level. A survey in 1935 showed that nearly 50 per cent of the population of England suffered from some form of malnutrition, and that approximately one-fourth of the English working class was unemployed all or part of the time. The proletariat shared in the general rise in the standards of living; its relative position remained un-

⁵⁰ See below, Chapter XX, for a discussion of economic imperialism.

changed. "There has been no alteration at the base of society, and insecurity at the base makes all the structure of society insecure." Under such conditions many of the beliefs of liberalism become little more than myths—economic liberty, education for all, careers open to those with initiative and talent.

The liberal thus finds himself in a quandary which explains much of the plight of liberalism in the postwar world. His basic sentiment has been a desire for the well-being of the individual. He has preached tolerance, justice, broad-mindedness, willingness to view a question from all angles. Social legislation, social service, education, humanitarianism—he has sincerely accepted and furthered all these as means for the distribution of the good things made possible by science and industry. His ardent advocacy of the theory of progress and perfectibility has expressed his belief in the steady improvement of conditions which he tried to ameliorate. In recent years liberals have felt ineffective and pessimistic. The problems which they attacked have in no way been solved, and in consequence it has been charged that liberalism as an approach and a technique for bringing about changes can make no fundamental solution. Liberal measures, it seems, only serve to ameliorate the more striking consequences of the problems.

SOCIALISM

Many people in the nineteenth century, facing the same social problems which the liberal tried to solve, cut through to what they feel to be the heart of all these problems—the dominance of industrial and financial capitalism and the profit system. They agree with the liberal as to the existence of the problems and often as to some of the remedies, but they have an advantage over him in that for them there is no paradox. They are willing to admit that amelioration has failed to solve the problems of poverty, disease, and distress because they believe that any real solution can be reached only by discarding the capitalistic system which the liberal has accepted as the basis for his position. This branch of modern political thought may be given the name of socialism.

In the first half of the nineteenth century attention began to be concentrated upon the masses and the problems of those who were forced to live at a low level of physical existence. It was, perhaps, almost the first time in the history of Europe that there was much real concern as to the plight of the unfortunate victims of an eco-

nomie system. This concern came partly from the fear that the masses would constitute a revolutionary movement, partly from the humanitarianism of the era, partly from the greater facilities for communication and publicity, and in part from the fact that there were greater concentrations of population, closer contacts, and more first-hand knowledge. Slowly there had developed a realization of the worth of the individual, of the sanctity of life, of the right of everyone to an opportunity for growth and the development of his powers to the extent of his ability. The eminent English historians, J. L. and B. Hammond, have entitled their chapter on labor in the early part of the nineteenth century, "The Shadow of the Slave Trade,"⁵¹ and those who were fighting against negro slavery in both hemispheres were also affected by the idea of new "wage slaves." They recognized that women and children in industry were subjected to indescribable hardships, that family life was miserable, that there was a growing pauperism, that many had insufficient food and were inadequately housed. And they sought not only easement of these conditions but the eradication of their causes, for they felt the problem of the proletariat to be the foremost problem of the modern world.

The first group to win the name of "socialist" was not composed of members of the proletariat. The masses were as yet scarcely literate, without cohesion and without the ballot with which to register their demands. The first socialists came from the middle and upper classes and were men moved to pity and to action by the evils they saw about them. They recognized that exploitation of the working classes was prevalent and, indeed, implicit in the theory of unrestricted profits. They felt that the masses were helpless against the power of capital, and that the laborer could be as truly enslaved as though he were the legal property of the owner of the factory in which he worked. This consciousness of social injustice was not new; every generation and almost every nation had produced thinkers who realized the inequalities of wealth and opportunity and endeavored to devise some scheme by which a better world might be created. It remained for the nineteenth century to produce a logical body of doctrine, and a practical platform for political movements and parties which won vast numbers of adherents. It was, of course, the development of a proletariat dependent upon machine technology in a world controlled by industrial capitalism that made possible the spread of socialism.

⁵¹ J. L. and B. Hammond, *Rise of Modern Industry* (Harcourt, Brace and Company), Chap. XII.

THE EARLY SOCIALISTS

The first socialists were reformers and philanthropists whose ideas were conditioned by humanitarianism and by the egalitarianism of the French philosophers. Called Utopian socialists, each of them yearned to create a Utopia of his own. Each was in many ways a visionary and an escapist; but each contributed something to later socialistic thought. It is not necessary to mention more than two or three of the Utopians, all of them men whose work fell in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. The first, a Frenchman, Saint-Simon, believed that exploitation of man by man had been the great evil throughout history and based his scheme for a new state upon co-operation. His guiding principle was "from each according to his capacity and to each according to his needs." Production was to be carried on for use and not for profit, and the state was to supervise both production and distribution. The suggestiveness of Saint-Simon's ideas is obvious. Another Frenchman, Fourier, evolved a scheme for "phalansteries" of farmlands, workshops and living quarters, each of which should be co-operatively operated by a "phalanx" of about eighteen hundred persons. Most of the communistic societies founded (largely by Europeans) in the United States in the nineteenth century were of the Fourier type.⁵² Robert Owen, an English industrialist, proved in his own factories that it was possible to provide good wages, to improve factory conditions, and to supply schools and decent living quarters and yet make a profit. After years of struggling to bring about legislative reform in England, Owen came to the conclusion that his experiments could best be worked out in a newer and freer environment. He founded, therefore, a communistic colony in New Harmony, Indiana, which scarcely outlived him.

The advocates of Utopian socialism were humanitarians and philanthropists. They did not come from the ranks of labor nor did they receive its support. They were not revolutionary in techniques, and they preached no upheaval in the existing order, but the social and economic organization they advocated was entirely different

⁵² Brook Farm in Massachusetts was an American variant and had among its members Bronson Alcott, Nathaniel Hawthorne and other famous figures. Besides the Owen Colony at New Harmony, Indiana, there were dozens of others in the United States—English, French, German, Swedish. In a country with cheap land, great opportunities for advancement, and mobile social classes, such experiments rarely lasted more than one generation. The younger men broke away, the common property was divided, and the communistic features of the settlement disappeared.

from that of the world in which they lived. The achievement of their Utopias would have involved revolutionary changes. Their remedy was fundamentally one of escape through the creation of small co-operative or communistic units by the few who could be stirred to join them. After the Utopians came men who accepted their ideas in some measure, but who worked for a more practical solution to the problem of a maladjusted society. Louis Blanc, a French journalist, advocated state subsidies for and state control of national workshops which would eventually be strong enough to take over the instruments of production and thus drive out private enterprise. He played a part in the French Revolution of 1848, but the opportunity given him was so limited that no real test of his plan was ever made.⁵³ The English Chartist movement of the same period⁵⁴ was largely political in character, but it was inspired to some extent by Robert Owen and was allied with the trade-union movement. The Chartists' demand for manhood suffrage and for the possibility of a labor representation in Parliament was doubtless preliminary to social reform. The Chartists' ultimate goal was economic democracy.

MARXIAN SOCIALISM

All of these reformers were but forerunners of Karl Marx, the "father of modern socialism" who, although born in Germany, lived and worked the second half of his life in England. Few men have made as great an impact upon their own and succeeding generations, and few have contributed as much to political, economic, and social thinking. Marx was the son of well-to-do Jewish parents. A well-educated man, his early interests were law, philosophy, and history. He was for a time the editor of a radical newspaper which was suppressed by the government. He went to Paris to study the doctrines of the Utopians and from there to Brussels and then to England, where most of his work was done.⁵⁵ Another German, Friedrich Engels, joined him and collaborated with him in writing *The Communist Manifesto* which appeared in 1848. Later *Das Kapital*, Marx's greatest work, was published, the fruit of his profound studies in economics and history. The three volumes of *Das Kapital*, intended

⁵³ See below, pages 521-22

⁵⁴ See below, pages 504-6.

⁵⁵ In 1848 he went back to Germany but was shortly expelled because of his socialistic agitation.

as serious works in the field of economics, became as well known as Rousseau's *Social Contract*; translated into almost every language, they formed the basis for socialistic doctrine in the later nineteenth century.⁵⁶

The ideas which formed the core of the doctrines of Marx and Engels were the materialistic conception of history, the continual struggle between social classes, the theory of value and of surplus value, the inevitability of the collapse, or downfall, of capitalism, and the international nature of the socialist movement. Throughout the ages, class has struggled against class for political and economic power until, with the advent of industrial capitalism, society has split into "two armed camps," and the interests of labor are opposed to those of the capitalists. The Marxian doctrine of value was based upon the idea that labor is both the measure and source of value. The value of any commodity depends upon the labor which was socially necessary to produce it. The difference between the wage which the laborer gets under the capitalist system and the market value of the commodities he produces is the surplus value. The interest on capital, profits, and land rents are paid out of the work of the laborers in the form of surplus value. Under capitalism that value goes to the capitalist; under socialism it would go to the worker. As long as the land and the means of production remain in the hands of the capitalists, laborers must work for the latter, selling their only commodity, labor.

The central thesis of Marxian socialism is that capitalistic society is so torn by warring forces that it will destroy the "social fabric," and communism can come into being. Marx and Engels believed that as capital became more concentrated, periodic overproduction and depression would cause economic crises and unemployment, the middle class would disappear, and the lot of the poor would become intolerable. The masses would then rise in revolt and capitalism would be overthrown. Marx and Engels did not fully describe the nature of the new society that would follow the social revolution. They held

⁵⁶ Summaries of Marxian doctrine may be found in Erik Achorn, *European Civilization*, pp. 341 ff., and in J. Salwyn Schapiro, *Modern and Contemporary European History*, pp. 568 ff. Marx's works, especially *The Communist Manifesto*, may with profit be read in their entirety, the student can, however, find excerpts from his writings and from commentaries on his works in J. F. Scott and A. Baltzly, *Readings in European History since 1814*, Chap. XI, pp. 396 ff., in A. N. Cook, *Readings in Modern and Contemporary History*, Chap. VI, and in Algernon Lee, *The Essentials of Marx*.

that the modern state is an agency for the administration of the affairs of the bourgeois class and that, as an "instrument of class exploitation," it must disappear with capitalism. Since neither capitalism nor the state would voluntarily surrender its control, revolutionary action would be necessary, and the transition to a communistic society would be made through a dictatorship of the proletariat. The ultimate state would be a free association of individuals in a classless society "wherein everyone would receive according to his needs." The parliamentary system would be replaced by occupational representation of workers and there would be "colossal abundance of production on the basis of an all-embracing planned economy."⁵⁷ Believing that such a movement would eliminate national boundaries, the *Manifesto* was concluded with the ringing words, "The Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains; they have a whole world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!"

On the basis of Marxian doctrine, socialism at last spread to the masses, and political parties were founded in every industrialized country in order to work by legal and parliamentary means for the eventual realization of Marx's theories. It must be admitted that socialism came to mean many different things to its numerous and varied adherents, but there was always a substantial core of Marxian belief, the most fundamental common idea being that in some way all the means of production must come under the control of a classless state and be used for the good of all its citizens.⁵⁸

ANARCHISM

There was developed in the same period another revolutionary movement, anarchism, derived in part from a similar revulsion against the exploitation of man by man and in part from the demand for personal freedom which had produced liberalism. Anarchism is not a single theory, but rather a group of related ideas varying with the different leaders or "schools" having the rejection of coercion and the repudiation of the state in common. Proudhon, the leading French anarchist, was an idealist with an almost religious devotion to what he called "eternal laws." He denied the validity of any type of authority, asserted that "property is theft," and urged the abolition of all classes, government, and privilege. Voluntary associations would then

⁵⁷ The quotations are from the article on Socialism by Oscar Jaszi in the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*.

⁵⁸ Socialism as developed in the various European states and socialism as an international movement will be discussed in Chapter XXI.

take over the functions of production, distribution, and government. Any form of restriction, direction or dictation, he held, was tyranny. He preached "freedom in order and independence in unity." Bakunin, the great Russian anarchist, on the other hand, was a collectivist who believed in the common ownership of land and the means of production and private ownership in consumption goods. He repudiated Marxian state socialism, and advocated the free co-operation of groups of individuals. Some of the followers of these leaders preached a mild doctrine of humanitarianism and tolerance, while others were pledged to violent and terroristic measures.

Modern anarchism is based upon the idea that the social and moral evils of the world can never be cured by the state, nor can reforms be applied from above. Human nature is, the anarchists believe, essentially good, and a new society can be reached by co-operation from the bottom "from the natural tendencies of the human soul led by reason and justice." The state must be eliminated or its activities greatly reduced and superseded by free co-operation among individuals and groups. Anarchism places its emphasis upon justice and liberty and is a protest against the growing power of the state and against the regimentation and mechanization of society. It has never become a danger in countries where a sufficient amount of freedom and liberty is guaranteed to the individual. In countries where restrictions have been oppressive it has won more adherents. It has much significance as a plea for justice and equality in all human relations.

As the nineteenth century progressed and all of these diverse types of political and economic thinking were developed, it became evident that democratic or liberal thinkers were tending to turn from individualism to a new collectivism, regardless of whether or not they were socialists, while conservative thinkers tended to adopt individualism as their weapon against popular, or mass, control. Both conservative and radical thinkers were beginning to look upon society as an organism rather than a mechanism. And as an organism society had the property of growth. It was dynamic, not static, and was constantly changing. Political thinkers like Marx were evolutionists, at least as far as society was concerned.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Crane Brinton, *English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 301. Marx was, however, not a Darwinian evolutionist.

SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

This new attitude toward society was a reflection of the important part played by science in modern life. It has been easy to see the significance of the union of chemistry and of physics with industry. The inventor, inspired by new scientific ideas, opened the way for further scientific discoveries. The differentiation between pure and applied science disappeared, and science as an integral part of everyday life, permeating, in its applications, every phase of that life, came into being. Any enumeration of scientists and their discoveries for the period of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries tends to become a mere listing of familiar names. When into one century one must put in the field of medicine alone such names as Pasteur, Lister, Koch, and Curie, one wonders what medicine was like without bacteriology, anesthetics, antiseptics, and radiotherapy. Since the great eighteenth-century founders of physics and chemistry, Newton and Lavoisier, one discovery has followed another in those fields until the total achievement beggars description.⁶⁰

In geology, in botany, and in biology there was remarkable advance, and the idea of progressive change or evolution came to permeate all of these fields. Biologists put forward the hypothesis that man was descended from some primitive and nonhuman ancestor; the French naturalist Lamarck advanced the idea that characteristics desirable or necessary for the individual were acquired when needed and were transmitted to succeeding generations. Sir Charles Lyell proved that geological changes came slowly and that there was geological evidence of the slow evolution of living forms. Slowly a body of supporting fact was built up, and the public became educated to receive the proof of evolutionary doctrine. Charles Darwin, in the middle of the nineteenth century after long and careful study, published his *Origin of the Species*, a book which has had as great an influence on modern thought as the works of Karl Marx. The

⁶⁰ Sir Arthur Eddington, *The Expanding Universe*, A. Einstein and L. Infeld, *Evolution of Physics*, Sir James Jeans, *The Mysterious Universe*, and Lancelot Hogben, *Science for the Citizen*, are very recent popularizations of scientific work. Chaps XXVI in Schapiro and XII in Achorn are adequate summaries. Other works on science and its effect on civilization are W. T. Sedgwick and H. W. Tyler, *A Short History of Science*; J. A. Thomson, *Progress of Science in the 19th Century*; R. H. Murray, *Science and Scientists of the Nineteenth Century*, J. L. Randall, *Our Changing Civilization*; F. S. Marvin, *Science and Civilization*; and G. W. Gray, *The Advancing Front of Science*.

theory of evolution means, in brief, that the various animal and plant species have varied widely from their origins and have changed of necessity in their struggle for survival, and that in this development of the species there was a changing from one form to another. When the theory was applied to the evolution of the human race, there arose a long and sometimes acrimonious conflict between science and religion. When the theory was carried over into the fields of political, economic, and social development, the repercussions were equally significant. There is, probably, no essential quarrel between science and religion if religious teaching does not become too literal and dogmatic, and if the scientist does not overemphasize mechanistic theories. Some of the greatest modern scientists have gone far in reconciliation, and many churchmen have found satisfaction in the acceptance of scientific thought.

The social scientist, the historian, the sociologist, the economist, and the political scientist have all found, in the theory of evolution, food for thought and a method of approach to their special fields. The impact of modern civilization upon their thinking has led to a tremendous advance in the social sciences and the creation of great popular interest in them. Modern society is complex, closely integrated, and yet infinitely varied in its aspects. There has been a great tendency in modern research toward minute specialization because of the infinite amount of work to be done. There has been, also, a tendency toward synthesis and an effort to weave together the various threads of the tangled web of modern life into a closely knit fabric of varied colors and intricate pattern and yet of but one substance.

READINGS

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. The economic histories of Europe by Heaton and Gras to which reference has been made for earlier chapters will be useful here. *An Economic History of Europe since 1750* (1937) by W. Bowden, M. Karpovich, and A. P. Usher is readable and detailed. *The Industrial Revolution* (Berkshire Series, 1927) by Frederick C. Dietz is brief and interesting. J. L. and B. Hammond are the authors of *The Rise of Modern Industry* (1926) which deals largely with English development. M. M. Knight, H. E. Barnes, and F. Flugel, *Economic History of Europe in Modern Times* (1928) and F. L. Nussbaum, *History of the Economic Institutions of Modern Europe* (1933) are recent texts that may be used. L. C. A. Knowles, *Industrial and Commercial Revolution in Great Britain in the Nineteenth Century* (Fourth edition, 1926) and E. Lipson, *The*

Economic History of England, 3 vols. (1929-31) approach the period from the English point of view. Paul Mantoux's *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century* (1929) is a brilliant study furnishing a background for the nineteenth century. The rise of modern capitalism is explained and discussed in J. A. Hobson's *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism* (New edition, 1928) and in the brief and interesting *Modern Capitalism* (1928) by Henri Sée. The important part played by inventions is the subject of *The March of the Iron Men* (1938) by Roger Burlingame.

POLITICAL HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY. Since much of the economic and social changes of the century began in England, reference might be made to C. R. Fay's *Great Britain from Adam Smith to the Present Day* (1928) and to G. M. Trevelyan's *British History in the Nineteenth Century* (1922). Various phases of political theory are discussed in Crane Brinton's *English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (1933); C. J. H. Hayes's *Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (1931); F. S. Marvin's *Century of Hope* (1919); J. H. Randall's *Our Changing Civilization* (1929); Bertrand Russell's *Freedom and Organization, 1814-1914* (1934), and E. L. Woodward's *The Age of Reform*. There are many editions of *The Communist Manifesto* by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels; a recent analysis is *The Essentials of Marx* (1938) by Algernon Lee.

THE ADVANCE OF SCIENCE. Works on modern science are legion. A few of the more interesting ones are: *The Evolution of Physics* (1938) by A. Einstein and L. Infeld; *The Mysterious Universe* (1930) and *The Universe Around Us* (1933) by Sir James Jeans; *Science and the Citizen* (1938) by Lancelot Hogben; *Science and Scientists of the Nineteenth Century* (1925) by R. H. Murray; *Science and Civilization* (1923) by F. S. Marvin; *A Short History of Science* (1929) by W. T. Sedgwick and H. W. Tyler; *The Expanding Universe* (1933) by Sir Arthur Eddington; and *The Advancing Front of Science* (1937), by G. W. Gray.

≡ XVI ≡

THE YEAR OF REVOLUTIONS

THE impact of the changes wrought by the mechanization of industry and the development of industrial capitalism was of increasing importance during the nineteenth century. The inequality in the distribution of the very real advantages of the economic changes led to unrest and dissatisfaction, while the urbanization of workingmen, and the consequent ease of communication and of organization, made that dissatisfaction more dangerous to the existing order. In areas not so affected by industrialization additional causes for unrest were found in the suppression of the desires of all classes for participation in government and for the realization of nationalistic aspirations. In these regions there were also economic reasons for discontent. The Congress of Vienna had prevented the unification of Germany and Italy and had not taken into consideration the wishes of Polish, Norse or Flemish peoples in the settlement of European boundaries. Conservative governments had frowned upon the crusading Jacobin nationalism of the days of the French Revolution and had proceeded after the downfall of Napoleon to ignore the fact that nationalism had spread far beyond the limits of France. The Metternich system was the denial of both nationalism and liberalism, and from 1815 to 1848 it held Eastern and Southern Europe in thrall. The quickly suppressed revolutions of 1820 and 1830 had but served to strengthen the governing classes in their determination to maintain their ascendancy by preventing the spread of all noxious doctrines.

THE INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

In the freer atmosphere of the New World nationalism had been triumphant in the establishment of the twenty and more republics of Latin America, and there as well as in the older sister republic of the United States written constitutions were a pledge of allegiance to liberal ideas and were regarded as the guarantee of individual

rights and of democratic institutions. European travelers in the United States commented with varying degrees of approval or horror upon the leveling effect of democratic institutions, and came back from the frontier regions with a new vision of the opportunities open there to the common man. Machine technology first made its appearance in the United States in those New England areas where water power, Yankee ingenuity, and capital amassed in commercial enterprise combined to make successful the first American factories. But the New England country towns did not soon become replicas of the English mill centers, for the relative scarcity of labor and an expanding economy ensured for a long time standards of living for the American working classes that were unparalleled abroad. Cheap land on the frontier drew westward both New England farm lads and immigrants, and factory owners were often hard pressed in the competition for labor.¹ Social classes in the United States were so mobile that labor did not develop organization for many years, and a class-conscious proletariat was not to become an economic or political force until later in the nineteenth century.

In the meantime, the democracy of a frontier society developed political theories and practices in the new West that had considerable effect upon the older ideas of the Eastern states and some influence upon the democratic movement abroad.² The frontier placed its emphasis upon the worth of the individual; birth, background, and wealth were not significant factors. The courtesy of the frontier asked no questions as to antecedents, although the insistent curiosity of the frontiersman as to the intentions, opinions, and present status of all comers evoked unfavorable comment from all English travelers. Most of those who settled on the frontier were poor, usually no one person had an initial advantage over another. Initiative, ability, and enterprise determined the rise of the individual to affluence and power in a society where opportunity for advancement seemed unlimited.

Politically such a society produced manhood suffrage, many elective offices, and frequent elections. It must be admitted that it produced as well the idea that one man could administer an office as

¹ The price of government Western land from 1820 to 1862 had a basic minimum of \$1 25 an acre cash. For \$100 an eighty-acre farm might be acquired, with soil so fertile that within a year a sustenance might be secured from it. In this period the Western lands seemed limitless.

² See Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Significance of the Frontier in American History*, James Truslow Adams, *Epic of America*, and Carl Russell Fish, *Rise of the Common Man*.

well as another and that frequent changes in office would offer opportunity for more persons to share in the privileges and remunerations that were the possession of the officeholder. Such an attitude toward government made possible the spoils system and tended toward laxity in political morality. The frontiersman believed, also, that government should interfere little with the individual; that banks, tariffs, and restrictions upon land sales were designed to thwart his interests; and that it was well to be suspicious of capitalists and industrialists.

As one Western state after another was admitted to the union the political importance of Western ideas grew. Eastern states were forced to follow suit in the extension of suffrage, and the lower classes of the East found a common ground with the frontiersman in the new Democratic party of the period after 1825. With the 1830's a wave of reform swept the North and East, and every variety of social and political reform found support. Education, temperance, abolition of slavery, women's rights, and socialistic experiments were all popular expressions of the reform movement. The election of Andrew Jackson to the presidency in 1828 was the victory of what one author has called a "triumphant farmer-labor party." The career of Jackson was in itself a saga of the American frontier.

The growth of democracy in the United States captured the imagination of the European working classes, and the broad opportunities which the frontier might offer encouraged enterprising representatives of that class to migrate. The letters of immigrants and the reports of travelers made the connection permanent and more personal. America became at the same time an example for European effort in the establishment of both democracy and nationalism and a refuge for those cast out after economic or political disaster.³ Until the slavery question clouded the issue those Europeans who came to America, whether they settled in Eastern manufacturing towns or, as many of them did, went straight through to acquire land on the frontier, quite naturally joined the Democratic party on the basis of Jacksonian theory. There was much that was undemocratic, as well as much that was crude and corrupt about the institutions of the rapidly growing country to which those hopeful self-exiled Europeans came, but it is difficult to over-emphasize the importance upon European thinkers of the democracy

³ The great influx of the Irish after the famine of 1845-46 and of Germans after the failure of the Revolution of 1848 are examples

overseas. The United States furnished a model for their own planning, and upon the success of the American experiment was staked, in a measure at least, the success of their own endeavors.

ENGLAND AFTER THE REFORM BILL OF 1832

In England the advance of the century had brought greater economic and social changes than in any other part of the world. The lot of the common man was unenviable, and the inequality of the distribution of the advantages of the new industrial regime was glaringly apparent; nevertheless the political situation was not hopeless, and the necessity for some measure of amelioration was beginning to be recognized. England, as well as America, was looked upon by the less fortunate European peoples as a source of liberal ideas and a model for their own efforts and for the institutions that might be the result of those efforts. In the period of political confusion and serious economic depression following the Napoleonic Wars England had succumbed briefly to the wave of reaction. The rapid increase and amazing shifts in population, the spectacular growth of industrial capitalism, and the development of machine technology found the English unprepared and the government inexperienced and inadequate in coping with the new problems. The Reform Bill of 1832 eased the tension for the time, made possible the political growth of liberalism, and gave promise of further constitutional reforms that might broaden the basis of government without any necessity for revolutionary tactics.

After the Reform Bill, progress, although slow and fought by a strong opposition, was constant. The Factory Inspection Act of 1833 and a new poor law of 1834⁴ were evidence of a growing recognition of governmental responsibility toward those made helpless by the economic changes. Slavery was abolished in the British Empire in 1833, and in the same year the government made its first financial grant for the education of the children rescued from a different form of slavery by the Factory Act. In 1835 a Municipal Corporations Act put into effect a new system of city government that might undertake the duties made necessary by the new conditions of urban life, and housing, sanitation, and public health were recognized as problems of government. Efforts were made also to remove the last restrictions

⁴ See above, page 482.

upon those whose religious belief did not conform to that of the Church of England.⁵

WORKING-CLASS ORGANIZATION

In the meantime the working classes were taking steps to better their own lot. In 1821 the London Co-operative and Economic Society was founded. It was followed by many others, the most famous and successful being the retail store of the Rochdale Pioneers founded in 1844 by a group of workmen who were Chartists and followers of Robert Owen. The Rochdale experiment was copied in many other districts, with the result that some variation of the Rochdale plan has been in operation for nearly one hundred years. The many co-operative societies had a newspaper, *The United Trades Co-operative Journal*, held congresses, ran shops, and were effective instruments in the spread of working-class propaganda. In 1824 the laws prohibiting labor unions were repealed, and, although the act was amended the following year to prohibit the use of strikes, it was not long before the Trade-Union movement brought organization into many branches of industry. It was, perhaps, unfortunate for the success of the movement that Robert Owen, returning from his unsuccessful communistic experiment in the United States, threw his energies into the working-class co-operative movement and turned it from a program which called for practical reforms in wages and conditions of employment into a socialistic scheme called the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union which was designed to end all exploitation of the working classes. Agricultural as well as urban laborers were enlisted, women workers were admitted, and the membership of the union is said to have reached a million. The English government, which rep-

⁵ The progress here was slow. "The Whig Cabinet broke up when it proposed to touch with mildest hand the extravagant endowments of the Protestant establishment in Ireland, in a hope of appeasing the 'tithe war' between the Catholic peasant and the minister of an alien religion. In England the Church retained until 1868 the right to levy a rate for ecclesiastical purposes from parishioners of all denominations, till 1871 the monopoly of Oxford and Cambridge, and till 1880 the power to read her burial service at the grave side of Dissenters"—G. M. Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century* (Longmans, Green & Company), p. 216. On the other hand, the University of London, founded in 1836, opened its doors to non-Anglicans, and the new Mechanic Institutes were nondenominational. It was long, however, before Jews obtained any political standing in England. Lionel Rothschild, a member of the illustrious banking house, was elected to Parliament again and again in the years after 1847 but was refused his seat because of his inability to take an almost obsolete oath "on the true faith of a Christian." See Count Corti's *Reign of the House of Rothschild*, p. 253 ff.

resented property owners, was soon able to crush this grandiose scheme. On the charge that the oath-taking ritual of the unions was illegal on the basis of an old law of 1797, six men were arrested in 1834, convicted, and sent to penal servitude for seven years as an example to labor that the government was willing and able to protect the interests of property owners. Employers, sure of their financial strength and of government approval, then offered employees the choice of renouncing the Union or losing their jobs. Panic swept through the ranks, and the badly organized, poorly financed movement collapsed. It was, however, of great significance as evidence of the widespread interest of the newly awakened working classes, and its ideas and ideals have continued under other names and in other organizations.

CHARTISM

Trade unionism began again within all of the various trades but was for a long time concerned with the practical issues of collective bargaining on questions of wages, hours, and conditions of labor. The standard of revolt dropped by the Grand National Union was raised once more by the Chartists, whose demands made many observers feel that England would lead in any revolutionary movements in the middle of the century.⁶ The Chartist movement was a continuation of the political agitation of the Reform Bill of 1832 and at the same time the first political struggle of the modern proletariat along class lines. The Charter from which the name of the movement was derived was the work of the London Working Men's Association founded by a group of London radicals (including Feargus O'Connor and William Lovett) in 1836 for the discussion of political reform. There were six points in the famous Charter—universal suffrage, payment of members of Parliament, vote by secret ballot, abolition of property qualifications for members of Parliament, annual elections of Parliament, and equal electoral districts. Today these demands seem moderate, and, in fact, the main features of the Charter were gradually worked into the law before the end of the century. At the time of the drawing up of the Charter, however, they were considered very radical. The adherents of Chartism were denounced as revolutionary, and their faith in "numerical democracy" was regarded

⁶ J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Age of the Chartists*, Chap. XIV, "The Revolt," has an excellent account of Chartism.

as inflammatory doctrine. All varieties and shades of reform opinion were found in Chartism, and its confused membership is indicated by the comment that if one were to put in one room the leaders of the half-dozen English reform movements of the period he "would have provided the kind of entertainment offered to the London public by the showmen who proposed to exhibit together a mad bull with a cat tied to its tail, a bear, and a dog dressed in fireworks."⁷ When followers of all of these leaders flocked by the thousands into the Chartist movement it is understandable that the results were confusion and an unworkable program. In 1839 a petition was presented to Parliament embodying the desires of the Chartists. It was duly rejected by a vote of 235 to 46, leaving Chartists hopelessly divided on the issue of what to do next. Strike, boycott, and violence were discussed and discarded, and the leaders quarreled interminably over measures and policies. Chartism seemed to have had its opportunity, to have lost it and, with it, all life and vigor.

An economic slump in 1847 increased unemployment and led to a renewed burst of Chartist enthusiasm and the drafting of another petition to Parliament for which a million signatures were sought.⁸ An alarmed government summoned the aged duke of Wellington to guard London from riots and disorders. With great common sense the duke kept soldiers out of sight as much as possible and made use of the ordinary police to hold the bridges which led to the House of Parliament and the heart of London. The ministry expected violence, and the blustering Palmerston hoped that Britishers might make an example of some "whiskered and bearded" rioters who were sure to prove to be foreigners! The great day for the presentation of the giant petition was April 10, 1848, and many Londoners braved the pouring rain to witness the "revolution." They found little to repay them for their effort. The chill rain may have contributed to the lack of enthusiasm of the London populace, and the determined front of the police who denied the procession approach to the bridge over the Thames completed the discomfiture of the dwindling marchers. The leaders dispersed the crowd and sent the petition to Parliament in a cab, going themselves to the Home Office to disavow any intent of violence. Carlyle went home to comment on "the No Revolution we have just sustained," and the Prince Consort wrote,

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 269

⁸ The total was between ten and twenty thousand

"We have had our revolution, and it ended in smoke."⁹ Although it lacked unity and organization, and although it failed to concentrate on any one reform with sufficient vigor to win success, Chartism was a significant movement. Its importance lay in that it brought a realization of the necessity of "capturing the political state as a step toward economic advancement and it may on the whole be looked back to as one of the headwaters of all socialistic currents in contemporary England."¹⁰

THE REASONS FOR THE RELATIVE CALM IN ENGLAND IN 1848

The lack of fire in the English demand for reform in 1848, when revolutions seemed to be succeeding all over Europe, and the collapse of the Chartist movement were due in part to the important legislation of 1846 and 1847 and in part to the rapid improvement in economic conditions. It had long been felt that there was a crying need for the repeal of the Corn Laws, which were regarded as the protection of the British landowner against foreign competition. As the population of England became more dense and more urban it was evident that the chief effect of the Corn Laws was to keep the price of bread high and, therefore, to reduce the purchasing power of the laboring poor. The laissez-faire doctrines of the liberals had caused extensive alteration in British tariff legislation, and in many other commodities a free trade or revenue basis had been reached. But the great landowners were still sufficiently powerful in both Houses of Parliament to block any change in the laws providing protective tariffs for English wheat. An Anti-Corn Law League was formed; Cobden and the liberals fought the issue in the press and in Parliament; the agricultural laborers broke away from their employers, and although unenfranchised, pleaded for repeal; and eventually the conservative prime minister himself became a convert. Whig industrialists joined with labor in backing the League, and the repeal in 1846 was a triumph of popular agitation and organization and of middle-class strength. The group which won the repeal was economically powerful, and the vote showed the importance of the industrial classes.

⁹ There is an interesting account of the fiasco that marked the end of the really significant Chartist movement in Philip Guedalla's *The Hundred Years*, pp. 61 ff.

¹⁰ W. H. Dawson, article on Chartism in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

The League had furnished an education to millions of Englishmen, who did not as yet have a vote, in the methods and tactics to be pursued in advancing both their political and economic ends. Revolution was not necessary when the way to reform by legal means lay open. It was evident that when the public demand was widespread and insistent Parliamentary action would be forthcoming. The leaders of the attack upon the vested interests of agriculture then turned to further extension of suffrage and initiated a long campaign that was to be punctuated by the laws of 1867, 1884, and 1918 before the Chartists' demand for universal suffrage was satisfied.

The agitation for a ten-hour day for workers under eighteen years of age reached its climax in the years which witnessed the debate on the Corn Laws. It was apparent that the restriction of the hours of labor for the lower age level would necessitate a ten-hour day for all workers, for a factory could not well be geared to such differentiation. Parliamentary division came, therefore, between those who were so strongly opposed to excessive hours for young laborers that they came, if unwillingly, to accept the ten-hour day for all labor, and those who, although not unmindful of the plight of the young, were so unwilling to restrict the profits of industry that they felt it necessary to condemn the young rather than to benefit all labor. The balance was fairly even between the two groups in the last years of an agitation that had begun in 1833, and it was not until 1847 that enough wavering voters were won over to secure the passage of the bill which applied, however, only to women and children. Many of the objectives of the revolutions which occurred in 1848 on the Continent had already been achieved in England. The Repeal Bill and the Ten-Hour Bill furnished assurance to the English public that while the Continent was shaken by revolution headway might be made along lines of reform and that a real emergency could be met by adequate measures legally and peacefully acquired.

It is worthy of note that, in these years of demand for reform, the desire to turn England into a republic practically died out. The four Georges had been unpopular, and in the long reign of George III the sovereign's desire for personal rule had resulted in friction with both Parliament and public. The morals of both George IV and his brothers had been questionable, and the prestige of the crown had reached a very low point. In 1837, when Queen Victoria came to the throne, the young queen captured the imagination of the British public. Her youth, virtue, gaiety, and attractiveness were apparent,

and it soon became evident that, although forceful and self-willed, she expected to govern constitutionally on good Whig principles. Her early marriage to the staid, conscientious, and hard-working German prince, Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, was not at first popular, but his sterling qualities and tact at last won support. The royal family, with its full nursery and happy domestic life, made a deep appeal to the English public. The long retirement of the queen after the death of her husband caused a diminution of her popularity, but by the 1880's it was won back again. Once more royalty was beloved and popular, and the Victorian Age assumed the characteristics it was to wear throughout the rest of the century.¹¹

Throughout the century one of the greatest safeguards against revolution in England lay in the fact that the guarantees of free speech and free press furnished an outlet for popular protest. Perhaps another safeguard lay in the British reluctance to consider abstract ideas. Guedalla calls it "a happy inability to apprehend" abstractions and states that at their approach "the public mind almost invariably refused to function or, conscious of its limitations, turned eagerly in other directions." In any event, by a minimum of extremely practical reform measures in a very critical period England weathered a storm that assailed Continental Europe, and, having weathered the storm, was ready to take advantage of the years of prosperity that followed the fateful 1848.¹²

NATIONALISM AS A BRITISH PROBLEM

The British government found it necessary in this period to take cognizance of the problem of nationalism only in connection with Ireland and with Canada. The Irish question was of long standing, and, in one phase or another, had cropped up in every generation since the first English invasions of Ireland in the Middle Ages. Repeated insurrections had been followed by further invasion and conquest, and the antagonism between the two peoples was deepened by racial and religious differences. After every major rebellion and invasion, Irish estates had been appropriated by the conquerors. Eng-

¹¹ Edith Sitwell, *Victoria of England*, and E. F. Benson, *Queen Victoria*, are two rather recent and very interesting biographies. Lytton Strachey's *Queen Victoria* is both a biography and a very keen and clever analysis of the period.

¹² In the United States as well, the late 1840's and the 1850's with the exception of 1857-1859, were boom years in which business was thriving, the West was rapidly developed, and prosperity was widespread.

lish and Scottish colonists had been settled in compact areas in northern Ireland, and sectional and factional disputes were common. The Irish peasants were tenants or agricultural laborers tilling the soil for foreign owners and living in a state not much different from that of medieval serfs. Friction was frequent in the nineteenth century. The poverty of the Irish people, aggravated by the evils of absentee landlordism, the injustice of the establishment of the Church of England in Catholic Ireland, the penal laws and many laws discriminating against the Catholics, and numerous fiscal and economic difficulties kept the Irish question constantly before the public of both islands. The surging nationalism of the century once more aroused Ireland's desire for autonomy or independence, and new leaders rose to plead for the repeal of the Act of Union¹³ and for Home Rule. The famine years, 1846-1847, took their terrible toll of lives. Thousands of Irish died and other thousands emigrated. Both the famine and the circumstances of migration increased the bitterness of the Irish. A "Young Ireland" movement, similar to the Sinn Fein of a later day, inspired the leaders to resort to force in 1848. There was little response, however, from the downtrodden people, and the movement was easily suppressed by the regular civilian police.

In Canada there arose a different type of problem of nationalism. The British Empire, in so far as colonies largely inhabited by settlers from England were concerned, was in the nineteenth century coming to be recognized as a federal system. If the device of dominion status had been worked out before 1776, there might have been no American Revolution and the empire would not have lost the American colonies. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Canada was restive under the antiquated form of government provided in fulfillment of the treaty of 1763, and agitated for constitutional changes. In 1837 there was armed revolt in various parts of Canada, and it was evident that Britain must either provide for recognition of colonial desires or consent to the independence of another "ripe" colony.¹⁴ During the years after 1837 both Canadians and Englishmen gave the problem much thought. The vast majority of both countries was opposed to a severance of the bond that held them together. The English govern-

¹³ Passed in 1800. It provided for the abolition of the Irish Parliament and for Irish representation in the British Parliament where the Irish were a tiny minority. The Irish never felt themselves a part of the British nation, nor did they grow reconciled to this amalgamation of governments.

¹⁴ After the American Revolution many Englishmen came to believe that colonies went through a period of growth and when "ripe fell off the parent tree."

ment, not wishing to coerce the colonists or to hold them against their will, sent Lord Durham to make a thorough study of the situation. In the atmosphere of mutual good will, therefore, compromises were possible, and in 1867 Canada became the first self-governing dominion of the British Empire. The governor general was the sole British official, and his status was modeled on that of the English king. The Canadian Parliament was, for Canada, the supreme legislative body. The one visible bond of union came to lie in the fact that both regions acknowledged allegiance to the same king, who in both cases reigned but did not rule.

EUROPE IN THE YEARS PRECEDING 1848

In turning from America and England to the Continent of Europe in the years preceding 1848 we find a very different scene. The revolutions of 1820 and 1830 had resulted in the triumph of reaction except in Belgium and in France, and the system of Metternich was to control Central Europe and Italy for another eighteen years. Russia remained for thirty years (1825-1855) under the rule of Tsar Nicholas I, who coined the phrase "frozen Russia" as evidence of the methods he used to prevent the entry of foreign ideas and to destroy any vestige of revolutionary thought in his domains. Poland was supine after the ruthless suppression of the revolt of 1830.

The kingdoms of Portugal and Spain were the scene of oppression, dynastic quarrels, and civil war for much of the period. In Spain there was little revival of enthusiasm for liberalism after the ruthless suppression of the 1820 revolution. Ferdinand VII lived on until 1833, leaving an infant daughter¹⁵ as heir to the throne. For many years Spanish history was the story of the rivalry between the queen mother as regent and Ferdinand's brother, Don Carlos, who attempted to obtain the throne. Neither party had much claim to being called liberal, but Don Carlos was backed by the ultraconservative noble and Catholic element, and his position was strong in the rural and almost medieval regions of northwestern Spain. The supporters of the young queen were numerous in the urban eastern districts, where Spanish liberalism and radicalism have always been strong. Nominally Spain was a constitutional monarchy; actually there was a succession of dictatorships. An obscurantist Catholic priesthood controlled edu-

¹⁵ Isabella ruled 1833-1868.

cation and dominated opinion. Over half the population was illiterate, and the movements which influenced the rest of Europe made little impression on Spain in the nineteenth century. In Portugal, too, dynastic struggles and factional quarrels were common. It was not until 1852 that a regime of military dictatorship gave way to a parliamentary government which produced some sort of political stability. In general Portugal in the nineteenth century remained under the wing of England, whose influence was dominant in her economic life.

In Belgium a fairly liberal constitution was provided for a state whose frontiers and integrity were guaranteed by the European powers in 1839. A German prince, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, became king, and a period of peace and prosperity was inaugurated. A rich industrial state for centuries, Belgium naturally forged ahead as the mechanization of industry advanced. In 1848 Belgium recognized the spirit of the times by an extension of the suffrage which doubled the number of voters.

The Dutch kingdom from which the new state had been cut suffered no decline in prosperity and remained through the century rich in both industry and commerce. In 1848 King William II granted a new constitution which widened the suffrage and made the ministers responsible, but not wholly so, to the legislature. The adjustment brought the Netherlands into the current of the times without revolution.

The Scandinavian countries of Denmark and Sweden-Norway went on as before, quietly adapting themselves to new conditions by economic and political changes. Liberalism, nationalism, and industrialization all played a part in that development but without violent disturbance. In fact, in 1905, after nearly a century of somewhat unhappy existence under joint rule, Norway and Sweden separated without war, and the two kingdoms have amicably occupied the Scandinavian peninsula since that date. In 1849 the king of Denmark granted a new constitution in recognition of the growing liberalism of his people, and Danish government since that time has been similarly responsive to public demands.

The example of Switzerland in the struggle for liberalism had great influence upon other European states. The conclusion of the long controversy in Switzerland came in 1847, so close to the "revolutionary year" that its story forms a part of the history of that year. In comparison with the feudal Catholic cantons, the thriving Pro-

testant towns had always been democratic and receptive to new ideas. During the French Revolution there had been furious discord within Switzerland, and the establishment of the Helvetic Republic with French aid was evidence of the triumph of the liberal nationalistic townsmen. The republic had a stormy career, for the rights of the Catholic cantons were ignored, and the adherents of revolutionary principles proved intolerant and arbitrary. With the assistance of Napoleon, through an Act of Mediation, a compromise between the two factions was effected, and the old cantonal balance restored. In 1815 the situation was again altered by the Federal Act, which contained much of the reaction against things French and Napoleonic. During the early nineteenth century there were two distinct parties in Switzerland following the old lines of division: the States Rights party, Catholic, aristocratic, and rural; and the Union party, to which belonged the liberals of the Protestant towns. Between 1830 and 1847 there were frequent periods of open violence culminating in a struggle in which the *Sonderbund*, or league of the seven Catholic cantons, was crushed. In 1848 a new constitution was adopted which provided for a federal system modeled on that of the United States. Throughout the last years of the struggle England had expressed approval of the Swiss liberals, while the governments of Louis Philippe in France and of Metternich in Austria had seemed inclined toward the conservative cantons.

FRANCE AND THE BOURGEOIS MONARCHY

If the liberal movement in Europe was widespread even in the smaller countries, it became strikingly apparent in France. The revolution of 1830 had resulted in meager recognition of democratic demands. The barricades in the Paris streets may have been thrown up and defended by the lower classes, but the well-to-do bourgeoisie reaped all the rewards of the revolt. The substitution of the Orleanist Louis Philippe for the Legitimist and reactionary Charles X and the increase in the number of voters from one to two hundred thousand¹⁶ were the tangible results of the revolution. Freedom of the press was restored, and the king accepted the principle of ministerial responsibility. Both the monarch and the wealthy governing classes were con-

¹⁶ By 1848 the number was slightly under 300,000 out of a population of 35,000,000.

tent with the change and determined to retain the power they had acquired.

The first years of the reign were disturbed by a variety of futile attempts to alter the *status quo*. In 1830 the radicals of Paris attempted to lynch the reactionary ministers of the abdicated Charles X, and there were loud demands that the government send aid to the Poles in their revolt against Russia. In 1832 the Legitimist faction made a great effort to stir up the royalist Vendéan peasants to revolt against the July Monarchy. There were riots in Paris incited by the disappointed republicans, and other riots in Lyons and the industrial cities caused by distress among the textile workers. In every case the National Guard remained loyal to the government and, as bourgeois as the monarchy, put down every attempt at revolt. Within a few years the monarchy seemed firmly established, and disorders ceased. Nevertheless, the Chamber of Deputies was turbulent, as indicated by the fact that there were seventeen ministries during the first ten years of the reign.

The king was one of the richest men in France and had lived as a *grand seigneur* before his accession. He was not apt to make the mistakes of his predecessor, for he was thoroughly conversant with the methods of constitutional government and was devoted to what he considered liberty, order, and parliamentary control. The king had more than average ability; he was cautious, conservative, and proud of his birth and position, but he consciously cultivated a democratic manner and endeavored to obtain the support of all Frenchmen. He was in sympathy with the wishes of the oligarchy which had put him in power and was willing to co-operate with the wealthy classes in advancing their special interests. Trade increased rapidly throughout the reign. France was developing along the lines of industrialization, and business reflected the increases in commerce and in manufacturing. Urbanization did not proceed as rapidly as in England, and as late as 1850 only about 10 per cent of the French population lived in towns. A large part of French industry was on a small scale, and the average factory had considerably less than a hundred employees. But the French industrial towns had a long history of turbulence and rioting, and Paris itself was crowded, notoriously radical, and inclined to violence. The government took a keen interest in the development of French industry and, with the increasing prosperity, was able to make great expenditures for public works such as roads, canals, and railroads. Public and private enterprise worked together in increasing

the wealth of France, and the bourgeoisie pointed with pride to all of the evidences of economic progress.

THE FAILURE OF THE JULY MONARCHY IN THE FIELD OF REFORM

It was obvious, however, that there was much dissatisfaction among the underprivileged because of the inequality of the distribution of wealth. French wages were low; prices were rising; and there were frequent protests against the hard lot of women and children in industry. Saint-Simon and Fourier preached the doctrines of the new socialism, but the French laboring classes were somewhat behind the English in labor organization and in the demand for reform. The German writer Heine visited French workshops in 1842 and reported to a German newspaper that he found the French laborers reading new editions of the speeches of Robespierre and Marat and of the works of Rousseau and Babeuf. Revolutionary songs again were in vogue, and threats of violence accompanied every clash between labor and capital. Labor organization was illegal, but labor unrest made some sort of union inevitable. The silk workers of Lyons adopted the motto "To live working, or to die fighting," and another group threatened, "we starve, we freeze, give us shelter and food, or we rise and kill or are killed."¹⁷ In answer to such cries came Louis Blanc with a new socialistic remedy and all the resources of his warm heart and ready pen. In 1838 he founded a newspaper, *Revue de progrès*, in which he published his own and other articles on the economic situation. His most important work was entitled the *Organization of Work*, which contained the essence of his plans for the nationalization of industry and the end of unemployment and of the exploitation of the laboring classes.

The government responded feebly to the demand for reform by passing, in 1833-1836, laws providing for elementary education, and in 1841 another regulating the employment of children in industry. Beyond that the wealthy classes refused to go. Any attempt at reducing the interest on the public debt and thus making possible a reduction of taxes was resisted by bondholders; the reduction of the tariff was blocked by the manufacturing interests; and other reforms were thrown out when they ran counter to the wishes of the parties

¹⁷ Quoted in J. A. R. Marriott's introduction to *The French Revolution of 1848 in Its Economic Aspects* (Oxford, The Clarendon Press), p. xxix.

in power. The freedom of the French press made possible the expression of public opinion on the failure of the July Monarchy to meet the demands for reform, and the cartoonists were especially fond of personifying their dislike of the oligarchy by portraying the stout "bourgeois" king as a pear, by caricaturing his large umbrella, and by surrounding him with "bloated bondholders" and crude captains of industry.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE JULY MONARCHY

The attitude of the government toward reform was not the sole cause of its decreasing popularity. The July Monarchy did not play a dashing part in foreign relations. In the early days of the regime French ambitions for close relationships with the newly created Belgium were frustrated by Great Britain; the desire of French liberals to aid the Poles was refused as a matter of expediency; and France backed the losing party in the Swiss internal disputes. In negotiating a marriage between Louis Philippe's second son and the sister of the young queen of Spain, she won British disapproval without sufficient gain for herself, and the French king was accused of sacrificing national interests to further his bourgeois plans for good marriages for his children. The government was somewhat more fortunate in winning popular approval for its policy in acquiring Algiers as the first French colony in Africa, but the project was expensive and not immediately profitable. The king's love for peace, his willingness to compromise, and his determination to maintain the friendship of England were used as weapons against him after the affair of Mehemet Ali. The ambitious pasha of Egypt endeavored to extend his power at the expense of Turkey. Thiers, the French prime minister, wished to back the pasha and thus extend French interests in the Near East at the expense of England and Russia. When England brought pressure to bear upon the French government, Louis Philippe refused to back Thiers, forced his resignation, and prevented a European war at the expense of some French prestige.

THE MINISTRY OF GUIZOT

Thiers's resignation brought in a ministry of which the real head was Guizot, who was called by English writers the greatest all-round statesman of the nineteenth century. And yet Guizot, who remained

in office from 1840 to 1848, was more responsible than any other man for the downfall of the king he served. Both Thiers, who played a great part in the early years of the reign, and Guizot were historians of considerable reputation. Thiers was the author of a history of the Consulate and the Empire which did much to revive French interest in the great days of the Napoleonic period, and Guizot's *History of France* had given him a European reputation. Thiers was a journalist by profession, a liberal, and a believer in a constitutional monarchy of the English type. He was inclined to be rash in foreign policy, ambitious, and without the reasoned balance that characterized his great rival. Guizot, who had been a professor in the Sorbonne, was a fine orator and a keen student of political affairs. He had been a leader in the opposition to the absolutism of Charles X and was devoted to the cause of political liberty. It seems paradoxical that such a man should have been for eight years the conservative barrier to social and economic reform and to political change in a France advancing to revolution.¹⁸

The answer to this seeming contradiction is that Guizot failed to understand the social and economic problems of the age in which he lived. A man of the middle class himself, he had the conventional views of his class on matters of property and of politics. He was a strong supporter of stability in government and of the maintenance of the power of the propertied classes. He was not unsympathetic toward the underprivileged and was a firm believer in the education of the masses, but he failed to see any reason for extension of suffrage or for legislation to benefit the working classes. Progress, prosperity, stability were his great objectives, and he felt that time and *laissez faire* would produce a *juste-milieu* in which the "greatest good for the greatest number might be obtained." By consistent support for the big industrialists, by the use of the patronage, and by the unfortunate practice of granting political positions to members of the legislature, Guizot managed to keep a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, but the opposition grew within the Chamber, and the press fanned public opinion against both Guizot and the king.

There was, throughout the period of the July Monarchy, a con-

¹⁸ There is an interesting account of the Guizot ministry in *Three Studies in European Conservatism* by E. L. Woodward, and a brief chapter entitled "From the Revolution of 1830 to the Revolution of 1848" in *French Revolutions* by the same author. There is an interesting chapter on the July Monarchy (Chap. XII) in H. A. L. Fisher's *History of Europe*, Vol. III.

fusion in French politics due in part to the fact that the monarchy was itself the result of a revolution. It did not have the sanction of legitimacy and tradition or that of popular choice, and it did not acquire prestige and popularity by glory in arms and brilliance in international affairs. The Legitimists representing the Bourbon family were in opposition throughout the reign, and the republicans, who had been cheated of the fruits of victory in 1830, were rapidly increasing in numbers. Lamartine, poet and politician, wrote his *History of the Girondins* in praise of republicanism, while the left-wing republicans followed the teachings of Saint-Simon and Louis Blanc into socialism.

THE NAPOLEONIC TRADITION

In 1830 the Bonapartists or Imperialists were insignificant. Napoleon had died in exile on St. Helena, and his son, the duke of Reichstadt, died in 1832. The head of the Napoleonic house was the young Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (1808-1873), the son of Hortense Beauharnais, the wife of Louis Bonaparte.¹⁹ The young man had a fixed idea, the firm conviction that he was destined to repeat the career of his uncle and establish once more the glory of his family in France. He had fought as a *Carbonaro* in Italy in 1831, had fled to the United States, and had been a penniless exile in England, but he was for the time without power or recognition in France. It was in part the fault of the July Monarchy that Bonapartism revived in France, and that the inglorious exile became Napoleon III.

The exiled emperor had spent much of his time on St. Helena writing his memoirs to justify his policies and to refurbish his glory and the memory of his services to France. The horrors of war forgotten, a new generation in France took the emperor at his word and believed him to have been the patriotic and glorious defender of French liberties and of the principles of the Revolution before an antagonistic world. A cult of Napoleon grew up and was fed upon the Napoleon tradition from which all dross had been eliminated. Anxious to capitalize upon this wave of patriotic feeling, Louis Philippe encouraged the movement. He gave honors to the marshals of Napoleon, authorized a statue of the emperor in Paris, and, finally, caused the return of the remains of the exile and made of his tomb in the

¹⁹ Louis was a younger brother of Napoleon I. He was for a time the King of Holland. His wife, Hortense, was the daughter of the Empress Josephine by her first husband.

Invalides a national shrine. Twice during the July Monarchy the young Louis Napoleon attempted to take advantage of this revival of interest in everything Napoleonic by returning to France to stir up a revolt to further his own ends.²⁰ In 1836 he made a futile dash on Strasbourg, and in 1840 he landed at Boulogne, where he was captured and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was sent to the fortress of Ham, whence he escaped to return to England to await a chance for another *coup*. In his *Idées Napoléoniennes* he developed the theory and program for the liberal empire he hoped to found.

From every side came evidence of the lack of popularity of the "bourgeois" government. In his *A History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, Benedetto Croce has collected from diverse sources criticisms of the monarchy and uses these criticisms as evidence that the regime had no political vitality and had built for itself no loyalties among the people. Karl Marx called it "a stock company for the exploitation of France's national wealth, whose dividends were divided among ministers, Chambers, two hundred and forty thousand electors, and their following." De Toqueville used much the same terms in giving it the name of "an industrial company in which the operations are carried out for the benefits that the members can derive from them." The historian Renan spoke of its greed and lack of ideals, while Lamartine completely damned the whole regime by saying "France is bored."²¹

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

Regardless of the criticism of the government and its lack of prestige, there seemed little in the situation early in 1848 that presaged revolution. In fact the economic situation had been worse in 1845 and 1846, and the lightening of the depression and better harvests had reduced the price of bread and had lessened unemployment by the fall of 1847. The opposition to Guizot in the Chamber of Deputies was growing, to be sure, but there were constitutional means for the expression of that opposition. The demands for suffrage extension were refused in 1847, and the government made every effort to ensure the election of government candidates. Elections were manipulated, bribery was employed, the press was censored, and public meetings re-

²⁰ An interesting account of Louis Napoleon is in the works of F. A. Simpson, *The Rise of Louis Napoleon*, and *Louis Napoleon and the Recovery of France*.

²¹ Benedetto Croce, *A History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 162-63.

stricted. The police denied the opposition candidates the right to use public halls for their meetings and billboards for their announcements. Pushed into a corner by these dictatorial methods, the opposition, led by Barrot and Thiers, made use of public banquets with after-dinner speeches as a means of spreading liberal ideas. The deputies who organized the banquets were not radicals and were, indeed, a little afraid of political agitation, for they had no desire for revolution. Those who attended the banquets were largely of the middle class, and the suffrage reforms which they advocated would have served merely to enfranchise a larger number of that class. The revolution, when it came, was in no sense a proletarian movement.

The Paris populace had little interest in the banquets until, in February, 1848, one was scheduled to be held in one of the poorer quarters of Paris. The police, stirred up by the moderates, refused permission for the banquet, but not before the more radical newspapers had stirred up excitement which would make the meeting a huge demonstration against the government. The deputies wished to avoid trouble and called off the banquet. The newspapers, suspecting collusion, planned a big procession in protest. The government called out the troops, but on the cold rainy evening of February 22 there was little apparent need for them. There was a little rowdyism and some disturbance on the streets, but the police had things well in hand, and no one anticipated any further action. On February 23 it was still raining, and there were scattered street fights and much noise. The ministers were alarmed and called out the whole National Guard. Much to the surprise of the government the Guard, whose loyalty had never been questioned, began to shout for electoral reform. If the Guard joined the populace all was lost; hence Guizot resigned, and the king tried to form a new ministry, but the protest group was caught without a program, and it was too late to prevent violence. The street crowds, too excited to disperse, surged back and forth. A procession got started and marched to the center of Paris, cheering, waving torches, happy over the victory. As the procession turned homeward, tired and excited, its way led by the Foreign Office, which was guarded by troops. Passage was refused the marchers, and when, instead of turning aside, they jostled the troops a shot was fired.²² The troops answered by a volley that killed sixteen and

²² It is not known by whom, or whether it was by accident or design. The opinion persists that those who wished the overthrow of the monarchy took this method of preventing a peaceful conclusion of the demonstration. The slaughter which followed is called the Massacre of the Capuchin Monastery.

wounded others. The angry and horrified crowd loaded the bodies into carts and paraded Paris, calling out the citizens to revolt. Barricades were thrown up. The mob advanced on the Tuileries, and when the National Guard shouted for reform instead of for the king, Louis Philippe abdicated in favor of his grandson, and the king and queen fled to England with passports made out for Mr. and Mrs. William Smith. In a few days he was so forgotten that he might, as de Toqueville says, have belonged to the Merovingian dynasty.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN 1848

France was now without a government. Paris refused to consider the young grandson of Louis Philippe. The mob sacked the palace and invaded the Chamber of Deputies to demand a republic. The middle-class group that had joined the revolution realized that order must be restored at once in order that the anarchy apparent in Paris might not spread elsewhere. A provisional government was formed by a combination of two sets of men, one chosen by the Chamber of Deputies from their own number with the approval of the populace, the other by a meeting held by men of extreme political views in the offices of a radical newspaper. The first group included the republican poet Lamartine, and Ledru-Rollin, a well-known liberal-republican orator. The second group included a leader of the workingmen named Albert, three journalists, and Louis Blanc, the leading socialist author of the day who had made popular the phrase "the right to work."

From the first meeting of the provisional government at the Hôtel-de-Ville, the clash of interests which was eventually to destroy the Second Republic was clearly apparent. The moderates, led by Lamartine, wished to await a general election and an expression of opinion on the part of the nation before determining the character of the new government. The middle class early realized that it could handle the radicals and socialists only through a Constituent Assembly. The radicals wished to accept the dictate of Paris, adopt the red flag of the laborers, and commit France to a socialist republic without ascertaining the will of the nation as a whole. They were well aware of the fact that France was largely rural, probably monarchical, and certain to be far less radical than the Paris populace. The National Guard, although it had aided in the overthrow of the monarchy, was distinctly middle class in sympathy and was not trusted by the radicals, who relied on the Paris populace.

LOUIS BLANC AND SOCIALISTIC REFORM

Under the circumstances some sort of compromise was necessary. On February 26 the Republic was proclaimed, elections were called for, and national workshops were decreed which were to be under the minister of the interior. Paris was placated by the provisional government's guarantee of work for everyone. Louis Blanc was made head of a Labor Commission of ten which met at the Luxembourg Palace. The commission was reinforced by seven hundred delegates selected by the various trades and constituting a labor congress or socialist assembly. In this way the socialist element in the government was segregated and left without the support of the moderates, who were obviously out of sympathy with any economic and social experimentation and were playing for time. The Labor Commission made an attempt to gain control of the government through the establishment of a Committee of Public Safety but was unsuccessful. Although it managed to procure the passage of a ten-hour law, it failed in its more radical measures, including a plan for a minimum wage law.²³

The commission was successful in settling a few disputes between capital and labor and in regulating the sale of prison- and convent-made goods, but in general it must be admitted that its energies were so divided that the net result was negligible. Louis Blanc's elaborate scheme for a nationally managed, planned economy in which the control of production would gradually assume the form of a sort of guild socialism, with the worker-controlled plants partly supported by, and under the supervision of, the government, was never tried out. The moderates had no intention of lending support to such a scheme, and both money and time were lacking. The national workshops which did emerge were not workshops at all but a regimentation of unemployed into groups which, in return for some crude labor such as ditchdigging, cleaning streets, and repairing pavements, received the lowest possible wage that could keep body and soul together. This rudimentary system of work-relief bore no resemblance to Louis Blanc's scheme, and he angrily hastened to condemn it as a travesty

²³ Many schemes were discussed by the Labor-Parliament, but few were ever put into effect. Among them were 'the foundation of agricultural colonies on co-operative principles, of a vast credit institution, of a central national bank with branches throughout France, of a national insurance office, of model lodging houses and labor exchanges.' J. A. R. Marriott, introduction to *The French Revolution of 1848 in Its Economic Aspects* (Oxford, The Clarendon Press), p. lxix.

of his original plan. He threw his own energies into an experiment in co-operative production which had some measure of success, and in some form outlived both the Republic and its author.²⁴

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF 1848

The position of the government was extremely precarious in the spring of 1848. Business felt the lack of security; there was much unemployment; and many establishments closed down. As usual the depression caused an influx of the poor from the provinces into Paris, and three times, on March 17, April 16, and May 15, the mob threatened renewed revolution. Everything turned on the elections to be held early in April. It was obvious that the struggle was one between Paris and the rest of France. Both moderates and radicals campaigned vigorously, and the socialist distrust of the provinces was shown to have been well based when the returns showed that of the 840 members of the National Assembly elected on the basis of manhood suffrage, a large majority were men of moderate opinion.²⁵ Even in Paris the middle-class desire for stability and the end of experimentation was evidenced by a heavy vote for Lamartine and his associates. Louis Blanc received less than half the number of votes cast for Lamartine, and when the provisional government turned over its authority to the new Assembly Blanc was given no place in the ministry or on the executive committee. The radicals made a futile attempt, on May 15, to overthrow the Assembly and to set up a new provisional government; their failure showed that the moderates were definitely in the ascendancy.

The conservative Assembly had no desire to continue the national workshops as a social experiment, nor did it wish to expend any further funds on relief. A series of decrees was passed providing that as rapidly as possible the unemployed whose homes had been elsewhere were to be sent out of Paris. Those who were left were to be forced into private employment as business picked up; others were to be encouraged to enter the army; and, finally, when existing appropriations were exhausted, the workshops were to be closed. On

²⁴ One of these co-operatives was a tailor shop of 2,000 tailors which was given an initial contract of 100,000 uniforms for the National Guard; the initial capital was subscribed by the master-tailors. This sort of scheme was much more nearly Blanc's "national workshop." All workers were to receive equal wages, and the profits were, in part, to be divided among the workers, in part put back into the enterprise.

²⁵ About one-fourth were known to be monarchists, 500 were moderate republicans.

June 23, three days after these decrees were published, an insurrection broke out that was far more violent than the February Revolution. The government had foreseen trouble, and had stationed in Paris regiments of the regular army as well as large numbers of the National Guard. General Cavaignac, a moderate republican, was given full power to put down the insurrection, which was marked by violent street fighting and much bloodshed. Thousands were killed on both sides and socialism was stamped out in France for many years. The socialist leaders were exiled and their program collapsed. But the conservative victory was a costly one, for the June Days robbed the Second Republic of the support of the working classes. The peasants swung back to monarchy, and even the allegiance of the middle class was badly shaken. With the specter of the red flag always before it, the bourgeoisie favored a strong government. The republic was doomed to failure even before its constitution had been adopted.

THE SECOND REPUBLIC

During the summer the Constitution was drafted. The president and the Assembly were to be elected by manhood suffrage: the latter was to be a unicameral body with 750 members, the former was to hold office for four years and be ineligible for re-election. The president was to have no legislative powers, and his ministers were to be responsible to the Assembly. The June Days had played into the hands of Louis Napoleon. In the alarm that swept France, his name was one to conjure with, and he returned to offer himself as a candidate for the presidency. General Cavaignac represented the republican element, and Ledru-Rollin was the choice of the radicals. Thiers supported Louis Napoleon. The long cultivation of the Napoleonic tradition and the sentimental cult that had been furthered by the July Monarchy now bore fruit, for Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was elected in December by an enormous majority.²⁶ The conservatives won 500 seats in the Assembly, while the socialists and radicals won but 180.

Louis Napoleon intended from the beginning to overthrow the republic by *coup d'état* and establish a government on the model of the First Empire. Revolutionary riots in Paris in June of 1849 caused the Assembly to add to the powers of the president, and a press law

²⁶ He had 5,500,000 votes as against 1,500,000 for his nearest rival. Seventy-five per cent of all those who could vote came to the polls, and 75 per cent of them voted for him.

made it possible for him to control propaganda. The Assembly continued to play into his hands. In 1850, fearing renewed insurrection, it passed a law which restricted universal suffrage by a registration and three-year residence requirement. In the same year a law was passed giving the Catholic Church much control in education. It was a triumph for clericalism and conservatism and antagonized the liberals. The president made no attempt to co-operate with the Assembly; instead he used his prestige and influence to discredit it. In December, 1851, when one year still remained of his term of office, he asked the repeal of the provision that made him ineligible for re-election. The proposal was lost when voted upon in the Assembly, and the president then appealed to the people on the basis that the restrictions on manhood suffrage had not had his approval. He had gradually won the support of the army, and he toured the provinces reminding the people of the glories of the first Empire and promising vast expenditures for public works. France was hopelessly divided: the constitutional monarchists could not unite on either Legitimist or Orleanist heir; the republicans were still suffering from the hatreds of the June Days; and the failure of the revolutions in other countries had helped to discredit the republic. The move to restore or re-create the empire won adherents rapidly. After all, this would be no innovation, no experiment; there was much in the name Napoleon.

Early in December, 1851, occurred the *coup d'état* for which the president and his half brother, the duke de Morny, had long prepared. A few well-known opponents were quietly arrested; the Assembly was dissolved; printing presses were seized; and with very little bloodshed ²⁷ the president was able to extend his term to ten years and thus take the next step toward his ultimate goal of empire. Throughout 1852 he prepared France for the restoration of a Bonapartist regime. The provinces rallied to his support, and even Paris applauded him. In December a plebiscite was held, and eight million voters expressed a desire for an empire while only a quarter of a million registered a vote against the change. Napoleon III was to rule France during the eighteen years of the Second Empire.

²⁷ The day after the *coup d'état*, however, 400 people were shot down in the streets of Paris.

THE GERMANIES BEFORE 1848

The events in France in the year 1848 were watched with great interest across the Rhine. In the Germanies the ground had been prepared for revolutionary changes, and it is doubtful whether the Year of Revolution would have been uneventful there if the February upheaval in Paris had not occurred. The governments of the individual German states and of the Confederation had been fixed, in the period after 1815, in the pattern of reaction and conservatism designed by Metternich.²⁸ The desire for a strongly unified Germany and for liberal governments had had no satisfaction, although the deep emotion of the years 1810 to 1817 was evidence that when opportunity offered the two motifs would appear again.²⁹ In the meantime, in other respects the Germanies had not stood still. The agricultural reforms of Stein³⁰ had had notable results and had been copied elsewhere, and the renewal of interest in education had had a remarkable flowering. The German universities after 1815 became the mecca of scholars everywhere. The German seminar method was admired and emulated by universities in other lands.³¹ The German *Gymnasien*, or secondary schools, were developed in this period, and they, too, became the model, many years later, for those who were impressed by German efficiency, thoroughness, and high educational standards. The elementary schools deserve, perhaps, the most attention and credit. Long before England and France came to a realization of the responsibility of the state in the matter of education, in most of the less democratic German states free compulsory public schools of high caliber were the accepted order. In the same period German scientists and men of letters were contributing their full share toward the civilization of the nineteenth century.

In economic relationships German unity was being achieved even though particularism might still prevent political union. The years after 1815 were years of rapid industrial growth. The Germanies had

²⁸ See above, Chapter XIV

²⁹ Benedetto Croce, in his *A History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 79, calls attention to the violent exuberance of the nationalists in Germany. The Italian patriots and poets visiting Germany in the period around 1825 were shocked by what they called unbridled "Germanomania" and deplored what they felt to be an almost insane obsession on the part of the German youth.

³⁰ See above, page 414

³¹ The first American graduate students to German universities began their migrations in this time, and the numbers grew throughout the century.

been little touched by the changes in agriculture and industry that were rapidly remaking the countries of Western Europe in the period before 1789. The long period of wars which followed prevented progress and left much economic building and reconstruction for the years after 1815. Trade revived rapidly, machines were introduced, roads were built, and, after 1830, there was agitation for railroad building. Particularism and modern industrial development were obviously incompatible. The first breaking down of local loyalties and independence came in the removal of internal customs barriers. The movement started in Prussia, whose territories, greatly augmented by the Treaty of 1815, sprawled across north Germany. The country was largely agrarian, and its exports were mainly raw products. In some parts of the more advanced Rhineland provinces there was approximate free trade, while elsewhere the tariffs were high. Duties were not uniform, and there were in all sixty-seven different customs offices with more than three thousand categories of goods.⁸² The difficulties of collection were many, for there were several tiny independent states, "enclaves," completely surrounded by Prussian territory, and Prussia had frontiers touching upon twenty-eight other states. In 1818 Prussia worked out a system whereby internal free trade was coupled with adequate protection for her infant industries. External tariffs were uniform and not excessive. Roads were built; the system of taxation was modernized; and Prussia began the industrial development that was to give her prominence in European industry. Gradually other near-by small states were drawn into the Prussian system, attracted by the obvious advantages shown in the progress of Prussia. Between 1819 and 1840 this customs union, or *Zollverein*, was slowly extended to include practically all of the members of the Confederation except Austria. Austria was, naturally, the implacable enemy of a system which was destroying both her economic and her political influence in Central Europe. The *Zollverein* not only removed customs barriers between German states but provided uniform external duties, the proceeds of which were divided annually among the member states.⁸³ The customs union also made trade agreements with outside states. Holland, Belgium, and even England made mutually advantageous commercial treaties with the *Zollverein*. Europe was beginning to feel that the

⁸² J. A. R. Marriott and C. G. Robertson, *Evolution of Prussia*, p. 290. Chapters IX and X of this work are excellent for the period 1815-1850.

⁸³ The exact proportion of each state was fixed by a customs parliament on the basis of total trade figures.

Germanies were a unit from which common action might be expected, in the economic world at least.

As long as German interests were predominantly agricultural, the policies of the *Zollverein* tended toward free trade. Adam Smith was the mentor of the customs parliament, and protection was incidental. Industrial development was rapid, however, and Germany produced in Friedrich List an economist whose theories were accepted not only in Germany but wherever protection became a national policy. His book, *The National System of Political Economy*, became as great a textbook for governments as *The Wealth of Nations* and soon had more supporters among officials than the earlier publication. List stated that any nation that had so developed her trade and industry that she feared no competition might find free trade to her advantage, but that less fortunate nations were required to protect their industries and regulate their trade. List's theories were slow in making headway in a region like Prussia, where two-thirds of the population were employed in agricultural pursuits, but the South German states and the Rhineland were rapidly being industrialized, and the protectionists were able by 1850 to boost the tariff on all manufactured products.

The political effect of the *Zollverein* was incidental but became a very real factor in Germany by 1848. Prussia had come to be looked upon as the economic head of the Confederation, and Austria's disapproval of the customs union was regarded as an admission of economic weakness and of fear for her political hegemony. Among Germans, in general, pride in material progress was tempered by a sense of inferiority and humiliation because of the conservatism and particularism of their respective governments, which were, they felt, lagging far behind the rest of the Western world. The closer the economic union between the several states and the more varied the contacts with the outside world, the more marked was the influence of liberals upon German thought.

THE DEMAND FOR REFORM IN THE GERMANIES

The few Germans who migrated to America before 1848 kept closely in touch with their friends in the homeland, and their letters revealed a "free community beyond the seas where life was easy and wages high." After the failure of the Polish revolt of 1830 the exiled Polish liberals found refuge in the German states, where their influ-

ence upon German thought was important. Southwestern Germany was especially affected by the struggle of the Swiss for democratic institutions and for a strong federal government. Above all the influence of France was significant, and the German liberals believed, as one of them said, that "to be against France is to be against statecraft, to be against statecraft is to be against freedom. France stands for the political principle, for the pure principle of human freedom in Europe, and France is alive."³⁴

It was in the southwest, therefore, in the region nearest France, that German liberalism found its chief expression. A meeting was held in Baden in 1847 to which came delegates from many states. A reform program was drafted that demanded the repeal of the Carlsbad decrees,³⁵ freedom of religion, press, and speech, jury trial, liberal constitutions in each state, and a representative assembly for all Germany. Social reforms were advocated, also: the removal of the remnants of feudalism, adjustment of disputes between capital and labor, and a progressive income tax. During the winter of 1847 there was much discussion of calling a German national parliament—and then came news of the February Revolution in Paris.

In each German state there was an immediate response. The inauguration of the Baden program was demanded, and in most cases discreet rulers agreed to its main principles and appointed liberal ministers to work out details. Constitutions were drawn up, and the old regime disappeared without bloodshed and without regret—disappeared so completely that regardless of the fate of the revolution elsewhere and of the fate of the plans for the unification of the German states, there could be no complete return to the outgrown political institutions and the long-hated restrictions of the years before 1848.

The greatest interest was, of course, in Prussia, the largest and most populous state of north Germany. In 1840 the old king, Frederick William III, had been succeeded by his son of the same name. Frederick William IV was a strange visionary individual whose main interest was in medieval civilization and whose outstanding personal characteristics were timorousness and vacillation. His life was to end in hopeless insanity, and even in his younger and more vigorous days he displayed little mental poise or stability.

Frederick William was not averse to reform, provided the essen-

³⁴ Quoted in H. A. L. Fisher, *The Republican Tradition in Europe* (G. P. Putnam's Sons), p. 256.

³⁵ See above, page 439.

tially feudal nature of the Prussian government remained intact, and he was genuinely interested in economic progress. It was obvious that the much-desired railroads could not be built without state aid. The royal exchequer was inadequate; the provincial assemblies could not be expected to grant the funds necessary; and there was no Prussian legislature to provide them. The House of Rothschild was willing to provide the funds, but the Rothschilds were more careful students of the trend of the century than were the monarchs of Europe, and they refused the loan unless it were guaranteed by a representative assembly. In 1847, therefore, the king took the important step of summoning a Landtag to meet in Berlin. Its purpose was to "advise" the monarch on questions he might submit to it, to grant new taxes, and to deliberate upon, but not initiate, legislation. Much to the king's chagrin the Diet demanded changes on its own account and held out for annual sessions and for control over taxation. It refused to make the grants of money, although it approved the railroad projects. The Diet was therefore dismissed without victory for either side, and the king recorded his distrust of constitutions in the words, "Never will I allow a blotted parchment to thrust itself between Almighty God in heaven and this Land!"

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848

Thus it is not surprising that in Prussia receptive ears heard the news from France early in March, 1848, and revolts broke out throughout the scattered provinces. At first the frightened king gave way completely: he called the Diet, revoked the censorship of the press, and consented to a constitution. During most of 1848 there was rioting and disorder in Berlin, and the constitutional assembly accomplished little. By midwinter, when the assembly struck the clause "King by the grace of God" from the constitution, Frederick William, made bolder by the failure of the revolutions in the Austrian Empire,³⁶ used the army, which was fanatically loyal to the monarchy, to dismiss it. In the next year he put into effect a constitution of a conservative nature.³⁷

Prussia was to be governed under this constitution until 1918, and conservatism remained in the saddle in much of north Germany. The keynote of the constitution was contained in the suffrage clauses.

³⁶ See below pages 535 ff

³⁷ In part promulgated in December, 1848, and in entirety in January, 1850

Every man could vote, but the qualified voters of each district were divided into three classes on the basis of taxable property, each class representing one-third of the total taxable property in the district. The first class was composed of a handful of the richest citizens, the second included much of the middle class, while all the rest of the voters fell into the third class. Each class chose one-third of a body of electors which in turn chose the district's representatives to the lower house (Landtag) of the Prussian legislature. By the three-class system and by the indirect method of voting, popular control was reduced to a minimum. It was further limited by the creation of a House of Peers (Herrenhaus) and by the fact that the king initiated legislation and appointed and dismissed his own ministers. For Prussia, at least, the victory in 1848 lay with the king.

To the outside world and to many Germans the question of the unification of the German states into one strong nation was of more importance than the issue of liberalism versus conservatism in each state. The South German liberals met in March and made arrangements for a great national assembly to be elected on the basis of manhood suffrage. To this Parliament, meeting in Frankfort in May of 1848, was given the problem of reconciling unity and liberalism. It was to determine the nature of the government and to make a constitution. The Frankfort Parliament was composed of men of ability and earnestness, but they had no army and no financial resources, nor could they afford to antagonize the governments of the small states. They were liberal and nationalistic to the core, and full of theories as to the methods of achieving their ends. Their greatest faults lay in their tendency to view all questions from an academic point of view and in their willingness to debate endlessly while events marched rapidly. But the failure of the Parliament was due rather to the difficulty of the problem than to any lack of realistic policy on the part of its members.

Eventually a liberal constitution was drawn up, but without any solution of the problem of the nature of the state. The first issue was whether it should be a republic or a constitutional monarchy, and, when that was settled in favor of the latter, the next question was the selection of the monarch. The king of Prussia was the logical choice, but Prussia could be chosen only with the exclusion of Austria, and by that exclusion German unity would be incomplete. When it was at last decided to ask Frederick William of Prussia to head the state, the year 1848 was over, and the early successes in the revolu-

tions of that memorable year had been followed by many failures. Frederick William himself had repudiated democracy in Prussia and shrank from accepting from the hands of the people an honor that was his heart's desire. The German princes had refused to commit themselves in favor of Prussia; furthermore, Austria, recovering from the disasters of the year before, forbade the Prussian king to accept the crown of a united Germany. The timid nature of the king dictated his refusal, but, indeed, the risk was so great that no one except a brave man with a bit of the gambler and a bit of the prophet in his nature could have taken it.

The high hopes for the creation of a liberal and united kingdom came to an end when the Frankfort Parliament disbanded on June 18, 1849. Frederick William then tried to unite the German princes in a federal union that would exclude Austria, but that attempt, too, failed when Prussia gave way to a threat of war and at Olmutz, in the fall of 1850, consented to the restoration of the old weak Confederation with the Austrian representative once more as its president.

There remained, in Germany, a few constitutions, a few liberal governments, and many disillusioned liberals. In many regions there was a strong reaction from liberalism with imprisonment or flight and exile the fate of those who had hoped to build a new state. Thousands of these self-exiles fled to the United States where, in the Middle West, they became sturdy citizens, first Democrats in their political affiliation and then, with the climax of the slavery controversy, Republicans and soldiers in the Union armies of the Civil War.³⁸ Many Germans, reviewing carefully the events of 1848, came to feel that liberalism must be sacrificed to nationalism, and that union could come only with the military defeat of Austria by Prussia. Militarism and nationalism became the watchwords—they could not afford liberalism. It is interesting to note that many years after 1848 Karl Marx wrote that Germany in that year missed the chance of establishing a socialist republic, while the realistic Baron Otto von Bismarck, who was to have opportunity to put his theories into practice, stated that Prussia should have seized her opportunity early, used her army, and established a powerful centralized state by force.

³⁸ Carl Schurz, so famous in American history, was one of these refugees. He and others of his compatriots, settling in St. Louis, helped to keep Missouri in the Union.

UNREST IN THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE BEFORE 1848

In any event, the result of the German question turned on Austria, and the greatest dramas of the Year of Revolution were played in the Austrian Empire. Metternich, who had come to power in the days of Napoleon's triumph, was still in power, and his "system," now hopelessly outmoded, could still prevent the entry of new ideas into Austria. Metternich was not unaware of the world outside and had no illusions as to the state of the empire to which he was devoted. His only justification was necessity, and his only reason for the continuance of his policies was the certainty that with any change the empire would crumble. In a world of growing nationalism, only relentless autocracy and suppression of "self-determination" could hold the polyglot empire together. In 1835, at the accession of the weak-minded Ferdinand, Metternich's despair grew. He himself called the years before 1848 the years of the dying empire, and he must be given credit for a certain nobility and courage in remaining at the helm of the ship of state as he saw his course carry it upon the rocks which he could find no way to avoid. A modern student of European conservatism reminds us that:

His care for European peace, his refusal to take the loud-spoken claims of nationalists at their own valuation, or to think in terms other than those of the well-being of many millions of men of different nationality and place and language, may redeem much of his narrowness and some of his mistakes.⁸⁹

Even with the Metternich system in full sway it had been impossible to keep the noxious weed of nationalism out of the empire. In Hungary the first half of the nineteenth century witnessed a great revival of Magyar language and literature. The proud Magyars had never felt the necessity of enduring the German yoke. The Hapsburg emperor was their king and wore the crown of St. Stephen, but in the minds of Hungarians Hungary was the equal of Austria within the Empire. German had not been forced upon Hungary as the official language, and the use of Latin in affairs of state marked an ancient compromise. With the revival of Hungarian national spirit the Magyars insisted upon the use of their own tongue in the local Diet. In 1847 the adherents of the patriot Francis Deák won in the

⁸⁹ E. L. Woodward, *Three Studies in European Conservatism* (London, Constable and Company), p. 107.

elections to the Diet and began an agitation for autonomy or separation. In the next year Louis Kossuth organized a Protection League pledged to use only Hungarian products, hoping thus to awaken popular sentiment for local self-government. Strong in their own national feeling, the Magyars refused recognition to the aspirations of the Slavs within Hungary, and the Croats and Slovenes of the south-east and the Rumanians of Transylvania resisted being "Magyarized." Metternich, following the traditional Hapsburg policy of "divide and rule," tried to play one faction against the other and thus maintain a precarious balance.

The north Slavs in the empire were moving also. The tiny Polish Republic of Cracow⁴⁰ was the center of Polish nationalism. In 1846 the republic proclaimed its complete independence and stirred up the Poles in Germany and Austria to insurrection. The Austrian army took advantage of the hatred of the downtrodden Polish peasants for their feudal lords and caused a bloody peasants' revolt which made the nobles powerless to resist the Austrian forces. Cracow was overrun, and, with the consent of Russia and Germany, Austria absorbed the city-state. There was no revolution among the Poles in Austria or Russia in 1848. Their nationalism was not dead, but the memory of the savage suppression of earlier revolts was too keen to permit a new trial in that year.

The Czechs of old Bohemia lent themselves with enthusiasm to the cause of nationalism. Their great historian, Palacky, retold the glories of the days of Bohemia's greatness; a history of the Czech language was written; and poets and musicians did their share in the revival. A censorship of the press imposed by Vienna was fruitless,⁴¹ and the Bohemian Diet was the scene of violent debate and clashes between the German and Czech elements.

ITALY BEFORE 1848

In Italy, both within and without the Austrian domains, liberalism and nationalism had been growing.⁴² The suppression of the revo-

⁴⁰ All that was left of an independent Poland after 1815

⁴¹ One Czech editor wrote a series of bitter articles criticizing the rule of one race by another under the guise of describing British difficulties in Ireland. The readers could easily substitute Bohemia for Ireland and Austria for England.

⁴² J. A. R. Marriot, *Makers of Modern Italy*, and Bolton King *History of Italian Unity*, are old but useful accounts. G. M. Trevelyan has made the past live again in his *Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic* and *Manin and the Venetian Revolution*. Stringfellow Barr, *Mazzini*, is a new biography.

lutions of 1820 and 1830 had driven both movements underground, but they fed upon persecution and were ready to reappear whenever the time came. A leader of utter sincerity, fanatical zeal, and prophetic fire was found in Joseph Mazzini, who through a life of exile, inspired thousands of Italians with his enthusiasm and his ideals. He founded the Young Italy Association to supplant all of the secret societies that had honeycombed Italy. Mazzini felt that the *Carbonari* had failed because they had no constructive program and in concentrating their energies upon destruction had lost sight of their aims and debased their methods. He called upon the Italian patriots to devote themselves to sacrifice and to the ideals of liberalism and virtue. The members of the Association were "to love Italy above all earthly things" and to concentrate "both thought and action to the great aim of reconstructing Italy as one independent sovereign nation of free men and equals." The means were to be "education and insurrection." Austria must be expelled by force by "Italians and for Italy." Inspired by the pure zeal of patriotism and acting in unison, Italians would be able to accomplish their ends without foreign assistance. Italy, said Mazzini, "radiant, purified by suffering, will move as an angel of light among the nations that thought her dead." Not even his most ardent supporters could claim that Mazzini was a practical statesman, but his greatest enemies were compelled to admit that he was a dynamic force.

While thousands flocked to join the Young Italy movement inspired by the mystic zeal of its author, and while the writings of Mazzini were acting as a type of propaganda admirably fitted to stir up revolt, it became apparent that there was no unanimity of opinion as to the ultimate nature of that free and united state which the patriots wished to build. Mazzini and his friends wanted a united democratic republic, but there were at least two other groups whose ideals were also liberty and independence, but whose methods were quite different. One group looked to Rome for leadership, basing its desire for a republic upon the tradition of ancient republican Rome and accepting the Catholic Church as the greatest common factor and the one common allegiance in the life of all Italians. The practical considerations that Rome must be the capital of the new state, and that Rome under any other rule than that of the pope was impossible, made many accept this idea. The chief spokesman of this group was Gioberti, a priest and a liberal who felt that a liberal pope might lead a new Italy. This party was much encouraged by the election of Pius IX in 1846. The new pope at once instituted such reforms

in the states of the church that he led people to feel that he was a pronounced liberal. He created a civic guard in Rome, conferred municipal self-government upon the city, summoned a representative assembly for the state, and began the establishment of an Italian customs union. Metternich, so alarmed that he doubled his army in Lombardy, at the same time tightened his influence over the small states of Italy.

The second group looked for leadership to the House of Savoy ruling in the kingdom of Sardinia or Piedmont. This group was more aware than the other two of the difficulties involved in unification and was convinced that both arms and diplomacy would be necessary. Independence was of more immediate importance in their minds than liberalism, and Sardinia, though as yet far from liberal, was the most powerful independent state in Italy. In 1847 Charles Albert, the king of Sardinia, in a letter to an agricultural congress in Casale, announced himself ready to lead an army against Austria in a war for Italian independence.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 IN ITALY AND THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE

In 1847 a revolt broke out in Sicily, followed by such disturbances in Naples itself that the reactionary king yielded and granted a constitution in January, 1848, similar to the French Constitution of 1830. Milan and the Lombardy towns remained quiet, but the rest of the Italian states were on fire. Italy did not need news of the French revolt in February. She was already deeply involved in revolutionary changes when that encouraging news came.⁴³ Early in March a constitution was promulgated in Piedmont, and within a few weeks Rome and Tuscany followed suit. With the news of the overthrow of Metternich in the revolt in Vienna, Lombardy rose, and there were revolts in Milan and Venice. Radetsky, commander of the Austrian troops, was forced to retreat, and the Austrian flag flew only over the famous and practically impregnable quadrilateral fortresses where the army guarded the routes over the mountains to Vienna.


⁴³ Count Corti quotes in his *Reign of the House of Rothschild*, p. 258, an illuminating conversation, January, 1848, between Metternich and Solomon, head of the Rothschilds of Austria and chief supporter of Metternich and the government. "Politically," said Metternich, "things are going well, but the Bourse is in a bad way. I am doing my duty, but you are not doing yours. If the devil fetches me, he'll fetch you too; I am looking hell in the face, you are sleeping instead of fighting, your fate is therefore sealed!"

Charles Albert declared war upon Austria on March 23, and was soon followed by the other states, who sent troops to join those of Piedmont. Even in Naples and in Rome there was so much popular enthusiasm that troops were sent, although neither the pope nor the king was willing to aid in the attack upon Austria. Mazzini and Garibaldi⁴⁴ returned to throw themselves into organizing a legion for the defense of Italy.

For a time the success of both liberalism and nationalism seemed complete, but before the force of Austrian arms could determine the struggle the fundamental weaknesses in Italy became apparent. No dependence could be placed upon Naples and Rome. King Ferdinand was a reactionary who, as soon as he was able to overturn the weak new regime in Naples by a *coup d'état*, withdrew both the constitution and the troops promised Charles Albert. The pope, quite logically, found it impossible to participate in an attack upon one of the great Catholic powers of Europe, and in an "allocation" to his cardinals repudiated the whole unification project. Without Rome and Naples, the northern states were very weak. Charles Albert was not a brilliant military leader, and his troops could not hope to hold out against Radetsky's able generalship and seventy-five thousand veteran troops. At Custoza in July, the Italians were defeated, and Lombardy-Venetia went back into Austrian hands. After an armistice, Charles Albert sent another army into battle only to be once more defeated at Novara in March, 1849. The Sardinian king immediately abdicated, and the first task of his son Victor Emmanuel was to negotiate the treaty of peace. Generous terms were offered, but on condition that the liberal constitution of Piedmont be repudiated. He and his people accepted the harsher terms then imposed, but all Italy came to look to him as the champion of its liberties and the hope of its independence.

The defection of the pope threw Rome into open revolt. A republic was established in the early spring of 1849. Mazzini was summoned to be one of the three triumvirs chosen to govern the city, but the infant republic was scarcely allowed a first breath. Louis Napoleon, newly elected president of the French Republic, sought to win the affection of the French army and of the Catholic interests by sending an expedition to restore the pope. At the news of the arrival of the French, Garibaldi hastened with his men to defend

⁴⁴ An old *Carbonaro* who had been in exile for many years.



From Schevill, *A History of Europe*, courtesy of Harcourt, Brace and Company

Rome, which was now attacked by Naples as well. He defeated the Neapolitan troops, but the odds were too great for his fiery patriots, and in July the French entered Rome. Garibaldi and four thousand of his men refused to surrender and escaped from the city, only to be hounded by French and Austrian troops until few of them were left alive. Garibaldi himself escaped to be once more an exile awaiting news of another opportunity to fight for the Italy he loved.

The debacle in Italy was a part of the general failure of the revolutions in the Austrian Empire. In Vienna an uprising on March 13, 1848, ended the Metternich regime, and the liberal Germans acquired manhood suffrage and a real Parliament. A Central Committee for the defense of popular rights ruled in Vienna while a constitution was being drawn up for all Austria. In Bohemia and in Hungary, March brought revolutions, and constitutions were in preparation. Feudalism was abolished everywhere, and civil liberties were promised. Autonomy within the empire was the objective of both Prague and Budapest, but the details of a federal system were undetermined.⁴⁵

Here again initial success was followed by discord and the recovery of the empire. Racial dispute was the disruptive issue. Even the liberal Germans of the empire could not long tolerate the practical secession of Hungary or the Czech assumption of leadership of all the Slavonic races in the empire. Metternich had been right in believing that only by the subordination of the problem of nationalities could the empire be held together. When Bohemia (June 2) called a Pan-Slavic Conference to meet in Prague reaction set in. On June 17 Prince Windischgratz turned his guns on Prague and crushed the Bohemian rebellion. An opportunity for the realization of Czech nationalistic aspirations was not to come for another seventy years. Windischgratz then marched southward and restored imperial authority in Vienna.

In Hungary, where the triumphant Magyars were unpopular among the Croats, Slovenes, and subject Rumanians, the Austrian government used this racial discord to crush the Hungarian revolt. A Croat, Colonel Jellachich, appointed to lead the troops against Budapest, defeated one of the Hungarian armies in October, 1848. Inspired by the courage and leadership of Louis Kossuth and Francis Deák, Hungary then declared herself a republic and strained every

⁴⁵ Hungary, for instance, insisted upon control of her own financial, military, and foreign affairs, while Bohemia had been content with an independent legislature.

effort to free herself from the Austrian yoke. The Slavic peoples of Hungary, fearing their fate if the Magyars were successful, revolted in their turn. To the civil war and the revolution were added the horrors of foreign war, for Nicholas I of Russia, alarmed at the commotion on his frontiers, sent 100,000 men to aid Austria in reducing Hungary to terms. At Világos in August, 1849, the Hungarians were defeated, and the re-establishment of the empire was complete. For nearly twenty years, however, the quarrel between Austria and Hungary went on. The proud Magyars had been defeated, but they could not be crushed, and Austria was eventually (1867) forced to make a compromise, or *Ausgleich*,⁴⁶ by which a dual monarchy was formed to recognize the autonomy of Hungary.

In Vienna a new minister, Count Felix Schwarzenberg, came upon the scene in 1849. Upon him descended the mantle of Metternich, and for three years (he died in 1852) he devoted his energies to the reorganization of Austria and the strengthening of the imperial machine. He forced the abdication of the imbecilic Ferdinand, called young Francis Joseph to the throne, centralized the imperial government, and brought Prussia to terms which restored the Confederation of 1815.

And so the Revolutionary Year and its aftermath of war and hate came to an end. In France the Second Empire, and not the Second Republic, was the real result; in the Germanies neither liberalism nor nationalism seemed to have made immediate gain; while in the Hapsburg realms a shrewd young emperor drew the reins tightly and started out upon the long career which was to take him and his polyglot empire well into the second decade of the twentieth century before war and revolution brought extinction to the empire and chaos to the Hapsburg realms. Not everything was lost, however. The fine enthusiasm and idealism were gone, but practical men had learned many lessons from the defeat of their youthful hopes. More careful planning, greater recognition of problems and dangers, and a better understanding of the power of their adversaries would make their next attempts more successful, if, perhaps, less spontaneous and glorious. Neither nationalism nor liberalism had been defeated.

READINGS

GENERAL ACCOUNTS. To the general accounts listed for the preceding chapters may be added H. A. L. Fisher's *History of Europe*, Vol. III

⁴⁶ See below, page 569.

(1935); Benedetto Croce's *A History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (1933); and Philip Guedalla's *The Hundred Years* (1937).

DEMOCRACY AND THE UNITED STATES. From the many accounts of the American scene for the period three might be selected as interpretive and readable: *The Epic of America* (1931) by J. T. Adams; *The Rise of the Common Man, 1830-1850* (1927) by Carl Russell Fish; and *The Significance of the Frontier in American History* (1894) by F. J. Turner.

ENGLISH TRENDS. The books on nineteenth-century England by Fay and Trevelyan, referred to for the previous chapters, will be useful here also. J. L. and B. Hammond's *The Age of the Chartist, 1832-1854* (1930) is extremely interesting. Francis Hackett's *Ireland, a Study in Nationalism* (1918) will furnish additional reading for that problem. There are a number of biographies of Queen Victoria that throw light on the period: *Queen Victoria* (1935) by E. F. Benson and *Victoria of England* (1936) by Edith Sitwell are sympathetic and interesting. *Queen Victoria* (1921) by Lytton Strachey is extremely clever and critical. G. K. Chesterton's *The Victorian Age in Literature* (1913) is a brilliant study. Lytton Strachey's *Eminent Victorians* (1918) deals with four prominent figures of the period. *Palmerston* (1926) by Philip Guedalla is an interesting biography. Not to be overlooked is E. L. Woodward's *The Age of Reform*.

FRANCE (1830-1850). C. E. Maurice, *The Revolutionary Movement of 1848-1849* (1887), is an older account of the whole European movement. H. A. L. Fisher's *The Republican Tradition in Europe* (1910) is of some general interest. French development before 1850 may be reviewed in A. L. Guérard's *French Civilization in the Nineteenth Century* (1914). E. L. Woodward's *Three Studies in European Conservatism* (1929) contains an excellent essay on Guizot, and his *French Revolutions* (1934), although brief, is useful. J. A. R. Marriott's introduction to *The French Revolution of 1848 in Its Economic Aspects* (1913) is extremely interesting. F. L. Simpson's *The Rise of Louis Napoleon* (1909) seems to be the best account of the early life of Napoleon III.

REVOLUTION IN THE GERMANIES AND IN ITALY. There are excellent sections on the German revolutions of 1848 in W. H. Dawson's *German Empire* (1914) and in C. Grant Robertson's biography of Bismarck (1919). The standard account of Italian history in this period is *The History of Italian Unity*, 2 vols. (1899), by Bolton King. J. A. R. Marriott's *Makers of Modern Italy* (1901) portrays a number of Italian leaders. Stringfellow Barr's *Mazzini: The Portrait of an Exile* (1935), Bolton King's *Mazzini* (1911), and G. M. Trevelyan's *Manin and the Venetian Revolution of 1848* (1923) and *Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic* (1907) are studies of three of the Italian leaders.

≡ XVII ≡

THE REMAKING OF EUROPE, 1849-1871

THE aftermath of the Year of Revolutions was a period of reaction, of stocktaking, and of readjustment. The foundations upon which the structure of the European state system rested had been shaken by the impact of the movements of liberalism and nationalism which had been gathering force from the social and economic changes of the nineteenth century. The old system had held its own and had weathered the storm, but in doing so had grown conscious of its weaknesses and was alarmed for the future. Those who had lost the first round of the battle were tending their wounds, considering their errors in tactics, and laying plans for the renewal of their attack.

The conservative elements in European politics, anxious to preserve the existing order, renewed their allegiance to monarchical principles and endeavored to restore the delicate balance which made it possible for the nationalities of the Austrian Empire to live together as subject races and for the German states to act as members of a Confederation whose principal reason for existing was to prevent embarrassing questions from being answered. Living in a Europe created by those who were the heirs of the cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century, they felt neither incongruity in the rule of one nationality over another nor injustice in the denial of the "liberties" demanded by a populace led astray by the recrudescence of Jacobin doctrines under the guise of "liberalism."

The balance of power based upon a nice international adjustment, which permitted no one state undue aggrandizement without the consent of the other states of Europe, was the accepted standard for international affairs. This confederation of Europe was, according to the theory that had prevailed since 1815, to be maintained by a Concert of Powers which might become active through the agency of a congress of delegates whenever the common interest might demand such action.

FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON III

In 1852 the monarchs of Europe greeted, with some trepidation, a new ruler to their councils. The overthrow of the Second Republic in France was a welcome sign that 1848 was well in the past, but the reappearance of Bonapartism might well hold menace for the future. The emperor of the French was known as a man who had made a guiding star of the career of the uncle whom Europe had condemned to St. Helena, and his fatalistic belief in the destiny that had carried him to power might be of incalculable danger to the peace of Europe if he chose to duplicate too closely the career of Napoleon I. Europe was reassured, however, by the often-repeated words that the new empire wished peace and that the emperor believed firmly in the maintenance of the European balance and of the confederative principle upon which Europe rested.

There was certainly nothing to alarm the monarchs in the government set up in France. Beyond the statement that the emperor was "responsible" to the people, and the fact that the establishment of the empire had been referred to a plebiscite, there was little to distinguish the Second Empire from the least liberal of European governments. The Constitution of 1852 was closely modeled on that of the Consulate¹ in which the names and forms of a representative government had been coupled with the actual administration of a dictatorship. Laws were initiated by an appointive Senate, and the somewhat futile debates of the legislative body were carefully edited before being given to the press. There was no freedom of the press, and other civil liberties were drastically curtailed to such an extent that "Metternichism" was one of the names coined to characterize the new regime.

Napoleon III did not keep his eyes fixed upon the past, however. He was a man of his own age and a close observer of the world about him. His travels had led him far afield, and his residence in England had kept him close to the economic developments of the day. Although Frenchmen were to be deprived of their political liberties, the emperor was determined to secure for them the advantages to be derived from industrial development. Railroad building went on apace; and canals² and roads were built as well; vast public

¹ See above, pages 384-85

² The Suez Canal was built by a French engineer, de Lesseps, and a French company

works were undertaken; Paris was beautified; and every encouragement was given to industry. New trade treaties were made to the advantage of French commerce, and France was able to reap her full share of the general rise in prosperity of the first decade of the empire. As wealth increased, the cost of living fell, and the advantages of increased production were distributed to some extent to the entire population. Napoleon was far from indifferent to the needs of the underprivileged and lent his aid to many plans for the amelioration of the lot of the workingman. Hospitals and other welfare institutions were built; parks were opened; the public works program relieved unemployment; and, in 1864, the restrictions on labor unions were in part removed so that strikes to force collective bargaining became legal.

The court of Napoleon III was brilliant, designed to dazzle the outside world and to arouse French pride. The marriage of the emperor to a young and beautiful Spanish countess, Eugenie de Montijo, made Paris more of a social center than ever, and the Paris dress-makers who attired the empress became the fashion arbiters of the feminine world. The new boulevards were crowded with foreign visitors, and the royal family entertained the queen and prince consort of England and other royalty, returning such visits in state with much *éclat*.³

The opposition had not been eliminated, but for the time it was silent—or nearly so. The socialists had suffered too deeply in the June Days of 1848 to disturb the early years of the empire, the Legitimists and Orleanists quarreled with each other and found few adherents, while the republicans were so weak that their opposition minority in the Chamber of Deputies was composed of five members.⁴ The bourgeoisie were relatively complacent; the conservative peasantry were won by the name Napoleon and by prosperity; and the working classes were lulled by the improvement of their lot. The support of the church was secured by French intervention in behalf of the pope in the revolution in Rome in 1849. The fact that the empress was a devout Catholic who came to be more and more

³ Philip Guedalla, *The Second Empire*, is an interesting and informal account of the period, rich in the personal element. F. A. Simpson, *Napoleon and the Recovery of France (1848-1856)*, is a somewhat broader study.

⁴ It must be admitted, however, that that number was no adequate representation of the total republican sentiment, and that republicanism grew steadily as the years went by.

under clerical influence, did much to keep the church favorable to the government for many years.

The early adventures of the empire in foreign affairs met with sufficient success to enhance the emperor's glory. France was not to be bored by an uneventful reign, nor did the emperor intend to permit French prestige to be tarnished. As part of a vigorous colonial policy one expeditionary force was sent to Syria to protect Catholic missionaries and another to China to secure commercial concessions. In the second decade of the empire the French made rapid strides in acquiring Cochin China, thus laying the foundations for the great colonies of Indo-China.

THE EASTERN QUESTION

Since the days of the terrible winter campaign of 1812, Russia had been regarded as a tremendously powerful and strangely sinister power. The vast size, almost limitless man power, and the potential military might of Russia made the smaller European states feel that she was not only foreign but menacing as well. England, with her vast Oriental interests, watched with great alarm Russia's eastward expansion and grew apprehensive over any project that might give Russia control in the Black Sea, the straits, and Constantinople. In the middle of the nineteenth century Western Europe was not yet familiar with Russian music and the literature that was already flowering. The autocracy of the Russian government and the misery of the Russian serfs were looked upon askance by more modern peoples. When the tsar sent Russian troops to aid Austria in suppressing both liberalism and nationalism in Hungary, France and England and liberals everywhere were alarmed, and when Turkey refused to surrender Hungarian refugees to the vengeance of Austria, the Turk was somewhat incongruously acclaimed as the defender of liberalism.

Almost without warning, in the early 1850's, a dispute broke out in the Turkish Empire which involved Europe in a general war, the first since 1815. The trouble started with a quarrel between the Greek and Roman Catholic churches over the defense of the Christian shrines in the Holy Land. The tsar urged the claims of the Orthodox Greek Church and demanded recognition of his right to protect all of that faith residing in the Turkish Empire. Napoleon III made similar demands in behalf of the Roman Catholic Church. In England public opinion was definitely Russophobe, although the gov-

ernment worked for peace. The British minister to Turkey, however, gave his advice in such terms that Turkish resistance to Russian demands was stiffened. Much more was involved than the matter of the fate of Christians within the Turkish Empire. The tsar frankly believed that Turkey might well be pushed out of Europe, and, calling the Ottoman Empire the "sick man of Europe," he had in 1844 asked England to consider the division of the "sick man's" property. Any such division would make Russia pre-eminent in the Black Sea and would doubtless give her control of the straits and of Constantinople. Russian ambition had likewise extended for some generations to the Danubian provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia and to Bessarabia (all today making up modern Rumania). England, France, and Austria were all quite logically opposed to any such settlement—England and France to any Russian appearance on the Mediterranean, and Austria to Russia's ambitions in the Balkans. Opposition to Russia became a fundamental part of the policy of England and Austria for the remainder of the century.

The sultan, sure of European backing, refused Russian demands, in regard to the Christians, and the war which followed found France and England the allies of Turkey. With what the Russians felt was heartless "ingratitude," Austria remained neutral, favorably inclined toward the allies of Turkey but too engrossed with domestic troubles to aid either side. Europe then witnessed the somewhat peculiar spectacle of the liberals of Western Europe urging co-operation with Turkey, an Oriental despotism, while the Moslems called on the Turkish people to fight a Holy war. Mazzini, Ledru-Rollin, and Kossuth, all in exile, wrote articles that were strongly anti-Russian, quite overlooking the fact that Turkey was fully as illiberal and as antinationalistic as Russia.

THE CRIMEAN WAR

The Crimean War (1854-1856) was an inglorious and almost incomprehensible episode and one in which neither side won many laurels. It can be said to make sense only with the peace settlement, for the main problems concerned the Danube and the principalities, the Black Sea, and the Ottoman Christians. These problems had long been important and received attention at the conference. The Treaty of Paris, 1856, was signalized as a victory for the allied powers, but its benefits were unevenly distributed, and there seemed to be

in it little of value for the French, who had contributed most heavily to the expeditionary forces. Russia was denied access to the Mediterranean for her war vessels and deprived of her position in the Danubian principalities. Thus Turkey, England, and Austria were satisfied.⁵ France had to take what satisfaction she could from the fact that the Russian Colossus had been shown to be conquerable. As keynotes of his foreign policy Napoleon III wished to avoid the mistakes which had caused the downfall of Napoleon I and also to revise the Treaty of Vienna. Russia's prestige, so important since 1815, was now broken; the England that had been the implacable foe of the first Napoleon was the companion-in-arms of his nephew. Although the Crimean War brought little glory and heavy taxes, the French ruler thought it well worth while. Nevertheless, it was insufficient to satisfy his desire to enhance French prestige. Dictators cannot afford defeats, nor can they stand still. The need to push constantly onward continued to urge Napoleon to further exploits in international affairs.⁶

CAVOUR AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE

There was in Paris for the peace conference a stout, middle-aged man, whose spectacles and fringe of beard gave him the appearance of an affable and benevolent schoolmaster. Count Cavour, prime minister of Sardinia, had won his place at that conference table by sending an expeditionary force of fifteen thousand Piedmontese to the Crimea in 1855 when the allies had been hard pressed and eager for aid. Piedmont had not the shadow of interest in the controversy, nor did she expect any share in the spoils of war. The sole reason which had led Cavour to force the Piedmont Parliament to permit the sending of the little Sardinian army to the Crimea had been to win the gratitude of France and the right to present what had come to

⁵ See C. D. Hazen, W. R. Thayer, and R. H. Lord, *Three Peace Conferences of the Nineteenth Century*, for an excellent brief account of the Treaty of 1856.

⁶ A side issue of the Peace Conference was the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which was offered for the consideration, and adherence, of other powers as well as the signatories of the treaty. The Declaration embodied the principles governing the activities and position of neutrals for which the United States had been working since 1776. These principles were, in brief, that blockades to be recognized as legal must be effectively maintained, that enemy goods on neutral vessels were free from capture, that neutral goods on enemy vessels were not confiscable, and that privateering was abolished. England, however, did not give up the right to seize contraband of war either on neutral or enemy ships.

be called the "Italian Question" for the consideration of Europe. With great shrewdness Cavour had gambled on the outcome of the war, and with the utmost diplomatic skill he was to continue to play his cards until he won the aid of Napoleon in his fight for the independence of Italy.

The presentation of this Italian problem before the European Concert of Powers was irksome to Austria, but Austria was isolated and practically friendless in 1856. Her humiliation of Prussia in 1850, her refusal to aid Russia in 1854, and her persistent neutrality in a war from which she could not help but gain in case of an allied victory had left her without support at Paris. Cavour's statement of the wrongs of Italy made a great appeal to the liberal English and found a ready listener in Napoleon III, who had already expressed himself willing to "do something" for the Italy in which his uncle had been so interested.

CAVOUR AND PIEDMONT AFTER 1848

After 1849 reaction had full sway in much of Italy. Conditions in Naples were so bad that the Englishman, William Gladstone, had burst into print in words of indignant pity inspired by a visit to the prisons for political offenders in that oppressed Italian state. In Rome and in Tuscany the pope and the returning princes had ruthlessly stamped out all remnants of the supporters of the 1848 revolutions. The areas controlled by Austria were the scene of an antiliberal and antinationalistic terrorism which had sent thousands into exile. Only in Piedmont was there a middle class, some measure of security for liberals, a parliamentary constitution, and a king who "kept his word to his people."

Piedmont was therefore the center of attention for those who still kept alive the flame of 1848, and Piedmont was to be of increasing importance as time went on. Although more promising than the rest of Italy, it was a poor state, economically backward, priest-ridden, and with little claim to the cultural and artistic tradition of Italy. The original seat of the royal house was Savoy, on the French side of the Alps, and was French rather than Italian; hence its people were not interested in the troubles of Italy. The Island of Sardinia, which gave its name to the kingdom, had always been malarious and backward. Genoa, the fourth section of the state, had had a glorious history, it is true, but Genoa's day had long since gone by, and the modern

city was not an element of strength to the kingdom. The assets which gave Piedmont a right to claim leadership in Italy lay in the facts that strategically her position in the northern mountains was good, that in Victor Emmanuel she had a wise and patriotic king, and that she was to find in Cavour one of the ablest statesmen of the century. There was also a certain negative asset in the fact that nowhere else in Italy could there be found a state which could begin to rival Piedmont in any aspect of leadership.

Count Camillo Benso di Cavour⁷ was nearly forty years of age when the events after 1848 brought him into prominence. His father's family had been of the Piedmontese nobility for twenty or more generations, while his mother's people were of Genevan Calvinist Huguenot stock. Probably he owed more to his mother's liberal influence than to that of his reactionary father, whose ambition for his younger son was only that he might have a military career and serve his king, the Charles Albert who reluctantly granted the Constitution of 1848. Cavour learned English before he was twenty and eagerly read the works of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and other liberals. He was most at home with his Swiss relatives, who were all liberals and who associated with men of the same views in England and France. He left the army in 1831 and settled on one of the family estates in the country near Turin. There he devoted himself to agriculture, throwing himself into the most exacting study of the economic needs of the country. He often visited Geneva and twice spent some months in England. His interests were in the workings of liberal political institutions and in the development of economic resources. The administration of the English poor law, the repeal of the Corn Laws, the methods and tactics of parliamentary debate were all of interest to him, and he spent hours in the visitor's gallery of the House of Commons.

Although he was one of the few successful farmers in his part of Italy, he found time for public work as well. He founded an agricultural journal in 1842 and five years later began the publication of *Il Risorgimento*, a journal advocating political reforms, the independence of Italy, and some sort of Italian unification. He was not at

⁷ There is a wealth of material on Cavour. The best short biography, in English, is that of the Countess Caesaresco. A good American biography has been done by W. R. Thayer. A. J. B. Whyte, *The Political Life and Letters of Cavour, 1848-1861*, is a recent account. There are good brief accounts in J. A. R. Marriot, *Makers of Modern Italy*, and in A. D. White, *Seven Great Statesmen: Cavour*.

first popular with any political group, for, although he was in no sense a radical, his liberal doctrines were condemned by the reactionary party in power, while his aristocratic birth and conservative family caused his motives to be suspected by those who were working for reform. In 1848 Piedmont won a constitution modeled upon that of France of 1830, and Cavour's opportunity came. He was elected to the Chamber of Deputies of the first Parliament and was thereafter almost constantly in public life. He was a close friend of the liberal prime minister, d'Azeglio, and was made minister of agriculture and commerce in 1850. In 1851 he acquired, also, supervision of the departments of the navy and of finance and in 1852 he became prime minister.

During these years of political activity Cavour devoted his energies to securing a firm basis for the constitution and to developing the economic resources of Piedmont. The church was the greatest opponent of the new government, for the terms of the constitution provided for equality before the law and thus made necessary the abolition of the special courts of the church and the special privileges of the clergy. After his return to Rome in 1849, Pius IX had definitely given up any pretense of liberalism and urged upon the Catholic clergy throughout Italy resistance to any changes or reforms. The government of Piedmont must therefore win a decisive victory over the clergy before the constitutional regime could have any security. In 1850 ecclesiastical courts were abolished, and the privileged position of the clergy was done away with. Other laws cut down the government's contribution to the support of the church, reduced the great incomes of the higher clergy, and closed several hundred monasteries. A law was enacted providing for civil marriage, and the transfer of education from church to state control was undertaken. Piedmont was thus secularized and freed from control of a reactionary clergy at a time when the Catholic Church was openly in opposition to both the liberal and nationalistic aspirations of the Italian states.

The economic reforms were of equal importance. Piedmont was poor in resources and backward in development. Her budget must be balanced, her credit established, and her resources so developed that she could at the same time increase the prosperity of her people and make provision for a greatly enlarged army. Largely as a result of Cavour's efforts, government aid was given to railways, agriculture was made a more productive enterprise, industry was encouraged, commercial treaties were negotiated, and Piedmont was put into shape

to take full advantage of the world-wide prosperity of the period of the 1850's. The transition to a vigorous government-supervised, relatively modern economy was made in the space of a decade.

Cavour never lost sight of the fact that Austria was the enemy and that all of his preparation had as its objective the expulsion of Austria from Italy. To that end he used whatever means that came to his hand. Turin was a haven for refugees from Austrian Lombardy-Venetia, and Daniele Manin, the head of the Venetian republic of 1848, became a supporter of Cavour. Mazzini never became reconciled to the leadership of Cavour or to the idea of an Italian monarchy. Cavour in turn detested the demagogue in Mazzini, and distrusted mass movements in general. Many of the followers of Mazzini, however, became convinced that in Piedmont lay the only hope of the extinction of Austria's control over Italy. Cavour lent his tacit support to all those who worked to spread anti-Austrian sentiment, and, although he regarded the idea as "Utopian," he backed the National Society founded in 1856 by Manin and other leaders of the earlier revolt.

CAVOUR AND NAPOLEON III

There is no evidence that Cavour at this time expected to create a united Italy, although he admitted that in his youth he had dreamed of "waking one morning a directing minister of the Kingdom of Italy."⁸ He was determined to drive out Austria, to establish Piedmont as the largest Italian state extending from the French Alps to the Adriatic, and to make some sort of a confederation of Italian states to present a united front to the rest of the world. Such a policy led Cavour to be friendly to France and to respond to the proposal to join England and France in the Crimean War. His opportunity to present the iniquities⁹ of Austria for European consideration came at the peace conference in 1856.

Cavour realized that Napoleon III was sincere in his desire to "do something for Italy" and in his interest in the suppressed nationalities of Europe. He was also well aware of the fact that Napoleon's career needed the prestige of victory and that driving Austria out of Italy would enhance the position of France. Both he and Napoleon

⁸ Quoted in R. C. Binkley, *Realism and Nationalism, 1852-1871*, p. 199.

⁹ In all probability the Austrian rule in Lombardy was less bad than the government of any Italian state except Piedmont, but since Austria was the foreign power any Austrian rule was regarded as iniquitous and tyrannical.

knew that Austria could expect little aid from any other power and that a war could probably be localized in northern Italy. After much preliminary maneuvering Cavour and Napoleon met at Plombières in July, 1858, and discussed a plan providing for French aid in case Austria attacked Piedmont. In case of success in such a war the Kingdom of Upper Italy was to be created in which Austrian Italy and some other smaller territories were to be added to Piedmont; a Kingdom of Central Italy was to be formed of Tuscany and parts of the Papal States; while Naples was to be untouched. France was to be rewarded by the surrender of Savoy and Nice, and a marriage was to be arranged between the daughter of the king of Piedmont and Prince Napoleon, the cousin of Napoleon III. This plan was embodied in a treaty signed in January, 1859, and Cavour turned to devising a pretext for war while Napoleon cleared the way through diplomacy. Russia was placated with a promise of French aid in securing a revision of the terms of the Treaty of 1856. England and Prussia then endeavored to mediate to prevent any shift in the European balance. For a time it seemed as though a European conference would be held which would prevent any war and ruin Cavour's careful plans. He proceeded with his schemes, however, floated loans for a war chest, and increased the size and efficiency of the army. Every agency of propaganda was used to stir up anti-Austrian feeling both in Piedmont and in the rest of Italy, and Cavour hoped to irritate Austria into some step which would lead to war. Just as France seemed about to abandon her war plan,¹⁰ Austria played into Cavour's hands by making the fatal error of attempting to force a humiliating demobilization on Piedmont.

THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY

The Piedmontese answer to Francis Joseph's ultimatum was negative, and war began by Austria's initiative. France was drawn in to fulfill her treaty obligations, and the attempt at concerted European action came to an end. The German *Bund* felt no necessity to come to the aid of an aggressor, and Prussia was glad to keep out of the combat. Luck, the blunders of his opponents, and his own diplomatic skill had aided Cavour and isolated his adversary. In a six weeks'

¹⁰ Cavour made every effort to hold Napoleon III to his promises but was so sure early in April, 1859, that he was to be left in the lurch that he exclaimed there was nothing for him to do but put a pistol to his head and blow out his brains.

war the allies won two battles, and it seemed as though Austria was to be driven from Italy. Napoleon III drew back, however, before the end for which the alliance had been made was achieved. There was unrest at home, where the enterprise was disliked by the clericals and by those who feared the creation of a strong Italian state. Germany was arming upon the Rhine frontier, and Napoleon suspected that Cavour would take advantage of events in Italy to acquire more than France could afford to grant. For these reasons, as well as because he had been genuinely shocked and sickened by the horrors of the battlefields, Napoleon agreed at Villafranca to a peace on the basis of the *status quo*. Realizing that Sardinia could not proceed alone, Victor Emmanuel gave his reluctant assent before Cavour appeared upon the scene.

The peace terms left Austria in possession of Venetia, gave Lombardy to Piedmont, and made plans for an Italian confederation of which Austria was to be a member. Napoleon agreed not to demand the fulfillment of the terms of his treaty with Piedmont which provided for the cession of Savoy and Nice. Cavour resigned in angry protest, and the halfway satisfaction of Piedmont's aims pleased no one. At this point the long cultivation of Italian nationalism bore fruit. Tuscany, Parma, Modena and Romagna had risen and demanded that they be allowed to join Piedmont. Napoleon gave his consent provided Savoy and Nice then be ceded to him.¹¹ Cavour came back to power to complete the transaction and arranged plebiscites in all the territories which were to change hands. Those in the duchies and Romagna (1860) were overwhelmingly in favor of union with Piedmont, and the cession of Savoy and Nice seemed to be in accordance with the same principle of self-determination. As d'Azeglio said, Piedmont could not "be for nationalism on this side of the Alps and against it on the other."

A strong Kingdom of Upper Italy was now assured, marred only by the presence of Austria in Venetia. The work of acquiring southern Italy was the task of Garibaldi, who had returned to take service in the army of Piedmont in 1859. With the connivance of Cavour, Garibaldi set forth from the harbor of Genoa with his Thousand Red

¹¹ Piedmont actually had the choice between an Italian confederation without the cession of Savoy and Nice and actual annexation of the duchies into a unified national state with the surrender of Savoy and Nice. Cavour had no desire for a weak and impotent confederation which might be a prey to Austrian aggression and chose the latter alternative.

Shirts.¹² Garibaldi was willing to use his private army for an attack upon Venetia, Rome, Nice or the Kingdom of Naples. Cavour used all of his influence to divert it to Sicily, where the fires of revolution were already laid. The Thousand, backed by Sicilian rebels, defeated the Neapolitan troops in the spring of 1860 and then crossed over to the mainland to repeat their exploits against King Francis II himself. Francis in desperation endeavored to liberalize his government and to accept the earlier offers of Piedmont to join in a liberal confederation of northern and southern states. It was, however, too late. Cavour saw a chance to acquire the Kingdom of Naples for his national unified Italy, and the Neapolitans, suspicious of the former tyrant, awaited the liberating touch of Garibaldi. The Thousand had the same success against Naples as on the island, and in September Garibaldi took the city of Naples and announced that he would then proceed to Rome. Cavour was alarmed, for there were two serious dangers in the situation: first, any attack upon Rome would bring Italians into conflict with the French troops that had protected the papacy since 1849; and second, the immense increase in the prestige of Garibaldi might lead him to refuse to turn his conquests over to Piedmont and to decide to establish an Italy based on Mazzini's ideas.

Cavour therefore secured the consent of Napoleon III to take over all of the territories acquired by Garibaldi, plus the rest of the estates of the church where revolt was imminent, provided that Victor Emmanuel's army block the way to Rome and that the pope be left in possession of his capital city. Against the wishes of the Mazzinians, plebiscites were taken in the Marches and in the Kingdom of Naples, and in November, 1860, north and south were united as the king and Garibaldi rode together into Naples. Garibaldi then withdrew, feeling somewhat as though his glorious schemes for a mass movement for a united Italy under popular control had been frustrated by Cavour's *Realpolitik*. With some difficulty national control was established over the backward southern provinces which had long been the home of rebels and "brigands," and a beginning was made in the task of creating a centralized nation-state out of the Italy that had long been regarded as a "geographical expression."

The constitution of Piedmont was extended to cover the new state,

¹² See G. M. Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Thousand*, and *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy*. The thousand had been recruited by Garibaldi personally and was financed by a campaign for a "Million Rifles Fund" to which Victor Emmanuel himself contributed.

for Cavour was a firm and consistent believer in the parliamentary system with its ministerial responsibility. The English system, therefore, was grafted upon an Italy that had for centuries been unfamiliar with any sort of liberal institutions. Freedom of speech and press, a gradually broadening suffrage, and liberal government assistance to education, industry, and agriculture were designed to bring Italy up to the standards of a modern liberal state. Rome was announced to be the ultimate capital of a government whose temporary seat was Turin, and a new "great power" appeared on the European stage. Cavour, worn out by long and excessive labors, died in 1861 without seeing the final achievement of the goals he had set. Venetia was to be added to Italy as a result of an Austro-Prussian war in 1866, and when the French troops withdrew from Rome in 1870, as the throne of Napoleon III tottered under German attack, the Italian government quietly took over its "capital" on the Tiber.

From the death of Cavour until the present time historians have differed in their estimate of his character and of his work. An Italian historian writes that the "process of Italy's independence, liberty, and unity would deserve to be called the masterpiece of the liberal, national movement of the nineteenth century," and again in speaking of Cavour says that ". . . with none of the 'titanic' in his make-up . . . [he] was none the less a great man."¹³ An American historian, on the other hand, says of Cavour's Machiavellian *Realpolitik* and his Neapolitan policy that "Cavour had been driven by circumstances into many deceptions and subterfuges, but never before had he revealed so callous a conscience as he showed at this time," and again, "When Cavour died . . . it would seem that his persistent tactics of deceit had won him the confidence of his contemporaries, who seemed to trust him because of the success of his magnificent treacheries."¹⁴

One of the greatest of the European figures of the century, Prince Metternich, maintained in 1856 that there was but one great statesman in Europe, an Italian named Cavour. It is perhaps safe for us to concur in the opinion of one who, great himself in many ways, was not inclined to be overgenerous in his estimates of those who played upon the same stage. Cavour was a great man, an idealist and a liberal, but, like almost all great political leaders, he was an opportunist and a realist. Neither demagogue nor theorist, his great fund

¹³ Benedetto Croce, *A History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (Harcourt, Brace and Company), pp. 225, 247.

¹⁴ R. C. Binkley, *Realism and Nationalism* (Harper & Brothers), pp. 220, 226.

of common sense and his keen intelligence led him to use whatever materials came to hand and to take advantage of any opportunity offered him for the accomplishment of his ends. The will of the people and the needs of the state were to him identical, and in establishing a unified state, operating under a liberal constitution, he felt that he was serving the Italy whose creation was the ideal of all Italian patriots.

THE SECOND EMPIRE IN FRANCE

Although French aid had helped create a new state in Italy, and although Austria as well as Russia had been forced to acknowledge defeat at the hands of French military force, the foreign policy of Napoleon III had not brought the added prestige to the Second Empire that its creator had wished. The Crimean War had been costly and had given France nothing of great value, and by opening the Italian Question by force of arms Napoleon had helped create a rival and not a satellite. A friend of suppressed nationalities, he had aided in a triumph of nationalism that could not fail to shake the precarious European balance. Indeed, the shrewd observer could, in 1860, foresee that he had set in motion forces that were to work for the weakening of the position of France in international affairs. The strong French Catholic faction was antagonized by the despoiling of the pope. Men who had previously supported the dictatorship were heard grumbling over the policies of the government. The sense of insecurity that was the result of the restlessness of France led Napoleon to make repeated concessions after 1860 to the growing liberal opposition. The Senate and the legislative body were allowed to express their opinions in a reply to the annual address from the throne and to question the ministers on the policies of the government. Full reports of the parliamentary debates were permitted publication. Criticism, thus unshackled, became widespread, and the opposition gained a much greater number of seats in the legislature. The clericals attacked his Italian policy; the liberals thought he should have permitted the Italians to take Venetia and Rome; the protectionists objected to his free-trade policies; and the Bourbons regretted the expulsion of their cousins from Naples. The republicans, growing in numbers, assailed the very existence of the empire and attacked both the policies and the personality of the emperor.

Under the circumstances Napoleon was driven to further exploits in foreign affairs, ever searching for the spectacular victory that would

consolidate his position at home. Three opportunities were offered him in the early 1860's. Poland revolted against Russia in 1863, and Napoleon, quite sincerely moved by their plight, desired to aid them. Again he worked for a European concert and a joint intervention; but England, irritated by his acquisition of Savoy, refused to disturb further the balance of power; and Prussia, wooing Russia for reasons of her own, was hostile to the French projects. The American Civil War offered, Napoleon felt, some opportunity for French aggrandizement. He believed firmly that the South would win—had not other revolutions been successful where the revolting state was far smaller and less powerful than the Confederacy? Had England consented to co-operate he would doubtless have been willing to use naval force to break the blockade and secure cotton for the factories of Europe even though the United States made it perfectly clear that any such action meant war. England, profiting immensely from her trade with both belligerents and from the indirect gains resulting from the destruction of the merchant marine of her greatest commercial rival saw no advantage in surrendering the profits of a neutral.¹⁵

The preoccupation of the United States with the Civil War, however, opened the door to another possibility for a French adventure in international affairs.¹⁶ France, Spain, and England combined in 1862 in a naval demonstration to force the payment of claims which Mexico owed their citizens. A revolution in Mexico offered an opportunity for French intervention. England and Spain withdrew, but France landed soldiers to support the clerical and conservative party opposed to the liberal president, Juarez, whose pro-Indian agrarian policies had jeopardized the wealth and the political position of the Catholic Church. Juarez was driven out, and the Clericals, realizing that they could be kept in power only with French aid, consented to the establishment of an empire which would be, in effect, a French protectorate. Napoleon arranged for a puppet empire with Maximilian of Austria and his bride Charlotte as its rulers.¹⁷ The project required

¹⁵ Frank Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy*, and E. D. Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War*.

¹⁶ Intervention in Mexico was pushed by speculations in repudiated Mexican bonds. The duke de Moiney, half brother of Napoleon III, had a 30 per cent interest if collection could be made.

¹⁷ Maximilian was the brother of Francis Joseph and his wife was the daughter of King Leopold of Belgium. The romantic story of the ill-fated young rulers and their "Phantom Empire" is told in E. C. Corti, *Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico*, and in P. F. Mertin, *Maximilian in Mexico*.

40,000 French soldiers and the expenditure of 14,000,000 francs a month. A huge Mexican loan was floated in France to finance the venture, and Frenchmen stood to lose heavily if it failed. And fail it did, for the original premise that the United States was sure to lose in the Civil War proved to be false. In 1867 a victorious American government exerted diplomatic pressure in support of a revived Monroe Doctrine and forced the withdrawal of the French troops. The "empire" of Maximilian collapsed, and the unfortunate emperor was executed by the returning Juarez forces. His wife, Charlotte, made insane by fear and despair, dragged out a miserable existence in a Belgian palace for more than sixty years. The Mexican venture was a colossal failure.

The liberals in France were more insistent than ever upon satisfaction of their demands and, one step at a time, forced concessions that slowly transformed the dictatorship into a limited monarchy in which by 1869 the opposition polled almost as many votes as the government candidates. Napoleon was forced to consent to the selection of his ministers from those parliamentary leaders who could control a majority of the votes in the Chamber, and this acceptance of ministerial responsibility ended his personal rule. Émile Ollivier, a liberal monarchist who had been a critic of the empire, was appointed as prime minister. In 1870 the emperor and the new prime minister worked out the details of a new constitution designed to establish the "Liberal Empire." The constitution embodied all the concessions already made by Napoleon III and provided that the Senate should become the upper house of a bicameral legislature and that both Senate and Chamber of Deputies should be freed from executive interference in making laws. In a plebiscite taken in May, 1870, the nation expressed a qualified approval of the new constitution.¹⁸ Defeated and discredited at home, the victim of an incurable disease that was soon to end his life, the "Emperor of Peace" was face to face with another war, due in part to his own policies, which was to cause his final humiliation and the downfall of his empire.

THE GERMANIES AFTER 1848

Beyond the Rhine there had been a succession of events during the period of the Second Empire which were to alter the balance of

¹⁸ Seven million votes were cast for it, one and a half million votes against it, with two million voters absent from the polls.

power in Europe and to determine in large degree the nature and trends of European history during the following years. The Germanies were to disappear in a new German Empire, and the hegemony of Prussia within that empire and of the empire in Europe were to make, and perhaps mar, much of the history of the period before 1914.

The failure of the Frankfort Parliament in 1848 to effect the unification of Germany along the lines of a liberal constitutional monarchy had discouraged the liberals and had led the most clear-sighted of them to feel that the great problem of relations of Austria and Prussia might well make the satisfaction of nationalistic aspirations impossible for the German people. The problem of liberalism was not so insoluble. A few German states came through the period of reaction with their liberal constitutions intact; Prussia retained a constitution, albeit a conservative one; Austria under Schwartzemberg had suppressed constitutions, but the powerful prime minister died in 1852, and the door to reform was not entirely closed. The old rivalry between Austria and Prussia had not diminished with the years, and any union in which both of them were included must be sufficiently weak to permit each to operate independently. To many Germans, especially in the south, Austria was nearer and more compatible than Prussia. To exclude Austria and permit the domination of Prussia was a bitter choice. There was no simple problem, as in Italy, of the expulsion of a common enemy. In sentiment, if not in history, the area occupied by Germans was one body. To sever that connection meant disunion, not unification. The difficulty might be overcome by a solution along the lines of federalism which would strengthen the *Bund* in which all German states had representation. Such a solution could be reached only by replacing the Confederation of 1815 with a new constitution in which each state would unselfishly surrender a part of its independence and contribute to the power of a national federal state. If Prussia and Austria could be brought to work together for that end, a new Germany might be created. Failing some such compromise, the alternatives were stagnation on the lines of the *status quo*, or a dualism in Central Europe which would mean the dissolution of the old *Bund* and the creation of two German states, one centered around Prussia and the other around Austria. Such a solution must, under the circumstances, mean war, for neither power would permit the other to command the allegiance of the thirty or more smaller states. A war fought for the control of Germany could not by any chance bring much satisfaction to the liberals, for neither Austria nor

Prussia had much in the way of liberal institutions to contribute to any new government.

For the first years after 1850, therefore, liberals and nationalists in Germany were puzzled as to what step to take. They had not forgotten the fine enthusiasm of 1848, but they were uncertain and hesitant. In the meantime, events moved rapidly outside Germany. The regeneration of Piedmont and the skill of Cavour were looked upon with interest and some envy in Germany. What Piedmont had done Prussia could do, and without the aid of foreign troops, but the cost would be terrible: devotion to militarism, a war of German against German, the use of every device of force and diplomacy, and in the end the sacrifice of liberalism for the power of an absolutist state.

In 1859 a German National Union was founded, modeled on the one created by Manin in Italy. Italian patriots expressed interest in, and sympathy for, the German nationalists, who were in turn encouraged by Italian success. In 1861 a German Progressive party was organized in Prussia to work for a responsible ministry, local self-government, secularization of education, civil marriage, and other reforms. In neither of these movements was there any real vigor, and the unification of Germany could never have come about from their efforts. They contributed, however, in setting the scene for the work of Bismarck, whose genius, energy, and ruthless force were, in large part, responsible for the trend taken by events in Germany after 1860. The figure of Bismarck towers above the others, and his motives and plans must be examined before the unification of Germany and the history of the German Empire can be understood.

THE EARLY CAREER OF BISMARCK

Bismarck, whose full name was Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck-Schönhausen, was a member of a family that traced its lineage back to the days when the Mark of Brandenburg was an outpost of Christianity on the Slavic frontier of the Holy Roman Empire. The Bismarcks belonged to the semifeudal landed aristocracy of North Germany and had for generations held civil and military office under the Hohenzollerns. This Junker class, as it is called, formed the backbone of the state created by Frederick the Great, and its devotion to king and to Prussia was never questioned. Bismarck's education was that of his class. He had about one year at the University of Göttingen and one at Berlin, but his university reputation was based

more upon his skill as a swordsman than upon zeal in scholastic pursuits. After his year of army service, he entered the civil service, but in 1839 the family finances demanded that he return to manage the ancestral estates. For some years Bismarck, like Cavour, made a real success of farming, and, like Cavour, he found outlet for his restless energy in reading everything that came his way—history, philosophy, drama, poetry. His favorite authors were Goethe, Shakespeare, and Byron, and not the liberal economists and political thinkers who attracted Cavour. He traveled, also, and his keen observation and retentive memory ensured him a valuable store of ideas as to the people and institutions of the countries he visited.¹⁹

In 1847 he was elected to the united Prussian Landtag,²⁰ where he unhesitatingly placed himself on the side of the king in opposition to the demands of the liberals. In the crisis of 1848 Bismarck was hostile toward the constitutionalists and was recognized as “a Tory of the Tories,” more royalist than the king. He rejoiced that Frederick William IV refused the crown when it was offered him by the Frankfort Parliament, and he defended the Olmutz convention because it discouraged further liberalism. His conservatism was so pronounced and his loyalty to the king was so well known that he was sent in 1851 to represent Prussia at the Diet of the German Confederation. His lack of diplomatic training was offset by his shrewdness and his complete and jealous devotion to the interests of Prussia. Austria soon found that the young Prussian was her greatest adversary, and the government of Prussia learned that he was to be depended upon in every turn of events.

In the eight years he spent at Frankfort he came to feel that Austria was Prussia's natural enemy and that an Austro-Prussian war was inevitable. He found the plight of Austria in the period of the Crimean War pleasing and was convinced that the weakness of Austria in the Italian war of 1859 was Prussia's opportunity. In 1858 Frederick William IV became insane, and his brother William was made regent to become king himself three years later. The prince regent, realizing Bismarck's strong anti-Austrian bias and not as yet ready to accept his ideas in formulating state policy, sent him as ambassador to Russia where he remained, as he himself said, “on ice”

¹⁹ One of the best of the lives of Bismarck is by C. Grant Robertson. Emil Ludwig's biography is an interesting interpretation written by a German. Munroe Smith's *Bismarck and German Unity* is a valuable brief account of his public life.

²⁰ See above, page 529.

for three years. They were valuable years, however, for he learned to know Russia thoroughly and to have the greatest respect for Russia's potential strength. He early acquired the conviction that the friendship of Russia was essential to Prussia, and he was willing to pay a price for it. In 1862 he was sent for a few months as ambassador to France, where he formed no very high opinion of the ability of Napoleon III.²¹

In the meantime, Bismarck's friends were urging upon William I his appointment as prime minister of Prussia. The king had known Bismarck for some years and was well aware of the strength of his character and of his loyalty to the crown, but he considered him too brusque, opinionated, and reactionary for the office and did not entirely trust his discretion. The king was, however, in grave difficulties in 1862 and desperately needed a master hand at the helm to bring his plans through the dangers that seemed too great for him to face unaided.

KING WILLIAM I OF PRUSSIA

William I, over sixty years old when he came to the throne, had been a soldier almost all of his life. He was intimately acquainted with all the details of the Prussian army, its deficiencies and its needs. In his mind the army was the peculiar responsibility of the monarch,²² and the improvement of the Prussian army was the main objective of the first years of the reign. In the days of the regeneration of Prussia in the struggle against Napoleon, compulsory military service had been decreed for Prussia, but in the years that had elapsed since 1815, as the population had grown, there had been no increase in the numbers of recruits called to the colors each year. Nearly twenty thousand men escaped military service annually. Military men felt that new regiments should be made to include these young men eligible for service. The reserve forces should be reorganized, and all equipment should be modernized. None of these reforms could be made without a large increase in appropriations for military necessities, and new taxes must, in accordance with the Constitution of 1850, be granted by the legislature.

The army plans called for an increase of the war basis of the army from 230,000 to 450,000 men and for a reconstruction of the

²¹ He said that Napoleon was "*une grande incapacité méconnue*."

²² The rights of the crown in army affairs were specifically guaranteed in the Constitution of 1850.

reserve forces which would increase the *Landwehr* from 150,000 to 300,000. The members of the Liberal party in the lower house of the legislature agreed to increasing the total armed strength of Prussia, for they saw the army as a means of unifying Germany; nevertheless, they wished to reduce the term of service from three years to two, and they insisted that the army budget be voted annually. The details of the parliamentary struggle are unimportant, but the principles involved are vital, for the decision upon them would determine the fate of parliamentary government in Prussia—and later in the German Empire. The real issue was fundamental and constitutional—the determination of the center of governmental power. The liberals did not dispute the rights of the king as commander in chief of the army, nor did they deny the obligation of every citizen to render military service. They did, however, make three important claims. The nation, through its representatives, had the right to determine the conditions under which that military service should be performed; the legislature might, therefore, decide whether the term of service should be three years or two; and, most significant of all, the army budget was not separate and inviolable but was merely part of the annual budget which must be reviewed each year by the representatives of the nation. Under the constitution no new taxes were legal without parliamentary consent. Parliament had, therefore, the right to control the government through its control over taxes.²³

Acceptance of the demands of the Liberal party would have meant, in a short time, that ministerial responsibility would be in effect and that the representative body would have complete control over finance. It would follow, logically, that the executive would be subordinate to the legislature and that the independence of the crown as a real power in the government would be at an end.²⁴ The whole nature of the state was at stake. It was the old monarchical theory of government versus the new idea of government through a liberal parliament. Each adversary fully understood the nature of the struggle and realized, as well, that the decision would be of as much concern

²³ This account of the constitutional question follows very closely that of C. Grant Robertson's *Bismarck*, p. 110 ff. The significance of the demands of the liberals is often overlooked. The success of Bismarck in creating the German Empire overshadows this initial defiance of the constitution.

²⁴ The struggle in Prussia was somewhat similar to the English Parliament-Crown dispute in the seventeenth century. In England, as a result of the struggle, the king came to have little influence over legislation and the executive was, in effect, a committee of the party in power in the legislature.

to Germany as to Prussia. The king dissolved parliament, only to find that new elections increased the votes of the opposition. The army reforms were inaugurated, fresh regiments were formed, but there was no money with which to pay them. Refusing to compromise, William I reached the point where abdication seemed to him to be his only alternative. The minister of war, von Roon, urged the appointment of Bismarck as prime minister as the only man who might secure the army reorganization in spite of the lower house. The king finally yielded, and von Roon telegraphed his impatient friend, "Come, the pear is ripe."

BISMARCK, CHANCELLOR OF PRUSSIA

Bismarck returned from France and threw himself into the fray. He felt that the collision furnished an excellent opportunity for a thorough defeat, not only of the Liberal party, but also of liberalism and parliamentary pretensions. He based his attack upon the naked principle of power. Refusing to admit the possibility of accepting any part of the English system of government, he denied the right of the representatives of the people to control the army, to frame policy, or to control the selection and dismissal of ministers. Bismarck assumed office in 1862 and for four years governed Prussia, in defiance of the opposition, on the audacious assumption that the crown plus the upper house formed a majority in the government. The lower house, he said, had the constitutional right to refuse to grant the budget, but the work of government must be carried on, and provision must be made for the army. It was his duty, in case of deadlock between the two branches of government, to carry on whether the budget bill passed or not. He would therefore continue to collect the taxes voted in the law of 1861 and await the time when indemnification or constitutional change might legalize his action. He refused flatly to admit that he was responsible to legislative control or that there was validity to the claim that government must operate only with the consent of the governed.²⁵

In September, 1862, he stated the very essence of his philosophy and of his design in a sentence that has been more quoted than any other of his trenchant remarks upon government.

²⁵ Bismarck's admission that his conduct could be legalized in the future by indemnification or constitutional change was a confession that his course was in direct violation of the Constitution.

Germany has its eyes not on Prussia's Liberalism; but on its might. . . . Prussia must reserve its strength for the favorable moment, which has already more than once been missed. The great questions of the day will not be decided by speeches and resolutions of majorities—that was the blunder of 1848 and 1849—but by blood and iron.

One English historian states that the phrase “burst like a shell in a powder magazine,” and another writes that to Bismarck the state was power and that war was a continuation of policy.²⁶

European governments, underestimating Bismarck's ability and overestimating the strength of liberalism in Prussia, predicted that Bismarck would not last three months and that revolution would be the result of his policies if William I continued to support him. But for four years the struggle for power went on, parliaments met, debated passionately, registered their votes of censure, and went home. Bismarck doggedly went ahead, collected taxes without sanction of Parliament, and gave von Roon the means with which to build up the army. He answered his opponents with the statement that the Prussian monarchy was “not yet ready to be manipulated as a piece of lifeless machinery of parliamentary government.” As a loyal servant of the king, he refused then and throughout his life to believe that he was answerable to any other authority. Such was his theory of government. He was also well aware that the practical ends for which he worked could not be effected by co-operation with the liberals. Neither in Prussia nor in Germany were the liberals willing to submit to his doctrine of the “Power State” whose might depended upon armed force and whose aims would be achieved ruthlessly by “blood and iron.” Bismarck owed the success of his larger plans during the period from 1862 to 1871 to his initial victory over the liberals of Prussia.

In the meantime events outside Prussia were occurring to shape the course of Bismarck's policy. In 1863 Austria, alarmed at the weakness of the German Confederation in the light of Prussia's military measures and disturbed by her own internal problems, sought a revision of the Act of 1815 and a strengthening of the bonds that held the German states together. Bismarck, feeling that any such changes would mean an extension of Austrian influence in Germany and correspondingly delay Prussia's domination, persuaded William I to refuse to co-operate in any way. Prussia won the distrust of the

²⁶ C. Giant Robertson and H. A. L. Fisher

German states and the condemnation of the liberals, but Bismarck secured independence of action and freedom to carry on his own plans for the reconstruction of Germany.

In the same year the revolution in Poland gave him an opportunity to frustrate French plans for action against Russia, and by so doing he earned the gratitude of Russia upon which he could rely at crises in his own career. His support of Russia was entirely sincere, for his attitude toward the Poles in Prussia was quite in harmony with the Russian viewpoint. Prussianization as rapidly as possible was Bismarck's formula for subject races, and he announced hotly that he would rather lose a province than submit the status of the Poles in Prussia to a European conference.

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN AND THE DANISH-PRUSSIAN WAR

Bismarck's opportunity to initiate his own program came in connection with the Schleswig-Holstein question. The complications of this four-hundred-year-old issue lie outside the scope of this book and are unnecessary for an understanding of the problem in 1864. The two provinces had long been governed by the king of Denmark through a personal union and were generally considered to be inseparable, although Holstein was predominantly German and had a vote in the German Diet, while Schleswig was more Danish than German. By the ancient law of the provinces succession must be through the male line. There was no such law in Denmark, and, when it became apparent in the middle of the nineteenth century that the Danish king, who had been an only child, would die without a male heir, the problem of the duchies had to be faced.

The increasing strength of parliamentary government in Denmark led the Danes to advocate the absorption of Schleswig into the body politic of Denmark. The German Confederation wished the separation of the duchies from Denmark altogether and their rule as an autonomous state by some German princeling sponsored by the Diet. A revolt in Holstein in 1848 was settled by the intervention of the European powers, and a treaty was drawn up in 1852 by which the heir to the Danish throne was recognized as the successor in the duchies even though his claim to the throne was indirect. Prussia and Austria concurred in this treaty, but the German Confederation was not a signatory. In 1863, a new Danish constitu-

tion incorporated Schleswig in Denmark and gave home rule to Holstein. The arrangement was sensible, but it angered the Germans. Holstein appealed to the German Confederation, which at once pushed the claims of the son of the man whom it had supported in 1848.

In 1864 the king of Denmark died and was succeeded by Christian IX in accordance with the terms of the treaty of 1852. He put the constitution drawn up in the previous year into effect, and the stage was set for the first act of Bismarck's drama of German unification. Bismarck was determined to despoil Denmark, to defraud the German Confederation, and, without a shadow of legal claim, to acquire the two provinces for Prussia. To prevent Austrian protest he sought the joint action of Prussia and Austria. The two powers recognized Christian as ruler of Denmark in accordance with the agreement of 1852 which they had both signed, but at the same time they presented him with an ultimatum demanding the abandonment of the Constitution of 1863 and the surrender of the right to incorporate Schleswig in the Danish state. The terms of the ultimatum were deliberately made such that no Danish government could consent to them, and a brief war followed in which Denmark was defeated by the two allies.²⁷

THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR

The two duchies and the little province of Lauenburg were ceded to Austria and Prussia jointly, thus creating a situation from which it was obvious that friction must arise. Bismarck was now ready to deal with Austria. When the expected friction in the administration of the provinces occurred, he arranged a treaty at Gastein (1865), which provided that the joint supervision should end, that Lauenburg should be given to Prussia with a money payment for Austria, who was to administer Holstein while Prussia managed Schleswig. He then prepared for war. The army, now thoroughly reorganized, was ready, but it was necessary that Prussia be protected from European intervention. Russia was friendly, and her neutrality could be relied upon. Napoleon III was engrossed with his Mexican adventure,

²⁷ Palmerston of England tried unsuccessfully to have the matter referred to mediation. Napoleon III suggested a European congress, but that was refused by England. Palmerston then urged that England intervene alone, but Queen Victoria was opposed to any action since her daughter was the Crown Princess of Prussia while the Prince of Wales had just married the daughter of the king of Denmark.

the failure of which was becoming apparent. At Biarritz in the fall of 1865, Bismarck played upon Napoleon's ambitions and upon his very real willingness to support nationalistic enterprises. Napoleon was led to believe that there might be some compensation for France if Prussia should be successful, and he expected to be able to obtain still more if Austria should win. He agreed, therefore, not to oppose an attack upon Austria and a subsequent invasion of the states of North Germany. An alliance with Italy was secured by the promise of Venetia, and Bismarck was ready to force the issue.

Bismarck realized the value of making an adversary appear to be the aggressor and of providing the people of Prussia with an issue for which to fight, a cause worthy of their defense. Much to the astonishment of the public, therefore, he came forward in April, 1866, with a scheme for the thorough reorganization of the German Confederation and the exclusion of Austria from it. He asked for a German national assembly, elected on the basis of manhood suffrage, to discuss the reform of the federal constitution and other matters. Austria's refusal of the proposition made Prussia appear to be the champion of liberalism. Austria endeavored to extricate herself from the impasse without surrendering to Prussia the control of Germany. Bismarck was inexorable and pushed Austria into a proposal which amounted to a declaration of war. Nearly all of the smaller states of Germany rallied to the support of Austria, but the Prussian military machine, Prussia's railroads and economic superiority, and Bismarck's skilful diplomacy were too much for them.

The war was brief—seven weeks through the summer of 1866—and the sole major battle was that of Sadowa or Königgratz. Austria's defeat might have been followed by the triumphal march of Prussian troops through the streets of Vienna, but Bismarck had greater wisdom than the generals or the militaristic Prussian ruler. Fully expecting to see the South German states voluntarily join Prussia in a new German union, he wished to leave them free to make that decision willingly. Such an end could not be reached by force or by severity to Austria. France must not be too violently shocked by Prussian greed. French acquiescence, South German friendship, and perhaps even an Austrian alliance might be secured by moderation. The Treaty of Prague, therefore, inflicted no indemnities or humiliating cessions of territory save that of Venetia to Italy. Prussia annexed Schleswig-Holstein and the various North German states which had opposed her. All of the German states north of the River Main were

united in a new confederation of which William I was the president and Bismarck the chancellor. The South German states were, for the time, left independent, but Bismarck soon concluded alliances with them which would ensure their co-operation in the future.

THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION

The Constitution of the North German Confederation received Bismarck's closest attention and was so devised as to need little except the change of name to serve for fifty years the empire he was soon to complete. He decided very wisely that Germany must be a federal and not a unitary or centralized state. The old loyalties and particularisms were far too strong to be discarded quickly, and any such action would have hopelessly alienated the powerful South German states. The lower house (Reichstag) of the federal legislature was to be elected on the basis of manhood suffrage, but this seeming concession to liberalism was counteracted by the fact that the chancellor and the ministry were not made responsible to the Reichstag. Its influence was largely negative, but it was to serve as a valuable arena for the expression of public opinion, and ministries soon learned to pay attention to its wishes. The upper house (Bundesrath) was to be a body composed of the forty-two representatives of the governments of the individual states. Many important functions were given to the Bundesrath. It was subject to the will of the reigning princes, and it was to be a decidedly conservative branch of the legislature with much more power than many European upper houses. The king of Prussia was made the hereditary president of the Confederation. His power in domestic affairs was limited, and he was to have no veto power. He was given great power, however, in foreign affairs, and he was to appoint the chancellor, who was to be the chief executive of the Confederation and the head of Prussia's delegation to the Bundesrath. The chancellor was not required to resign when he lost the support of the legislature but was responsible only to the king who had appointed him. The other ministers were to be dependent upon the chancellor, and were mere administrative officers. The position was designed to fit Bismarck's stature and was to be one of more power than was usual among European prime ministers.

Prussia's large population assured her a majority of the votes in the lower house, and she was given seventeen delegates in the

upper house, whereas the other states received from one to six. The Prussian state, therefore, became Germany, and the chancellor, whose control had been extended over Prussia in spite of the constitution and the opposition of the liberals, was now able to dictate the policies of the Confederation.

With the triumph of 1866 a wave of national feeling swept away the hatred felt for Bismarck and gave William I for the first time the affection and approval of his people. Bismarck wisely refused to make of the new situation an opportunity for the suppression of liberalism. He preferred to let sleeping dogs lie, and, without changing his fundamental ideas one iota, he asked but one concession—the passage of laws legalizing his extraconstitutional measures of 1862-1866.

The contrast between the creation of the new German state and the unification of Italy can easily be seen. The contrast between Bismarck and Cavour is equally complete. The two states were formed by attack upon a common enemy—Austria—and the success of each was owing to a powerful and able minister; there the similarity ceases. In the unification of Italy nationalism was associated with liberalism, and the state established was based upon parliamentary government modeled upon the English plan. The German state was the work of a man who despised liberalism and believed in autocracy, and in it, therefore, were developed institutions which concentrated power in the hands of the executive who ruled by hereditary right and not by popular consent.

THE INTERVAL BETWEEN WARS, 1866-1870

The years following 1866 form a period of uneasiness in international relations. The unification of Italy and the reconstruction of the German Confederation had irretrievably altered the balance of power. The weakness of Austria could be a matter of great satisfaction to no other power except Russia, and the great increase in the power of Prussia was a potential menace to France. It was perfectly apparent, furthermore, that the situation had not provided the complete realization of Bismarck's plans and that Prussia was not yet satisfied. Napoleon III had not foreseen the ease with which Prussia would win over Austria and had expected to be able to make territorial gains for France from the exigencies of one combatant or the other. The war ended so abruptly, and the treaty was signed

with such despatch, that France had no time or opportunity to get any satisfaction from the episode.

The Second Empire was weakening in its control of the domestic situation, and its foreign policy was the subject of acrimonious debate in the Chambers. The emperor endeavored to relieve the tension by diplomatic negotiations with Bismarck. Unfortunately his lack of authority and prestige was such that he appeared in the guise of suppliant, and Bismarck played with him as a cat with a mouse. There were tentative suggestions of Luxemburg, Belgium, and various Rhineland provinces as compensation to France. In each case Bismarck was careful to give his consent to no cession of territory, and the French got nothing from him in writing, although their own suggestions were, unfortunately, put upon paper. While Prussian military preparations went on apace, Bismarck saw to it that each of the states that would have been the victims of French demands obtained proof of the projects for territorial gains. As a consequence, Bavaria was led to make an alliance with Prussia; England was thoroughly incensed against France because of the suggested acquisition of Belgium, whose integrity both England and France were pledged to protect; and the Rhineland states were persuaded that Prussia was their friend and that France was a wolf in sheep's clothing.

Austria spent the years after 1866 in putting her own house in order. The long period of quarrels with Hungary came to an end in 1867, when an agreement was reached providing for the foundation of a dual monarchy in which Hungary should have complete local autonomy and a Diet of her own²⁸ For matters of common concern there was to be a meeting annually of a body called the Delegations. To this body, meeting one year in Vienna and the next in Budapest, was given the consideration of war, army, foreign affairs, postal service, and imperial finance. A joint imperial ministry acted as the executive body to perform the work of the joint services. After 1867 the Hungarian Magyars were satisfied, but the subject nationalities of both states were restless, and the later history of the dual monarchy was much disturbed by their problems. Often it seemed as though some sort of federation might be the solution, but agreement was never reached, and in 1918 the Great War brought dissolution to the Hapsburg empire.

In the years after 1866 Austria had little friendliness for France,

²⁸ This agreement was called the *Ausgleich*. See above, page 538

for the memory of French aid to Italy was too fresh. Bismarck had not hopelessly antagonized Austria by severe terms in 1866, and Francis Joseph found it possible to forgive the blow to the old Confederation, for he feared Russia and needed the protection of North German friendship. Napoleon, therefore, succeeded in obtaining nothing except a sort of understanding that in case France declared war on Prussia and succeeded in occupying South Germany, Austria and Italy would send aid.

France was, with that slight exception, isolated both by her own folly and by Bismarck's design. There is no doubt that Bismarck was willing to risk a war if it would aid in completing German unification, but he was determined that such a war must be, in outward appearance, forced upon him by France. The opportunism of the German chancellor is nowhere more apparent than in the manner in which he made use of events to effect his ends. Chance played a part, and the opportunity came through episodes outside either Germany or France. The troubled career of Queen Isabella of Spain ended in 1868 in a revolution; the throne was declared vacant; and the crown was offered to a young Hohenzollern prince belonging to the South German branch of the family. From the Spanish point of view the offer had much of merit. The young man was a Catholic; the family was of excellent standing and wide connections; a brother of this Prince Leopold, Charles of Hohenzollern, had become Prince of Rumania in 1866; and Leopold himself was married to a Portuguese princess. The connection of the southern family with the ruling house of Prussia was slight, although the Prussian king was recognized as the head of the family. In fact, Leopold was more nearly related to Napoleon III, since they were second cousins through a Beauharnais ancestor.

France, however, was alarmed and professed to see in the "Hohenzollern candidacy" the Machiavellian touch of Bismarck. The German ambassador was informed that France could not "tolerate" a German prince on the throne of Spain. Bismarck was quite willing that the candidacy be accepted and hoped that France would declare war either on Prussia or Spain as a result. Early in July, 1870, news was received in Paris that the prince had declined the throne of Spain. The French emperor and the prime minister, Ollivier, expressed satisfaction, and the episode—much to Bismarck's chagrin—seemed closed. The French foreign minister, Gramont, came to his assistance, however, for he was determined to score a diplomatic victory over Prussia and was, in addition, a member of the French war party which was convinced of the necessity for restoring prestige by show of force. He

therefore took upon himself the responsibility for an act of utter folly. He instructed the French ambassador to obtain from William I assurances that the candidacy not only had been refused with his approval but that he would guarantee it would not be renewed in the future. The French minister, Benedetti, met the king of Prussia at Ems, presented his request as to guarantees courteously, and was as courteously refused, although the king stated frankly that he had assented to the withdrawal of the candidature.

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

When the royal telegram, giving a detailed report of the meeting, reached Bismarck he saw an opportunity to use the episode to his advantage. He "edited" the despatch and gave it to the newspapers. A careful comparison of the original and the much briefer published version will show that Bismarck did not alter, forge, or falsify. All he did was to cut discreetly until it appeared that a rude demand had been made which was brusquely and abruptly refused. The "edited" version was read to the great army heads, von Roon and von Moltke, who agreed that it was "good." The Bismarck version was received in France as an insult, and the emperor's Council held an all-day session. The empress, who was an adherent of the war party, was present; the emperor wavered from one side to the other. Paris shouted for war, confident of the invincibility of the French armies. On Bastille Day the French government decided to call out the reserves, and on July 19 France officially declared war.

The Franco-Prussian War was one of great disillusionment to the French people and a revelation of German power and efficiency. All Germany rose in a wave of national enthusiasm, the South German states joined the northern Confederation, and the rest of Europe remained neutral. France was equally enthusiastic, but her war preparations were found to be grossly inadequate, and her army administration inefficient beyond description. Von Moltke's carefully planned campaign proceeded like clockwork in the presence of French confusion. The French were driven back, the main army was bottled up in Metz, and the emperor himself was captured at Sedan, September 2, 1870. When the news reached Paris, Napoleon was deposed, and the Second Empire came to an end. The empress slipped away to England, where Napoleon joined her when he was released by the Germans.

A "Government of National Defense" was organized in Paris and

placed in the hands of a group of republican leaders of whom Gambetta²⁹ was the most prominent. Paris was besieged by a German army, but Gambetta escaped in a balloon to organize armies of the people for national defense. One disaster to French arms followed another; one city after another was occupied by the Germans; and on January 28, 1871, Paris capitulated. An armistice was arranged to permit the election of a French Assembly which could negotiate a peace treaty. The National Assembly met at Bordeaux and elected Thiers "head of the executive power" (February 17) without definitely deciding for a republic or a monarchy. The German peace terms were very severe. The military men had their way in the demand for the cession of Alsace-Lorraine. Metz and Strasbourg were ceded also, and Thiers retained the fortress of Belfort only by submitting to the humiliation of a triumphal entry of the German army into Paris. The Treaty of Frankfurt (signed May 10, 1871) provided, also, for an indemnity of five billion francs and a Germany army of occupation which would be withdrawn by stages as the indemnity should be paid.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

In the mind of Bismarck the triumph over France was, however, not the main objective of the war. It was to be the last step in the building of the German Empire. The South German states, swept along by the success of the war, were at last ready to join with the North German Confederation,³⁰ and King William I was proclaimed German emperor in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles on January 18, 1871. The Constitution of the North German Confederation was extended to fit the empire, and the dream of Bismarck became a reality—a powerful state under the domination of Prussia with the king of Prussia as its emperor, and the reins firmly held in his own hands as chancellor.³¹

²⁹ Leon Gambetta had been a member of the Chamber of Deputies during the latter years of the empire. An outspoken republican, he had championed those who had been the victims of the illiberal laws in regard to speech and press.

³⁰ Bavaria's size and importance were recognized by special concessions in regard to foreign affairs, army, railway, postal and telegraph systems. Wurttemberg received special consideration also.

³¹ Benedetto Croce comments in *A History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 253, that "if the Italian *Risorgimento* had been the masterpiece of European liberal spirit, the rebirth of Germany was the masterpiece of political art in union with military virtues; two masterpieces as different from one another in general appearance, as a fine poem is from a powerful machine."

THE SITUATION IN FRANCE, 1871

The year of 1871 brought much further grief to the French republic which had been born in such travail. The provisional government had been dominated by such republican leaders as Gambetta, but the new National Assembly, led by Jules Favre and Leon Gambetta, was more conservative and was definitely monarchical in its preferences. The election of Thiers, elderly, bourgeois, and an Orleanist in background, as "head of the executive power" was indicative of the Assembly's political complexion. The elections had been held hurriedly and under very unusual conditions. Paris was besieged, four hundred thousand men were prisoners of war in Germany, and a hundred thousand other soldiers were interned in Switzerland and Belgium. The conservative peasantry had, perhaps, a greater representation in the Assembly than it would have had under normal conditions. At any rate, the townsmen, especially the Paris populace, regarded the Assembly with scorn and suspicion and used the term "rural assembly" as a title of opprobrium. The Assembly, on the other hand, was faced with a task that required both unusual ability and the hearty support of all France. Defeated, and forced back into the position of a second-rate power, without a single army in the field, France could not fight on longer; and yet there were many Frenchmen, again largely Parisians, who urged a continuation of the war. The outspoken demands on the part of the provinces for "peace at any price" were the cause for increased hatred of the "rural" government which represented them, and the news of the severity of the peace terms was received with hysteria in a Paris already unnerved by the prolonged siege. The conservative bourgeoisie of the city supported the "Government of National Defense," but the radical and republican elements denounced it vigorously.

During the months of the siege, Paris had been protected by the National Guard which was revolutionary in sentiment and into which had been recruited a large share of the city populace, especially the workingmen who were unemployed because of the collapse of business and industry. The payment of the Guard was, in effect, a method of relief, and the working class was largely dependent upon the pittance paid this citizen militia. The arms which were provided for the National Guard were the visible evidence of such employment and of the right to receive payment. There was, also, a large quantity of ammunition stored in Paris, and many of the big guns used by the

artillery to fight off the besieging Germans were still in place. Under the circumstances the first months of the republic were beset with dangers, not the least of them being domestic upheaval.

For many years after the June Days of 1848 there had been little evidence of socialism or, in fact, of any sort of radicalism in France. The repressive policies of the first years of the Second Empire had sufficed to prevent the expression of radical opinion. Utopian socialism had died out; Louis Blanc and his schemes had been to some extent discredited by the failures of 1848; and Marxian socialism was but in its infancy.³² After 1860, however, as the restrictions upon speech, press, and public meeting were relaxed, socialism as well as republicanism revived; and by the time of the Franco-Prussian War there were several active and articulate groups with little in common except their desire for a republic and their determination to bring about changes in the social and economic order.

A large proportion of this radical element was directly descended from the Jacobin element of the French Revolution and was only slightly touched by socialism. This group believed in revolution as an agency for political reform. It wished to retain the centralization of government characteristic of France, but hoped to dominate that government from radical Paris. Rousseau, Robespierre and Hébert were still the guiding stars of the Jacobins, and they paid only slight attention to the Marxian doctrines of the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat. As the 1860's progressed, however, there was an ever-increasing number of orthodox Marxians in Paris. The First International, which was organized in 1864, had an active section in Paris. Jacobin or Marxian, the Paris radical often was somewhat uncertain as to where one set of doctrines left off and the other began. In addition to these groups Blanqui and his followers advocated doctrines which were socialistic, communistic, and revolutionary. Anarchism was present in France, also—the work of Proudhon, one of the most famous of nineteenth-century anarchists. Proudhon wished to reduce government to a minimum and to replace coercion with self-determination. In almost every way Proudhon was in opposition to Jacobins and socialists. He favored the decentralization and eventual elimination of government, the extension of individualism, and advance by enlightenment rather than the use of force. Nationalism was strong also, and the radical groups resented the defeat and the treaty.

³² *The Communist Manifesto* was published in 1848.

Radicalism in Paris in 1871, therefore, was a composite of all of these ideas, each having some following among the masses of the population.⁸³

THE PARIS COMMUNE, 1871

The fear that the Assembly was monarchical and reactionary and the rage and despair over the terms of the peace aroused the radicals of Paris to revolt. The economic situation was serious, and the suffering of the people continued after the withdrawal of the German forces. The Assembly, which had at first met in Bordeaux, was suspicious of the loyalty of Paris and refused to entrust itself to a possibly revolutionary populace by returning to the capital when the war danger was over. Instead it moved to Versailles (March, 1871), the home of the Bourbon kings. From Versailles the Assembly issued two decrees which infuriated Paris: it declared the wartime moratorium on private debts at an end, and it cut off the pay of the National Guard and ordered it to surrender its arms. Faced with unemployment and destitution, Paris refused the demands and defied the Assembly. Troops were sent to seize the cannon in Paris, but they were repulsed, and Paris kept the cannon. The insurrection which followed was a civil war between the National Assembly and the Paris Commune. The name was taken from the French term for city, although, as a matter of fact, the Commune of 1871 was an attempt to establish a new government for all France.

The technique of the Commune and the ideas for government developed by the *Communards*, as the revolutionists were called, were studied carefully by Marxian socialists, who eventually came to feel that the Commune was the first attempt to put into effect their doctrines of the revolt and dictatorship of the proletariat. In that way the Commune became a part of the tradition of Marxianism and a lesson in revolution studied by Marxians the world over. The Bolshevik social revolution in 1917 bore certain evidences of similarity to the attempt which had failed in France nearly fifty years earlier. The Commune of 1871, however, was not socialistic. It was patriotic, proletarian, and republican. A General Committee of Communards acted

⁸³ E. S. Mason, *The Paris Commune*, gives an excellent analysis of French radicalism and is in many ways the best account, in English, of the Commune. E. L. Woodward, *French Revolutions*, has a brief essay on the Commune of 1871, while nearly all of the histories of the nineteenth century and of this period in France give it a chapter.

as an executive body and called elections for a new General Council of Paris. The conservative bourgeois sections of Paris either failed to vote, or their representatives withdrew in protest, and the Council was purely radical, although composed of diverse radical elements. The red flag was adopted, and many reforms were advocated. In effect, Paris seceded from France, for the Commune refused to recognize any of the acts of the Versailles Assembly. Fearing the numerical superiority of the peasantry, the Communards worked out a system of government for France which provided for complete decentralization of the government and the autonomy of each commune. They hoped by such a device to rob the bourgeoisie of peasant support and thus to make them subject to the control of the urban proletariat.

The Assembly was determined to subdue the revolt with force and without compromise. France as a whole was horrified at the thought of turning from defeat in a foreign war to the dissolution and disaster of civil conflict. The troops released by Germany after the agreement upon peace terms were added to the regular forces protecting the Assembly, and a new siege of Paris began in April, 1871. After six weeks the troops entered Paris (May 21), and a few days of terrific street fighting followed. Outnumbered and desperate, the Communards were guilty of atrocities, hostages were "executed," public buildings were burned, and the loss of life was very great. The June Days of 1848 and the Terror of the first revolution were exceeded in violence and frightfulness. Nor was the victorious national government less violent and excessive in its vengeance. All armed captives were shot without trial, thousands lost their lives, and other thousands, less fortunate, were arrested, tried, and deported to the faraway prison islands in the tropics. The extremists were too crushed to be of any importance in the early years of the Third Republic, but bitter memories remained to prevent reconciliation.

With the signing of the Treaty of Frankfurt and the suppression of the revolt, the National Assembly was free to begin the reconstruction of France. Thiers, the bourgeois monarchist, headed a government that was republican not from devotion to republican principles but, as he said, because it would divide France the least. The vigor with which Thiers had fought the forces of radicalism won confidence for the new regime among the middle and upper classes, and the speed with which the German indemnity was paid was evidence that confidence inspired peasants and propertied classes to buy bonds

giving them a stake in the republic.³⁴ Bonapartism had almost died out, and the Legitimist claimant to the throne was as intransigent as Charles X had been so that the monarchists were hopelessly divided. The Assembly was therefore unable to make any decision as to the ultimate form of government and hung on without a general election for several years. Finally the growing sentiment in favor of a republic was so convincingly expressed in by-elections and in the press that recognition could no longer be delayed. In 1875 a series of organic laws was passed which provided for a Chamber of Deputies elected by manhood suffrage, a Senate chosen by local bodies, and for a president selected by the legislature. With this half-hearted recognition of the republic the National Assembly came to an end as the year 1875 drew to a close. It was not, however, until 1879 that France had a government republican in all of its branches. Inaugurated thus slowly, the Third Republic has lasted for fifty years—a far longer time than any French government since the disappearance of the old monarchy in 1792.

READINGS

To the general accounts mentioned for previous chapters may be added *Realism and Nationalism, 1852-1871* (1935) by R. C. Binkley.

THE SECOND EMPIRE. Philip Guedalla's *The Second Empire* (1922) is extremely interesting and readable. F. A. Simpson's *Louis Napoleon and the Recovery of France* (1923) is a good account of the establishment of the Second Empire. The Treaty of Paris of 1856 is the subject of one of the sections of *Three Peace Conferences of the Nineteenth Century* (1917) by C. D. Hazen, W. R. Thayer, and R. H. Lord. The entanglement of Napoleon III in Mexico is interestingly told in E. C. Corti's *Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico* (1928). Material on the French and English interest in the American Civil War may be found in *King Cotton Diplomacy* (1931) by Frank Owsley and in E. D. Adams's *Great Britain and the American Civil War*, 2 vols. (1925). E. S. Mason's *The Paris Commune* (1930) is a penetrating study.

ITALY. For the unification of Italy reference must be made again to Bolton King's *History of Italian Unity* (1899). There are a number of lives of Cavour, none of them definitive: one of the oldest, by Countess

³⁴ Foreign banking houses aided in financing the loans Germany benefited little by the payment—in a two-year period—of the huge indemnity. Bismarck remarked, ironically, that the next time the Germans defeated France, he would see to it that Germany paid the indemnity.

(E. L. H.) Martinengo-Cesaresco (1898), is probably still the best in English. *The Political Life and Letters of Cavour, 1848-1861* (1930), by A. J. B. Whyte, is interesting. P. Orsi, *Cavour and the Making of Italy* (1923); M. Paleologue, *Cavour* (1927); and W. H. Thayer, *The Life and Times of Cavour*, 2 vols. (1911), are by authors of different nationalities and different points of view. There is an essay on Cavour in A. D. White's *Seven Great Statesmen* (1927). G. M. Trevelyan has written two volumes on Garibaldi, *Garibaldi and the Thousand* (1912) and *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy* (1912).

AUSTRIA AND GERMANY. *The Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria* (1929) by J. Redlich and *Elizabeth Empress of Austria* (1936) by E. C. Corti are excellent biographies. One of the best brief accounts of the unification of Germany is Munroe Smith's *Bismarck and German Unity* (New edition, 1923). W. H. Dawson's *Evolution of Modern Germany* (1914) is useful. C. G. Robertson's *Bismarck* (1919) and Emil Ludwig's *Bismarck* (1927) are both interesting but entirely different in approach. There is a very readable section on Bismarck in A. D. White's *Seven Great Statesmen* (1927). E. C. Corti's *Reign of the House of Rothschild* (1928) has valuable material for all of the great European countries for the period.

≡ XVIII ≡

A CENTURY OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

UNTIL the beginning of the nineteenth century Russia seemed almost apart from the affairs of the rest of Europe. Neither the efforts of Peter the Great nor those of the men and women who followed him upon the throne in the chaotic period of the middle of the eighteenth century had provided any solution for the problems that had made it impossible for Russia to assume an important place among the nation-states of Western Europe. Vast, feudal, and semi-Oriental in culture, Russia was foreign and an enigma to the peoples of other European states. In general, they paid little attention to things Russian unless some exceptional circumstance forced them into prominence.¹ Whether Russia was a European nation or a vague Asiatic domain was a matter of indifference to a large proportion of those who lived in Western Europe.

RUSSIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Toward the end of the eighteenth century Russia's persistent thrust westward brought her, with the acquisition of Polish territory, well into Central Europe, and she could no longer be ignored in the council chambers of European governments. From the Gulf of Finland southward to the Carpathian Mountains, territories such as Finland, Lithuania, and Poland, whose history had long been a part of Europe's heritage, were now Russian, and the European character of Russia's possessions was recognized. The political instability of Russia contributed to the delay in the establishment of her position as a European power. It was not until the opening of the nineteenth century that the principle of hereditary monarchy was fully accepted, and

¹ A rather striking reflection of such an attitude is the fact that a famous English historian, H. A. L. Fisher, has no chapter on Russia in his recently published history of Europe in the nineteenth century.

the chaos of palace revolution ceased.² Nor did the tsars have any adequate administrative machinery with which to make their government effective. The power of the feudal nobility remained strong, there was no well-trained bureaucracy, and there was no vigorous middle class from which to recruit a civil service. In theory, there was no law save the will of the tsar; in practice, there was confusion in every branch of administration. It was not until the reign of Catherine the Great (1762-1796) that an elaborate system of local government gave a somewhat clumsy order to the governmental institutions which controlled the life of the average citizen.

The cultural life of Russia before the nineteenth century bears marks of the same lack of integration and unity. Peter the Great and his successors had borrowed eagerly from the ideas and standards of Western Europe and had urged, or forced, foreign culture upon their subjects without regard to the limits of their powers of assimilation. A thin veneer of alien culture made the eighteenth-century educated Russian neither fish nor fowl—his culture had no roots in the soil of his own heritage and tradition, nor was he completely at home in an alien atmosphere. In the nineteenth century Russian cultural life came into its own, in a "golden age" of achievement in which Russia contributed her full share to the civilization of modern Europe. In music, in art, in literature, and in science the contributions of Russia took their place with the best that Western Europe could produce. It is sufficient to mention but a few of the best known of Russia's men of genius to prove her claims to participation in Europe's cultural progress: Tschaikovsky, Borodin, and Moussorgsky in music, and Tolstoy, Pushkin, Chekhov, Dostoevski, and Turgenev in literature were striking evidence of the flowering of a genuinely Russian cultural life.

Until the nineteenth century Russia had no security in the possession of her frontiers. After 1800 the situation was definitely eased, and Russia was no longer on the defensive. Her long rivalry with Sweden and Poland on the west had ended in the surrender of Swedish claims to dominance in the eastern Baltic and in the extinction of Poland as an independent state. Turkey, long a menace to Russian expansion southward, was dangerous in the nineteenth century only when backed by other powers that feared the aggrandizement of Russia. In Asia the century was an era of the steady advance of Russia's

² The Law of Succession to the Throne (1797) was the first legal basis for the empire.

frontiers, and her share in the imperialistic activities of modern Europe lay to the east

The backwardness of Russia's economic life long cut her off from the rest of Europe. During the days of Peter the Great and his successors Russia's trade had developed through the agency of foreign traders and middlemen. Russia was slow in developing a middle class of sufficient size and energy to exploit Russian resources or develop Russian industries. The bulk of the populace was agricultural, a servile and ignorant peasantry, exploited by the landowning nobility and living on a subsistence level. With the nineteenth century came the awakening of the Russian people to the conditions of modern life. Industrial capitalism accelerated Russia's economic development, and in its train came the changes in social structure that brought Russia more into harmony with Western Europe, changes which led to demands for alteration in the governmental structure. Nineteenth-century liberalism was to be contorted into strange shapes in autocratic Russia, for the heritage of the past was to color all of Russia's political history.

RUSSIAN PROBLEMS

In brief, nineteenth-century Russia³ was imperial and autocratic, with church and nobility dependent upon the crown. Russian culture was highly developed and distinctively original, but economic development was slow, and the common people were backward and oppressed. Russia was, however, a European state, and the bonds, economic and cultural as well as political, that held her to the West grew stronger and tighter as the modern world became more closely knit and interdependent. It is equally true, however, that Russia, both in Europe and in Asia, continued to be different from Western Europe and that her problems, even when called by the same names, had little in common with those of other countries.

No other country had quite the same problem of vast distances

³ The little volume of Michael Karpovich entitled *Imperial Russia, 1801-1917* is valuable to students. S. T. Platonov, *History of Russia*, is perhaps the best one-volume account of Russian history for general use. Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, is more recent and more detailed. C. R. Beazley, N. Forbes, and G. A. Birkett, *Russia from the Varangians to the Bolsheviks*, is brief and useful. George Vernadsky, *Political and Diplomatic History of Russia* and his *History of Russia* are recent and scholarly. M. N. Pokrovsky, a former assistant commissar of education in the Soviet government, has written a *Brief History of Russia* which is a Marxian interpretation of events from the earliest days to the Bolshevik Revolution.

which separated one part of the empire from another. The distance from the western capital, St. Petersburg, to the Pacific port of Vladivostok on the east is staggering even today, and Russia's slowness of economic development made the problem of communication and control very difficult through much of the nineteenth century. Paved highways began to appear in the West after 1830, but progress in their construction was very slow. In 1867 there were less than thirty-five hundred miles of railroad in all the Russian empire; the famous trans-Siberian road was not completed until the twentieth century.

The problem of nationalities in Russia was as complex as in any other European country, even if the Asiatic problems are excluded from consideration. The Great Russians, whose old capital was Moscow, furnished a large homogeneous nucleus. The Ukrainians and White Russians on the Western borders added large blocs of Russian stock with which there was very little difficulty.⁴ The problems of governing the Poles, Lithuanians, and Finns were much more serious. Race, religion, and tradition were different, and the centuries of independent existence had given these groups a sense of nationality that could never be eradicated. In addition they were in many ways more advanced culturally and economically than the Russians who were their masters. The thinly populated Asiatic areas of the empire were the home of a heterogeneous collection of peoples and tribes whose contacts with the West were of the slightest.

The government which covered these far-flung territories and diverse peoples was an autocracy, in large part deliberately modeled upon Hohenzollern or Hapsburg patterns. The old feudal control of nobility and church had been gradually thrown off, and there was in theory little to differentiate the Russian from the Prussian or Austrian governments. After Peter the Great the Russian nobility (boyars) had been subjected more closely to the tsar's authority and had lost the right to participate in the government. In the same period the church became an agent of the state and derived its power from the willingness of the autocracy to leave certain matters in its control. The spiritual affinity between the Russian tsars and the Metternich system was an evidence of the common basis of autocracy. Russia differed from the norm of Western states in that her problems of economic backwardness and unwieldy size made it difficult for her to build up

⁴ In 1914 there were over 120,000,000 in the three Russian groups out of a total population of about 186,000,000

an efficient bureaucracy to carry on the work of government. The similarity between them was more pronounced in concept than it was in practice.

Throughout the nineteenth century there were two easily discernible trends in Russian opinion and in Russian policy. The desire to identify Russian development with that of the rest of Europe and to stress the European character of Russia was of great importance. This emphasis upon Europe led to an acceptance of foreign influence in economic and cultural life, to increasing governmental contacts with Europe, and to a desire to "modernize" many phases of Russian life. The other trend, diametrically opposed to the first, was to emphasize the distinction between Russia and Western Europe and to stress the Slavic rather than the European nature of the Russian people. This Slavophil movement was of great importance culturally, and became of concern to Europe as a whole when the Slavophiles became Pan-Slavs who wished to defend the cause of Slavdom outside Russia. At times of crisis the defense of "brother" Slavs under Turkish or Austrian domination was a decidedly complicating factor in European diplomatic relationships. The two trends in Russian allegiance and policy were present simultaneously through the century but were, in general, dominant alternately. There were long periods in which Slavophilism seemed dormant, and others in which it was very much alive.

THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER I

The reign of Alexander I (1801-1825) opened the nineteenth century. More than half of the reign was, of necessity, concerned with the effects upon Russia of the career of Napoleon I.⁵ The tsar played a prominent part in European affairs, and the Russian campaign was recognized as contributing much to the downfall of Europe's dictator. Alexander I was, in his youth, very much affected by the "Enlightenment" which had brought the teachings of the French philosophes into Russia during the reign of Catherine the Great. He played for many years with the idea of a constitution for Russia, but always let it drop before anything was accomplished. He did, however, insist, in 1814, that the Bourbon king grant a constitutional charter upon returning to France, and the French had the tsar to thank for the mildness of the terms which were given them when the Napoleonic

⁵ See Chapters XIII and XIV.

Wars came to an end.⁶ A year later, upon becoming king of Poland, Alexander I provided a constitution for the Poles which was very liberal for that era, and his influence was exerted in Vienna in behalf of constitutions for the German states.

During the years from 1789 to 1815 there had grown up in Russia a large group of liberals who considered the young tsar their leader. They were recruited largely from the nobility and gentry, for Russia's middle class was small and unimportant. Their attack upon the existing order was broad and bold, for they wished to bring about the end of autocracy, of serfdom, and of inequality and privilege. The nobility were exempt from personal taxation, from compulsory military service, and from corporal punishment by a charter of Catherine the Great withdrawn by Paul I and restored by Alexander I. The Russian nobility had no political power, nor was it a real obstacle to autocracy. The middle class had many of the privileges of the nobility but no great political power or cultural influence. The demands of the liberals went far beyond the tsar's complex mixture of liberalism and autocracy which did not envisage any limitation on the power of the ruler. Alexander's readiness to subscribe to Metternich's principles after 1820 was an evidence of his natural revulsion from demands that were in excess of his quite sincere, if somewhat vague and mystical, ideas in regard to constitutionalism.

The repressive policies of the latter years of the reign were put into force by a rude and dictatorial minister, Count Arakcheev, who was hated throughout Russia. He established "military colonies" in which peasant soldiers were forced to train for military service and provide their own sustenance from the land allotted to them. Military service was made hereditary in the "colonies," discipline was severe, and living standards were on a very low level. Under Arakcheev civil administration was also very oppressive. There had been considerable expansion of educational facilities in the early years of the reign with the establishment of schools patterned after the German *Gymnasien*, and of universities. When the liberal period came to an end, these, as well as other institutions, were carefully supervised in order to stamp out "false reasoning" and "free thinking." In effect, the Carlsbad decrees were thus applied to Russia. Under Nicholas I (1825-1855) the restrictive policies were retained and elaborated. The lower classes

⁶ The diary of the Duc de Caulaincourt, Vol. II.

were excluded from higher educational institutions, and for the rest freedom of thought was suppressed in a "frozen Russia."

There was, however, some progress along lines of governmental administration during Alexander's reign. "Ministries" were established in 1811 (by a law which defined their functions and set up new ones) to take care of the regular departments of government, such as war, navy, justice, and foreign affairs. The ministers were responsible to the tsar for the conduct of their offices. A permanent Council was set up to direct policies and to act in close contact with the tsar. An able and well-informed adviser, Michael Speranski, worked out a comprehensive plan for governmental reforms and for the codification of the laws along lines of the Napoleonic code, but Alexander became alarmed and dismissed him. In the following reign he was recalled and permitted to publish in 1833 a systematic law code based, however, upon Russian tradition and representing no new principles. Slavophil influence was strong in the reign of Nicholas I, and foreign ideas were anathema. The administrative system worked out, and the codes drawn up, in this period were far from perfect, but they indicated a definite modernization. After these changes they persisted with very little modification throughout the century.

Finances were in the utmost confusion during the reign of Alexander I, but in the next reign the currency was stabilized, bonds were sold to take care of the debt, and a government bank was established. After these reforms, business improved, and it was possible for Russia to enter upon the long process of developing her resources and industries. The increase in urban population and the expansion of trade led to agricultural changes. Production of surpluses for distant trading changed the whole problem of agricultural labor, so that serfdom seemed antiquated and economically unsound. In the central regions—the so-called "black soil" areas—it was found that agriculture could be very profitable with the introduction of more modern methods, while in the northern regions, where the soil was less rich, landowners began to find profit in transferring their serfs from the soil to factories established on their estates. There was very little free labor in Russia, and the growth of industrial capitalism could not fail to undermine the whole system of labor based upon medieval serfdom. The government was fully aware that some change must be made both because of economic needs and because of the growing moral protest against a bondage that was little different from the most degrading

slavery.⁷ There were so many peasant revolts during the first half of the century that the most elementary regard for order made reform imperative. Both tsars contemplated the liberation of the serfs, secret committees discussed the matter at length, but no decisive action was taken, for the vested interests were so strong that even autocracy hesitated to overturn the existing order. Decrees were published empowering the landlords to free their serfs and to provide them with land, but the response was negligible. Some reforms were made in regard to the treatment of the serfs, and a few serfs were emancipated or bought their freedom. The sum total of improvement in the first sixty years of the century was very slight.⁸

THE ACCESSION OF NICHOLAS I

The liberal nobles, who had been encouraged by the early reforms of Alexander I, were disappointed by the period of reaction which followed. When political outlet was denied them, they had recourse to secret societies of a Masonic character which worked underground for constitutional reform. In 1818 a Union, or Society, of Welfare, first organized in 1816 as the Union of Salvation, divided into a northern and a southern section and worked for revolutionary changes. Although their meetings were secret, all their plans were known to the government, which was on the point of suppressing the whole organization when Alexander I died suddenly in southern Russia. His brother Constantine, the commander in chief in Poland and next in line for the succession, had renounced the throne two years before, for he had no desire to reign. Alexander had made another brother, Nicholas, his heir, and papers to that effect had been deposited in Moscow and in St. Petersburg. The whole affair, however, was shrouded in secrecy, and Nicholas himself was not convinced that he should take the throne. In the general confusion in the capital when news arrived that Alexander had died, Constantine was proclaimed emperor, and Nicholas took an oath of allegiance to him. In faraway Warsaw, Con-

⁷ See M. N. Pokrovsky, *Brief History of Russia*, Vol. I, pp. 118 ff, for a discussion of "The Serfowner's State" in which the blackest side of the situation is exposed. N. V. Tchernikov, in his *Glimpses of High Politics*, describes his childhood on his ancestral estates and presents a much more pleasant picture. Prince Peter Kropotkin, *The Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, describes his early life as a landowner under Alexander II.

⁸ It must not be forgotten, however, that those sixty years were the period of the anti-slavery agitation in the United States, where emancipation was finally made possible only through a terrible civil war.

stantine had, in the meantime, sworn allegiance to the Tsar Nicholas. Apparently neither brother was anxious to ascend the throne, but when a letter was received from Constantine reiterating his refusal, Nicholas assumed power, in December, 1825, and issued a proclamation calling upon all citizens to take the prescribed oath of allegiance. This was the opportunity for the revolutionary groups in the Northern Union, and a number of soldiers and sailors refused to obey the order, shouting, "Hurrah for Constantine and the Constitution."⁹ The movement was badly organized, the leaders failed to appear at the critical moment, and there were far too few men willing to revolt to accomplish anything. The authorities had no difficulty in dispersing the crowd, although an ill-advised order to fire upon the rioters was the cause of some loss of life. Ineffectual as their efforts had been, these "Decembrists" came to be regarded as the defenders of freedom and the first to assail Russian autocracy.

This attempt at revolution had a great effect upon the tsar, who personally conducted the investigation which followed it. A few of the leaders were sentenced to death and many were exiled to Siberia. From the beginning to the end of the reign there was no relaxation of autocratic rule, nor was any opportunity given for the expression of demands for political reforms. Nicholas was indefatigable in the work of government and took a greater personal share in administration than his predecessors had done. "His Majesty's Own Chancery" became one of the main divisions of the government. From it royal agents were sent to all parts of Russia to oversee local officials. But even the most repressive measures for the control of public opinion could not prevent a desire for reform and intense interest in the world-wide movements of the day.

THE DESIRE FOR REFORM IN RUSSIA

The new middle class, which arose as industrial capitalism became more developed, demanded, and eventually acquired, the right to an education. A new intelligentsia was thus created which was closely in touch with the younger members of the liberal nobility, but, denied political expression, both elements devoted themselves to debating philosophical and ethical problems. They were idealistic and visionary; some of them advocating the adoption of Western ideas,

⁹ There is an old anecdote that the simple soldiers, who had been instructed to utter these words, thought that "Constitution" was the wife of Constantine.

others entirely Slavophil, but all anxious for the abolition of serfdom and the inauguration of liberal regime.

Socialist thought introduced into Russia in this period followed the teachings of Saint-Simon and Fourier. A few courageous souls began to advocate revolution and the establishment of a socialist state whose basis would be the rural communal organization of Russia.¹⁰ The secret police were soon aware of the new ideas, and their expression was suppressed. Imprisonment or exile were the fate of their adherents. Alexander Herzen, the outstanding leader of this early socialist movement, escaped to London and directed the "Young Russia" movement from exile. Marxian socialism made no headway in Russia until the greater industrialization of the latter part of the century created an urban proletariat.

The autocracy of the government was shown nowhere more clearly than in its policy toward the western provinces that had been somewhat recently added to the empire. The Poles resented Russian rule and had from the beginning been dissatisfied with the constitution granted them in 1815 by Alexander I. The fact that it was, for its day, a liberal charter and that they had a larger measure of self-government than any other part of the empire did not prevent bitter complaint. Some of the recalcitrant Poles wanted a republic; others advocated reforms and a revision of the constitution; both groups were revolutionary in their tactics, and both disliked the Grand Duke Constantine in whose hands control had been placed. There was an open revolt after the success of the July Revolution in France, and when Nicholas I refused to grant the Polish demands for virtual independence, war broke out. The revolution was ruthlessly suppressed. The constitution was revoked, the Diet abolished, and the Polish army disbanded. Polish universities were closed, and a deliberate policy of Russification was inaugurated. An "Organic Statute" of 1832 provided for the government of Poland as a province of Russia. Russian was made the official language, Russians were given Polish land, and there was little evidence that Poland had ever been autonomous.

The revolution of 1830 had spread to Lithuania and West Russia, where Polish influence had always been strong. After the suppression of the revolts, a policy of Russification was undertaken here also. Lands confiscated from the leaders of the revolt were given to Rus-

¹⁰ See below, page 592

sians; children were taught the Russian language; and a Russian university was opened at Kiev. The Finns and the Baltic Germans were more successful in retaining some measure of control over their local governments until late in the century. Bessarabia, acquired under Alexander I, and the Asiatic provinces had been governed from the first from St. Petersburg.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE CENTURY

The principal problem of Russia's foreign relations in the early years of the century was the struggle with Napoleon. The story of Russia's part in the downfall of Napoleon has already been told. As the sun set upon Napoleon, the tsar was, briefly, the outstanding figure in Europe. "He was the soul of the European coalition against Napoleon, and the chief manager of all military activities."¹¹ The work of Talleyrand and Metternich at Vienna served to restore the European balance in a large degree, and Alexander played a smaller part in the years which followed.¹² It was upon a liberal concept of his own that the tsar had based his fight against Napoleon and the principles of the French Revolution—the federation of the national states of the world in a union devoted to peace and Christian ideals. The reluctant adherence of the European powers to a decidedly weakened version of his plan, the Holy Alliance, was the sole result of Alexander's vision. Russia participated in the Congresses from 1818 to 1822, and the fear of revolution, such as those occurring in Spain and Italy, drove the erstwhile liberal tsar to accept the policies of Metternich.

The Congress system, already weakened by the defection of England, broke down when it came to the question of the revolution in Greece. There Russia's long enmity for Turkey forced the tsar¹³ into the position of supporting a revolutionary movement against a sovereign power. With the collaboration of England and France, Russia gave aid to the Greeks in their struggle for independence, and rejoiced in the defeat of Turkey. The participation of Russia in the war for Greek independence was a part of the continued and consistent Russian policy of aggression against Turkey. The Russo-Turkish War

¹¹ G. Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, p. 134.

¹² See above, Chapters XIII and XIV.

¹³ Alexander I held aloof, but, after his death, Nicholas I came into the Greco-Turkish War.

earlier in the century had secured for Russia the valuable province of Bessarabia (1812) and a foothold on the Danube. The near-by Danubian provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia were of especial interest to Russia, and in the treaty of 1830 Russian insistence secured for them autonomous status under Turkish suzerainty. In the same treaty Russia secured the right to protect the Orthodox Greek Catholics in the Turkish Empire. A few years later Russian influence in Turkey was evidenced by an agreement whereby Turkey agreed to close the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to the war vessels of all foreign nations. As the reign of Nicholas I advanced, however, France and England did all that they could to weaken Russian influence in Turkey and to prevent any Russian advance in the neighborhood of the straits. The climax of this anti-Russian movement was the Crimean War (1854-1856) which disclosed the weakness of Russia both in military and economic fields. The war marked the end of the reign as well as a temporary rebuff for Russia's ambitions in the Near East. The Crimean War brought into prominence, also, the nascent rivalry of Austria and Russia in the Balkans, for, although deeply in debt to Russia for aid in suppressing the revolution in Hungary some years before, Austria now refused assistance and was indirectly the chief power to gain by Russia's loss of prestige. Russia lost part of Bessarabia and the right to maintain a fleet on the Black Sea. Turkey closed the straits to the military vessels of all nations, and Russia lost the right of exclusive protection over the orthodox subjects of Turkey.

THE REFORMS OF ALEXANDER II

Within Russia the Crimean War was accepted as the end of the old era and the beginning of a new regime in which far-reaching changes must be made. Although he was no reformer by nature, Alexander II (1855-1881) realized that upon him rested the responsibility for taking the steps necessary to bring Russia into line with nineteenth-century developments in the rest of Europe. The new tsar had been well trained for his position and had been associated with his father in the work of conducting the government during the last years of the reign. Fundamentally, his devotion to absolutism was as great as that of Nicholas, but he was more tolerant, more adaptable, and better acquainted both with the institutions of other countries and with the strength of the Russian demand for reform. He had shared his father's dismay over the bad showing made by Russian industry,

transportation facilities, and military organization during the war. The dishonesty and inefficiency of the bureaucracy had been glaringly apparent. Even the most autocratic of tsars could but admit that the policy of "freezing" Russia had outlived its usefulness and that thoroughgoing reforms must be the work of any ruler with pretensions to enlightenment.

The first act of Alexander II was the relaxation of the restrictions upon travel and upon the freedom of speech and press. New newspapers and reviews appeared whose chief purpose was to criticize the government and to demand reforms. The doors of the universities were opened to many who had before been excluded, and the careful censorship of instruction was abandoned. The critical and democratic nature of the Russian universities throughout the rest of the century dated from this period. Students were stimulated to take a part in politics, and their voices swelled the demand for reforms.

All the reformers had long been agreed that serfdom must be abolished.¹⁴ No political reform was involved in this step, but it was a social and economic issue of major importance. The whole question of the modernization of Russian agriculture and the development of Russian industry depended upon it. Alexander faced the problem with courage and with considerable insight into a very complex situation. It was felt that it would be futile to emancipate the serfs without land, and yet it was equally apparent that to free them with land made necessary the compensation of the owners of the land. The problem was entirely different in the north, where the soil was poor and the landlords had eked out their income by the wages of their serfs in industry. The value of the land was small, and payment for it would fail to compensate the master for the loss of the serf's labor. In the "black soil" areas, the large peasant population must be granted adequate land or it would starve, but the landowners were reluctant to part with their fertile farmlands.

Alexander II was convinced that the reluctant gentry must work out some sort of flexible plan by which emancipation could be effected with due regard to the problems of the various regions. From 1857 to 1861 a number of committees worked upon the problem, the tsar made it very evident that the abolition of serfdom was his "direct will," and in 1858 he freed the serfs on the royal appanages. A scheme was finally adopted which was incorporated in an edict issued by the

¹⁴ Serfdom had been abolished in the Baltic provinces in 1816-1819.

autocrat in March, 1861. The basic principles of the edict were as follows: Serfdom was abolished without compensation to the landlords; household serfs were to be freed but were to receive nothing on gaining their freedom; the land was recognized as belonging to the landlords, but it was understood that the peasant-serf was to have the use of his house and garden and a share in the so-called "field portion." For this land compensation must be made. The peasants might buy the land and thus become peasant proprietors. It was obviously impossible for many peasants to make any such arrangement. Generally speaking, the peasants kept the lands they had used as serfs, and the state paid the landowners at once, requiring the peasants to repay the full amount in a series of annual payments over a period of forty-nine years.

The emancipation of forty millions serfs was a reform of tremendous significance, and an appreciative world gave Alexander II the title of the Tsar-Emancipator and coupled his name with that of Abraham Lincoln. Russian emancipation (completed about 1866), like the American one, was followed by a period of reconstruction and created new economic and social problems which were long to defy solution. Slaves were emancipated in the United States without compensation to their owners but also without land. The hoped-for "forty acres and a mule" did not materialize, and the negro was left to make whatever arrangements he could in the new South. The Russian serf was freed on somewhat better terms, but he, too, found disadvantages in his new state. In general, the amount of land granted was too small and the price was too high. Under the old regime the peasant lands had absorbed only about half their labor, the rest had been expended on the lands of the gentry. The peasant allotments of 1861, therefore, were too small to support the peasant population, nor did they allow for any growth of that population. Many peasants became agricultural laborers in districts of good soil, or, where agricultural conditions were less attractive, they went into the industrial towns to find work. A greater grievance than the paucity of the land ceded was the fact that individual peasants did not become the owners of the land. The allotments were made to the village communities, or "mirs," whose members were responsible for the payments to the state and for the subdivision of the land to the peasant population. The nearest counterpart for the Russian mir in the history of Western Europe is the medieval manor, where somewhat the same arrangements existed. These communes, composed of ignorant peasants, thus controlled the

use of the land and made all arrangements for its cultivation, which became a common enterprise. The responsibility was too great, and agricultural progress was retarded as peasant discontent grew.

Although the peasant was no longer a serf, emancipation had not made him the equal of other citizens. He was set apart by law from the rest of the population, his rights were severely restricted, and his village was under close governmental control. The old customary law of the days of serfdom still regulated his property rights, and the modern codes did not apply to him. He alone of all the population was still subject to corporal punishment. Every effort was made to keep him on the soil, segregated from the rest of Russian citizens. In the years after emancipation the Russian peasant became land-hungry and dissatisfied with the bargain made in his behalf in 1861 by landlord and tsar.

Emancipation meant, however, that the village commune became a sort of unit for local government and that the old arbitrary power of the gentry over the local units was gone. This change was evidenced in a thorough reorganization of local government. In 1864 the "zemstvos" were established to give Russia, for the first time, local self-government without class distinctions, although the franchise was unequal and the nobility still held the most prominent place. Landlords, peasant communes, and urban population elected representatives to district zemstvos to which was given control over schools, roads, and medical affairs. The zemstvo elected an executive committee, or permanent board of supervisors, and it sent representatives to a provincial zemstvo which elected its own board to supervise matters of public welfare in the province. The zemstvos were not in any way legislative bodies, but they were allowed to levy taxes for local purposes. Through the rest of the century the zemstvos were a training ground in self-government, and from them came demands for further reforms that would bring legislation and policy-making into the control of representative bodies.

The judicial reforms (1864) were of almost equal importance. Court procedure was improved; trials were made public; the jury system was introduced; and the principle of equality before the law was recognized. Lawyers were organized into a formal bar. Judges were made irremovable and adequately paid for their services. After 1864 the Russian court system was comparable to that of progressive Western countries. As the century progressed, however, trials for political offenses came to be considered as outside the province of the regular

courts, and the famous "third section" of the police had methods of its own that were quite different from the usual procedure.

The last of the major reforms was the reorganization of the military forces of 1874. Universal military service was introduced. Prior to that time conscription had been exercised only upon the lower classes, and the term of service had been unbearably long. The new law made all citizens subject to a term of service shortened from twenty-five years to six.¹⁵ Training was reorganized, soldiers were much better treated, and an effort was made to educate them while in service.

All of these reforms tended to remove the old class distinctions and to break down the old power of the nobility. In the succeeding years the increasing industrialization continued this process. A middle class developed, education made headway, and, for the first time, Russia had a large number of professional men of standing and influence. This new intelligentsia took upon itself the responsibility for securing further reform and for organizing opposition to the government. Many of the nobility squandered the sums allotted them by the government and were unable to adjust themselves to the new conditions that faced agriculture after emancipation. They fell into debt and were forced to sell their lands to the wealthy members of the middle class. Society was becoming democratized far more rapidly than the government.

THE END OF THE PERIOD OF REFORM

Since the reforms had been undertaken by the tsar as matters of administrative necessity and not as any forerunner to political reform, the ideas of the intelligentsia were coldly received by the government. In fact, in their application, the government reform measures were distorted and partially nullified. The Poles, quiet since the suppression of their revolt in 1831, demanded the reforms granted in Russia. When their demands were refused, they revolted again in 1863, only to be once more relentlessly suppressed. The tsar was shocked by the revolution and from that time this and other factors seem to have caused him to feel that reform had gone far enough. The partial freedom of the press was the signal for a flood of publications calling for reform. In 1866, a young communist student of unbalanced mind

¹⁵ Shortened still more for educated persons

attempted to assassinate the tsar. From that time on the government suspected students of radical and dangerous ideas. A growing reaction was manifested toward both the press and education. Penalties were inflicted upon the editors of all publications which opposed the government, and a series of measures (1868-1874) practically re-established an effective censorship. Strange measures were used to bring education under the control of the reactionary government, whose object was to limit the spread of education, to control its scope, and to prevent further advancement of the middle-class intelligentsia.

The minister of education insisted on emphasis upon the classical studies and Slavonic philology. He excluded the natural sciences, history, and geography from the curriculum of the *Gymnasien*, increased the hours devoted to Greek and Latin, and greatly reduced the amount of time allotted to the study of modern languages. All of these measures tended to exclude from the institutions of higher learning those students who belonged to the lower classes, for only the children of the nobility had either the tradition or the opportunity which might make it possible for them to have had the elementary work in the classics which was required for admission to the *Gymnasien*. Higher education for women was not encouraged, and technical schools were restricted in many ways. Government inspectors were appointed to supervise all schools, to control the appointment of teachers, and to keep an eye on student activities. Only the zemstvo schools were somewhat outside this rigorous system and managed with great difficulty to continue on a more liberal course.

At the same time the reactionaries did all in their power to prevent further reform and to hamper institutions established by the earlier reforms. The municipal government act of 1870 was a very poor measure as compared with the earlier zemstvo act, but after 1870 by being deprived of funds for their public welfare work the zemstvos were so restricted in their activities that many of their ablest administrators resigned. The judicial reform was stultified by the appointment of illiberal officials in 1874, and political cases were withdrawn from the regular courts.

The plight of the peasants was one matter which engaged the attention of reactionaries and liberals alike. Emancipation had obviously failed to solve either the agrarian problem or the labor question. The redemption dues were heavy; of the 208,000,000 rubles of direct tax, the peasants paid all but 13,000,000, and they were the only class to pay the poll tax. Russia was increasing her wheat exports because

of the great growth in urban populations in Western Europe, prices and rents were rising, and peasant distress was great. Famines because of crop failures in several districts in the early 1870's added to that distress, and the intelligentsia set itself to examine and to expose its causes.

THE TREND TOWARD REVOLUTION

This new intelligentsia was made up of two groups: one plebeian in origin, realistic, inclined to be Marxian, and conscious of class loyalties; the other of noble origin, idealistic, convinced of the iniquities of the upper classes, and inclined toward the anarchism of Bakunin. In the period of reaction two movements were the outcome of the protest groups. "Nihilism" was a revolt against traditional authority and an assertion that nothing was sacred or to be accepted unless it could stand rational criticism. "Populism" was an attempt to find a solution for the social problem. It meant that the intelligentsia must serve the people and repay the debt owed to the oppressed. Both groups were deeply conscious of responsibility toward the peasantry and eagerly listened to the teachings of the socialist, Herzen, who urged that the students go back to the people, "This is your place, exiles of knowledge, soldiers of the Russian people." Other reformers added their persuasion; some believed that the goal might be reached through education, others—like Bakunin—preached terrorism and revolutionary anarchism. Bakunin was a collectivist in his economic thought, and the violence he advocated had a philosophical basis. He attacked the state, the church, and the family. The effect was both propaganda and insurrection. Students held secret night classes in factory districts and circulated radical literature. They established secret depositories for books and pamphlets in the country districts. Translations of the books of Karl Marx were circulated as well as copies of all that Bakunin wrote. The fundamental conflict between a socialism based upon the theory of the capture of the machinery of the state by the workers and an anarchism based upon the theory of the destruction of the state and the substitution of many independent free communities was not of immediate consequence. Both advocated revolution and the abolition of the reactionary regime. Even the liberals, the summit of whose desire was a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary government, could work with the radicals in attacking the tsarist regime.

These missionaries to the peasants and laborers, called *Narodniki* ("men of the people"), attracted a large following among young men and women, especially in the universities. By 1875 there were groups in almost every province, and in 1879 a great *Narodnaya Volya* society was formed with several thousand members, whose meetings were held in secret. The real headquarters had to be abroad, where most of the work of publication was done. The police were not inactive; of the thousands arrested many served prison sentences, and others were sent to Siberia. More democratic countries became the asylum for many who preferred exile to arrest and certain punishment. In general, the work of the *Narodniki* in arousing widespread desire for change was a success. Some of their members were men of tremendous intellectual ability and moral force. Lenin, for instance, found in the movement his first opportunity to work for reform. Others, of course, were men of inferior ability whose minds were unbalanced by the incendiary doctrines with which they were filled. Fear, secrecy, and oppression made all effort for reform take on the nature of revolutionary conspiracy. Assassination and terrorism were the natural weapons of those who were denied any opportunity for legal activity.

Throughout the later decades of the nineteenth century the tsars and the Russian government in general seemed unable to realize the wisdom of combating radicalism with reform. Terrorism was countered by more stringent police measures and more drastic punishment. There were peasant revolts, jail-deliveries, huge strikes, and assassinations. Attempts were made on the life of the emperor in 1866, 1879, and 1880. The government was at last thoroughly alarmed and endeavored to stop the wave of terrorism by the completion of the reforms begun early in the reign. The minister of the interior, Loris-Melikov, was wise enough to see that some of the demands of the liberal groups must be granted, and he planned a meeting of representatives of the various public bodies to consider the problem of reform. It was too late, for in March, 1881, the Nihilists were at last successful in their efforts to assassinate the tsar.

ALEXANDER III AND REPRESSION

The accession of Alexander III (1881-1894) was a triumph for the reactionaries, for the new tsar had consistently advised repression instead of concession. One of his first proclamations as tsar promised that he would "strengthen and guard the autocracy from any possible

encroachments." There was no deviation from this policy during the thirteen years of the reign, and the tsar bequeathed it to his son, Nicholas II (1894-1917) who departed from it only with the gravest misgivings. The details of the reaction were the work of Constantin Pobyedonostsev, who had been a professor of civil law and the tutor of Alexander III. He was made Procurator of the Holy Synod,¹⁶ and from that strategic position he led the attack upon the freedom of the press, upon the idea of the separation of church and state, and upon universal education. From his complete philosophy of reaction he developed the theoretical basis for the autocratic state. Through his influence the censorship was stiffened, the zemstvos were made more conservative, the nobles were given more power, and religious orthodoxy was pressed. "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationalism," was an old Russian formula, revived by the Pobyedonostsev regime. The minister of the interior, von Plehve, was an equally resourceful supporter of autocracy. His policy, called "thorough," was one of repression of all opposition. Spies, the secret police, and the Cossack troops were employed to stifle revolt.

Nationalism was perverted to cover a multitude of sins and used as a red herring to confuse the issue of liberalism versus reaction. There was an intensification of the process of Russifying the Poles, and the same practices were extended to the Finns, who had been somewhat exempt in the previous reign. The chief victims of the policy, however, were the Jews. These unfortunates had long been forced to live in restricted areas known as the Jewish "pales." In this period these areas were reduced in size. The civil liberties of the Jews were restricted, their children were discriminated against in the matter of education, and the race was accused of plotting against the government. The policy was continued in the next reign, and upon occasion "pogroms," or anti-Jewish riots, were permitted or even encouraged by the police to prevent revolutionary demonstrations and to justify the presence of armed forces.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA

During the latter part of the nineteenth century Russia made great advance along technical and industrial lines. Industrialization

¹⁶ Government official in charge of the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. The office was established by Peter the Great; see Chapter VIII.

came slowly to Russia, and the vast size of the Russian state, coupled with the backwardness of its largely agricultural population, deterred progress. After 1880, however, there was extensive railroad building, for the most part by state enterprise. The financial difficulties of the government were straightened out, the currency was stabilized, banking and credit facilities were developed, and in 1897 Russia was at last able to establish the gold standard. The metallurgical industries were stimulated, and much progress was made in the manufacture of textiles. In 1899 Russia was third in the list of European pig-iron producers and was exceeded only by England and Germany. In the decade between 1887 and 1897 the number of workmen in Russian industry was increased by about 750,000, and the value of the production of manufactured goods was increased by about 1,500,000 rubles. Protective tariffs, government subsidies, joint-stock companies, and other evidences of the relationship between modern business and the state became of importance in Russia for the first time. The man most responsible for this development was Sergius Witte, the minister of finance from 1892 to 1903. Under Witte economic progress became a policy of the state and the "modernization" of Russia an objective of the government.

The development of industry led directly to the growth of an urban proletariat and to the appearance of the accompanying social and economic problems of the modern age. The conditions under which Russian men, women, and children worked in the latter years of the nineteenth century were as bad, or worse, than those prevalent in Western Europe a century earlier.¹⁷ The backwardness of Russia, which had prevented the early development of a liberal middle class and had preserved the brutality characteristic of the relationship of master and servile classes, was the cause for a more complete disregard for the rights of labor than could be found elsewhere in Europe. It also accounted for the slowness of Russian labor to organize¹⁸ and for the sporadic nature of the strikes, which were usually unsuccessful. In the last years of the nineteenth century the government began a modest program of labor legislation by limiting the hours of labor and establishing factory inspection. In the

¹⁷ See M. N. Pokrovsky, *Brief History of Russia*, Vol. I, p. 200 ff., "The Working-class Movement," for a detailed description of working conditions and the growth of labor organization and socialism.

¹⁸ Trade unions were illegal until 1902

face of the opposition of employers and the lack of strong public opinion very little was accomplished to ease the lot of the urban laborers.

SOCIALISM IN RUSSIA

The existence of a proletariat, however, meant the introduction of Marxian socialism. The *Narodniki* had looked upon the worker only as a peasant in a different setting; the Marxian regarded him as the tool which would overthrow tsarism and establish the dictatorship of the class to which he belonged. In the early 'eighties the first Marxian groups were organized, and within a few years most of the young radicals were Marxians. The reformers who refused to accept Marxian doctrines became known as Liberals or Constitutionalists, and were considered to be distinctly bourgeois in their ideas. The Nihilists were of increasingly less importance as socialism grew. The left-wing reform element formed a political group called the Social Democratic party whose ultimate aim was to establish the control of the state by the industrial proletariat. Soon after 1900 the Social Democrats split into two groups—one composed of moderates who were willing to collaborate with the liberals in working for constitutional reforms on the principle that socialism could best be obtained through the advance of democracy; the other, led by Lenin, worked for an alliance with the peasants and the immediate realization of Marxian aims by revolution. The moderates were called the Mensheviks,¹⁹ or minority; the radical group took the name Bolsheviks, meaning majority. The influence of the Mensheviks gradually decreased, and the radical Bolshevik party attracted active and determined leaders who developed a strict party discipline and adopted definite revolutionary objectives. Needless to say, most of the Bolshevik leaders spent some time in prison, in Siberia, or in exile.

In the meantime the problem of the peasantry was growing worse instead of better. The growth of population made the amount of land allotted them more inadequate than ever, and the restrictions which prevented individual ownership grew more burdensome as the more enterprising peasants became familiar with modern improvements in agricultural methods. The prolongation of the medieval open-field and strip system of farming into the twentieth century was an anachronism decried by all economists. The government was

¹⁹ Although a minority at the meeting where the divisions occurred, the Mensheviks were a majority in Russia as a whole

not indifferent to the peasant problem, and both Alexander III and Nicholas II were willing to improve conditions. In 1881 the redemption payments were reduced one-fourth, and a little later the poll tax was abolished. Emigration to Siberia was encouraged to satisfy the peasants' land-hunger to some extent, and a land bank was established to provide credit to enterprising peasants²⁰ who wished to buy land. The old *Narodniki* movement found new life in the Socialist Revolutionary party, which rejected Marx and appealed to the peasants' individualism. The Social Revolutionaries promised to satisfy the peasants' desire for land and worked through agrarian disturbances and through a continuation of terrorism and the assassination of unpopular officials.

In this crystallization into political factions or parties, the liberals, composed of members of the middle class and the gentry, found themselves deserted by the radicals in their efforts to obtain a constitution providing a representative government. The liberals worked through the zemstvo assemblies, which offered a training in governmental procedure and an opportunity for legitimate criticism and opposition to governmental policies. These zemstvo workers, together with the liberal professional class and some of the middle class from the old intelligentsia, later formed the Constitutional Democratic party which worked for a constitution of the English type.²¹

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TO 1905

By the beginning of the twentieth century the tension in Russia was so widespread that an impartial and well-informed observer might well have predicted some violent modification of the existing order within a short time. The immediate cause for the outbreak of

²⁰ Later called "kulaks."

²¹ The popular names of the three parties were: Social Democrat, S.D.; Social Revolutionary, S.R.; Constitutional Democrat, Cadets. In George Veinadsky, *History of Russia* (Yale University Press), p. 179, there is a brief summary of the aims of the parties: "All these parties were united in desiring the end of autocracy and the introduction of a representative government elected by universal, direct, equal, and secret ballot. But between the programs of these political parties and the concrete needs of the people, there was no relation. The Social Democrats . . . were interested only in the propaganda of socialism among the workers; the Social Revolutionaries . . . advocated the nationalization and socialization of all the land, including that of the peasants, in spite of the fact that the peasants desired only the division of the large estates among themselves. The Constitutional Democrats advocated a parliamentary government . . . and the destruction of centralized executive power, while the interests of Russian democracy in fact dictated a combination of popular representation and strong government."

revolution was entangled with the disastrous result of Russian foreign policy, some brief survey of which must be undertaken before the revolt of 1905 can be approached. Since the foreign affairs of Russia in the latter half of the century were a part of the diplomatic and military history of the rest of Europe, only the purely Russian aspects of those problems need be discussed in this connection. After the Crimean War Russian influence in Turkey was definitely lessened, and France and England fell heir to that influence. Between them they endeavored to bolster up the "Sick Man" and to persuade, or bully, him into some measure of reform. Russia was hemmed in and restricted by the Treaty of Paris of 1856 which prohibited the maintenance of a Russian Black Sea fleet, and was forced to play second fiddle to Austria in the Balkan regions. During the Polish revolt of 1863, Russia became convinced of the friendship of Germany, and she played the part of a benevolent neutral throughout Bismarck's career. In 1870, taking advantage of the Franco-Prussian War, Russia announced that she would no longer respect the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of 1856. Feeling that Austria was weak and that the new German Empire was friendly, the tsar joined the Hohenzollern and Hapsburg rulers in the League of the Three Emperors in 1872²² and began once more an aggressive policy in the Near East.

In the meantime Russian enterprise in the Middle and Far East was pushed. Russian conquest of the Caucasus was completed in the reign of Alexander II. The region east of the Caspian Sea was occupied, Bokhara and Turkestan were brought under Russian control, and Russia began to menace British interests in the regions north of India. In the Far East the region of the River Amur was occupied in the 1860's, and Russia began to press downward into Outer Mongolia which was, somewhat vaguely, a dependency of China. The building of the trans-Siberian railroad in the latter part of the century was evidence of an attempt to bind all of these vast possessions together with some sort of central control. Alexander II endeavored to compensate for his somewhat isolated position in Europe by a policy of friendliness toward the United States. In 1867 Alaska was sold for a nominal sum, making Russia and the United States neighbors in the Bering Sea and sharers in the lucrative fur seal industry.

The renewal of Russian activities in the Near East in the 1870's was due to Turkish oppression of the Slavs in both Bosnia and Bul-

²² See below, page 632.

garia.²³ It was never hard to rouse Russian interest in the cruel fate of "brother Slavs," and the massacres which attended the Turkish attempts to put down the revolts in the Balkans in 1876 led to Russian intervention to aid the little Slavic states of Montenegro and Serbia that had declared war on Turkey. One of the most constant factors in Russian foreign policy throughout the nineteenth century was her interest in the straits, which separated the Black Sea from the Mediterranean. A Russian solution of the "Question of the Straits"—as it was called by all Europe—would mean the extinction of Turkish power in Europe and Russian control of Constantinople. Such a solution was intolerable to the other powers. England, France, and Austria were determined to prevent the realization of Russian ambitions, and Bismarck was mainly anxious to prevent a general European war and to preserve some sort of accord between Russia and Austria.²⁴

When Russia was victorious over Turkey in 1877, therefore, an English fleet in the Dardanelles prevented Russia from taking Constantinople, and in the next year a general European Congress in Berlin (1878) rewrote the treaty Russia had been able to force upon Turkey and pared down Russian gains to a minimum. The reign of Alexander II ended as it had begun—in a period of failure in foreign policy. The reign of Alexander III was one of "firmness and stability."²⁵ in foreign relationships. The Pan-Slavs were discouraged, Russian interest in the Balkans was kept to a minimum, and attention was directed to the Middle and Far East, where real advance was made. As long as Bismarck remained in power some sort of friendly agreement with Russia was maintained, but after 1890 Russia and France drew together in an alliance (negotiated and consolidated between 1891 and 1894) from which France expected help in case of trouble with Germany and Russia sought aid against Austria.²⁶ Anglo-Russian relations grew steadily worse as Russia pushed ahead in the areas north of Persia, India, and Tibet. Only a common danger in Europe early in the twentieth century could lead the two powers to compromise on their imperialistic rivalries and join in a European entente.²⁷

²³ See Chapter XIX.

²⁴ See below, pages 630-32.

²⁵ Platonov's terms. Vernadsky says foreign policy in the reign of Alexander III was characterized by "fatigue and disillusionment."

²⁶ See below, Chapter XXI.

²⁷ See below, page 640.

The foreign policy of Nicholas II in the early years was pacific. He had many family connections with Western Europe. His mother was a sister of Alexandra, Princess of Wales,²⁸ and his wife was a granddaughter of Queen Victoria and first cousin to William II of Germany (1888-1918). The tsar kept up the alliance with France but was not in any way anti-German until after 1908, nor, indeed, strongly anti-Austrian until Russia renewed her interest in the Balkans shortly before that date. The pacific policy of the tsar, as well as Russia's inadequacy in armament, led him to initiate the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, and it was not the fault of Russia that nothing tangible resulted from that effort.²⁹

The extension of Russian interest in the Far East after 1878 led to economic as well as political penetration. Witte, the father of Russian industrialization, encouraged the expansion of Russian trade and advised the limitation of military and political activities. When Japan defeated China in a brief war in 1894, Witte urged Russian intervention in favor of China. Japan was forced to give up the Liaotung Peninsula, and a Russian-French loan helped China to pay the war indemnity. In 1896 a treaty of friendship was signed by Russia and China. When China gave her the right to build railroads in Manchuria, Russia began economic penetration. The Russian government then sacrificed China's good will and aroused the keenest animosity in Japan by following Germany's example and advice in occupying a Chinese port as guarantee for her financial interests in China.³⁰ Russia took the Liaotung Peninsula she had denied to Japan less than five years before, and, on the basis of a long-term lease forced upon China, she fortified Port Arthur and built an extension of the trans-Siberian railroad to the harbor. After almost a decade of increasing friction, the Japanese fleet attacked Russian armed vessels at Port Arthur. In the Russo-Japanese War which followed, much to the surprise of the Western world Japan was victorious both on land and sea.

By the peace terms³¹ Russia ceded to Japan the southern half of the island of Sakhalin and the "lease" to the Liaotung Peninsula. Japan then considered that she had a paramount interest in Korea and a foothold on the Continent of Asia. Distance and the difficulties

²⁸ Later Queen Alexandra, the wife of King Edward VII (1901-1910).

²⁹ See below, Chapter XXI.

³⁰ See below, page 676.

³¹ The Treaty of Portsmouth, negotiated with the good offices of President Roosevelt of the United States.

of transportation—the trans-Siberian railroad was not yet finished and the completed part was only single track—were the official and most charitable reasons given for the defeat of the far larger Russian forces. As a matter of fact, the war revealed an appalling situation. The commanders were inferior, the bureaucracy was honeycombed with graft and inefficiency, and, worst of all, there was little confidence in the government and still less will to fight. The war was unpopular, and the people of Russia were outspoken in their demands for reform in every department of government. By the time the humiliating peace treaty was signed Russia was already in a state of revolution.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1905

The forms taken by the revolutionary unrest were many and varied. There were thousands of acts of violence among the peasantry, ranging from isolated instances of incendiarism to agrarian riots of considerable proportions. The situation through the country districts resembled those in rural France in the summer of 1789, when the peasants rose and burned the châteaux and the records of feudalism. The urban workers went out on strikes in behalf of political reform. The liberal zemstvos drew up a program for constitutional changes, held political banquets, and enlisted the aid of the professional class. This class responded by organizing political unions which were finally merged into a Union of Unions of which Miliukov, a leader of the constitutional movement, was the head. The universities participated with lectures on political subjects and the organization of student reform societies, which, when opposed, directed student riots. Socialist agitators worked the disgruntled soldiers and sailors up to riots and mutiny. The terrorists contributed their part by a series of assassinations of unpopular officials, the most important victims being the reactionary minister of the interior, Plehve, and the uncle of the tsar, the Grand Duke Sergius, governor of Moscow. Government agents were insinuated into radical organizations as spies who might act as *agents provocateurs*, the theory being that riots which such agents led might be easily put down by the forewarned police and the whole organization crushed. In 1904-1905 the spies often went over to the radicals and carried over to the advantage of the revolutionaries their knowledge of police plans and methods. The Poles, Finns, Baltic Germans, Letts, and Lithuanians, resenting the "Russification" policies of the government, were ready to join the revolutionaries provided

their reward might be autonomous status in a liberal and federal empire. The government tried to stir up racial animosities and thus divert attention from the need for political reform. "Pogroms" against the Jews were deliberately encouraged by the police, and the unfortunate Jews were denounced as the enemies of Russia and the cause of all the trouble.

In January of 1905 the revolution received its baptism of blood when a procession of St. Petersburg workers, led by the radical priest, Father Gapon, started for the Winter Palace to present the grievances of the workers in person. The crowds of workmen were unarmed and had attempted no violence, but the troops sent to disperse them fired upon the crowd, killing several hundred. After this "Bloody Sunday" the socialist groups were greatly augmented from the working classes, and their radicalism was ensured. As a result the summer of 1905 was filled with strikes, and business was hopelessly upset. In the autumn a general strike called throughout all of Russia affected railroads, electrical plants, water supply plants, and all agencies bringing supplies to the cities. The economic life of Russia seemed paralyzed. Councils of the socialist leaders of the workers met in various cities under the name of Soviets of Workers' Deputies to direct the work of revolution. The leader of the St. Petersburg Soviet was a man named Bronstein who was later to be known as Trotsky. The revolution brought back to Russia, also, the head of the Bolshevik division of the Social Democratic party, the son of a Russian nobleman, born Ulianov but known to the world as Lenin.

In the emergency the tsar turned to Count Witte, who had just returned from the negotiation of the peace treaty. Although not a constitutionalist or even a liberal, Witte was a realist and an economist. He saw just two possible courses for the government—military dictatorship or concession. The first was out of the question with the army disaffected; the second he, as prime minister, was willing to try. On October 30, 1905, Nicholas II issued a manifesto which represented the surrender of autocracy and was, in itself, the basis for a constitution. By it the Russian people were granted the fundamental civil liberties of free speech, assembly, and organization. A representative legislature was guaranteed, the basis for which was to be a democratic franchise.

Count Witte then endeavored to put the government upon a broad basis by appointing liberals to cabinet posts in the new ministry. From that point it became evident that the concessions of the

October manifesto were not sufficient to secure a peaceful solution of all difficulties. The long years of suspicion, distrust, and oppression had hopelessly alienated the reform element from the government. The liberals refused to serve under Witte and with the tsarist reactionaries. The Constitutional Democrats divided into two groups: a minority, called Octobrists, declaring themselves satisfied with the halfway reform measures, the majority favoring further concessions. The Social Democrats, desiring the triumph of socialism, felt that the manifesto meant the defeat of their efforts and refused to cooperate in any way. The strikes went on through November and December, until it became evident that the mass of the people were not behind the radicals but, longing for peace and security, were ready to try the program of the manifesto. Early in 1906 the government was in control of the situation, order was restored, the revolutionary Soviets were disbanded, and arrangements were made for the new Parliament, or Duma.

When the decree providing for the election procedure and for the structure of the new government was published, it was seen that, although the tsar had fulfilled the obligations of the manifesto, the constitutional regime was to be made as harmless as possible. Suffrage was granted to almost all of the male population, but it was not direct or equal, and every effort was made to break up the opposition parties by placating the peasantry. The old Council of State was made over into an upper house of the legislature as a check upon the popularly elected Duma. Half of its members were appointed by the tsar; the rest were elected by the nobility, zemstvos, and university faculties. The upper house could therefore be dominated by the reactionary court and nobility. The ministers were not to be members of the Duma or responsible to it. They could, however, be interpellated by it, and, of course, were to expect criticism from a legislative body whose freedom of speech and security from arrest were guaranteed. Russia was apparently to have a constitutional regime more democratic than that of European governments before 1870, but considerably less liberal than twentieth-century standards demanded.

The socialists boycotted the elections of March, 1906, but the composition of the Duma was far from satisfactory to the tsar. Of the 490 members, about 260 represented the liberal or labor elements, and the conservatives had very few seats. The main point of issue in the first Duma was the old agrarian question. The Constitutional

Democrats proposed the expropriation of the large estates and the satisfaction of the land hunger of the peasantry. The nobility and landowners were unalterably opposed to any such plan. In the ensuing deadlock Nicholas could either force the nobles to yield or dismiss the Duma—and in July, 1906, he ended the short and stormy career of the first Duma.

The government now endeavored to work out its own scheme for the solution of the agrarian problem. Since Russia was predominantly agricultural, no government could be secure unless the peasantry was docile and fairly content. Stolypin was made prime minister and devoted his attention to the problem. He was able, experienced, and a statesman, although a decided conservative. The first step was the remission of the redemption dues for 1906; the next was the complete end of the whole redemption system and the abolition of the communal control of the land under the mir. Peasants were given the right to withdraw from the mir and to receive their land in a solid field. There was no expropriation of noble estates, but peasants were permitted to buy and sell land among themselves, or to purchase from such gentry as might be willing to sell, and were aided in their purchases by the Land Bank, which gave them liberal credit. After 1906 there was much reorganization and transfer of holdings. As a result there was an increase of the well-to-do peasant group—kulaks—on the one hand, and, on the other, an exodus of other peasants from agriculture into industry. Stolypin's reform program received much opposition, and the liberals refused to co-operate by joining his cabinet. Eventually he came to rely more and more upon the reactionaries and the old bureaucrats. It is difficult to form any opinion as to what might have been the effect had either Witte or Stolypin been able to win the confidence of at least the bourgeois Constitutional Democrats (Cadets) or liberals.

In the meantime, the election of the second Duma was before the people. In the summer of 1906 about half of the opposition members of the first Duma had signed a manifesto at Viborg, in Finland, urging the people to refuse to pay taxes or to serve in the army. There was little popular response, and the signers were prosecuted for conspiracy against the government and lost their right to vote in 1907. This loss of liberal membership was more than compensated for, however, by the fact that Lenin reversed his policy and urged the socialists to vote for the second Duma. Although the government used all its resources to influence the election in favor of

conservative candidates, the new legislature, with its 180 socialists, was more radical than the first. It met in March, 1907, and had a stormy life for about three months, when it was dissolved on the pretext that it did not represent the "needs and desires" of the people.

THE FAILURE OF THE REVOLUTION

The tsar now felt free to make an open declaration that he still retained his old autocratic powers, "as it was God who bestowed upon us our power of autocrat, and before His altar we shall answer for the destinies of Russia."⁸² A new electoral law was then announced by which the Prussian class system of voting was introduced.⁸³ When it was put into effect the landowners got 60 per cent of the electors to whom the selection of representatives for the Duma was entrusted, the peasants had 22 per cent, the merchants 15 per cent, and the workingmen only 3 per cent. The majority of the deputies of the third Duma was, therefore, made up of the parties of the Right, and the socialists and radicals were almost completely left out. The third Duma ran a relatively tranquil course from 1907 to 1912, and the fourth Duma then elected was likewise conservative.

The causes for the very considerable failure of the Russian Revolution of 1905 have been a matter of interest to students of history ever since that time. The main object of the liberals was the establishment of a thoroughly parliamentary and constitutional government. The objective of the socialists of all shades of opinion was undoubtedly the creation of a socialist state, while the objective of the government was to confine the obviously necessary changes within the narrowest possible limits. There can be no question as to which group won the largest measure of success. Strictly speaking, autocracy came to an end in October, 1905, but an autocratic government relying upon the votes of reactionary groups continued to hold the representative Duma in such check that its influence was chiefly that of advice and criticism.

The reasons usually given for the failure of the revolution are apparent from the foregoing discussion of its course. There was a

⁸² Nicholas II never seems to have been clear in his own mind as to his position after 1905. The manifesto and the existence of a Duma were certainly a limitation upon autocracy even though he refused to acknowledge the fact definitely.

⁸³ See above, page 530.

disastrous lack of organization of the opposition forces, and there was no well-planned program. The various reform elements could work together in attacking the old regime but were unable to join forces in consolidating their victory. It was soon evident that the constitutionalists had as little in common with the socialists as with the reactionaries and could be relied upon to back the program of neither extreme. The army, in spite of its occasional mutinies, remained loyal to the tsar and could be used to suppress strikes and riots as soon as division showed itself in the ranks of the reformers. Foreign governments were sympathetic to the tsar and offered assistance even though foreign radical and liberal groups expressed their approval of the revolution. The German emperor offered military assistance, which was not needed, but it was the French Republic that came to the aid of the tsar with a large loan which did much to rehabilitate tsardom. It seems probable that the Marxian historian Pokrovsky has expressed the fundamental cause of the 1905 failure when he wrote: "Even the leaders never realized that the aim of the fight must not be to obtain *rights* but to win *power*."³⁴

After the Revolution of 1905 Russia shared in the period of world-wide prosperity which made the years preceding the Great War seem a golden age in more ways than one. The economic growth of Russia went forward, foreign capital flowed in to build railroads and develop resources, and agriculture benefited both from the Stolypin reforms and from the increase in agricultural trade. The co-operative movement had tremendous growth as agriculture improved. By 1914 there were nearly thirty thousand co-operative societies, predominantly agricultural in character, with a membership of more than twelve million. Labor conditions were definitely improving. In 1906 unions became legal, and a few years later the government began some much-needed social legislation. Health and accident insurance, collective bargaining, and a slowly rising standard of living were far from satisfying the real needs of the workers, but the gains were of some importance. There was a more striking progress in the field of education. Elementary education was put on a firm basis, and illiteracy was greatly reduced. The expenses of the government for education increased 628 per cent between 1894 and 1914. The zemstvos, granted greater powers and more money, did a tremendous work in the decade before 1914 in providing schools of all

³⁴ M. N. Pokrovsky, *Brief History of Russia*, Vol. II, p. 238.

descriptions, hospitals, libraries, roads, and telephone service.⁸⁵ Russian universities had been hampered through much of the nineteenth century by governmental regulation, but in 1905 control was handed over to the faculties. In their academic standards the universities compared very favorably with those of Western Europe in the same period and played a greater part in the development of political thinking. The professors were, for the most part, Liberals, and a large number of the students were socialists. Artists, scientists, men of letters, musicians, and composers continued to make important contributions to European culture in the early years of the twentieth century.

Between 1905 and 1914 there was a trend in Russian foreign policy from a concentration of interest in the Far East to a renewal of interest in European and, especially, Near Eastern affairs. The Pan-Slavs were heard once more, and Austro-Russian rivalry became critical. Under the pressure of the dangers apparent in that rivalry, Russia came to the conclusion that it would be wise to ease the Middle East situation by an agreement with England on the question of Anglo-Russian interests in Persia. In 1907 a compromise solution was reached by which both powers agreed to abstain from political interference in Persia while Russia was to have a free hand for economic penetration in the north, leaving to England the same privilege in the region of the Persian Gulf. The Balkan crisis of 1908 and the gathering clouds of the period from 1908 to 1914 are legitimately a part of the history of the Near East and can best be discussed in that connection.

READINGS

There are chapters on Russia in the general works in Modern European History. Michael Karpovich's brief *Imperial Russia, 1801-1917* (Berkshire Series, 1932) is very useful, as is C. R. Beazley, N. Forbes, and G. A. Birkett's *Russia from the Varangians to the Bolsheviks* (1918). Bernard Pares's *A History of Russia* (1928) is excellent. S. F. Platonov's *History of Russia* (1925) is brief and useful. M. N. Pokrovsky's *Brief History of Russia* (1933) is a Marxist account. George Vernadsky's *History of Russia* (1936) is interesting. Paul N. Miliukov's *Russia and Its Crisis* (1905) and *Russia Today and Tomorrow* (1922) are the work of a Russian liberal.

⁸⁵ See Vernadsky, *History of Russia*, Chapter XII, "Internal Development of Russia from the Middle of the Nineteenth Century to the World War"

N. V. Tcharykov's *Glances of High Politics* (1931) is by a Russian diplomat of the old regime. *The Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (1920) by Prince Peter Kropotkin contains valuable chapters dealing with the author's youth on a great estate. Stephen Graham's *A Life of Alexander II of Russia* (1935) is an interesting recent biography of the "Tsar-Emancipator." *The Education of a Princess, a Memoir* (1931) by the Grand Duchess Marie of Russia is an interesting account of life at court at the turn of the century.

≡ XIX ≡

THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST

THROUGHOUT much of the nineteenth century the phrase, the "Eastern Question," was so much before the public that no European who was at all interested in affairs of state felt the need to define or explain it. To him it was a convenient title or label for a whole congeries of problems that had as their common denominator the fact of the projection of the Turkish Empire into the heart of Eastern Europe. These problems were so familiar to Europe that their implication in any specific episode and period was easily understood, and the label covered a multitude of widely different and very complex relationships. In our own day the problems have changed, and the emphasis has shifted to such an extent that, although there is a superabundance of complex questions in, and in regard to, the countries of Eastern Europe, the label the "Eastern Question" has no longer any meaning. The problem of the Near East, however, was so much a focal point for international relations in the nineteenth century that it is safe to say that it is impossible to understand European diplomatic history without a grasp of the broad sweep of the Eastern Question.

THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY

Historians differ as to what areas should be included in the Near East. There is an old Austrian proverb that "Asia begins on the Ringstrasse," and a glance at a map of Europe in 1600 is sufficient to show how close to Vienna the Turks carried their rule. By 1800, however, the Hapsburg lands had been extended southward, and Hungary and Croatia seemed to have been won back from the clutches of Asia. In Europe, then, only the states of the Balkan Peninsula are to be considered as the habitat of the Eastern Question. Across the narrow straits from the southeastern corner of that peninsula lay the Asiatic home of the Ottoman Turks, old Anatolia, in Asia Minor. The fact

that Turkey was both a European and an Asiatic power, holding in her control a link between the two continents and the gateway from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, was a vital part of the famous Question. Out of it grew the "Problem of the Straits," a phrase almost as familiar to the European statesmen as was that of the larger problem, the solution of which was the objective of every generation of Russian statesmen. There is a certain logic in including in the Near East those areas that were, in the nineteenth century, relics of that age of splendor and conquest when the Turkish armies swept all before them in their march from Constantinople to Gibraltar. Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia, Egypt, and the states of North Africa were, by 1800, semi-independent regions under rulers of their own, with a more or less shadowy dependence upon the government of the Sublime Porte.¹ In general, in the nineteenth century, the greater the distance of the outlying dependency from the center of government, the less the degree of central control. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries all of the North African provinces were lost by Turkey in the satisfaction of the imperialistic ambitions of stronger states.²

A study of the physiographic map of the Balkan Peninsula will reveal much that is of significance for any analysis of the problems of Southeastern Europe. Unlike the peninsulas of Spain and Italy, the Balkans have no mountain barrier against the rest of Europe but join the Continent in the broad basin of the Danube River. Most of the peoples of the Balkan states came into the peninsula by this route, and it has always been open to penetration from the north. At the southeast, the connection with Asia is very close, and a natural thrust eastward leads directly through Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. For many centuries the Balkans have been an essential part of the trade routes from east to west and a meeting place for the civilizations of Asia and Europe.

The history of the Balkan states has been conditioned also by the broken nature of their contour. Mountain ranges extend from east to west in part of the peninsula, and from north to south in other areas. There is no natural geographic center where cultural and political unity would tend to develop. Along the west coast there is a narrow coastal plain backed by a high mountain ridge. This narrow Adriatic

¹ The ornamental gate which was the public portal to the house of the ruler of the Ottoman Empire. The term came to be the figurative title for the Turkish government.

² See below, Chapter XX.

strip has a few good harbors but they can serve only inadequately as economic outlets for the people of the back country, since there are no broad rivers cutting through the mountain barrier to the sea. As a consequence, the coastal area facing Italy throughout the centuries has acquired some veneer of Italian culture, although its Slavic character is always clearly apparent.

Behind the western coastal mountains there is a long corridor extending from Thessaly on the south to Bosnia on the north. It is drained by the Ibar River, a tributary of the Danube, and the Vardar River, which flows into the Aegean Sea near Salonika. The combined Ibar-Vardar corridor is the strategic center of the peninsula and the great trade route from Salonika to Vienna. Its soil is fertile, and the mineral wealth of the mountains which border it adds to its importance. The southern part of this corridor was, however, one of the last regions of the Balkans to be freed from the Turkish yoke, and, although its soil is rich and it should be the center of important trade, it is still afflicted in the twentieth century with a backwardness that is the heritage of years of oppression and conflict.

To the northeast of the headwaters of the Vardar lies the valley of the Morava River, which opens the way to the great Danubian plains and which is an outlet to the Black Sea. Following the Morava Valley southeastward, the second and best-known trade route of the peninsula crosses the low saddle of mountains to the valley of the Maritza River, which flows eastward with a broad plain extending to Constantinople. This is the route of one of the old Roman roads, and of the modern German-built railroad over which runs the "Orient Express." It is also the route for the much-discussed Berlin-to-Bagdad line and a part of the pathway of German progress eastward. This line from Vienna to Constantinople passes through Belgrade and Sofia, the capitals of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria; in the region eastward to the Black Sea and northward to the Danube Valley live more than half the peoples of the Balkans. In those fertile lateral valleys a prosperous peasantry has developed one of the granaries of Europe and the resources which make the region vital in European economic life.

The coastal plain along the Aegean Sea is to some extent cut off from the peninsula by the Rhodope chain of mountains. The mountains disappear, however, where the Maritza comes out to the sea, and, between the river and Constantinople, the low plains which form the eastern part of the coastal strip are the home of a mixed race—Greek, Bulgarian, and Turk. The economic and cultural life

of the region bears the imprint of the same mixed heritage. It was one of the last regions given up by the Turks in Europe. As old Thrace it received a permanent Greek character, but the gradual infiltration of Slavs from the north and the effects of centuries of Turkish rule have made it a combination of the three. Since it must be an economic outlet for Bulgaria, a political problem has arisen which has as yet had no solution.

The importance of physiography in the history of Greece is obvious from the most cursory glance at the map. The sea is an ever-present factor in the life of the Greek people. The highly indented coast and the poverty of the mountainous soil early led the Greek to seek his fortune on the sea. Traders and colonizers in ancient times, the Greeks carried their civilization far afield. In the Middle Ages the Greeks were the tradesmen and administrators of the Byzantine Empire, and, after 1453, they quickly took over the same functions in the empire of the warlike Turks. The Slavs of the Balkans are agriculturalists; the Greeks have always found their major interest in trade; the Turks dotted the valleys of the peninsula with a few colonies, largely military, but relied chiefly on the imperial governor and tax collector to make their contacts with the subject-Slavs.

The importance of the straits and of the position of Constantinople cannot be overestimated. Throughout the ages the straits have been the outlet of the vast southern area of European Russia from the Caucasus Mountains almost to the Danube. They have been the outlet, as well, to some extent, at least, for the Danube Valley. It was possible until the days of modern warfare for Constantinople to be defended from land or sea.

The high plateau across the straits, south of the Black Sea, was the real home of the Turkish people. Even in this area there was a mixture of races held together by a common allegiance to the Moslem faith. South of the Caucasus Mountains there were the Armenian highlands, and, extending on to the south, the once irrigated and fertile valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. On the sea coast from the plateau to the Isthmus of Suez were the little states of Syria and Palestine, while behind them south and eastward stretched the vast Arabian desert areas. Turkish control was fairly evident along the coastal strips but very weak in the desert regions inhabited by nomadic tribes. The khedive of Egypt and the sultans of the states fringing North Africa—Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco—held their power, in theory, from Constantinople, but were, in fact, inde-

pendent rulers. The states they governed were backward in economic development and so weak both politically and in military strength that they were to be the easy victims of nineteenth-century imperialism.³

THE DECLINE OF TURKISH POWER

The empire of the Ottoman Turk reached its height in the sixteenth century. Suleiman the Magnificent was the great figure of the period, not Charles V, although the empire of Charles, his wars, and the Reformation which occurred in his lifetime fill the pages of histories of Europe. But even in the days of its splendor the empire began to decay. Naval control in the eastern Mediterranean was lost, and Europe began to recover the territories surrendered to Suleiman. Gradually Hungary was won back, and pressure was exerted to push the Turk south of the Danube. In the late seventeenth century there was a revival of Turkish vigor when an Albanian family ruled for several generations as grand viziers for the weak sultans, but all Eastern Europe sent volunteers to aid the Hapsburgs to withstand the attack upon Vienna. After that the weakening of Turkish control was steady, and European Turkey shrank appreciably with each generation. Russia cleared the Turks from the north shore of the Black Sea, and pushed down against them through Bessarabia in the west and the Caucasus Mountains in the east. A major part of Austria's policy was to drive back the Turks, but she looked with suspicion upon Russia's common purpose and hesitated to choose between them as neighbors.

The reasons for the decline of Turkish power are complex but can be stated quite simply. The Turks themselves were never colonizers to any great extent. Relatively few Turks settled permanently in the outlying districts of the empire, and the governors, tax collectors, and other officials, who were required to live there, were usually most concerned with making both their reputations and their fortunes in order to return to Constantinople where they might end their days in luxury and in the favor of the court. In addition, the Turk was never an organizer. He was a poor businessman and left trade to the Greeks and Armenians. He had no comprehension of the intricacies of the administration of government. While keep-

³ The loss to Turkey of these provinces will be discussed in Chapter XX on imperialism.

ing the forms of the old Byzantine government, he gradually allowed almost all of the work or functions of government to fall into decadence or disuse. Roads, education, protection, efficient and honest administration were all of no interest to the Turkish administrator, who concerned himself mainly with the extraction of taxes from the subject peoples over whom he ruled.

Another reason for the difficulties of the Turk, especially in the European provinces, was the difference in religion between conqueror and conquered. The Christian peoples of the Balkans would not be Islamized, and the conflict between them and their masters often took on the character of a crusade or—from the Moslem viewpoint—a holy war with all of its horrors. And it must not be forgotten that the Slavic Christians of the Balkans were not cut off from the infiltration of ideas from the Christian peoples who lived to the north of the Danube. This cultural influence became of great importance in the latter part of the eighteenth and in the early years of the nineteenth centuries. Taken from their native environment, filtering into the almost illiterate East through the most devious of channels, the teachings of the philosophes were often strangely misunderstood and distorted. The dynamic changes that swept Europe between 1789 and 1815 were not unknown in the Balkans, and the familiar words "liberalism" and "nationalism" struck fire in the imaginations of Serbs, Greeks, and Rumanians and inspired them to rise against their oppressor.

THE RISE OF SERBIA

The Serbs were in a position to strike first. They were remote from Constantinople, and Turkish control was relatively weak. Their lands bordered on the Austrian Empire, the traditional enemy of Turkey which had always been friendly to the Serbs and had furnished asylum for fugitives from Turkish misrule. Serbia had had a glorious history in the early Middle Ages, and the Serbs in Austria formed a nucleus of nationalists that endeavored to revive language, literature, and traditions as whips for Serbian pride and goads to action against the Turks. In 1804, there was an uprising led by a well-to-do peasant named Karageorge. The Turks, weakened by the war with Russia,⁴ were driven out of Belgrade, and a Serb state

⁴ See above, page 590.

was about to be formed when the Russo-Turkish War ended suddenly in 1812, and the sultan was free to turn upon the Serbs. But within a few years the Serbs found a new leader in Milosch Obrenovich⁵ and revolted once more. It is difficult to set any exact date for the winning of Serbian independence. In 1817 Turkey recognized the election of Obrenovich by the other Serb leaders as their chief, and in 1826, in a convention with Russia, the Turkish government agreed to satisfy the demands of Serbia. The Treaty of Adrianople, which ended the war for Greek independence, contained a clause, inserted because of Russian insistence, providing for concessions to Serbia. Within the next half-dozen years these concessions were made, and Serbia became an autonomous state with a hereditary prince as ruler. Turkish sovereignty was recognized, annual tribute was pledged, and Turkish garrisons were left in specified fortified places; but the Turkish landlords departed, with compensation, and Serbia was given control over all of her own domestic affairs. These arrangements and the boundaries then agreed upon remained substantially the same until 1878, when Serbia became an independent kingdom.

By no means all of the Serbs resided in the new autonomous state, and the Serb nationalist movement was to continue with increasing strength until the period of the Great War. In southern Hungary there was a large group of Serbs who had migrated northward when the Turks had been expelled from the fertile plains near the Danube. They were Orthodox, or Greek, Catholic, and struggled to keep their national identity. The Austrian Empire, on the other hand, held them under Magyar domination and tried to fit them into the autocratic system of the Hapsburg domain.

Another Serb center was in Bosnia, which remained under Turkish control until 1878, when it was administered by the Austro-Hungarian government. The desire to free the unredeemed Serbs of the western provinces was to color much of Serbian history, especially since the acquisition of Bosnia would bring Serbia nearer the sea. Bosnia was to be a hotbed of Serb nationalist agitation early in the twentieth century, although culturally the Bosnians had been the most

⁵ The descendants of the Karageorge and Obrenovich leaders continued to be of importance in Serbia through the rest of the century. They alternated as princes of Serbia and later as kings. The Obrenovich dynasty ruled from 1817-1842 and from 1889-1903 except for periods of insurrection and assassination. The Karageorge dynasty came back into power after a palace revolution in 1903, and the present king, Peter II, is of that family.

Turkish of any of the northern provinces. The Bosnian nobles had accepted the Moslem faith and had the fanaticism of proselytes. Gradually, however, Moslem influence lessened, and the Bosnians became strongly Serbian and anti-Austrian.

The fourth center of the Serbs was the mountainous region known as Montenegro. All of the conquering zeal of the Turks in their most vigorous period had been ineffective against the brave Serb mountaineers. They were pushed out of the fertile valleys into the bleak hills back of Cattaro, but there they could defy attack. They called their craggy eyrie the Black Mountain (Chernagora) for which Europe accepted the Italian version, Montenegro. Its story was romantic, and its centuries of struggle against the Turks furnish many a dramatic legend, but its main claim to fame in the nineteenth century was that its people had never bowed their necks to the Turkish yoke. In 1797 the sultan of Turkey signed a treaty with the Montenegrin prince, Peter I, by which the full independence of the Black Mountain was explicitly recognized. Throughout the nineteenth century the wild highlanders kept to their mountain fastnesses, and it was but slowly that Montenegro took on any of the aspects of a European state.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF GREECE

The deliverance of Greece from Turkish rule was no more romantic than the resistance offered by the Montenegrins to the same conqueror, but it was more sensational and much better known. Almost every European schoolboy of the period since the Renaissance humanists had had a "classical" education. The history, the geography, the literature, and the glories of ancient Greece were a part of the cultural heritage of the educated—and governing—classes of European society. Modern travelers returned from the eastern Mediterranean with tales of oppression and misrule in the land of Homer and Plato, and those whose love for Greece was rooted in the memories of their youthful response to the splendor of her past listened with quick sympathy to the news of a Greek rebellion against Turkish rule.

As a result Greece had from the start a wider measure of attention and support than . . . was given to any other Balkan state. Her cry against misgovernment found its echo in the halls of learning as well as in the

fashionable clubs; European scholars and European idealists, such as Byron, were willing to give their all in her cause. They saw in the leaders of the insurrection of 1821, many of whom were a strange medley of brigand and



From Palm and Graham's *Europe Since Napoleon*, used by permission of the publishers, Ginn and Company.

RISE OF THE BALKAN STATES

soldier of fortune, the true representatives of the heroes who fought at Thermopylae and at Marathon. They undoubtedly expected too much of those Greeks in 1821, but at the same time they were willing to cover their shortcomings with a mantle of silent charity. As a result, the story of

the Greek revolt has been obscured by a superimposed legend which has covered many of its good, as well as its bad, features.⁶

The revolt in Greece drew its strength from three sources. There were the intellectuals who, fully cognizant of the glories of ancient Greece, had made a cult of that heritage and worked with religious fervor for a revival of Greek national feeling and a revolt against Turkey. Largely exiles, many of them residing in Russia, where Alexander I offered them refuge, these men were the propagandists of Greek independence. It must be admitted that, when it became safe for them to return to Greece, they quarreled with one another, showed themselves to be incapable of organizing the government, and were often a trial to the new state in the early years of its history. A second group was composed of native chieftains who, hating the Turks, had fled to the mountain districts, where they lived "the free life of outlaws," emerging upon occasion to attack some Turkish outpost. They were skilled guerilla warriors—half patriot, half brigand, undisciplined and often unprincipled, but untiring in the cause of independence. The majority of the Greek people, traders or peasants, were devoted to the cause of revolt and fought on for years, when the going was rough, displaying both courage and patience. In the dark years of the 1820's, before foreign aid was secured, the verve and energy of the Greek sailors furnished an element of success and drama to the dogged struggle. They had prospered in the days of the Napoleonic Wars and of the Continental system, when much of the trade of the East had gone through their hands, and the economic depression of the first years of the peace made them willing to throw their energies into an attack on Turkey.

Besides the Greeks whose homes were on the peninsula itself, there were numerous other Greeks living on the Aegean and Ionian islands and on the coast of Asia Minor. They were the traders of the Turkish Empire and were often very wealthy and able to purchase immunity from the exactions of the government. There were many Greeks serving as officials of the Turkish government. Those

⁶ M. W. Tyler, *The European Powers and the Near East* (University of Minnesota Press), p. 30. The first four chapters of this book furnish an excellent background for the study of the Eastern Question. J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question*, is an interesting account of European diplomacy in the period. Ferdinand Schevill, *The History of the Balkan Peninsula*, and *The Balkans*, by N. Forbes, A. Toynbee, D. Mitrany, and D. G. Hogarth, are good concise accounts of the Balkan states. *Nationalism in the Balkans, 1800-1930*, by W. M. Gewehr, is brief and interesting. Hans Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East*, furnishes a good special treatment.

residing in Constantinople, as administrators of the government or as the clergy of the Greek Catholic Church, were frequently men of great influence and practically controlled the Christian population of the empire.

The revolt started as a peasant uprising, which at first met with some success and then seemed to stand still. Europe, in the midst of the reaction directed by Metternich, who worked through the Quadruple Alliance, was engaged in putting down revolts in Italy and Spain. Neither liberalism nor nationalism was popular in governmental circles in European capitals. The sultan secured the aid of his Egyptian vassal, Mehemet Ali, who had both an army and a fleet, and it seemed as though the revolt in Greece was soon to be extinguished. The tsar, although no friend of revolutions, had his own reason for opposing the success of Turkey and so came forward at this juncture to offer aid to the Greeks. British foreign policy was, after Castlereagh's death, entrusted to George Canning, who was influenced by the pro-Greek sentiment of the English people, and by British interests in the Mediterranean, as well as by a reluctance to see Russian influence in the eastern Mediterranean strengthened. England and France tried at first to hold Russia back, but, failing in that, they joined the tsar, and the three powers presented the sultan with a demand for Greek independence. The allies destroyed the Egyptian fleet at Navarino (1827), and the Turkish government was soon prepared to recognize the new Greek state which the European powers set themselves to establish.

The troubles of Greece were not over, however, for the conflicting factions that had worked for independence could not agree as to policy either before or after that objective had been achieved. A Bavarian prince was selected as king, but he was unable to establish an orderly government although he struggled with the problem for thirty years. In 1862, after a revolution was followed by the abdication of the king, the powers stepped in again to help the Greeks out of the mess. A Danish prince became King George I of Greece; England gave Greece the Ionian Islands to start the reign off well; and some attempt was made to straighten out Greek finances. Political stability came slowly, even after 1862, but Greece advanced economically, and much was done to make up for the centuries of misrule and backwardness. The Danish king was able and patient, education was advanced, and industry and agriculture slowly developed. To the domestic problems inevitable in the new state was

always added a keen interest in the many Greeks living outside the Greek state—in Macedonia, in Asia Minor, and especially in Crete. As long as these “unredeemed” Greeks remained under Turkish control, the policies of Greece could not be entirely peaceful. At any moment oppression or massacre might set off the spark that would kindle a “war of liberation.”

THE APPEARANCE OF INDEPENDENT RUMANIA

Rumania was the third independent state to be formed from the European possessions of Turkey during the nineteenth century. The two provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia were not, strictly speaking, a part of the Balkan Peninsula, but their fertile valleys, watered by streams flowing down to the Danube from the mountain barrier to the north, form a physiographic and economic unit with the peninsula rather than with the continent beyond the mountains. In the days of old Rome the valley of the Danube was an important outpost, and colonists from all parts of the empire were planted there. In culture and language the Rumanian still bears some slight witness to the closeness of the contact between his remote ancestors and the civilization of Rome. Through the Middle Ages one invading horde after another swept across the plains of the lower Danube—Hun, Slav, Magyar, Tartar, and Turk. The native population was driven back into the mountain districts only to emerge, practically without change, as each wave subsided. The Slavic invaders settled more extensively and in larger numbers than the other invaders, so that the Rumanian people today have several ethnic strains. Christianity was adopted in the period of Roman control, but in the Middle Ages cultural contacts with the West were broken, and the Greek Orthodox faith replaced the Roman.

The Turkish conquests in the sixteenth century included the Danubian provinces; the long finger of Bessarabia extending along the northwestern corner of the Black Sea gave the Turks access to the plains of southern Russia. As an outlying district of the Turkish Empire, however, the two provinces were less firmly held under Turkish control than the provinces to the south, and at times they were practically independent. The richness of the soil and their strategic position in relation to the Danubian trade made them a luscious plum for the Turkish tax collectors. In the periods when Turkey was definitely in control, the provinces paid a high price for their sins

and were as bitter as any other Balkan region against the Ottoman overlord.

In the eighteenth century Russia drove the Turks out of their fortresses in the region north of the Black Sea and followed them into Bessarabia and the Danubian provinces. Taken over and occupied during periods of warfare, they were used again and again by Russia as a pawn in negotiating treaties which ended her wars with Turkey. At each retrocession Russia insisted upon reforms in the administration of the provinces and endeavored to retain some rights of protection and intervention. Early in the nineteenth century the tsar was given, by the Treaty of Tilsit,⁷ a free hand in the Near East, and, in a war with Turkey, acquired for himself the two provinces and Bessarabia. In 1812, however, he found himself unable to hold these gains, because of the threatened invasion of Russia by Napoleon, and made a treaty with the sultan by which Moldavia and Wallachia went back to Turkey, although Russia retained a sort of protectorate over them, much to the dissatisfaction of both Turkey and the provinces. Bessarabia remained in Russian hands. At the end of the Napoleonic period the Danubian provinces were neither independent, nor Turkish, nor Russian, but a queer mixture of all three. A strong national feeling grew up as a result of the constant Turkish-Russian rivalry. Educated Rumanians visited European capitals and came home filled with the ideas of the French philosophes. They revived popular interest in Rumanian history and legend, roused patriotism, and stimulated a desire for independence from both Turkey and Russia.

During the period between 1815 and 1854 the provinces steadily encroached upon Turkish sovereignty and bided their time for the assertion of complete autonomy. National feeling developed rapidly, and the economic situation of the provinces improved with the years. Their opportunity came with the Crimean War. The powers forced Russia to give up Bessarabia to Moldavia and to surrender her right to protect the provinces from Turkish misrule. A specific clause in the Treaty of Paris made such protection the joint responsibility of the European Concert of Powers. Another clause reaffirmed Turkish suzerainty and declared that the two provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia should remain separate. The Danubian delta was returned to Turkey by Russia, but the administration of all problems of trade and navigation of the lower reaches of the river was put under an international commission.

⁷ See above, pages 402-3.

After 1856 the powers attempted to keep their pledge to "reorganize" the provinces, but there was much difference of opinion as to the extent of liberties to be given to them. Napoleon III was anxious to recognize the Rumanian nationalist movement by a liberal constitution, autonomous status, and the union of the provinces. Austria was in determined opposition to any such project, for there were many Rumanians in the eastern part of Hungary.⁸ The arrangements made in 1858, therefore, fell far short of satisfying Rumanian nationalistic desires. Each province received its own constitution and was authorized to elect its own prince; the only concession to nationalism was a joint committee of the two provinces to deal with common affairs. When it became known that the European powers had failed to provide the union so greatly desired, the Rumanians decided to accomplish it themselves. Both provinces made arrangements for the elections; and each elected Colonel Alexander Couza as its prince. Thus, by indirect means, the union of the provinces was effected, and the new state of Rumania came into existence. Coming as it did at the time of the war for the independence and unification of Italy, the Rumanian action could not be disputed by Austria. The powers, therefore, recognized the new state in 1861, and a joint assembly and cabinet met in Bucharest to inaugurate the common government.

The problems of the new state were many, and the career of Prince Couza, who advocated a number of radical reforms, was brief. In 1866, by a bloodless revolution, the abdication of Couza was secured, and the throne was offered to Prince Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.⁹ The new ruler was a wise executive and a strict constitutionalist. The economic problems were acute, especially those of the peasant-farmer, there was much political disorder, illiteracy was widespread, and the country as a whole was backward and undeveloped. Gradually, progress was made in the solution of the many problems of state, and the long reign of Carol I¹⁰ was a series of

⁸ Austria was determined, as well, upon the reduction of Russian influence in the Balkans, and Russia had advocated the union. Turkey was pro-Austrian and anti-Russian. England wished to keep the provinces separate as a "balance of power" measure.

⁹ Brother of the Prince Leopold who was offered the Spanish throne in 1870. Bismarck is said to have advised Prince Carol to accept the offer, saying, "You will at least have something to tell your grandchildren." The Austrian minister to Turkey asserted that the problems of Rumania were so difficult that Carol could succeed "only by a conjurer's trick." But succeed he did in a long reign lasting until 1914.

¹⁰ The present king is his grandnephew.

small triumphs over difficulties that had at first defied solution. Railroads were built, wheat and corn were exported in ever-larger amounts, oil was discovered before the end of the century, and Rumania became one of the centers of European economic life. Rumania was an ally of Russia in the war against Turkey in 1877, her objective being complete independence from Turkey and the realization of her nationalistic aspirations. At the Congress of Berlin the European powers and the sultan of Turkey recognized Rumania's sovereignty, and in 1881 Carol took the title of king.

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM IN BULGARIA

The last Balkan nationality to emerge during the nineteenth century was the Bulgarian. Although Bulgaria did not achieve autonomy until 1878, Bulgarian national sentiment had been growing throughout the period since 1815. The Turkish yoke was heavy in Bulgaria, and Turkey made every effort to hold this region in subjection while Serbia, Greece, and Rumania were escaping from Turkish control. The small middle-class element in the Bulgarian towns organized schools, spread liberal and nationalistic ideas, and struggled against the narrowness of the Greek Orthodox clergy that allied itself with the Turkish officials in order to maintain its control over church and education. The Bulgarian leaders found friends and advisers in the American missionaries, especially in George Washburn, the president of Robert College in Constantinople, and the missionary schools and colleges were of great assistance in the spread of liberal ideas. Russia was always ready to encourage Balkan nationalism and to foment revolt against Turkish rule. Russian sympathy and Russian aid were relied upon at every step in the Bulgarian nationalistic movement. It was obvious that open revolt would be certain whenever there should be a crisis in Balkan affairs, or whenever there might seem a reasonable chance for success.

The opportunity came in 1875 in a peasants' revolt in the outlying provinces of Turkey in Europe—Bosnia and Herzegovina. At once the European powers were alarmed, for it was obvious that if the revolt spread there must be a reopening of the Eastern Question. Turkey was in worse shape than she had been in 1854, and the Balkan states were more restive and bolder. The Pan-Slavs in Russia had been dangerously articulate for a decade, and Russia had built a fleet on the Black Sea after repudiating in 1870 the neutralization

clauses of the Treaty of 1856. England was determined that Russia should not have a free hand in settling the Question of the Straits to suit herself so that she could become a Mediterranean power with access to England's precious route to India via Gibraltar and the new Suez Canal. Austria had for many years been jealous of Russian influence in the Balkan Peninsula and had, besides, looked upon Bosnia as a possible field for Austrian expansion in case Turkish control lapsed. Bismarck's chief concern was to prevent a break in the League of the Three Emperors which he had created in 1872 to hold Russia, Austria, and Germany in friendly accord. The powers, therefore, hastened to bring pressure to bear upon the Porte in order to obtain reforms that might satisfy the insurgents, and at the same time they tried to localize the revolt by warning Serbia and Montenegro against furnishing aid to their brother Serbs in Bosnia. Russia grew impatient as the year came to an end, no satisfactory reform program was devised, and there was much friction and a great deal of activity in diplomatic circles. There were riots in Balkan ports and remonstrances of increasing urgency in Constantinople, while foreign warships were sent to Turkish waters to guard the interests of the respective powers.

Encouraged by the lack of agreement among the powers and the prolongation of the chaos in the Balkans, Serbia determined upon war with Turkey in behalf of Bosnia, in the expectation that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be united to Serbia as a result. Montenegro declared war on Turkey, also, and a general Balkan war seemed imminent. To clear her path of any interference from the Bulgarian patriots among whom revolt was simmering, Turkey sent into Bulgaria troops whose tactics in calming Bulgarian excitement were drastic but ineffective. In June, 1876, rumors began to appear in European newspapers of atrocities in Bulgaria. When facts took the place of rumors the word "massacre" was substituted for "atrocities," and even the anti-Russian, pro-Turkish English were aroused against "the unspeakable Turk."¹¹

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR

Russia was willing to abstain from intervention and to listen to Bismarck's appeals for agreement with Austria as long as it appeared

¹¹ Gladstone's expression. The English Liberal party was anti-Turkish, but the Conservatives under Disraeli were in power.

that the Serbian troops might be successful against Turkey. When Serbia was defeated, however, Russia insisted upon action against the Turks regardless of the disapproval of the Austrian and British governments. The diplomats made repeated efforts to patch up some sort of solution while public opinion in St. Petersburg was growing more frenzied as the days went by. In October an ultimatum was sent to Constantinople demanding a month's armistice for Serbia. Russia then mobilized a part of her army in preparation for war. In the meantime, a palace revolution in Turkey had removed one sultan and had brought to the throne another of far different caliber, Abdul Hamid II, who was determined to play one power off against another and to hold all that belonged to Turkey, conceding reforms only when he could not evade the demands. In the winter of 1876-1877 there was a fruitless conference which drew up a program of reforms to be put into effect under European supervision. The adroit sultan accepted the reforms but refused to compromise his sovereignty by permitting European officials to put them in operation. The conference broke up in despair, and in April Russia declared war.

Before taking that decisive step Russia had negotiated an agreement with Austria by which Austrian neutrality was pledged for the period of the war, in return for a promise of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia's share in case of victory was mentioned, but no detailed arrangement was made in advance either to Russian territorial gains or to Russian supremacy at the straits. Russia found it necessary to make an agreement with England, also, before she was free to declare war upon Turkey. England insisted upon a promise that Russia refrain from any attempt to acquire Constantinople or to settle the Straits question without a European conference. England demanded guarantees, also, in regard to the Suez Canal and the English interests in the southeastern Mediterranean. Neither Austria nor England had any intention of permitting Russia a free hand in dealing with Turkey in case Russian victories should be decisive. Russia was aided by an agreement with Rumania which permitted the passage of Russian troops across Rumanian territory. As the war went on and Russian soldiers were unable to take the mountain fortress of Plevna, Rumanian military assistance was given as well. Plevna fell in December, 1877, and the Russian forces poured into the plains around Adrianople from which they could see the minarets of the city of Constantinople, the objective of the campaign and the Carcassonne of Russian hopes.

Austria and England, alarmed by the decisiveness of the Russian victories, were apprehensive lest Russia now forget the promises made before the war began. An English fleet at the Dardanelles effectively prevented any violation on Russia's part of the clause prohibiting the capture of Constantinople, but the powers were determined to limit Russian gains as far as possible. The British public that had shuddered at the stories of Turkish atrocities now greeted the avenging Russians with the London music-hall favorite from which the word "jingoism" has been culled for our modern lexicon,

We don't want to fight, but, by Jingo, if we do,
We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too.
The Russians shall not have Constantinople!

Austrian and English diplomats tried to discover what peace terms Russia would demand from the Turks and insisted that their governments would not tolerate a Russo-Turkish treaty that ignored the interests of other powers.

The Russians determined to make the best bargain they could with Turkey, hoping to be able to hold most of it against the assault of the disgruntled powers. The Turks, on the other hand, were quite willing to sign an agreement satisfactory to Russia in the expectation that the powers would bring about a considerable paring down of Russia's gains. The outstanding feature of the Treaty of San Stefano (March, 1878) was the fact that it practically abolished the rule of the sultan in Europe. A large autonomous state of Bulgaria was to be created out of almost all that was left of Turkey's European possessions, leaving to Turkey just the land about the straits and a narrow detached strip called Albania on the west, along the Adriatic coast. Although Turkey was to retain nominal suzerainty over Bulgaria, the powers were convinced that Russia expected to dominate the new state. Russia was granted outright Kars, Bayazid, and Batoum. Asia Minor, ports on the Black Sea, and the Straits Question were to be worked out by Russia and Turkey. Turkey agreed to cede the Dobrudja, a strip of land on the Black Sea south of the Danube, which Russia proposed to give to Rumania in exchange for Bessarabia.

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN

England and Austria did not want a war with the victorious Russians, and they turned to Bismarck, without whose tacit approval Russia would never dare insist upon the execution of the treaty. Bismarck refused to back the Russian demands. Protesting that no German interests were involved and that he was but an "honest broker," he issued an invitation to all the European powers to an international Congress at Berlin in the summer of 1878. The spring months were spent in a series of diplomatic negotiations which were designed to clear the way to a quick and peaceful solution of all difficulties in Berlin. The Congress was almost as brilliant as that of 1815 at Vienna, but there was less feasting and dancing and there were no crowned heads in attendance. Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield) was one of England's representatives; Prince Gortchakoff, one of the ablest of Russia's statesmen, fought to hold all that he could of the fruits of victory; and Andrassy presented Austria's claims for compensation. Two principles guided the powers opposing Russia; first, Turkey must be strengthened, and, second, Russian advance must be halted and Russian ambitions frustrated.

The treaty which was the result of the Congress of Berlin evidenced the success of those who wished to hamper Russian progress. The so-called Big Bulgaria was divided into three parts. A northern section between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains was to be autonomous under Turkish suzerainty; a central strip, called Eastern Rumelia, was to be left under Turkish military control but was to have a measure of self-government and a Christian governor; and, finally, all of Macedonia was turned back to the sultan in order to leave him in a dominant position in the southern part of the Balkans. Having thus defeated Russia's major purpose, the powers were willing to permit her a few minor concessions. The tsar was granted Bessarabia (Rumania reluctantly accepting the Dobrudja in exchange), and in Asia Minor Russia acquired territory including the cities of Kars and Batoum. After settling Russia's affairs the powers then "compensated" themselves by a distribution of rewards. Austria was given the right "to occupy and administer" Bosnia and Herzegovina under Turkish suzerainty. The term was hypocritical, for no one doubted that Austria would take complete possession of the provinces. Austria obtained the right, also, to maintain garrisons in a

long strip of land, called the sanjak of Novibazar, which separated Serbia from Montenegro. By these concessions Austria was able to maintain a dominant position in the western Balkans. England received her reward from Turkey in the cession of the Island of Cyprus, in return for which Disraeli pledged England to come to the assistance of Turkey in case Russia again imperiled the straits. Serbia, Rumania, and Montenegro received small territorial gains and were recognized as completely independent of Turkey. Greece, hitherto uninvolved in the conflict, asked for consideration at the Congress and obtained Thessaly and a small part of Epirus.

The settlement of the problem of the Near East as worked out at the Congress of Berlin was to last, in form at least, until 1908. It represented so many compromises that it left every Balkan nationality dissatisfied and raised a great many questions that had to be solved later. Nevertheless, it did prevent a European war, and it did grant enough gains to the Balkan states to render them relatively independent of Turkey on the one hand and of the European powers on the other. The powers recognized the decadence of Turkey and pledged themselves to urge reforms upon the Porte. The European Concert of Powers functioned with great efficiency under Bismarck's guidance in this last great peace congress of the nineteenth century. After 1878 it became increasingly difficult for Europe to rely on such methods for the easement of international tensions.

THE BISMARCKIAN SYSTEM OF ALLIANCES

After 1878 two general tendencies in European affairs had great influence on the Near Eastern situation. The crisis had forced upon Bismarck the choice between Austria and Russia. He had endeavored to reconcile the divergent points of view of the two powers, but it was obvious that, in case of a clash between Austria and Russia, German interests lay with Austria. The crisis had shown the weakness of the Three Emperors' League, which had been Bismarck's first essay in alliance-making after the creation of the German Empire, and the League came to an end, temporarily, with the crisis. Bismarck therefore sought a closer bond with Austria, and the Dual Alliance of Austria and Germany was signed in 1879. It was a defensive pact, the terms of which were secret. It provided for mutual assistance in case either was attacked by Russia and neutrality if one of the two powers should be attacked by any other power, except

that if such other power should receive Russian aid the alliance would become operative.¹²

Two years later Italy became a member of this alliance because of a serious rift in Italian-French relations.¹³ The Triple Alliance thus formed endured until the outbreak of the Great War, although Italy was at no time entirely to be relied upon and, after 1902, was definitely known to be swinging back to friendship with France. Italian interests in the Adriatic were menaced by Austrian gains in the Balkans, and there were many Italians living outside Italy under Austrian control in the Tyrol or in Dalmatia. *Italia irredenta* was too close to the hearts of Italians to permit any genuine friendship with an enemy of such long standing.

There is some evidence that Bismarck never regarded the Dual Alliance or its successor, the Triple Alliance, as of primary importance in his foreign policy. The closer union with Austria was a step made necessary by the breakdown of the Berlin-St. Petersburg-Vienna "axis" in the crisis of 1877-1878. He said to the Russian ambassador: "There are five great powers. I must always strive to be one of three against two." As long as the Pan-Slavs were active in Russia, any reconciliation was impossible. Tsar Alexander II keenly felt what he called "German ingratitude" and was decidedly cool toward Bismarck. In 1881, however, Alexander II was assassinated and was followed on the throne by his son Alexander III. The Pan-Slavs lost influence, and the new foreign minister, de Giers, turned his attention to the Middle and Far East. Bismarck's repeated assertion that he felt that there was room in the Balkans for both Austria and Russia and that the two states should divide the peninsula into two spheres of influence no longer fell on deaf ears. The Three Emperors' League was re-created in 1881 and provided for mutual recognition on the part of Austria and Russia of each other's interests in the Balkans. It provided, also, that if any one of the three powers found itself at war with a fourth power the other two would be neutral.¹⁴ The terms of this renewed League of the Three Emperors were to be secret, and it

¹² G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe 1878-1919*, Chap II, "The Triple Alliance." This work furnishes an excellent account of European international relations in the period it covers. A. C. Coolidge, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance*, is a careful study of the background and negotiations. All of the secret treaties of the period may be found in the publications of the various European governments since the Great War.

¹³ See below, page 660.

¹⁴ Except in case of war between Russia and Turkey, when some preliminary agreement would have to be made as to the results of the war.

was to run three years. In 1884 it was renewed, but that was the end, for in the Bulgarian crisis of 1885 the rivalry between Austria and Russia flared up once more.

Even then Bismarck refused to drop that precious "line out to the east" which had been the key to much of his foreign policy since he became chancellor in 1862. In 1887 a "reinsurance" treaty was drawn up which bound Germany and Russia in a friendly alliance for three years. The two powers pledged their neutrality in case either was involved in war with a third power, unless Russia attacked Austria or Germany attacked France. The alliance with Austria-Hungary and the "reinsurance" treaty contained such obligations that it is difficult to see how Bismarck could have carried out the terms of both if a European war had occurred. However, since his chief objective in both cases was the maintenance of peace, he may have felt that he was not running an undue risk. Bismarck's successors, after 1890, felt it impossible to continue this complicated policy, and the treaty with Russia lapsed. Almost immediately Russia and France drew together in the *rapprochement* which Bismarck had feared, and the defensive alliance of the two states in 1894 was just what the mighty chancellor had predicted.

AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA IN THE NEAR EAST AFTER 1878

In the meantime, Austria set out to consolidate her position in the Balkans. In 1881, a treaty was made with Serbia by the terms of which Serbia became, for all practical purposes, a protectorate of Austria. This treaty, almost entirely to the advantage of Austria, ran until 1895. Its effect was to make it impossible for Russia to exert any influence in the western Balkan area. After 1895 Serbia broke loose from Austrian control and grew steadily more antagonistic. Contacts with Russia were renewed, and the early years of the twentieth century were filled with friction between the Austrian empire and the Pan-Slav-Pan-Serb movements south of her borders. In 1883 Austria and Rumania signed a treaty increasing Austrian influence in the eastern part of the Balkan Peninsula, a region formerly looked upon by Russia as peculiarly her own. Rumania, however, felt no gratitude toward Russia after the forced cession of Bessarabia and was glad to have assurance of aid in case the Pan-Slav movement should again become aggressive. Germany and Italy adhered to the Austro-Rumanian treaty, which lasted with some modifications until

1914. Had it not been for the great number of Rumanians in Hungary, there would have been very little reason for the entrance of Rumania in the Great War on the side of the Allied Powers.

By 1883 Russia was left with much reduced influence in Balkan affairs. With Austria dominant in the states of Serbia and Rumania in the north and English influence as strong in Greece as it had always been, Russia could look for friends only to remote, and inaccessible, little Montenegro and to the Bulgaria created at Berlin in 1878. Russia made every effort to secure a hold over Bulgaria commensurate with that which Austria had over Serbia. Plots and counterplots, intrigues and secret agents make a detailed account of the period seem more like a melodrama—or even a comic opera—than serious history. The result was definitely bad, both for the Balkan states involved and for the international relations of European powers. Bulgaria had emerged from the Congress of Berlin a small remnant of the Big Bulgaria created by Russia in the Treaty of San Stefano. About two-thirds of the Bulgarians still lived under Turkish rule either in Eastern Rumelia or in Thrace and Macedonia. Quite naturally the aim of autonomous Bulgaria was first to unite with Eastern Rumelia and then to work for the liberation of the rest of the Bulgars from Turkey. Austria was determined to keep the two provinces separate because of her fear of an increase of Russian influence. Bismarck disliked reopening the Balkan Question lest the League of the Three Emperors suffer another blow. Even Russia held back, for, although she wanted a strong Bulgaria, she did not wish to work for it unless she could feel sure of Bulgarian loyalty. The insistence of Russia's agents antagonized the Bulgarians, who had no desire to substitute Russian dictatorship for the Turkish yoke they had just discarded. Under the leadership of Stambulov, who has been called the "Bismarck of the Balkans," they developed a policy that was exclusively Bulgarian.

The union of the two provinces was the keynote of the policy of the Bulgarian patriots. It was backed by a popular movement which culminated in a revolution in Eastern Rumelia in the fall of 1885. The Turkish governor was dismissed, and the province voted for union with Bulgaria. The annexation took place at once, and Bulgaria presented a reluctant Europe with a *fait accompli* that could not easily be undone. Turkey appealed to Europe for aid only to find that a remarkable shift had taken place in the general situation since the Congress of Berlin. Russia, alarmed at the independent policy of

the Bulgarians, now opposed the union. England's pro-Turkish policy of 1878 had been in large part the personal policy of Disraeli. That statesman was now dead, and the government, despairing of securing genuine reforms from Turkey, accepted Gladstone's statement that the "best defense against Russia was the breasts of free men." A strong Bulgaria was therefore acceptable to England. Austria was in a quandary, for although she felt a strong Bulgaria would hamper Russia, she was bound by the Three Emperors' League, and Bismarck counseled discretion. France and Italy backed England and Bulgaria.

A general conference was held in Constantinople in November, and in the crosscurrents of the interests of the great powers it seemed as though Bulgaria would come through with her gains unchallenged. Serbia injected a new factor into the situation by declaring war on Bulgaria in order to gain compensation for herself since Bulgaria had upset the Balkan balance of power. The foolhardy Serbs were soundly defeated by the Bulgarians, who were about to march into Belgrade when Austria threatened to give aid to her ally Serbia, and Turkey threatened to invade Bulgaria from the south. The brief war came to an end, and peace was restored on a *status quo ante* basis. The episode served to convince the powers of the necessity for ending the Balkan crisis. In April, 1886, Turkey and Bulgaria signed a treaty in which the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia was recognized.

Later in 1886 a note of tragicomedy was introduced into the still uneasy Balkan situation in the form of the kidnapping of Prince Alexander of Bulgaria by a group of Bulgarian officers belonging to the pro-Russian, anti-Stambulov faction in politics. Whether instigated in Russia or not, this episode was evidence of Russia's animosity toward the prince and caused the abdication of Alexander when he was released by his captors. The powers refused to permit Russia to name his successor or to dictate to the Bulgarian regents. Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was selected, and, despite the difficulties in the situation, he accepted the throne. He ruled wisely, avoided quarrels with Russia, brought Bulgaria within the Austrian sphere of influence, and abstained from irritating Turkey by permitting aggression in Macedonia. In 1894 Ferdinand was able to effect a reconciliation with Russia, and two years later he was recognized by Turkey as prince over an autonomous state made up of the two provinces. These gains were far from a complete satisfaction of Bulgarian ambitions. Complete independence and the annexation of the Turkish districts in which Bulgarians lived were always the main objectives of Bulgarian

policy, but they were ultimate aims to be attained when some future Balkan crisis might furnish an opportunity for their realization.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE TURKISH EMPIRE

In the years after 1890 there was comparative quiet in the Near East as there was in the rest of the world, and the Balkan states shared in the general prosperity and made considerable economic advance. The administration of Abdul Hamid II in Turkey was no more efficient or enlightened than that of his predecessors, but the wily sultan saw a chance to escape from the reforms urged by the powers and to strengthen Islam and his own power by relying upon the Moslem elements within his realms. The Christian subjects of the Porte would be sure to suffer if religious fanaticism were aroused, and the most vulnerable of the Christian peoples in Turkey were the Armenians who had for many centuries lived in the eastern half of the Asia Minor plateau. Under a succession of conquerors they had withstood war and conquest, religious persecution, and every vicissitude of life. They could be killed and hopelessly defeated and degraded, but they could not be converted or absorbed. In spite of incredible hardships they lived on as aliens within the empire, hated, distrusted, and feared as well as despised. The Turk of Anatolia was a simple peasant, the Armenian was trader and businessman as well as agriculturalist, while the third occupant of the region, the Kurd, was Moslem and a pastoral nomad and mountaineer. In the latter part of the nineteenth century Armenia felt the stirrings of the nationalistic movement that had swept away so much of Turkey's subject states. Part of the Armenians lived in the mountain areas south of the Black Sea where Russia had acquired territory, and they resented attempts at Russification as much as their compatriots under Turkish rule did the oppressive policies of Abdul Hamid. Into the combustible materials of Armenia the sultan in 1894 threw the lighted torch of a holy war. The fanatical Kurds were turned loose upon the Armenians, and for three years the massacres raged. Probably more than one hundred thousand Armenians perished, and many more thousands were made homeless.

The Turkish government did not attempt to put an end to the horrors, and all over Europe public opinion was aroused against Turkey. Abdul Hamid was condemned everywhere, but statesmen seemed unable to devise any scheme for the solution of the Armenian prob-

lem. Abdul Hamid had been shrewd when he counted upon the inability of the powers to agree upon a policy. England could not permit Russian intervention; France was now an ally of Russia and could not back England; Germany was beginning extensive investments in Turkey, and the kaiser was wooing the sultan for economic concessions; while Russia, fully occupied in the Far East and fearful lest her own Armenian subjects be encouraged to revolt, refused to reopen the question of the Near East. The European conference which England desired was not held, for the powers could not agree upon a policy, but the massacres gradually died down when the fever of fanaticism had run its course.

In 1896 attention was diverted from the plight of the Armenians to a revolution on the Island of Crete. There the problem was the old one of the inability of Turkey to govern a region where the population was composed of both Christians and Moslems and where the Christian part of the population had nationalistic aspirations. The Cretan Greeks desired freedom from Turkish rule and union with Greece. The people of Greece were quickly aroused, and Greek nationalists agitated for a war with Turkey with the double objective of acquiring Crete and of driving Turkey out of Macedonia. Once more the powers were unable to bring concerted action, and Greece landed an expeditionary force on the island. In the war with Turkey which followed the Greeks were hopelessly defeated. Both parties accepted the mediation of the powers, and peace negotiations dragged on for some months. Eventually it was decided that Greece cede to Turkey a small part of Thessaly and pay an indemnity. Crete was made an autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty with Prince George of Greece as its governor. Although Greece lost the war, Crete was secure from further Turkish misrule, and the annexationists were soon to begin again their plans for union with Greece. In another period of crisis shortly before the Great War, the Cretan nationalists were successful in achieving the end for which they had worked so long.

THE INTERESTS OF EUROPEAN POWERS IN THE NEAR EAST

The relative quiet in the Near East in the early years of the twentieth century was merely a lull before a storm whose fury was to focus the anxious attention of European diplomats upon the prob-

lems of this troubled region. There were, however, even in the years of comparative peace, some developments which indicated the difficult problems that were soon to arise. As long as Bismarck remained in power German interest in the Near East had been limited to acting as a "broker" or mediator between Austria and Russia in order to preserve peace and prevent the disruption of the League of the Three Emperors. When William II became emperor in 1890, Germany initiated a much more imperialistic policy. Recognizing the position of her ally Austria in the Balkan Peninsula, Germany turned her attention to Turkey. Economic penetration, friendship openly expressed when the rest of Europe criticized the "unspeakable Turk," military advisers, loans, and sundry accommodations were the entering wedges. The German kaiser visited Constantinople and Damascus, where he made dramatic protestations of German friendship for the Moslem millions. There were two results of the new German policy: the Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad project, and a German-Turkish friendship which endured, with some minor breaks, until it caused the entry of Turkey into the Great War on the side of Germany and Austria in 1914.

At any time after 1890, therefore, Germany could be relied upon to be in opposition to Russia if the latter power should renew her interest in Balkan problems. It was to German interest to back Austria and to aid Turkey. If an issue should arise where Turkey and Austria were on opposite sides, Germany would, in all probability, support Austria. All three states would undoubtedly oppose Russia, who might call upon France and England for aid. After the Russo-Japanese War¹⁵ interest in the Near East again became an important part of Russia's foreign policy, and the Pan-Slavs were once more heard upon every occasion. Their articulateness was of more real danger in this period than it had been twenty years before, for the Pan-Serb and the Pan-German were equally noisy, and nationalism had become more strident than it had been in the earlier crises.

With the renewal of Russian interest in the Near East, it was obvious that friction would occur if the Eastern Question should be reopened in any way. And reopened it was, in the exposure of Turkish misrule in Macedonia. One careful observer has commented that "Macedonia has for two thousand years been the 'dumping ground' of different peoples, and forms, indeed, a perfect ethnographic mu-

¹⁵ See page 604.

seum,"¹⁶ while another has more flippantly said that in Macedonia the population was Greek, Bulgarian, or Turkish, depending upon the nationality of the census taker. Serbia, too, claimed certain "historic rights," dating them back as far as Stephen Dushan, who ruled over Serbia in the fourteenth century. There was, it is true, a Serb minority in the northern part of Macedonia, but Serbia's chief interest was not in that minority but in the possibility of obtaining on the Aegean the seaport she felt to be vital for her existence. The Macedonian question opened the way not only for friction between the European powers working for its solution, but also provided ample opportunity for quarrels among the three Balkan states (Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia) interested in acquiring Macedonian territory for themselves.

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ACCORD

Realizing the dynamite in the situation, the representatives of the great powers worked unceasingly between 1902 and 1908 to effect some solution that would prevent open conflict. Had they been dealing only with Turkey they might have found a solution in an autonomous Macedonia, under a governor selected by the powers and supported by an international loan and an international police force. Such a solution failed to take into consideration either the wishes of the Macedonians themselves or those of the Balkan states interested in the region. As the years went by the failure of the powers to reach a solution of the problem led to greater distrust between Vienna and St. Petersburg. This distrust was matched by the growing apprehensions in England in regard to German aggressiveness, especially in the matter of naval armaments. As a result of their common alarm over the policies of the German-Austrian alliance, Russia and England decided to sink their differences in Asia and present a common front to their European opponents. The Anglo-Russian accord of 1907 was the result, and its repercussions in the Near East were the preliminaries of the crisis of 1908 which came perilously near involving Europe in a general war.

¹⁶ Luigi Villari, quoted in M. W. Tyler, *European Powers and the Near East*, p. 194.

THE CRISIS OF 1908

In the fall of 1908 there occurred in rapid succession three events for which there had been some diplomatic preparation but which were a decided surprise to most informed observers. Each of the three had its roots in the past. The events were the "Young Turk" revolution, the establishment of the independent kingdom of Bulgaria, and the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The oppressive policies and the corrupt rule of Abdul Hamid had not gone unopposed in Turkey. Many of the younger generation were educated abroad, realized the necessity for reforms, and, intensely patriotic and nationalistic, believed that the gradual dissolution of the Turkish Empire might be stayed by reforms. Fearing that the Anglo-Russian accord might lead to Russian intervention in Macedonia, the Young Turks revolted in July, 1908, and forced Abdul Hamid to grant a constitution and to consent to their control of the Turkish government. The somewhat futile efforts of the powers to solve the Macedonian question came to an end. After all, if Turkey had a new liberal government and the corrupt machine of Abdul Hamid was no longer in control, why not leave reform to the new regime? All of the powers were anxious to give it an even chance for success.

The declaration of Bulgarian independence came on October 5. It was in part a result of the general readjustment, but it came with the full consent of Vienna, for the Austrians were anxious to win Bulgarian support for a scheme of their own which was sure to shake the whole structure of international peace. On October 6 Austria announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, provinces which she had administered since 1878. Only Turkey was injured by the Bulgarian act, but Austria's announcement was a deathblow to Serbia's desire to gain a sea outlet to the west and the end, at least for the time, of the Pan-Serb dream of a union of the Serbs of Bosnia with the independent state of Serbia. Austrian-Serb relations had grown steadily more strained since the assassination in 1903 of the pro-Austrian king of Serbia. A commercial war (known as the "pig war") in 1905 convinced Serbia that Austria was endeavoring to strangle her economic life. Russian-Serbian friendship grew as relations with Austria became more strained. In the fall of 1908 Serbia demanded consolation in the form of an Adriatic port for herself. Austria refused

any concession and appeared to feel that it might be wise to end Serbian agitation by severe punishment.

The winter of 1908-1909 was a period of great tension. If Russia gave Serbia promises of support the Serbs might refuse to retract their demands, and war would result. England and France were pacific and worked for peace while Russia still hesitated and hoped for a European conference to settle all questions arising out of the changes in the Balkans. During the winter, however, Bulgaria settled her difficulties with Turkey by a money payment, and Austria made such compensations to Turkey as were necessary to salve that country's wounded feelings. Toward Serbia Austria turned a deaf ear with the statement that a conference was not necessary since the interests of Serbia were not involved. Germany then came to Austria's aid with a demand to Russia that she accept the Austrian proposals and consider the matter closed. The German communication to Russia ended peremptorily with the statement, "We expect a precise answer. Yes or No. Any ambiguous reply we must regard as a refusal."¹⁷ In 1909 Russia was in no position to undertake a war in behalf of Serbia. Her army had not recovered from the Japanese War, and her financial situation was far from good. She was forced to give way, therefore, and Serbia presented her formal surrender on March 31.

Austria's aggressive policy and highhanded action won her a striking victory which was at the same time evidence of the closeness of the Vienna-Berlin alliance. The cost to both Austria and Europe was, however, so great that the victory foreshadows the catastrophe of 1914 and the disruption of the Austria-Hungarian Empire. Embittered Serbia plotted revenge, the Serbs in Austria joined in the plots, Russia made ready for the time when she might once more be called upon for help, and danger lurked in every international contact.

When the problem of the Near East again became the concern of European diplomats, the situation was quite changed and, in many respects, was more ominous than ever before. Those who had been able, in the earlier difficulties, to plaster up the cracks in the peace structure of Europe were beginning to feel that the whole structure rested upon sand, and that the next storm in the Near East might turn their tireless efforts into futile gestures. There were other weak spots in other parts of the world, but the Eastern Question was still

¹⁷ Quoted in G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe* (Henry Holt and Company), p. 421.

the weak point where at any moment a fatal break might occur. With the nationalities through the length and breadth of the Austrian Empire restive, with Poles, Czechs, Croats, Serbs and a half-dozen other peoples questioning the right of Austria or Hungary to rule over them, the government in Vienna came into the control of a group of ministers far more bellicose than their predecessors had been. Emperor Francis Joseph was very old, and his heir was unpopular with those who were determined to make no concessions to the Slavs in the empire. France and Russia, far more ready for war after 1912 than they had been in 1908, were beginning to feel that, if war must come, they might never be more able to face it than at that time.

THE BALKAN WARS, 1912-1913

In the Balkans affairs were approaching another crisis. For two years after the humiliating retreat of 1908, Serbia wooed Bulgaria. If she could not obtain any compensation from Austria, it might be possible to get it at the expense of Turkey. Since Bulgaria and Greece were deeply interested in Macedonia, any acquisition in that area could be made only in conjunction with them. After a century of mutual distrust and internecine quarrels the Balkan states were at last learning, for a time at least, to sink their differences preliminary to a joint attack upon a common enemy. In 1912 a series of treaties bound Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria together in an alliance. The alliance was directed against Turkey, the objective was the acquisition of Macedonia, and the signatory states showed their confidence in Russian aid by selecting the tsar as arbiter in the distribution of the gains that might be made.

Turkey was at the moment especially vulnerable, for in 1911 Italy had seized Tripoli,¹⁸ and a war between Italy and Turkey had followed in which Turkey had been defeated. Just as that brief war was drawing to an end the Balkan league attacked Turkey. Within a few weeks the Bulgars threatened Constantinople, the Serbs were well into Macedonia, and the Greeks had taken Salonika. Russia and England were outspokenly in favor of permitting the victors to profit by their conquests, but Austria and Germany refused to consent to the extinction of Turkey in Europe and the aggrandizement of the anti-Austrian bloc of Balkan states. Austria concentrated troops

¹⁸ See below, page 660.

on the Serbian frontier, and there was much war talk in Vienna. Germany was less bellicose, however, and worked with England and France to bring about a European conference to effect a compromise solution. A general European war was very near in the winter of 1912-1913, but the diplomats who met in London from December through the winter were at last able to patch up a pseudo agreement which was signed as a treaty of peace in May, 1913. Greece obtained Salonika, Crete, and part of southern Macedonia, Serbia acquired central and northern Macedonia, and Bulgaria secured Thrace and a strip of the Aegean coast. Turkey in Europe was reduced to a tiny hinterland for Constantinople. Albania was made into an independent state with a German princeling as its head.

The treaty satisfied no one. Serbia had not acquired the seaport she desired, and her expansion to the coast through Albania was blocked. Greece shared Serbia's desire for a revision of the treaty. Bulgaria felt that she had borne the brunt of the fighting and had won the greatest victories only to be forced to divide her gains with her allies. Rumania, having remained out of the league, was aghast at the increase in prestige and power of her neighbor Bulgaria. Out of the quarrel that ensued came the Second Balkan War, in which Bulgaria was defeated. Before the powers had time or opportunity to act the war was over, and the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913) was dictated by the victors. Bulgaria, deprived of most of the territory she had obtained from Turkey, was so enraged at the treatment she received from her quondam allies that she soon made an alliance with Turkey and came into the orbit of the Central Powers.

The Balkan Wars left European peace badly shaken. Russia had backed the Balkan league to a point just short of European war and had strengthened her position in the Balkans by acquiring the friendship of Rumania, a state still nominally an ally of Austria. Serbia and Austria were more hostile than ever, and the Pan-Serbs made it constantly more difficult to cope with racial dissension in the Austrian Empire. It was apparent as 1913 drew to its close that at any time the longstanding quarrel between Austria and Serbia might break into open conflict. When that should occur all of the toil of patient diplomats might be unavailing. The shot at Serajevo in June of 1914 was the culminating event, the occasion—not the cause—of the Great War.

READINGS

There are a number of special histories of the Near East. Among them are N. Forbes, A. Toynbee, D. Mitrany, and D. G. Hogarth, *The Balkans, A History* (1915); W. M. Gewehr, *Rise of Nationalism in the Balkans, 1800-1930* (Berkshire Series, 1931); J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question* (New edition, 1930); W. Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors* (1934); Ferdinand Schevill, *The History of the Balkan Peninsula* (1922); and M. W. Tyler, *The European Powers and the Near East, 1875-1908* (1925). Of this group, the last-named provides in its first few chapters a very useful summary of the Eastern Question. There is an essay on the Congress of Berlin in *Three Peace Conferences of the Nineteenth Century* (1917) by C. D. Hazen, W. R. Thayer and R. H. Lord. The life of Disraeli, who played a part at that Conference, by A. Maurois (1936) is interesting. *The Origins of the Triple Alliance* (1917) by A. C. Coolidge is authoritative. G. P. Gooch's *History of Modern Europe 1878-1919* (1923) is very useful. Hans Kohn is the author of two recent accounts of the relations of European powers to the Near East: *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (1932) and *Western Civilization in the Near East* (1936).

== XX ==

IMPERIALISM

THERE has never been a time since the Middle Ages when European countries have not been interested in extending their trade, their influence, and their political control to the remote points of the world. That interest has not been of constant intensity, however, nor have all states experienced it at the same time and in the same degree. One of the most dramatic movements of modern times has been the expansion of Europe overseas, and it is true, to a considerable degree, that the whole of the period since the Age of Discovery has been characterized by the extension of European civilization, the migration of European peoples, and the penetration of European economic life and standards into all corners of the earth.

For centuries each generation was able to base its life and to predicate its development upon the fact that markets and opportunities were expanding with the discovery of new areas into which penetration might be made. There were frequent variations in the general upward trend of trade and numerous fluctuations in prosperity. Looking back over an era of five hundred years, it is safe to say that the constant feature of the age was the expansion and extension of trade, with Europe as the center from which, and to which, the lines of trade radiated. If that era of nearly five centuries is divided almost exactly into two equal parts it will be evident that the first half had as a major economic factor the distribution of an ever-increasing quantity of goods to a greater number of the earth's inhabitants. The second half of the era has had its greatest interest concentrated upon the problem of the production and the manufacture of goods to satisfy the rapidly developing wants of a steadily increasing number of people. In each half of the long era there was a period of intense interest in colonics and empire building. During and after the Age of Discovery, the countries of Europe staked out for themselves vast colonial empires and developed the mercantilist system under which they carried on the commerce accruing to them from the possession

of the regions providing access to the goods of which Europe was in need. The climax of this period came in the dramatic rivalry between England and France which ended in the defeat of France in 1763.

THE DECLINE OF INTEREST IN COLONIES IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

Before the end of the eighteenth century the mercantilist theory and the utility of colonial possessions were alike in dispute. When French trade continued to increase as her colonies were lost, and when England watched her North American colonies grow to maturity and succeed in their battle for freedom, men began to subscribe to the idea that there was little to be gained by owning colonies. Colonial imperialism was one of the institutions assailed by the laissez-faire theorists and by Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and the Manchester liberals who followed them. Trade moving freely, they argued, was as profitable if the region in which the market or the source of raw material was located did not yield allegiance to the flag of the trader. Ownership added responsibilities and expenses and provided cause for friction; the production and distribution of goods were not necessarily made easier by it. The first period of imperialism came to an end, therefore, in the latter years of the eighteenth century.¹

England led the way in disparaging the value of colonies even though she yet retained the largest of all the colonial empires. When free trade was accepted as the lodestar of British economic policy, the foundation of colonial imperialism tottered, and the English liberals very nearly convinced themselves that the acquisition of the colonies had been a mistake which England must rue to the end of her days. In practice even the "Little Englanders" made exceptions. India was always in a special category. There were other liberal doctrines, also, which contributed to the widespread sentiment against colonial expansion. Nationalism, self-determination, democracy, respect for the rights of individuals, humanitarianism—one or all could apply to the problem of one area or one people held in bondage by another. As the Serbs, the Greeks, the Poles, or even the Boers experienced the overwhelming desire to govern themselves according to their own views, liberals everywhere paid tribute to the validity and the force

¹ See above, Chapter VIII

of that desire. The movement for the unification of Italy was viewed in much the same light—a people feeling itself to be a nation must be permitted to throw off an alien oppressor and emerge a free and self-governing state. When the United States became involved in a civil war in which a confederacy of eleven Southern states struggled to free itself from the control of the federal government, Europe accorded the revolutionaries the same sympathy and had the same belief in their ultimate success. When William Gladstone, soon to be the great Liberal party leader and a Little Englander, stated at Newcastle in 1862 that Jefferson Davis had made an army, was making a navy, and had created a nation, he may have enraged the diplomats of the United States, but he was merely expressing the honest opinion of numerous Englishmen.

With so ready a recognition of the necessity for according national status to subject peoples, European liberals could take no other view than that colonies, too, would in time reach the point of demanding independence. Richard Cobden led the attack in this as in so many of the struggles for liberalism. He attacked British control over India as both politically and economically unsound. He advocated free trade both for its intrinsic value and for its logical effect in getting rid of the dangerous colonial empire. Although Cobden's tirades won only a small number of converts, their effect upon public opinion and upon the leaders of the Liberal party was considerable. The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 marked the triumph of the advocates of free trade and the acceptance of a policy that was to be followed through the rest of the century. In the period between 1835 and 1867, marked by friction between the British government and Canada, there was much expression of the opinion that Canada would soon be independent and might logically join the United States. In fact at one juncture in negotiations between Great Britain and the United States shortly after the Civil War, an English diplomat stated frankly that the British would not lift a hand to hold Canada if she wished to be independent. The British colonial officials throughout the mid-Victorian period seem to have been firmly convinced that the destiny of the colonies was independence and that the acquisition of more colonies would be futile.²

These anti-imperialistic views were reflected in colonial policy. As compared with the acquisitions of the earlier period, or with those

² C. A. Bodelsen, *Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism*.

after 1870, the additions to the British colonial empire for the century after the American Revolution, with the exception of India, were slight in extent but scattered in location and of great strategic value. There was a scattering of widely separated fragments harvested after the Napoleonic Wars;³ the East India Company was supplanted by governmental officials in India; settlers migrated slowly to Australia and New Zealand; some small additions were made in South Africa; and a rather feeble interest in the Far East was manifested in the acquisition of Singapore and Hong Kong. More often than not through the middle of the nineteenth century the British government resisted rather than welcomed the possibility of additions to its colonial possessions. The Fiji Islands were offered to England by native rulers three times before the offer was accepted in 1874. Even in the early 1880's the liberals viewed the extension of British control over Egypt with the greatest reluctance, and the beginning of German advance in Africa came in an area where the British had deliberately declined to extend their interests.

Although this anti-imperialism is most noticeable in Great Britain, partly because of the vast extent of the British Empire, it may be found in the other countries of Western Europe. France emerged after the Napoleonic era with but a remnant of her former colonial empire. The returned Bourbons, with their memory of past glories, might have made some attempt at colonial gains, but the English foreign minister, Canning, issued definite warnings, and the American Monroe Doctrine acted as a further deterrent. After 1840 French influence was increased in Algiers, Tahiti became a protectorate, and under Napoleon III a foothold was acquired in the Far East and in Africa. These gains were small and do not seem to have represented any real colonial policy on the part of the French government, for Napoleon III rather consistently favored free trade and usually defended cosmopolitanism and self-determination. His one great imperialistic adventure, the establishment of Maximilian in Mexico, was a complete failure.

Spain lost the larger part of her colonial empire by revolution early in the century and, torn by civil conflict, held the remainder only because no other power challenged her possessions, or because her colonies developed no strong desire for independence. Portugal lost

³ Malta, Ceylon, Cape Colony, Heligoland, Tobago, Trinidad, Guiana, Mauritius, and St. Lucia.

Brazil as a result of the dynastic quarrels of the restoration period,⁴ but the rest of her colonial possessions drowsed on, Portuguese more through inertia than because of vital interest. The Dutch retained their vast East Indian possessions as a relic of the past but were undisputed and unenvied in their possession. Russia was frankly imperialistic both in Asia and in the Near East, and yet she seems to have been regarded by the other powers as a hundred years late in development rather than as leading the world in a new era. The progress of the United States westward across a continent presented a picture of a different sort of imperialism: the United States called it "manifest destiny," Europe was content to regard it as a development natural to, or peculiar to, the Western Hemisphere. Until the continental possessions of the United States had been fairly well settled there was little desire for colonial acquisitions.

When the unification of Germany so drastically altered the European balance of power and brought into prominence a new state born without colonial possessions and without prejudice either for or against their acquisition, there was no immediate change in the general picture. Bismarck indignantly refused to consider compensation in the French colonies instead of the cession of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. His remarks about the inutility of colonies and the foolishness of German competition in their acquisition were many and contemptuous. He wished to isolate France, to hold Russia and Austria to him, and was quite willing to ignore England. France might be kept busy with colonial ventures which would also serve to mar her friendship with Italy or England; hence Bismarck acquiesced in the French annexation of Tunis. He was interested in the Near East only as the mediator between Austrian and Russian interests and suggested blandly that the two states divide the Balkans into "spheres of influence" so that their interests might not conflict. He seems, at first, to have favored free trade, having been brought up in a period when the Prussian *Zollverein* was showing the advantage of the removal of restrictions. It was slowly, and apparently reluctantly, that Bismarck went over to a protective tariff policy, and still more reluctantly that he allowed himself to be pushed into the position of an advocate of colonies.

⁴ Brazil remained an empire under a branch of the Braganza family until 1889.

THE REVIVAL OF INTEREST: THE NEW ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

In the decade after 1870 modern economic imperialism sprang into being, so nearly full grown when it was first observed that it seems inexplicable without an understanding of the political and economic changes of the preceding years. These changes had brought into vogue new theories which already had wide popular following before the imperialists made much headway in governmental circles. As the nineteenth century waned, economic and political progress reached such a point that "Europe was converted to imperialism not by logic alone, nor by economic 'necessity' alone, but by a combination of argument and interest, arising from an almost revolutionary alteration of economic and political conditions."⁵

During the early part of the nineteenth century, England had been in that enviable position to which Friedrich List⁶ referred when he said that any nation that had so developed her industries that she feared no competition could enjoy free trade. As the years went by businessmen of other nations began to compete with those of England. The mechanization of industry spread across the Continent of Europe slowly but steadily. Factories were set up from Sweden to Italy and from France eastward to Russia. The United States gradually came to supply her own markets with textiles and metal wares. At first the new competitors were weak, and English corporations were able to hold their own in some fields and to acquire new markets to make up for those that were being restricted. In the United States and elsewhere infant industries were given governmental protection, and tariffs were erected to lessen the danger from foreign competitors. The initial advantages of the British vanished as

⁵ Parker Thomas Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, p. 25. This is in many ways the best one-volume work on the subject. There are three small volumes on the subject in the Berkshire Series: D. E. Owen, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Far East*, H. L. Hoskins, *European Imperialism in Africa*, and R. G. Trotter, *The British Empire Commonwealth*. Two books by N D Harris are also useful. *Europe and the East*, *Europe and Africa*. C. J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, has an interesting chapter on economic factors in nationalism which has some bearing on imperialism. Grover Clark, *A Place in the Sun* and *The Balance Sheets of Imperialism* are very valuable recent estimates of the value of colonies. Leonard Woolf has written two decidedly anti-imperialist studies: *Economic Imperialism* and *Imperialism and Civilization*. J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism, a Study*, is outstanding. N. Lenin, *Imperialism, the State, and Revolution*, has a different approach.

⁶ See above, page 527.

industrialization spread to France, Germany, the other European countries, and the United States. Each country, as it began to produce manufactured products, tended to supply its own markets to a considerable extent, and, when its production of finished products passed a certain point, it, too, entered into the competition for foreign trade. British production and British trade gained steadily, it is true, but the competitive strength of the nations who had entered the field more recently was increasing at a faster rate.⁷

FACTORS IN MODERN IMPERIALISM

As larger areas of Europe and America became engaged in the production of manufactured goods, new markets had to be sought or surpluses of finished products would be piled up to the detriment of profits and of business stability. In 1873 there was a severe panic of world-wide proportions, followed by a long period of falling prices, keen competition, and frequent industrial depressions. Two trends of the latter part of the nineteenth century combined with economic necessity to bring about attempts to reserve the home market for domestic consumption and to widen markets for the dammed-up surplus products. One of these factors was the triumphant nationalism which had so recently established strong governments in Germany and Italy, brought into being the new states of Southeastern Europe, and reunited the great republic in North America after four years of civil war. For Europe and America nationalism meant self-determination, but for much of the rest of the world it was soon to mean subjection to European or American domination. This triumphant nationalism was frankly and closely connected with business. The laissez-faire doctrines of the previous half century were either forgotten, or given but lip service, save in Great Britain, where free trade was to have adherents for a longer period. Under economic nationalism the world was divided up into units striving desperately for self-sufficiency and for national power. The politically powerful bourgeoisie furthered national power and its own profits by its control of national resources, overseas investments, sources of raw materials, and foreign trade of every variety. Tariffs, subsidies, the diplomatic services of the state, and national armaments were agencies at the services of economic nationalism. The whole system thus established resembles

⁷ See P. T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, Chapter III, for tables of comparison

the mercantilism of an earlier day and may be called neomercantilism. The other major factor in the inauguration of economic imperialism was the appearance, in the same period, of the powerful corporations, trusts, and other combinations of business enterprise. The joint-stock company had long been known and had played a part in the development of commerce, banking, and colonial empires in the earlier period of imperialism. In the last years of the nineteenth century, corporations, or combinations of corporations, were to dominate business and, through the connection of business and government, to play a considerable part in the formulation of government policies. As the authors of one recent book phrase it, "Industrialism reinforced nationalism and tended to transform nationalism into an agency of imperialism."⁸

The greater integration of business and the development of large-scale production not only made possible surpluses of finished goods but tended also to increase wealth and to produce great accumulations of capital for future investment. Invested in home industries, such capital might easily work to the detriment of business, for interest rates and dividends would tend to decline as money for investment became more plentiful. Invested overseas in areas where resources were undeveloped and capital was lacking, such accumulations of wealth would bring much greater returns and at the same time create markets and produce raw materials for the benefit of business. In 1870 the field for the investment of capital overseas was just opening. Between 1870 and 1914 there were tremendous gains. The annual average of British foreign investment for the earlier year was about sixty million pounds and for the latter one hundred and eighty-five million. France invested very little overseas until after 1885, but quadrupled her foreign investments between that year and 1914. Germany's advance in the same period was from five to twenty-five (approximately) billion marks.⁹ Imperialism, therefore, made a sort of investor's paradise in which large returns for speculative enterprise brought fortunes to the venturesome. Investment and control without political annexation is the most recent phase of economic imperialism.

The rapidly growing population of the European states was considered by many observers to be an alarming accompaniment of the advantages of modern economic development. Many governments,

⁸ M. Bowden, M. Karpovich, and A. P. Usher, *Economic History of Europe since 1750* (American Book Company), p. 630. There is an excellent section on economic nationalism in Frederick Schuman's *International Politics*, pp. 263-68.

⁹ See Herbert Feis, *Europe: The World's Banker, 1870-1914*.

however, considered population increase necessary for the supply of man power for the military forces and for the establishment of national prestige. It was recognized that overcrowding of population was a relative thing and that the increase of the number of persons per square mile might have altogether different implications in different areas. There is no denying the fact, however, that toward the end of the nineteenth century certain European states felt that their populations had reached the point where only emigration or a disastrous reduction of the standard of living would serve to relieve the pressure. In such countries the matter of obtaining colonies took on an added significance, and imperialism became the duty of the national state, which desired to provide homes where its subjects might live under the flag of the mother country.

The period that witnessed these changes saw tremendous advances in means of transportation and communication. It is difficult to imagine the industrial development, or the imperialistic activities of the period since 1870, without the steamboat and without telegraph and cable services. The twentieth century added new means of communication that tend to integrate the world still further and to create an internationalism of news and ideas in a topsy-turvy period in which there was an intensification of nationalism along many other lines. Better means of transportation and more rapid communications brought all parts of the world close together. The luxuries of one generation became the necessities of the next. Cotton goods, coffee, cocoa, and other tropical products were on the shopping lists of the housewife of Europe and America. It would have been a clever and well-informed child who could have listed and located the regions represented by the commodities with which he came in contact in the course of a day.

Science formed another thread in the fabric of modern imperialism, and it was a thread of many fibers. Scientific expeditions increased the stock of information about lands as yet little penetrated by Europeans. Explorers and scientists joined in the slightly mad adventures for the discovery of the North and South Poles.¹⁰ The ultimate corners of the earth were explored, and their resources and characteristics made known. The scientists in the laboratories of industry discovered, adapted, or invented uses for the products found far afield.

¹⁰ See Apsley Cherry-Garrard, *Worst Journey in the World*, for the amazing account of one of the major polar expeditions as told by a scientist attached to that expedition.

As chemistry, especially, became the handmaid of industry, tropical products, such as rubber, oil, and copra, that had hitherto been of little value, loomed large on the balance sheets of commerce.

The humanitarianism of the nineteenth century played its part also. The century was still young when the American Board of Foreign Missions was founded. In the foreign field its missionaries met men and women sent out by British Societies for the Propagation of the Gospel, as well as other men and women representing other lands and other sects. They contributed greatly to the sum total of the knowledge in their homelands of the peoples, problems, and the resources of the regions in which they had worked. Where that work was opposed by hostile natives, or by the anti-Christian and antiforeign sentiments of the rulers of the countries in which they were stationed, it was natural that they should look to their own nations for aid. If successful at all in their efforts to educate as well as Christianize, they could not help but further the cause of trade, for education created in its pupils desires for commodities that had formerly been unknown. Many European liberals, whether or not they were interested in missionary enterprises, came to look upon the backward areas of the world as the peculiar responsibility of the white races, and, firmly convinced of the merits of their own civilization, they talked, with all seriousness, of taking up "the white man's burden" and of extending that civilization to the unfortunate people who would otherwise be unable to share its advantages. The white man managed, however, to carry so heavy a "burden" of raw materials and profits that he was apt to refuse the extra load of "civilization" and to give little support to the philanthropists and missionaries whose interests lay in the betterment of the lot of the native.

To sum up all of these contributing factors, it is sufficient to say that the primary cause of modern imperialism was a new type of civilization in Western Europe. Technological changes, better means of communication, scientific discoveries, and inventions changed the balance between Europe and the vast areas comparatively untouched by this new civilization. For centuries "the civilization and barbarisms of Europe, Asia, and Africa each pursued its own immemorial path, with occasional wars and clashes, with an erratic and spasmodic interchange of ideas or religion, of spices or woollens, but on the whole with tolerance and indifference. But the new European civilization of the nineteenth century changed all that. It was a belligerent, crusad-

ing, conquering, exploiting, proselytizing civilization.”¹¹ The outstanding characteristic of the governments of European states in this new civilization was power—power expressed in money and in economic resources, in force of arms and in national prestige. When it appeared that imperialistic activities would increase that prestige, tolerance of barbarism vanished, and power, resources, and sheer stark force were used to overcome any obstacles in the path of empire.

THE TECHNIQUES OF MODERN IMPERIALISM

The new economic imperialism, which became an outstanding characteristic of the period after 1870, developed its own techniques. These varied with the degree of “backwardness” of the area to be penetrated, with the density of its population, with the resources to be developed, and with the intensity of rivalry between competitors for economic advantages. A whole new terminology has grown up to describe the various shadings of imperialistic control. There was, of course, the age-old term “colony,” and many regions where the native governments were weak were carved up into colonies by the European powers. There were, however, many kinds of colonies. The British Empire, for instance, is made up of the self-governing dominions,¹² a variety of semi-self-governing colonies in regions where white people settled in fairly large numbers, and the crown colonies (mostly in the tropics) which are governed by a semimilitary regime. India has a special sort of status in the empire, but in our own day it is tending toward dominion rights. France has no self-governing dominions, but she does have “assimilated” colonies in which the tariffs of the mother country are operative, and other colonies which have a special status. Algeria, for instance, has a considerable French population and is governed as a French department, sending representatives to the national legislature in Paris.

Modern imperialism developed other methods of control, often as effective as colonial government and somewhat less expensive and difficult to use. A “protectorate” or “dependency” may appear in some respects to be an independent state, but upon close examination it is

¹¹ Leonard Woolf, *Imperialism and Civilization* (Harcourt, Brace and Company), p. 9.

¹² Canada was the first to become a dominion (1867). Early in the twentieth century the Union of South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand acquired dominion status. The Irish Free State is the most recently created dominion.

apparent that it has surrendered to the stronger government some essential part of its sovereignty such as control over foreign relations, finances, or police power. Egypt was for several generations a "dependency" of Great Britain; Cuba and Panama have been "protectorates" of the United States. The latter country has invented yet another name for certain regions that are colonies in their essential characteristics. Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have a "territorial status," although it is doubtful whether they will ever be admitted to the union on a par with the original states. Held in permanent tutelage, they are denied the normal growth to maturity which was the heritage of earlier territories.

In other regions where there was more economic development and the governments were not helplessly weak, "peaceful penetration" was often sufficient to create a privileged position for the "penetrating" state. Such penetration was often accompanied by close "friendship" between the two governments which was evidenced in assistance given in reorganizing armies and in training efficient bureaucracies. Germany's relations with Turkey in the fifteen years before the Great War is an example of such "peaceful penetration." In return for the various expressions of the friendliness of the more powerful state, the government of Turkey bought extensively from Germany and granted valuable "concessions" to German capitalists. "Concessions" were privileges granted by the weaker state which permitted groups of foreign capitalists to develop mines, build bridges or railroads, or otherwise profit by exclusive economic advantages. When there was competition between groups of capitalists representing two or more states "spheres of influence" were staked out by the governments of the respective groups with—or without—the consent of the government of the state thus divided. Within a "sphere of influence" exclusive privilege of development—or exploitation—was claimed by the power controlling it. At times such exclusive privileges were secured by long-term "leases," and a leasehold might become nothing more nor less than a colony. Since the Great War the term "mandate" has been coined to describe the status of the areas once belonging to Germany or Turkey, granted after the Great War to the various victor states, to be administered under the supervision of the League of Nations. The mandate system was a compromise between the secret agreements of the Allied Powers, which provided for the outright division and annexation of the conquered colonies, and the internationalism and idealism of the postwar period.

THE FIELDS FOR ECONOMIC EXPANSION

By one or another of these devices the "Westerners"¹³ in the period after 1870 increased their political and economic control over the territory of the earth. It is an amazing record. The total area of the land surface of the earth is 51,600,000 square miles. In the period from 1450 to 1800 the Western nations claimed a little more than half of it and actually occupied about two-thirds of that which they claimed. Between 1800 and 1878 they added about 6,500,000 square miles, mostly in North Africa and on various islands, thus extending their claims to make a total of two-thirds of the earth's land surface. Between 1878 and 1914 nearly 9,000,000 square miles were added to the holdings of the Western powers. With the small additions made after the Great War in the form of "mandated" areas of the former Turkish Empire, the grand total of the holdings of Western powers now stands at 84 per cent of the earth's surface. Japan is, of course, not included as a Western power, but her rate of expansion in the period since 1900 has exceeded that of any other state, and her imperialism has been as rampant as that of any Western state.

The European powers did not start out upon the path of modern imperialism from the same point or with the same initial advantages. The heritage of the past made it possible for Great Britain to begin the age of imperialism with a tremendous advantage over all rivals. In the West Indies, in North, Central, and South America, in South Africa, in Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand, and in India, Great Britain had colonial possessions of tremendous extent and value and of the greatest possible variety in respect to climate, resources, and populations.¹⁴ Although colonies were often considered a liability and a burden, the average Englishman was, through long tradition, instinctively empire-minded and responded quickly to the new imperialism.

France had lost the greater part of her former colonial empire in the period after 1750 and entered the competition of the latter part of the nineteenth century with a slender array of old acquisitions in the West Indies and on the coast of South America. She succeeded in acquiring Algeria in the mid-century, added a foothold in South-

¹³ Name given by Grover Clark in his *Balance Sheet of Imperialism* to the peoples of Europe and the United States. The estimates given in this paragraph are from Clark, pp. 5 and 6.

¹⁴ See map, Chapter IX.

eastern Asia during the Second Empire, and picked up some scattered bits along the east and west coast of Africa. When the Third Republic was established, however, France had but a paltry million square kilometers of colonial territory, populated by less than six million inhabitants. In the early years of the republic the Chamber of Deputies was reluctant to take steps to augment that territory and seemed to feel it necessary to speak apologetically of Tonkin and Tunisia when they were acquired.

Germany and Italy came into being as European states without inherited empires and awakened to the value of such possessions late, to find the best areas for expansion already staked out by other powers. Spain experienced no great industrial development in the nineteenth century; therefore her colonial and imperial growth was retarded. She nursed the remnants of her past grandeur—Cuba, the Philippines, and a few scattered islands—with no realization that her colonial policies belonged to the seventeenth rather than to the nineteenth century. Portugal had been more fortunate in holding huge areas in bondage in the Far East and in Africa, but she, too, looked back to mercantilism for her guide and made little advance in the government or the development of her colonies in the modern age. The Dutch clung to their enormous possessions in the East Indies, husbanded their resources, and derived great wealth and commercial advantages from them. Belgium had no colonies, but her king was not without appetite for them when imperialism got under way. Austria-Hungary looked to the Near East for satisfaction of her imperialistic desires, and Russia had the long southern frontier of Siberia from which she could make trial excursions southward when imperialism became a ruling motif.

THE NEAR EAST AND IMPERIALISM

The gradual weakening of the Turkish Empire was coincident with the rise of the new imperialism. In the Near East, the emergence of the Balkan states was a deterrent to the expansion of both Austria and Russia, but the unevenness and backwardness of those states permitted many of the secondary characteristics of modern imperialism. Economic penetration was inevitable; their resources were enviable, and their capital was inadequate. The Balkans became a focal point for the rivalries of stronger states, and disturbances in the Balkan area caused many a headache for the diplomats of Europe as crisis

after crisis had to be met. Asiatic Turkey remained strong enough before 1914 to escape any major amputation, but the Russian knife cut off scattered bits from the Black Sea and Caucasus areas. The remedies prescribed for Turkey's "backwardness" were concessions, loans, military and financial reorganization, and the tonic of general economic penetration. Germany, after 1900, was the recipient of most of the favors Turkey had to bestow and reaped the benefits of such penetration. The Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad project, backed by the German government, was a favored field for German investment. Concessions were obtained from the Turkish government and the extension of the road across Turkey to the Persian Gulf promised to give German interests the control not only of Turkish trade but access to all the resources of the East. The project had, however, an importance outside the possible profits to investors, for it meant the increase not only of German economic penetration of the whole Balkan and Near Eastern areas but of German political and military interest as well. France looked upon Syria as her sphere of influence, and French missionaries, schools, and traders stamped Syria with a distinctly French imprint. Italy and Greece both looked greedily at the Turkish areas across the sea with the obvious intention of taking what they could when the opportunity was offered them.

EGYPT AS A FIELD FOR IMPERIALISTIC ENTERPRISE

North Africa was Turkish territory only in name during the nineteenth century. The khedive of Egypt and the rulers of the other coast states governed quite independently although in the name of Turkey. These North African states were weak politically and backward in economic development. Their rulers found it difficult to keep order within their boundaries or to develop the resources of their countries; one and all, they were unable to pay the debts which they contracted when purchasing the European goods they had been taught to desire. Algeria became French before 1850, and France annexed Tunisia, with Bismarck's benediction, in 1881. Italy had regarded Tunis as the next stepping stone beyond Sicily and, in her anger at France, threw herself into the Triple Alliance. Italian ambition, then fixed upon Tripoli, was realized in 1911-1912 when a brief Italo-Turkish war ended in a victory for Italy.¹⁵ Tripoli is the Mediterra-

¹⁵ See above, page 643.

nean littoral for the present Italian colony of Libya, which extends southward into the desert regions.

The name given to the khedive who came to the throne in Egypt in 1863 was Ismail "the Spendthrift." Railroads, lighthouses, telegraphs, and, above all, the Suez Canal were constructed. Capital flowed into Egypt from abroad as the khedive squandered vast sums on wars, palaces, and amusements. Heavily in debt, the khedive sold a large block of Suez Canal shares to the British government in 1875, and the imperially minded Disraeli scored a triumph that led his Liberal successors in Downing Street ever deeper into Egyptian affairs. Because of the canal, England could not permit Egypt to fall into the hands of any other power or to disintegrate into chaos. She could monopolize all that Egypt had to offer the imperialist, or she could share with other claimants. For four years she shared the responsibility with France and even invited Italy to join in securing the safety of the canal and the tranquillity of Egypt. For various reasons both France and Italy declined to assume any share of the burden. Without any intention of permanent occupation, England sent Lord Dufferin to Egypt to study the whole problem and to make recommendations which might lead to the establishment of a regime which could "afford satisfactory guarantees for the maintenance of peace, order, and prosperity in Egypt, the stability of the khedive's authority, the judicious development of self-government, and the fulfillment of obligations to foreign powers."¹⁶ The Dufferin report showed deep insight into Egyptian conditions, and his recommendations furnished a complete scheme for taxation, the administration of justice, education, and the development of self-government. Such a plan could not be a success without the prolonged assistance of Europeans. For more than three decades of "temporary" occupation, England remained in Egypt, the real power behind the throne, ruling as a benevolent despot through Egyptian figureheads.

After 1883 Egypt was a British protectorate in all but name and remained so until after the Great War, when Great Britain recognized the growing Egyptian nationalism and agreed to the formation of the independent Kingdom of Egypt. It is doubtful, however, whether that independence is real or whether either England or Egypt would consider it permanent if Egypt should be menaced by Italian imperialistic ambitions. After intervening in Egypt, England was drawn into

¹⁶ Lord Dufferin's instructions, quoted in G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe*, p. 86.

the interior to suppress native uprisings and established herself in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Possession of the headwaters of the Nile and the development of irrigation projects made it possible for British interests to utilize vast areas of great productivity. The long-staple cotton of excellent quality now being produced in the Sudan, for example, has freed the British manufacturer from his old dependence upon American cotton. When Egyptian independence was conceded, the Sudan remained in British control and is a vital part of the empire today, "the brightest jewel in the crown of European imperialism."

The status of the Suez Canal was a matter of European concern. England owned a controlling interest in the stock of the canal, but the problem of its political control remained undecided after the limitation of the sovereignty of Egypt. France desired the internationalization of the canal with guarantees providing for its free use at all times by all comers. England fought against this plan and insisted upon the neutralization of the canal with the ports of access and the policing of the canal in Egyptian hands. In 1888 an agreement was reached which "guaranteed the free use of the canal," but with a reservation which granted the British government "liberty of action" and, in effect, gave Great Britain full control in case of war.¹⁷ The acquisition of British Somaliland and of Aden on the tip of the Arabian Peninsula gave Great Britain control of the southern outlet of the Red Sea and secured the route to India.

GERMANY AS A COLONIAL POWER

Bismarck had acquiesced in the French annexation of Tunisia and the British occupation of Egypt. When Germany, in the 1880's, embarked upon imperialistic enterprise, she found opportunity to satisfy her ambitions in West Africa both in the equatorial regions and in Southwest Africa, an area which Cape Colony officials had always regarded as a sort of British preserve. North of the equator Togoland and a portion of the Kamerun district became German colonies. German Southwest Africa was proclaimed in 1884 and included the whole coast from Cape Colony to Portuguese West Africa, with the exception of Walfish Bay, which remained British. German Southwest Africa had inadequate rainfall and was of little value as an agricul-

¹⁷ During the Great War Great Britain fortified the Canal

tural area. Few Germans migrated, and the cost of government exceeded any profits to be obtained from the colony. Eventually the discovery of valuable metals and of diamond fields gave promise of future wealth. The area was conquered by the British during the Great War and was assigned to the Union of South Africa as a mandate after the war. One of its most valuable assets to South Africa is the fact that possession carries the control over resources and the right to limit the output of diamonds so as to prevent the overloading of the market and the decline of prices.

The acquisition of West African territories did not satisfy the newly awakened German ambitions. In the same period a German colonization society sent agents into East Africa, where treaties made with credulous natives ceded Germany many thousands of square miles north of the old Portuguese colony of Mozambique. Although England had long had interests in this region the Liberal ministry acquiesced in Germany's aggression. As a result the German colony of East Africa, or Tanganyika, was established. A great English empire builder, Sir Harry Johnston, saved something for England, despite the slowness of the British government, and British East Africa, or Kenya, soon extended northward from the German frontier to Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. In 1890 an Anglo-German agreement was signed which carefully marked the boundaries of the possessions of the two powers in Central, Southwest and East Africa. By this treaty England ceded Heligoland to Germany and acquired, in exchange, undisputed sway in Zanzibar, Pemba, and Nyasaland. Since Heligoland made possible the building of the Kiel Canal, the treaty has been disparaged by English ministers in the years of Anglo-German enmity. Both powers, however, were fully satisfied with it for at least a decade after it became effective. The British government acquired Uganda in the area south of the Sudan in the 1890's, thus connecting Kenya with its northern possessions. In the highlands of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika white people could live, and some immigration took place. Tanganyika became a British mandate after the Great War. With the possible exception of Uganda, where cotton and coffee can be grown, it is doubtful whether any colonies yielded a profit commensurate with the costs of administration.

THE PARTITION OF CENTRAL AFRICA

The interior of Central Africa was long the *terra incognita* of the Dark Continent. The coast from the Senegal River around to the mouth of the Congo had been known since the Age of Discovery. Portugal, Great Britain, France, and, later, Germany divided the coast line among themselves and quarreled over the extent of the hinterland that went with the coastal area. British Nigeria and French West Africa were the largest of the holdings in this part of Africa. Intrepid explorers slowly added to Europe's knowledge of the interior. The lake region of Central Africa was explored, and the upper reaches of the Nile, the Niger, the Zambezi and the Congo were at last investigated. Scientists, explorers, and missionaries of France, Germany, and England contributed to the world's knowledge of "Darkest Africa." Although the name of David Livingstone, the Scotch missionary-explorer, and that of Henry Stanley, who led a relief expedition into the interior to rescue him in 1871, are the most familiar, Paul du Chaillu and Savorgnan de Brazza were almost equally responsible for the arousal of interest in the interior.

Stanley was tremendously impressed with the vast resources revealed by his travels, for he made several extensive explorations after 1871, and he endeavored to interest British manufacturers and the British government in the regions he had explored. Failing there, he found a ready listener in Leopold II of Belgium who, as a ruler of a state which had no colonies, greatly desired to share in the partition of Africa. In 1876 he assembled in Brussels the representatives of seven European states to discuss opening "to civilization the only part of our globe where it has not yet penetrated." An International African Association was formed, and affiliated branches were founded in the principal European countries and in Africa. Little came of this semi-altruistic scheme, but Leopold appointed Stanley the agent for the making of treaties with native chiefs in the Congo area and for opening the area for commerce. The International Association was made over into a frankly commercial company under Leopold's direction. French merchant explorers vied with the Stanley-Belgian enterprise. Portugal and England became alarmed and made a treaty (1884) asserting their control over the mouth of the river. This brought furious attack from France, Germany, and Belgium. Even the United States protested the attempt to close the door to trade, and the outcome was

a great international Congo conference in Berlin in 1885. The conference was called by Bismarck for the pious purpose of considering the freedom of navigation on the Congo, the Niger, and other rivers, and the rules to be observed in future occupation of African areas. When the conference met its original purposes were discarded, and it devoted most of its time to considering trade and land titles. It recognized the right of Europeans to whatever African territories they desired, but endeavored to avoid clashes by stating conditions for asserting such claims. Portugal was denied control of the mouth of the Congo, and the Congo Free State was erected under the control of King Leopold.

Leopold bought out the non-Belgian interests in the Congo companies, and proceeded to exploit the region for his own benefit. He was a heavy stockholder in all of the rubber, palm oil, and ivory companies permitted to develop those industries and reserved for crown advantage, exclusively, an area ten times the size of Belgium. From the proceeds of this exploitation he built up one of Europe's largest fortunes, but on the basis of so horrible a system of forced labor that the natives were reduced to slavery and were completely at the mercy of the greedy concessionaires. Rumors of the Congo situation began to come back to Europe. England and other countries, even the United States, protested frequently, until at last an official Commission of Inquiry was appointed whose report caused the government of Belgium to take over the Congo Free State in 1908 and make it a Belgian colony. After King Albert came to the throne, colonial reforms were effected rapidly, and the government made every effort to develop both the native population and the resources of the Congo. Slavery was abolished, other products besides rubber were favored, and railroads were built. The costs have been great, and the days of huge profits are definitely over, but improved conditions and improved trade make the region one of the most valuable of the African colonies.

ITALY AND AFRICA

Italy looked on with considerable envy while other powers partitioned Africa without regard for Italian interests. She turned for compensation to East Africa, where she staked out a large colony in Eritrea and a few years later another along the Somali coast south of the outlet of the Red Sea. A protectorate was established over Abyssinia, but further expansion there was blocked by a war in which King Menelik decisively defeated the Italian forces at Adowa in 1896.

The reversal was so decisive that the ministry of the Italian imperialist, Crispi, fell, and Italy withdrew from activities on the eastern coast of Africa to concentrate her attention upon Tripoli, which she finally acquired in 1912. She did not forget her humiliation, however, and Mussolini played upon that memory with great effect in arousing enthusiasm for his conquest of Ethiopia in 1935. With that conquest Italy added a huge area to her African possessions and was in a position to bring pressure to bear upon Egypt through Libya and upon the Sudan through Ethiopia. The position of the British was made extremely difficult, and "appeasing" Mussolini had imperial significance.

THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH AFRICA

The extension of British control northward from Cape Colony has been continuous since 1815 and constitutes one of the most important chapters in British imperialism. One section of that chapter has to do with the relations between the British and the Dutch settlers (Boers) who were already in possession at the Cape when England acquired the region in 1815. There was friction from the first contacts of the two peoples. English liberalism championed the degraded natives whom the Boers had exploited, and the Boers resisted the application of the act of 1833 by which England freed all slaves in the British Empire. The British coveted the resources of the areas held by the Boers and endeavored to control both economic development and trade. Racial and language difficulties increased the friction, and, in 1835, the Boers migrated in a body to a new area across the Orange River. There were formed the small republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State which were partially, at least, recognized by the British in the 1850's. Cape Colony, now wholly British, prospered and had a responsible government of its own by 1872. Increasing English settlement meant inevitable pressure on the Boers, and again British interference and selfish trade policies caused frequent clashes. Natal, on the east coast, became a British crown colony in 1843.

Diamonds were discovered in the Kimberley area of the Orange Free State in 1867, and gold was found in the Transvaal in 1886. The settlers who rushed in were mostly British, and friction with the Boers was immediate and constant. British enterprise succeeded in snapping up almost all the native lands that remained, and the little Boer states were practically surrounded. The great imperialist, Cecil Rhodes, already immensely wealthy because of the development of the diamond

mines, devoted himself to the acquisition of a great area north of the Boer region to be called Rhodesia when it became a British protectorate in 1890. Thus isolated, submission or war was the only course open to the Boers. In Paul Kruger they found a leader whose hatred of the British was the guiding star of his policy as president of the Boer republic. British settlers were heavily taxed and denied participation in the government. In 1895 the continued disagreements resulted in the melodramatic Jameson Raid, engineered by Dr. Jameson, a friend of Cecil Rhodes, who hoped to begin a revolution of the British settlers in the Boer state which might end in the conquest of the whole area by the British. The raid was ill-timed and badly managed, but its failure merely served to make compromise difficult.

The war which broke out in 1899 was the logical consequence of the generations of irritation. Any comparison of the resources of the two combatants would suffice to show that the outcome was never seriously in doubt, but the Boer resistance was astonishingly strong and prolonged. Nearly a quarter of a million British troops were needed to subdue the Boer army which had not at any time more than forty thousand men. The valiant republics were annexed but were promised fair treatment. The British gave the two Boer states full political rights under the crown, and, later, when the Union of South Africa was formed (1909), they remained separate administrative districts. There were, of course, many clashes. The Boers generally dominated the Union Parliament and endeavored to advance their agricultural interests over the mining interests of the British faction. But they were loyal to the British Empire, and in the Great War fought under their own generals, Botha and Smuts, beside the British for the conquest of the German colonies.

ANGLO-FRENCH COLONIAL RIVALRY IN AFRICA

The most pressing rivalry between European powers in Africa in the latter years of the nineteenth century was that between England and France. Although France had refused to co-operate in the solution of the Egyptian problem in the 1880's, she had not been pleased at the British assumption of full responsibility and had frequently asked embarrassing questions as to the duration of British "occupation" there. She viewed with alarm the penetration of the Sudan and regarded the region about the headwaters of the Nile as an area in which she had special interest. France protested against the Anglo-

Portuguese Congo treaty in 1884 and hastened to extend her interests inland from the French holdings near the mouth of the Congo. From Algeria and Tunisia on the north and from French West Africa in the Senegal region, French control was pushed southward and eastward until the whole Sahara region was claimed. French Somaliland furnished a foothold on the east coast. If England bade fair to be able to traverse Africa from south to north—from the Cape to Cairo—France was progressing across Africa steadily from west to east. The two lines of advance crossed in the southern Sudan area, and there the two powers came almost to the point of war at the turn of the century. Even the mild Sir Edward Grey, the Liberal undersecretary for foreign affairs, was stirred to the point of declaring in Parliament that the advance of a French expedition

. . . from the other side of Africa into a territory over which our claims have been known for so long would be not merely an inconsistent and unexpected act, but it must be perfectly well known to the French government that it would be an unfriendly act, and would be so viewed by England.

France refused to admit the right of England to dictate in the matter, and in 1896 Marchand was instructed to lead an expedition from the northern part of French Congo to the Nile. The French denied that the expedition was a military one, but it was obviously a direct challenge to the British, for a British expedition under Kitchener was proceeding southward into the same territory. In the meantime, France had annexed the Island of Madagascar, and her protective tariffs there worked to the detriment of British commerce. In the Niger River region, also, there were rival claims. In fact, wherever the French and the English came into contact in Africa, friction occurred until it was obvious that the total effect was dangerous. In September, 1898, Kitchener entered Khartoum with his Anglo-Egyptian army and started southward to meet the French expedition. On September 19, he reached Fashoda, where he found the French flag flying over Marchand's headquarters. Kitchener protested against the French occupation and demanded that Marchand retire. When the situation was known in London and Paris public feeling ran high, and both governments at first refused to compromise. England insisted on unconditional surrender, and war seemed imminent when France suddenly yielded to the threat of force and ordered Marchand to withdraw.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE

After it was all over both countries saw how close to war they had been. They realized, also, that such conflicts were disastrous. Since each of them feared conflict with Germany, relations with each other should be improved rather than aggravated. The French foreign minister, Delcassé, stated frankly in the Chamber of Deputies that a war with England would have endangered the whole French colonial empire, for the French fleet was very weak. He did not add that by such a conflict France would have sacrificed all chance of recovering her lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine and that he knew Anglo-French enmity to be a cherished objective of German foreign policy. The British government, for its part, was being forced to the conclusion that the German naval program was a deliberate challenge to England and that isolation might be "splendid" but was sure to be more and more foolhardy as time went on. Between 1899 and 1904, therefore, through a long and difficult series of negotiations, England and France agreed to sink all their colonial disputes and to present a common front toward European difficulties. The *rapprochement* was due to Delcassé, Paul Cambon, French minister to England, King Edward VII, and the British Foreign Office. The treaty of agreement, when it was finally drawn up, was not an alliance but merely settled amicably several outstanding colonial questions. France withdrew all objections to the English position in Egypt, and England acquiesced in the projected extension of French control in Morocco. After 1904, however, the two powers drew closer together until the "Entente" bore a marked resemblance to a defensive alliance.¹⁸

THE MOROCCAN QUESTION

In the same period (1900-1904) France made similar friendly agreements with Italy and Spain. The wound caused by the annexation of Tunisia was salved by a new commercial treaty and by a colonial arrangement in which France agreed to the eventual acquisition of Tripoli by Italy while Italy agreed to the increase of French

¹⁸ The chief distinction lay in the fact that no alliance had been ratified by Parliament. England was not bound to aid France in case of war, nor was she to be "bound" at the outbreak of the Great War. As a matter of fact, however, the two powers had, before 1914, come to a friendly agreement as to the disposal of fleets, and so on, in case of attack, and England could scarcely have avoided entering the war.

influence in Morocco. Spain made a similar agreement upon recognition of her rights in the Morocco area opposite Spain, and the way was cleared for another French protectorate in North Africa. Germany was the only power not "appeased" whose interests might be involved, for Franco-German relations were not such as to permit a similar friendly agreement.

The Moroccan situation presented the familiar picture of an extravagant ruler, heavily in debt to foreign creditors, a corrupt and inefficient government, valuable natural resources, and continual domestic disorders that made the frontiers unsafe and investments precarious. France expected to force the Moroccan government to submit to French police power, French control over finance, and preferential treatment for French investors. The status of Morocco under such a regime would be at least that of a protectorate, probably eventually that of a French colony. French progress, however, was not easy, for Germany endeavored to block it and to force a recognition of German rights in Morocco, or compensation for them elsewhere. The dispute involved Europe in two crises, either of which might easily have caused a European war.

The immediate occasion of the first crisis was the speech of Emperor William II at Tangier in 1905 in which he emphasized the interests of the German Empire in Morocco and German insistence that the sultan of Morocco remain an independent ruler. "My visit is to show my resolve to do all in my power to safeguard German interests in Morocco." For some months there seemed grave danger of a European war. France continued her advance into Morocco in defiance of the German assertions and, relying upon British aid, appeared ready to risk a war. Germany demanded a European conference on the Moroccan issue. France at first refused but in the end, partly owing to the active part played by President Roosevelt, consented to such a conference which must mean a compromise solution of the problem. The Algeiras Conference of 1906 was a duel between France and Germany in which the latter power had little support from the other states. The solution was in fact a compromise providing for some international supervision of police and finance but leaving France in a predominant position.¹⁹ The arrangement did not work out satisfactorily, and trouble broke out again in 1911 when a French military

¹⁹ One result of the Algeiras Conference was unfortunate. After 1906, Germany was convinced that she had too many enemies to submit her difficulties to a European conference, and the old Concert of Powers was at an end.

expedition to Fez caused the German government to send the battleship "Panther" to the Moroccan port, Agadir, to protect German interests. Great Britain and France were indignant, and again war seemed imminent. The diplomats were, however, able to patch up peace by another compromise. Germany agreed to permit France freedom of action in Morocco in return for the cession of about 100,000 square miles of the French Congo. The compromise was looked upon as a defeat in both Berlin and Paris and left Franco-German relations so strained that both powers came to feel that war was unavoidable and might, perhaps, follow the next crisis. Morocco furnishes an excellent case study in the disastrous effect of imperialistic quarrels upon European international relations.

INSULAR POSSESSIONS

Africa was not the only field for the operation of modern economic imperialism. Even the smallest and most remote islands might furnish some desirable tropical product or serve as a coaling station or a naval base. Each of these scattered territories had some value great or small for its possessor or for some influential economic group in the possessing state. The search for raw materials had gone far afield and modern science and industry had combined in the utilization of products that had at one time been unimportant. Even a small island, provided it had a good harbor, might be of value as a naval base or a coaling station. With the twentieth century radio and airplanes were to add to the value of remote and isolated possessions.

Between 1870 and 1914 practically all of what is called Oceania was taken over by one power or another. Hawaii, Samoa, the Carolines, Fiji, the Philippines—European powers, or the United States, took possession of them all, by one means or another, with or without the consent of the native rulers or of the former European owner, as the case might be. Island holdings long in the possession of European powers grew in value as the demand for certain tropical products increased. The Dutch East Indies were looked upon greedily by other powers, and Spain lost the Philippines to the United States. Australia and New Zealand grew in population with continued immigration from the British Isles and became self-governing dominions early in the twentieth century.

IMPERIALISTIC ENTERPRISE IN EASTERN ASIA

It was in Asia, however, that the imperialists found opportunity for using the widest variety of the instruments forged for them by modern industry and modern governments. Parts of Asia and its environs had been the scene of colonial imperialism and of colonial rivalries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The East Indies had fallen into the hands of Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch merchants and conquerors; India had been the battleground of rival French and English interests; and Russia's steady drive eastward had carried Russian control across Siberia to the Pacific before the period of modern economic imperialism began. Western Asia along the Mediterranean coast had played a part in European history since the days of ancient Greece. Between 1870 and 1914 all of the rest of Asia was to be wrenched open to European penetration and to receive the impact of European civilization, receiving its worst as well as its best aspects.

In the nineteenth century, the British government acquired political control over almost all of India and from the 1850's on made every effort to develop British economic interests there.²⁰ The advance was not without protest from the native rulers. In 1857 the Sepoy Rebellion revealed a deep-rooted hatred of the invading race. It led to a transfer of control from the East India Company to the crown and was crushed as were later native uprisings. Queen Victoria was made Empress of India in 1876 partly as a satisfaction to Disraeli's imperialistic pride, but the move was no more than a milestone in the steady advance of British control. The vast population of India and its continental size and resources made the area of tremendous importance to British economic interests. The Indian peoples furnished a seemingly limitless market for inexpensive manufactured goods, especially cotton cloth, and Indian agricultural products supplied Great Britain with goods such as raw cotton and tea, valuable to both factory and consumer. India was regarded as a vital part of the British Empire. The Indian civil service, the troops for India, and the navy necessary for the maintenance of British control in India were the concern of every British ministry. Foreign policy was colored by the problem of India; Anglo-Russian relations were determined by it; and the Medi-

²⁰ India's imports increased almost 500 per cent in the period 1875-1913; her exports 350 per cent. British investments were almost entirely the product of the period since 1850. See P. T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, pp. 291 ff.

terran can question was viewed by English statesmen as of importance because of Gibraltar, the Suez, and the route to India. The British imperialist looked with pride upon the benefits conferred upon India by British rule. Peace, enlightened codes of law, efficient administration, economic development, and some attempt at the relief of the age-old problems of illiteracy, poverty, and famine were considered compensation for lack of independence and self-rule.

The Indian people, however, were unconvinced either of the disinterestedness of British good will or of the advantage in remaining under British control. Before the end of the nineteenth century, a "Young India" movement was inaugurated that proclaimed the doctrines of both nationalism and democracy in a campaign that was not entirely peaceful. Its followers roused sentiments of nationalism, unity, and desire for a share in the government by every means of propaganda within their reach, and they emphasized their demands by acts of violence. They accused the British of exploiting native labor and of stifling native crafts and industries, of overtaxing the Indian peoples for the benefit of British civil servants and of refusing to admit educated natives into political or administrative positions. When the Liberal party came into power in England in 1906, there began a process of compromise with the demands of India that has continued to the present day. Concession followed concession, and each reform was met by increased demands. A limited measure of participation in government was acquired by India before 1914. India's services in the Great War were met by a promise of home rule. In the working out of these promises Great Britain was to find one of her major postwar problems.

From India the British pushed northward through the mountain passes into Baluchistan and Afghanistan, westward to the Persian Gulf, northeastward through Nepal and the Himalaya Mountains toward Tibet, and eastward from Calcutta around the Bay of Bengal to Burma. After 1880 they found themselves opposed to a Russian advance all along the northern mountains, and Anglo-Russian rivalry was the cause of many a border dispute which had repercussions in European diplomacy. In the Persian Gulf area the British became the potential rivals of the German interests engaged in constructing the Berlin-to-Bagdad railway, and of Russian interests pressing down from north Persia. By the end of the century the discovery of vast resources of oil made this whole area of ever-increasing importance. Burma was acquired at the expense of the weakening Chinese Em-

pire, and the protectorate extended over Tibet in the twentieth century might be considered another evidence of China's weakness.

France, too, was interested in south Asia, selecting as her sphere Indo-China, where semi-independent and backward native governments fell easy victims to the imperialistic policies of Jules Ferry, the great French minister. France got a foothold in that area during the Second Empire with the acquisition of Cochín-China and Cambodia; under the Third Republic she added Annam, including Tonkin, Laos, and a "leased" port on the Chinese coast. Of all southeastern China only the little kingdom of Siam has managed to stay independent, and, strange as it may seem—in spite of British talk of the "white man's burden" and the Frenchman's "*la mission civilisatrice*"—Siam has a better record in education and trade than either British India or French Indo-China.

THE OPENING OF CHINA

The vast Chinese Empire was surrounded by a number of semi-independent subject states only very slightly controlled from Peking. These states, such as Mongolia, Burma, or Indo-China, might be cut off by Russia, England, or France without much effect upon China. Huge, densely inhabited, decentralized, with a venerable civilization and an intricate social and political structure, China was for a long time indifferent to, and contemptuous of, the efforts of Western "barbarians" to force themselves upon her consideration. For centuries trade with China was rather indirect, the actual transfer of Chinese goods taking place somewhere in the Malay area or the East Indies. Later certain ports (especially Canton) in south China were opened for trade. A few merchants were permitted to buy silks, tea, and china and to sell opium (from India), furs, and certain other Western products at these ports. Between 1840 and 1880 Western ingenuity, energy, and occasional armed force opened the door for missionaries and merchants. The process started with the Anglo-Chinese Opium War of 1839-1842; fought in the first place to prevent Chinese exclusion of Indian opium, in the second place to force the relaxation of Chinese trade restrictions. The war taught China that the "barbarians" might be despicable and uncivilized, but that they were, nevertheless, powerful and that their demands must be met. The Treaty of Nanking (1842) listed five Chinese cities as "treaty ports" where foreigners might live, trade, and erect warehouses. It provided, also, for the ces-

sion of Hong Kong to Great Britain and made British citizens in the treaty ports subject to British rather than to Chinese law and court procedures. "Extraterritoriality" is the term applied to this exemption, and the practice is a limitation upon sovereignty deeply resented by native peoples after their national feeling has been aroused. The treaty also made limitations upon the tariff rates to be levied by China upon imported British goods. The United States, France, and other powers soon obtained treaties of the same sort. The so-called "Open Door" policy was inaugurated early to insure the entry of the United States into the lucrative China trade, and it has been consistently advocated by the United States and by other powers that did not wish the partition of China but desired only that they might obtain benefits equivalent to those acquired by any other power.

There were great profits in the China trade; China had vast resources to be developed, was without the railroads, and other conveniences of modern civilization, and had an immense population to serve both as market and as cheap labor supply. It was inevitable, since China was unable to develop a strong government and an armed force to keep the foreigners out altogether, that she should become the scene of the rivalries of the Western powers and the laboratory for the testing of all the devices of modern imperialism.

THE EMERGENCE OF JAPAN AS A GREAT POWER

In the meantime, Japan had been opened for trade. The United States took the initiative in the case of Japan. In 1854 Commodore Perry, using a combination of gifts, threats, and show of force, obtained a treaty permitting a very limited entry of Japanese ports. A few years later other treaties opened trading ports providing, as in China, fixed duties and extraterritorial jurisdiction for foreign consuls. Korea, known as the "hermit" kingdom, was opened in similar fashion within a few decades, and the three Eastern countries were forced to receive Western ideas, religion, and civilization, as well as Western goods. This forced opening to trade is as much a part of modern economic imperialism as any of the other techniques by which control has been established.

The effect was very disturbing to the East. Missionaries and traders alike upset old allegiances, broke up old customs, and aroused new interests. In some districts antforeign sentiment was strong; in others Westernization proceeded rapidly. Japan copied Western ideas

and practices by deliberate government action. Until nearly 1870, Japan was a feudal monarchy, and her civilization was medieval in character. Having once decided to become a modern state, Japan advanced rapidly. Foreign experts were engaged to direct governmental and economic changes. English, French, German, and American advice was sought for various reforms. A constitution was drafted in 1889, and a representative but not democratic government was established. Factories were built, the army was modernized, and a navy was organized. In military and economic lines the Japanese copied Western institutions extensively. Christianity made little headway, and there was little evidence of any desire on the part of Japanese authorities to make corresponding changes in their cultural institutions or social structure.

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR

The results of the Westernization of Japan were apparent when, in 1894, Japan decided to share in the partition of the outlying provinces of China and staked out Korea as her portion. Japanese intervention in Korea was followed by a war with China in which Japan was victorious. China was forced to recognize the independence of Korea, thus permitting Japanese domination there, to pay an indemnity, to cede Formosa to Japan, and, most important of all, to cede the Liaotung Peninsula and the southern tip of Manchuria. It was over that last clause that Russia aroused the powers to intervene. Japan was forced to give up the foothold on the mainland of China only to watch the valuable Liaotung Peninsula go to Russia as a "leasehold" a few years later. Out of that situation came the cause for the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 which resulted in further gain for Japan on the mainland of Asia.²¹

In 1898 the powers "accepted rewards" from China for their assistance. Spheres of influence were set up, valuable concessions were obtained, and economic penetration began in earnest. Russia looked upon Manchuria as her sphere (later taken over in part by Japan), France confined her attention to south China, England's interest was in the rich Yangtse Valley, while Germany, new in the field, leased a port, Kiaochow, in order to dominate the Shantung area. As a result of all of these "rewards" the open door seemed in grave danger of closing, and the American government was alarmed. American

²¹ See above, page 604

trade with China had reached large proportions. Economic partition might easily be followed by territorial partition, in which case American interests would be sure to suffer. John Hay, the American secretary of state, endeavored to extract a pledge from the European powers that they would not construe their "spheres of interest" to mean the exclusion of the trade of other powers. Hay preferred for diplomatic reasons to consider the replies to this "open door" note satisfactory, although they were, in fact, anything but encouraging, and the United States met with considerable discrimination in later years. The "open door" was very imperfectly maintained.

THE REACTION IN CHINA

The Chinese had not witnessed this exploitation and despoliation unmoved. There were two quite different types of reaction—to follow Japan's example and to Westernize China by extensive reforms in every field; or to rise in an antforeign movement and drive out the usurpers by sheer weight of numbers and violence of action. The fanatical Boxer Rebellion of 1900, in which foreign residents were attacked and many lost their lives, was the result of the second type of reaction, while the overthrow of the cumbersome reactionary imperial regime in 1911 was an attempt to realize China's desire for modernization. The leader of the party of "Westerners" was Sun Yat-sen, a man of humble origin but great ability and influence. He had worked for reform and for the overthrow of the dynasty in the years before 1911 and was chosen as the president of the provisional republican government established in the South as a result of the revolution. In the next year a liberal constitution was adopted, and Europe and America hailed China as the latest convert to Western principles of science, technical development, and government. The Chinese Republic was faced with problems of great difficulty. The presence of the European powers, with their great economic stakes and spheres of interest, constituted one problem. The backwardness, illiteracy, and indifference of the bulk of the Chinese people formed another. A third was apparent in the difficulty of combating the traditional decentralization of government and the tendency of the country to fall into great sections, each under its own government and all too frequently quarreling with the other regions. Civil war and chaos followed, and progress toward political unity and economic and political stability was very slow. The year 1914 found the Far East with all

of its problems unsolved. The period after the Great War was to be one of continual struggle with the relations between China and imperialistic Japan the major factor.

IMPERIALISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

In the general division of the "backward" areas of the world, the Western Hemisphere was relatively free from the more obvious intrusion of imperialistic activity. Peaceful penetration was practiced by European countries in the United States and in other areas of both continents. Much of the early economic development of the United States, for example, was made possible by foreign capital. Government bonds were sold abroad, foreigners invested in state and municipal securities, railroad and industrial stocks and bonds, and bought Western lands in large tracts. As the United States grew in population and wealth this economic dependence upon Europe came to an end, and her citizens, too, acquired capital which sought advantageous investment abroad.

The enterprise and capital of both Europe and the United States went into Latin America. England and Germany developed a brisk trade with the South American republics. Capital from the United States flowed into Mexico, Central America, and the West Indies after 1870. Railroads were built, mines were operated, large landed estates were purchased, and sugar and coffee plantations were cultivated. In the twentieth century Mexican oil was added to the products to be exploited. The cheap native labor used in the operation of all sorts of enterprises led to economic bondage. The larger and more vigorous of the Latin-American republics escaped some of the effects of such bondage; the weakest and most turbulent were the most affected. The Monroe Doctrine was undoubtedly of some effect in preventing political encroachment or intervention. In several instances the United States intervened to prevent the violation of the sovereignty of a Latin-American nation by a European state. European immigration flowed into South America; whole sections of Brazil, for example, became German or Italian and were, after the growth of Fascism in Europe, to be the nuclei for similar movements in America. Again, the power of the United States may be an effective deterrent.

It must be admitted, however, that the imperialism of the United States was equally obnoxious and less easily controlled. Cuba became

a United States protectorate after the Spanish-American War, and the Republic of Panama was created largely because of United States interest in the zone in which the Panama Canal was to be built. In the period of exuberance after the opening of the twentieth century, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua became protectorates. The United Fruit Company, investment banking corporations, and various oil companies tried to dominate the politics as well as the industrial policies and finances of the smaller and less-developed republics. Political instability, revolution, and disputes between the various states made the smaller republics vulnerable. Irritation against the United States was widespread, and the growing dislike and fear of the methods of the "Colossus of the North" gave warning that inter-American relations were seriously askew. In the 1920's both sides began to contribute to a betterment of conditions. Nationalistic and nativistic movements led the Latin-American states to throw off the foreign yoke. Mexico, Colombia, and other states asserted the rights of their peoples to the resources that foreigners had been exploiting. The United States, for its part, came to feel that too-aggressive policies were bad both for business and for international relations. Through the "Good Neighbor" policy, which actually began before the administration of the president who gave it its name, the United States undertook for the first time to cultivate good feeling based upon mutual respect and confidence.

Outside of the Western Hemisphere the United States was slow to enter the imperialistic race. Several times before 1898 the Hawaiian Islands might easily have been acquired. Samoa might have been taken in whole or in part long before a share was secured by the United States. Overseas possessions came as a consequence of the Spanish-American War of 1898, and even then few citizens of the United States were genuinely imperialistic. Having ample resources and huge domestic markets, the United States has had less incentive to aggression overseas. Since the Great War, a desire to keep out of international difficulties has decreased interest in possessions outside the Americas. For the time being, at least, both North and South America are suspicious of Europe and determined that imperialism must be a thing of the past, at least in the Western Hemisphere.

THE BALANCE SHEET OF IMPERIALISM

It is difficult to draw up the "Balance Sheet of Imperialism."²² Whether or not ownership and political control have added to the economic advantages any state may have had in any of the areas, where such ownership may have been acquired, is doubtful. Andrew Carnegie once said that, far from following the flag, trade knows no flag.²³ The producers of raw materials will sell to the highest bidder regardless of his nationality. Protective or preferential tariffs have some effect but cannot counteract economic self-interest. Often a colony's most important trade is not with the mother country, and frequently the homeland's best markets and sources of raw materials may fly a different flag. Colonies have not been of especial value for surplus European population, if there is such a thing as surplus population. Germans and Italians emigrated extensively to Brazil, but almost not at all to the colonies Germany and Italy so laboriously acquired. The expense of colonial administration has been enormous to all imperialistic states, and yet not nearly large enough to permit the promise implied in "the white man's burden." Education, the eradication of tropical diseases, and economic development are all extremely expensive. Great Britain has probably been the most conscientious of the European states along such lines, although the sum total of her achievement has not been startling. The United States made a fairly good record in the Philippines, but at great expense and without winning much support or gratitude from the Filipinos. It would be difficult to prove that imperialism has been of much value to the inhabitants of the areas that have been fields for imperialistic activities. If the costs of acquisition and of maintaining order are added to the cost of administration, few colonies would show any net profit. It is true, however, that immense profits have been made to some individuals, corporations, and concessionaires. The taxpayers of both colony and empire-center have paid the difference. Undoubtedly, if some international arrangement for neutralization and the preservation of order could be devised and some sort of common arrangement for education and economic welfare could be set up, a practice of free trade and no special favors would both relieve the

²² The title of a book on that subject by Grover Clark. Mr. Clark is convinced that imperialism has not paid and gives elaborate statistics to prove his thesis.

²³ P. T. Moon comments that business is "color blind."

taxpayer and distribute the advantages most widely. Such a solution seems Utopian.

From the European point of view, the balance seems all on the debit side. Imperialistic rivalries have caused dangerous friction and wars. The taxpayer has not only been burdened with colonial expenses, but also with the crushing expense of maintaining armies and navies sufficient to hold the colonies and defend European prestige against all rivals. Modern economic imperialism has been one of the greatest causes for militarism. Both imperialism and militarism have been grounded in economic nationalism, and upon the three rests the responsibility for many of the problems of Europe today. In 1914 imperialism was an important contributing factor to the fundamental causes of the Great War.

READINGS

In addition to the general texts in European history, all of which have chapters on imperialism, it is well to mention G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919* (1923). This work emphasizes, especially, diplomatic and international relations.

MODERN IMPERIALISM. C. A. Bodelsen's *Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism* (1924) is a monograph on the period of declining interest in colonies. Grover Clark has written two stimulating recent books, *A Place in the Sun* (1936) and *The Balance Sheet of Imperialism* (1936), which give statistics to prove the fact that colonies are an economic burden to the countries holding them. H. Feis's *Europe the World's Banker* (1930) emphasizes the overseas investments of European nations. J. A. Hobson's *Imperialism, a Study* (1902) is an older but standard treatment. N. Lenin's *Imperialism, the State and Revolution* (1933) gives a Marxian point of view. P. T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (1926) is a clearly written, interesting text. *International Politics* (1937) by Frederick Schuman has some extremely interesting chapters on imperialism in which economic factors are stressed. A distinctly anti-imperialistic point of view is evident in the provocative little volumes, *Economic Imperialism* (1920) and *Imperialism and Civilization* (1928) by Leonard Woolf.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE. The British Empire is discussed in W. P. Hall's *Empire to Commonwealth* (1928) and in R. G. Trotter's *The British Empire Commonwealth* (1932). Sir Valentine Chirol's *India* (1926) is an authoritative account of one of Britain's oldest colonial possessions. *India: A Short Cultural History* (1938) by H. G. Rawlinson gives an interesting survey of Indian history and present conditions.

THE PARTITION OF AFRICA. The partition of Africa is the subject of *Europe and Africa* (1927) by N. D. Harris; *European Imperialism in Africa* (Berkshire Series, 1930) by H. L. Hoskins; H. H. Johnston's *A History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races* (1913). *Cecil Rhodes* (1921) by Basil Williams is an interesting biography of the empire builder. *The Story of My Life* (1923) by Sir H. H. Johnston is a fascinating account of a very varied career partly spent in Africa.

ASIA. H. H. Gower's *Outline History of Japan* (1927) is useful. Hans Kohn's *Orient and Occident* (1934) is interesting. K. S. Latourette's *The Development of China* (1929) is also helpful. The brief *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Far East* (Berkshire Series, 1929) by David Owen is especially recommended. P. J. Treat's *The Far East A Political and Diplomatic History* (1935) is valuable.

OTHER REGIONS. Of the many books on Latin America only two are mentioned: W. R. Shepherd's *Latin America* (1914) and *Latin America: The People and Politics of Latin America; a History* (1930) by M. M. Williams. Apsley Cherry-Garrard, *The Worst Journey in the World* (1930) is a remarkable and engrossing account of an Antarctic expedition.

≡ XXI ≡

THE PROBLEMS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN
STATES, 1870-1914

THE domestic problems of the states of Western Europe during the forty years before the Great War were, in many respects, similar and sprang from a common background of economic development. It has been recognized that democracy and nationalism were the outstanding motifs of the nineteenth century. It is equally apparent, upon further examination, that both of them shifted gradually, as the century progressed, from a political to an economic emphasis. After the period of political unification, the nationalism of the states of Western Europe was an economic nationalism that grew more intense as the years passed. Economic nationalism took the form of economic imperialism as surpluses of goods and capital followed increased industrialization. Imperialism and nationalism together, rooted deeply in economic conditions, shaped the course of international relations.

The whole intricate structure of modern life was closely connected with the machines that turned the wheels of modern industry. And yet, although mechanization had proceeded apace and was of such importance in the period, it is impossible to view modern life as though it, too, were an intricate mechanism. The integrity and the independence of the individual—his rights, his liberties, and his responsibilities—had been recognized in the period which had created the impersonal machine. In the period after 1870 emphasis was to be put, as never before, upon changes and reforms for the benefit of the individual and of society as an aggregate of individuals.

Although the problems of the period were similar in the various countries that make up Western Europe, it is obvious that the course of events would be different as the background and conditions varied. Climate, natural resources, personalities of men in charge of governments—all played their parts. In no country were the people automata; in each they reacted to common stimuli. It is possible to find

a common pattern for much of the period, but the reaction was in each case conditioned by factors peculiar to each country and to its people. Some knowledge of the history of each country prior to 1870 is necessary, as well as an understanding of the fundamental trends of the century, and of the problems that had to be faced wherever industrial capitalism had extensively altered the life of the people.

THE INCREASE OF MACHINE TECHNOLOGY

Machine technology developed in England in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Had it not been for the long period of revolution and war from 1789 to 1815, there would, perhaps, not have been the disparity between English and Continental development which existed after 1815. As it was, the British lead in industrialization was maintained through much of the century. Those regions which had vied with England in making goods for the rest of the world before the age of machines rapidly adapted themselves to industrialization. The Netherlands, Belgium, and France built factories and railroads with alacrity. Their interests were somewhat different from those of Britain, and their economic development was not upon exactly the same lines, but in 1870 it would have been futile to have made comparisons either as to the extent or the quality of the result. In Germany industrialization was slow until unification: after that the rate of speed was greater than elsewhere. The Bohemian and Austrian provinces of Austria-Hungary followed Germany's example. Unified Italy fell into line. The Scandinavian states and Switzerland made great economic progress with due regard for their own peculiar problems, and there was evidence of similar change in northeastern Spain.

THE PART PLAYED BY AGRICULTURE

It must not be forgotten, however, that even in Western Europe there were large areas, especially in the mountain districts, where industrialization was almost unknown, and that many other regions remained predominantly agricultural, even when urbanization was advancing rapidly. England was the only country where agriculture actually declined markedly as industrialization advanced. Where the new ruling classes were industrialists, they were content to build industrial progress at the expense of agriculture. In England the small

landowner had been almost wiped out. The large estates made England a land of gardens and private parks, but the urban population was fed largely by importations from abroad.

Across the Channel there was a much better balance between agriculture and industry. Intensive farming on small holdings made the importation of any great amount of food unnecessary, and there was less urbanization. Industrial units also tended to be on a smaller scale, with a somewhat greater emphasis upon the home market and trade with neighboring states than upon overseas trading. Across the Rhine lay the industrial area of Germany, where a combination of coal, iron, and accessibility to markets made the Ruhr and the Saar valleys and much of Alsace-Lorraine one of the most thickly populated and busiest regions of the world. Much of the rest of Germany raised the food to support such an urban population. The sugar beet and the Irish potato revolutionized German agriculture. The fact that the members of the Junker class which dominated the government of Prussia and of the empire were at the same time landlords, deriving their incomes from large estates, made the German government acutely conscious of agricultural problems.

Italians had long regarded their peninsula as a garden spot of great potential fertility and beauty, prevented by lack of unity and by foreign oppression from fulfilling its destiny. Careful studies made after unification led to more conservative estimates and much pessimism as to Italy's economic future. The poverty of Italy's soil and natural resources was admitted, but the new nation set to work to utilize what it had, and great progress was made in both industry and agriculture. Grain had to be imported to feed the growing population, but improved methods of agriculture slowly increased the productivity of Italian lands. Much wheat was grown, and Italy became the greatest European producer of American corn, or maize. Italian vineyards began to rival those of southern France, and Italy produced increasing amounts of raw silk. The lack of coal and iron was a deterrent to industrialization, but labor was cheap and Italy had raw products to manufacture. Coal was imported from England, railroads were built, and Italian industries developed. Before 1914 electrification partially compensated for lack of coal, and Italy's abundant water power was utilized.

THE RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND
INDUSTRY

After 1870 increasing industrialization brought common problems to all of Western Europe. In every state, as industrialization increased, the dependence of business and government upon each other became more apparent. The *laissez-faire* theories of the earlier part of the century were forgotten; indeed, they had been enunciated only to be modified or disregarded even by those who quoted them most often. After 1870, *laissez faire* was called upon only when there seemed some danger that competitive business might meet a kind of government regulation that would limit profits. The state was deemed to exist to guarantee the possession of goods gained in competitive action. It must protect private property and maintain the sanctity of contracts. Sound money, uniform legal codes, measures, standards, and port regulations were the duties of the state, which was expected to act as an arbiter or umpire between competitors and to uphold "fair practices" in business affairs. In Germany the state played an active role in business in the granting of subsidies and the creation of monopolies.

Both within the state and abroad the government was held responsible, after 1870, for other duties of a nature that only a strong, powerful nation-state could perform. The home market must be protected for those who produced or manufactured goods within the state, and the government must also protect the trader and the investor abroad. The first obligation leads to a discussion of protective tariffs; the second leads to the problems of imperialism, colonial rivalries, and "dollar" diplomacy. England, with her initial advantages of priority in the field, both in industrialization and colonization, with her merchant marine and sea power, was able throughout the century to uphold the doctrine of free trade. She was not afraid of competition, and it was essential that she should be able to trade widely and procure food for her industrial population as easily as possible. It was not until the very end of the nineteenth century that a movement appeared in England which was called "tariff reform," but which actually demanded protective duties. Its leader was Joseph Chamberlain, a Birmingham manufacturer and Conservative party leader, who was alarmed at the growing excess of imports over

exports.¹ Chamberlain and his followers advocated a British Empire customs union which would maintain free trade, or at least decidedly preferential tariffs, within the empire, but would levy protective tariffs against foreign competitors. The liberals, however, remained wedded to their free-trade doctrine and held that upon it depended the maintenance of great foreign trade and the low cost of living. The issue was stated before 1900, but no action was taken. It was not until after the Great War that England awakened to the fact that her hegemony of the industrial world had not only been challenged but broken and that competitors had arisen whom she could not discipline. At the present time free trade has few adherents in Great Britain, imperial preferential tariffs are an accepted fact, and Britain experiments, as does the rest of the world, with quotas, trade agreements, and the rest of the paraphernalia of economic nationalism.

The United States went over to high protective tariffs during the Civil War period and, in the long period of the ascendancy of the Republican party in the latter half of the century, held fast to protection even when the Treasury could be relieved of its large surplus only by the "pork barrel" and the pension system. In no country was business enterprise more outspoken in asserting its rights than in the United States, and it was only with great effort that some of the rudiments of control over railroads, trusts, and other forms of corporative wealth were established. It is difficult to find an economist who tries to justify the system of protection, as it appears in the United States in the twentieth century, but business interests through Congressional action have kept highly protective tariffs on the statute books. In the postwar period, as the dangers of economic nationalism have become apparent, there have been attempts to modify protection by reciprocal international trade agreements.

Friedrich List, who published his *National System of Political Economy* in 1841, was the father of protection in Germany. His theories were not adopted until after the formation of the German Empire. Several reasons led Bismarck to swing over from the old *Zollverein* theories to protection. The enthusiasm and exuberance over

¹ England's foreign trade increased 120 per cent between 1872 and 1913, but that of other countries, especially Germany, was increasing more than twice as rapidly. Many countries paid for the difference between imports and exports by several "invisible assets" such as the income from the carrying trade, sums spent by foreign travelers, fees for banking and exchange services, interest on investments abroad, profits from concessions, and so on.

unification, plus the too rapid payment of the French indemnity, led to overconfidence and speculation. When the panic of 1873 followed, the usual wails of distress from business and agriculture stirred the Germans into searching for the causes of business cycles.² The conservative Junker party feared that German agriculture could not maintain itself against the flood of food supplies coming in from the Americas, while the manufacturer asked for a monopoly in the home market. A farmers' bloc was formed in the Reichstag in 1879, and high protection was provided for agricultural products and for manufactured goods. The German tariffs were flexible and could be regulated from time to time on the recommendation of a tariff commission. Neither tariffs nor business regulations were matters of politics. Scientific long-term planning was the desired end. Both Italy and France adopted a protective tariff policy before 1890, and their example was followed by many of the smaller states of Western Europe.

Under protection German business expanded tremendously. Efficiency and economy in production and a careful study of market conditions made possible the establishment of German goods in foreign markets in such amounts that competitors grew to hate the trademark "Made in Germany." Industrialized rather late and long accustomed to the control of a paternalistic government, Germans fitted easily into the grooves of a "planned economy." Germany jumped the laissez-faire period almost entirely and emerged after 1890 as the leading advocate of economic nationalism and economic imperialism. "Big business" was made even more formidable by the cartel system, which provided for pools, or business agreements, to regulate output, prices, and division of market territories. There was no antitrust sentiment in Germany, for government regulation was accepted as a matter of course, the state played an active part in furthering business, and large-scale enterprise was considered normal. As a result monopoly structure under government supervision was the accepted order. There was a close union between science and industry in Germany; both received government aid. Regulation was expected, and through the ownership of railroads and other public service agencies, the government entered into business itself.³ The policy of imperialism was, in

² The panic of 1873 was world-wide, and its causes and course were of international significance.

³ Railroads were individual state enterprises, not the property of the imperial government, but the empire regulated them carefully. Thorstein Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*, is good for all of the economic questions.

part, the result of the fear of German industrialists that they might be cut off from raw materials and from markets for their vast amounts of manufactured products. As German wealth and German trade grew, Germany too began to pay for the excess of imports over exports with "invisible" income from freight rates, interest from overseas investments, and from payment for services in the complicated relationships of international finance.

France was prosperous in the period of the Third Republic. It is probable that no other country enjoyed such widespread prosperity, for wealth was more evenly distributed than in almost any other region. The agricultural unit was the peasant-proprietor, and the same sort of standard went through the structure of retail business and manufacture. There was less governmental regulation than in Germany. The small establishments were thrifty, and savings were invested in the business, or in land and in government securities. The French *rentier* class lived on incomes from government bonds and from investments in colonial or foreign enterprises. More self-contained, France needed little foodstuffs from abroad. Domestic trade furnished her best market, although French goods were a part of the luxury trade of all nations. Paris, as a great international capital for the world of wealth, leisure, and culture, enjoyed an income that represented an immense amount of foreign capital. The same thing might be said in some degree of the Netherlands and of Belgium, although the former probably drew more income from her colonial possessions than did France.

Italy was poor, and the standard of living for the lower classes was decidedly lower. Italian imports exceeded exports, and Italians had to use the merchant fleets and banking facilities of other states. Emigration helped somewhat, for emigrants did not have to be supported from Italian income. In fact, the sums sent home to the families of emigrants by those who made money in the New World and the money spent by travelers in Italy were the chief means of balancing the annual trade account.⁴

⁴ For this problem of the relations of government and economic development as well as other nonpolitical problems of the period, it is rather hard to select material for further reading. General texts have been so much concerned with diplomatic and political history, and the literature for special fields is so detailed, that one is forced to a rather limited list. J. S. Schapiro, *Modern and Contemporary European History*, Part II, Chaps. XVI-XX, and Part II, Chaps. XXVI-XXIX, is about the best brief account that can be used. G. P. Gooch, *Germany*, Benedetto Croce, *A History of Italy, 1871-*

THE ADVANCE OF DEMOCRACY: SUFFRAGE EXTENSION

In the period after 1870 there was a widespread culmination of the movement toward democratization, in so far as that could be effected by manhood suffrage. The Reform Bill of 1867 in England reduced the property qualification for suffrage so that nearly twice as many Englishmen could vote. In 1872 the Liberal party put through a measure providing for the secret, or Australian, ballot. In 1884 the third Parliamentary Reform Bill of the century again cut the property qualification and made the qualifications the same for both agricultural and urban districts. By this measure nearly 2,000,000 rural workers were enfranchised, and the total number of voters was increased by 40 per cent. In the following year, the whole country was redistricted so that the constituencies were of even size throughout the country, providing one representative in Parliament for every 50,000 of the population. After 1884 England practically had manhood suffrage. A few groups were still without a vote, more by accident than design; in general, the disfranchised either did not own the houses in which they lived or did not pay rent for their lodgings. The Third Republic in France was founded on the basis of complete manhood suffrage, and political democracy was implied in French governmental institutions after 1879. In Germany, the Reichstag was elected on the basis of manhood suffrage. A large majority of the states of the German Empire had manhood suffrage, also, but Prussia, the largest and most important, kept the three-class system of the Constitution of 1850⁵ until after the Great War. Since the Reichstag was less influential in Germany than were the popularly elected lower houses in other countries, manhood suffrage meant less democratization in Germany than elsewhere. The heavy percentage of illiteracy in Italy caused a certain reluctance to enfranchise the masses. Suffrage extension was coupled with the advance of literacy. The electorate was more than tripled in 1882, and universal manhood suffrage was established by 1912. Belgium removed property qualifications from suffrage

1915, G. M. Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century*, W. H. Dawson, *Evolution of Modern Germany and The German Empire*, and C. H. C. Wright, *The Third French Republic*, will fill in some gaps J. H. Clapham, *The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914*, and his *Economic History of Modern Britain*, and W. F. Bruck, *Social and Economic History of Germany from William II to Hitler, 1888-1938*, are good special treatments.

⁵ See above, pages 529-30.

in 1894, the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands liberalized their constitutions but did not provide manhood suffrage before the turn of the century. Even Portugal and Spain had liberal suffrage laws, although other conditions prevented real democratic control over government.

THE BRITISH SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

The extension of suffrage was only one of several manifestations of democratization. Without power in the hands of the legislative bodies thus elected and without control exerted by these bodies over executive policy, democracy would have been a meaningless word. Since many European governments based the constitutions drawn up in the nineteenth century upon the famous, but largely unwritten one, of Great Britain, it might be well to restate the major features of the English system. In theory, the king is a limited monarch; in practice he "reigns but does not rule," and the activities of the government are carried on in his name through ministers responsible to Parliament. The power and functions of the crown have been taken over by Parliament, and the term "Crown in Parliament" covers the broad executive activities of the very powerful cabinet. The king is of great importance as the representative of all parts of the empire and may in emergencies, through the force of his personality and the disinterested nature of his position, exert considerable influence through his right to "warn," "advise," and "encourage" his ministers. He does not, however, veto measures or in any way influence legislation. Since he is of value to the nation chiefly as a symbol, his private as well as his public life are matters of state concern, and he has less freedom of action than an elected official.

Executive power rests in the hands of the cabinet, which is a committee of members of the majority party in Parliament, chosen by a caucus of that party in the House of Commons. The cabinet initiates all important bills and appoints all executive officials. It holds office until it can no longer obtain a majority vote on important measures. It may then resign and permit the formation of a cabinet from the opposition party in Parliament, or the House of Commons may be dissolved and a new election held to determine whether the public prefers a government by the old cabinet or a new administration representing the opposition party. It is not necessary that more than three weeks elapse between a vote of "no confidence" and the

return of a new House of Commons to London. The House of Lords is, in theory, of equal importance in legislation with the House of Commons. In fact, however, since 1911 the House of Lords has not had the right to veto any important act of the Commons. It can at most delay the passage of legislation for two years. Sovereignty is therefore definitely located in the House of Commons, which is elected every five years on a basis of universal suffrage. Its power is operative largely through the cabinet. The prime minister of England, as head of the cabinet, is probably the most powerful executive among the heads of democratic governments, but his power is dependent upon his ability to obtain the votes of a majority of the members of the Commons. Since there is no single document or constitution, everything which Parliament does is constitutional, and any governmental institution may be changed by a majority vote.

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE

The constitutions of many of the countries of Europe were modeled upon that of England. The executives, whether kings or presidents, were supposed to play the part of an English king, while real power was vested in a prime minister and cabinet responsible to the popularly elected lower house of the legislature. Conditions in France may be used by way of illustration. By the law of 1875 the president of the Third Republic was to be elected by the legislature for a seven-year term. No executive act was to be legal without being countersigned by a member of the cabinet, and the president was given no real veto power. The Organic Act provided for a centralized government and a bicameral legislature. The Chamber of Deputies is elected directly by manhood suffrage; the Senate is selected by electoral bodies and has somewhat more power than the House of Lords, but less than the United States Senate.

The Chamber of Deputies was modeled upon the House of Commons, and the cabinet was supposed to function as a responsible ministry in the English sense. The system has worked out quite differently in France, however, and in other European countries, largely because there has been a multiplicity of parties, and no one party has been able to obtain a majority of the Chamber. For various reasons no European country has followed the British two-party tendency. In the early years of the Third Republic there was a sharp division between monarchists and republicans. Neither of these major

groups was a unit, for within each there were factions. The republicans divided into the bourgeois and Leftist wings, and the radical groups differed as to whether to co-operate with the bourgeoisie in the formulation of government policy through accepting ministerial responsibility or to act purely as an opposition force. The result was a multiplicity of parties, each representing a different line of political theory or action. Cabinets are therefore made up of men from several parties and stand or fall as the group, or bloc, which supports them obtains or loses a majority vote in the Chamber. With many parties representing relatively slight differences of opinion, party ties are weak, and it is difficult to hold coalitions together. As a result cabinet changes are frequent, and parliamentary crises follow one another with bewildering rapidity. The situation is far less chaotic than it seems to an outsider, for three or four factors make for stability. The Chamber is not dissolved, as it may be in England, when the cabinet fails to hold a majority of the votes. A new cabinet is formed, representing a new bloc, and the work of government goes on as before. Often many of the members of the new cabinet were also members of the old. The highly centralized administrative system of France carries on regardless of cabinet shifts, and the bureaucracy is little touched by political changes. Since there is little party organization, there is little emphasis upon platform and policy. Political leaders are of more importance than party machinery. Each important political figure is usually backed by a newspaper and a faction or party of his own. The framework may have been British, but the finished structure of government has a decidedly Continental appearance.

GOVERNMENT IN THE GERMAN EMPIRE

There was very little resemblance to the English system in the structure of the German Empire (1871-1918). Germany was a federal state, the executive was independent of the legislative body, and the power of the appointive upper house (Bundesrath) was intended to exceed that of the lower house (Reichstag).⁶ The states which made up the empire varied in regard to democratic standards. Prussia, the largest and most important, was one of the least democratic.⁷ The

⁶ See above, page 567. As a matter of fact, the chancellor could not act without the support of the Reichstag, for it could refuse to pass any legislative act desired by the executive.

⁷ See above, page 530.

Reichstag, which was elected upon a manhood suffrage basis, exerted a considerable influence even though it did not control executive policy. Its debates expressed public opinion, its consent was necessary for legislation, and its parties were powerful enough to influence the action of ministers. The political parties of the Reichstag were made up of rather loosely organized groups which combined into blocs from time to time. The Conservatives favored an aggressive foreign policy, a large army and navy, and protective tariffs, especially on agricultural products. The National Liberals and Radicals represented the middle classes and advocated much the same policies as those favored by the bourgeoisie in all countries. The Radicals demanded political reforms and the establishment of a genuine parliamentary government with ministerial responsibility. The Center was the Catholic party, especially strong in Bavaria and the Rhineland. The party making the greatest gains after 1900 was the Social Democratic party, representing the socialistic working classes. The long centuries of paternalism and militarism in Prussia made their imprint on the government of the German Empire and on the general attitude of the German people to that government. An efficient and highly trained bureaucracy maintained high standards in the administrative system, new legal codes after 1870 put the judiciary on a modern level, and in the honesty and efficiency of its operation the average citizen found some compensation for his lack of influence in the government. There was much agitation in Prussia, however, for a revision of the Constitution to end the three-class system of voting and for the establishment of ministerial responsibility. The liberals throughout the empire prior to 1918 wished to reduce the power of the Bundesrath and to bring the ministry under Reichstag control. Some radical groups were anxious to do away with the federal system and the empire, substituting in their stead a centralized republic.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT

Under the *Ausgleich* (1867)⁸ the Austro-Hungarian Empire came into the later years of the nineteenth century with a dual government over two autonomous areas. The emperor of Austria was the king of Hungary, and a Diet, or Parliament, met annually in each of the two regions. Executive power in each was exerted by a ministry

⁸ See above, page 569.

responsible to the monarch, who also had an absolute veto over legislation. The Diets of Austria and of Hungary were dominated by the aristocracy and the upper middle class. For the early years after 1867 suffrage was narrowly restricted. There were successive modifications in Austria until, in 1907, manhood suffrage was established, and its exercise was made compulsory. In Hungary suffrage remained restricted and indirect. As late as 1910, only about one million out of a population of twenty million had the right to vote, and the electoral laws were so manipulated that, although the population was almost equally divided between Magyars and non-Magyars, nearly all the seats in Parliament were occupied by Magyars. In both Austria and Hungary the problem of nationalities⁹ complicated politics and retarded the growth of real democracy. For common purposes a joint organization known as the "Delegations" was devised, and a joint ministry was maintained for matters relating to foreign affairs, army, and imperial finance.

SWITZERLAND

Discussion of the democratization of European governments cannot be complete without a brief mention of the government of Switzerland. In structure Switzerland is unique in Europe, for she is the only successful modern confederation of autonomous cantons. Both territory and population are very small, but in governmental institutions the Swiss have developed a democracy of great significance. There is universal manhood suffrage. Each canton has a representative government of its own and sends representatives to a national legislature which acts on matters of concern to the country as a whole. The national executive is a committee of the legislature, the chairman of which is designated as the president of the confederation. In each canton, all important legislation is submitted to the electorate for approval, and the voters may, if a sufficient number of them so petition, initiate any legislation the public desires. The same principle is applied in the national government. Any organic change in the government must be submitted by referendum; other legislation may upon petition be referred to the people for vote. The people of Switzerland are of three nationalities; Germans are the most numerous, the French are second, and the Italians third. There has been no nationalities problem, all three languages are official, and the

⁹ See above, pages 532-38.

educated Swiss are at least trilingual. Members of parliament may deliver their speeches in any one of the three languages. Completely tolerant of national and religious differences themselves, the Swiss have offered asylum to the oppressed of all countries and, in the past century, in international affairs have been concerned chiefly with the maintenance of their own absolute neutrality. It is significant that neither Nazi nor Fascist propaganda seems to have made any headway among the German or Italian Swiss in the period since the Great War. The Swiss ask little of the outside world save to be left alone politically and to be permitted to exchange their products for those necessities which their mountain fastnesses cannot provide.

THE ADVANCE OF EDUCATION IN ENGLAND

The problem of democratization was tied up with that of education, for the liberal early became convinced that a voting public must be literate. The problem of education was, in its turn, connected with that of the secularization of the state. If education were to remain a function of a powerful church, mass literacy and mass voting might easily endanger the existence of the state. In all European countries in the nineteenth century there have been problems connected with the relations of church and state. In nearly every case the crux of the problem has been the control of the church over education; in general, the result has been the final triumph of the state.

In England the entry of the government into the field of education was undoubtedly delayed for many years by the priority of the Anglican church and of the dissenting sects in that field. The first tentative moves of the government were in the form of assistance to the various Voluntary Societies and the schools already in existence. Catholics, Dissenters, and members of the Church of England, hesitated, as members of Parliament, to advocate measures that might in operation aid one group at the expense of others. The English nonconformist working classes were reluctant to further the power of Anglicanism in any way. A national school system, on the other hand, would be difficult to establish without interference with those already in existence. The Education Act of 1870 (the Forster Act) was a characteristically British compromise. Its aim was to establish schools "to complete the voluntary system and fill up the gaps." The new state schools—"board schools"—were supported by local taxes and managed by local boards of education. They were a great success in

eradicating illiteracy but served to accentuate the differences in education between the social classes. In the same period the British government removed the last of the restrictions against non-Anglicans. In 1869 church and state were separated in Ireland. The Church of England was disestablished in Wales early in the twentieth century. The connection between church and state remained unbroken in England, but there were many attacks upon its privileged position, and it has not been permitted any political significance. In 1871 Parliament repealed the laws requiring that all recipients of degrees at Oxford and Cambridge must be members of the Church of England. It was not until 1888 that the last religious test for office holders was removed by the substitution of an affirmation of loyalty for the customary oath of allegiance.

THE PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION AND OF CHURCH AND STATE IN FRANCE

The problem of the relations between church and state was far less simple on the Continent. In the countries with large Catholic populations the struggle was most severe and was complicated by the old problem of "ultramontanism"—the allegiance of the Catholic clergy and laity to Rome. With the advance of democracy and the increase in power in the lower houses of national legislatures, the conflict was carried into politics and a Catholic party was formed in almost all countries. This clerical party tended to be conservative on many issues, but, since it belonged consistently neither to the Right nor to the Left, it was usually known as the Center party. Where the division between the groups of the Right and Left was close, the Center party often held a balance of power that made its importance out of all proportion to its numbers.

In France the Catholic Church was still united with the state by the Concordat of 1801.¹⁰ It was strong among the nobles and the peasantry—in other words, among the monarchists. From the beginning of the Third Republic, the church was looked upon with suspicion and enmity by republicans, and its influence in education was considered a menace to the existence of the republic, which had always recognized the necessity for extensive expenditure of state funds for education. The elaborate Napoleonic system of education

¹⁰ See above, page 390.

had never been put into complete effect, especially in the fundamental elementary branches. After the restoration, the many religious teaching orders practically controlled the education of French children. In 1833 a law was passed requiring the establishment of local public schools, but attendance was not made compulsory, and many children, particularly in the rural districts, were not sent to school. The defects in the French system had long been realized by the French liberals, who went so far as to state that German superiority in education had been the cause for the defeat of France in 1870. The republicans were convinced that democracy could succeed only if the French were educated—that suffrage without literacy would be futile and dangerous. The work of educational reform in France was undertaken by Jules Ferry, who served both as minister of education and as prime minister. Ferry was an anticlerical, and the Ferry laws (1881-1886) established a national system of free schools supported by both local and state governments. No state support was provided for church schools. Elementary education in public or private schools was made compulsory; religious instruction in public schools was forbidden; normal schools were provided; and only lay persons were given certificates to teach in public schools. Higher education for women was encouraged, and nearly all educational institutions were opened to both sexes on equal terms.

The Ferry laws made possible the growth of secular public education but did not restrict the educational activities of religious orders except by denying them the financial support of the state. The mildness of the educational laws was no measure, however, of the antagonism of the republicans for the church. In 1884 a law was passed recognizing marriage as a civil contract and permitting its dissolution by legal divorce. The minister of public worship was usually an anticleric and administered the affairs of the church in a manner indicative of the general unfriendliness of the republican attitude. Neither side, however, desired the separation of church and state. The prestige, income, and influence of the church were larger under the establishment. The republicans, on the other hand, felt that their clerical enemies were less dangerous when under some measure of state control.

THE DREYFUS CASE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE TO
THE THIRD REPUBLIC

It remained for the Dreyfus affair to bring every latent animosity into the open and to make it possible for a triumphant republicanism to administer a final blow to its foes. The dramatic story of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, falsely accused in 1894 of selling the military secrets of his country, reads like a mystery or detective novel. The details of the plot and the various incidents which kept the case before the whole world for a decade need not be recounted here.¹¹ It is essential that the factors which made the case of vital importance to French republicanism and democracy be understood. Dreyfus was a Jew, and anti-Semitism was aroused. His case was tried in secret. The military refused to endanger its prestige by reopening the case when new evidence was obtained. The aristocracy and the clerical party threw their influence with the military authorities, while all of the champions of liberalism fought to bring about a new trial under civil authority and the vindication of Dreyfus. Anatole France and Emile Zola,¹² leading French novelists, were among his champions. The socialist Jaurès and the journalist Clemenceau aided in what they considered to be the defense of democracy and humanity. Colonel Georges Picquart, head of the military intelligence bureau, unearthed evidence that a man named Esterhazy had been guilty of the offense for which Dreyfus had been condemned and defied his military superiors in demanding a new trial. Public opinion was roused as never before. All republican parties in the Chamber of Deputies drew together in 1899 into a bloc to support a "Cabinet of Republican Defense" under Prime Minister Waldeck-Rousseau and a group of leaders including Millerand, Clemenceau, and Briand. Their policies were anticlerical and included the separation of church and state and extensive social reforms. A second court martial resulted in a second condemnation of Dreyfus, after proceedings so biased as to make a travesty of justice. Dreyfus was pardoned by President Loubet as an evidence that the civil authorities disapproved the conduct of the military courts. The vindication of Dreyfus was finally obtained (1906)

¹¹ The case is discussed in Chaps. VII and VIII, C. H. C. Wright, *The Third Republic in France*. There is a good brief account in J. S. Schapiro, *Modern and Contemporary European History*, pp. 337-42, and in C. D. Hazen, *Europe since 1815*, pp. 354-59.

¹² Zola's *J'accuse* was one of the most famous publications in the case.

when the supreme civil court of France reviewed the case and completely exonerated him. When the excitement of the battle was over, it was apparent that the republic was on a more secure basis than ever before, for civil government had maintained its authority over the military leaders, and popular democratic opinion had forced a revision of a case which involved the prestige of the army, that last stronghold of French royalism. The result was a great increase of strength for the liberal forces of the republic. The monarchists and clericals received a blow from which they were unable to recover. The army was democratized and brought largely under state control, and the authority of the civil government was established.

THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN FRANCE

The Dreyfus affair brought the relations between the Third Republic and the Catholic Church into prominence, for the Catholics had supported the army and opposed the revision of the case. The Waldeck-Rousseau ministry determined to take an aggressively anticlerical position and opened the attack by denouncing the rivalry of the clerical system of education. The Associations Law of 1901 required all religious orders to be incorporated or "authorized" by the state; those that did not acquire state licenses were to be suppressed and their property was to be confiscated. Administered drastically, the law had the effect of driving out the religious orders. It was especially directed against the teaching orders, and was followed, in 1904, by a second law forbidding all teaching by members of religious orders. Church schools were closed or came under government control and were thoroughly secularized. The separation of church and state, the final stage in the long conflict, was embodied in the Separation Law of 1905, which was largely the work of the socialist member of the Chamber of Deputies, Aristide Briand. The law abrogated the Concordat of 1801 and provided for the withdrawal of all state subsidies from the church and for the turning over of all church property to "associations," or boards of trustees.¹³ The pope denounced the law, and there were several years of dissension before a series of minor

¹³ The law applied to Protestants and Jews as well, for they had also received support from the state. The government made provision in 1905 for continuing pensions for clerics who had reached retirement age and, in general, endeavored to make the transition as easy as possible.

compromises made a final settlement possible. The separation of church and state further weakened the royalists, while it left education entirely in the hands of the state. The measure was looked upon as a triumph for democracy and for the republic.

BISMARCK'S STRUGGLE WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

In Germany, a wave of triumphant nationalism followed the establishment of the empire. One of its manifestations was a dislike of the "ultramontanism" of the Catholics. The regions in which there had been the greatest objection to unification under the standard of Prussia had been Catholic, and the peoples with separatist tendencies after unification, such as the Poles and the Alsatians, were also Catholics. The conservative Junkers were strong Lutherans and not averse to an attack, while the liberals had long disapproved the control of the church over education and regarded the Catholics as reactionaries. On several occasions in the period after 1860 Pope Pius IX had shown unmistakable evidence of his own conservatism and of the reluctance of the papacy to admit any "modernism" in the church. In asserting the authority of the church, he condemned freethinkers, agnostics, anticlericals, materialists, nationalists, and all "indifferent" persons who wanted the church to reconcile itself to "modern civilization," and in the *Syllabus of Errors* he denounced civil marriage, divorce, liberty of conscience, and state-controlled education. In 1870 by a great Vatican Council, the dogma of papal infallibility was announced. The dogma proclaimed that when the pope "speaks *ex cathedra*—that is, when in discharge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, he defines, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the universal church"—he is endowed with "that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining faith and morals." Liberals everywhere considered the attitude of the papacy a challenge to all new ideas in science, education, or government. Anticlericals found in the assertions of papal authority added cause for their determination to break the hold of the church upon the youth of the nation.

The struggle between church and state in Germany was known as the "Kulturkampf." Due to the federal character of the Reich it was fought both in state and imperial governments. Bismarck, who was

much concerned in the 1870's with establishing national institutions, led the fight both in Prussia and in the imperial government. The Jesuits were expelled from the empire in 1872. In the following years the famous "May laws" were passed in Prussia,¹⁴ establishing government control over the education of the Catholic clergy. Many Catholic teaching orders were suppressed, Catholic seminaries were placed under state control, and the use of the German language was required for all religious instruction. When the Catholic clergy of Prussia protested and refused to obey the laws, with the approval of the German Catholic clergy at large, the government retaliated by additional laws providing severe penalties for all infractions. Within three years every Catholic bishop and many priests were in prison or in exile, and all German Catholics were roused in opposition. A Catholic party was formed both in state legislatures and in the Reichstag. The members of the new party were drawn from every class in society and were pledged to work for a repeal of the May laws and for social reforms. They won over many of the minority groups—Poles, Danes, Alsatians—and were able to obtain support from radical groups, such as the socialists, who opposed the government for other reasons. The Kulturkampf was Bismarck's one great failure, and he tacitly admitted as much in 1879-1880 by withdrawing the oppressive laws and renewing relations with the Vatican. The fact that Pius IX had been followed on the throne by Leo XIII, a much more conciliatory person, made the retreat seem less like a defeat.

In the matter of education, in general, the record of Germany was exceptionally good. Free, compulsory, elementary education had been prevalent in Germany long before unification. The *Gymnasien*, or secondary schools, and the technical schools were the models for the institutions of other countries, and German universities had long been the favorite havens of study and research for students from all over the world. No other country held its university staffs and its professional classes in such high esteem or showered as many favors upon them as did the German Empire. There was much of caste structure in the German educational setup, however, and much of paternalism and regimentation in the whole system. Mass education did not serve in Germany, as it did elsewhere, as a training school for democracy.

¹⁴ Prussia's Rhineland areas were largely Catholic.

EDUCATION, CHURCH, AND STATE IN OTHER
PARTS OF EUROPE

Two of the great problems in Italy after 1870 were the illiteracy of the masses of the population and the antagonism between the government and the papacy. The country was very poor and the parties of the Right that held office in the first years of the kingdom were averse to spending very much money upon education. The Left groups representing the middle classes came into power about 1876, but little was done for education. The middle-class element tended to lower the moral level of Italian politics, and much graft crept in. Cabinets were formed by coalitions of self-seeking politicians, and the whole moral tenor of government was low. It was feared that education would encourage the peasantry and the laborers to make undue demands upon the employing classes, and that there would be revolt against the low standard of living and against the lack of enfranchisement. It was not until after 1900, therefore, that a law was passed providing for free public school education. Illiteracy was estimated at 25 per cent of the population in 1914.

The antagonism of the Catholic Church for the Kingdom of Italy is perfectly explicable. Unification had been accomplished partly at the expense of the church, and the invasion of Rome in 1870 had marked the end of the centuries of the extensive temporal power of the papacy. The government was frankly anticlerical and suspicious of any clerical interference. The church, for its part, refused to recognize the Italian government and ordered the devout Catholics to abstain from voting and from office holding. In the Law of Papal Guarantees (1871) the government made provision for the church. Within the district in Rome in which the Vatican and St. Peter's Church are located the pope was to rule in complete authority. No Italian officials might intrude, and the pope might send and receive ambassadors and conduct diplomatic negotiations. An annual allowance was set aside by the state as indemnity for the loss of the papal estates. Catholicism was recognized as the national religion, but church and state were entirely separated. The pope refused to accept the terms of the Law of Guarantees and retired to the Vatican, severing all contact with the Italian government. For many years the situation remained the same. The pope was a self-made "prisoner" in the Vatican, and the strongly Catholic element refused to participate in poli-

tics. After the death of Pius IX there was some easement of the situation. The pope withdrew the restrictions on participation in politics, and a Catholic, or Center, party appeared. The breach was to be healed in theory, at least, after the Great War, although the position of the papacy in Fascist Rome has not been satisfactory.

In the other Catholic countries of Europe there was little conflict in this period. In Belgium there were disputes between church and state, largely over the matter of education, and a Center party made considerable impression in the legislature. In Spain and in Portugal the Catholic Church maintained its hold with almost medieval strength. The union between the conservative upper classes and a narrow and often bigoted priesthood brought the church into politics on the side of reaction. The clerical control over education caused the church to be held responsible for the illiteracy and ignorance of the masses. When the people rose in revolt against autocratic government¹⁵ it was inevitable that they should also attack the orthodox and reactionary church. Catholicism remained strong in Austria-Hungary, where the church had been subjected to state control early in the century and exerted influence over the cultural life of the empire through activities permitted it by the state. As long as the old emperor-king was able to hold the empire together there was no real problem of church and state.

SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE MODERN STATE

Education was not the only great social service assumed by the modern state. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century the shift of population in the Western world from the country districts to the towns had produced startling results. The greater integration of business, the new "mass production," new machines, new types of power, greater concentration of capital, and a greatly increased application of chemistry to industry, all contributed to producing what amounted to a new industrial revolution. Urbanization was accelerated. Populations were increasing in all the Western states, but the rate of increase was much greater in the urban industrial areas than elsewhere. As urban populations increased, modern science and engineering were turned toward the problems of urban life. Sanitation, public health, water systems, police and fire protection, and, in some

¹⁵ Portugal, 1910; Spain, after the Great War.

cases, transportation facilities and gas and electrical plants were provided by local governments at the expense of the taxpayer. More extensive police protection, roads between cities, and various other means of communication were looked upon as the functions of larger units of government.

Urbanization has had a tremendous effect upon the life of the citizen; it has also had a great effect upon the duties of both local and national governments. For the first time since the days of old Rome, city life has become really livable and desirable. It has become a part of civic pride to beautify urban centers and to eradicate the most glaring early results of industrialization. The process is in no way complete even in the second quarter of the twentieth century, but it is generally accepted as a matter of civic responsibility that ugly slum areas should be cleared, that city children have a right to decent playgrounds and parks, and that public welfare is an ever-broadening term. With more than half the population living in cities, the work of modern government has become overwhelmingly of the nature of a public or social service. Both local and national governments have found it necessary to increase their budgets and to enter into all sorts of business enterprises. The power of the state has increased at the same time, and the contacts between the administrative state and the individual have multiplied. Mechanization has created a new society dominated by the needs of urban masses. Public and collective interest has come to be paramount in the state. The problems of urban life are common to all nations that have reached the stage in industrial development in which population tends to be concentrated in certain areas. Whatever the system of government, the state after 1870 has become more pervasive as it has assumed function after function affecting the life of every citizen.

SOCIALISM IN EUROPE AFTER 1871

The need of the proletariat for a security not provided by the modern capitalistic organization led to several types of activity in the period since 1871. With the extension of the franchise the workers organized into political parties to acquire by legislation the solution to the problems of the working class. The ultimate objective of most of the workers' parties was a socialistic state. In the long period before the realization of that end, some of them were prepared to work within the framework of existing governments, relying upon the

effect of their numbers at the ballot box. Ferdinand Lassalle, a German and a contemporary of Karl Marx, founded the General Workingmen's Association in 1863. A few years later Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel organized the Social Democratic Labor party. After the unification of Germany the two movements united under the name of the Social Democratic party, and Bismarck was faced by a militant organization that made its program public through its representatives in the Reichstag. The program included, among other things, free secular education, an eight-hour day, heavy income and inheritance taxes, and limitation of armaments. With each election the party won more votes. In 1871 it received 124,500 votes and won 2 seats in the Reichstag; in 1912 it polled over 4,000,000 votes and won 110 seats.

In France both socialism and socialistic political parties were held up because of the disaster to the Commune.¹⁶ Small socialistic factions appeared in the 1880's, but there was little unity or party organization. By 1893, however, the whole group polled about 500,000 votes. Jaurès, Millerand, and Briand were socialists whose leadership brought the various groups into some sort of union. In 1914 the socialists polled 1,500,000 votes and won 102 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In Italy and in other countries on the Continent the organization of socialist parties came somewhat more slowly, but in all countries they polled enough votes by 1914 to make them of considerable importance in the various legislatures.

In England, Marxian socialism made little headway, and the Social Democratic party, founded in 1881, won few votes. In 1893 a trade-union leader, Keir Hardie, started the Independent Labour party which was to be of much more significance. By the turn of the century the Labour party had begun to wean the workers away from their old reliance upon the Liberals and had attained the position of a strong third party. Its socialism was of a moderate, "reformist" nature, for, although its leaders, Hardie, Philip Snowden, Sidney Webb, and Ramsay MacDonald were all socialists, the rank and file of British labor was strongly trade-unionist but not Marxian.

With socialist parties in almost all European nations working for similar ends, the socialist movement as a whole acquired an international organization in the First and Second International Associations. Congresses were held, Marxian principles were adopted, and agitation, education, and organization were adopted as the activities

¹⁶ See above, pages 575-76.

of the movement. It was not revolutionary in its methods but directed its energies toward the eventual realization of its ends through legal means. Its greatest single principle was its implacable opposition to militarism, and a deathblow was dealt to the Second International when its members forgot their allegiance to internationalism at the outbreak of the World War. Socialist parties in the belligerent states supported their respective governments, voted armaments and war credits, and socialists became as wholeheartedly partisan and nationalistic as any of their compatriots.

TRADE UNIONISM

Trade unionism was another manifestation of working-class solidarity. The movement was probably stronger and more successful in Great Britain than elsewhere, but no country was untouched by it. Combinations of laborers became legal in England after 1824. It was many years, however, before the unions found a type of organization and developed a program that gave them a chance for successful collective bargaining. Their progress was bitterly opposed by the bourgeois employer class whose influence in Parliament made possible obstructive legislation. In the 1870's, however, the unions were victorious in obtaining the legal right to strike and the right to register and thus own property in their own names. Registration, moreover, did not carry corporate responsibility, for the Trades Disputes Act of 1906 said that unions could not be sued for breach of contract or for damages caused in labor disputes. Along with collective bargaining and attendant strikes went the growing movement for the arbitration of trade disputes. Unionism spread rapidly in England after 1890. In 1914 there were more than four million members in British unions. With newspapers and a political party of its own, English trade unionism worked for social security legislation, shorter working days, and minimum wage laws.

On the Continent unionism was of less significance and developed much later. This retarded development was owing in part to the later industrialization of Continental countries and in part to the fact that industries tended to be smaller with fewer aggregations of skilled laborers in large establishments. In mines, in railroads, and in textiles organization came early, but in most factories, where paternalistic management opposed any sort of "closed shop" organization, progress in unionization was slow. Employers' unions were formed to

combat labor organization, and lockouts were used to break unions and combat strikes. In France unions did not obtain legal status until 1884; in Belgium organization was permitted in 1866, but strikes remained illegal until 1921. Unionism grew up with the Social Democratic party in Germany, and Bismarck attacked both of them when he assailed socialism after 1878. Many unions were dissolved and the activities of others limited. After 1890 the persecution abated, but German courts were far from liberal toward unions in the whole prewar period. Austria legalized unions in 1867 as did the Netherlands in 1872, but it was 1906 before Russia followed suit. It should be stated, however, that where unions were needed, they were organized, whether legal or not. Adverse legislation made their operations more difficult, but did not prevent them. Continental unionism was closely allied with the Social Democratic parties, and unionists, generally, were Marxian in political theory.

In France there was developed a different pattern for labor organization and activity—syndicalism. Syndicalism was a revolutionary policy which developed in the French General Confederation of Labor between 1895 and 1902. The radical wing of the French socialists felt that those who co-operated with the bourgeoisie and entered politics were careerists and had abandoned the cause of revolution. Syndicalism provided for a constant attack upon capital by means of strikes, sabotage, and all sorts of direct action. The general strike was a weapon of the syndicalists, and May 1 was selected as the day for their greatest activity. French syndicalists never managed to obtain a sufficient labor solidarity to produce the one big strike that would suffice to deliver paralyzed capital into their hands, but their principles found expression in an important new type of theory. They believed that a socialistic state would be as arbitrary an employer as the capitalist, and so they discarded Marxian socialism for the idea that each industry should be run by those who worked in it, organized as an industrial union.¹⁷ French syndicalism failed to accomplish very much in the face of the resolute opposition of the government. The power of the modern state was too great for the success of so anarchistic and decentralized a movement. As Frenchmen realized this, the old socialist organizations regained the allegiance of many syndicalists while the extremists went over to communism. Syndicalism spread from France into other European countries and America. It was to be

¹⁷ See Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, pp. 720-21.

of significance after the Great War, for it contributed some elements to Fascist theory, and some of its principles have been taken over in the vertical union movement.

It came to be recognized, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, that the greatest cause for the uneasiness of the laborers was insecurity and that insecurity came from certain easily recognized causes for which remedy might be found without any fundamental change in the nature of the state or of the industrial system. The causes for insecurity were disability due to accident or illness, unemployment, and old age. Protection against these hazards could be provided by the state, and such action might be taken either as a preventive of labor disorder and the growth of socialism, or as a frank recognition of the social responsibility of the state.

SOCIAL LEGISLATION

Bismarck's attack upon socialism and labor organization after 1878 was accompanied by a series of laws providing social security for a class that might thus be weaned away from radicalism. He insisted that the state was a beneficent institution with due regard for all classes within its control and that the "soldier of industry" had as much right to care in disability and old age as a soldier in the army. His program was in keeping with the paternalism of Prussian tradition and has been called "state socialism." The three measures for which Bismarck was responsible were the Sickness Insurance Law of 1883, the Accident Insurance Law of 1884, and the Old Age and Invalidity Law of 1889. Funds were obtained for sickness insurance from employers and workingmen, for accident insurance from the employers alone, and for old-age insurance from state, employers, and employees. State supervision and administration was provided to make the laws effective.

The German social legislation was long a model for other countries. In 1902 the British factory laws were codified and new provisions added to bring them up to date. The employment of women and children was strictly regulated, and factory employment for children under twelve years of age was prohibited. Neither women nor children were allowed to work in mines, and an eight-hour day was established for all mine labor (1908). In 1906 a comprehensive Workmen's Compensation Act was passed making employers liable for compensation for industrial accidents and diseases. An Old Age Pen-

sions Law was passed in 1906, the funds for which were to come from the state treasury. Minimum wage laws were passed for the "sweated" trades and, somewhat later, for the coal industry.¹⁸ In 1911 the great National Insurance Act was passed under the leadership of David Lloyd George, the great Welsh Liberal member of Parliament and of the Asquith Cabinet. The law provided for insurance against sickness and against unemployment and required contributions from employers, employees, and the state. The unemployment provisions of the National Insurance Act were a great innovation in social legislation. Unemployment was becoming a chronic condition in England in the first decade of the twentieth century, and the new legislation was a recognition of state responsibility for the welfare of the unemployed. Under the burden of the greatly increased unemployment of the postwar period the National Insurance Act was to break down because of too great a drain upon the funds, and the government was forced to supplement it by large contributions from state funds. The term "dole" then came to be applied to a system which was in the beginning an insurance measure.

France provided adequate factory legislation in the period after 1890, and a workmen's compensation law was passed at the turn of the century. An old-age pension act was added in 1910. The French system was later and less complete than that of Germany and England but somewhat ahead of the Italian legislation. Other European countries and the United States were slow to assume the responsibilities of extensive social insurance programs. A smaller degree of industrialization probably was the cause for the slowness of many states. The reasons for the tardiness of the United States in such matters are complex: the higher standard of living in the United States, the greater opportunities for making money, cheap land, higher wages, greater individualism, more mobile social classes—all contributed. The complexities of the federal system, where legislative responsibility is divided between state and nation and where there is great lack of uniformity in the standards of the different states, were factors also.

¹⁸ The social insurance acts and the naval program made necessary a greatly increased national budget in 1909. It was out of the resistance of the Lords to this budget that the Parliamentary Act of 1911 came. This Act reduced the powers of the Lords so that any money bill passed by the Commons becomes a law without the consent of the Lords. Any other bill, if passed by three consecutive sessions of the Commons, becomes a law with or without the consent of the Lords.

NATIONALISM AND THE MODERN STATE

Nationalism was a problem, or a motivating force, common to all of the European states. Many of its aspects have already been considered: its effect upon the economic life of the nation, its effect upon patriotism—"jingoism" with its insistence upon national prestige—and its influence upon imperialism. The "problem of nationalities," or of nationalism among minority groups held in subjection by European states, is an aspect of nationalism of vital significance in the prewar years, but not one of equal importance in all states. Germany found the growing national sentiment of the Poles on her eastern frontiers a matter of some concern, while the persistence of French nationalism in the conquered territories of Alsace-Lorraine was equally irritating. In both cases there were no concessions made to national sentiment, and "Germanization" was the policy adopted.

In 1906 Sweden and Norway agreed to sever the ties that had bound them together since 1815. The rise of Norse national feeling was answered by complete sovereignty, and two states instead of one ruled in the Scandinavian Peninsula. There was occasional trouble between the Flemings and the Walloons in Belgium over such matters as education, suffrage qualifications, and the official language of the state, but the disputes were usually solved by compromise.

It was not so easy to settle the "nationalities" problem in Austria-Hungary. After the *Ausgleich* had settled the differences between Austria and Hungary, each state of the dual monarchy was left with further minorities problems. The satisfaction of all of the minorities would have meant the disruption of the empire. The Czechs were the most numerous and important of the subject Slavs, and the Slovaks, Poles, and Ruthenians continued Slav opposition across the northern boundaries of the empire. There were Rumanians in eastern Hungary, and Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to the south and west. The Italians in the Tyrol, Trieste, and Dalmatia added to the difficulties of the minority problem. This conglomeration of races was held together by a variety of bonds: the dynasty which had acquired all of the fragments throughout centuries of history, common allegiance to the Catholic Church, the bureaucracy, economic bonds, and the age-old Hapsburg policy of playing one faction off against the other. As a "going concern" each part depended upon the whole, and disruption would imperil too many interests to be contemplated with

comfort. One historian remarked that had the Austrian Empire not existed Europe would have had to create it, while another commented that the empire held together because even its enemies did not know how to get along without it. Such sentiments, however, did not prevent constant and vigorous quarrels between the various Slavic peoples, especially the Serbs and the Czechs, and the dominant Magyar and German groups. Between 1867 and 1914 there were very few years in which there were no crises in the relations of the central government with the subject nationalities. The problem became critical when nations outside the empire were moved to sympathize with the plight of their "racial brothers" among the subject peoples. Pan-Slavism and Pan-Serbism were of vital concern to Austria-Hungary, and were the cause for friction that was to make the annihilation of Serbia seem to Austria, in 1914, an act of self-defense. The sovereignty of Austria over hundreds of thousands of Italians led to a surge of national feeling for *Italia irredenta* and was sufficient cause for Italian lukewarmness toward the Triple Alliance.

The Irish Question was Great Britain's contribution to the nationalities problem and was one of the oldest, most often irritating, and most persistently discussed national and racial sore spots of Europe. In the period after 1870, many phases of the problem were taken up, and projects for final settlement received much attention. In 1869 Irish Catholicism was recognized, and a great source of irritation was removed by the disestablishment of the Anglican church in Ireland. The chief economic difficulty in Ireland had long been the poverty of the agricultural peasants, who lived on the estates of landlords who were usually of English origin and were often living in England. The English Liberal statesman, William Gladstone, devoted much of his career to the cause of Ireland, and one of his first measures was a land law (1881) which provided for a Land Commission to adjust matters of dispute between tenant and landlord. In 1903 a more radical act was passed designed to bring about the gradual transfer of the land from the landlords to the tenants. The Land Commission was provided with funds which might be borrowed by the peasants on long-term loans to buy out the landlords, who were induced to sell by the promise of a government bonus. The results were most gratifying; the peasantry became more prosperous and more contented, and emigration almost ceased.

These reforms eased the situation but did not solve the fundamental problem, which was the desire of the Irish for self-govern-

ment. The movement for Home Rule was not new in 1870 but was taken seriously for the first time by the British government in the years following that date. Gladstone once more led the defense of Irish rights. The Liberals split on the vote on the first Home Rule Bill in 1886, and the Conservatives won in the election that followed its defeat. In 1893 a second Home Rule Bill was introduced. It passed the Commons but was defeated in the House of Lords. The election of 1895 had Home Rule as its great issue, and the Conservatives scored a decisive victory. They remained in power for a ten-year period in which there was a great increase in Irish nationalism. The Gaelic speech was revived; Irish literature sprang up; Irish music, history, and poetry were revived; Irish co-operative societies endeavored to develop industrial and agricultural enterprises independent of England; in short there was an Irish Renaissance. The result was a movement for independence rather than for Home Rule. In 1910 the nationalist movement was so strong that a third Home Rule Bill was introduced. The situation was complicated by the presence in Ulster of a large Protestant population descended from English and Scottish settlers. Provision was made in the bill for the exemption of Ulster from its operation. Two years later it passed the House of Commons by a combination of Liberal, Irish, and Labour votes. The Lords refused to pass the bill, but, due to the Parliamentary Act of 1911, the bill would automatically become a law in two years. Home Rule was delayed because of the dangers of the Great War period, and the strife between England and Ireland did not cease when Ireland became a self-governing dominion at the end of the war.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AFTER 1870

A final common problem of European states after 1870 was the race for armaments; that problem involved the relations of the states with one another and was evidence of the growing tension between two sharply divided groups of states. The unification of Italy and Germany had greatly upset the European balance of power. The Concert of Europe, although operative after that date, was never as strong as it had been before, and the powers sought security in alliances. Bismarck insisted, after 1871, that his sole desire was for peace, but he realized that France could not fail to resent the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. To counteract the inevitable *revanche* policy of France, Bismarck determined that she must be isolated and prevented from form-

ing anti-German alliances. He formed the League of the Three Emperors, therefore, and continued by one means or another¹⁹ to hold Russia in the German orbit until his retirement in 1890. France was urged to use her energies in the colonial field, and her acquisition of Tunisia was used to entice Italy into the Triple Alliance. Bismarck considered that Anglo-French colonial rivalries would keep England and France apart, and he made no effort to draw England to Germany, although the Conservative Lord Salisbury would have been willing to make such an alliance in the 1880's.

When Bismarck was forced from power by William II, his policies were, in part, discarded also. The alliance with Russia was dropped, and Germany placed her dependence upon a greatly strengthened union with Austria. Russia at once drew closer to France, and the formal alliance made in 1894 was the result. German imperialism burgeoned under the *Weltpolitik* of the blustering kaiser, and Germany's demand for a "place in the sun" led to a race for colonies that caused friction with both England and France. The kaiser was jealous of England and impolite to his British relatives,²⁰ but the growing Anglo-German rivalry was based on more fundamental causes than personalities. The expansion of German industry made Germany the most formidable commercial rival of Great Britain. At the turn of the century Germany embarked upon a navy-building program that was regarded as a challenge to British supremacy upon the seas. The German threat was met by a settlement of Anglo-French difficulties in 1904 and an entente between England and Russia in 1907.²¹ England protected her Far Eastern interests by an alliance with Japan in 1902, and settled all the vexatious minor questions that had ruffled her relations with the United States.²²

By 1907 a Triple Alliance faced a Triple Entente, and the great powers were lined up in two opposing camps. Germany began to fulminate against the "encirclement" policy of her opponents. International crises grew more ominous as the tension increased. The Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911 and the Near Eastern crisis of 1908 brought all Europe perilously close to war.²³ Imperialism and nationalism had played their part in deepening animosities. Under such conditions every effort was expended upon preparation for war.

¹⁹ See above, pages 632-34.

²⁰ He was a grandson of Queen Victoria.

²¹ See above, pages 611, 640.

²² See above, page 679.

²³ See above, pages 641-42.

The German military system had long been regarded as a model for other states. One at a time the European nations (with the exception of Great Britain) adopted conscription. Great Britain and Germany vied with each other in the building of battleships, and a larger and larger proportion of the revenues of the great powers went into armaments. In 1913 Poincaré, a bitter opponent of Germany, became president of France. The legislature which elected him was equally determined to be ready for war. Germany's larger population gave her a military advantage that could be counteracted only by a longer term of service for French recruits. In 1913, therefore, the 'Three Years' Military Law was passed over the protest of the socialist parties, which insisted that it put an intolerable burden upon the French taxpayers. The English, French, and Russian naval authorities conferred on the possible tactics to be pursued in case of war, and the French and Russian military staffs agreed as to plans for the disposition of armies. Germany and Austria developed plans for united forces, German officers drilled Turkish troops, and Austria prepared for trouble in the Balkans. With militarism unrestrained, Europe faced the next crisis in two armed camps. The immediate cause for war would be of relatively little significance; it would only be a spark that would serve to ignite a fuse long laid which led to the vast store of explosives Europe had compounded from the trends and events of the period since 1871.

READINGS

Many of the general works mentioned before will be useful for this survey of Europe from 1871 to 1914. General accounts not before listed include Preston Slosson's *Europe since 1870* (1935) and *Twentieth Century Europe* (1927), *European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932* (1933) by R. J. Sontag, and *Beginning the Twentieth Century* (1933) by J. W. Swain. Special accounts of France are *French Civilization in the Nineteenth Century* (1914) by A. L. Guerard; Raymond Recouly's *The Third Republic* (1928); C. H. C. Wright's *The History of the Third French Republic* (1916); and R. L. Buell's *Contemporary French Politics* (1920). *A History of Italy: 1871-1915* (1929) by Benedetto Croce, the Italian philosopher-historian, is an interpretive account. W. H. Dawson's *The German Empire, 1867-1914* (1919) is comprehensive and detailed. *Germany* (1925) by G. P. Gooch is brief and readable. W. F. Bruck's *Social and Economic History of Germany, 1888-1938* (1938) is useful. Francis Hackett's *Ireland*,

a Study in Nationalism (1918) should be mentioned again. J. L. Hammond, *Gladstone and the Irish Nation* (1938), is also to be recommended. C. J. H. Hayes's *Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (1931) also deserves further reference. *Triple Alliance and Triple Entente* (1934) by B. E. Schmidt is useful for foreign affairs and G. L. Dickinson's *The International Anarchy, 1904-1914* (1926) is an illuminating brief volume.

≡ XXII ≡

THE GREAT WAR

IT is with a sense of Greek tragedy that those whose memories encompass the events of the year 1914 approach any account of the beginning of that which may yet be called the Great War—the First World War. As that year has been reached by various routes, it has become apparent that everywhere trouble was brewing for a world, many of whose peoples had long enjoyed the blessings of peace. In the Near East there were sore spots so sensitive that the merest touch was an intolerable irritation. Economic imperialism had stirred up the national resistance of subject peoples, and imperialistic rivalries had caused friction between the great powers. In the search for security and a new balance of power as the old Concert of Europe disintegrated, alliances had been formed which divided Europe into two camps. Mutual fears and frustrated hopes had armed those camps and added militarism to the dangers of the situation.

1914: A TROUBLED YEAR

The year 1914 opened inauspiciously. Within each country there were steadily increasing tensions due to problems common to all of Europe but appearing in different guises in the various countries. In England militant suffragettes destroyed property, defied the police, and gladly made themselves ridiculous for the cause of women's rights. The centuries' old quarrel between England and Ireland was trying the patience of statesmen who were endeavoring to work out a final solution that would reconcile Protestant Ulster and Catholic Ireland, that would enable the Irish who yearned for independence to live happily under an autonomous government, and that would ensure the defense of Great Britain while securing the loyalty of the Irish people. The English Liberal party had made great concessions to the laboring masses only to find a growing Labour party challenging their control over the votes of the people their efforts had enfranchised.

On the Continent a militant left-wing socialism was pressing the solution of the problems which attended the mechanization of industry. The conservative socialist groups that had co-operated with other parties to obtain reforms by parliamentary means had been disappointingly slow in achieving results. The more radical groups resorted to "direct" action, and sabotage and strikes attended their efforts. In 1914 France was seething with labor unrest. In France and elsewhere the radical parties won more votes than in any previous year. In Italy, anarchism added its threat of violence to that of the syndicalists. The Social Democratic party was the largest in the German Reichstag. The Terrorists and the Social Revolutionaries in Russia were more active than ever before. Careful observers were predicting another year of revolution in that country, where autocracy had triumphed less than a decade earlier. Reactionary elements in every state from England eastward to Russia were willing to use the threat of war as justification for their suppression of the demands for social reform. In Austria and in Hungary, where subject nationalities were making demands that threatened the disruption of the dual monarchy, it was an old saying that the racial shirt was closer to the heart than the imperial uniform. Agitation for reform was so menacing in Austria that parliament had been dissolved, and the bureaucratic government ruled without popular sanction and regardless of the democratic suffrage laws so recently placed on the statute books. Magyar Hungary was fighting against any concessions to the reform movement lest the Slavs challenge the political supremacy of the dominant race. Discord was apparent in the Balkans, where two wars in as many years had set each little state on edge.

THE AGENCIES MAKING FOR PEACE

It is probably true that in any period a survey of world conditions might reveal elements of conflict and danger, and that the resulting picture, although true in its detail, is yet inaccurate through its failure to portray other factors making for harmony. The emphasis upon international rivalries should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the rivals were growing more and more dependent upon each other. Germany may have been England's bitterest opponent in many respects, but she was at the same time vitally important as a market. Business enterprise and modern finance knew no flag and were, to a great degree, dependent upon peace for their profits. Ease

of communication and rapidity of transportation had created a cosmopolitanism that liked to regard war as obsolete. A whole galaxy of international organizations bore witness to the world-wide recognition of the dependence of the nations upon one another—the International Red Cross, the Universal Postal Union, and an International Office of Public Health. Peace societies grew more vigorous as the dangers of war increased. The peace conferences of 1899 and 1907, although failing to bring about disarmament, had succeeded in establishing an International Court of Arbitration at the Hague, to which nations were slowly becoming accustomed to submitting disputes that did not involve national honor or major policies. With so many agencies working for peace and with the presumption that at least nine-tenths of the population of every country wanted peace and hated the thought of war, it would seem rash to state that the war which came in 1914 was inevitable. All that can be said is that, when the crisis came, the tension grew too great and the bonds that held Europe in equilibrium snapped.

THE EVIDENCES OF APPROACHING CONFLICT

When the relative strengths of the tendencies toward peace and war are weighed, the balance may be found to dip to the side of war because of the mental attitude of those who formed public opinion and developed policies. Europe was psychologically attuned to war in 1914. The press was full of predictions of war, preparedness for war was the thesis of many a book and pamphlet, and parliamentary debates over increased armament kept the technicalities of warfare constantly before the public. Bernhàrdi's *Germany and the Next War* was translated into several languages and read all over Europe. The logic with which he predicted a great war before the end of 1914 was looked upon as inescapable. Observers commented upon the chauvinism in the capitals of all major countries. The Belgian minister to France reported, early in 1914, that the French political leaders "who two years ago showed themselves frightened at the mere thought of possible difficulties between France and Germany, have now adopted a different tone; they say they are certain of victory."¹ Colonel House wrote back to the United States in May, 1914:

¹ Quoted in J. W. Swan, *Beginning the Twentieth Century*. The preliminaries of the World War are carefully treated in this book as well as in Preston Slosson, *Europe since 1870*. A longer and more detailed account of the period is S. B. Fay, *Origins of*

"The whole of Germany is charged with electricity. Everybody's nerves are tense. It only needs a spark to set the whole thing off." A Russian government-inspired newspaper urged, "Russia is prepared. France must prepare also." International relations were still conducted with the most punctilious politeness, governments refused to admit the slightest rift in their relations, and diplomats remained on the friendliest of terms, but, underneath, a current of hate and fear was growing steadily stronger. As one historian has said, international hatred is "of all the luxuries of the heart the most perilous."²

After long negotiation the Triple Alliance was renewed in the summer of 1912, but Austria-Hungary and Germany placed little reliance upon Italy's loyalty. Bulgaria, angered by the treatment she had received at the hands of the other Balkan states, leaned toward the Central Powers. Rumania was still in the Austrian orbit but, as the Austrian minister sadly reported, she was so in name only; her real reliance was upon Russia, and her friendship was given to Serbia and Greece. Count Berchtold of the Austro-Hungarian foreign office was desperately alarmed over the Balkan situation. He asked and received assurance from the German kaiser in respect to the strength of the Austro-German alliance, while the more bellicose minister of war came to the conclusion that Austria's only safety lay in the complete subjection of Serbia, and Conrad von Hötzendorf, the chief of staff, talked constantly of a "preventive" war. Turkey undertook extensive reforms to repair the damages done by her disastrous wars with Italy and with the Balkan states. English and French advisers were secured for the reforms in the custom services and in finance and for the contemplated changes in the navy and the police system. A German general was secured to undertake the reforms in the army, and, in order to make his work effective, he was given command of an army corps. Russia and France were immediately hysterical over

the World War G. P. Gooch goes into the prewar situation in 1913-1914 carefully in both his *Germany* and the *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919*. Two standard texts of great value are *Europe since 1914* by F. L. Benns and *The World since 1914* by W. C. Langsam. Liddell Hart, *The War in Outline*, is written by an authority on military history. There is a wealth of material on the part played by the United States. The entry of the United States is discussed in detail in C. H. Grattan, *Why We Fought*, Walter Millis, *The Road to War*, and C. C. Tansill, *America Goes to War*. S. F. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, and J. H. Latané, *American Foreign Policy*, contain brief accounts. Charles Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War*, is brief and readable.

² H. A. L. Fisher, *History of Europe* (Houghton Mifflin Company), Vol. III, p. 1139.

the danger to the interests of Russia in the Black Sea and straits area. A compromise was reached which met the technical issue of the command of the Turkish army but failed to satisfy the Pan-Slavs. If Germany and Austria felt a fear of encirclement, Russia was in constant dread of a solution of the Question of the Straits in a manner opposed to her interests and felt herself hopelessly cut off from the rest of Europe by the wall of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Men recalled that Bismarck had said that although he would not live to see the next war the young men of his acquaintance might expect to do so, and that it would come in the Near East.

In London and Paris the tension increased as the governments watched the problems of Eastern Europe approach a new crisis. The entente between France and England was strengthened, and in the early summer of 1914 the English government was prepared to arrange for a naval understanding with Russia similar to the one that had been reached with France nearly two years earlier. When news of the naval conversations leaked out, Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign minister, was asked in the House of Commons whether England was bound by a treaty with Russia. Grey answered by an involved and indefinite statement that may have satisfied the members of the House as to England's freedom from entanglements but to the diplomats was sufficient evidence of the nature of her position. Grey maintained then, as he did in the dread days of early August, that Britain was free to choose her course. There was no actual alliance, it is true, but the bonds that held England to France and Russia were so strong that they could scarcely have been broken with honor. It was to be the sad fate of Grey, one of the most truthful and candid of men under ordinary circumstances, to be regarded by the Germans, both before and during the war, as the most perfidious of the sons of Albion.

THE CRISIS IN THE NEAR EAST, 1914

To the uninformed, the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife on June 28, 1914, may have come as a complete surprise. To those who had been anxiously awaiting the crisis they held to be inevitable, it was a blow long expected. Out of the jungle world of "international anarchy"³ had come the attack which

³ G. Lowes Dickinson has used this phrase as the title for an interesting analysis of the prewar period.

those who lived in the fear of war had long been dreading. Increased armament, the doctrine of preparedness, and the tragic insecurity which they created had awaited the occasion presented by the act of violence at Serajevo.

The Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the nephew of the old emperor, Francis Joseph, was the heir to the throne. He had gradually been admitted to a share in the government and was known to have decided views on the fundamental problems of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy which made him unpopular in several important places. He held the militarists in Vienna in check, and he planned to revise the *Ausgleich* to make the empire "tripartite" instead of "dual" by forming an autonomous South Slav state. An alternative plan was a scheme for a strong central parliament representing all nationalities. Either plan was anathema both to the Austrian Germans and to the Hungarian Magyars. Serbia dreaded his accession to the throne, also, for Austrian appeasement of the Slavs in the empire would defeat the aims of the Pan-Serbs. He believed, too, in the extension of suffrage and in social reform. His trip to Bosnia for the army maneuvers was foolhardy, in many ways, for Bosnia was a hotbed of Pan-Serb conspiracy, and June 28 was a Serb national fete day. The Serb minister to Vienna had somewhat vaguely, and apparently upon his own initiative, warned the Austrian government of the possibility of a plot against the archduke, but no changes were made in his plans nor were any unusual precautions taken for his protection. Austrian and Serbian officials must share the blame for his assassination at the hands of a Bosnian youth, Gavrilo Princip.

An Austrian subject by birth, Princip and the other young men associated with him were Serbs who had lived in Belgrade and had been involved there in the plots of the Serbian national societies. The plan to assassinate the archduke, whom Serbians considered their greatest enemy, may have been their own, but it was worked out under the direction of the head of the secret "Union or Death," or "Black Hand," society, who was at the same time the chief of the intelligence division of the Serbian general staff. The pistols, ammunition, and bombs with which the young assassins were provided were furnished by friends in Belgrade who smuggled them across the border before June 28. The Serbian government had no official connection with the plot and did not desire the assassination, as the vague warning to the Austrian government would indicate. It did,

however, know of the plot a month before June 28 and made no effective effort to prevent its success.

THE APPROACH OF WAR

The news of the assassination was received with horror and dread in every European capital. Had such an incident occurred at any other time and in any other region the situation would have been serious but the danger of war might not have become imminent.⁴ The assassination of the heir to the Hapsburg throne by a Bosnian Serb was recognized as an affair with possibilities of catastrophe. In Austria and Germany the news was received with great indignation as evidence of a Slav defiance of Teutonic control in the Balkan region where they felt it essential to be dominant. Much of what is now known of the Serbian complicity in the affair was immediately suspected, but Vienna did not have, at that time, the proof that has since been obtained. The Austrian government was in the hands of the minister of foreign affairs and of the military chief of staff, for the old emperor was too enfeebled and too overcome by shock to exert any active control. Military circles were wild for war, and the decision to deal drastically with Serbia seems to have been made deliberately by the Austrian government. The German ambassador to Vienna counseled caution, but the kaiser grew hysterical over the blow dealt to the pride and security of monarchs and urged that the "Serbs must be cleaned up and that quickly." The deliberateness of Austria was, however, more menacing than any bluster. Investigation brought conviction that Serbia was behind the plot, preparation for war went forward, Hungary was won over to the idea that the time to strike had arrived, and assurance of support was obtained from Germany.

There is not the slightest proof that Austria and Germany plotted a general European war in July of 1914, or at any other time. There is every evidence that Austria was determined to end the menace to the empire by the complete subjection of Serbia and that, on July 5, the German government pledged its support unconditionally. This is the famous "blank check" upon which any accusation of German war guilt must be based. Both Germany and Austria hoped to localize

⁴ In 1934 King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the French foreign minister, Barthou, were assassinated. Hungary was implicated in the affair and there seemed danger of war. Both Hungary and Yugoslavia submitted their cases to the League of Nations, and a compromise settlement was arranged.

the conflict and appear to have thought that Russia might desert her protégé, Serbia, as she had done in 1909. It must not be forgotten, however, in condemning Serbia for her part in the assassination, that Serbian action was based upon the feeling that small states, also, have a right to their existence, that Serbia's ambitions had long been thwarted by Austria, and that her life was menaced by the Austrian policy of encroachment in the Balkans. Russian aid might also be secured in the face of open Austrian aggression. Everyone awaited the announcement of Austria's demands. The only evidence of Russia's position, aside from the warlike words of the Pan-Slavs, was the comment of the Russian foreign minister that the "policies of Russia are pacific but not passive."

The long delayed "ultimatum" to Serbia was presented on July 23, and even those who had expected severity were surprised at the formidable nature of its demands. After stating that Serbia had not lived up to the promise given in 1909 to be a "good neighbor"⁵ and asserting that Serbia was entirely responsible for the crime of Serajevo, the Austrian government demanded that the government of Serbia condemn and prevent all anti-Austrian propaganda, that Serbia suppress the secret societies and their publications, that all anti-Austrian teachers and textbooks be banned from Serbian schools, that Serbia dismiss all public officials implicated in anti-Austrian activities, and that two Serbian officials whose names were given in the ultimatum be arrested at once. Then followed two demands which would have impaired Serbia's sovereignty and have ended in the extinction of Serbian independence: Serbia must accept Austrian "collaboration" in the suppression of propaganda and Austrian "help" in the judicial investigation of the Serajevo crime. Serbia was given forty-eight hours to reply to the demands.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Serbia's reply¹ was submissive and was considered satisfactory everywhere except in Vienna. With the exception of the participation of Austrian officials in the activities of the Serbian government, Serbia accepted every demand, in whole or in part, and agreed to submit the doubtful points to mediation, or to the Hague court. Even the German kaiser felt that the reply removed "every cause for war"

⁵ The bad "neighborliness" had been as fully apparent on the side of Austria as on that of Serbia, at least as far as Serbian opinion was concerned.

and that he would never order mobilization after such an answer. The Austrian government, however, was bent upon a punitive war and preferred to consider Serbia's reply unsatisfactory. Diplomatic relations were broken off on July 25, and Austrian mobilization followed. On July 28 Austria declared war on Serbia.

The attention of the world was then focused upon Russia; only Russian assistance could prevent the elimination of Serbia "as a political factor in the Balkans."⁶ To those who have watched the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia in 1938, it may seem that Russia had an alternative. To the Russians of 1914, the desertion of Serbia seemed unthinkable, suicidal to Russian prestige as well as a craven consent to the extinction of Serbia. In the words of Sir Arthur Nicholson, an English diplomat, "localizing the war merely means that all the powers are to hold the ring while Austria quietly strangles Serbia." When Austria flatly refused Russia's request that the two powers negotiate directly, Russian mobilization seemed inevitable. In the meantime, Sir Edward Grey urged the mediation of England, France, Germany, and Italy between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. This was refused, for Austrian pride would not permit mediation of a dispute with a small state. Germany proposed instead a mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary. This was acceptable to Grey, and a day or two later, when Grey's second proposal came, the German chancellor urged Austria to consider it, saying that a refusal would make the Central Powers appear to be desirous of war. Austria's answer was the declaration of war on Serbia. On July 29 the tsar ordered mobilization against Austria. Grey worked feverishly to prevent general mobilization and to bring about a conference which would attempt a settlement. The military chiefs were in control in St. Petersburg and Berlin. On July 30 general mobilization was ordered in Russia, and the die was cast.

There was consternation in Germany, for, apparently, there had been genuine expectation that the war could be localized. Both France and Germany tried to force England to a decision, but Grey insisted that England was not bound and was free to intervene or not as Parliament should choose. He was bitterly condemned later for not having stated plainly that England would back France and Russia, on the basis that such frankness would have prevented Germany's action. On July 31, Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia

⁶ A phrase in a letter from Emperor Francis Joseph to Kaiser William II.

demanding demobilization and another to France asking a categorical statement of her position if Russia and Germany were at war. Russia did not reply at all, and Germany declared war on August 1. France's reply was noncommittal. Germany declared war against France on August 3. Of all the great European powers, England was the only one not yet involved.

Ever since the Russian-French alliance had made it necessary to plan a war on two fronts, the German general staff had based its plans for a war upon a rapid thrust at Paris itself. It was expected that Russia would have difficulty in getting her vast forces mobilized and that Germany could neglect the eastern front until her success in the west permitted a division of her forces. Such an attack must be made through Belgium, regardless of the neutrality guaranteed that country by a treaty of 1839, for the French border fortresses were looked upon as too formidable for a campaign that depended upon speed. The plan had merits from the point of view of military strategy but was the one thing needed to ensure Great Britain's entry in the war and to make certain the assessment of war guilt upon Germany later. On August 4, German troops entered Belgium, and England declared war on Germany. The German chancellor bitterly denounced England, asserting that "necessity knows no law" and that Germany's violation of "a scrap of paper" was no cause for England's attack.

THE LINE-UP OF THE POWERS

The complicated alliance system was now called into play. Italy and Rumania decided to renounce their obligations and declared their neutrality. Montenegro entered the war on the side of Serbia; Turkey joined forces with Austria and Germany. Bulgaria stayed out for a time but joined the Central Powers in 1915. Greece, bound to neither side, was torn between two allegiances. The king was pro-German, while Venizelos, the prime minister, strongly favored the Allies.⁷ Japan declared war on Germany (August 23) and demanded the evacuation of Germany's possessions in China.

No statement as to the groups of states lined up against one another in the titanic combat would be complete without an account of Italy's entrance into the war. It was a long step from the neutrality declared in August, 1914, to the entry on the side of the Allies less

⁷ The name given the France-Russia-Great Britain combination after they made a definite alliance in August.

than a year later. Germany and Austria had hoped to keep Italy neutral by the promise of small compensations in "unredeemed" Italy and in the Balkans. Austria balked at any significant offers of territory at her expense. The Allies had no reason to hesitate and were willing to pledge the realization of all Italy's ambitions—when and if a supine Austrian empire lay ready for their knife. The Trentino and the southern Tyrol, part of the east coast of the Adriatic, the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean,⁸ part of the German colonies, the port of Valona in Albania, and a sphere of influence in Asia Minor were all promised her.

Rumania hesitated a little longer. In the Second Balkan War, she had been an ally of Serbia and had made a bitter enemy of Bulgaria. Her nationalistic interests were centered in areas controlled by both Russia and Austria-Hungary. It was difficult to choose between Bessarabia and Transylvania, but an old grudge against the haughty Magyars tipped the balance, and Rumania came into the war on the side of the Allied Powers in 1916. And so with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey lined up against England, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, Italy, Rumania, and Japan⁹ the war ran nearly three years of its fateful course. With desperate endeavor the remaining European powers made every effort to maintain their neutrality. Across the Atlantic another neutral found it more and more difficult to carry on the normal activities of a great commercial power.

WAR RESPONSIBILITY AND WAR AIMS

When a great war has been fought to the point where one adversary is able to dictate a peace to a vanquished foe, it is inevitable that the victor should endeavor to impose responsibility for the war as one of the terms of the treaty of peace. Of all the terms of the treaty drawn up after the Great War, the clause in which Germany was forced to admit war guilt has rankled the most in German hearts. Before the war was over controversy began to rage among historians as to the validity of that indictment, and countless books and articles have been written to prove one thesis or another. There has long been no doubt as to the facts in the case, for there has never been a war in the history of the world about which more complete information

⁸ She had taken these islands from Turkey in 1911 but had not been confirmed in her possession of them.

⁹ Portugal was drawn in in 1916 but was not a significant factor.

has been available. Almost every country, especially those where revolution followed war, has published voluminous documentary material. The differences that exist today are largely differences of opinion: differences due to sentiment rather than to fact. Certain general statements may be made. No one wanted the war, save perhaps a few munition makers and military men and an occasional diplomat, certainly not the kaiser, or Sir Edward Grey, or the tsar, or the broken old emperor of Austria. The diplomats who had labored so hard for two decades to plaster up the cracks in the peace structure of Europe were crushed by the collapse of their efforts. Blunders had been made, it is true, but not willfully. There was no great war fever in any country, nor any organized war propaganda. There was no state in 1914 that glorified war, and no people in whom chauvinism had been raised to a religious fervor. Every nation felt that it was fighting because of grim necessity and in self-defense. Serbia's determination to live, and to grow, and her willingness to use whatever means she could to reach that end, and Austria's determination to prevent the disintegration of the empire furnish the basic elements in the situation in July, 1914. Back of that situation lay the alliances, the vast armaments that had been prepared for war, national aspirations, and a crisscross of rivalries.¹⁰ The only safe conclusion is that responsibility for the war must be shared by all the nations that engaged in it and that it is an absurdity to attempt to fix war "guilt" on any one nation or person.

War aims, as declared by the various participants at different stages in the struggle, are of much greater value in estimating fundamental responsibility than any examination of the causes of the war. War came so unexpectedly and found the great powers so unprepared that there was at first little idea as to objectives other than to defeat the enemy. Soon, however, "national ambitions" were formulated, and demands were drawn up which could only be attained with military victory. Peace then became dependent upon the satisfaction of war aims, and war was preferred to "peace without victory." In this respect also there is ample evidence: the secret treaties made as new belligerents took their places on one side or the other, the correspondence of the diplomats among each group of allies, the action of each

¹⁰ One author uses the striking phrase, "the inelastic mind which placed petty points of national prestige . . . above the preservation of general peace," and another emphasizes the importance of the "military time-table for mobilization" which caused peace to play second fiddle to the demands of military plans.

power as opportunity offered, and numerous publications in every country involved. Very early the fundamental aim of the Central Powers appeared—the creation of a *Mittel-europa* extending from the mouth of the Rhine to Constantinople and a “Berlin to Bagdad” line on to the Persian Gulf. Had peace been dictated by Germany there is little doubt but that German domination in Belgium, in the Balkans, and in Asia Minor would have resulted. Satisfaction of German colonial ambitions at the expense of England and France was an additional “aim,” and extension of German power in the Far East was mentioned.

France was definite from the beginning in her demand for Alsace-Lorraine. Beyond that there was great difference of opinion, but security, indemnities, and colonial gains were considered essential. Russia looked to the straits and Constantinople—annexation if possible, internationalization and neutralization, at least. Russia wanted the German and Austrian Polish areas as well and a place of predominant interest in the Near East. Italy and Rumania were quite frank in regard to their war aims, and the secret treaties by which they entered the war are irrefutable evidence of the selfishness of those aims. Japan’s action against the German colonies and her demands upon China¹¹ were a preliminary to her relentless effort to establish Japanese hegemony in the Far East to the exclusion not only of Germany’s interests there but of those of every Western power. England said less about “war aims” but took immediate steps to seize German colonies and expressed herself forcibly on the subject of the German fleet. She annexed Cyprus and Egypt in the early days of the war and thus ended the anomalous situation in those two areas.

It can easily be seen that there was a dangerous lack of harmony on the question of national ambitions, and that postwar compromises would, of necessity, be numerous. The only really significant point of agreement on the part of the Allies was the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine. So far as altruism or lofty principles are concerned, there is little to choose between the two groups of belligerents. Those who lament the injustice to Germany of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles have grounds for their criticism but often lose sight of the terms which Germany would, in all probability, have inflicted had she been the victor.

¹¹ See below, page 880.

THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE COMBATANTS

In turning to the relative strength of the two sets of combatants, it is wise not to place too much emphasis upon the long array of names in the list of the Allied Powers. Both sides expected a short war, and when plans were based upon speed the advantage lay with Germany. It was only in the last year of the war, after the entry of the United States, that the increased resources and reserves of the Allied Powers came to be of great importance and even then it was, in part, potentiality rather than fact that turned the tide. In 1914 the German army was the most formidable instrument of war the world had ever seen. It numbered nearly four and a half million fully trained men, with a million more who were partly trained. "Its artillery was overwhelming and its mobilization was a work of art. Thousands of trains deposited their human burden on the long railway sidings which had been especially constructed on the Belgian and French frontiers in anticipation of 'the day.'"¹² Although Germany must fight on two fronts, she had the inestimable advantage of being able to move troops from one front to the other with great ease. Her allies were not equals but subordinates, and there never was any doubt about a unified command, or as to where ultimate authority lay among the Central Powers. German scientific and industrial ability was unequaled and was at the service of the state. Certain deficiencies in necessary raw materials were serious, but only a long war could make them dangerous.

On the side of the Allied Powers superior man power was counterbalanced by lack of unified command and the wide separation of battle fronts. The French army was the best the Allies could show, and was the backbone of their cause on the western front. Russia had the largest mobilized force in the world,¹³ but it was poorly equipped and badly organized. Again the problems of distance, transportation, and backwardness of economic development made the Russian war strength less than would be expected if numbers were the only consideration. England had a very small standing army, and

¹² H. A. L. Fisher, *History of Europe* (Houghton Mifflin Company), Vol. III, p. 1154.

¹³ The mobilized forces of the Central Powers numbered about 21 million men, half of whom were Germans. The Allies numbered about 40 million, with Russia leading with 12 million.

it was only very slowly that the great man power of the British Empire could be brought into action. In the same way, the greater potential resources of the Allies were difficult to mobilize. England's navy was a tremendous asset, and the navy and merchant marine made possible the acquisition of supplies from every part of the world. The power of the English pound sterling cannot be overestimated. For three years and more English funds backed all Allied efforts, and it was only the entry of the United States that brought relief to the British treasury. In 1914-1915, therefore, there seemed to be a fairly even distribution of power between the two sets of combatants, the advantage in a short war probably lying with Germany and her allies.

MOBILIZATION FOR WAR

No account of the mobilization of resources for the Great War would be complete without some comment on the colossal expenditure in materials, money, and energy. The world had seen nothing like it before, and the figures staggered the imagination of those who made estimates, for there had been no major combat since the industrialization of the Western world revolutionized every human activity. To a postwar generation, speculation as to the numbers involved in any future world war and as to the expenditure of resources such a war would require does not come with such terrific shock. The cost of war on a large scale was learned by experience. The destructive nature of modern warfare was soon apparent, and the amount of munitions alone that would be required seemed almost unbelievable. Old factories were enlarged, new ones built, and output was almost limitlessly increased. Transportation was similarly regimented and mobilized. National boards in every belligerent country organized the production of every basic war supply. Even agriculture was brought under supervision, because armies and civilian population alike had to be fed. Labor was carefully directed, strikes were forbidden, and wages and conditions of labor were regulated. Women went into every variety of industry as men went to the front, and five years of war meant a tremendous economic readjustment.

The figures needed for a discussion of war finance are astronomical. Eighty per cent of the total war expenditures were met by borrowing, and the immense war debts will be a burden upon generations yet unborn—providing, of course, that ultimate payment is ever

achieved without cancellation in whole or in part.¹⁴ Nations with broad financial resources carried the poorer and weaker states within the group, and huge interallied debts were thus created. War taxes mounted with war debts until almost every inhabitant of every belligerent country was made genuinely tax-conscious. Income taxes, death duties, commodities taxes, and numerous varieties of stamp taxes brought home the necessities of the government.

Almost everywhere war consumption was apt to exceed war production. The Allied blockade of Central Europe increased the scarcity there of many commodities, while the submarine campaign cut down the vital imports of Germany's opponents. Consumption was therefore limited and regulated in as close a manner as production. Food cards, rationing, the use of substitutes, and compulsory self-discipline and reduced consumption were all used by every belligerent. Even the United States, after her entry into the war, found that the needs of the Allies made similar tactics necessary. Meatless days, heatless days, the use of corn, rice, and potato flour, and sugar rationing made the lot of the housewife interesting and perplexing. The "totalitarian" state was a product of war, born of the necessity for utilizing every resource for a common end. "Cannon instead of butter" might well have been a war slogan; its use long after the war years were over was an ill-omen for the future.

THE USE OF PROPAGANDA

In retrospect, one of the most refreshing things about the pre-war years was the relative absence of propaganda. There were countries where the press was censored and other countries in which it was far from free, but there was little deliberate and widespread endeavor on the part of governments to provide the public with that which they desired it to think, and feel, and act upon. With the war that was all changed, and again war lessons were carried over into postwar years. Civilian and soldier alike were urged to believe in the iniquities of their enemies, in the justice of their own cause, and in its ultimate triumph in order that they might be willing to sacrifice all that made life worth while, or life itself, for their country. Mass education had produced a reading public that could be influenced by

¹⁴ There have already been many instances of cancellation. The Russian Revolution liquidated the national debt. Inflation had much the same effect in Germany. Payments of interallied debts have been suspended and will probably never be made.

propaganda in a way that had never been possible before. Every country maintained elaborate propaganda systems. Reports of war atrocities were given wide circulation in neutral as well as belligerent countries. Many, if not most, of the propagandists on both sides were honest men, and not consciously or knowingly mendacious. Imaginations were stimulated by the unnatural tension of war, however, and it was easy to believe evil of a powerful opponent. Germans knew nothing of the horror aroused in the Allied countries and in the United States by the reports of German atrocities in Belgium, but they were well aware that the Allies used native troops from Africa and India on the western front, and they believed that the German wounded were butchered and mutilated. As a matter of fact, very few of the atrocities of which each side accused the other could be proved, and most of the horrible ones were exaggerated or altogether baseless. The English-speaking peoples forgot all other opponents to concentrate their propaganda of hate and fear upon the Germans, called the "Huns," while in Germany a wave of Anglophobia "found expression in the lyrical madness of the poets and the blasphemous ravings of the pulpit."¹⁵ "The Hymn of Hate" was repeated all over the world but was much more popular in Berlin than at the front. Soldiers seemed cold to the stirring:

Hate by water and hate by land;
Hate of the heart and hate of the hand;
We love as one; we hate as one;
We have but one foe alone,—England.

Within the belligerent nations very few were able to withstand the war fever, regardless of their convictions prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In fact, there was a remarkable and almost instantaneous sinking of differences of opinion. The long years of devotion to the cult of nationalism bore fruit in a surprising unity which endured for at least the first two years of the war. The only notable exceptions were among the subject peoples of the Austrian and Russian empires and in some sections of Ireland. Opposition parties in the political arena joined in aid of the government. Businessmen and financiers turned every effort to make all resources yield their utmost in the crisis, the professional classes gave their services eagerly, while scientists and inventors made contributions of inestimable value. The pul-

¹⁵ G. P. Gooch, *Germany*, p. 118.

pits of churches of every denomination were rostrums for the service of the state—and the sacred Cause. Once again the God of Battles received the supplications of all combatants.¹⁶ Pacifist organizations lost their vigor and often disbanded altogether. Quakers and “conscientious objectors” found life most difficult in communities stirred by a passion of national patriotism and stimulated by war propaganda. Those who continued to love peace tried to content themselves with the comforting slogans, “War to end war,” “*Krieg und Kultur*,” and “War to save democracy,” or they devoted themselves to movements designed to create a postwar international organization which would make war impossible. Socialists, whose prewar sentiments had been so markedly pacifist, succumbed to nationalism and discarded for a time their international affiliations, working as loyally as any other citizens for the success of their respective states and willingly submitting to a state socialism that would have roused their deepest ire in the prewar period. The total effect was a fusion of all elements into an astonishing unity of purpose. Subjected to the constant assault of propaganda and deprived of the thought-provoking influence of an articulate opposition, countless people suffered desperately from the strain of long-continued war, and war hysteria made absurd fears—and still more tragically absurd action—possible.

As the barrage of propaganda grew more violent it was very difficult for outsiders to remain neutral. With her command of the sea and control of overseas mail routes and cable heads, Great Britain was able to make a far greater impression in the United States than was Germany. Part of that success was due to the fact that the same language was spoken in England and the United States, and part of it undoubtedly came from the blunders and unfortunate military acts of Germany. The invasion of Belgium, the sinking of the “*Lusitania*,” the execution of the nurse, Edith Cavell, and the numerous acts of sabotage and disturbance on the part of German agents in the United States, acts designed to counteract the advantage of British sea power, were of inestimable assistance to the Allies in turning American public opinion away from Germany.

¹⁶ Pope Pius X, whose death in August, 1914, was undoubtedly hastened by the war, refused to condone its outbreak or to bless the arms of any state. “I do not bless war, I bless peace,” were almost his last words. His successor maintained a neutral position and worked constantly for peace, but Catholics in every nation rallied to patriotic demands as did members of all other churches.

CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME

Every nation which participated in the war, even the most democratic, had to surrender its civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, of assemblage, and of the press. Intolerance of minority groups was prevalent everywhere. Even in the United States after 1917, where there was far less justification than in war-torn Europe, unofficial Committees of Public Safety watched the foreign-born citizens, scanned the German-American newspapers, and regulated public meetings. Civil liberties are an expensive privilege in war times. The test of the strength of the attachment of the people for them, and of the democracy of a country's institutions, is the speed with which a return to them is effected at the close of a war.¹⁷

One of the striking characteristics of the Great War was the proof which it offered of the fact that, under conditions made possible by modern industrialization, mechanization, and urbanization, there could no longer be any great numbers of people who could be considered noncombatants. The farmer in the fields, the worker in the factory, the trainmen on the railways, the employees of all sorts of public service agencies were of as much value to the belligerents as the soldiers at the front. Gone were the days when professional armies fought according to prescribed rules while the great bulk of the population of belligerent states knew little of the ways of war. The integration of modern life was carried over into warfare: mass armies supported by mass production meant the mobilization of every resource of the state and the subjection of men, women, and children to the necessities of war. This change meant, in turn, the increased frightfulness of war, for any device which might serve to disrupt such organization and mobilization became a legitimate war weapon. Bombardment of industrial centers, interference, by any means that could be devised, with the normal productive life of an adversary became an objective of those who planned campaigns. The destruction of a factory might be as important as the annihilation of a whole military division, while the lowering of civilian morale could be as deadly as an army insurrection. The hazards of war were shared by civilian and combatant alike, when the new agencies of modern warfare were exercised to bring death and devastation to those who, in previous wars, had lived safely behind the lines.

¹⁷ See Leon Whipple, *The Story of Civil Liberties in the United States*.

THE PROBLEMS OF NEUTRAL STATES

These same factors of mass mobilization and of new methods and weapons of warfare necessitated a corresponding change in the whole conception of neutral rights and duties. The later part of the nineteenth century had so enlarged the economic horizon, and the intricate network of international trade was so necessary a part of modern economy, that the question of neutral trading was more important than ever before. Since the end of the Napoleonic period there had been no European war of sufficient length or magnitude to make the problem of neutrality an international issue.¹⁸ In 1856 the powers drew up the Declaration of Paris which accepted in a large degree the principles defended by the United States in the period of Napoleon. The first clause of the declaration abolishing privateering was of no significance in 1914, but the other three were at first held to be effective: the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war; neutral goods, with the exception of contraband, are not liable to capture under an enemy flag; blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

The Great War had no sooner begun than the great trading neutrals found themselves in difficulties. Since British sea power was supreme, the crucial question was the interpretation given to neutral rights by the British government. Realizing the necessity for cutting off certain essential raw products from the Central Powers, the British extended the list of contraband to include both food and materials to be used in industry, and the provisions of the Declaration of Paris referring to neutral shipping were made almost meaningless. At the same time there were interference with the mails, boycotting of firms which had been "blacklisted" because of their financial dealings with the enemy, and every sort of attempt to divert essential products to the Allied ports and thus make neutrals the economic allies of Britain. England's blockade of Germany was in many ways similar to that of the Napoleonic period, the external blockade versus the Continental system, with the added difficulties of mines, "war zones," and "military areas."

Neutrals, such as the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, that could trade freely with the Central Powers were

¹⁸ Some significant problems of neutrality did arise during the American Civil War.

brought into line by stringent "rationing," and their importation of essential products was kept to a prewar level. Great Britain felt herself to be under the necessity, also, of maintaining as much as possible of her normal trade and, therefore, permitted under the British flag a licensed trade which she forbade to neutrals. The United States verbally defended the "freedom of the seas," and claims for damages piled up against the British government. There were an infinitely larger number of claims and of irritating incidents between neutrals and the Allied Powers than between neutrals and the Central Powers, but they were almost entirely monetary claims. Although trade was hindered, it remained profitable, and, although there was grave danger that friction might lead to war, neutrals continued to trade. European neutrals accommodated themselves to the pressures of the Central Powers. Overseas neutrals, with many loud protests, submitted to Allied restraint; the former furnished economic aid to their masters, the latter fell into the Allied orbit; and both groups were nonneutral, at least in the economic sense. When the German government endeavored to break the strangle hold of the blockade by the use of a new device, the submarine, the old problem found a new element. The effective use of submarine warfare injured neutrals in a way for which compensation could not be arranged in money or concessions after the war. Neutral lives as well as neutral goods were endangered, and the horrors of war were brought home to neutrals most remote from the scene of battle. The old conceptions of neutrality were entirely inadequate and were rapidly becoming obsolete.¹⁹

MORE FEATURES OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY WARFARE

There were other novel features of the Great War, evidence of the changes made in all phases of modern life by the scientific and mechanical achievements of the preceding century. Military men have said that the Great War produced only one entirely new method of fighting—the use of poison gas. Heretofore there had been cutting, and bombarding or shooting weapons, now a device which produced strangling was added. If that be true, there were certainly new methods of use, or adaptations, of old weapons. Machine guns, bombs of all sorts, mines, new explosives, long-range cannon made the

¹⁹ S. F. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, Chap. XXXII, for an excellent discussion of the difficulties of neutrals.

artillery a quite different service. With trench warfare, the need for cavalry forces declined, while tanks, trucks, airplanes, and submarines were evidence of motorized warfare new to military history. Radio and wireless telegraphy revolutionized communications. Engineers, inventors, and scientists were fully as important as generals, and campaigns depended upon mechanization as much as upon strategy.

The auxiliary services were as greatly affected by the modern age as the military arm itself. The commissariat was made over to fit the demands of the huge armies and to utilize the new methods of caring for and transporting foods. The whole medical and nursing services were based upon the vast development in those fields in the nineteenth century. Hospitalization, the Red Cross, and all the arrangements for the care of the sick and wounded bore little resemblance to the rudimentary provisions of the period of the Crimean and the American Civil wars. In actual tactics, the most revolutionary change was the trench warfare which replaced the old open battles. On the western front, and to some extent on the eastern as well, there was one long battle with "drives" at intervals, when one belligerent or the other endeavored to break the deadlock which resulted from the operations of trench warfare on "fronts" hundreds of miles in length.

MILITARY AND NAVAL CAMPAIGNS

The western front was established within a few weeks of the opening of the war and was relatively little changed until the armistice in November, 1918. Germany's initial thrust had been predicated upon the belief that Paris could be reached in a fortnight and that troops could be sent back from France to the eastern front in six weeks, in time to meet the much more deliberate Russian advance. The estimates were made upon the expectation that Belgium would passively submit to the passage of German troops, that Russia would be too slow to be a menace, and that England would remain neutral. There may have been some underestimate of French ability to organize and to rally under pressure. The premises upon which the timetable had been drawn up were not true. The early advance of Russia made necessary the removal of troops from the west, and Belgian resistance, English assistance and French determination in combination stopped the German hordes at the Marne six weeks after the war began. The war was not to be won by a quick decisive thrust.

In the winter of 1914, the opposing forces dug themselves in on the western front, and the long years of trench warfare began. Most of Belgium and a fringe of northern France were in German hands until the end of the war; the line of operations shifted back and forth with the drives and counterattacks that marked each year's campaign. The six months' long Battle of Verdun in 1916 was the outstanding event of those long years of deadly stalemate and was Germany's second great effort to end the war by a western victory. The battle cost each side a half million lives, but the fortress held, and the Germans were forced to give up the attack. Toward the end of the Verdun battle, the English endeavored to relieve the pressure by a counterattack on the Somme, where almost as many lives were lost as in the Verdun salient. The year ended in no material gain for either side, except that the Germans retired to a slightly shorter and more defensible line, which they held until 1918.

The outline of the war on the eastern front can be similarly condensed. General von Hindenburg met the Russian forces in East Prussia in late August, 1914, and after defeating them decisively, followed them into Russian territory. The Russian armies that had been sent against Austria scored notable successes in August in Austrian Poland and Galicia. The German General von Mackensen was sent against them, and the southern campaign, also, ended in dire defeat for Russia. In 1915 the Russian lines were re-formed again, leaving much of Russian Poland and part of the Baltic provinces in the hands of the Central Powers. Russia was now powerless to aid her allies, and her greatest service was the negative one of holding a part of the German army on the eastern front.

Partly to encourage the eastern allies and partly to open the straits so that Russia might acquire much-needed munitions, France and England entered upon the Dardanelles campaign early in 1915. Had it been successful Turkey would have been forced out of the war, and the Allies could have driven a wedge into the Balkans. But the combined efforts of a powerful British fleet and a strong land force failed to open the straits or to capture Constantinople. The campaign was abandoned at the end of 1915, although an Allied force was left at Salonika.

The war in the Balkans was a long story of tragedy for the small states and of costly victories for the Austro-German forces. Serbia made a gallant resistance but was conquered in the fall of 1915. Montenegro and Albania were brought under Austrian control. When

Rumania, encouraged by the failure of the Germans at Verdun, was so foolhardy as to join the Allies in 1916, General von Falkenhayn invaded Rumania and, in a terrible four months' campaign, defeated her so drastically that she signed a separate treaty (1918) and withdrew from the war. Rumanian wheat and oil were of more value to the Central Powers than any other fruits of their Balkan victories. Greece stayed out until 1917, partly because of the pro-German proclivities of the king, whose wife was the sister of the kaiser. Greek neutrality was violated by the Allies in a flagrant manner and they aided in a revolution in June of 1917, which threw the king from his throne and made it possible for the pro-Ally leader, Venizelos, to bring Greece into the war in opposition to the Central Powers.

Although the Turkish forts at the Dardanelles withstood the Allied attack, other parts of the Turkish Empire were more vulnerable. The first years of the war, however, were disastrous for the Allies. The British invaded Mesopotamia from the Persian Gulf in a campaign that failed to make any gain. The Russians pushed down into Asiatic Turkey in 1916, but were driven back by the German-trained Turkish forces. In fear of an Armenian uprising, the Turks entered upon a policy designed to exterminate the whole Armenian nation. Massacre followed massacre; those who escaped alive were deported to other parts of the empire; and a rough estimate places the number slain or killed by privation at a million. Greeks, Syrians, and Jews were massacred as a result of similar deliberate policies of forestalling possible resistance. Later in the war Colonel Lawrence and other British agents stirred up Arab nationalism, and a series of uprisings broke up the Turkish Empire and made possible the entry of Allied troops into Bagdad and Jerusalem.²⁰

The German colonies fell into Allied hands early in the war, for the German navy was unable to defend them. Troops were sent into German West Africa from the Union of South Africa in 1915. German East Africa held out until the end of the war against the combined forces sent from the British, Portuguese, and Belgian colonies, but was forced to surrender after the European armistice. Togoland and the German Kamerun colony were taken by British and French forces. Japan took Kiaochow, and the German island colonies were picked up before the end of the war. The hard-won

²⁰ See Colonel Lawrence's own account, *Revolt in the Desert*.

German colonial empire vanished in thin air, as the fatherland battled for victory on the western front.

Naval warfare played a much smaller part than had been expected. The sea power of England was a fact of tremendous importance, and the British navy was as efficient on the sea as was the German army on land. Most of the German navy was bottled up in the vicinity of Kiel Harbor, German overseas commerce practically disappeared, and the German coast was blockaded. The British navy made possible the safe transportation of troops and supplies from all parts of the world. British industry and trade were able to go ahead without any drastic curtailment until the height of the submarine campaign. A few German vessels, on the high seas when war began, were able to prey on Allied commerce until their brief careers were cut off. The only important naval battle occurred in 1916 off the coast of Jutland. It was a gigantic combat which ended in both sides claiming the victory. At any rate, Great Britain was still mistress of the seas.

THE EFFECT OF THE BLOCKADE AND OF THE MILITARY STALEMATE

At the beginning of the war, the Central Powers were very nearly self-sufficient as far as the production of essential food products was concerned. They were lacking in certain necessary raw materials, but a government commission combined rigorous conservation with every encouragement to science and industry. The German armies never lacked for adequate arms and munitions of all sorts, and German industry was able to furnish the new weapons of warfare with a speed quite commensurate with the demand for them. If the war had been a short one, the British blockade might have been irritating only, and not of great significance. In a long war, the cumulative effect was of great importance. As more and more men were taken from industry and agriculture to fill the depleted ranks of the army, the old self-sufficiency was gone. Food could not be produced in large enough quantities to feed both armed and civilian populations. Industry suffered, for preference in obtaining laborers was given to the producers of goods essential to the armies. The constant addition to the Allied ranks of countries representing raw resources and vast potential man power struck terror to the hearts of Germans, who saw

their own resources and man power being diminished without the possibility of replenishment.

The current of unrest among the Poles, Czechs, and other Slavs was a matter of growing concern, and the entry of Rumania in 1916 caused an alarm in Germany out of proportion to the military significance of that event. The successes of 1915 had led the Central Powers to feel confident of a victorious conclusion of the war before the pressure upon their peoples became intolerable, but the failure and carnage at Verdun and on the Somme in 1916 brought the conviction that the end was far in the future. Within Germany there was evidence of disaffection. The Social Democratic party split early in 1916, with a vigorous minority of its representatives in the Reichstag refusing to vote for further war expenditures. The kaiser was very much alarmed and was induced (August, 1916) to summon Hindenburg and Ludendorff to supreme command.

Hindenburg took personal command on the western front and at once ordered the construction of a heavily fortified line to which the German army might withdraw and which they might be able to hold against any attack. Ludendorff, as quartermaster general, became virtual dictator of Germany. Having stabilized the situation for the time being, those in charge of the new regime made a careful survey of the problems of the Central Powers and came to certain definite conclusions as to their future program. Their conclusions were that the resources and man power of the Allied Powers were such that Germany could not win the war by land offensives, that the most she could expect was to hold the lines which she was then defending, and that another campaign like that of Verdun and the Somme would be disastrous. They felt, therefore, that Germany's only hope lay in turning to unrestricted submarine warfare. The submarine might work such havoc upon British commerce that the Allies would be forced to sue for peace.

THE SUBMARINE VS. THE BLOCKADE

Ever since the beginning of the war Germany had contemplated the use of the submarine as a decisive weapon. The flotilla of "U-boats" was very small²¹ at the beginning of the war—only twenty-seven in January, 1915—and their use at that time might have been

²¹ Only about one-third of them could be kept in continuous cruising service.

irritating and terrifying but not of great effect in destroying commerce. They were used in laying mines, and in maintaining a war zone around the British Isles. The old regulations of international law in regard to "visit and search," and in regard to the protection of the lives of noncombatants on unarmed merchant vessels, became obsolete with the advent of the submarine. A submarine commander could take no prizes to port, nor could he provide accommodations for those on the boats he torpedoed. If a submarine campaign were to be very effective there could be no distinction between neutral and belligerent merchant vessels, for both were bringing food and supplies to the enemy. In fact, as the British blockade tightened, Germany came to feel that all neutrals trading with the British were, in fact, the allies of Britain, for their activities supplemented those of the British fleet and merchant marine.

Again, as in the period between 1793 and 1815, neutrals were caught in a web of the retaliatory acts of opposing belligerents, each endeavoring to use economic pressure to effect a victory over its opponent. As in the Napoleonic period, the United States was the chief commercial neutral, but in the twentieth century the power of the United States was incomparably greater than it had been a hundred years earlier. Since neither group of belligerents wished to drive the United States into the arms of its enemies, both felt it necessary to proceed cautiously. The United States answered Germany's announcement of the use of submarines in the war zone by a note (February, 1915) stating that she would hold Germany to a "strict accountability" in case American lives were lost, and she met all British interference with neutral trade with protests and the filing of bills for damages to be settled after the war. In an effort to ease a situation so potentially dangerous, the state department endeavored to use its good offices to bring the belligerents to a mutual agreement to give up the practices that were causing the danger. Germany was asked to give up mine laying and submarine attacks upon merchant vessels, and England was asked to permit the neutral carriage of foodstuffs to German ports, under the guarantees of the American government that they would be used only by the civilian population.²² Neither side accepted the offer of good offices, and the full meaning of the

²² England insisted that Germany was not to be trusted. Germany agreed to accept only if *raw materials* were added to foodstuffs, and the raw materials were those necessary for war

submarine as a weapon of war was brought home to the United States in the sinking of the "Lusitania" in May, 1915.

The "Lusitania" was an unarmed British passenger liner carrying a cargo largely composed of contraband munitions. It was torpedoed without warning off the coast of Ireland, and 1,195 lives were lost, including those of 128 Americans.²³ The whole question of American neutrality was at once brought into the open. For the first time a large section of American opinion thought seriously of entering the war. Although the war had been looked upon as a European quarrel in which the United States had no concern, there had never been any doubt as to which belligerent was favored by Americans from the beginning. Pacifism was nowhere as strong as in the United States, and the president who was to lead her into the war was himself a distinguished pacifist. War spirit was entirely lacking at first and was very slow to develop, but the combination of affection for England, economic bonds with the Allied Powers, effective Allied propaganda, and German blunders caused an ever-increasing surge of pro-Ally sentiment. American money and energy were poured out in providing for the refugees in Belgium. The violation of Belgian neutrality had turned the people of the United States toward the Allies, and they were easily persuaded to believe the tales of German atrocities. Individual Americans crossed the border to join Canadian regiments or enlisted in the Allied forces abroad. Americans contributed funds for medical units, and American doctors and nurses were sent to the western front. The American ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Hines Page, was pro-Ally from the beginning, as was Colonel House, upon whom the president depended for advice. Wilson himself seems to have felt that the Central Powers could not be permitted to win. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, was one of the few members of the administration genuinely neutral in policy, and he resigned in protest against the "Lusitania" notes, on the ground that they might lead to war. Only in German-American, and occasionally in Irish-American, circles was there much sympathy for the Central Powers. It must be admitted, of course, that munition makers prospered, that war prices for all sorts of commodities were high, and that Allied bonds sold in the United States gave its citizens a stake

²³ See S. F. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, pp. 598 ff., and an article by Thomas A. Bailey, "The Sinking of the *Lusitania*," in the *American Historical Review*, October, 1935.

in the cause of the Allies.²⁴ It would be easy, however, to overestimate the effect of economic issues on American opinion.

The use of the submarine, on the other hand, was to be the deciding factor in bringing about the entry of the United States into the war. As the British government hastened to point out, the blockade might be irritating to neutrals but it did not endanger neutral lives; whereas the submarine knew no distinction between neutral and belligerent, or between combatant and noncombatant. The sinking of the "Lusitania" was followed by a long diplomatic correspondence in which the position of the United States was fully discussed. During the remainder of the year 1915, more American lives were lost, and the American notes grew sharper. The British took advantage of the controversy to extend their restriction upon trade. Through the winter of 1915-1916 Germany hesitated. She still had less than fifty submarines, not enough to be an effective menace to the Allied merchantmen, and she was preparing for the great Verdun drive. When in April, 1916, after the sinking of the "Sussex," the United States threatened the severance of diplomatic relations, Germany finally promised to sink no more vessels without warning and without provision for the saving of human lives.

THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES

With that diplomatic victory, the United States went into the presidential campaign and re-elected President Wilson in the confidence that he could continue to "keep us out of war." The president, however, felt no false confidence and turned his attention after the election to an effort to bring about negotiations for peace. Germany, in her discouragement after the costly summer campaign, was willing to ascertain what might be gained through negotiations but did not wish to make any definitive statement of peace terms. The Allies, reassured by their success in withstanding the German drive, refused to negotiate without previous information as to German terms. Both sides confided their probable basis for negotiation to President Wilson privately.²⁵ The comparison of the two sets of "aims" was sufficient

²⁴ See Walter Millis, *The Road to War*, for a detailed account of the years 1914-1917, in which these economic factors are emphasized.

²⁵ Germany offered to give up Belgium but demanded control over Belgian railroads, forts, commerce, and so on, a slice of France, most of Serbia, freedom for Bulgaria to do what she pleased with Rumania, indemnities from everyone, colonies for

to show that no peace could be negotiated in the winter of 1916-1917.²⁶

Germany then turned to her alternative plan, the Hindenburg recommendation for a declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare.²⁷ The declaration presented to the American government late in January, 1917, stated that after February 1, all ships, neutrals included, trading "from and to England and France," found within certain specified zones would be sunk without warning. The United States thereupon severed diplomatic relations and awaited the overt act that must force her into war. Just at that juncture the British government forwarded to the State Department a dispatch, obtained by the British secret service and deciphered by British agents, which had been sent by the German minister of foreign affairs, Zimmermann, to the German minister in Mexico. The Zimmermann note was the one thing needed to rouse public opinion in the United States to a desire for war, for it proposed a German-Mexican alliance, in case the submarine campaign caused the United States to declare war—an alliance which might make it possible for Mexico to regain Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona with the aid of Japan.

More important even than the Zimmermann note was the news of the March revolution in Russia. Had it occurred several months earlier, Germany might have been encouraged to await a victory on land without the renewal of submarine warfare. Coming when it did, it had a decisive effect upon American policy. The president now felt that the Allies genuinely represented the cause of democracy, and he was encouraged to believe that in Germany, too, autocracy might be overthrown if the United States added her weight to the Allied forces. The American people were led to look upon the war as a crusade "to make the world safe for democracy." On April 6, 1917, Congress answered the president's war message by an overwhelming vote in favor of "the recognition of a state of war, thrust on the

Germany, "adequate to her population and economic interest," and "freedom of the seas." The Allies intended to diminish the area under the control of the Central Powers by the breakup of the Austrian Empire, to have Alsace-Lorraine returned to France, to create a Polish state under Russian sovereignty, and to acquire reparations and damages.

²⁶ The death of Francis Joseph in 1916 brought to the throne the Emperor Charles I, who was so alarmed by the disaffection of the Slavic peoples of the empire that he began negotiations with the Allies in January, 1917. The negotiations were unsuccessful.

²⁷ Germany then had about 140 submarines, a number considered sufficient for the campaign.

United States by the acts of Germany." Six months later, war was declared on Austria-Hungary. The United States did not declare war on the other Central Powers, nor did she formally join the Allies. She remained an "associated" power throughout the rest of the war.

Whatever the effect upon commerce of the unrestricted use of the submarine, the policy was costly to Germany and advantageous to the Allies. The loss of 209 neutral American lives on the high seas, all but 29 of them on belligerent ships, had brought into the war the richest and most populous of all the neutral powers.²⁸ The submarine campaign itself was less effective than Germany had hoped. The Allies destroyed part of the U-boats by using depth bombs, mines, airplanes, and destroyers, sent merchant vessels and army transports under convoy, and, in general, learned many methods of evasion. The blockade was tightened with the entry of the United States, and as the Latin-American states, one by one, entered the war, or broke diplomatic relations with Germany, the number of trading neutrals steadily declined.

THE PART PLAYED BY THE UNITED STATES

The United States mobilized for war, taking advantage of all the experience of the Allied Powers. Conscription was decided upon, and slowly a huge army was built. Supplies were poured into the Allied countries, and the United States acted as the banker for the hard-pressed finance ministers of her "associates." It was at first thought that the United States would not need to send large numbers of soldiers to the front but could devote her energy to the transport of all varieties of supplies and to the antisubmarine campaign. When the need for men became glaringly apparent, the process of training seemed painfully slow, and few soldiers reached France before 1918. Germany early in that year was girding herself to make one tremendous effort to win the war on the western front before the resources of the United States made such a victory impossible.

The Allies, faced by the collapse of Russia and by defeatism in the ranks of the war-weary French and Italian armies, demanded the hasty dispatch of the partly trained American forces to France. In all, about two million American soldiers crossed the Atlantic before the end of the war. The United States insisted that her army units

²⁸ The figures are from Bemis, p. 597.

remain intact under their own commander, General Pershing, subject only to the authority of the Allied central command under Marshal Foch.²⁹ In the final campaign of the summer of 1918 the American forces were of considerable military significance and of still greater importance in proving to Germany the futility of continued resistance. The Armistice in November, 1918, came just as the United States was beginning to bring its full resources of supplies, equipment, and man power into the combat.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1917

The month which brought to the Allies the inestimable advantage of the entry of the United States into the war, brought, also, the revolution which was to end in the withdrawal of Russia from the war. When the war began in 1914, Russia was in a state of unrest and dissatisfaction that led competent observers to predict that there would be a popular revolt within a year. The Duma was elected on a basis so narrow that liberals were largely excluded and the landed aristocracy was dominant, but by 1914 its members were advocating reforms. The unenfranchised radical parties grew steadily more restive and won more popular support. Marxian socialism spread rapidly as Russian industries developed. In the summer of 1914, a series of strikes indicated that large masses of working people were ready to fight for revolutionary changes. The beginning of the war saved the monarchy and absolutism for the time being. The Russian people came to the defense of their country with as much enthusiasm as the people of any other nation. If the government had recognized that patriotism by a thoroughgoing reorganization and by the institution of reforms designed to win the confidence of the people, the danger of revolution might have been over. But, instead, it was the old story of the Russo-Japanese War: graft and inefficiency appeared everywhere. Transportation facilities were inadequate, supplies and funds for the army were wasted and diverted for private profit. Barefoot and half-fed, the soldiers were sent into battle without arms or ammunition, and the loss of life was terrible. Doctors, nurses, and medical supplies were so insufficient that thousands who might easily have survived with proper care died miserably. Rumor, spreading rapidly, made conditions seem worse than they were, and there was a widespread belief that many officials were traitors to the country.

²⁹ Made commander of all Allied forces in March, 1918.

A wise and competent tsar might have been able to act to prevent disaster. There were able men who could have replaced the incompetent reactionaries in the ministry, and the Duma was both patriotic and anxious for reform. As a war measure, the bureaucracy could have been forced into honesty and efficiency or forced out of office, and by great effort the demands of war might have been met. But Nicholas II was a weakling, patriotic but incompetent, and utterly unable to control either the court reactionaries or the corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy. Government became a three-cornered struggle between the army, the court, and the civilian office holders—each more anxious to maintain its own power than to win the war. The tsarina was a German princess, an autocrat to the core, and, probably through much of the war, mentally unbalanced. She and the tsar were both so much under the influence of the eccentric monk, Rasputin, that he was used as a tool by the most unscrupulous elements in the court. When he was killed by a group of patriotic nobles, the situation was not improved, for a succession of similar favorites prevented any wise advice from reaching the tsar. No reforms were made in the government, and the secret police continued to harry the liberals. The army, under the command first of the Grand Duke Nicholas and later of the tsar himself, suffered defeat after defeat.

The ministry was almost uniformly inefficient and uninterested in the success of the armies. Many of the ministers were pro-German in sympathy, and almost all of them were more concerned with court intrigue and with the protection of the autocratic government, from which they derived their power, than they were with the battles that were being lost. This situation was seized upon by the liberals as an opportunity to show both their zeal and their ability at organization. In the Duma, in the zemstvos, and in all branches of local government, they struggled against corruption and inertia in an effort to get supplies to the army. Both men and women went into the work of the Red Cross and into all varieties of war work. The professional classes, the Liberals, the Social Democrats, and even the Social Revolutionaries united to aid in the mobilization of Russian resources. The result, by 1916, was a renewal of the Russian offensive. The campaign of 1916 brought new defeats and horrible losses, but the Russian liberals continued their efforts. It is possible that the army was better equipped in 1917 than in the fall of 1914, but the unbroken record of defeats and the consciousness of ineffective leadership had undermined army morale and made defeatism rife.

The domestic situation was equally bad. In the effort to feed and supply the armies, the civilian population was neglected. Government finance was in distress before the war and grew steadily worse as the conflict went on. Inflation flooded the country with paper money and caused a general rise in prices that played havoc with the economic life of the masses. The standard of living, always low, fell still lower, and even those who had money could not buy what they wanted, for Russia was cut off from foreign trade, and Russian factories were unable to produce war supplies and civilian necessities at the same time. Difficulties of transportation aggravated the shortage of food supplies, the basic public services broke down because of lack of coal, and the conditions of urban life became nearly intolerable. Strikes and bread riots began to occur, and there were ominous indications of revolt in the army and of mutiny in the navy.

By the winter of 1916-1917 everyone was expecting revolution. The court reactionaries talked of the abdication of the tsar and of ending the war in order to stamp out the liberal movement. The liberal members of the Duma, bourgeois and socialist alike, made up their minds to block any such action. The urban masses, sensing both the situation in the government and the disaffection in the army, listened eagerly to revolutionary agitators who urged the overturn of the tsarist regime. The tsar, early in March, played into the hands of the reactionaries by dismissing the Duma and loosed the revolution.

When the soldiers stationed in Petrograd³⁰ were ordered to restore order, the reactionary ministry found that, at last, the chief reliance of autocracy had failed them. The army was as revolutionary as the civilian populace. Supported by part of the troops, the Duma refused to adjourn and took the government into its own hands. The tsar's abdication was demanded by all the revolutionary groups. Upon being informed by his generals that the army could not be relied upon, the tsar abdicated in favor of his brother, Michael, who was the choice of the liberal members of the Duma. Grand Duke Michael, however, refused to accept the throne unless it were offered him by a constitutional assembly "selected by universal, direct, equal, and secret ballot." The tsar asked to be permitted to retire to one

³⁰ St. Petersburg was rechristened Petrograd during the war in order to de-Germanize the name. The city was to be renamed again after the revolution and is now Leningrad.

of his country estates but was refused. The liberals were willing that he be allowed to seek refuge outside Russia, but the dangers of such a course seemed too great. The royal family was kept for many months in closely guarded seclusion in a status similar to that of prisoners of war. After the Bolshevik revolution their plight grew steadily worse. They were moved from place to place and, in July, 1918, were executed by the Bolsheviks as a part of the reign of terror of that period.

THE NEW REGIME IN RUSSIA

After the abdication of the tsar upon which all the revolutionary groups had been in agreement, a fundamental cleavage began to appear in the ranks of those who had united to overthrow the old regime. A provisional government was set up which called upon the people to stop rioting and upon the army to preserve order and to carry on the war. The leaders of the new regime were members of the Duma. The mere fact that it had been possible for them to have been chosen in 1912 as members of the fourth Duma was an indication that they were not radical. "They were men of lofty character, scholarly, honest, sincere, patriotic, devoted, but wholly unfit to guide a nation in the throes of revolution."⁸¹ The prime minister was Prince Lvov, who had been a leader of the zemstvo reform group; the historian Miliukov became foreign minister; the minister of war had been the president of the central war industry committee; and the ministry of justice went to Alexander Kerensky, the only socialist in the new government. The main objective of the provisional government was a liberal constitutional regime. Many of the liberals would have preferred a liberal monarchy, but the distrust of the Romanoffs was too great. The basic intentions of the leaders were to set up a stable government, to protect property, to continue the war, to keep faith with the Allies, and to work for fundamental and far-reaching reform by constitutional means. Their immediate program embraced the removal of all restrictions upon speech and the press, amnesty for all political prisoners, wide liberties to labor unions, and universal manhood suffrage. Arbitrary arrest was made illegal, and speedy trials by the regular courts were guaranteed. The Jews were freed from all discrimination, complete religious freedom was established, and

⁸¹ J. W. Swain, *Beginning the Twentieth Century* (W. W. Norton & Company), p. 499.

the special privileges of the Orthodox Church were abolished. Russianization of subject peoples was declared at an end, and the Poles were promised their independence. In many respects the sweeping changes recalled the days of 1789 when the French, too, had set in motion a revolution that had not stopped with the realization of the hopes of the liberals who initiated it.

For the time being the socialist radicals agreed to support the provisional government, but at no time was their support more than halfhearted, for they looked upon the group in power as hopelessly "bourgeois" and considered their reforms totally inadequate. The socialists organized for action as soon as the revolution began. On March 12, the "Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies"⁸² was announced, and the people were asked to elect delegates to the soviet, on the basis of one representative for each thousand factory workers and one from each army company. Soviets sprang up in almost all Russian cities as news of the revolution spread. One of the officers of the Petrograd Soviet was Kerensky; another was Stalin, a Bolshevik. The soviets organized militia units of their own and set about winning over the rank and file of the army. The authority of the officers of the army was undermined by an order or proclamation of the Petrograd Soviet—the famous Order No. 1. Within a few weeks the soviets were aided by the return of the radical leaders who had been living in exile. Trotsky came back from New York, and Lenin was permitted to cross Germany on his return from Switzerland. The soviet leaders were abler, younger, and more vigorous men than the members of the provisional government. They were not hampered by nationalistic or patriotic scruples, nor were they willing to pledge themselves to preserve any of the institutions of the old regime. They were Marxian socialists, and they were determined to turn the situation to their own advantage, with the ultimate objective of establishing a completely socialist state. As Lenin put it, the bourgeois reforms were to be followed by a proletarian revolution. For that achievement they must have peace and popular support.

All through Russia governmental authority disintegrated with the revolution; the peasants took over the estates of the landlords with-

⁸² The word "soviet" means council. From the first the Petrograd Soviet was radical, but it was so because of the men who were elected to it and not because of there being any radical connotation in the term. Theoretically the members might be of any political affiliation; actually they were largely Social Revolutionaries with a few Bolsheviks. They represented economic or occupational units and not geographical districts.

out waiting for legal title; the soldiers fraternized with the enemy and deserted by the thousands. The Petrograd Soviet issued a manifesto urging all workers "to take into their own hands the decision of the question of peace and war." The provisional government endeavored to bring the radicals into co-operation by admitting several of their leaders to the ministry, and at the same time made heroic efforts to continue preparations for new military campaigns. The attempt was scarcely a success, for the radicals demanded immediate peace, and peace on a world basis, with "no annexations, no indemnities, and the self-determination of peoples." The Allies were alarmed at the situation in the Russian republic they had greeted so willingly, and the provisional government found its position steadily growing more untenable. The issue between the two groups was perfectly apparent—and fundamental. The liberals, still a majority in the government, intended to continue the war and could promise no solution of the land question until a constitution had been drawn up; the socialists promised immediate peace and the confiscation of the land of the church and the nobles.

The summer of 1917 was spent in the struggle between the two groups. In the meantime in July a crisis was reached when the provisional government succeeded in putting down a revolt of the radicals of Petrograd. The peasants organized and elected representatives to a huge congress which met in Petrograd and demanded the nationalization of the land for "free use by agricultural laborers." The workers formed unions and elected factory committees which agitated for control of industry by the workers. They, too, held an All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions which demanded that production be controlled by the government. In the army discipline disappeared, soldiers' committees had nominal authority, but desertion was everywhere prevalent, and brigandage and looting common. The soviets in all parts of Russia sent delegates to an All-Russian Congress of Soviets which pledged its support for the time to the provisional government but left a permanent executive committee in Petrograd to act in co-operation with a similar committee from the Peasants' Congress. In this All-Russian Congress the Bolsheviks appeared for the first time as a significant factor in the Revolution.⁸³ They were a small minority and found little hearing for their extreme views from the other parties in the Congress.

⁸³ Of the 1,090 delegates, 285 were Social Revolutionaries, 248 Mensheviks, and 105 Bolsheviks.

In a reorganization of the ministry, Kerensky, in charge of the war department, put forth every effort to arrest disintegration and to restore the morale of the army. The campaign opened in July on the Galician front in an attempt to relieve the pressure upon Rumania. It was a complete failure, and after terrible losses the shattered Russian army withdrew from Galicia, leaving Rumania with no alternative save a separate peace (Treaty of Bucharest) on whatever terms she could obtain from the Austro-German forces.

The disasters at the front were followed by fresh riots in Petrograd, when General Kornilov made an unsuccessful attempt to gain control of the government. The last of the Liberals were forced out of the ministry, leaving Kerensky in dictatorial power but almost entirely dependent upon radical support. In September a republic was formally proclaimed in order to satisfy popular demand, and arrangements were begun for a provisional parliament and for the election of a constituent assembly. The life of the Kerensky regime was very short, however, for the Bolsheviks were capturing the soviets. In Petrograd, Leon Trotsky replaced a Menshevik as head of the soviet, and preparations were made for a new and more radical revolution.

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION OF NOVEMBER, 1917

The revolt in November was made possible by the Bolshevik control over the "Red Guards," a revolutionary regiment stationed in Petrograd. The public buildings were seized, and the ministers were arrested. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets approved the new revolution and recommended that it be accepted throughout Russia. A government was set up of which the executive branch was a Council of Peoples' Commissars, made up entirely of Bolsheviks. In other words, Russia was now governed by a minority group of the socialists who were in turn a minority in the whole population. The Council refused to endanger its supremacy by accepting the authority of the Constituent Assembly. The Bolsheviks left the Assembly when it refused to agree to their demands, and on the next day it was forcibly dispersed by the Bolshevik troops.

The Bolsheviks had advanced to power on the promise to give Russia an immediate peace. Their first act, therefore, had to be the negotiation of that peace. The Russian representatives at the conference with Germany at Brest Litovsk were in a difficult position. They knew that the Russian army could, and would, fight no longer. The

Germans were fully aware of the same facts. At the same time the Russians dreaded the effect in Petrograd of the cessions demanded by Germany. They played for time, therefore, and secretly tried to stir up revolt among the German troops. Negotiations dragged on for months. In the meantime, Russian control over the border nationalities was disintegrating. Germany encouraged the movement, hoping to be able to dominate any little states that might be set up. Finland and the Ukraine became republics, while Russian Poland and the Baltic provinces slipped out of Russian control. Finally, despairing of better terms, Russia signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk on March 3, 1918. By its terms Russia gave up all claims to sovereignty over the border states and agreed to pay a huge war indemnity. The Allied Powers refused to recognize the treaty, and Germany was denied any advantage from it after the war came to an end.

THE END OF THE WAR

The easement on the eastern front encouraged the Central Powers to feel that they might gain a victory in the west before the American forces could assemble in sufficient numbers to turn the tide. The collapse of Russia increased the war-weariness of the Allies, and defeatism of the most dangerous sort was apparent in the French army and on the Italian front, where the German-Austrian victory of Caporetto, October, 1917, had destroyed Italian morale. The French government attacked the antiwar movement by making the fiery patriot, Georges Clemenceau, prime minister in November, 1917, and permitting him to use any means he wished to combat defeatism. Throughout 1917 efforts to bring about peace were initiated in various ways. The German Reichstag (July, 1917) passed a resolution in favor of a peace of "mutual understanding" in which there should be no acquisitions of territory and no indemnities. A month later Pope Benedict XV made an unsuccessful attempt at mediation. Austria tried appeals to Germany and an effort at direct negotiations with the Allies, but got no satisfaction from either party. The Russian Revolution encouraged the Labor and Socialist parties in other countries to take a peace stand that seemed ominous to the government and military authorities.

In the midst of the general gloom, Premier Lloyd George of Great Britain was led to restate Allied war aims on a slightly more moderate basis than were those announced the year before. The

breakup of the Austrian Empire was not demanded, nor was the Turkish surrender of Constantinople. In January, 1918, President Wilson laid before Congress his statement as to the terms upon which peace should eventually be made. This statement immediately won the name of the "Fourteen Points" and was, because of its concise and definite statement, generally accepted as the peace program of the "Allied and Associated Powers," although it was not actually stated as such. The fourteen points of the program included: the abandonment of secret diplomacy, freedom of the seas, and equality of trade relations; the reduction of armaments; fair adjustment of colonial claims; evacuation of Russian territory, restoration of Belgium and of Alsace-Lorraine; adjustment of the Italian frontiers, the re-establishment of Poland, and the evacuation of the Balkan states; the right of self-determination for the peoples of Austria-Hungary and Turkey; and the creation of a league of nations.

In the spring of 1918 the situation was more favorable to Germany than it had been for three years. The eastern front needed no defense, the Italians were in bad shape, the Balkan states were supine, and every effort could be concentrated on the west. Then, if ever, the decisive victory must be gained. If it could not be won by autumn all hope of success must be given up, for the strain of the blockade had brought the German people to the breaking point, and the full support of the United States would make the odds impossible. From March to July, the Germans roared forward, until first the British and then the French had their backs to the wall. But the weary lines held as they had at the Marne four long years before. All through the drive the Americans had been arriving, and late in July Foch was ready to launch his counterattack. Through August and September the Germans were pushed back. They reached the Hindenburg line, which they had held without challenge for two years, but that line was broken, at the Saint Mihiel salient and through the Argonne Forest where the American forces had been stationed. In October, the Hindenburg line was abandoned, and the Germans retreated across Belgium and northeastern France.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS

The German retreat was the beginning of the end. Germany's allies crumpled first. Bulgaria sued for peace in September, and in October Turkish resistance ended. Open to attack from the rear and

unable to obtain more help from Germany, Austria faced an Italian offensive and the rise of the subject nationalities of the empire. Revolution broke out in Hungary and in Bohemia, the South Slavs united with the newly created Yugoslavia, and the Italian Tyrolese went over to the standard of Italy. Early in November, Austria signed an armistice with the Allies.

When the Hindenburg line broke, the German military dictators knew that the end had come. Late in September, Ludendorff suggested a popular ministry and negotiations for an armistice. A liberal, Prince Max of Baden, was appointed chancellor. When he proposed an armistice, he was met by a demand, inspired by President Wilson, as to whether Germany accepted the Fourteen Points, and whether the "Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war." It was not until Wilson received assurance that the chancellor represented the majority of the Reichstag, that negotiations were begun, and then not until the Allies had added two amendments to the Fourteen Points—one reserving the "freedom of the seas" for their own interpretation; another insisting that restoration of invaded territories must include full reparations for damages.

The terms of the armistice were dictated by the Allied military commanders and were intended to make impossible any renewal of the war by Germany. On November 11, 1918, the guns ceased firing, and all over the world there was wild rejoicing at the coming of peace. The defeated Germans agreed to evacuate France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Alsace-Lorraine, to surrender a specified amount of war material and a number of warships, to surrender prisoners of war, to abandon all claims under the treaties of Brest Litovsk and Bucharest (Rumania), and to permit the occupation of the Rhineland. The Allies refused to relax the blockade before a definite treaty should be signed, but agreed to supply Germany with whatever foodstuffs were "necessary" for the duration of the armistice. The negotiations begun by Imperial Germany were completed by the German Republic, for the admission of defeat implied in the term "armistice" had brought the revolution which had been threatening for more than a year. It began with a naval mutiny and spread quickly to the urban trades unions. The Center party, the Progressives or Liberals, and the Socialists united in demanding a republic. The kaiser and his family fled to the Netherlands,³⁴ and the chancellor surrendered the

³⁴ The kaiser abdicated November 28.

government to Friedrich Ebert, the leader of the conservative wing of the Socialist party. In the various states of Germany princes abdicated and left the government in the hands of the revolutionary groups. The German republic, born in the throes of defeat, was to need the greatest courage and fortitude for the hard task of making a constitution and of organizing a government to receive from the representatives of the victorious Allied and Associated Powers the humiliating terms of the treaty being prepared in Versailles.

READINGS

ORIGINS OF THE WAR. Much has been written about the origins of the Great War, and there has been much controversy over details and over interpretations of events. Two well-known accounts are *The Origins of the World War*, 2 vols. (Second edition, 1930) by S. B. Fay and *The Coming of the War*, 2 vols. (1930) by B. E. Schmitt. Much briefer accounts may be found in various general histories of the period mentioned for earlier chapters, especially *Beginning the Twentieth Century* (1933) by J. W. Swain and *Europe since 1870* (1935) by P. Slosson.

MILITARY ACCOUNTS Good one-volume histories of the war are *The War in Outline* (1936) by Liddell Hart and his *The Real War, 1914-1918* (1936). Two new general histories beginning with the World War will be useful for this and following chapters: *Europe since 1914* (1931, New edition, 1939) by F. L. Bennis and *The World since 1914* (New edition, 1936) by W. C. Langsam.

SPECIAL REGIONS. G. P. Gooch's *Germany* (1925) has interesting chapters on the war. C. J. H. Hayes's *France: A Nation of Patriots* (1930) is interesting. *The Revolt in the Desert* (1927) by T. E. Lawrence, who was largely responsible for the success of the Allies in Arabia, is an engrossing book. E. J. Dillon's *The Eclipse of Russia* (1918) portrays the effect of the war upon Russia.

THE UNITED STATES. *The Diplomatic History of the United States* (1936) by S. F. Bemis has excellent chapters on the problems of the United States both as a neutral and as a belligerent. Three recent studies of the reasons for the entry of the United States are *Why We Fought* (1929) by C. H. Grattan; *The Road to War* (1935) by Walter Millis; and *America Goes to War* (1938) by C. C. Tansill. Charles Seymour's brief *Woodrow Wilson and the World War* (1921) is interesting. The more recent *American Diplomacy during the World War* (1934) and *American Neutrality, 1914-1917* (1935) by the same author are longer but more valuable. *The Story of Civil Liberties in the United States* (1927) by Leon Whipple is stimulating.

≡ XXIII ≡

POSTWAR PROBLEMS

THE peoples of the war-torn and war-weary world greeted the Armistice of November 11, 1918, with an outburst of joy and relief that mounted to a wild hysteria before the day was done. The strain of war, fought for four years under twentieth-century methods and conditions, had become intolerable. The ideals and often the causes of the war had long been forgotten, buried in the horrors of trench warfare, and men had fought on while the whole world trembled lest civilization itself might crumble under the bombardment which had shattered every nerve. In vast areas men faced despair, misery, famine, and anarchy. Righteousness of cause and loftiness of war aims were giving way to thoughts of vengeance and a desire for loot. The impact of the propaganda of fear, suspicion, and hatred had been so great that few people had been able to remain objective in judgment, well-informed as to fact, and unemotional in their attitude toward friends or foes. After four years of war and destruction, there was time, with the armistice, for the realization of the costs of war, of the toll levied by the greatest disaster the modern world had known.

THE COSTS OF WAR

The modern world had been so imbued with the idea of scientific observation and so used to the tabulation of statistical data that men began to estimate the costs of the war even before the actual fighting ceased. The meticulous records kept by all belligerents made possible more accurate estimates than could have been made at the end of any other war. And yet the problem of a final balance sheet remains as difficult as the attempt at fixing responsibility for the war. Elaborate tables of expenditure and lists of dead and wounded bear somewhat the same relationship to the problem of the cost of war as the statement of who fired the first shot does to the causes of war.

Although we know that about sixty-five million men were taken from their civilian occupations and put into the armies, that they were the most physically fit of the entire population, and that between eight and nine million of them were killed, while almost as many were maimed for life, and more than twenty million were wounded,¹ no estimate can be made as to the effect of such disasters upon the war generation or upon countless generations to follow. We must admit the incalculable importance of that effect, however, upon the physical, mental, and moral development of mankind in general. But the list of the dead and maimed does not furnish a complete picture of the human cost of war. To it must be added the victims of the blockade and of other agencies that completely disrupted the normal life of the civilian population. Malnutrition, starvation, and disease were responsible for more deaths than those that occurred on the field of battle. Tuberculosis, cholera, and typhus exacted a terrible toll, and in the winter of 1918 stark famine menaced millions of people in Central and Eastern Europe. The blockade was as deadly as the artillery, and hunger was as horrible, if not as dramatic, as an air raid. There was no armistice for the loss of life attributable to the war. The revolutions and civil wars of the next five years continued the destruction, and the influenza epidemic of 1918, in which many millions died, owed its rapid spread and unusually dire effects to the lowered resistance of its victims. There could be no reparation, replacement, or reconstruction for the human costs of the war; costs which were levied upon victor and vanquished alike. The material costs of war can be more accurately estimated. The war lasted 1,565 days, and in 1918 the cost was \$244,000,000 each day. The total direct expenditures for war purposes amounted to about \$200,000,000,000. To that total direct cost must be added property losses on land and sea, losses of production, losses to neutrals, and the sums laid out for war relief. The total estimate of nearly \$338,000,000,000 has been reached by those who have made a careful study of the costs of war.² If it were possible to estimate the productive value of the lives lost in the war or ruined as a consequence of it, the total economic costs would seem yet more astronomical. To them should be added, also,

¹ More than twice as many men were killed in battle during the World War than in all the major wars from 1790 to 1913. Careful estimates as to war costs may be found in F. L. Schuman, *International Politics*, p. 367 ff., and in E. L. Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs of the World War*.

² E. L. Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great War*, p. 299; and F. L. Schuman, *International Politics*, p. 569.

some of the economic costs of postwar depressions, and of the economic causes and effects of trade rivalries, civil wars, and revolutions.

It is much more difficult to estimate the moral costs of war. After the American Civil War there was heard the homely phrase "the bottom rail got on top." War dislocates the whole normal balance, and arouses the worst as well as the best of human emotions. Profiteering, graft, and all varieties of political corruption have accompanied and followed wars in all regions throughout history. Reconstruction periods have always been filled with widespread intolerance, with arbitrary action on the part of those in authority, and with moral obtuseness throughout the body politic. The long-continued violence of war was responsible, in some degree, for the wave of lawlessness and crime that followed. Political assassinations were numerous in the postwar period and were an evidence of a growing disregard for human life.

The cost of the war to the old balance of power was staggering. Old thrones had tottered and those who had occupied them in 1914 were gone. The four great empires, Austria, Germany, Russia, and Turkey, were no more. Numerous small states had come into being. Three nations that had once been powerful monarchies—Bohemia, Poland, and Lithuania—now reappeared, and the states of Austria, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland bore witness to the disruption of old empires. Old boundaries had disappeared, new ones had not yet been drawn, and all was in confusion. To the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns, the cost of the war was their thrones if not, like the Romanoffs, their lives as well. For the time it seemed as though democracy and nationalism had at last triumphed, by war and revolution, over all the forces of autocracy and reaction that had checked them for so long.

THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

In international relations hate and distrust were the legacies of the war. As men began to realize the stupendous cost of the war and as the cessation of war gave them a chance to feel the pain of the losses they had sustained, they were filled with a blind vindictiveness that sought satisfaction in retaliation. The blockade was most unjustifiably kept in force for the months following the armistice, and thousands

of German children paid for that cruel folly with their lives. Devastated Belgium and France looked across at the untouched German countryside with a determination to exact the most complete reparation. England added her voice to the cry for vengeance. Premier Lloyd George wished a clear mandate from the people to sustain his work at the peace conference. He dissolved Parliament, therefore, and threw England into a general election. This was a fatal disaster to the cause of moderation,³ for he soon found that public opinion was such that the campaign had to be fought on the basis of a vengeful treaty. The favored slogan was "Hang the Kaiser," while politicians promised that "we shall squeeze the orange until the pips squeak," and Lloyd George himself was heard to say, "They shall pay to the last farthing, and we shall search their pockets for it." British economists deplored the spirit of the election, for they knew that prosperity for England depended upon the revival of prosperity in Central Europe, but the economists were not listened to in the campaign, nor were they elected to Parliament. Lloyd George and the Coalition Cabinet received their mandate, but it was a command to trample on the vanquished.

The third ominous circumstance of the month after the armistice was the choice of Paris as the scene of the conference. The continuation of the blockade was a disaster to German recovery, and it created a deeper and more lasting hatred in Germany than had been roused by the long years of war. The British election was a sad exhibition of postwar violence of feeling which could not help but influence the British representatives at the peace conference. But neither calamity could so surely block a peace of justice and moderation as the exposure

³ Mr. Harold Nicolson, the son of a famous English diplomat, himself one of the British experts at the Peace Conference, and now a Labor member of Parliament, has vividly described the circumstances of the Paris Conference in his *Peacemaking, 1919*. He calls the general election a "disaster" and a "regrettable necessity," a "necessity" because Lloyd George's Coalition Government was menaced by attacks from the vindictive "peace of victory" group on the one side, and by the Leftist groups that demanded immediate demobilization. A "calamity" because "it returned to Westminster the most unintelligent body of public-school boys which even the Mother of Parliaments has known" (p. 19). There is a wealth of material on the peace conference. The most scholarly and complete history of the conference is H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), *History of the Peace Conference*, 6 vols. There have been biographies or reminiscences of the important figures. All of the general accounts of the period since 1914 have chapters on the conference: for example, J. Hampden Jackson, *The Post War World*; F. L. Benns, *Europe since 1914*; W. C. Langsam, *The World since 1914*; P. Slosson, *Europe since 1870*; R. Sontag, *European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932*; R. B. Mowat, *A History of European Diplomacy, 1914-1925*; F. H. Simonds and Brooks Emery, *The Great Powers in World Politics*.

of every negotiator to the atmosphere of disillusioned, war-weary, and security-demanding Paris through the long months of the conference. The clearer atmosphere of Switzerland might have prevented much of the miasma of hate and distrust that was all too apparent in Paris.

The statesmen of Europe have been roundly censured for the long delay in the assembling of the Peace Conference. It was not until January that the delegates got together in Paris, but it is difficult to see how the delay could have been avoided. Europe was in turmoil, and the prime ministers of the great powers had to decide a thousand details of reconstruction and reorganization both before and after the conference met. Lloyd George had the British election to consider, Clemenceau was occupied with the problems of devastated France, and the United States was in the throes of the mid-term Congressional elections, and President Wilson could not leave America. In January, all the world seemed to descend upon Paris⁴—all the world except the Germans, for it was decided that it should be a dictated peace and not one negotiated with German representatives at the council table. This ominous decision was due in part to the desire for a "victor's peace" and in part to a consuming fear that there would be dissension in the ranks of the victors themselves and that agreement must be reached among them before the Germans were admitted.

Many of those who have written on the Peace Conference have come to the conclusion that one other great mistake preceded its opening session—the decision of President Wilson to come to Paris to direct in person the work of implementing his Fourteen Points. Wilson was a great idealist and the foremost disinterested statesman in Paris pledged to a peace of justice, but he was no match for those who opposed his plans and his principles. He was forced into one compromise after another until there was little left of his leadership or of his Fourteen Points.⁵ The American people had repudiated the

⁴ "An Arabian night's touch was imparted to the dissolving panorama by strange visitants from Tartary and Kurdistan, Corea and Azerbeijan, Armenia, Persia, and the Hedjaz—men with patriarchal beards and scimitar-shaped noses, and others from desert and oasis, from Samarkand and Bokhara. Turbans and fezzes, sugar-loaf hats and headgear resembling episcopal miters, old military uniforms devised for the embryonic armies of new states on the eve of perpetual peace, snowy white burnouses, flowing mantles, and graceful garments like the Roman toga, contributed to create an atmosphere of dreamy unreality in the city where the grimmest of realities were being faced and coped with."—E. J. Dillon, *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference* (Harper & Brothers), pp. 5-6.

⁵ See Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking, 1919*, Chaps III and VIII

president and his policies in the November election by returning a Republican majority to Congress and were giving evidence that they were anxious to withdraw from participation in the affairs of Europe. It is possible that from the distant vantage point of Washington the president might have exerted a greater influence than he could in the thick of the fray. The disintegration of his leadership was one of the tragedies of the conference.

THE CONFERENCE AT VERSAILLES

Although there had never been a European peace conference with greater or more complex problems to solve, no group of men had ever come together with more adequate preparation for their task. The British and American delegations, and to a lesser degree the French, came fortified with staffs of experts who were equipped with innumerable filing cases filled with an almost limitless amount of data on every subject to be considered. The personnel of foreign offices, aided by lawyers, historians, political scientists, and economists, had been working for months on various commissions appointed to prepare for the negotiations. One of those experts has written: "The trouble about the Peace Conference was not that there was too little information, but that there was far too much. The fault was not lack of preparation, but lack of co-ordination." The worst that could be said of the members of the conference on that score was that, in the confusion of the work of those crowded weeks, they could not, or did not, always utilize all of the services the experts were ready to give.

The influx of the statesmen, experts, and secretarial staffs of the great powers taxed the capacity of Paris hotels, while the arrival of representatives of all of the liberated nationalities from the Persian Gulf to the Baltic gave the streets of Paris a cosmopolitan appearance beyond that of its gayest days. Aside from that one note of color, there was little in Paris in 1919 to remind one of the gaiety of Vienna a hundred years earlier. The food was poor, scanty, and expensive; there was little social activity—this congress did not dance—and there was a complete absence of monarchs at the meetings of the conference. The influenza epidemic was raging and spared the members of the conference no more than it did the rest of the Paris populace.

The first full session came on January 18, and from that open-

ing meeting it was obvious that the first of the Fourteen Points was to be discarded. With thirty-two Allied and Associated Powers represented, it was impossible to decide the intricate problems before the conference in public. The work of drawing up the treaties was at once delegated to a Council of Ten, consisting of the heads and foreign ministers of the five great powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.⁶ In the spring, when lack of progress became alarming, a group of four, called the Big Four, constituted an inner circle in which all important decisions were made. The four were Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando.

President Wilson realized that, in the midst of conflicting interests, it would be difficult to make a peace based on the principles he had enunciated. He therefore determined upon securing priority for the creation of the League of Nations that, he felt, would furnish the structure for a durable peace. With the Covenant of the League in shape and with the pledge of the Conference that it should be an integral part of the treaty, Wilson went back to the United States to fulfill numerous presidential duties. When he returned in March his days of leadership were over, and the spirit of Clemenceau dominated the Conference. The need for speed was apparent: disease and famine were spreading through Central and Eastern Europe, twenty-three little wars were being fought in various parts of the world, and the "Red Terror" of Bolshevism was spreading from Russia into Hungary and even into Germany.

Bound by secret treaties to furnish compensation to Italy, Rumania, and Japan, France and England were determined to acquire for themselves advantages that would make even more impossible a peace on the basis of Wilsonian principles. Orlando was interested in nothing except the Adriatic for Italy, Clemenceau was determined to procure the security of France by dealing a final blow from which Germany could not recover. Lloyd George was pledged to the British voters to come home with reparations and a punitive peace. Closeted with these three who knew their own minds, Wilson was painfully isolated and, apparently, helpless. Fearful lest the Covenant of the

⁶ President Wilson and Robert Lansing, Lloyd George and Arthur Balfour, Clemenceau and Pichon, Orlando and Sonnino, Saionji and Makino of Japan. The American delegation included, also, Colonel House, General Bliss, and Henry White, the only Republican and an ex-ambassador to France. Clemenceau had André Tardieu, Jules Cambon, and L. Klotz as assistants. Lloyd George was aided by Lord Balfour, Bonar Law, G. N. Barnes, and delegates from each of the dominions.

League be refused by the United States Senate because of the absence of a clause recognizing the Monroe Doctrine, Wilson hesitated, for resistance to Clemenceau meant a French refusal of that vital clause, while acceptance of the old "Tiger's" offer of the clause meant a series of surrenders on the Fourteen Points. Since he felt that the League was of paramount importance, and the entry of the United States a necessity for its success, Wilson gave way. He had refused Clemenceau on one vital point, the creation of a buffer state in the Rhineland, promising instead the adherence of the United States to a pact by which England and America would guarantee French security. In no other way did Wilson stand out for the fulfillment of the promises made to Germany before the Armistice. He persuaded his colleagues to accept the German colonies as mandated territories⁷ instead of taking them outright, but he was unable to obtain from Japan anything more than a verbal promise to surrender Shantung to China.⁸ When Italy demanded more than she had been promised in 1919, Wilson was able to prevent the Italian acquisition of Fiume, and the port was saved, for a time, for the Yugoslav hinterland.⁹ Otherwise the influence of the idealist was of little effect.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

In May of 1919 the Treaty of Versailles was ready for presentation to the representatives of Germany. When the German delegates were brought before their conquerors they knew that it was a sentence that was to be handed down to them; that much was implied in the manner of the negotiation and in the very atmosphere of their

⁷ In the treaty three classes of mandates were recognized. Class A mandates were made from the former Turkish possessions, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine, which were expected to be independent soon. Class B mandates were made from the former German tropical African colonies, and were to be open to the trade of all League members. Class C mandates were made from Southwest Africa and the Pacific island colonies of Germany. They were to be governed as a part of the colonial possessions of the country accepting the mandate. England and France shared the Class A group; England, France, and Belgium the Class B group; England, the Dominions, and Japan were given the Class C mandates.

⁸ See below, page 880.

⁹ After the treaty was signed a group of Italian chauvinists led by the poet d'Annunzio occupied Fiume. They were eventually forced out by the Italian government, which made a treaty with Yugoslavia surrendering the port in return for concessions elsewhere. In 1924, in a treaty made after Mussolini came into power, Yugoslavia was forced to give the port to Italy, retaining only certain trading privileges.

admission to the council chamber. They had had, however, no intimation of the severity of the terms they were asked to sign. The treaty was long, containing more than four hundred clauses, and as one careful punitive detail followed another the Germans found it even worse than the most pessimistic of them had feared. As was expected, Alsace-Lorraine was given back to France. France was granted the Saar coal field with full right of exploitation for at least fifteen years. The Saar Valley was placed under the protection of the League of Nations for the same period with a plebiscite at the end of that time to determine whether or not it should go back to Germany. Poland was to have West Prussia,¹⁰ Posen, and a corridor extending southward toward Upper Silesia, which was to be divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Northern Schleswig and Eupen-et-Malmédy were to decide by plebiscite whether they wished to remain German or to go to Denmark and Belgium.

Germany was deprived of all of her colonies; the fortifications on Heligoland were to be dismantled; the German merchant fleet was to be turned over to the victors;¹¹ and German navigable rivers were to be put under an international commission. The German army was fixed at a maximum of 100,000 men, and compulsory military service was forbidden. The General Staff was to be dissolved in an effort to prevent the revival of militarism. The size of the navy was prescribed, the air force was dismantled, the use of submarines and poison gas was prohibited, and many fortresses were ordered to be destroyed. The Rhineland was to be permanently demilitarized. Although deprived of much of her economic resources, of coal, iron, facilities for trade, and colonies, Germany was required to agree to the subsequent payment of an unspecified sum in the way of reparations. After the payment of an initial sum of five billion dollars, the total was to be determined by an Allied commission. Finally an army of occupation was to hold the left bank of the Rhine for fifteen years, and Germany was forced to agree that she alone was responsible "for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."

¹⁰ Danzig was to be an independent city under the protection of the League of Nations. Memel-land was to have similar status.

¹¹ Germany's fleet had been sunk by their own crews a few days before the treaty was signed.

The German delegates were thunderstruck at the terms of the treaty which deprived Germany of 27,000 square miles and more than a tenth of her population, which took her economic resources and her colonies, compelled her to sign a "blank check" for reparations, and deprived her of any weapons of defense. At first there was thought of a complete rejection of the treaty on the grounds that the terms were technically impracticable and that they violated the Fourteen Points. But Germany was helpless; refusal would mean invasion and still more punitive terms. The delegates used all of the time allotted them and submitted a long counterproposal which was promptly rejected at Versailles. A few concessions were made, including a plebiscite for Upper Silesia, but the Allied reply was so stern that it was apparent that nothing more could be obtained, and Germany was given five days for consideration. After a debate of despair in which the chancellor and other dissenting members of the cabinet resigned rather than assent to the acceptance of the treaty, the Assembly recognized the inevitability of the agonizing step and voted that the delegates sign the treaty. On June 28, in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles where the German Empire had been proclaimed in 1871, the last scene of the war act of the drama of international relations was played. The war was over, but whether or not a lasting peace had been made was yet unknown.

President Wilson went home after the completion of the Treaty of Versailles to carry on the struggle for its ratification which would mean the entry of the United States into the League. In that unsuccessful struggle his strength, long overtaxed, and weakened by an illness in Paris, gave way, and he watched his greatest effort fail when the Senate, led by the Republican leader, Henry Cabot Lodge, refused to ratify the treaty without reservations unacceptable to the invalid in the White House. The election of 1920 turned on the issue of participation in European affairs, and the Republican victory was regarded as a repudiation of all that constituted Wilsonism. Separate treaties were made with Germany and Austria, and the participation of the United States in the World War came to an end.

Since that June day in 1919, there has been endless discussion of the iniquities of the Treaty of Versailles. That its terms were unjust and impracticable has been a convenient excuse for those who realize that the difficult problems resulting from it have not been solved. It reflected the spirit of the time in which it was drawn up, as did the Treaty of 1815. In both periods the victors were determined to

obtain security from any future aggression on the part of the feared but conquered state and to compensate themselves for the efforts they had put forth. The "practical" Machiavellian policies of the rulers and diplomats at Vienna seem cooler, more urbane, and less vindictive than the punitive measures of those who drew up the Treaty of Versailles. It must be remembered, however, that nationalism and democracy, after a century of growth, both contributed to the greater bitterness of the later period. Mass literacy and modern means of communication made it possible for popular opinion to be roused, while manhood suffrage gave that opinion a great deal of weight in Paris. If the work of the statesmen of Paris is to be condemned, that censure must be extended to the people of the nations they represented. The Treaty of Versailles was the treaty that the masses in the victorious states wanted. Both in London and in Paris there was more criticism of its leniency than of its severity. One of the best-informed British commentators on the treaty writes: "Given the atmosphere of the time, given the passions aroused in all democracies by four years of war, it would have been impossible even for supermen to devise a peace of moderation and righteousness."¹² One American historian says that the peace was "imperfect but not Carthaginian,"¹³ and another states that, although humiliating and severe in some of its clauses, it yet had in it more idealism and vision than can be found in earlier treaties.¹⁴

There are certain facts to be remembered whether the treaty of 1919 is justified or condemned. Germany remained a powerful state and an important factor in international trade and politics. The Continental territories trimmed away from the Reich were for the most part inhabited by alien peoples joined to Germany after earlier wars or treaties of conquest. The essential German core of the state was left intact. Both in the Treaty of Versailles and in those signed with the other defeated belligerents, the principle of self-determination was respected to a remarkable degree. Where populations were mixed, some injustices were done, but even there use was made of plebiscites to determine the wishes of the people. The actual indemnities demanded were less than the war debts of the victors, and the undetermined reparations would, in the final analysis, have to conform to Germany's ability to pay and the ability of the creditors to receive the sums awarded. The Treaties of Brest Litovsk and Bucharest are suffi-

¹² Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking, 1919*, p. 7.

¹³ Samuel Flagg Bemis.

¹⁴ F. L. Bennis, in *Europe since 1914* (1939 edition), p. 189.

cient evidence that had Germany been victorious the treaty made with the Allied Powers would have been as severe in its terms as the one presented to her at Versailles. Finally, the Covenant of the League of Nations, that was an integral part of all the treaties, provided for a permanent international organization to which many of the issues arising out of the treaties might eventually be appealed. The extent of European co-operation through the League might determine the ultimate justice or injustice of the peace.

OTHER PEACE TREATIES

The treaties with the other Central Powers were being considered during the months devoted to the Treaty of Versailles. The dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had begun before the end of the war, and recognition of the new states carved from that polyglot empire on the principle of self-determination was an inevitable consequence of the war. Granted the defeat of the Central Powers, any re-creation of the Hapsburg empire was an impossibility. The conferees at Paris were therefore not responsible for that dismemberment; it was a collapse and not a partition. They were responsible for drawing the boundaries of the new states, where the problem was one of infinite difficulty. Nor can it be said that equity was always the consideration uppermost in the minds of the statesmen of 1919. Italian greed and desire for a strategic boundary caused the inclusion of more Slavs and Germans than could be justified under the principle to which the Conference paid more than lip service. Czechoslovakia was induced by the French to take in more Germans than her statesmen Masaryk and Benes thought wise, and a Magyar minority was added when the southern boundary was drawn to provide an access to the Danube. The Slavic states of Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Poland were given boundaries that represented numerous compromises and undoubtedly were not entirely just. All that was left for the Republic of Austria was Vienna and a territory on the Danube equal to about one-fourth of the size of the Austrian part of the prewar Dual Monarchy. Without a seaport and with a capital city geared to the political and economic needs of a great empire, the only hope for the future of such a truncated state was union with Germany. A logical application of the principle of self-determination would have resulted in such a German union, at least along economic lines. Fear of German

recovery,¹⁵ however, dictated a clause in the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (September, 1919) pledging Austria to preserve her complete independence.

The treaty with Bulgaria was signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine one month later. Western Thrace, which Bulgaria had taken from Turkey in 1913, was given to Greece. Slight changes were made in other Bulgarian boundaries. Limits were set for the Bulgarian army, and reparations were required, this time a fixed sum being set.

The peace treaty with Hungary was not signed until June, 1920, because of the chaotic situation in that state. A revolution in March, 1919, brought in a communist regime under Béla Kun. Rumanian troops were sent into Hungary to put down the communists, and the country suffered the horrors of a ruthless invasion. Nearly a year elapsed before there was a government established in Budapest with which the Supreme Council in Paris could conclude a treaty. When the final settlement was made, Hungary lost territory to all of her neighbors, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia. In all more than two-thirds of her territory and two-fifths of her population were allotted to other states. The rest of the terms of the Treaty of the Grand Trianon were similar to those contained in the other treaties.

Since all of the treaties created new boundaries within which new minority groups must live, the Council at Paris decided to incorporate minimum guarantees for such minorities in the treaties made with the defeated powers and to provide the same guarantees for the minorities in the states benefiting from the division of territories by special treaties. The minorities were thus guaranteed the protection of life and liberty, freedom of religion, and the use of their own language in private business and in private schools. The League of Nations was made the guardian of minority rights, and the guarantees could not be modified without the consent of a majority of the Council of the League.

The last of the series of peace treaties received the signature of the Turkish delegates at Sèvres in August, 1920. Of all the treaties it was the only one which was not ratified, and a final settlement with Turkey was not reached until the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne in July, 1923. The terms of the first treaty were severe, providing for the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire along the lines

¹⁵ Such a union was desired in Austria and was favored by the American delegates at Paris. France blocked the plan. Austria was required to reduce her army and to pay reparations as later determined by a commission.

indicated in the Allied war aims announced before the end of the war and provided for by the various secret treaties. The collapse of Russia and President Wilson's insistence upon the application of the mandate system to the areas taken from Turkey prevented the complete carrying out of all of the terms of those agreements, but all that the Allied powers intended to leave of the old Turkish Empire was a small Asiatic state in Anatolia. The sultan was unable to refuse his consent to the treaty, but the plans made in Paris were frustrated by a wave of militant Turkish nationalism set in motion by Mustafa Kemal, an army officer of experience and distinction, whose revolutionary career had started in the early days of the century in the Young Turk movement.

Under his leadership a large number of the deputies of the Turkish Parliament signed a National Pact which was later to be the basis for the program of the nationalist movement. Rather than surrender any part of that program the Turks were willing to fight, and no Allied pressure could bring them to accept less. The Pact recognized the loss of the Arab provinces and the opening of the straits to commerce, but it declared the determination of the Turks to hold all territory "inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority." The nationalists turned with especial fury upon the Greeks, who were endeavoring to take the Smyrna area for themselves. In the war which followed the Turks were victorious, and, after an armistice in the fall of 1922, the Angora Assembly deposed the sultan. At Lausanne in the following year the delegates of a Turkish republic, of which Mustafa Kemal¹⁶ was the president-dictator, signed with the European powers a treaty which they had helped negotiate. By it the boundaries of Turkey were extended slightly beyond those of the Sévres treaty, especially in Thrace where Greece was forced to yield the area to the Maritza River. Turkey gave up all claim to her old subject states in Mesopotamia, Syria, Arabia, and Palestine and surrendered most of her Aegean islands to Italy and Greece, but without restrictions she held all areas occupied by Turks, and agreed to no reparations and to no limitations upon her military and naval forces. The treaty recognized the abolition of the old "capitulations" by which Turkey had submitted to supervision of her customs administration and to the trial of foreigners by consular courts. At the same time agreements were drawn up to provide

¹⁶ Called President Atatürk. The Turkish president was determined to do away with the backwardness of Turkey. One of the numerous reforms was a requirement that all Turkish citizens take surnames. Atatürk was the one which he took for himself.

for the transit of the straits and for their demilitarization as well as the demilitarization of their approaches. Other agreements made arrangements for the mutual exchange of Turkish and Greek nationals in the territories ceded. In brief, the program of the National Pact was carried out in full.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Although the president of the United States had had great difficulty in persuading his colleagues in the Council of Ten of the necessity for a league of nations and still more difficulty in obtaining their consent to the inclusion of the Covenant of the League as an integral part of the treaties, once the decision was made the Council found the projected League of the greatest service in the work of completing the treaties. There was nothing new in the idea of an international organization for the preservation of European peace. Schemes for world peace through international organizations go back to the fourteenth century. Since the days of the Thirty Years' War, when Grotius wrote a treatise entitled *On War and Peace*, almost every great war had given rise to some scheme designed to prevent such catastrophes in the future. This was the first time, however, that such an organization was made a part of the treaties ending the war. In fact, the League was so intricately woven into the body of the treaties of 1919 and 1920 that without it many of the terms of the treaty could not have been carried out. Much of the work of the League in the decade after the war was in connection with the treaties and with difficulties and disputes arising from them.¹⁷ This interweaving of the treaty and the League was, however, an element of weakness as well as of strength, for it made the League a defender of the *status quo*. There is, to be sure, a brief article in the Covenant which empowers the League to make recommendations as to the revision of outgrown treaties, but it is weak as compared with other articles, and any attempt at revision under it could be vetoed by any member of the League Council. Wherever the treaties were unpopular and "revision-

¹⁷ C. K. Webster and Sidney Herbert, *The League of Nations in Theory and Practice*, is an excellent brief summary of the organization and work of the League of Nations. All of the general accounts of postwar events contain chapters on the League. Special attention might be called to J. T. Shotwell, *On the Rim of the Abyss*, Chaps. VII-XII; and to E. H. Carr, *International Relations since the Peace Treaties* Chaps. V and IX.

ism" was strong, there was a tendency to disapprove of the League and its activities.

The League was not designed to be a superstate. Those who drew up its constitution, the Covenant, were careful that there should be no surrender of sovereignty on the part of the member-states. Every important decision had to be by unanimous vote, and none of the pledges of the member-states would become effective without that complete unanimity. A French project to provide the League with a military force was defeated, and no power of armed coercion was given to it. It was, in short, to be a league and not a state, or, in the words of the French, a Society of Nations. Since the Covenant might be amended with the unanimous vote of the members of the Council and a majority vote of the Assembly, the League was provided with an opportunity for growth. It might become whatever the member-states wished to make it. At every stage of its history since 1919, it has functioned as the large sovereign states have wished. It has no function and authority and can carry out no policy without the consent of the member-states. In so far as it has succeeded in the past, it has been because of the authority granted by the governments of the states which belonged to the League. Where it has failed, it has been largely because of lack of power from the same sources.

To make the work of the League effective all of the great powers and a large majority of the smaller powers needed to co-operate in its activities. The absence of any powerful state rendered difficult any attempt to handle a crisis through the agency of the League, for at no time since 1919 has every great state been a member of the League. The United States refused to join, and thus did all that lay within her power to prevent the success of an experiment for which her president had been in large part responsible. Germany and Russia were not members for the early years of League history,¹⁸ and since 1933 Japan, Germany, and Italy have withdrawn.¹⁹ In the most critical years, from the point of view of the preservation of world peace, the League has been hopelessly handicapped. It must be admitted, also, that the great powers among the member-states have never given indication of any desire to permit the League to interfere with their entire freedom of action in any matters of great concern to them.

¹⁸ Germany entered in 1926, Russia in 1934

¹⁹ Several small states have also withdrawn. Any state may do so upon two years' notice.

The Covenant provided the principles for effective international co-operation, and the machinery of the League has been adequate. For the first fifteen years of its history it was regarded by many of the small states as their anchor and protection and was looked upon by all internationalists as the most hopeful sign of our times. As the world drew close to war in the years after 1933, the League as an agency for the preservation of peace seemed to go into an eclipse. Its future, like the future of the peace it was designed to preserve, has become precarious and is hidden in the darkness of tomorrow.

THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE

With this understanding of the nature and the powers of the League a brief description of its structure, its functions, and its activities is in order. With the Covenant as its constitution, the League works through a council, an assembly, and a permanent secretariat. Its meetings are held in Geneva, Switzerland,²⁰ in a magnificent building erected for it by the member-states. The Assembly, a representative body in which every member-state may have from one to three delegates, meets once a year and works through large standing committees. Its work is not legislative but consultative and deliberative. Its discussions cover a broad range of subjects, and it can play an invaluable part in increasing international understanding and good will. The Council is much smaller, made up of one delegate from each state entitled to representation. There are a small number of great powers with permanent membership on the Council, the nonpermanent memberships rotating among the smaller member-states. At its largest the Council numbered fourteen. The scope of its powers is the same as that of the Assembly, but it was given certain specific work by the Covenant. To it member-states may appeal for protection from an aggressor and for mediation in disputes. The Council receives the reports from the states to whom mandated colonies were entrusted, and has the task of devising plans for disarmament. The permanent secretariat numbers several hundred men and women drawn from more than forty states and is headed by a secretary general. It is divided into eleven sections to provide for the work assigned to it on such matters as minorities, disarmament, mandates, public health, and financial and economic questions. The secretary general registers and

²⁰ The Council occasionally meets in some European capital.

publishes all treaties signed by League members or voluntarily submitted by nonmember states.

There are various advisory committees, organizations, and bureaus connected with the League which have done excellent service. Among them are groups working on public health, traffic in opium, communications and transit, and other nonpolitical matters. Two major agencies were provided for by the peace treaties and may be considered a part of the machinery of the League. They are the Permanent Court of International Justice²¹ and the International Labor Organization.²² As has been the case with all of the work of the League, these nonpolitical agencies have done some very valuable work, but all of their activities depend upon the willingness of sovereign states to co-operate. The Minorities and Mandates Commissions have been repeatedly ignored, and the conventions drawn up by the International Labor Organization have seldom been ratified by more than seven or eight states out of a possible forty-eight. And yet many people believe that the International Labor Organization alone has been worth all the effort that has gone into the work of the League and that its potential influence is of tremendous significance for the future.

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Although the League has achieved none of the large objectives for which it was created, it has rendered very valuable service in a great number of matters of common concern to the nations of the world. If the specter of war could be removed and the world could have a respite from constant preoccupation with international rivalries and animosities, it might be possible to evaluate properly the potentialities of the nonpolitical activities of the League of Nations. Its work in saving lives through combating disease and famine, the help it has given to refugees, and its efforts in curbing the trade in dangerous drugs have all been of great value and could easily become more extensive in normal times. In the period of the 1920's, the financial advisory agencies of the League were used with great effect in reorganizing the finances of several states, the most important being Austria, which

²¹ This court should be distinguished from the Permanent Court of Arbitration, commonly called the Hague Court

²² The United States joined the International Labor Organization but has not joined the World Court, although every president has advised the adherence.

were drifting into bankruptcy and financial collapse. In the Saar Valley the League conducted a model plebiscite, worked out after several years of study and careful planning, by which the area was returned to Germany after fifteen years of international control and French influence. The League was entrusted with the administration of the Free City of Danzig and carried on that work efficiently and to the economic welfare of the city for some years. No international regime could handle that situation to the satisfaction of Germany and Poland, and the real problem of Danzig has been in the German-Polish rivalry and not in the work of the League. As a publicity agency for every variety of international issue, and as a center for international intellectual and cultural contacts, the League is of inestimable potential value. Nearly every student of its work reaches the conclusion that the League has become so indispensable that it would have to be replaced by some similar structure if it should be abolished. Like every other constructive organization, it can function effectively only in an atmosphere conducive to world peace.

The record of the League of Nations in preventing wars has not been altogether encouraging. The famous Article 10 that was viewed with such fear and disapproval in the United States pledged the members of the League to preserve the "territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members"; Article 11 made any threat of war a concern of the whole League; while Article 12 required all member-states to submit disputes to arbitration, judicial settlement, or inquiry by the Council. Article 16 provided the course of action to be taken by the member-states in case any member of the League should resort to war. Such action, or "sanction," might be financial or economic; it might include partial or complete cessation of trade with the aggressor belligerent; or it might result in collective armed intervention. With these carefully drawn provisions designed to secure peace, it is necessary to repeat the statement that they mean just what the member-states intend them to mean in each specific instance when they are called into question, for a unanimous vote of the Council must be secured to put them into operation.

In several minor instances League mediation has settled disputes that might have led to serious disturbance of European peace. In 1922 there was a settlement under the auspices of the League of a dispute between Finland and Sweden arising out of a controversy over the Åland Islands. Less successful was the League's handling of a Polish-Lithuanian dispute over the possession of Vilna. The aggressive tactics

of Poland gave her a freebooter's title, and the League was forced to recognize the boundary as Poland drew it. The same sort of thing occurred when the Lithuanians, in turn, forcibly took possession of Memel. When an Inter-Allied commission found it impossible, in 1921, to settle the Upper Silesian question by a plebiscite, the League was asked to make recommendations. The Council appointed a committee of four composed of members from Belgium, Spain, China, and Brazil. The report of the committee was used as the basis for a settlement which divided the disputed territory between Germany and Poland.²³ The boundaries between Yugoslavia and Albania and between Greece and Albania were under dispute as soon as the war ended. The two larger states were apparently about to divide Albania as they had wished to do in 1912. After some negotiation and threats of economic sanctions, Albania was saved from partition. Various questions arising out of the Treaty of Lausanne were turned over to commissions appointed by the League for settlement. In one or two instances the World Court was called in to decide legal questions. In general Turkey and the other powers involved, notably Great Britain, were glad to accept the decisions of the League. The most important dispute which came before the League in these early years was one between Italy and Greece involving both a quarrel over the boundary of Albania and a political assassination. In co-operation with the Council of Ambassadors, the League secured a speedy settlement, although one which was contrary to the principles it had at first laid down. In 1925 a Greco-Bulgarian boundary dispute was settled. The aggregate of all of these settlements was important to the peace of Europe, and they represent what the machinery of the League was capable of doing when there was co-operation among the European states.

When the larger issues of Manchuria, Ethiopia, and Spain arose in the next decade the picture was entirely different. The great powers refused to act effectively through the League or to make adequate use of its machinery in settlement of disputes. The League is in principle completely opposed to wars of aggression, but nations bent on conquest and conscious of their power to inflict their will upon other states do not accept the advice of the League. Until they are ready to do so, the League cannot be expected to work effectively in the prevention of war. One may concur in the conclusion of an American historian,

²³ The decision was probably unjust to Germany in that it gave all of the valuable economic resources of the region to Poland

devoted to the League and to the cause of international peace, who says that:

There is no other way to secure permanent peace than by maintaining an international organ of co-operative pacification. The League is that one body. Its failures should not blind us to the necessity for it. In the midst of peril it will endure if our civilization itself endures; for it is the symbol and the agent of international morality. The League may yield at times before the brutal impact of unscrupulous power, or be held back from impartial action by nations which for the time being have the advantage. . . . The final question is not what the League has or has not done, but what it will have to do in the future and how it can be put in a position to fulfill its mission.²⁴

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN 1919

In the decade after the Great War, economic problems loomed large in both domestic and international affairs. The war had thoroughly dislocated the normal economic life, not only of the countries that had been a party to it, but of all neutral states as well. In the industrial and commercial areas, the usual avenues of trade had been blocked or interfered with, production had been geared to war necessities, and distribution had been influenced by war demands. Even in the United States the normal relationships between government and business had been overturned with the federal administration of railroads, the coal industry, and of shipping concerns. The war had affected agriculture, industry, and labor as well as commerce. The regimentation of every field of production for the service of war needs increased economic nationalism and accustomed men to the interference of government in every activity of life. At the close of the war business enterprise everywhere demanded a return to a more normal situation. The absorption of the millions of veterans into civil life was a staggering problem. War demands had created a demand for labor that had been satisfied by the entry of countless women into work they had never done before. New inventions had, to some extent, compensated for lack of man power, and the prospect of still further mechanization of industry gave promise of more, rather than less, unemployment due to such causes.

The early postwar years were years of economic strain. High prices continued for a time, and an artificial prosperity mounted. In

²⁴ J. T. Shotwell, *On the Rim of the Abyss* (The Macmillan Company), p. 353.

Great Britain the first year after the war was marked by a feverish increase in industrial development and by a marked rise in the cost of living. The same thing was true in the United States, and in other countries where industry attempted to create goods enough to meet the demands of those who had been deprived of them by war. This was, however, but a temporary boom. Replacement demands were not permanent, rehabilitation orders fell off, areas that had been temporarily unproductive began to supply their own needs, and in 1921 there was a sharp decline. This postwar depression was felt all over the world. In the United States agriculture had been stimulated by war demands, and there was an overproduction of food products and cotton. The depression meant the collapse of staple crop prices and, eventually, of farm prices. Mortgage payments could not be met, and the American farmer found himself at the end of a "boom" period that had begun early in the century. The recovery of the later 1920's was much less apparent in agriculture than in industry, and the "Great Depression" which began in 1929 meant only an added deflation.

In Great Britain the effect of the depression of 1921 was marked and, in some ways, permanent. There were serious strikes and labor difficulties, and unemployment increased so rapidly that a new Unemployment Insurance Act was necessary. The demands upon the insurance funds were so heavy that government aid was needed, and the "dole" came into being. Many of Britain's best customers—Germany, Russia, and the Danubian states—were impoverished. In other regions Britain had lost markets to Japan, the United States, and other rivals. Some of the basic industries of Great Britain, such as the coal industry and shipbuilding, had declined to such an extent that whole regions seemed permanently out of adjustment. The attempt on the part of the British government to return to the gold standard, and to keep the pound sterling on a prewar level in order to maintain British control in international financial affairs, was disastrous, for most of the Continental governments resorted to inflation. As the ruble and the mark depreciated in value almost to the vanishing point, and as the franc and the lira were eventually reduced to a fifth of their prewar value, Continental countries liquidated their national debts at the expense of their own *rentiers* and of foreign bondholders, while the British debt remained oppressive. Taxes, therefore, remained high and were a heavy burden on all propertied classes. The period of recovery brought some comfort to British industry, but the debacle of 1929 came too soon for any real relief.

Countries that had been devastated by war had to meet all of the problems attendant upon rehabilitation. In France, in the expectation of huge reparations payments, the government entered upon a tremendous rebuilding program at government expense. At the Peace Conference Germany had offered to engage in this reconstruction, using German labor and German materials, but France and Belgium had refused to consider any project that would deprive their own citizens of the advantages of such activities. At the close of the war there was economic chaos in France. Ruins had to be cleared away, populations moved back into homes built for them with government aid, and the needs of ex-soldiers and dissatisfied laborers met in some fashion. The moderately conservative bloc which controlled the government was reluctant to increase taxes. Instead, it met the reconstruction bills with the sale of bonds and the issue of paper money. As the months went by without the arrival of the expected reparations funds the financial situation became precarious. One ministry followed another as solution of the economic problems was sought. The value of the franc fell to two cents, one-tenth of its prewar value, and the government bonds were below par. At last a Union Ministry was formed by Poincaré and six ex-premiers (1926) and, aided by the general world recovery, it was able to bring about a stabilization of the franc (at four cents), to exact high taxes, and to balance the budget. Unfortunately, its work was scarcely completed before a new world depression again upset financial adjustment, and the recent years have been difficult in France as elsewhere.

In the less industrialized areas the years immediately after the war brought great economic readjustments. The succession states²⁵ of Eastern Europe found their greatest problem in satisfying the demands of a militant and land-hungry peasantry. The term "the Green Revolution" has been coined to fit the legislation necessary to satisfy the agricultural populations of the states extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea.²⁶ Where the aristocracy dominant before the war had disappeared as a result of war or revolution, as in the Baltic states and Poland, the period was one of social upheaval, and the postwar governments recognized the changes by the division of the great estates in such a way as to make it possible for the peasants to possess small

²⁵ A term applied to those states created from Austria-Hungary and from the border provinces of Russia and Germany.

²⁶ Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak end of Czechoslovakia, Hungary. The Balkan states had the same problems.

units of land. In Hungary and the Balkans, where the great landowners remained, the agrarian problem could not be so easily solved, although it has been of great importance.²⁷

The economic problems of the vanquished states were even more difficult than those of the states that might have been considered the recipients of whatever benefits victory might afford. The first problem in Austria and Hungary was that of preventing starvation. The disruption of the Austrian Empire had meant chaos in the economic life of the peoples whose interests had been intricately knit together under the empire. Vienna, no longer the thriving center for the economic, political, and cultural activities of a great power, was a dying city. The industrial areas of the old empire had been largely in the region that was now Czechoslovakia, every succession state erected its own tariff walls, and agriculture and commerce were alike disrupted. In Hungary the situation was similar but less serious, for in an agricultural country there was less actual starvation and misery. In Austria relief for the starving was the first problem; after that financial rehabilitation of the bankrupt governments might be undertaken. Food supplies were sent in on credit, and relief loans were furnished by Great Britain, the United States, and other governments. In 1923 and 1924, through the agency of the League of Nations, the finances of Austria and Hungary were finally reconstructed, and the problems of economic readjustment were approached with some chance of solution. Under such circumstances the reparations clauses of the peace treaties were inoperative, and no attempt was made to require payment.

THE REPARATIONS PROBLEM: FIRST PHASE

In Germany the economic problems of the postwar years were entangled with the question of reparations. Germany had been one of the greatest of the commercial and industrial nations of modern Europe. As a result of the war, she lost part of her resources of coal and iron, her colonies, and her merchant fleet, and she was extremely low in all sorts of raw materials necessary for her industries. But she

²⁷ The European states not mentioned in this brief summary had similar problems and each fell into one of the three categories discussed. German and Russian problems will be taken up in other connections. There are several chapters on economic problems in J. Hampden Jackson, *Post War Europe*, and in William Orton, *Twenty Years' Armistice, 1918-1938*.

had great resources, technical skill, industrial plants, and a large domestic market, as well as the ability to recapture her international trade. Regardless of these factors conducive to recovery, the years immediately after the war were certain to be difficult, for the necessary readjustments in every field of business activity were numerous. The chief obstacle to economic recovery, however, was the question of reparations.

It is significant that the famous "war guilt" clause in the Treaty of Versailles was placed at the beginning of the reparations sections. Only on the basis of German acceptance of full responsibility for the damage done by the war could she be expected to pay all that the victors intended to demand. Since it was impossible to estimate the sum that Germany would be able to pay after she had recovered from the first effects of the war, there was no stipulation of the total amount of reparations. A Reparations Commission was created and was authorized to determine the amount of Germany's indebtedness by May, 1921. In the meantime Germany was to pay the equivalent of five billion dollars to defray the costs of the army of occupation, any residue to be applied as an initial payment of reparations.

Without any information as to the amount they were to be required to pay, the Germans found little incentive to attempt economic rehabilitation. Recovery would mean merely an increase in the final bill; prolonged economic prostration might mean greater leniency. The treaty gave Germany an opportunity of presenting an offer based upon German estimates, but under the circumstances Germany delayed taking advantage of it. The Reparations Commission drew up a tentative proposal of an indemnity of \$56,000,000,000 which so alarmed even the Allied experts that Germany was not pressed to accept it. In 1921 the Germans claimed they had paid, in delivery of goods, the equivalent of the \$5,000,000,000 demanded as an initial payment and offered to pay a moderate lump sum to clear the whole reparations claim. The Reparations Commission denied that the initial sum had been paid in full and indignantly refused the offer as totally inadequate. An acrimonious exchange of notes followed which could not fail to end in a German defeat, for the Allied Powers had only to threaten force. In May of 1921, the German government reluctantly agreed to pay, in a series of installments, a total of \$32,000,000,000—a sum much lower than the earlier demands and yet three times as high as that suggested by the economic experts at the Versailles conference.

It was one thing to fix a sum and another to obtain payment.

German finances had been going from bad to worse. There was little to export in the first postwar years, but large quantities of goods must be imported from abroad. Gold, sent out of the country to meet obligations due to the unfavorable balance of trade, drained specie from the country, a process which, in turn, led to inflation of the currency. The general precarious situation, plus the high taxes and the fear that the government might endeavor to meet reparation bills by a capital levy, caused German capitalists to invest large sums in foreign securities. The "flight" of German capital to other countries increased the embarrassment of the government and led to increased issue of paper money. Back of all this lay the lack of any desire to pay reparations and a willingness to permit the government to plunge into bankruptcy rather than to make voluntary sacrifices to meet the hated obligations. As a result, the mark depreciated to such an extent that it was valueless to the creditors, and, since she had no other medium in which to pay, Germany asked for a moratorium in the summer of 1922.

This situation exposed a decided rift in the ranks of the creditor nations. England realized that her own prosperity depended upon the recovery of Europe and the re-establishment of her old markets. She was becoming convinced, also, that the whole matter had been badly handled and that the total bill was too large. Her own economic experts were outspoken in their condemnation of the reparations measures, and English liberals were gradually reaching the point of regretting the severity of the whole treaty.²⁸ Great Britain was therefore willing to make concessions and anxious to take measures to aid in German recovery. France, with the vengeful Poincaré as prime minister, was glad to obtain security through German weakness and, at the same time, was ready to use the opportunity to acquire Ruhr coking coal for use in the Lorraine steel industry. She had not forgotten her desire for an independent barrier state in the Rhineland and was engaged secretly in fomenting a separatist movement there. The plight of Germany was an opportunity for French aggression in the Ruhr, on the basis that the treaty provided for "such measures as the respective governments may determine to be necessary . . . in the case of voluntary default by Germany."

²⁸ J. M. Keynes, *Economic Consequences of the Peace* and *A Revision of the Treaty*, are early examples of such analysis and condemnation.

THE OCCUPATION OF THE RUHR

In January of 1923, without British co-operation, French and Belgian troops entered the Ruhr and endeavored to utilize Ruhr industries in partial fulfillment of reparations obligations. The German government declared a policy of passive resistance, German workers refused to operate the mines of the Ruhr, and the deliveries to France did not cover the costs of the invasion. At the same time the situation in Germany grew hopeless. Economic life was at a standstill, and the mark continued to fall. The paper manufacturers worked hard to produce the paper on which the ever-increasing amounts of fiat money were printed. German debtors paid off their obligations in depreciated paper, the German government liquidated its domestic debt, and speculators made huge sums, but the consequences to other classes beggar description. The middle class practically disappeared; all of those who lived on fixed incomes from rents, securities, or mortgages lost all that they had, and a vast "new poor" was created, bitterly resentful, hating the enemies outside Germany, and distrustful of the Weimar Republic. This class was eventually to follow Hitler into the National Socialist party.

The French occupation, plus the complete collapse of the mark—by August, 1923, it was quoted at five million to the dollar—broke German resistance, and the government in Berlin announced the end of the policy of passive resistance. A new foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, undertook the work of co-operation. France had won, but with the loss of British support and the respect and friendship of other powers. The financial benefits of the occupation had been slight, and the French people grew impatient with a ministry that could not solve the economic problems or stop the steady decline of the franc. The Poincaré ministry fell, and the elections returned a majority for the parties of the Left. A more liberal ministry after 1923 was able to co-operate with England and Germany for a general appeasement of the international situation.

REPARATIONS: THE THIRD PHASE

There was no expectation that German payments could begin until the currency was stabilized, the budget balanced, and industry revived. A commission of experts, headed by the American banker,

General Dawes, was appointed to make a study of the situation and to draft recommendations. The Dawes plan, resulting from the deliberations of the experts, was a long step toward the solution of the problem. The recommendations included the evacuation of the Ruhr, the establishment of a central bank of issue (the Reichsbank), a flexible scale of reparations payments, and an immediate foreign loan. Certain state revenues were to be set aside for the payments due on reparations, and foreign supervision was provided for customs, railways, bond issues, and for the Reichsbank. Some modifications were made in this plan in 1929 when a second commission headed by another American, Owen D. Young, conducted a similar investigation. In both "plans" the major objective was the satisfaction of a debt. The experts were not concerned at all with punitive measures; they acted only as a board of receivers endeavoring to make over a bankrupt organization into a solvent concern.

For some years their efforts met with success. They were aided by the fact that with Stresemann in office, there was, for the first time, genuine co-operation from the German government and by the fact that outside Germany there was less vindictiveness toward a former enemy. The greatest factor in German recovery, however, was the world-wide economic prosperity in the "boom" period which lasted until 1929. German bonds sold extensively abroad, German cities were rebuilt, roads were constructed, all sorts of improvements were made—and all on borrowed money.²⁹ Germany realized the dangers of the situation. In 1928, Foreign Minister Stresemann said to a group of press correspondents: "I must ask you always to remember that we are living on borrowed money. If a crisis were to arise, and the Americans were to call in their short-term loans, we should be bankrupt." While Germans were not averse to accepting the benefits of this artificial prosperity, they not unnaturally resented both their dependence upon foreign aid and the continuance of foreign supervision over their economic and financial life. Reparations did not cease to rankle when the payment was made easier, and economic nationalism with its tariff obstructions prevented any extensive revival of Germany's international trade.

German bonds were not the sole form of speculative enterprise in those "boom" years, nor were international investments of that nature the only signs of an unsound world economic condition. In 1928

²⁹ Apart from loans of an official nature, foreign investors made private loans to Germany by 1930 of about five billion dollars.

legitimate trade began to decline and world agricultural prices fell. There was a near panic in Central Europe, where agriculture was of great importance. In Austria, especially, conditions were precarious.⁸⁰ When the crash came in the New York stock market in the fall of 1929, there were immediate repercussions abroad, and the panic spread into the Great Depression. In 1930 and 1931 the German government made heroic efforts to prevent another financial collapse, but foreigners withdrew their credit, and the Reichsbank tottered. To save the situation, always hoping that recovery, like prosperity, "was just around the corner," President Hoover proposed (June, 1931) a one-year world moratorium on intergovernmental debts and reparations.

REPARATIONS: THE FINAL PHASE

The moratorium was little more than an easement of an impossible situation. No recovery occurred, and at the end of the year a conference was held at Lausanne to consider the whole question of the world economic situation. At the conference an agreement was made to set aside the German reparations arrangements of the Young plan and to substitute an obligation upon Germany requiring her to pay slightly over seven hundred million dollars for general European reconstruction.⁸¹ Since Germany could not, in 1932, pay even that sum, the amount remained a paper obligation only, and Germans in general regarded reparations payments as no longer necessary. So ended all consideration of what had been a burning issue for more than ten years: The scars it left were deep, and the resentment it had caused boded ill for the relations of Germany with the rest of the world in the new era which was about to begin.

The delegates of France, Italy, and Great Britain at Lausanne reached an agreement among themselves after so drastically reducing Germany's liability. This "gentlemen's agreement" opens up another postwar problem, for it provided that the Lausanne convention should not go into effect until the powers had made satisfactory arrangements with their own creditors. Throughout the whole of the first decade after the Treaty of Versailles there had been a persistent attempt to link war debts and reparations; after the Lausanne conference they both sank into the same grave.

⁸⁰ Austrian recovery had been hampered by the fact that she was too small to furnish adequate markets for her industries, and the states surrounding her erected tariff walls against her manufactured goods.

⁸¹ Compare this sum with the fifty-six billion dollars demanded in 1920.

THE INTER-ALLIED DEBTS

These inter-Allied debts had arisen out of the war situation. Before the United States entered the war England had been the creditor for Russia, France, and the smaller Allied Powers. After April, 1917, the United States assumed that position. Altogether the United States loaned to her "associates" about ten and a half billion dollars.³² At the Paris conference in 1919 Great Britain offered to cancel all the war debts owed to her if the United States would adopt the same policy. President Wilson refused, and every American Congress to discuss the situation later insisted upon collection. In 1922-1926 the United States made arrangements with all of the states involved, providing for the funding of the war debts and for payments extending over a long period of years. As long as German reparations came in, the European states made prompt payments to the United States. The Hoover moratorium suspended payments on inter-Allied debts as well as upon reparations. Shortly after the Lausanne Conference one after another of the debtors served notice that payments could no longer be continued.³³

In the virtual repudiation of the inter-Allied debt, another long-debated question received a solution of a sort. To many Americans the solution was looked upon as inevitable and as unfortunate only in the manner of its coming. Although Congress, supported by the mass of public opinion, demanded the full payment of the debt, many well-informed people had long been convinced that the whole matter should be carefully reconsidered and arrangements made for eventual cancellation. Some of them based their opinion on the economic grounds that payment would interfere with normal business relationships, since it must be made either in goods or in gold. The first method would necessitate tariff changes and would flood the American market with European commodities; the second, if possible at all, would be disastrous in the field of international finance. Others were convinced that the question of the debts, like that of reparations, was an obstacle to international harmony. They felt that the obligations had been incurred as a part of the war and were the contribution of the United States to the common cause, and they believed that an

³² Tables and terms of settlement may be found in W. C. Langsam, *The World since 1914*, pp. 194 ff

³³ Finland alone has met its annual obligations.

offer of cancellation might win European adherence for the American desire for a plan for general disarmament. The arguments of the cancellationists went unheeded. Repudiation and not cancellation was the manner of solution, and armaments increased rather than decreased in the following years.

THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE, 1933

The Lausanne Conference had closed in 1932 with a request that the League of Nations summon an international conference to discuss the general economic situation, of which the questions of war debts and reparations were a part. The world-wide depression deepened steadily, and the most difficult period was the winter of 1932-1933. In 1931, Great Britain went off the gold standard, and a coalition government was formed to carry the country through the crisis. The elections of 1932 threw President Hoover out of office, and ushered in the New Deal with the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. After the inauguration in March, the United States abandoned the gold standard. The World Economic Conference in London in 1933, therefore, found the nations divided on fundamental policies. The United States refused to discuss war debts, reparations, and tariffs, and insisted that she could make no modification in her currency policies until a rise of commodity prices should relieve the tension at home. Under the circumstances little could be done, and the conference broke up without any notable accomplishment. There was a general feeling among its members that relief could come only through some modification of the restrictions on international trade. The reciprocal tariff agreements of Secretary of State Cordell Hull were the United States' answer to the problem. Various methods of quotas and barter were resorted to by other states, but the "barbed wire entanglements" of economic nationalism continued to bar the way to trade revival.

THE FRENCH SYSTEM OF ALLIANCES

The desire for security was the fundamental basis of French foreign policy in the years after the war. It explains much of the vindictiveness of Clemenceau at the Peace Conference and of Poincaré in the Ruhr crisis. To Frenchmen who could remember the horrors of two German invasions, the recovery of Germany meant

the possibility of a third. At Versailles France had endeavored to obtain, first a neutralized independent Rhine state, and failing that, a guarantee of her frontiers on the part of England and the United States. She accepted the League of Nations reluctantly and tried to stiffen it to serve French ends by the inclusion of clauses providing it with an international military force. In every effort the French delegates were unsuccessful. The punitive measures of the treaty, although gratifying to France, were not enough to satisfy her. The return of Alsace-Lorraine was looked upon as inevitable and a minimum concession, and the further paring of German territory was not sufficient to diminish, appreciably, the advantage of Germany over France in man power. Furthermore, the German population was growing rapidly, while the French birth rate showed an ominous decline. The danger of a German policy of *revanche* was constantly in the minds of Frenchmen and colored all French policy in the postwar years.

Although willing to use the League of Nations to further French ends whenever possible, France had little faith in the efficacy of such procedure in her search for security. She endeavored to turn the reparations crisis of 1923 to her advantage by the invasion of the Ruhr, only to have that invasion result in a loss of British sympathy and a further alienation of the United States. A Franco-Belgian alliance in 1920 was a first step toward security through alliances, but Belgium was scarcely an adequate safeguard against Germany. Before the war, the alliance with tsarist Russia had been regarded as France's greatest bulwark, but in 1919 Russia was definitely out of the picture, and France was pursuing the "Red Peril" of Bolshevism by subsidizing White Russian counterrevolution. It might be possible, however, to find a substitute for the Russian alliance. Two regions of Eastern Europe offered opportunity for the play of French diplomacy. Postwar Poland was weak in many respects, but she was warlike and ambitious. Situated between Russia and Germany, her future was precarious without outside help, and she had reasons as vital as those of France for wishing to prevent German recovery. In 1920, General Pilsudski led the Poles in an attack upon Russia for the conquest of the Ukraine. The attack was subsidized by the French, and the Treaty of Riga (1921), which pushed the Polish frontier one hundred and fifty miles farther east, was obtained with the approval of France. The French were delighted to have, in Pilsudski, a friend who could live up to his own words: "The sword alone decides the destinies of nations. A people which shuts its eyes to this fact would irretrievably

compromise its future.”³⁴ The Franco-Polish treaty of alliance signed in February, 1921, provided for close political co-operation, and a military convention in 1922 (renewed in 1932) made the alliance more valuable to France. French officers aided in the organization of the Polish army, and French munitions flowed into Poland on easy terms.

After the war the succession states of Austria were conscious of their weakness and found in France a natural protector. Hungary was looked upon by Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as their greatest immediate menace. They were all determined to prevent the restoration of the House of Hapsburg and to block all Hungarian attempts to win back the lost territories. Yugoslavia feared Italian aggression and was embittered by the quarrel over Fiume. Czechoslovakia was apprehensive of German recovery and ready to take any steps possible to prevent an *Anschluss* with Austria. The three states, therefore, in 1920 and 1921, drew together in a Little Entente directed primarily against Hungary,³⁵ but providing for a common attitude toward other problems. In the same period Rumania and Poland entered upon an alliance to protect their eastern frontiers. In the following years, France signed friendly pacts with each of the members of the Little Entente and backed her declaration of friendship with loans, munitions, and assistance in fortifications. A new “armed camp” appeared in Europe with France as its guiding spirit. Every energy of the coalition was directed against treaty revision. French hegemony was a definite factor in the Europe of the first decade after the war.

THE TREATIES OF OTHER POWERS

An inevitable result of such a situation was counteraction on the part of the states against whom the entente was directed. In 1922 Russia and Germany signed a treaty of friendship and commerce, and in 1925 a Russo-Turkish treaty of friendship and neutrality gave additional evidence that Russia refused to take the French challenge without retaliation. A second Russo-German treaty and a Russo-Lithuanian nonaggression pact followed within a year or two.

³⁴ Quoted in W. A. Orton, *Twenty Years' Armistice, 1918-1938*, p. 42. Chaps. III and IV in this work and Chap. I in E. H. Carr, *International Relations since the Peace Treaties*, deal with the French alliance system.

³⁵ There were three dual alliances, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and Yugoslavia and Rumania.

Italy regarded France as the chief obstacle to her Mediterranean and colonial expansion and felt, also, that French interference in the Near East was inimical to her interests. In 1924-1927, therefore, Italy signed treaties of friendship and neutrality with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Hungary. The complexity of the network of pacts and alliances and the variety of the obligations assumed by each state did not promise much concord for the future. The search for security was a will-o'-the-wisp pursued by every French ministry and captured by none. Statesmen became convinced that world peace would be seriously endangered unless some agreement could be obtained among the larger powers.

The efforts to procure a stable peace through conciliation, and to combat the effect of defensive alliances, with their encouragement of huge expenditures for military preparedness, led to an examination of the whole matter of the reduction of armaments. The Covenant of the League of Nations had recognized (Article 8) that "the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. . . ." The conquered powers were forced to agree to drastic reductions of armament, and there was a vague understanding that the victors would take similar steps. The League early took cognizance of its responsibility and attempted to bring about disarmament agreements in 1921, in 1923, and again in 1924, when the Geneva Protocol was approved by the Assembly. The protocol declared that aggressive war was an international crime and laid down a long series of steps, including compulsory arbitration and economic boycotts, for the prevention of such wars. The final provision of the protocol was a request for an international conference to arrange for the reduction of armaments. Several smaller nations ratified the protocol, but the British government flatly refused to approve any measure which would enlarge its Continental responsibilities.

LOCARNO

The amelioration of Franco-German relations after the appearance of Stresemann and Briand, following the Ruhr crisis, made possible a different sort of effort for peace. The German foreign minister suggested a Four-Power pact, with Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy as signers, guaranteeing the existing Rhine frontiers and pledging the submission of all disputes to arbitration. France made a

number of conditions to protect her various allies, but was willing to sign the general provisions. At Locarno, therefore, in October, 1925, there was a series of extremely friendly meetings in which the whole question of European peace was discussed, and seven treaties were signed which were designed to perpetuate the "spirit of Locarno" and to provide for the peaceful settlement of all disputes. Germany agreed to enter the League as evidence of her good will. Close examination revealed, however, that although the general principles laid down at Locarno were conciliatory and the spirit of the meetings was excellent, there had been little real accomplishment except the agreement on the permanence of the Rhine frontiers. And there were too many sources of friction in the European situation to give assurance of the preservation of the Locarno "spirit."

MEASURES TO PREVENT WARS

Briand turned in 1927 to the United States for assistance in another move to render the outbreak of war difficult. Secretary of State Kellogg broadened the Briand suggestion of a two-power peace pact to include other nations in a general antiwar agreement which became known as the Pact of Paris. By 1932 sixty-two acceptances had been received, and the pact to "outlaw" war obviously had world-wide approval. Just how effective its general terms would be in preventing war remained for the future to determine. As an expression of good will in the period in which the signatures were recorded, it had considerable significance.

The League was encouraged to proceed with the long-pending arrangements for a great international disarmament conference under its auspices in Geneva. The committees appointed to arrange for the conference found themselves entangled in a mesh of fear, jealousy, and national pride. It seemed impossible to find any program upon which there could be enough agreement to make an agenda for a general conference. France insisted upon security and a strong international control of armaments. England was reluctant to increase her obligations on the Continent and chary of naval limitations. Germany was impatient for the fulfillment of the pledge of Article 8 of the Covenant and determined to arm herself if Europe took no steps to limit armaments. Russia seemed the only great power willing to vote for a thorough disarmament program, but the other powers were suspicious of all Russian proposals.

THE PROBLEM OF NAVAL ARMAMENT

Those working in the League committees could draw little encouragement from the attempts at the limitation of naval armaments. At the close of the war there was grave danger of competitive naval construction, for the peace treaties had ignored the question of the "freedom of the seas." The situation in the Far East was causing uneasiness, also, because of the aggressive policy of Japan in China. In the winter of 1921-1922 a conference met in Washington on the invitation of President Harding to consider the problems of naval limitation and of relations in the Pacific.⁸⁶ Several treaties resulted from this conference, the most important of which provided for a ten-year "naval holiday" and for the fixing of a ratio on which the navies of the five great powers should be based. Great Britain and the United States were placed on a parity, Japan came third, and France and Italy, with equal standing, followed. The ratio was 5.5:3:1.67:1.67. Since this agreement applied only to capital ships, a second conference was held in 1927 at Geneva to work out limitations for submarines, cruisers, and destroyers. The conference split hopelessly over the question of the limitation of different sizes of cruisers and broke up without accomplishing anything. In 1930 another conference was held in London to attempt anew to settle the various problems of naval armaments. After much discussion and a long deadlock, a treaty was signed which was largely vitiated by the fact that Italy and France could not agree and refused to sign the most important clauses of the treaty. The proceedings of the London Conference revealed the lack of accord between all of the states involved, especially between Italy and France. In 1934 Japan broke up a conference, which met to discuss the renewal of the naval limitations treaties, by demanding parity with Great Britain and the United States. When the demand was refused, Japan gave the required two years' notice of her abrogation of the naval agreements. By that time the rearmament of Germany had so altered the world situation that no further mention was made of the limitation of naval forces.

⁸⁶ For results of the conference in Pacific relations, see page 880.

THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AT GENEVA

Thus when the League was ready to call a general disarmament conference, it was apparent that, although no one desired war, there was little hope for an agreement on the question of reducing any of the implements of warfare. The vital obstacle to all plans for reduction was the clash between the German demand for equality and the French insistence upon security. France stated flatly that her present armaments were based on the limitations laid upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles and that she would have to meet any increase in German armament by additional measures of her own. In the opening session of the conference which finally met early in 1932, France refused to consent to any disarmament plan unless her security were guaranteed, preferably by a powerful military force under the League of Nations. For more than two years the conference met at intervals without being able to reach any agreement. Proposals and counterproposals were made, but none of them received enough support to encourage hope. Germany, Russia, and Italy were all antagonized by the recalcitrance of France, and there was a decided strain in all international relations. Friction was increased by the intensification of the economic depression and by the rise to power in Germany of the National Socialist leader, Adolf Hitler.³⁷ In October of 1933 a deathblow was dealt the conference when Germany announced her withdrawal on the basis that there seemed no prospect of recognition of her claim to equality. At the same time she gave the notice required by the Covenant prior to withdrawal from the League of Nations. In May of 1934, the last meeting of the conference, upon which so many high hopes had been staked, adjourned without accomplishment. Each of the powers that had been represented in the conference then proceeded to make whatever preparations that lay within its power for the protection of its own interests. A new period of international anarchy and a new armament race were the major results of more than a decade of attempts at the solution of postwar problems.

READINGS

GENERAL ACCOUNTS. Mention must be made again of F. L. Bennis's *Europe since 1914* (1931), W. C. Langsam's *The World since 1914* (New

³⁷ See below, pages 851 ff.

edition, 1936), and Preston Slosson's *Europe since 1870* (1935). R. B. Mowat's *History of European Diplomacy, 1914-1925* (1931) and R. J. Sontag's *European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932* (1933) will be useful.

THE PEACE CONFERENCE. The comprehensive history of the peace conference was edited by H. W. V. Temperley. *A History of the Peace Conference at Paris*, 6 vols. (1920—). Harold Nicolson's *Peacemaking, 1919* (1933) is an extremely interesting brief account by a participant. E. J. Dillon's *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference* (1920) is more journalistic but readable. E. L. Bogart's *Direct and Indirect Costs of the World War* (1920) and two books by J. M. Keynes—*The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1920) and *A Revision of the Treaty* (1922)—are useful for special topics.

READJUSTMENT AFTER 1919. There are a number of accounts of post-war years which may be used for this chapter and for those following. Notable among them are: *International Relations since the Peace Treaties* (1937) by E. H. Carr; *The Post War World* (1935) by J. Hampden Jackson; *Twenty Years' Armistice, 1918-1938* (1938) by William Orton; *On the Rim of the Abyss* (1936) by J. T. Shotwell; and *The Great Powers in World Politics* (1937) by F. H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny. G. D. H. and M. Cole have written an interesting book called *An Intelligent Man's Review of Europe Today* (1933). *The League of Nations in Theory and Practice* (1933) by C. K. Webster and Sidney Herbert is authoritative yet readable.

SPECIAL REGIONS. Interesting special studies of certain European countries include *France* (1927) and *Those Europeans* (1924) by Sisley Huddleston; André Siegfried's *France: A Study in Nationality* (1930); G. P. Gooch's *Germany* (1925) and *The Social and Economic History of Germany, 1888-1938* (1938) by W. F. Bruck; André Siegfried's *Post War Britain* (1924) and his *England's Crisis* (1931); Oscar Jaszi's *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy* (1929); T. G. Masaryk's *The Making of a State* (1927); and M. W. Graham's *The New Governments of Central Europe* (1924) and *The New Governments of Eastern Europe* (1927).

≡ XXIV ≡

THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS

MANY years must elapse before it will be safe to estimate the significance of the experiments in government which grew out of war and postwar conditions. Nor can we weigh their value and judge their merits or condemn their injustices and failures with accuracy. The best that can be done during the lifetime of those who have watched the inauguration of new regimes, alien to every principle upon which the prewar world was constructed, is to point out the main trends of the period and to describe simply the events, personalities, and institutions of an era when the whole body politic seemed out of joint. There is no apologia, but only a statement of fact, in beginning a discussion of Communism, Fascism, and Nazism, as they developed after the war, with the comment of an author who found himself in the same predicament: "It is impossible to be impartial when writing of things of which one is part. It is impossible to be accurate when writing of movements which are still in progress. All that can be hoped is that whatever bias there may be is unobtrusive and whatever is inaccurate is obvious."¹

THE POSTWAR TENDENCY TOWARD DICTATORSHIPS

It has been easy to believe that the war was the cause of all the problems which have vexed men's minds and that every revolutionary change of recent years came from the great trauma caused by the war. It is possible, however, with a somewhat deeper analysis, to discover that the war acted as an accelerator for agencies already in motion; that it broke the bonds formed by habit, altered the normal routine, and offered unusual opportunities for men of peculiar genius who might in ordinary times have lived and died unknown and unsung.

¹ J. H. Jackson, *The Post War World* (Little, Brown and Company), p. vi.

The war was destructive; it created nothing except horror and chaos; but it afforded opportunity for new mass movements and the development of new techniques. It might raise men to a high pitch of self-denial, common purpose, and patriotism, but it could also plunge them to the depths of despair in which their whole world seemed to be disintegrating. Postwar exhaustion was psychological and moral as well as material. Under such circumstances men sought authority and leadership—a way of life that might lead to better things. There was no part of the world where men did not, at some crisis in the post-war period, feel the desire to confide in, and place their reliance upon, someone stronger than themselves; there was no region that was entirely untouched by the urge to render allegiance to some integrating idea or ideal that might take the place of that old allegiance to religion that had been disappearing in a mechanistic and scientific age. The regimentation of war years, the unthinking obedience demanded of soldier and civilian in the period of crisis, weakened the hold of the average citizen on those precious liberties which he had accepted as his due and as a part of the atmosphere of a civilized state. So much, at least, can be attributed to the war.

Certain factors, however, go far back into the prewar years. The nationalism which was so fundamental a characteristic of the nineteenth century had its basis in the belief that the national state could best provide for the betterment and happiness of its citizens. Democracy won its hold over the masses through the same reasoning. A democratic state might be expected to protect the interests of the public and to provide the services that men had come to consider necessary for their well-being. The socialist, too, placed his reliance upon the state and wished to put into its hands all of the means of production and to give it control over everything essential to life itself as a necessary preliminary to the ultimate disappearance of the state. Where liberty had long been the familiar possession of the average man, the increasing power given the state seemed only to make it serve more fully the needs of a society whose basis could be increasingly democratic. Where the idea of government was authoritarian, the state could become an end in itself, demanding the submission of its servants the people. The old Jeffersonian ideal that that government was best which governed least had disappeared in an age where the agencies of government were of service to the public in innumerable ways. The war multiplied the activities of govern-

ment and extended its control over industry, science, and even over thought. The totalitarian state thus became possible.

It must not be forgotten that in prewar Europe there had been strongholds of autocracy in which there had been little of civil liberty and only the barest forms of parliamentary or democratic institutions. It was those authoritarian states that suffered defeat. Russia was defeated in almost every campaign and ended the war years in a humiliating peace treaty. Defeat and revolution tore the people loose from their moorings, and civil war and chaos were experienced before reconstruction on a different basis was possible. From the border provinces of Russia, and from the territories of the disrupted Austro-Hungarian Empire, the "succession states" were formed. There, too, social discipline had collapsed, old ties had been broken, and new institutions had to be created by peoples unused to self-government. In Germany, the pain and humiliation of defeat were poignant. The Hohenzollerns disappeared with the collapse of the structure which they had owed to the genius of Bismarck and the success of his policy of "blood and iron." The republic was born under auspices that augured ill for the future and became for many Germans the symbol of their acceptance of defeat. In Italy, where the allegiance of the masses to the parliamentary regime was not of great strength, the people were taught to feel that their war losses were stupendous and that their recompense had fallen far short of their dues. Although one of the victors, Italy experienced the psychology of defeat and was dissatisfied with her lot. Turkey had never had the institutions of the democratic West and went from the autocracy of the sultan to a republic under a president-dictator without any great political upheaval.

Out of the materials at hand in the years after 1918 each of these countries reared a new structure of government conditioned in varying degrees by the institutions and history of the past. In each new ideology there was much that was traditional, and each of the dictators through whom that ideology was expressed could base his hold over the people he ruled on the fact that in some essential way he satisfied a fundamental need felt by those who obeyed him.

THE FORMATION OF COMMUNIST RUSSIA

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was made possible by the failure of the Kerensky regime to promise the peace demanded by

the Russian people, to provide bread for the urban poor, and to satisfy the desires of the land-hungry peasantry. With the November *coup d'état* the Bolsheyiks, who were willing to make peace at any price and who could promise the end of the exploitation of both urban laborers and peasants, won their opportunity to create a state in accord with the teachings of their mentor, Karl Marx. They called their theory communism, but the term should not be confused with the Utopian communism of Robert Owen or Fourier, or with the uprising of the Paris Commune of 1871. The Russian communists claimed that they were introducing orthodox Marxian socialism by revolution and establishing it by party dictatorship. The Bolshevik leaders spoke of a dictatorship of the proletariat as a preliminary to a classless society in which government should exist only for the prevention of exploitation. The exigency of the situation in 1917 made the new regime a dictatorship of a small minority of the proletariat, organized in the Communist party and dominated by a group of Marxian leaders of whom the most famous were Lenin and Trotsky.²

The November Revolution in Petrograd was almost bloodless and was accomplished so rapidly that many foreign correspondents scarcely realized that any important event had occurred in the city where they had watched the drama of revolution for nine months. With the Petrograd Soviet and the armed forces of the capital in Bolshevik hands, the transition from the Kerensky regime to a government directed by the communist intellectuals was effected without great violence. Throughout the country the story was the same. Only in Moscow and a few other cities was there resistance of much importance, and the local soviets and Bolshevik leaders took over such government as had survived the chaotic conditions of the Revolution. The Bolshevik delegates who swung enough of the others to control a majority constituted the most numerous group in the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, meeting in Petrograd at the time of the *coup d'état*, and from them was obtained a sort of national sanction for the new government which called itself a Council of Peoples' Commissars. Lenin was the chairman of this council or soviet, Trotsky

² One of the most concise accounts of Russia since 1917 is the *Russian Revolution, 1917-1931* by G. Vernadsky. A much longer and more complete account is contained in William Chamberlin's *Russian Revolution*, 2 vols. *Soviet Russia*, by the same author, is an excellent one-volume history of Russia from the Revolution to 1930. All of the recent histories of Russia and of postwar Europe listed in previous chapters have chapters on this period. A list of books by Russian, English, and American authors describing present-day Russia is given in the bibliography for this chapter.

became commissar for foreign affairs, Alexei Rykov was in charge of the department of the interior, and Joseph Stalin was commissar of nationalities.³

The new government at once proceeded to fulfill its promises and to consolidate its position by a series of decrees. The first proposed immediate peace for all warring peoples on a basis of no annexations or indemnities; the second abolished all private ownership of the land, which was henceforth to be used by the peasants on the basis of personal labor; the third gave to the workers the control over industrial plants. At the same time a broad program was announced calling for the quelling of all local revolts, the complete revision of the economic, social, and political structure of Russia, the establishment of a "temporary" dictatorship, and the spreading of the revolution throughout the world.⁴ It was recognized that the first necessity was to provide for the returning soldiers and to secure food for the hungry multitudes in the cities.

CIVIL WAR, 1918-1921

All of this program had to be undertaken in the face of foreign and civil war and carried through in the midst of social and economic upheaval. The period from 1917 to 1921 was filled with every variety of danger to the new regime. Russia's withdrawal from the war was effected by the humiliating Treaty of Brest Litovsk⁵ and the sur-

³ Stalin was a Georgian whose real name was Joseph Dzugashvili. He had been educated for the priesthood but had become a revolutionary in tsarist days and had suffered every penalty save death at the hands of the police. The pseudonym means "man of steel." As one of the important figures not only of Russia, but of the whole world, Stalin is of great interest. John Gunther's *Inside Europe* (1936) has two chapters on Stalin and the men about him. Richard Freund's *Zero Hour* has a chapter entitled the "Red Empire" which presents Stalin's policy. Walter Duranty's *I Write as I Please*, Eugene Lyons's *Assignment in Utopia*, the books of William H. Chamberlin, especially his *Russia's Iron Age*, all discuss Stalin from one point of view or another. Louis Fischer's *Soviets in World Affairs*, 2 vols., furnishes a broad survey. Nicolai Lenin, *Imperialism, the State and Revolution* (1933), gives the official Russian view of the revolution.

⁴ It was this idea of world revolution which struck terror into the hearts of those who were anxious for peace and security after the war. In Germany there was grave danger that the new republic might be overthrown. There was a Bolshevik government under Béla Kun in Hungary in 1919-1920 and Bolsheviks were active in Italy. In India and in China Bolshevik "missions" were connected with native revolts. Even in the United States radical agents were sufficiently active to frighten such high authorities as the attorney general.

⁵ See above, page 755.

render of the provinces along the western border. The creation of the republics of Finland and Ukraina further diminished Russian territory, while the bonds with the distant areas of Asiatic Russia were almost completely severed. In the outlying areas, especially in southern Russia, there were White, or tsarist, counterrevolutionary forces carrying on numerous petty civil wars. Nobles, Don Cossacks, and ex-army officers raised troops of a sort and endeavored to combat the new regime. They were supported by Allied funds, munitions, and technical aid, and Allied troops were sent, in 1918, to make attacks upon the widely separated ports of Batum, Baku, Vladivostok, and Archangel. "White" governments were set up in the extreme north, at Omsk in Siberia under Admiral Kolchak, in the south under General Denikin, and in the Crimean area under General Wrangel. In Siberia the White forces were aided by 35,000 Czech soldiers who had been in arms in Russia in the last years of the war and were making their way home by a long march eastward toward the Pacific ports which were in Allied hands. In the Baltic region General Yudenich headed a "Northwest Government of Russia." The Poles and the Cossacks threatened the western border, and there was a counterrevolutionary movement in eastern Finland and Karelia. In the summer of 1918, the territory under Soviet control was scarcely more than the districts around Petrograd and Moscow. Everywhere else there was disintegration, counterrevolutions or invasion. The Bolshevik government seemed on the verge of complete collapse.

In this extremity the genius of Leon Trotsky created an army and brought about organization, at first for defense and then for aggression. With the nucleus of the Red Guard formed in 1917, he built up a Red army and inspired it with a determination to drive out the opposing forces. The Bolshevik government was aided throughout this trying period by the fact that the White leaders were unable to win over any considerable number of the Russian people. Urban populations were usually strong supporters of the new regime, and, although the peasants resented the government's requisition of their grain, yet they feared and hated the Whites whose victory would mean the return of the old landlord system. When the Central Powers collapsed and the European war came to an end in the fall of 1918, the Western nations gradually withdrew their support from the White armies. Ukraina, where there had been German occupation, was overrun by Bolshevik forces in 1918. Denikin and Yudenich were defeated in the next year, and in 1920 the Poles were driven

back upon Warsaw. The defeat of the Russian forces near Warsaw and the treaty which followed, giving the Poles a new boundary a hundred miles further eastward, were offset by the defeat of General Wrangel and the last of the White armies. By 1921 the danger from civil and foreign war was over, and the government was free to extend its control throughout the length and breadth of the land.

These successes had required the expenditure of tremendous effort and were not effected without the horrors that accompany a civil war that is at the same time a class war. The Bolshevik leaders had neither scruples nor inhibitions. They knew that the movement for which they were willing to sacrifice everything could succeed only through violence, and, forced into a corner, they fought with every weapon within their grasp. An Extraordinary Commission for the Suppression of Counterrevolution (Cheka) was organized by the order of Lenin. This body was a powerful secret police armed with all the authority of the state and commissioned to ferret out all plots against the state. Its tactics were learned from the activities of the secret police of tsarist days, and its success led it to be made a regular part of the communist government.⁶ A "Red Terror" was proclaimed against the enemies of the state and thousands of persons were executed with only the barest shadow of legal procedure. It is impossible to make any estimate of the numbers of those who died in the Red Terror. It is probable that there were as many as fifty thousand "official" executions. The assertion of General Denikin that there were a million and a half in south Russia alone is evidence of the gross exaggeration inevitable in a period of such terrific disturbance. The "official" executions were, however, only a part of the Terror, for the peasantry wreaked its vengeance upon the hated nobility, and bandits everywhere exacted their toll. The White retaliations added a terror as widespread as the Red and second to it only in the number of victims.

To win the war, Lenin, as head of the government, resorted to a war communism that amounted to a mass conscription of all the resources of the state. Supplies were confiscated, foreign trade was taken over, private property was requisitioned, factories were "nationalized," and the economic life of the nation came under state control. The peasants, forced to surrender their stores of grain for

⁶ The name in later years (after 1922) was Unified State Political Administration, known by the initials of the Russian words, O.G.P.U.

the use of soldiers and civilian workers, found that, in the state, they had a landlord as relentless and as exacting as the old noble class. They fought back by cutting their production to that which they could consume themselves and by making what private sales they could to such bourgeoisie as had any money with which to buy, or goods with which to barter. Prices rose steadily as a result of scarcity, the lack of transportation facilities, and the declining buying power of the ruble. Russian finance had been in a state of collapse at the time of the revolution. In the following years banks were "nationalized," foreign and domestic debts were repudiated, and the ruble was inflated. The lack of food and of raw materials added to the already serious disruption of industry, and production fell to 10 or 15 per cent of the prewar level. Although the Red armies were victorious in 1920 and 1921, the country was on the verge of a famine which cost more lives than had been lost in the war.

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

There was no alternative before the government save a compromise between socialist principles and practical necessity. Food must be produced and industry revived, or the regime so recently saved from its armed foes would collapse from sheer inability to solve the problems of peacetime production. Fighting the opposition of his own party, Lenin forced the introduction of a program that came to be called the New Economic Policy, generally shortened to the NEP. As set forth in a Communist party congress in 1921, this policy substituted taxation for requisition upon the peasants, who were thus given permission to sell their surplus grain in the market. As agriculture improved industry revived, and the process was aided by further compromises that permitted a great deal of private enterprise. Small concerns began to manufacture for profit, and foreign firms were encouraged to commence operations under liberal concessions. The great industries were kept under state supervision and, in theory, were still nationalized; in fact, they were almost autonomous in the form of organized state trusts. Foreign trade was still a government monopoly, as was the financial control of the new State Bank and all of its branches. Distribution through private agencies on a profit basis was again permitted, and the currency was stabilized. The ration cards which had been the only legal method of securing food were abolished, and, in theory, supplies might be sold by ordi-

nary methods of private trade. The government, however, encouraged co-operative societies for distribution, and these grew rapidly, maintaining their own factories and purchasing agencies. Neither in industry nor in distribution was there a complete return to competitive capitalism. The result was a compromise in which there was some socialism, some private enterprise, and a great deal that has been called "state capitalism."

The period of the NEP extended from 1921 to 1928. It violated Marxian principles and was looked upon with disfavor by Lenin (who died in 1924) and by all of the Bolshevik leaders. It was entered upon as a matter of necessity and received its only justification in their eyes from the fact that it was successful. The drought of 1921, coupled with the greatly decreased production of previous years, made it impossible to escape the famine which had been imminent when the new policy was adopted. The winter of 1921-1922 was one of the most terrible in Russian history. The loss of life would have been far greater had it not been for the aid sent in from abroad, especially from the United States. After 1922, however, food was produced in sufficient quantities to avert famine.

Under the new policy *nepmen* (private capitalists) grew relatively rich on the profits of the trade permitted to them. Enterprising businessmen made money out of the building projects necessary to meet the housing needs of the new capital, Moscow,⁷ whose population was increasing rapidly. The peasants were left in undisputed possession of the land on terms that seemed to permit complete private ownership. Clever peasants acquired more and more land and employed their less able fellows as laborers. These kulaks or rich peasants formed a class with which the state must reckon eventually. But in the meantime Russia was recovering from the wounds of war and economic collapse. By 1923 the amount of land sown to grain equaled that of 1913, and there was food for those who had money to buy it. The export trade rose from one and a half million rubles in 1920 to over two hundred million in 1923.

Although the Moscow leaders did not discard their idea of a world revolution, they were willing to compromise here as elsewhere and entered into commercial agreements with England, Germany, and other European countries. Such agreements were followed by

⁷ The capital was moved from Petrograd in March, 1918, when the danger from foreign and White troops was serious. Petrograd was soon renamed Leningrad, but never regained its prewar importance. National life was centered in Moscow.

the recognition of the Soviet government by foreign powers, and legations were opened in Moscow.⁸ In 1924 a treaty was signed with China which gave recognition of Russia's position in Manchuria, and in the next year Japan agreed to evacuate the territory she had occupied in the Russian Far East.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT

During the period in which the New Economic Policy was followed, the Moscow government came to terms with the districts which lay outside Russia proper. In 1923 a constitution was drawn up for a confederation known as the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (U.S.S.R.). The name Russia was applied only to the largest unit, the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) which extends from Petrograd to eastern Siberia and has about 100,000,000 inhabitants.⁹ The other autonomous states in the U.S.S.R. were the White Russian and Ukrainian republics in Europe, the Transcaucasian republic and three smaller Asiatic states. Each of the republics retained complete liberty to develop its national and cultural life. There was no attempt at Russification, and there is every evidence that from Siberia to the Ukraine the lot of these peoples has been better than that of other groups of the same nationalities under the suzerainty of other powers. In theory, every state was not only autonomous but could, if it wished, secede from the union it had voluntarily entered. It is extremely doubtful, however, whether in practice such secessions would be permitted. It was hoped in the early days of Soviet rule that other republics, such as Finland or Poland, might decide to join the U.S.S.R., and the constitution provided for that contingency. Needless to say, there has been no move to that end on the part of outside states. In theory, also, there was no problem of nationalities; indeed, there has been little national or race prejudice in the Union, and the development of national cultures has been encouraged. Each republic, however, was expected to develop its economic resources for the good of the state and in accordance with the directions issued from Moscow.

The government of each state in the Union was based upon a

⁸ The United States did not recognize the Russian government until 1933.

⁹ Nine-tenths of the area and seven-tenths of the population of the Union are in this one state.

constitution similar to that of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic which was drawn up by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in 1918. This constitution was revised several times, and a new one was promulgated in 1936, but there has been little change in the general plan of government. The seven republics and the Union itself were recognized as class states in which power was to be in the hands of the industrial proletariat. The democratic ideal of universal suffrage was expressly denied, for besides disfranchising lunatics and criminals the Soviet regime barred, both from the ballot and from public office, those who employed hired labor for gain and those whose incomes were not derived from toil. Merchants, priests, and members of the prerevolutionary police were included in this proscription. In 1927 about 4 per cent of all those who might otherwise have qualified were disfranchised.¹⁰ This "pariah caste" of former aristocrats, merchants, factory owners, and rich peasants was regarded as "inimical to the state" and its members were considered class enemies whose "liquidation" would benefit the masses of the population. Under this system social origin became of vital importance.¹¹ The disfranchised were deprived of more than the vote, for they could not be members of trade unions or be employed in any state undertaking. The doors of all upper schools were closed to their children, and for all public services they were required to pay double rates. The aristocrats of the Soviet regime were the laborers, to whom every opportunity was offered. The peasants were from the first looked upon with somewhat less favor, and only the poorer among them were classed with the urban workers.

The political mechanism of this class state was based upon the soviets, or Councils of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies. The smallest units were the factory and the village soviets, and from them representatives were sent to district soviets. The district soviets sent delegates to a provincial congress which in turn elected delegates to an All-Russian Congress. Each of the other states had a similar organization for its own government, and the same procedure in the U.S.S.R. produced the All-Union Congress. Since these congresses were large and unwieldy, each selected a Central Executive Committee which was the most important legislative body of the state, or the Union,

¹⁰ See W. H. Chamberlin, *Soviet Russia*, pp. 108-9, for a discussion of suffrage in Russia.

¹¹ The Constitution of 1936 removed many of these restrictions by providing that bourgeois birth or social origin would no longer disqualify a citizen from employment or a career.

as the case might be. This committee selected a Council of Commissars to act as an executive body, or cabinet, and a standing committee to watch over the work of the commissars when the great congress was not in session. In the Union government, since care was taken to give representation to the small ethnic groups, there was the added machinery of a council of nationalities between the All-Union Congress and the All-Union Central Executive Committee.

There were several features of this system which marked it as different from the norm of modern democratic countries. Only the first local elections were participated in by the voting public. All others were indirect, and the process narrowed and grew more selective as the apex of the structure was approached. The local electoral units were based on occupation rather than on residence, and all voting was done by voice or by show of hands. The supremacy of the urban workers, who formed a much smaller class than the peasants, was at first maintained by granting one delegate to the All-Union Congress to every 25,000 city dwellers and one to every 125,000 peasants. It should be noted, also, that there was no separation of the functions of government into legislative, executive, and judicial departments. The commissars, or executives, for each division were selected by the council or soviet concerned. The judges were also under the soviets and could be removed at any time. The power of the OGPU, or secret police, transcended the decisions of the courts, and no legal warrant or court authorization was needed for the arrests it made.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1936

In 1936 it suited the policy of the Russian government to issue a new constitution for the U.S.S.R.,¹² conforming in several ways to democratic principles. It is impossible to make any statement in regard to the credence to be given to Russian claims that the constitu-

¹² There is great difference of opinion on the motives of the government. Those who are favorably inclined toward the Russian government are enthusiastic over the liberal provisions of the constitution and maintain that it is the "proof of absolute confidence by the regime that it is unshakably stable." Other writers whose opportunity for observation has been as great believe that the liberal provisions of the constitution were drawn up largely to win the support of the democratic countries in the expected struggle with the common enemy, Fascist Germany. It is probable that there is some truth in both points of view. One of the newspaper correspondents put it succinctly when he said that there was a continual contradiction between the theory and practice of communism.

tion is liberal, because it is impossible to know how much of its liberality will ever become a reality and how much is a paper pledge that will not be reflected in the political activities of the Russian people. The new constitution, for instance, promises "freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and holding mass meetings, freedom of street processions and demonstrations, inviolability of persons and homes." As yet there has been no indication that these provisions have been put into effect or that any considerable number of Russians have dared take any advantage of them. The new constitution does away with the unequal system of voting which gave a given number of the urban workers five times the representation accorded the same number of peasants. It provides also for a Supreme Council of the Union which is to be a bicameral legislature, one house of which is to be chosen by the nationalities of the Union, the other to be elected on the basis of "universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot." More fundamental from the socialist point of view, the constitution states that the citizen is entitled to work, free education, free medical attendance, holidays with pay, and all existing social services. From a liberal point of view the Constitution of 1936 leaves little to be desired. The vital issue of the reality of that liberalism has been summarized by one of the best-informed American students of Russian affairs:

Were this Constitution to be genuinely implemented, the Soviet Union would deserve a place not among the dictatorships but among the democracies of the world. Unfortunately, there are the strongest reasons for believing that all these glowing assurances of full democratic liberties will not be, and indeed cannot be, carried into effect.¹³

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

There is reason to discount the liberal clauses of the 1936, as well as of the earlier, constitutions because of the special position enjoyed by the Communist party. The fact that no other political parties exist nullifies in part the democratic grant of universal suffrage and frequent elections. The fundamental reality of Soviet politics is the party; when that is realized all of the seeming inconsistencies can be swept away, and the intricacies of the legislative and administrative pro-

¹³ W. H. Chamberlin, *Collectivism. A False Utopia* (The Macmillan Company), p. 9. Chamberlin is not a sympathetic critic. Many writers are much more optimistic about the probable success of the new constitution.

visions are immaterial. Iron discipline is maintained in a party membership of about two to three million,¹⁴ and frequent purges preserve the control of a few men at the top. Communist party history has been full of strife and bitter rivalries. Lenin dominated, by sheer force of personality and of burning zeal, a group of men who differed widely in their interpretations of Marxian principles. After Lenin's death in 1924, the struggle for party leadership was intense. The chief contestants were Trotsky, who headed the left-wing, "world revolution" communists, and Stalin, who was, and has remained, a Russian nationalist and realist of tremendous energy and ability. After the defeat and exile of Trotsky, Stalin proceeded to rid himself of opposition both from the Left and the Right with great shrewdness as well as ruthlessness. The great public trials and the resulting executions of former party leaders on charges of counter-revolutionary activities are part of the relentless policy of removing opposition. Party dissension has doubtless been as much a matter of power as of principle, and the dictatorship has been maintained at all costs.

The organization of the party is somewhat similar to the organization of the government. The Political Bureau, consisting of Stalin, as secretary of the party, and his nine associates, is the real source of all authority in the state. All important decisions as to foreign and domestic policy are made by this bureau and dictated to the executives, legislators, and agencies of the government. From the will of the dictator, whose sole office is that of chief of the bureau, or party secretary, there is no appeal. Since no other party is permitted and since membership in the Communist party, if not a formal prerequisite, is extremely valuable in securing political or military office and appointment to important executive positions in the economic system, it can be easily seen how a population of one hundred and seventy millions can be controlled by a highly centralized organization working through a small minority of the whole people. In the early days of party history, Lenin is said to have remarked that there might be any number of parties in Russia, provided that the Communist party was in power and all other parties in prison. Under such circumstances civil liberties are worth little. All power is vested in one party which permits no debate or differences of opinion in its own ranks,

¹⁴ This number represents, however, at least ten million of the population. Even at that it is a small minority.

and there is no possibility of an opposition group outside the party. If those who are elected to office on the basis of universal suffrage must submit to the dictation of party heads and function chiefly as an audience for the reports of cabinet ministers who in turn are but the agents of the dictator-head of the party, then plebiscites, no matter how universal the vote and how secret the ballot, are meaningless.

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Founded upon the principle of the abolition of the exploitation of the worker, the Soviet government has accomplished much to prove that it has been faithful to its trust. The doctrines of Karl Marx and Lenin's interpretation of Marxian theory have been accepted with religious fervor in Russia. Although the Soviet regime has not produced the communist or socialist state which was the ideal of the revolutionists of 1917, although the government today is more autocratic than it was in tsarist days, there have been concrete achievements that have revolutionized the lives of the Russian people. Under the Soviet government great emphasis has been placed upon education. Thousands of schools have been provided for the many language groups, and elementary education has been made possible for adults as well as for children. In 1914 70 per cent of the people could not read, and only seven million pupils were attending elementary schools; in 1932 illiteracy had been reduced to 9 per cent and there were nineteen million elementary school pupils. Since technicians were desperately needed for all Russian enterprises, much emphasis was placed upon vocational education. Technical schools were attached to factories, where students spent part of their time in learning theory and the rest in the workshop. Especially able students were sent on to the technical high schools and, if necessary, from there to the university at state expense. The universities have been liberally treated by the government, especially in respect to grants for scientific and medical research. Languages and other "tool" subjects have been stressed.

The social sciences, philosophy, and the fine arts have tended to be pressed into the Marxist framework and perverted to further the ends of the communist ideology. Academic freedom has not been permitted in those fields where criticism of the new regime might arise.

Instruction has been forced into pragmatic lines and made to serve the desire for propaganda favorable to the government. Recalcitrant members of the professional classes who have dared to think for themselves and to express those thoughts have been imprisoned, executed, or exiled. The old liberal intelligentsia that at one time regarded itself as revolutionary has suffered a fate it has not deserved, and, as a class, has disappeared—to use that expressive new term, it has been “liquidated.”¹⁵

THE YOUTH MOVEMENT

The communist state early recognized the need for the indoctrination of the young and made it a matter of state policy to guide the youth of Russia into collectivist thinking. From young people trained from babyhood in communistic theory, the party would obtain its recruits, and collectivism would become the Russian way of life. The idea was not original with the communists. Lenin's remark, “Give me four years to teach the children, and the seed I have sown will never be uprooted,” is very similar to a far older statement accredited to the Roman Catholic Church, and Lenin's policy has been followed by the dictators of other states. Two large organizations, in which there is no sex distinction, have been created for this purpose. The Young Pioneers were composed of children from two to sixteen. The Union of Communist Youth was an organization for those from fourteen to twenty-three. More than two million young people belonged to each of the two organizations in the early 1930's. The Pioneers were somewhat like the Scout groups of democratic countries, but with the added feature of intensive collectivist training. The children of workers were preferred as members, but class lines were not rigidly drawn. The Union of Communist Youth was designed as a training school for the Communist party, and its members were generally expected to graduate into the party, although there was nothing automatic about it. In 1930 almost half of the young workers belonged to the Union of Communist Youth. The program of this organization is varied; military training is a part of it, and its members participate in “drives” for one purpose or another, from enrolling illiterates in classes to procuring scrap iron to relieve the shortage

¹⁵ Mme. Tatiana Tchernavin, *Escape from the Soviet*, and Vladimir Tchernavin, *I Speak for the Silent Prisoners of the Soviets*, were written by members of the old intelligentsia who were able to escape after the most stirring and exhausting adventures. The latter book deals with the fate of the old liberal professional class.

in metal. Various sorts of social work, too, have been encouraged, but antireligious teaching, especially, is a characteristic of the youth organizations.

RELIGION IN SOVIET RUSSIA

The close affiliation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the autocratic government of the tsars made it inevitable that religious organization should be suppressed in Soviet Russia. The Russian church, long condemned for its formalism and cultural backwardness, had lost all hold over the intelligentsia years before the Revolution. All of the Communist leaders were atheistic and, where their followers have felt the need for religion, they have found it in their faith in Marxian doctrines. One of the first steps in the early days of reconstruction after 1917 was the separation of church and state. No public money was granted for priests' salaries or for religious education. Church property was confiscated, and church buildings were used for government purposes when needed. Otherwise they were kept open by those who retained their devotion to the old faith. All social activities of the church were prohibited, church processions and festival days were abolished, and the new work week made no concessions to the Christian calendar. All churches in the Soviet state were required to confine their activities to strictly religious functions. Antireligious propaganda was a part of the communist program, and deliberate effort was made to win the young people away from religious allegiance. Revolutionary heroes were substituted for the saints of the church, and revolutionary holidays replaced church festivals. The great parades and public gatherings of party significance were organized to stir the enthusiasm and arouse the zeal of young communists, who would never miss the old church pageants. At first the government attacked only the Orthodox Russian Church, but after 1929 the same restrictions were applied to the various Protestant sects. It is not fair to accuse the Soviet government of religious persecution, for "priests still walk openly in the streets of Moscow and administer the sacraments to the faithful, and in the Moslem republics men still turn to Mecca to pray, and strive to make, once in their lifetime, the long pilgrimage to the Holy City."¹⁸ It is quite true, however, that there was no religious freedom. Every sort of political and economic disability was heaped upon the clergy, and

¹⁸ J. H. Jackson, *Post War Europe* (Little, Brown and Company), p. 152.

religious affiliation was not expected of good party members. The new constitution (1936) guaranteed freedom of conscience, but the whole basis of education was designed to displace religion.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND REFORM

Although there has been this open intolerance toward religion and an even greater intolerance toward all social classes except the workers and peasants, there has been no anti-Semitism, no antifeminism, and no oppression of nationalities. In these respects the Soviet regime has exhibited no prejudices. In Fascist countries women have been kept in political and economic subjection to men, nationalism has been exalted, and a fetish has been made of racial purity. In Russia there has been universal suffrage, and women have had practically the same economic opportunities as men. Party membership has been open to women, and political advancement has not been denied them. This equality of the sexes was reflected in Soviet regulations in regard to marriage and divorce. The first was entirely secularized and made a matter of legal registration, while the latter could be procured upon the application of either party. The state, however, insisted upon recognition of the rights of children, and their welfare was made a matter of the joint responsibility of both parents. As the chaos which followed the revolution subsided and Soviet domestic policy could be carefully reviewed, it was realized that the stability of the family was a valuable asset to the state. Divorce was made less easy, family life was encouraged, and parental discipline and authority were given the approval of the government. Parents and children alike were expected to co-operate with the state for the welfare of society.

The Soviet government was from the first interested in the social welfare of children, and made many regulations in regard to their care. Illegitimacy was eliminated, and children born in or out of wedlock were given the same legal and social status. Since in a worker's state where there was a constant scarcity of labor it was customary for both parents to be employed, day nurseries and nursery schools were provided for their children. The government also made every effort to provide for the care and education of the thousands of children orphaned by the civil wars. Hospitalization, convalescent homes, vacation resorts, and recreation facilities were provided for the working class which was the main concern of the Soviet state.

The palaces of the royal family were turned into museums and art galleries, and the country homes of nobles were converted into rest homes and orphanages. The intention of the government to give all of these social advantages to the people must be recognized. At the same time it is well to note that the program has been only partially and imperfectly carried out, for time, energy, and money have been lacking. It should also be recognized that these public welfare services are not peculiar to Russia. Many of them are furnished by democratic states, and they are not foreign to the programs of other forms of totalitarian states.

The establishment of a dictatorship of the Communist party and its extension through treaties and constitutions to the faraway parts of the old tsarist empire were tremendous achievements. The development of a vast social program in keeping with the ideals and principles upon which the regime had been based was of immense potential importance, but the fate of the whole experiment depended upon its success in solving the economic problems whose difficulties had baffled Russian officials for many decades. Unless Russia's natural resources could be developed, unless the Russian people could be fed and satisfied, neither the Soviet nor any other government could survive. Lenin himself had said, "If we are not able to organize our heavy industries, then, as a civilized State, let alone as a Socialist State, we will perish." After the disasters of foreign and civil war the Soviet government found it necessary to give itself a relief from strain, and the Russian people an opportunity for recovery, in the New Economic Policy. This compromise with Marxian theory was regarded from the first as a respite only—a strategic retreat and not a surrender. In the extremity of famine and chaos, expediency was the first consideration, consistency and devotion to principles had to be sacrificed. In the years from 1921 to 1928 the theory of socialism was adhered to, but the encroachments of private enterprise were numerous and were tolerated because the end for which the NEP had been established was being attained.

After Lenin's death in 1924, there were two or three years in which the main consideration was the struggle for power within the government; upon the outcome of that struggle depended the future policy of the Soviet regime. Stalin's victory meant the concentration of energy upon the success of the socialist experiment in Russia. It meant nationalism and state socialism—something different from Marxism; Stalin called it Leninism and described it at length in a

nine-hundred page treatise, but so much of himself went into it that perhaps it should be called Stalinism.

THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN

The chief characteristic of Stalin's policy was state economic planning on a vast scale. All the means of production were, under socialist theory, the property of the state. The time had come to make fact accord with theory, and to build the industries of the state and develop its resources so that Soviet Russia would be independent, self-sustaining, and prosperous. After 1925, steady progress was made to achieve those ends. In that year each factory, mine, and trust was asked to prepare estimates of production and capacity. These reports were secured from all of the republics within the Union and checked by a Supreme Economic Council. A board of experts was appointed to draw up an industrial plan for the whole Union, based upon the production capacity of all the industries within the several states. This industrial plan was to be the objective of Russian industry and was designed to make Russia industrially powerful and independent. Stalin then (1928) announced his economic policy, stating three objectives: first, the Soviet Union was to be self-supporting, "an industrial and powerful country quite independent of the caprices of world capitalism"; second, agriculture was to be reorganized on the basis of large mechanized farms instead of small peasant holdings; third, illiteracy was to be eliminated in order that the people might play their part in a communist industrialized state. This announcement was the inauguration of the first Five-Year Plan.¹⁷

After some preliminary propaganda the Russian workers adopted the plan "in the spirit of soldiers defending the fatherland," and the party made every effort to keep that spirit alive. The plan called for great sacrifice. The workers were asked to contribute a week's, or a month's, pay to the fund necessary to put the plan into operation. Since emphasis was to be put on heavy industries, factory building,

¹⁷ Probably no other feature of postwar Russian history has been more discussed. W. H. Chamberlin's *Russia's Iron Age*, gives a not too sympathetic account, stressing the suffering of the peasants and the famine of 1933. Maurice Hindus's *Red Bread*, published in 1931, gives a vivid picture of Russian agriculture before the Ukraine famine. There are numerous chapters in more general accounts; one of the best is in J. H. Jackson, *Post War Europe*, pp. 139-54. Chap. XV in R. Freund, *Zero Hour*, an excellent brief summary of the years after 1930, concerns itself only in part with economic developments.

electrification, and transportation, the production of consumption goods was cut to the bone. In the language of the propagandist, the Five-Year Plan was a period of "postponed consumption"; and the meaning of that term was a constant and painful reality to hungry, badly housed, poorly fed Russians. All surpluses in the production of food and natural resources had to be sent abroad to pay for machinery and for the services of foreign experts and technicians. When the world-wide depression of 1929 brought the collapse of commodity prices, more and more goods had to be exported, but the plan was not discontinued. Instead, the slogan became "The Five-Year Plan in Four."

The inauguration of the Five-Year Plan meant the abandonment of the NEP policy. Private traders were, in large degree, deprived of their right to trade, private businesses were taxed out of existence, and small manufacturing plants were brought under government control. Consumers' co-operatives were encouraged to expand. By 1932 they were distributing more than half of the retail goods sold in the Union. State shops were multiplied, and consumers' departments were opened in connection with factories, where workers were given ration cards. It should be noted that with the renewal of state control over trade there was much inequality in distribution. Manual workers and trade-union members had special access to goods that was denied to Nepmen. Foreigners were supplied from special shops, for their foreign currency was needed to pay for imported goods. Wages varied, also, and those doing work that was deemed especially important received many privileges.

THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION

At the same time agriculture was revolutionized. In 1928 all but 3 per cent of the farms were worked by individual peasants. The land, in theory, belonged to the state, but under the NEP the peasants had been in complete possession. Peasant methods were medieval, and peasant production was grossly inadequate to the needs of the Five-Year Plan. Large-scale agriculture under modern methods, using tractors, combines, and the other varieties of mechanical equipment meant the transformation of the Russian countryside and of the Russian peasant. This large-scale production was initiated on the land belonging to the state and extended to peasant lands. In 1932, collective farms utilized three-fourths of the arable land, and the area under

production had been greatly increased. But progress was at a terrific cost. The capitalistic peasant, or kulak, resisted collectivization through self-interest; the poor and backward peasant resisted from sheer backwardness, ignorance, and inertia. It was a second civil war, and, with a ruthlessness that was accompanied by misery, famine, and the death of millions, it was fought by the government against an almost defenseless enemy.

A contribution in grain was levied on every village; the peasant was deprived of opportunity to sell his produce in the private market, and every sort of pressure was used to force him into the collective farms. The zeal of the urban Communists who were entrusted with this collectivization was matched by their ignorance of agriculture and of peasant psychology. Kulaks were loaded into boxcars and deported en masse to labor camps in the frozen north—"liquidated" out of existence. Through vast areas 'despairing peasants killed their livestock and refused to harvest more than they and their families could consume. This resistance was especially strong in the Ukraine. The government regarded it as a fundamental resistance to the whole socialist program and calmly refused to relax the orders for the government tax in grain. The tax collectors went through the recalcitrant areas and took the full amount of the stored grain due the government, leaving the peasants to starve as a consequence of their resistance and folly. This enforced collection was justified on the ground that otherwise the loyal urban workers must starve through no fault of their own.¹⁸ After the famine the backbone of resistance was broken, and collectivization proceeded rapidly. In the following years concessions and compromises were made which greatly eased the situation. Peasants were allowed their own houses, garden plots, poultry, and some livestock. The collective farms owned the machinery, directed operations, satisfied the government requirements, and arranged for the division of the income. The old Russian mir and communal farming reappeared in a new guise.

THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

In the meantime industrialization proceeded. A great electric-power station was constructed at Dnieperostroi, and in the Ural Moun-

¹⁸ No figures are available for the famine of 1933. W. H. Chamberlin says about five million; but other observers have maintained that that is a greatly exaggerated estimate.

tains a new town, Magnitogorsk, was built to turn into steel the great resources of coal and iron. At Stalingrad thousands of tractors were manufactured each year until Russia was able to satisfy the domestic demand. In Transcaucasia the oil industry was developed, and pipe lines were built from Baku to Batum on the Black Sea. Railroads were built to tap new resources, and cotton from the new fields of Turkestan was brought out for the factories of Russia. The achievements of the four years were remarkable. Stalin claimed a 97 per cent success for the plan. But figures are untrustworthy in measuring results. Every official was interested in making those figures as imposing as possible. As one author has said, "A ton of steel is one ton of steel at the factory, one ton of steel when loaded on the railway, and one ton when unloaded: that is three tons when the figures appear."¹⁹ Machines were machines, whether they would go or not, and shoes were shoes regardless of their wearing qualities. In fact, the results of the Five-Year Plan were much more imposing quantitatively than qualitatively. But it is probably safe to say that the Soviet government had, on the whole, reached the objectives it had set, and that it had accomplished in five years industrial changes that had taken Western nations generations to bring about.

The "drive" to reduce illiteracy had a great deal of success. Many schools were built, and adult workers were given greater opportunity to learn to read. Emphasis was placed upon technical education. Students were sent abroad to study foreign methods, and instructors and engineers were brought into Russia to help bridge the gap between Russian and foreign methods. The modern devices of radio and visual education were eagerly adopted. In the effort to encourage artistic and literary production Russia at last realized the stultifying effect of insisting upon the propaganda value of such mediums of expression. In 1932 the censorship which had rigidly controlled the creative arts was abolished.

That the tremendousness of the human costs of the first Five-Year Plan was realized was shown in the announcement that the next plan would concentrate on consumption goods and upon increasing wages, reducing prices, and promoting the well-being of the people. Collectivization was to continue, co-operative shops were to be multiplied, and communal feeding of factory workers and peasants was to be increased. It is far too soon, and the information far too scanty,

¹⁹ J. H. Jackson, *Post War Europe* (Little, Brown and Company), p. 142.

to permit any estimate of the success of all of these enterprises. Economic advancement has undoubtedly increased the comfort of the average Russian and brought a sense of internal security. The fact that the population of Russia has increased more than 30 per cent since 1924 is an evidence of the economic advance. The Soviet regime, therefore, has a more stable basis and an opportunity to expand the socialistic program. The classless state, however, with a communistic government in which the workers control both production and government, has not been the outcome of the Russian Revolution. A strong national state, dominated by a dictator whose will operates through a great political party, is far from the Marxian ideal of the early days of the Revolution, but it is more in keeping with both the Russian tradition of autocracy and orthodoxy and the trend of the postwar age toward totalitarian governments and dictatorships.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF SOVIET RUSSIA

The relations of Soviet Russia with the world outside its gates are of great concern to any observer of European or Asiatic affairs. Extending across two continents, with a broad western frontier and another front thousands of miles away on the Pacific, Russia is doubly vulnerable. One of her statesmen once remarked, "Peace is indivisible," and truly for Russia today, war in the West would mean another war in the East. In the early years of the new regime, enthusiastic Bolsheviks worked for the world revolution which they felt must follow the disasters of the Great War. Lenin and his followers, especially Trotsky, who had spent much of their lives in exile in the study of Marxian doctrine, were not Russian chauvinists but were international in their point of view. For them a world revolution, led by a World Communist party, was the great objective of all their lifework. This conception was embodied in the Communist, or Third, International whose first Congress met in Moscow in 1919. The program of the International called for sabotage in capitalist countries, for "boring from within," and for a drive to win over radical labor organizations to a communist program. Attention was to be especially devoted to the "backward" and dissatisfied countries, India, China, and Latin America. Russian money and the services of the Russian secret police were given to the International. The only place where the movement had notable success was in China. There it played a part in the revolution and civil war of 1925 and 1926, and since that period a Chi-

nese communism, quite different from the Russian, has made great headway in northwestern China.²⁰

This first wave of international missionary activity declined with the exile of Trotsky and disappeared as the realist-nationalist Stalin came into full power. After 1925 Russia gave every indication of desiring peace with all outside nations. Treaties of friendship and non-aggression were made with many Western states. In an effort to avoid friction, Russia recognized the Rumanian acquisition of Bessarabia, made friends with Turkey, and acquiesced in the Japanese advance into Manchuria. In 1934 Russia joined the League of Nations and has worked since that time for the maintenance of the position and prestige of the League. With almost limitless natural resources and great domestic problems of her own, Russia had none of the aggressive external policy of the dissatisfied powers. Imperialism has little meaning when it has no economic, commercial, or financial foundation. Peace, therefore, was the greatest objective of Russian foreign policy. Russia was not indifferent to the plight of such states as China and Loyalist Spain but her chief interest has been the defense of her own frontiers and her own institutions. For Russia there have been in the years since 1933 just two great enemies: Japan, whose Manchurian and Chinese policies are a constant threat to Siberia; and Nazi Germany, whose policy of expansion eastward must ultimately clash with Russian interests. Of the two the latter was far the greater threat to Russia. That threat has been met in two ways: by an increase in armament, and by co-operation with the democratic powers of the West. The significance of both policies will be seen as a part of the drama of the development of the Western dictatorships.

READINGS

GENERAL ACCOUNTS. The general accounts of the recent period by F. L. Bennis, W. C. Langsam, and J. H. Jackson all contain chapters on Russia since 1917. G. D. H. and M. Cole's *An Intelligent Man's Review of Europe Today* (1933) may be used again. The following histories of Russia mentioned for Chapter XVIII may be used here as well: B. Pares, *History of Russia*; M. N. Pokrovsky, *A Brief History of Russia*, and G. Vernadsky, *History of Russia*. J. Mavor's *Economic History of Russia* (1925) and his

²⁰ The earlier movement in China is vividly described in Vincent Sheean's *Personal History*. The importance to the Chinese nation of the Communists of northwest China is most interestingly discussed in Edgar Snow's *Red Star over China*. See, also, Louis Fischer's *Soviets in World Affairs*.

Russian Revolution (1928) are useful. The *Russian Revolution, 1917-1931* (Berkshire Series, 1932) by G. Vernadsky is readable and very brief. Lenin's *Imperialism, the State and Revolution* (1933) may be used in this connection, also *European Dictatorships* (1931) written by an eminent Italian diplomat, Count Carlo Storza, gives some material on Russia.

BOOKS BY INTERNATIONAL NEWS CORRESPONDENTS. Some of the best material on recent European events is from the pens of international correspondents. One of the best-informed American correspondents in Russia was W. H. Chamberlin, who has written *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*, 2 vols. (1935); *Soviet Russia* (1931); *Russia's Iron Age* (1934); *Collectivism, a False Utopia* (1937). Walter Duranty, correspondent of the *New York Times*, wrote *I Write as I Please* (1935). Louis Fischer's very sympathetic *Soviet Journey* (1935) is interesting, and his *Soviets in World Affairs*, 2 vols. (1930) is a detailed account of Soviet foreign policy. Richard Freund, correspondent for English newspapers, is the author of the very interesting *Zero Hour* (1937). John Gunther, for many years correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News*, has written the very popular *Inside Europe* (1936, with later revised editions) Eugene Lyons's *Assignment in Utopia* (1937), Vincent Sheean's *Personal History* (New edition, 1937), and Anna Louise Strong's *I Change Worlds* (1935) are extremely interesting personal reactions to the communist regime.

WORKS BY RUSSIAN AUTHORS. There are a number of books by Russians now living outside the U.S.S.R. Among them are the works of M. G. Hindus, all very readable and valuable: *The Russian Peasant and the Revolution* (1920); *Humanity Uprooted* (1929); *Red Bread* (1931); and *The Great Offensive* (1933). Irina Skariatina, a princess in the old regime, has written *A World Can End* (1931); *A World Begins* (1932); and *The First to Go Back; An Aristocrat in Soviet Russia* (1933). A member of the old intelligentsia and his wife, Vladimir and Tatiana Tchernavin, describe their experiences in *I Speak for the Silent Prisoners of the Soviets* (1935) and *Escape from the Soviet* (1934).

BIOGRAPHIES. There are several interesting lives of Lenin: among them *Lenin* (1931) by D. S. Mirsky and *Lenin, Red Dictator* (1931) by G. Vernadsky. The autobiography of Leon Trotsky, *My Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography* (1930), is interesting. Stalin is the subject of biographies by Stephen Graham and I. D. Levine, both published in 1931.

≡ XXV ≡

FASCISM: ITALY AND GERMANY

IN every country, the period immediately after the war was one of profound dislocation, of psychological *malaise*, as well as one of social and economic difficulty and readjustment. In Italy the situation was aggravated by factors that did not appear elsewhere. Italy had entered the war after long hesitation,¹ not because of invasion, or because of profound conviction, but because those who desired intervention were able to obtain enough political power and enough popular backing to accomplish it. Italian opinion was too divided to make any great war enthusiasm possible. The conservative parties had opposed the war, hoping to extract concessions from Austria by using constant threats of intervention. The Catholics were strongly in favor of neutrality, both because of the pacifist attitude of the church and because Austria was a great Catholic power while France was notoriously anticlerical. The advocates of entry on the side of the Allied Powers represented widely different factions. The industrialists and the landowners were pro-Ally from the beginning, for their economic interests were bound with those of France and England. The republicans, and there was a considerable body of republican opinion in Italy, looked upon the Allies as the defenders of democracy. The syndicalists advocated intervention in the expectation that war would develop mass unity and open the way for revolution. Italian anarchism was pro-Ally, but the socialist groups divided on this issue as they did on many others. The Reformist Socialists voted for war, while the bulk of the Socialist party was in opposition throughout the whole period. There was no great enthusiasm for war on the part of the country at large, except in urban centers, just as there had never been any great interest in politics or parliamentary government. Divided into factions before the war, and varying widely in their reasons for intervention, the governing classes of Italy quite naturally lost all

¹ Italy's obligation under the Triple Alliance was only to aid her allies in case of a defensive war. Italy considered the Central Powers the aggressors in 1914 and declared her neutrality.

cohesion again as war came to an end. In 1919 the government was quite unable to deal with the civil disturbances that disrupted Italy.

THE EARLY CAREER OF MUSSOLINI

When the Great War began in 1914, a young man named Benito Mussolini (born in 1883) was the editor of the *Avanti*, the Socialist party newspaper. Son of a revolutionary-socialist blacksmith,² he had been reared in abject poverty but in an atmosphere of socialistic agitation. His mother had been a schoolteacher and made every effort to obtain an education for her son. He early became a socialist agitator of the syndicalist, "direct action" school. His activities led to arrest and imprisonment, both in Italy and in Switzerland, where he lived for some time, having gone there to continue his education and to escape compulsory military service. After his return to Italy in 1904, he pushed his way upward in radical socialist circles until he became editor of *Avanti* and built up a substantial personal following.

Mussolini broke with the majority socialists over the issue of intervention in the war and was expelled from the party. He resigned the editorship of *Avanti* and founded, probably with French money, a newspaper of his own, *Il popolo d'Italia*. Still a socialist, but ardently nationalistic and personally eager for war as a great adventure, Mussolini used his editorial position to urge intervention. In 1916, he enlisted himself and served a month in the trenches before being wounded. After seven months in the hospital, he obtained release from further active service, but his career was greatly influenced by his brief war experience.

His career was one in which violence was practised and suffered, and his philosophy one in which violence was not outlawed. . . . Henceforth, he was to worship violence where its application had, in his opinion, a wholesome end, and to praise its uses where it cut away the gangrene. How dangerous an analogy and state of mind when applied to the life of a society! There is some certainty about the nature of mortified flesh, and the precise use and control of surgical intervention; but who will have the presumption to judge which of the members of the Great Society are mortified, and then cut off, not dead flesh, but human lives.³

² Of peasant stock, the family for generations had been farmers.

³ Herman Finer, *Mussolini's Italy* (Henry Holt and Company), p. 108. This is one of the most valuable accounts of the whole Fascist movement. It is penetrating and detailed, yet absorbing in its interesting interpretation. Gaudens Megaro's *Mussolini in*

ITALY AT THE CLOSE OF THE WAR

During the war, the prospect of gains in territory, power, and prestige was used by the Italian government to whip up war enthusiasm and to justify the sacrifices the people were asked to make. Five million men were mobilized, six hundred thousand were killed in battle, and a million more were wounded. The defeat at Caporetto lay like a raw wound on Italian pride, and the recovery of morale that came when the Italian soldiers at last blocked the Austro-German advance did not prevent acute defeatism and disillusionment. The Allied command sent troops to strengthen the Italian front, and the Italian government made extravagant promises of agrarian and social reforms in order to bolster up war spirit. The armistice brought a belated feeling of achievement and victory. It also brought a demand for the fulfillment of the promises made by the politicians and the pledges made by the Allies upon Italy's entry into the war. In 1919, however, neither the vague promises of economic reforms nor the terms of the Treaty of London satisfied Italian demands. The people had suffered much, and they expected their payment to be commensurate with that suffering.

The politicians' promises were not kept—in fact, they could not be kept—for there was a severe economic crisis in 1918-1919. The Allies had helped the Italian government financially until the end of the war, but after 1918 there were staggering annual deficits. The lira fell steadily in value, prices rose, and there was much suffering in Italian cities.⁴ One strike followed another in every line of industry, as the laboring classes endeavored to obtain compensation for the rise in prices. In June of 1919, in an astonishing wave of public feeling, the working people declared a 50 per cent cut in prices. "Grim looking and shabbily-dressed workmen patrolled the shops, taking care that everything was paid for at half its former price, neither

Making gives an interesting account of his early career. Of similar interest are Gaetano Salvemini's *The Fascist Dictatorship in Italy*, and *The Axe of Fascism*, G. A. Borgese's *Goliath, the March of Fascism*, and *Fascism for Whom?* by Max Ascoli and Arthur Feiler. George Seldes's *Sawdust Caesar* is an interesting journalistic biography. It has been said that Fascism has produced no significant books written by its supporters. *The Awakening of Italy* by Luigi Villari is from the Fascist point of view. J. S. Barnes, an English supporter of Fascism, has written, with the approbation of Mussolini, *Fascism*, and *The Universal Aspects of Fascism*. See also L. Sturzo's *Italy and Fascismo*.

⁴ See G. Salvemini, *The Fascist Dictatorship in Italy*, p. 5 and notes, for the inflation of the lira and the price level.

more nor less. There was no confiscation of private property and no violence."⁵ As suddenly as it had appeared this movement collapsed, and prices rose again. The trade-union movement gained tremendously during the years 1915-1920. Agricultural laborers, industrial workers, public employees, railroad men, and schoolteachers joined unions and fought for wage increases. The Socialist party won 156 seats in the Italian Parliament in the election of 1919,⁶ and talk of radical change was in the air.

ECONOMIC UNREST IN 1919-1920

Two movements of 1919-1920 were indicative of the unrest, and from both of them came the reasons for Mussolini's rise to power. This was the period of the Bolshevik attempts to stir up world revolution. Wherever economic distress suggested that success might attend their activities, protagonists of communism advocated sabotage, strikes, the occupation of factories, and tactics of a general disruptive and obstructionist nature, hoping that out of economic collapse there might come an opportunity for a proletarian dictatorship. In the winter of 1919-1920 many people in Italy believed that revolution was inevitable. Elections in many cities brought radical socialists into office, and in Parliament itself socialist deputies cheered Lenin and hissed when the king was mentioned.

The peasants were infected by the general disturbance and demanded the division of the large estates, even going so far, occasionally, as to burn houses, destroy crops, murder landowners, and seize land for themselves, all after the manner of the Russian peasants. In the autumn of 1920 the industrial difficulties reached their peak when a half million laborers in more than six hundred factories seized the plants and announced that workingmen's committees would operate them in the future. This was both the climax and the beginning of the end of the whole revolutionary movement. The laborers discovered that the intricacies of production were too much for them. Expert management and access to raw materials and to foreign markets were essential factors which were not in their possession. After a few months the factories were returned to their owners, and the trade unions agreed to co-operate with the government in working out a solution for the economic difficulties. By January of 1921 the

⁵ Max Ascoli and Arthur Feiler, *Fascism for Whom?*, p. 34.

⁶ Mussolini himself was badly defeated in Milan.

danger of revolution seemed to be over. The radicals seceded from the Socialist party to form a small separate communist organization. As the great wave of strikes subsided it was evident that the mass of the laboring population favored moderate policies, and the revolting peasantry submitted to the re-establishment of the power of the landlords. The crisis had, however, thoroughly demoralized the economic life of the country and had frightened the landlords and industrialists into a willingness to favor any movement that promised a strong government and the ruthless suppression of the proletariat. The claim of the Fascists that they saved Italy from Bolshevism was unfounded, for the danger was over before they had gained much power. Nevertheless the Bolshevik threat did prepare the ground for Fascism and gained many capitalist adherents for the movement.

At the same time that these economic difficulties were most ominous, general unrest was increased from other causes. The government had made no arrangements for the absorption of the soldiers into civilian life. Nothing was done financially to tide them over the difficult period. Even the primary obligations of medical care for the wounded and of pensions for the maimed and for the families of those killed in the war were met with exasperating slowness. The socialists, who had opposed Italy's entry into the war, now jeered at the discontented soldiers who, they said, had been cheated by the bourgeoisie, the government, and the Allies.

ITALY AND THE PEACE TREATIES

This claim that Italy had been cheated out of the fruits of victory was magnified by the angry nationalists into a clamor that made the Italian populace believe that their sacrifices had been in vain and that their efforts had ended in defeat. The reason for Italian dissatisfaction lay partly in the fact that, in the enthusiasm attending the end of the war, Italian statesmen decided to demand more than the generous terms of the secret treaties had promised them, and partly in the fact that Italy, contrary to the promises of the Allies, was ignored in the distribution of the German colonies and the regions taken from Turkey. The fact that Italy had at last obtained a strategic Alpine boundary and that, in the acquisition of the South Tyrol and the Trentino, her boundaries now included almost all the Italians of Europe did not suffice the chauvinists. Having acquired Trieste, they now demanded Fiume and the Dalmatian coast, claiming that the prin-

ciple of "self-determination" should be extended to all those Adriatic areas in which Italians lived.

The statesmen at Versailles refused to yield to Italian demands, for they were concerned with the needs of the Slavic hinterland and its right to an outlet to the sea. Italy found her old imperialistic yearning for Smyrna frustrated when the Allies smiled upon the claims of Greece, and she reluctantly transferred her ambitions to Adalia on the Asia Minor coast, only to find that, in the revival of Turkish power under Mustafa Kemal, both Italy and Greece lost all control over the areas they had staked out for themselves. In Albania, also, Italian ambitions were denied. An attempt to obtain territory there came to an end when Albanian guerilla bands drove a small Italian force into the port of Valona in the summer of 1920. A treaty which followed recognized Albanian independence, and Italy withdrew her troops. Yugoslavia then vied with Italy in obtaining influence in Albania so that, by playing one neighbor off against the other, the Albanian government was able to maintain its independence. Italy blamed her "faithless allies," and a feeling of defeat was added to other causes of unrest.

THE FIUME INCIDENT

At the end of the war, a hundred and sixty thousand army officers were demobilized. Most of them were young men from the middle classes, and they found it very difficult to get into any sort of remunerative occupation.

They had grown accustomed to having a fair amount of money to spend, they had acquired a taste for command and for a life of adventure. On their return home, they could not adapt themselves to the uneventful and obscure labor of a postman, a shop assistant, or a clerk. Being hungry and discontented they imagined themselves revolutionaries, and hung about the towns, eaten up with idleness, dissatisfied with themselves, their neighbors, and the world in general. Restless chimerical spirits, thirsty for adventure, they were capable alike of heroic acts and frightful crimes, stirring up revolt as long as they lacked means of livelihood, but once having secured that, ready to turn into violent reactionaries.⁷

Ex-officers and men from the ranks of the army made up a large part of the "storm troopers" who followed Gabriele D'Annunzio

⁷ G. Salvemini, *Fascist Dictatorship in Italy* (Henry Holt and Company), p. 6

in 1919 on his mad adventure, the conquest of Fiume. For fifteen months they dominated that Adriatic port in defiance of the European powers and of the Italian and Yugoslav governments. There they wore the black shirts, developed and used the ritual, and tried out the violent methods that were later to be carried over into Fascism. When the Italian-Yugoslav treaty of 1920 settled the Fiume question⁸ an Italian force ended the D'Annunzio regime, and his followers returned to Italy to play their parts in a movement already started there.⁹

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE FASCIST MOVEMENT

In March, 1919, Mussolini called a meeting in Milan in protest against the communistic violence of the period. At this meeting were founded the *Fasci di Combattimento* (Fighting Groups). Similar groups of a nationalistic or conservative nature were springing up all over Italy. Founded largely by ex-soldiers, they acted as "vigilante" societies and as training schools in violence and intimidation. Gradually the various groups combined under Mussolini's leadership, and he became the guiding spirit back of their struggle for power. Since so many discordant elements went into the Fascist movement in the early days, it could have no consistent program and no philosophical background. Mussolini himself and many of his followers were ex-socialists, and their first programs included such socialistic ideas as the dissolution of limited-liability companies and banks, the management of industry by syndicates of technicians and workers, and the granting of lands to the peasants. But, repudiated by the Socialist party, Mussolini gained his greatest opportunity for power from the frightened middle class, which was willing to support any leader who would take strong measures to end the threat to bourgeois security. From the middle classes came money and recruits, and the local urban authorities gave the Fascisti immunity and tacit assistance. The army was at first acquiescent, and then approved the revolutionary and extralegal measures of their ex-comrades. The national government, unable to work out a solution of its own, was forced to tolerate the increasing violence and arrogance of the black-shirted usurpers.

⁸ See above, page 841.

⁹ The best account in English of the Fiume episode is in G. A. Borgese's *Goliath, the March of Fascism*.

The movement grew rapidly. In the spring of 1920 it numbered about thirty thousand; by the time of the March on Rome in the fall of 1922, the total number was ten times as large. Utterly unscrupulous, violent, and ruthless, the Fascists and their leader rode to power by the use of intimidation, arson, beatings, torture, and murder. Workmen, peasants, socialist and labor organizations, and opposition leaders everywhere were attacked. Aided by the police and the army and supplied with money by the industrialists, the Fascist bands (*squadristi*) encountered no organized resistance. The government tried to use them against the socialists and provided them with guns, ammunition, and immunity from interference. It was not long before the Fascists realized the possibility of a *coup d'état* which might bring them national power. In the elections of 1921, they won thirty-five seats in Parliament and joined with the Nationalists in opposing the socialist and clerical groups in a hopelessly factional Chamber of Deputies. Under Mussolini's direction the Fascist movement became a political party, a party backed by uniformed armed squads well versed in every method of terroristic violence from castor oil to murder. The government woke to the danger too late to take effective action. Only resolute local authorities, backed by ruthless and loyal police and military forces, could have blocked a movement which had gained so much momentum. But the populace was intimidated, the authorities still inclined to fear the "Reds" more than the "Black-shirts," and the army and police were honeycombed with Fascism.

THE MARCH ON ROME AND FASCISM IN POWER

In October, 1922, the Fascists were conscious of their strength throughout Italy, aware of the fact that they could rely on the army, and equally aware that they would as yet be a hopeless minority in any free election. They were impatient for power, and so the famous March on Rome was ordered. The threat of revolution might be as effective with the national government as the use of violent tactics had been on the smaller stage of local affairs. In the last days of October, the Fascists moved southward from their stronghold in the north, took over local governments and railway and telegraph lines, and marched into Rome. Anxious to avoid violence and distrustful of the army, the government vacillated, and the king refused to sign a

proclamation of a state of siege. In the end the cabinet resigned, and the king called on Mussolini to form a new ministry.¹⁰

When Mussolini became prime minister, parliamentary government, as Europe had been accustomed to define it, came to an end in Italy, although Parliament continued to meet, and the reality of dictatorship was cloaked in the garb of the old political system. In 1922, there were only fifty Fascists and Nationalists in a Chamber of more than five hundred members. Mussolini was no ordinary prime minister, responsible to a majority of the legislature and dependent upon public opinion and the ballot box for his power. He demanded and received from a frightened Parliament dictatorial powers for one year. At first there were non-Fascists in the cabinet. As Mussolini extended his power they were dropped one by one. Gradually all the administrative offices throughout the centralized system of the Italian government were filled with Fascists. In the next election, by the use of Fascist methods and with the aid of a new electoral law, a Fascist majority was returned to Parliament. The policy of intimidation and *squadristi* violence was continued until all popular resistance was broken.

New laws were passed which did away with local self-government. Officials appointed by the central government were given office in place of those who had been elected by the people. Mussolini himself assumed more and more power. The title of premier was changed, in 1926, to that of "His Excellency the Chevalier President Benito Mussolini, Head of the Government, Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for War, for the Navy, and for Aviation." To the Italian people he became, more simply but also more forcefully and dramatically, *il Duce*. He was freed from all dependence upon Parliament and acknowledged responsibility only to the king, whose power became more of a symbol than a reality. The monarchy was retained in order that the dictatorship, now indefinitely extended, might absorb the loyalty with which the people still regarded the crown.

METHODS OF CONTROL

The mass of the Italian people was uninterested in politics and indifferent to the changes in government. There was opposition, how-

¹⁰ Mussolini had remained in Milan during the days of the Fascist advance, and his share of the famous March was undertaken in a sleeping car after the victory had been won.

ever, from many sources, and wherever it appeared it was ruthlessly suppressed. The press was brought under strict censorship by a series of laws that were vigorously interpreted by courts which were subservient to, and entirely dependent upon, the executive branch of the government. Fascist journalists were given many privileges, and wide use was made of the servile press for propaganda. The Fascist party maintained a propaganda bureau, and in 1934 a government department for "Press and Propaganda" was set up. The radio and the film industries were brought under similar control. When the penal code was revised after 1923 to fit the needs of the dictatorship, all of the old civil liberties disappeared. A drastic sedition law made the slightest remark derogatory to the Fascist regime sufficient cause for severe punishment. A whisper, a joke, or an expression of doubt might bring years of imprisonment. Telephones were tapped, correspondence was opened, and spies were planted everywhere. A secret police system was established, and a special court was set up to handle all cases in which the position of the state or any of the officials of the state were involved. Public meetings were strictly regulated, and all associations and institutions were brought under state control. In 1930, university officials and the principals of public schools were required by law to be chosen from the Fascisti, and professors who were not supporters of Mussolini were dismissed.

The violence of the early days of Fascism reached its climax in the abduction and murder, in 1924, of Giacomo Matteotti, a socialist member of the Chamber of Deputies and an opponent to the new regime. The widespread popular disapproval of this act shook Fascist power and made Mussolini determined to put an end to the black-shirted *squadristi*. The police were ordered to suppress all illegal violence, a Fascist militia under the control of the state replaced the old Fascist bands, and the rapid improvement of the army made possible the establishment of regular military authority. The Matteotti murder ended all parliamentary opposition, for the anti-Fascist deputies withdrew in protest, leaving the political arena entirely in the possession of the Fascist party. By 1926, therefore, all open opposition had been eliminated, although some undoubtedly continued to exist underground. The new restrictive laws and the new police and court agencies might be expected to prevent any renewal of attacks on the government. The basis of the whole system was fear. No citizen was free from it, and its constant presence was an assurance of passive acquiescence if not of approval and enthusiasm. With opposition sup-

pressed, the Duce could proceed to the creation of a positive program for a movement and a party which had hitherto been opportunistic, diversified, and incoherent.

THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF FASCISM

Italy became, under the guiding hand of Mussolini, a different state from that which had been designed by the founders in the days of unification. The name "totalitarian" has been coined to fit the characteristics of Mussolini's Italy, and the government devised by his genius has come to be the model for other and more recent dictatorships. The experience of Italy has been a textbook studied carefully by those who wished to assume complete power. It can serve, also, as a guide and a warning for those who wish to preserve liberal and democratic institutions. The first chapter of the text dealt with the problem of the use of violence to eliminate all opposition and the inculcation of fear in order to provide continuance of submission. The structure of the government was a further problem. The dictator was made the center of the system, supreme, independent, and above criticism. In the words of the council appointed in 1925 to examine all constitutional problems, "of the powers among which the acts and the explicit sovereignty of the state were distributed, the chief importance must now as always be attributed to the Executive." The chief executive, or "Head of the Government," was made responsible only to the king, whose power was purely nominal. The ministers were completely under the authority of the Duce, who himself said, ". . . they go where their chief tells them, and they stay if I tell them to stay."

In 1928 a new electoral law reduced parliamentary elections to a mere plebiscite on lists of names chosen by the Grand Council of Fascism from longer lists provided for it by various Confederations and Associations all of which were dominated by the dictator.¹¹ There has been, therefore, no freedom of choice in the matter of candidates. The Chamber of Deputies has been composed of members of the Fascist party selected by Fascist agencies. To make assurance yet more sure, universal suffrage was done away with, and the vote was granted as a reward for certain services to the state such as the payment of direct taxes, the payment of contributions to a worker's or employer's

¹¹ See below, pages 836-37.

association, or in recognition of special status to members of the clergy and to salaried employees. Thus elected, the Italian Parliament was brought further under the control of the dictator and the party by minute regulations of its activities and by the removal of all power of initiative. The government—that is, the dictator—took over the right to promulgate “decree laws” which were later to be confirmed by the Chamber. Under the Italian system, therefore, Parliament functioned chiefly through committees which took care of a great deal of work of a detailed nature but of secondary importance. It has met less than two months out of each year, and membership in it has been valued largely for prestige and because it came as a reward of the party for faithful service.

Parliament was valuable to the dictator partly because it furnished a sounding board for his policies and from it he could get such slight measure of public opinion as could be expressed under the censorship which pervaded the whole system, and partly because of what seemed to be the dictator's profound need for popular approval. Everyone who was privileged to do so was urged to vote and implored by every agency of propaganda to signify his approval of the Duce. Election day “must be . . . a day of holiday and joy. Respond to the appeal of the Duce by going to deposit your ‘Yes’ of gratitude and consent.” Since elections were carefully supervised and the secrecy of the ballot was extremely doubtful, it was no wonder that there were very few “ungrateful” voters. There was also some satisfaction to the Duce, probably, in the existence of a parliamentary body which represented the whole nation, to which his policies could be explained, and which, in theory, must share with him the responsibility for them. The recent decision to abolish the Chamber of Deputies may represent a change of opinion on the part of the dictator.

Local government also derived all of its force from the central power. The prefects and administrative officials were appointed by, and reported to, the Head of the Government. Local councils were concerned chiefly with carrying out the plans made by the central government for public works in each part of Italy.

THE FASCIST PARTY

In discussing the dictatorship the titles “Head of the Government” and “Duce” have been used interchangeably. The connection between the chief executive of the state and the leader of the Fascist party is

made through the Grand Council of Fascism, which was made a part of the organization of the Italian government in 1928. It is defined as "the supreme organ which co-ordinates and integrates all the activities of the regime which issued from the Revolution of October, 1922."¹² It is presided over, and its activities are dominated by, the dictator of the government. The secretary of the party acts as its secretary, and its members include the cabinet ministers, the presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, the heads of the defense organizations, and the presidents of the National Fascist Confederations and Trade Unions. The dictator may make any other appointments to the Council that he may choose, and thus no vote it might take could be adverse to his wishes. The Council must be consulted on all matters of constitutional importance. It has the power to name the prime minister, and, in theory, would be the body to choose the successor of the present dictator. From the governmental side, the totalitarian state, as it is seen in Italy, means a state in which there is but one party, the head of the party is prime minister of the state, master of Parliament, president of the Grand Council of Fascism, and direct controller of all local government.

Power, so concentrated, entails tremendous responsibility. Mussolini holds the government in secure possession as long as he dominates the party, and such domination depends upon the production of results. The regime must collapse unless there is competence in government and unless the economic welfare of the nation is such that some measure of satisfaction is secured for the members of the party and the people as a whole. The term "totalitarian state" includes, therefore, the idea of absolute control over the economic life of the nation. After the March on Rome, Mussolini, a socialist no longer, seemed to repudiate the idea of government interference in business. He had ridden to power on the crest of a wave of bourgeois revolt against socialism. Organized labor had been the victim of Fascist violence, and the party's greatest claim to public support came from its alleged saving of the nation from Bolshevism. The industrialists and landowners quite naturally expected to dominate the economic life of the nation, secure in the support of the Fascist government which they had helped to power.

¹² Quoted in H. Finer, *Mussolini's Italy* (Henry Holt and Company), p. 277.

THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS:
THE "CORPORATIVE" STATE

A careful study of the economic situation led to the gradual development of a policy and to the establishment of a control over both labor and capital so that both have become servants of the totalitarian state. The survey of Italian economic conditions showed that Italy was a poor state, unable to grow enough wheat to feed her population, without adequate coal and iron for her industries, and without colonies rich in essential raw materials. Exports did not pay for imports, and the balance was made up from remittances sent back by emigrants to their families, from money spent by tourists, and from the wages of many Italians who each season helped to harvest the products of other countries. Mussolini was determined to make Italy self-supporting as a part of his larger program of making her a great power. Electrical power must be developed, more grain must be planted, the total of arable soil must be increased, and agriculture, industry, and labor must combine to work efficiently for the increase of the national wealth. Out of such necessities an economic program was evolved. The old trade unions were abolished. Instead, in each local industry one syndicate was formed for employers and one for employees. Recognition was given only to pro-Fascist bodies and to any Fascist syndicate which represented 10 per cent of the workers. Acceptability to the party was a prerequisite for syndicate leaders. The syndicates were given power to exact contributions and to settle matters of hours, pay, and discipline for all workers, whether or not they were members of the syndicate. The workers were denied all right to strike, all disputes which could not be settled by arbitration were to be referred to a Labor Court of Appeals, whose judges were appointed by Mussolini.

The local syndicates sent representatives to district federations, and these, in turn, elected delegates to national confederations. Provisions were made for thirteen great confederations: one for the laborers and one for the employers in each of the six great divisions of production (industry, commerce, agriculture, banking, domestic transportation, sea and air transport), and a thirteenth for the professions. These great confederations were to be represented in a National Council of Corporations to which was entrusted the economic planning of the state. The National Council was to be presided over by a cabinet

minister responsible to the dictator himself. Thus the corporative state came into being,¹³ and the Duce assumed full control of another phase of Italian life. To these great confederations, dominated by the party, was given power to draw up the lists from which the Grand Council of Fascism selected the names of those for whom the people might vote in parliamentary elections.

Under the corporative state neither labor nor capital has an independent existence. Labor has lost all opportunity for direct action. All collective agreements are subject to government intervention. In theory, the system might work for the protection of labor; in practice, labor is completely subject to state authority. Capital is equally under the control of the state. Each activity of business is under some Fascist administrative agency, called a corporation. Employers are instructed as to the number of employees they may hire, the volume of business, the quality and quantity of their production, and the profits they may make. Banking and credits are entirely under the control of the government.¹⁴ The state, itself, has gone into business, especially in industries such as shipping, munitions, mining, and oil, but capitalistic enterprise in other fields is not interfered with as long as the state chooses to leave certain types of business in private hands. In 1936, as a result of the Ethiopian crisis, the future nationalization of the key industries was proclaimed. Mussolini announced that agriculture and domestic commerce would not be subject to extensive change, that foreign commerce and banking were, on the other hand, direct functions of the state, and that all "industry that works directly or indirectly for the defense of the nation will be reorganized in big units under the direct control of the state."¹⁵

With the extension of governmental control over industry the structure of the Fascist system was complete. The skeleton of totalitarianism might appear intricate were it not for the fact that every

¹³ Provided for in the Labor Charter of 1927, put into partial effect in the following years. Even today the corporative state exists largely on paper.

¹⁴ Fascist power to control finance and to dominate the economic situation was shown in 1926 when the lira started to accompany the franc in a downward slide. The industrialists urged stabilization of the lira at a figure which would not endanger international trade. The government undertook revaluation at a much higher rate, and the country was plunged into a severe depression. Business was regimented, and governmental control was greatly extended during this depression. In 1929, when the world depression began, Italy was in a position of some advantage due to this early discipline. Fascist power was greatly increased.

¹⁵ Quoted in Max Ascoli and Arthur Feiler, *Fascism for Whom?* (W. W. Norton & Company), p. 96.

part of it is closely connected with the head of the whole system. The state, the party, and the economic system are all centralized and all controlled by one authority—the power of the Duce. This framework is, however, no lifeless skeleton. It is given life by the faith in Fascism and by fervent belief in the godlike qualities of the Duce. It is clothed in a gorgeous robe fashioned from every possible variety of propaganda, and no effort is spared in making the whole system attractive and vital to the people.

THE ITALIAN YOUTH

From the beginning of Fascism, Mussolini realized that it would be necessary to build up a body of well-trained and disciplined youth upon whose shoulders the mantle of party control might fall. A succession of organizations for children and young people was created, similar to those of Russia in many ways, but entirely different in that the sexes are separated and the training for boys is quite different from that provided for girls. A boy becomes a "Son of the Wolf" at six, a member of the *Balilla* at eight, and of the *Avanguardisti* at twelve, a Young Fascist at eighteen, and a Fascist at twenty-one.¹⁶ For girls there are two organizations: the *Piccole Italiane* and the *Giovane Italiane*, the first for young girls, the second for those over twelve. Children normally desire membership in these groups, for all of the sports and play life fostered by the state are centered in them.¹⁷ Fascist schoolteachers urge the young people to join the organizations, for the government wants numbers. It has been harder to recruit young people between the ages of fourteen and eighteen¹⁸ both because they seem to prefer activities of their own and because lower class boys of that age are busy earning their livelihood.

Military training is provided for boys, and martial virtues are extolled, "Believe, obey, fight!—Mussolini!" is the constantly repeated slogan. Subservience to the state and adoration of the Duce, whose portrait is constantly displayed, are inculcated as children are taught to say "Mussolini is always right." Manuals, or textbooks, have been prepared for each organization, and they are carefully studied as

¹⁶ Since 1933 no one may enter the Fascist party except through this system.

¹⁷ In 1931 there were 1,400,000 in the *Balilla* and about one and a half million in the *Avanguardisti*. The groups for girls were, at that time, slightly larger.

¹⁸ In 1935 there were about 600,000 Young Fascists, a number which constituted about 50 per cent of the young men of the correct age in Italy. H. Finer, *Mussolini's Italy*, p. 451.

progress is made from one group to another. The climax of the whole system of indoctrination is reached in the Fascist Oath by which the Young Fascist surrenders himself to the Duce and the party. Through all of these organizations social services are carried on. The groups for younger children are closely connected with the schools. Scholarships and prizes, food, clothing, and books are frequently given to needy members of the youth organizations. Excursions, vacation camps, special vocational schools, and other privileges are reserved for them. In many ways, the state has encroached upon the family in its effort to control every phase of the life of the young. Even in maturity, the citizen finds the state directing his private life through the *Dopolavoro*, or leisure-time recreational activities. Social life in a totalitarian state is as fully under the control of the state as are the political and economic phases of life, and an existence in any way apart from state control is unthinkable to a good Fascist.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND FASCISM

The totalitarian state finds it difficult to tolerate any independence on the part of organized religion. In Italy, Fascists are also Catholics, and Rome is the seat of the international Catholic Church. It was necessary to make some sort of compromise between the authoritarian principles of church and party. Whatever Mussolini's personal beliefs had been prior to 1922, he was quick to realize the value of what he called the "spiritual assistance" of the church. The anticlericalism of the liberal regime was done away with, the crucifix was put back into the schools, and religious instruction was arranged for. Mussolini, however, had no intention of permitting the church any position except that of subordination to the state. The "aloofness" of the church since 1870 and the separateness of the Vatican from all contact with the Italian government were anathema to the dictator, and it became his ambition to settle the old dispute between church and state as a preliminary to the reduction of the church to a place within the Fascist system.

In February, 1929, a treaty, a financial settlement, and a concordat were signed. The first recognized Catholicism as the religion of Italy, and admitted the sovereignty of the pope over Vatican City and over its population of about four hundred persons. The pope, in turn, recognized the Kingdom of Italy with Rome as its capital. The Concordat pledged the Italian government to secure to the church freedom of

the public exercise of its "spiritual power and rites" and its jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters. The church conceded that the approval of the state was necessary on the appointment of high officials of the church. Religious instruction in the schools was agreed upon, and the state recognized the lay organizations of the Catholic Action. A financial settlement of the old issue of the papal estates taken by Italy in 1859-1860 was arranged, entailing the payment to the church of a large sum both in cash and in government bonds. Italy and, indeed, the entire Catholic world were pleased with the settlement of the old and annoying difficulty.

The church was soon to find, however, that the bargain was less advantageous than it had seemed and that the dictatorship pressed in on the church from many angles. The Catholic Boy Scouts were absorbed into the *Balilla*; the military activities of the young people, often arranged for Sundays, kept them away from church services; and the oath taken by the children of fourteen to obey the orders of the Duce without discussion, and to serve the Fascist cause "with all my force" was in opposition to every claim of the church for the allegiance of its members. Mussolini forbade the continuance of the Catholic young people's organizations and denied the right of the church to participate in education.¹⁹ The press campaign of the Fascist party against the church grew violent, and the government proceeded against the Catholic Action organization on the basis that it was an opposition party. The pope fought back by advising Catholics to take the Fascist oath with mental reservations. Many Catholics resigned from the party; others were expelled. The deadlock continued through the summer of 1931, but both opponents knew that compromise was necessary. Mussolini conceded that the Catholic Action might reopen on condition that its young people's clubs confine their attention to religious instruction and did not compete with the Fascist organizations in recreational activities. The solution was a triumph for the government, for the attractiveness of the Catholic groups was greatly diminished thereby, but the struggle with the church did not come to an end, nor is it likely to end, for the principles of the totalitarian state are fundamentally opposed to those of the Catholic Church. A new element was introduced in 1938 by the Italian government's adoption of the German policies of racialism and anti-Semitism. Catholic

¹⁹ The Catholic Action organizations had long conducted activities similar to those provided by the *Balilla*.

disapproval of these policies was prompt and outspoken, and the pope asserted that the Duce had flagrantly violated the Concordat.

FASCIST FOREIGN POLICY

The foreign policy of Fascist Italy has been and is of great importance to the outside world. Mussolini at first emphasized the national aspects of Fascism, maintaining that "it could not be exported." The international aspects of Fascism and its emergence in other countries, under other names but with an obvious Italian stamp, were not a part of Fascist policy in the early years of the Italian experiment. Mussolini, however, was determined from the start to play an independent, active, and aggressive role in international affairs. He acquired the Dodecanese Islands by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). He insisted on a heavy indemnity from Greece for the murder of four Italians on the Island of Corfu, and shelled the island when the money was not immediately forthcoming. The treaty with Yugoslavia (1920) making Fiume a free city had been regarded as a blow to Italian pride. In 1924, Mussolini pressed Yugoslavia into a treaty which divided the territory and the port facilities but gave the city of Fiume to Italy. Italy endeavored to extend her influence eastward by treaties of friendship with the Balkan states, Turkey, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, and by a policy of economic penetration. Albania became, for all practical purposes, an Italian protectorate, and Italian influence was predominant in Austria. Mussolini's most cherished project was the increase of Italian influence in the Mediterranean, the *Mare Nostrum* of the days of earlier Caesars. Italian influence was advanced in Tangier, and Mussolini demanded naval parity with France, refusing to sign the London Naval Treaty of 1930 when that parity was denied.

In the meantime, the army was increased and reorganized. In 1936, Mussolini claimed that he could put eight million men into the field. A formidable air force was developed, and the mechanization and motorization of all branches of the army were advanced. The navy was Mussolini's great pride, and, within ten years, he built cruisers, submarines, small craft, and warships that were to frighten the British in 1935. Coastal defenses were strengthened, naval and air bases were established, and the world suddenly awoke to the fact that from the standpoint of land, air, and naval forces Italy was a great power and a challenge to those states that had heretofore been accustomed to con-

sider themselves her superiors. Italian industries were keyed to war needs, and supplies of raw materials had been acquired. For thirteen years Fascism had prepared for war. The only justification for that long preparation would be the success of a war in which the weapons so carefully made ready might be used. In 1935, Italy began the conquest of Ethiopia, and for the rest of the world there began a nerve-racking progress from crisis to crisis which brought the horrors of a general European war closer as each month drew to its close.

GERMANY IN 1918-1919

The international situation since 1935 cannot be understood without some knowledge of the development of Nazi²⁰ Germany and of the power and pretensions of the German leader (*Der Fuhrer*), Adolf Hitler. Fascism, coming into power in Italy in 1922, was victorious in Germany a little more than a decade later. The causes for the German movement, like those of Italian Fascism, must be sought in postwar conditions. And yet the economic strain and the political difficulties of the postwar years alone do not furnish an adequate explanation for Fascism. The Italian author Borgese, in his *Goliath, the March of Fascism*, states that the fundamental reasons for Italy's acceptance of Fascism were psychological. If that was true in Italy, it was even more true in Germany. Economic difficulties and political dissension played their part in creating the background against which Fascism developed. Emotional and psychological factors made possible the success of a positive, dramatic movement when its aspirations were personified in the figure of a leader who drew to himself the loyalties of the dissatisfied masses.

The roots of Nazi Germany and of the power of Hitler lie far back in German history. Nationalism, militarism, and imperialism are not new factors; the willingness of the German people to submit to authority or to accept another leader is not new. The rapidity with which Germany had grown, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, from a group of small states loosely bound together in a weak confederation to a powerful empire aspiring to a paramount place in European affairs roused the feeling of nationalism to a fever pitch. Pan-Germans envisaged the spread of the authority of the Reich over all German peoples. The expansion of commerce and colonies seemed

²⁰ A contraction of the German name of the party Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei, sometimes called, also, N.S.D.A.P.

to assure Germany of that "place in the sun" that was her due. The best army in the world and a navy second to none were shining weapons with which to acquire that "place" if it should be denied or challenged by any other power. The monarchy, the aristocracy, and the army had led the way in this rapid development. The industrialists, the bourgeoisie, and the peasantry, and even the intelligentsia identified themselves with the principles of intense nationalism, militarism, and imperialism upon which the regime depended.

Democracy never made much headway in Imperial Germany. The constitution was the creation of Bismarck, and the power of the emperor and the chancellor had been designed to fit his own stature and that of the emperor he served. Under the constant pressure of the growing political aspirations of the German people, as expressed by the parties of the Reichstag, even the doughty Bismarck had found it necessary to consider public opinion. In the controversy with the Catholic Church, in the questions of tariffs and colonies, and in the issue of socialism, he had struggled with varied political groups. The lesser men who followed him had found it difficult to dominate the political arena of Germany as Bismarck had done, but they and the flamboyant emperor, who had dismissed Bismarck, had refused to alter the constitution of Prussia or of the empire. The crown, the army, and the bureaucracy governed prewar Germany, and from the lowest postman, policeman, or sergeant upwards through the whole hierarchy they "felt themselves to be not servants of the public, but its masters, invested with an unapproachable authority as representatives of the state. The state . . . ruled. The people were restricted to a silent, or a grumbling, but always a yielding, passivity."²¹

The results of this situation were such that the defeat of the army, the abdication of the emperor, and the collapse of the bureaucratic regime were crushing blows to the German people. Accustomed to expect everything from the state and to accept dictation from the top downward, they had not developed the ability of self-organization and self-government. Since they had never been able to take over

²¹ Max Ascoli and Arthur Feiler, *Fascism for Whom?* (W. W. Norton & Company), p. 138. All of the accounts of Nazi Germany go back to the prewar attitude toward the state. Among the best of the books on Germany in the postwar period are *The Third Reich* by Henri Lichtenberger; and *A History of National Socialism*, by Konrad Heiden. E. B. Ashton, *The Fascist: His State and His Mind*, is excellent. *Germany Puts the Clock Back* by Edgar Ansel Mowrer is a very readable brief account by an unusually well-informed journalist. *The Nazi Dictatorship* by Frederick L. Schuman is an anti-Nazi treatment of the organization, philosophy, and strategy of the regime. *Germany since 1918*, by the same author, is brief and readable.

responsibility, formulate policies, and direct activities, political parties had remained disputatious factions, willing and able to criticize any measure but unable to create a serious and comprehensive program. The interest of the people had been diverted from politics on a national scale to economic organizations and theories. Class-conscious and divided, Junkers, army men, bureaucrats, and peasants found, after the war, very little in politics on which they could unite. The bitterness and the disillusionment of defeat were common to all groups, but they were destructive forces out of which it would be difficult to create a new Germany.

THE GERMAN REVOLUTION

The revolution of November, 1918, was more a collapse of existing institutions than a successful use of force on the part of revolutionary forces that had widespread public opinion behind them. For a short time conditions were chaotic. There was a considerable amount of violence in the German cities; the people were still hungry; and there was much unemployment and suffering. Workers' and Soldiers' Councils sprang up that bore a certain resemblance to the Russian soviets of the year before. These took over the local government in many cases, and there was a widespread fear of Bolshevism. Actually, those who were concerned in this revolutionary movement were a very small minority of the German people—a minority within a minority, for they represented only a very small part of those who had been considered radicals or Leftists before 1918. During the war the German Socialist party had split, largely on the war issue. The Independent Socialists, the minority group, opposed the war and carried on anti-government propaganda. Yet more revolutionary was a group of extremists, the so-called Spartacus group led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, that was Communist in its affiliations and principles. These radicals organized the workers into "shock troops" for which they managed to acquire arms. Mutinous sailors and soldiers who were on leave joined with these Socialist-Communist groups in an effort to prevent any attempt to renew the war or to restore control to the old governing classes.

Violent though it was, this November revolution was of short duration. It had few really able leaders, no widespread organization, and no real hold over the people. The Majority Socialists refused to take part in the revolt, and prevented any great number of the indus-

trial workers from doing so. Instead they threw their influence to the bourgeois parties and acquiesced in the use of the army against the revolutionaries.²² The industrialists, the army, and the Junkers were willing to co-operate with the Socialists to create a reformist republic in order to stave off the threat of a Soviet Germany. There were important consequences, however, of the brief revolt. The fear of communism was implanted deeply in the hearts of bourgeoisie and upper classes and would be played upon again and again later to win support for antiliberal measures. Coupled with the fear of communism was an intense hatred of Russia which was to influence German foreign policy in the years to come.

THE CONSTITUENT CONVENTION, 1919

In the meantime, plans had been made for the establishment of a new national government. The various councils that had assumed power all over Germany in November selected representatives for a national "congress of councils" which met in Berlin. The members of this congress were moderates who refused to support the Communist leaders. Their conservatism and their decision to summon a National Constituent Assembly, elections for which were to be held January 19, were the immediate causes for the revolt in Berlin early in January. The Majority Socialists were left in full control of the provisional government and were joined by the bourgeoisie in the campaign for the coming elections. New party names appeared in recognition of the establishment of the republic. The old monarchical groups—the Junker landowners, the militarists, and the Pan-Germans—called themselves the German Nationalists. They were avowedly in favor of a restoration of the monarchy and outspoken in their anti-socialistic opinions. A large part of the old National Liberal party organized itself as the German People's party largely representative of big business. Its leader was Gustav Stresemann. The old Center party endeavored to broaden its base by calling itself the Christian People's party and advocating the extensive democratization of political institutions. Its leader was Matthias Erzberger, who, in the summer of 1919, was to lead those who urged the signing of the hated peace treaty. The old bourgeois Progressives united with the Left-Liberals

²² On January 5, 1919, there was an uprising in Berlin in which nearly 100,000 Spartacists and Independents were involved. It was ruthlessly put down after ten days of street fighting, and both of the Spartacist leaders were killed.

to form the German Democratic party. The Majority Socialists retained the old party name of Social Democrats and won a larger number of seats in the assembly than any other group.

The election of delegates to the Constituent Assembly was held on the basis of universal suffrage, and over thirty million men and women cast their ballots. The result was decisively in favor of the moderates, and the National Assembly which met at Weimar in February was considered by the outvoted radicals to be entirely counterrevolutionary. The Weimar Assembly was not only a constitution-making body, but it was also, like the assemblies of the French Revolution, entrusted with the government of the nation. Since the Social Democrats, although they had elected a larger number of delegates than any other party, did not have a majority, the executive committee, or cabinet, of the assembly was a coalition group made up of men from several parties. The assembly elected Friedrich Ebert, a Social Democrat who had been a saddler by trade, as the first President of the German Republic.

THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION

The Weimar Constitution was an elaborate document providing for the most modern democratic institutions and procedures. Suffrage was to be "universal, direct, and secret," and a system of proportional representation was provided to protect minority parties. The chancellor and the ministers were to be responsible to the Reichstag. The president, who was to be elected by the direct vote of the people for seven years, was to have very little real power, for every executive order required the countersignature of one of the ministers. The national legislature was to be bicameral, with the Reichstag representing the whole people and the Reichsrat representing the states. The domination of the Reichsrat by any of the larger states was prevented by a clause making it impossible for any one state to have more than two-fifths of all the votes. The Reichstag was given the responsibility of enacting laws; the Reichsrat had only the right of objection and could be overruled if the Reichstag repassed the law with a two-thirds majority. The principles of initiative and referendum were incorporated in the constitution. Although more centralized than the former empire, Germany remained a federal state. National laws were to be supreme and a Supreme Judicial Court was given the right to decide between state and national authorities in case of dispute.

The strength of the Socialist party in the Assembly was shown in the inclusion in the constitution of measures providing for the government ownership of railroads and national operation of waterways. Land might be expropriated if needed for public use, entails were to be dissolved, and the unearned increment on land values was to return to the state. The constitution provided for local economic councils and for a national workers' council to care for the social and economic interests of labor. The national workers' council and a group representing employers were to constitute a National Economic Council to which laws relating to social and economic policy were to be submitted before they were introduced into the Reichstag. This Council might also propose measures to be drafted into bills by the Reichstag. Although its powers were consultative and advisory, the Council was a recognition of the fact that economic representation was vital in an industrialized nation. This part of the constitution was considered by many Germans to be its most original contribution to political practice.

The Weimar Constitution was a magnificent piece of work from the point of view of liberal democratic theory of the generation before 1919. It contained almost every liberal institution evolved in the democratic countries in the prewar years: universal suffrage, proportional representation, ministerial responsibility, initiative, referendum and recall, functional advisory bodies, and elaborate provisions for education. As a document it left little to be desired, but when it was put into operation many difficulties appeared. It was too conservative to suit the left-wing socialists and received nothing except blows from the extremists. At the same time, it was far too radical for the parties of the Right and was constantly attacked by the Nationalists and all the advocates of states' rights.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE REPUBLIC

The republic which was to operate under the new constitution was faced with problems of sufficient difficulty to shake any government. The peace treaty was finally and reluctantly signed a month before the constitution was adopted, and the Weimar Republic was saddled with the opprobrium which that act entailed. Upon it rested the responsibility of putting the terms of the treaty into effect, of paying reparations, and of submitting to the occupation of the Rhineland for a long term of years. The humiliation of the war-guilt clause was

attached to the republic and not to the emperor and the army chiefs who had directed the war and demanded the armistice. The collapse of German finance, the inflation, the occupation of the Ruhr, and the ruin of the middle class²³ were all laid at the door of the republic, although the causes for these difficulties were outside the control of those who governed under the new constitution.

The government of the republic was weak politically. The Social Democratic party failed to assume leadership and to develop a positive program, although it had at first a larger number of representatives in the Reichstag than any other party. Lacking leadership and afraid of dissension in their own ranks, of the Communists, and of the Independent Socialists, the Social Democrats compromised with the bourgeoisie and pursued an entirely negative policy. "They did not know how to play the leading role which had devolved upon them."²⁴ The bourgeois parties showed little more ability or leadership than the Socialists. They were torn by dissension and hesitated lamentably in working out solutions for the economic difficulties that might have been considered their special province. The policy of passive resistance to the peace treaty and of letting Germany's economic ruin prevent the fulfillment of the reparations obligations gave full sweep to inflation and ended in the invasion of the Ruhr and the complete collapse of 1923. The only bourgeois leader of importance was Stresemann, who realized the need for a policy of conciliation in foreign affairs and for co-operation among the various parties at home. He was a realist and a man of great ability, but his foreign policy was one of disillusionment and the admission of defeat. At the same time the attempt to draw the irreconcilable Nationalists into relations of harmony with the Socialists could scarcely be successful without the promise of some positive advantage to be acquired by the combination.

The difficulties of the republic were increased by the constant distrust and suspicion of the Allied Powers, especially France. It was not until Locarno (1925)²⁵ that Germany was treated as a great power and an equal, and her admission to the League of Nations in the next year was a further sign of general appeasement. From the point of view of the German people, the withdrawal of the Allied troops from the Rhineland was the greatest achievement of the Stresemann regime.

²³ See above, page 785.

²⁴ Henri Lichtenberger, *The Third Reich*, p. 12. The first section of this book contains an excellent account of the republic and of the rise of National Socialism.

²⁵ See above, page 792.

The Dawes plan, the foreign assistance to the German treasury, and even the welcome loans were regarded as a part of the humiliation attendant upon the policy of carrying out the terms of the nefarious treaty. The republic gained no friends at home from the amelioration of foreign relations.

The inflation of the early postwar years was a disaster to the lower middle class. The small businessmen were ruined, those who lived on incomes from investments lost all that they had, and the professional classes and "white collar" workers were reduced to poverty. These "new poor" were resentful, dissatisfied with their proletarian status, and inclined to blame the republic for all their woes. The inflation played into the hands of the great industrialists, for they found it possible to reduce their bonded indebtedness and to reduce the power of labor. Municipal, state, and national governments, also, were able to wipe out much of their debt, thus making still worse the lot of those of the bourgeoisie who had invested in public securities. The brief period of economic revival from 1923 to 1930 came too late and was too short to bring any satisfaction to the middle class. The world depression which followed brought a deflation, especially in agricultural prices, that caused great suffering. The numbers of unemployed, always large under the republic, increased rapidly. The young men were especially violent in their demands for change. They had come of age since the war, found no opportunity opened for them in the economic world, and saw little hope for the future. They resented the degradation of their country and disliked and distrusted a regime that could promise nothing better than the altogether unsatisfactory present.

This general disillusionment and disintegration were not left to bring about the collapse of the republic by their own corrosive action. There were attacks both from the Right and from the Left. In 1920, the reactionaries endeavored to overthrow the republic in what is known as the Kapp-Lüttwitz²⁶ *Putsch*. With several brigades of the old army that had refused to disband in accordance with the treaty terms, the conspirators captured Berlin and attempted to set up a new government. The *Putsch* failed, for the bulk of the armed forces refused to join the revolt, and the working people supported the republic by a general strike that paralyzed Berlin. This episode was followed by a series of revolts on the part of the Communists. Miniature "Red armies" sprang up in various parts of Germany, and the Reichswehr

²⁶ Kapp was a former East Prussian official, and Lüttwitz was commander in chief of Berlin.

troops were sent out to suppress the rebellion. Terrorist trials and court martials made the suppression effective but served to alienate the radicals still further. In several states there was great dissatisfaction with the reduction of state authority, and in the west, in 1923, there was a separatist movement for the creation of a "Rhineland Republic." Largely of French manufacture, the movement collapsed with the withdrawal of the French from the Ruhr, but it was indicative of the general unrest. A series of political murders, or assassinations, increased the difficulties of the government. Matthias Erzberger, the great Centrist leader, was killed in August, 1921, and Walther Rathenau, a Democrat and the minister of foreign affairs, was murdered during the next summer.

The German Nationalists were unalterably opposed to the Weimar Constitution. They resented the defeat and were bitter over the humiliation of the peace treaty. Representing the old governing classes and the old army, they refused to admit that the disasters of 1918 were due to their own policies and errors. They sought culprits on whom to fasten the blame and found them in the Socialists, who had delivered the final blow to the old regime with the "knife in the back" of revolution. It was easy to find other culprits in the Jews who might be either Communists or men of great wealth but, even if just average citizens, were suspected of internationalism and the betrayal of the German people. German nationalism had always had a racialistic tendency. It now became frankly and rabidly racial. The Nationalists cultivated a warlike spirit and secretly prepared for the day when there might be a new call to arms. Some of them adopted the swastika as an emblem and organized the "Steel Helmets" for whom arms were acquired.

With problems of such difficulty and with opponents of such varied ideas, it was not strange that the Weimar Republic found it increasingly difficult to function when the world depression brought a new economic collapse to Germany. "It became habitual to say that democracy in Germany had failed. More correct would be the statement that 'German democracy' failed. . . . For democracy in Germany never had a fair chance. An undemocratic people was confronted with a democratic machinery of the most complicated and, if you will, perfected sort—and was not successful with it. . . . In fact, it is questionable if anything short of a community of saints could have made a real success of the German democratic system."²⁷

²⁷ E. A. Mowrer, *Germany Puts the Clock Back* (Penguin edition), p. 148.

HITLER AND THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY

At the same time that the difficulties of the government were becoming more and more apparent, a new movement was getting under way which was to attack the republic in the days of its weakness and to bring to power a leader under whose dictation the German state was to be transformed. The National Socialist party was so much the creation of one man, Adolf Hitler, that it is necessary to consider his career and his political ideas as they developed in the years before his rise to power. There is ample information as to his youth and the formulation of his guiding principles in his own book, *Mein Kampf*. Although the book is undoubtedly romanticized somewhat for party and propaganda purposes, the development of the fundamental principles of German Fascism is clearly portrayed. Hitler is an Austrian who did not become a German citizen until shortly before he became head of the German government, but he is, and has been for many years, passionately German. He hated the Austro-Hungarian monarchy because of its polyglot ethnic structure and even before 1914 believed that the disruption of the empire was inevitable and desirable. When the war came he enlisted in the German army, glad to serve in the magnificent army of the country of his adoption.

Hitler came from neither the working class nor the peasantry. His father, who had been a cobbler in his youth, was a petty customs officer during the childhood of the son, Adolf, who was born in 1889. The boy loved his mother but hated his father and refused to follow his example in choosing a lifework. His education was most elementary, and the early deficiencies have not been compensated for in later life. He wished to be an artist or an architect, but lack of ability and lack of funds prevented him from obtaining either recognition or adequate training. He worked as a day laborer, a house painter, and a draughtsman. During those years he developed an intense dislike for the socialists and a thorough disapproval of every idea based on Marxian theory. Anti-Semitism became one of his most pronounced characteristics, and he linked the Jews with Marxism and lived in horror of both. Racialism led him to be intensely interested in the growth of the population of Germany, in the German cultural mission, and the expansion of German territories. Even before 1914, Hitler believed that frontiers were not sacred and that Germany must expand eastward at the expense of the Slavic peoples whom he felt to be "racially" inferior to the "dominant" Nordics.

Hitler acquitted himself well in the war, rose from a private to a lance-corporal, and was awarded the Iron Cross. The organization of the army made a great appeal to him, and he heartily approved of the obedience of the soldiers to their superior officers, regarding the relationship as an ideal one for the citizen and the state. Parliamentary institutions and democratic theories were abhorrent to him, and the disturbed early years of the Weimar Republic merely confirmed him in the views he had already made his own. He quickly accepted the idea that the war had not been lost at the front but that the defeat had been due to a "knife in the back." Socialists and Jews were the culprits, and the republic was their creation. The republic, therefore, was condemned from the beginning, and no good could come of it. More nationalist than the Nationalists, less reconciled to the defeat of Germany than the most ardent monarchist, Hitler had at the same time a strong interest in the common people, an interest that had its roots in his own poverty.

In the early days after the war Hitler came into touch with a group of men, largely ex-soldiers, who were organizing a German Workers' party. It was not long before he was the guiding spirit of the party and was well known as a speaker, an agitator, and a "mob orator." He was partly responsible for the famous Twenty-five Points of 1920, which were later taken over by the National Socialist party.²⁸ The program contained in these points represented Hitler's anti-Semitism, antiparliamentarianism, anti-Marxism, and his positive views on nationalism, Pan-Germanism, and militarism. The lower middle-class complexion of the party was shown in a series of planks in the platform demanding state control of trusts, state care for the aged, state aid to the small traders, and agrarian reforms. The program ended in a demand for a strong central authority in the state.

Hitler provided not only a program and systematic propaganda for the infant party, but the swastika emblem and the Brown Shirts (S.A.) and the Black Shirts (S.S.).²⁹ Both of these groups of armed men were turned loose in Munich³⁰ and other Bavarian towns in the troubled years 1920 and 1921. There they used terroristic tactics similar to those of the Fascist bands active in northern Italy in the same years.

²⁸ See Konrad Heiden, *A History of National Socialism*, pp. 10 ff. This is one of the best accounts of the movement.

²⁹ The initials come from the words *Sturm-Abteilungen* (storm troops) and *Schutzstaffeln* (defense squads).

³⁰ Hitler had regarded Munich as his home since 1912.

A newspaper of its own was acquired by the party in 1920, and its propaganda became more noisy. In the same year the German Workers' party united, at Salzburg, with another small group known as the German National Socialist Party of Austria. The combined party name was the National Socialist German Workers' Party, usually shortened to the Nazi party. Publicity, constant public meetings, provocative speeches, extravagant promises, Jew-baiting, Red-baiting, rapid organization of branches all over Germany, deliberate and calculated violence upon the slightest evidence of opposition, were the measures used to recruit members for the party. In the general unrest of the period such methods won more men than they alienated.

When French troops entered the Ruhr and it appeared that the German republic was about to collapse of its own impotence to solve either the economic or the reparations problems, Hitler's troops became more openly military in organization. In November, 1923, acting in conjunction with Ludendorff and the extreme nationalists, Hitler led the National Socialists into an open revolt against the republic. This Munich *Putsch* was premature and was easily put down. Hitler was imprisoned and it seemed as though the defeat would mean the total collapse of his work. The leader himself, however, had not the slightest intention of surrendering his plans. He learned two valuable lessons from the failure: first not to take action until he was certain of victory, and second, not to use the method of armed rebellion but to win the confidence and votes of the people until he would be chosen as *Der Fuhrer* by the nation itself. The defeat of 1923 marks the end of the first period of Hitler's political career.

THE RISE TO POWER

The second period from 1924 to 1929 can be dismissed with a word. Both demagogue and statesman,⁸¹ Hitler made far-reaching

⁸¹ There probably is no more controversial question in recent years than the nature of the leadership of Hitler. There is an excellent analysis of Hitler's character in Heiden, *A History of National Socialism*, Chap. III. E. A. Mowrer, *Germany Puts the Clock Back*, Chap. XX, is entitled "A Showman of Genius." S. H. Roberts's *The House That Hitler Built* is good. The first seven chapters of John Gunther's *Inside Europe* deal with Hitler and his Nazi lieutenants. There is unlimited material on the leader and the movement. When one well-informed journalist (John Whitaker, in *And Fear Came*) states flatly, "In dealing with Nazi Germany, you are not dealing with a normal, civilized nation," and another (John Gunther) admits that "Adolf Hitler, irrational, contradictory, complex, is an unpredictable character," while Konrad Heiden believes that

plans, developed party organization, and won new followers by his fervid oratory. The world depression beginning in 1929 was the great opportunity of the Nazis. Unemployment increased,⁸² the Young plan of 1929 was very unpopular in spite of the fact that its terms were a reduction of Germany's obligations, and the drift was from the negative bourgeois parties to the National Socialists.

In the elections of 1928 the Nazis had won twelve seats in the Reichstag and were soon approached by the Nationalists, who wanted to utilize the propagandist genius of the Nazi leader. For the time being Hitler acted with the Nationalists, and the combination won more votes. The old program of the Twenty-five Points was still the party platform, but Hitler stressed Pan-Germanism, revision of the peace treaties, restoration of colonies, and certain economic and social reforms. Labor paid little attention to Hitler's oratory, but he won thousands of German youth, many from the professional classes, almost all the small businessmen, and countless of the recently pauperized middle class. The elections of 1930, in which twenty-seven parties cast votes, gave the Nazis great gains. The twelve seats of 1928 became one hundred and seven, and the Nazi strength was second only to that of the Social Democrats. The parties of the extreme Left gained also, making a sharp cleavage in the Reichstag.

The final test of the Weimar Republic came in the period 1930-1933. On the death of the first president, Ebert, in 1925, the parties of the Right had nominated the aged field marshal, Paul von Hindenburg, thinking that his great popularity might make election possible. The multiplicity of parties and the constitutional provision for proportional representation made parliamentary government difficult. One chancellor followed another with confusing rapidity, and there was little stability in the relations of the various parties. The general trend was to the Right, away from the socialist group that had dominated the early sessions of the Reichstag. Hindenburg had been considered a monarchist, and his election was viewed with alarm abroad, especially in France. He took the oath of allegiance to the republic wholeheartedly, however, and his policy was one of moderation and conciliation. But it was beyond the power of any president to stabilize the

Hitler's genius is of the intellect and that he is a master of logic, although at the same time showing "unreliability, carelessness, and ignorance," the average individual can have no very clear-cut impression of the German leader

⁸² There were 540,000 unemployed at the height of the period of prosperity (1927) By 1933 there were over 6,000,000.

government. When the ministry resigned in 1923, because of its inability to obtain a majority, it took six weeks and the threat of a presidential dictatorship to obtain another, which was able to withstand the disintegrating effects of party disputes for but six months.

In 1930, Dr. Heinrich Brüning, the leader of the Center party, became chancellor with a moderate coalition ministry and attempted to govern the republic during the days of increasing economic difficulty. The aged president, now well past eighty, was rapidly becoming senile and could be of little help to those who were loyal to the republic. The issue was sharply drawn between the Nazi-Nationalist section of the Reichstag and the Social Democrats and moderates. The battle had to be fought amidst budgetary difficulties and steadily increasing deflation and hard times. The advantages were all with the Nazis: they had a program of hope and action, they had an elaborate system of propaganda and a remarkably effective organization, and they had, in Hitler, a leader of consummate political ability. The method used was one of constant attack. Every act of the republic, from the signing of the Treaty of Versailles to the acceptance of the Young Plan, was condemned, and, above all, change was promised—change along every line.

Although the elections of 1930 had increased the voting strength of both the Right and the Left, the moderate Brüning cabinet was able to maintain its majority until 1932. In the presidential campaign of that year all of the moderates combined in support of Hindenburg as the only candidate who could hold the vote of the masses against Hitler.⁸⁸ Hindenburg, eighty-five and senile, was hailed as the "safest" of all candidates and was re-elected with an equally "safe" majority. Soon after the presidential election the Brüning ministry fell. For some time the chancellor had been governing by emergency decrees, since it was impossible for the discordant Reichstag to act on any legislative program. The decrees had produced no relief for the economic situation and the people clamored for action. With the fall of Brüning came the end of the control of the moderates who were genuinely loyal to the republic. Von Papen, a Nationalist, became chancellor. He represented a coterie of "adventurous patriots" who controlled the aged president and intended to hold office and to create a strong military state with the support of the army and of the "Steel Helmet"

⁸⁸ To run for the presidency it was necessary for Hitler to become a German citizen. He did so by accepting a minor political appointment since office holders automatically became citizens.

organization made up largely of ex-army men. They captured the government of Prussia by violent means. Their program was chiefly the revision of the Treaty of Versailles and the acquisition of arms parity for Germany. They were opposed to all socialism and had little use for personal liberty or self-government. They considered Hitler a cheap lower-class demagogue and hysteric and despised his rabble party, but they expected to steal votes from him by their dramatic foreign policy.

Like many another reactionary group, the von Papen ministry underestimated the strength of its opponents. In the Reichstag elections in July, 1932, the Nazis doubled their seats, reaching a new total of 230, the largest number ever held by any one party. Hitler was offered a cabinet position but declined since he was not assured a controlling influence. Rather than face a vote of no-confidence, von Papen dissolved the Reichstag and called for a new election to be held in November.³⁴ Again the Nazis held a larger number of seats than any other party; the Communists elected a hundred deputies. It was obvious that the feudal policies of the von Papen group had no popular support, and the cabinet resigned. The office of chancellor was offered to Hitler but under such conditions that he refused,³⁵ and awaited the almost inevitable failure of the next chancellor, Kurt von Schleicher, announcing that he would cause the fall of every new cabinet until he was sought out as a savior.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DICTATORSHIP

The unrest in the country mounted, and the chaotic political situation was intolerable. The great industrialists decided to throw their influence to Hitler, since he seemed to be the only leader with sufficient popular following to prevent complete collapse. Once more a Nazi-Nationalist coalition was effected, and, when the Schleicher cabinet fell after a brief two months in office (January, 1933), Hitler became chancellor with a cabinet which contained Hermann Goering, his ablest lieutenant³⁶ and several Nationalists. The first act of the

³⁴ This was the fourth national election in eight months.

³⁵ A parliamentary majority could be obtained only by a coalition cabinet. What Hitler demanded was, in effect, dictatorial powers, and Hindenburg refused.

³⁶ See Henri Lichtenberger, *The Third Reich*, pp. 30-51, for an account of this confused period. There is some proof that Hitler's reason for accepting the aid of the Nationalists was to prevent a *coup d'état* on the part of Schleicher and the army for the establishment of a military dictatorship.

new chancellor was a violent attack upon Socialists and Communists. The existing Reichstag contained far too many of both parties to give Hitler a majority for his program. Dissolution was decreed, therefore, and elections were held in March to test the popular support of the Nazi leader.

The elections showed the weakness of the conservative Nationalists and the effectiveness of the Hitler methods as well as the strength of the Nazi hold upon the public. The combination of stirring up intense hatred for a regime which tolerated Jews, radicals, and the Treaty of Versailles and the promise of a Germany free from all these evils and united in a solidarity based on the principle of general welfare and social justice proved very effective. A few days before the election the Reichstag was nearly destroyed by a fire of mysterious origin. The Nazis proclaimed that the Communists had started the fire, and they used the episode with dramatic effect in the last days of the campaign.⁸⁷ The victory of Hitler was overwhelming. The Nazis won 288 seats, and the Nationalists 52, while the Socialists dropped to 120 and the Center to 73. Since even yet he did not have the two-thirds majority necessity to amend the Weimar Constitution, Hitler secured from a badly demoralized Reichstag a law conferring upon him the dictatorship for four years.⁸⁸ Until April 1, 1937, Hitler was empowered to do anything, either constitutional or unconstitutional except to diminish the rights of the president and to abolish the two houses of Parliament "as institutions."

THE POLICIES OF *DER FÜHRER*

The dictatorship thus established was quickly made effective. The independence of the several states was broken by the appointment of Nazi officials. There was no new national constitution and no new law code, but a new system of government and a new "philosophy" of law were evolved. Nazi institutions were developed and a totalitarian state was evolved within the framework of the old regime, but the Third Reich bears little resemblance to the Weimar Republic. The Nazi party and all of its organizations were retained alongside the state administrative divisions, and duplicated many of them. The Brown

⁸⁷ There is evidence that the fire was of Nazi origin and was a part of their unscrupulous campaign methods. See Douglas Reed, *The Burning of the Reichstag*.

⁸⁸ It is interesting to note the parallelism between Hitler's career and methods and those of Mussolini.

Shirts (S.A.) were kept as a protective body for the party, and the Black Shirts (S.S.) became a special police. The Reichstag, although retained in principle, met only on rare occasions and was stripped of all legislative power. All parties were dissolved except the National Socialist, and no organized opposition was permitted. As in all dictatorships, the authority came from above and not from below, and each subordinate was responsible to his superior, and ultimately to Hitler. Elections became plebiscites at which approval of the acts of *Der Fuhrer* was demanded and obtained. He was conceded to be responsible only to God and his own conscience. On the death of Hindenburg in 1934, the functions of president were combined with those of chancellor, and Hitler's position became supreme legally as well as actually. It has been a matter of pride to the Nazis that *Der Fuhrer* was chosen by the people and granted unlimited authority by them.

The domestic policy of Hitler has been, in large degree, that of carrying into effect the program of *Mein Kampf*. Founded on the theory of race, the Nazi regime has been consistently anti-Semitic. By successive measures of restriction and suppression, Jews have been reduced to the position of outlaws in the German Reich. Never more than about 1 per cent of the population, their numbers have been reduced by exile, privation, and execution, and they are now (1939) faced with wholesale deportation, if homes can be found for them elsewhere, or with gradual extermination if they remain in Germany. The world has never seen the execution of a similar policy so ruthlessly applied to so large a number of people. The positive side of racialism has been equally emphasized: the encouragement of early marriages and large families, emphasis upon eugenics, a Spartan type of education to strengthen the race, and even the absurd idea of a German racial purity and the superiority of Nordic peoples. This racialism became of great importance to the outside world when it was coupled with the chauvinistic policy of extending the German flag over all Germans outside the Reich. With Hitler, Fascism became exportable to wherever there were Germans who might be brought under the control of the fatherland, or who might be induced to aid in Nazi projects.

The basic militarism of the regime was evident in every phase of policy. The determination to acquire German objectives and to establish German hegemony by the use of force, or by the threat of its use, was implied in the aims of the Nazi leader. The withdrawal first from the Disarmament Conference and then from the League of Nations

was a preliminary for the announcement of Germany's intention to rearm, and that intention has been fully carried out.³⁹ Conscription was announced in 1935. A year later the Locarno pacts were broken when Hitler moved his troops into the demilitarized Rhineland. The unabashed militarism and the aggressive foreign policy of the Reich have been largely responsible for the increasing international tension of the period since Hitler came to power.

THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

The economic life of Nazi Germany has been subordinated to military necessities. The aim has been a self-sufficient state and the acquisition of new areas or the reacquisition of old colonies to make that self-sufficiency complete. The control of the totalitarian state over industry has been as characteristic of German Fascism as of Italian. The whole organization of labor was refashioned. Laborers and employers were united in one great organization, the *Arbeitsfront*, which was under government control. The industrialists, who aided Hitler in his advance to power, have found that they must conform to his economic and political policies, and can find no opportunity for operation outside the limits which are set by the government. The idol of the lesser middle class, Hitler has endeavored to respond to their faith in him by the removal of their greatest difficulties. There has been little attempt to carry out the early social program of the party, but there has been some amelioration of economic conditions. The removal of Jewish competition has benefited the tradesmen and professional classes. On the other hand, the middle class has suffered under Nazi intervention and dictation. Unemployment has been almost eliminated by extensive public works and by the preparations for war. Extensive housing, road building, fortifications, and munition projects have been financed by bond issues and by forced loans. As long as the dictatorship retains its hold over the people the ordinary economic laws operate with difficulty, and it is unsafe to make any estimate as to the length of time that seemingly unsound methods can endure. In Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, the Nazi regime found a financier who, as long as he was president of the Reichsbank, was able to perform great feats both in domestic and in foreign finance. Foreign trade was put on a

³⁹ The only limitation to which Hitler has consented has been a naval agreement with Great Britain in 1935 by which the German fleet was to be restricted to 35 per cent of the British fleet.

barter basis, and bargains were made on the agreement that those who supply Germany with raw materials must take their pay in finished products. The Balkans were drawn into Germany's economic orbit, and countries to whom Germany owed money have been induced to take their pay in German goods. As one author says, Schacht made Germany "the most successful fraudulent bankrupt in the history of the world."⁴⁰

Labor, both in industry and on the soil, was regarded by the Nazi party as honorable because it was of service to the state. In theory every German was to be rooted in the nation through service in the army and through his work or his profession. At no time was he to be an isolated individual with freedom to formulate ideas outside the program of the state. Labor service was instituted through which the young men were required to spend six months in the employ of the state. Voluntary land-help was devised to take young people of both sexes out of the cities as well as to ensure adequate agricultural labor. Social Honor Courts were instituted to make effective the principles of National Socialism. To them were taken cases of the exploitation or degradation of labor, and they were empowered to lay heavy fines upon employers whom they found guilty of "gross violations of social duties." The glorification of labor was accompanied by the ruthless suppression of trade unions and of all means of direct action. The German Labor Front was made a section of the Nazi party and was not an institution established by the workers themselves.⁴¹ Employers were not excluded, for the purpose of the Labor Front was not the regulation of the relations between labor and capital but rather the direct promotion of social ends. Vocational training, aid to those in need, the publication of trade journals, and the inculcation of Nazi spirit constitute the program of a movement that claimed in 1936 to have thirty million members. The collectivist organization of leisure—the great "Strength through Joy" movement—was established as a supplement to the Labor Front. Between them all of man's activities were to be supervised and brought under state control.

Agriculture has been a field in which the German government has been especially interested. This interest has been expressed in laws entailing the larger peasant farms, owned by "racially pure" Germans,

⁴⁰ John Gunther, *Inside Europe* (1936), p. 93.

⁴¹ See Max Ascoli and Arthur Feiler, *Fascism for Whom?* (W. W. Norton & Company), Chap. VII. Chap. VIII furnishes an excellent account of the Nazi economic policy.

so that they cannot be sold or divided and must descend to a single privileged heir. The farm population of nearly half the arable land of Germany was thus made "a source of blood of the German people." A great national agency was authorized to make all plans for agriculture, forestry, and conservation, including co-operative enterprises and marketing. Local farm associations were organized to watch over agricultural production, and a National Farm Leader was appointed by the chancellor. He was also secretary of agriculture, and, in fact, was a dictator of agricultural affairs. Protective tariffs, government regulation of each type of agricultural production, state monopolies of such vital necessities as wheat and fats, and cartelization of many other types of produce have combined to bring agriculture under an elaborate regimentation that is a tribute to German genius for efficient organization.

EDUCATION AND THE YOUTH MOVEMENTS

The educational system of Germany, long one of the best in Europe, was taken over by the Nazi regime and recast along Nazi lines. All opposition has been eliminated from the teaching staff, which has also been made completely "Nordic." The schools were used extensively for propaganda purposes and for education in Nazi principles. Physical education has been emphasized, and racialism has been carefully inculcated. The youth organizations favored by dictatorships have been built up to a high degree of effectiveness. There is an organization called the *Deutsche Kindschaft* for children from four to nine. The German boy enters the Young Folk group at ten, at fourteen he goes into the Hitler Youth, and then to labor service, military service, vocational training, or, perhaps, into the S.A. or the S.S. Military training is emphasized everywhere, and the German love for uniforms is recognized. Indeed, it is seldom necessary for a boy or man to appear in any other garb. The girls begin with the *Bund Deutschen Madel* and are supposed to go through a school for mothers. The youth groups have many activities and have been largely responsible for the organization of vacation camps and the erection of guest houses for "hikers" and for the building of recreation centers in urban communities. The purpose of the entire educational program was expressed in Hitler's own words: "The young man will proceed from one schooling to the other, which begins with the child and will end

only with the old warrior of the movement. No one shall say that there is any time for him alone when he is left exclusively to himself."

THE CONTROL OF PUBLIC OPINION

The forming of public opinion and the suppression of opposition are combined in the department of propaganda and are ably handled by one of Hitler's chief lieutenants, Dr. Paul Goebbels. The press is censored, and the radio and the movies are under his control. The "spontaneous" demonstrations that attend Hitler's appearances and speeches are as carefully planned as affairs of state. Every agency of propaganda is utilized to create the desired effect upon the German people, and there is no opportunity for opposing ideas to be circulated. Spies are used everywhere; the secret police (Gestapo) is efficient, and its chief, Himmler, is feared and respected; concentration camps or summary execution await the recalcitrant; and conformity is the only course for the discreet. The fact that there are many "in-discreet" is evidenced in the growing severity of the repressive measures. Fear is the law of the land, and the reign of terror is effective in driving all opposition underground.

The conformity and co-operation of the Christian churches of Germany was regarded as essential from the first, although the ardent Nazis are frankly pagan in their repudiation of all that is "un-German." Christianity is to them "a foreign ideology," but the German people have not accepted such a definition. Neither the Catholic nor the Protestant churches have been happy under Nazi rule, for the Nazi ideal has been the establishment of one State Church, or at the most one Catholic and one Protestant church, both under state control. The Catholics have temporized and compromised but have not yielded; as in Italy the church relies upon the permanence of its hold upon the allegiance of millions of Europeans and awaits its opportunity. The Protestant churches have divided, with a strong Nazi wing willing to co-operate with the government, but for many pastors and for thousands of their parishioners the fight is still going on. The German spirit has not been completely subdued, nor have the new loyalties entirely supplanted the old.

With the Fascist states, as with the Communist, the final word must be the glorification of the state which operates through a dictator and a rigid one-party control. The whole structure of dictatorship is complete and all-embracing. The system it presents is a new way

of life.⁴² That it seems intolerable to those who have been accustomed to the civil liberties and the individualism of democratic states does not mean that its overthrow is inevitable. Democratic institutions are relatively new in the world; they may be evanescent, and the return to authoritarian governments the path of the future. Only an allegiance to democracy as strong as the allegiance to totalitarianism, and only a power equal to that which has conquered in the dictatorships can preserve the democratic states. No one can foretell the future of the dictatorships. Possessing all of the agencies of power, from propaganda to the armed forces of the state, they will endure until some force emerges that can develop courage and energy sufficient to destroy the new order. Born of one great European war, they might be carried to extinction by another, but in such a catastrophe might perish much more than the dictatorships.

READINGS

GENERAL ACCOUNTS. The general accounts by F. L. Bennis, J. H. Jackson, and W. C. Langsam contain chapters on Italy and Germany. The following books by international newspaper correspondents will be found interesting and useful: John Gunther, *Inside Europe* (1936, 1938); F. H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, *The Great Powers in World Politics* (1937); John S. Whitaker, *And Fear Came* (1936); W. H. Chamberlin, *Collectivism a False Utopia* (1937). G. S. Ford, editor, *Dictatorship in the Modern World* (1939) has brief essays on both Germany and Italy.

FASCIST ITALY. General accounts of Italy under Fascism include E. B. Ashton, *The Fascist: His State and His Mind* (1937); Herman Finer, *Mussolini's Italy* (1935), excellent; Bolton King, *Fascism in Italy* (1931); and H. W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State* (1928); and *The Fascist Government of Italy* (1936).

MUSSOLINI. Gaudens Megaro's *Mussolini in the Making* (1938) is excellent for Mussolini's early career. George Seldes's *Sawdust Caesar* (1935) is a biography by a somewhat antagonistic journalist.

⁴² "It seems at first sight to present a reversal of our whole cultural and political drift during the past three centuries. Actually, however, it is a direct and natural outgrowth of our present society. The dilemmas that Fascism seeks to resolve are our dilemmas, the institutions it wishes to conserve are the basic economic institutions of our society, the loyalties it appeals to are the loyalties that attach to the nation-state which we have created, the militarism it exploits is the same militarism that leads to our own wars, the passions it channels to its purposes are the race and class passions that grow out of the competitive struggle inherent in our society"—Max Lerner in *Dictatorship in the Modern World*, edited by G. S. Ford (The University of Minnesota Press), p. 21.

BOOKS BY EXILED ITALIANS. There are several extremely interesting books on Italy by exiles from the Fascist state (all anti-Fascist); among them *Fascism for Whom?* (1938) by Max Ascoli and Arthur Feiler; *Goliath, the Myth of Fascism* (1937) by G. A. Borgese; *The Fascist Dictatorship in Italy* (1927) and *Under the Axe of Fascism* (1936) by Gaetano Salvemini; and Carlo Storza's *European Dictatorships* (1931).

PRO-FASCIST ACCOUNTS. It is difficult to find books written in support of Fascism: J. S. Barnes, author of *Fascism* (1931) and *The Universal Aspects of Fascism* (1928) is an English friend of Mussolini; Luigi Villari's *The Awakening of Italy* (1924) is pro-Fascist.

GERMANY. *My Battle* (1933; New editions, 1939, *Mein Kampf*) by Adolf Hitler is invaluable both for the life and the policies of the German dictator. More than half of *Fascism for Whom?* (1938) by Max Ascoli and Arthur Feiler is an extremely interesting but emotional account of Germany today. W. F. Bruck's *Social and Economic History of Germany 1888-1938* (1938) is useful for those fields. Probably the best accounts of the German regime are Konrad Heiden's *A History of National Socialism* (1934) and *The Third Reich* (1937) by Henri Lichtenberger. *Germany Puts the Clock Back* (1933, 1937) by E. A. Mowrer is a journalist's protest against the Nazi government. *The Burning of the Reichstag* (1934) by Douglas Reed offers proof that the famous fire was set by Nazi orders. S. H. Roberts's *The House That Hitler Built* (1937) is a recent account of Hitler's career. F. L. Schuman's *The Nazi Dictatorship* (1936) is an interesting but violently anti-Nazi account. His *Germany since 1918* (Berkshire Series, 1937) is brief and readable.

≡ XXVI ≡

THE RECENT YEARS

THE RETREAT FROM DEMOCRACY

DEMOCRACY, Communism, and Fascism have been the great ideologies—"lay religions," so to speak—of the postwar years, and, in the struggle among them for the support of modern nations, democracy has appeared to be fighting a losing battle. Less practical than the rival ways of life, more tolerant, dependent upon popular support and beset by opposing factions and parties, the democracies have been hard put to it to hold their own against the more purposeful and ruthless totalitarian dictatorships. There can never be anything but conflict between liberal democracy and Fascism, for they are based upon antagonistic principles. Devoted to peace as Fascism is to war, and pledged to further the rights and well-being of the individual who, under Fascism, is subordinated to the service of the state, democracy has failed here, yielded there, and, in general, has not met the challenge of the dictator states.

The retreat from liberal democracy was not marked until the world economic crisis which began in 1929. True, Russia was a Communist state, and Mussolini had risen to power in Italy; and true that Poland, Hungary, and some of the Balkan states paid little allegiance to liberal institutions. But elsewhere democratic governments held sway, and there were few who feared the triumph of opposing forces. France was dominant in Western Europe, and, through the friendship of England and a network of alliances in Eastern Europe, she had attained a measure of security which she sought to augment by supporting the activities of the League of Nations and by enforcing a rigid adherence to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.¹ The French government was assailed in the postwar years by the attacks of extremists from both Right and Left. Fascistic and monarchical groups clashed with communist organizations, and the republic withstood

¹ See above, pages 766-67.

with difficulty the pressure from both extremes. In 1934 there were especially severe riots, and many observers felt that the republic was in danger. There was a great revulsion in the parties of the Left against the French financial classes and especially against the group of wealthy families that controlled the Bank of France and dictated the financial policies of the French government. The withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations in 1933 and the announcement of the repudiation of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in 1935 alarmed the French and caused the divergent political groups to draw together. The leftist parties deserted their pacifist views, co-operated with the bourgeoisie, and advocated a firm foreign policy. The conservative parties shared the alarm and subordinated their hatred of communism by agreeing to a defensive alliance with Soviet Russia in 1935. This broad common basis for political action, unusual in French politics, became the Popular Front which controlled the government in 1936. The irreconcilable nature of the differences within its ranks became apparent, however, in the formulation of a policy on the Spanish question, as well as on other issues, and the Front began to crumble. The leftist factions condemned the nonintervention policy and opposed the financial measures of the government as well. The Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938 completed the destruction of the Popular Front, and France faced the winter of 1938-1939 more divided than ever. Only the continued German menace and the colonial demands of the Italian government prevented open dissension.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE EMPIRE

Great Britain endeavored to lessen her European commitments after 1919 and turned to the difficult task of rebuilding her financial and commercial power. The period preceding the economic crisis of 1929 brought some measure of prosperity, but unemployment persisted, the "depressed" coal and textile industries of the north of England failed to make much recovery, and the increasing economic nationalism and neomercantilism² of other countries made it impossible to regain British commercial ascendancy. The poverty and weakness of Germany and other Central European states prevented them from purchasing British goods, and political issues worked against any great capture of Russia trade. The United States had forged ahead in the

² See above, pages 779-82.

expansion of her Latin-American financial and commercial interests during the war and was determined to hold the gains she had made. The British Liberal party lost heavily after the war when the working classes went over to the Labour party. In 1923 and in 1929 Labour took over the government, but in neither case with a majority sufficient to maintain power without Liberal co-operation. While in power the Labour party was weak and its policies vacillating. In the 1931 elections the Conservatives got control of Parliament and have been in the saddle since that time. The great self-governing dominions of the British Empire, developing their resources and industries and approaching economic maturity, were willing to subscribe to the principle of imperial preferential tariffs but refused to submit to economic or political tutelage.

After the Great War the dominions became members of the League of Nations and were accorded a status in international affairs that was equivalent to independence. In domestic affairs they had long been self-governing. An empire conference of British and dominion statesmen in 1926 recognized the situation by the announcement that "Great Britain and the dominions are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinated one to another. . . ." In 1931 the Statute of Westminster enacted this statement into law. The crown thus became the only legal bond between Great Britain and the dominions in the British Commonwealth of Nations—Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Irish Free State.⁸

Nationalism, already active in India before the Great War, created serious crises between that colony and Great Britain in the postwar years. The nationalist leaders organized an Indian National Congress to work for self-government, and an intensive propaganda aroused anti-British sentiment. In 1919, a modest amount of self-government was granted India in an act which provided for an Indian legislature but kept the control of the police, the law courts, the army, and

⁸ Ireland became a dominion by treaty in 1921 as the result of a three-year war between Irish Sinn Féin rebels and the British government. Six northern counties, including Ulster, were given a separate government, and, under the name of Northern Ireland, this region has a capital and a parliament of its own and sends representatives to the British Parliament. Since 1921 the oath of allegiance to the British crown and the office of lord lieutenant have been abolished in the Irish Free State. In 1937 the Irish government under De Valera issued a new constitution declaring Ireland to be "completely sovereign." Thus it can no longer be considered a dominion. Newfoundland recently gave up its dominion status.

foreign affairs in British hands. These concessions stimulated the Indian peoples to further demands, and dominion status became the objective of the nationalists. Gandhi, a Hindu religious leader, became the spokesman of those who preached a doctrine of non-co-operation and civil disobedience. Dissension between Hindu and Moslem factions prevented united action, but because Gandhi's advocacy of native industries and a boycott of British-made textiles caused distress in the British manufacturing areas, the British continued to make concessions, especially along economic lines. An effort was made to end the exploitation of native labor in industrial establishments, irrigation projects were undertaken, and the production of cotton was stimulated. In 1933, an elaborate constitution was formulated for India, which was promulgated two years later, but the nationalists pushed on to a demand for complete independence and at first rejected the constitution with all the obstructionist tactics of passive resistance. After a few months, the Congress party decided to co-operate with the British government, and in 1937 elections were held in which the nationalists obtained control in seven of the eleven provinces of British India. Indian ministers have conscientiously endeavored to conduct an orderly government but have been hampered by extremists in their own party and by the continual friction between the Mohammedan and Hindu populations. No settlement has yet been reached for the important problems of India, and the final determination of the relations between Great Britain and her oldest and most valuable colony may await the outcome of the struggle for power in the Far East.

EUROPE AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The shadow of European events fell across the Western Hemisphere when the Fascist dictators decided that their doctrines were "exportable" and that their interests might be furthered by the activities of their numerous nationals living in the Latin-American countries. Central and South American states have long been accustomed to a variety of political revolutions and dictatorships peculiar to themselves. Since the rise of National Socialism in Germany Fascist propaganda has poured into Latin America and every effort has been made to arouse interest in Fascist totalitarian ideas and to stimulate friendship for the Fascist powers and antagonism for the United States. The economic resources and the trade of Latin America have been a part of the stake in such an enterprise. It is difficult to estimate the

possible political or military motives of such activities, but as the war clouds thicken they are viewed with increasing apprehension. There is some evidence that Latin-American governments, dictatorships or pseudo dictatorships though they may be, have bitterly resented the inculcation of Fascism in their midst and have turned toward the possibility of a hemispheric solidarity against "imported" ideologies. The United States has endeavored to emphasize the "good neighbor" policy, to cultivate friendly relations, to advance inter-American trade, and to build up a common front in defense of democratic institutions and against the aggression of foreign states. At Montevideo in 1933 and at Lima in 1938, Pan-American Conferences discussed measures of accord and common policy for the Western Hemisphere, and, although no alliance was made or definite and binding agreements were drawn up, ground was found for some degree of unity. In case of attack or danger it is probable that a united front would be achieved.

THE STATES OF NORTHERN AND EASTERN EUROPE

The smaller states of Northwestern Europe, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the three Scandinavian countries, devoted themselves after the war to economic and social problems. Belgium had the added problem of the restoration of the devastated area and the rehabilitation of the war-weary people. All of the five states were firm supporters of the League of Nations and of the principle of collective security. All of them shared in the prosperity of the years before 1929 and in the economic difficulties of the depression years. With varying programs their governments have endeavored to solve the difficult problems of those years. Small and with remarkably homogeneous populations, it has been possible for them to pursue a policy of careful economic planning and to reach a relatively satisfactory solution of problems of housing, production, and distribution, and of the relations of capital and labor to each other and to the state which have defied solution in other countries. Although monarchies, these states have been consistently democratic in government and ask little more of the rest of the world than to be left undisturbed to trade peacefully and to live quietly in accordance with their own needs and their own interests.* The rise of Nazi Germany has inexpressibly complicated

* See Marquis Childs's *Sweden: The Middle Way* for an account of that country's solution for many modern problems.

the existence of each of these governments. The Scandinavian countries guard the western outlet of the Baltic and cannot fail to be concerned with the ambitions of their powerful neighbors, Germany and Russia. Sweden exports large quantities of goods to Germany, especially iron; Denmark, which must always fear a demand for the return of the Schleswig area, is economically dependent upon Germany; and the Low Countries, now as always, are especially vulnerable because of their location at the mouth of the Rhine, and because they can be used for military flanking operations against France. Belgium and the Netherlands are both colonial powers. The former may well feel the danger of German or Italian aggression, while the Dutch East Indian empire, officially called the Netherlands Indies, is exposed to the attacks of Japanese imperialism.

In the eastern Baltic area lie the Russian succession states. Democracy apparently triumphed with nationalism in the establishment of the republics of Finland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. Economically backward, heavily in debt, and torn by internal dissension, these succession states, with the exception of Finland, early abandoned the democratic institutions to which they had given lip service, and some sort of dictatorial regime was established in each of them. Their economic and social problems have been those of agrarian areas where the bulk of the population is an illiterate and land-hungry peasantry. After the Great War there was an effort to solve the major problem by the division of the vast estates of the old nobility in order to permit the purchase of small units by peasant farmers. For all five of these Baltic states the major problem in foreign affairs is the presence of two powerful and dangerous neighbors—Russia and Germany. The permanence of the independent status of each depends upon its relations with those neighbors, and it may depend even more upon the relations of Germany and Russia to each other. Poland is the largest, the most powerful, and the most autocratically governed of the group, but, in some respects, the most vulnerable. The problem of the Polish corridor has been held in abeyance because of the preoccupation of Nazi Germany with other problems. The presence of German majorities in both Memel and Danzig has made international relations still more precarious. In 1934 Germany and Poland signed a ten-year pact of friendship, but Germany's desire to move eastward to the Ukraine is a constant menace to Poland. Seeking security for some years in an alliance with France, Poland now finds herself in a precarious position between a powerful aggressive Germany and the vast

expanse of Soviet Russia. A conflict between the two powers might easily be disastrous for Poland, but a choice between them would be difficult. The smaller Baltic states can find security only in a situation where German-Russian antagonism does not reach a climax in war. So long as there is no open conflict between them, the continued existence of the succession states is possible. Born as a result of one great European war, they might all disappear in the holocaust of another.⁵

THE SUCCESSION STATES OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

In the succession states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire there was short shrift for democracy except in Czechoslovakia.⁶ In Austria the economic problems were such that domestic turmoil was constant. The great metropolis of Vienna could not draw its sustenance or find its markets in the relatively unproductive mountain provinces that surround it. The city became steadily more socialistic, while the agrarian areas remained conservative and Catholic. A customs union with Germany might have relieved the tension and have brought a measure of economic prosperity to a region that was being maintained only with outside loans and financial assistance. Such a union, however, when proposed in March, 1931, was prohibited by the great powers. Both France and Italy feared the increase of German influence in Austria, and Mussolini strengthened his influence in Vienna. The government of Austria was conducted in the main by the Catholic or Christian-Socialist party. Assailed by the socialists of Vienna on the one hand and by rabid nationalists of Nazi persuasion on the other, the government grew steadily more inclined to a dictatorship. In 1933, when the effects of the world-wide depression were most apparent, the government under Engelbert Dollfuss abolished the democratic constitution and put down all opposition by force. The socialists were crushed in a brief civil war early in 1934, and in July of the same year an attempt to outlaw the Nazi party led to a rebellion in which Dollfuss was murdered. The revolt was obviously of German-Nazi manufacture, and its suppression was a temporary defeat to Hitler's well-known de-

⁵ There is an excellent statement of Baltic problems in Chap. V of Richard Freund's *Zero Hour*.

⁶ See Chapter XXIII for some account of the early postwar years.

sire to dominate Austria.⁷ Throughout this period Mussolini regarded the maintenance of Austrian independence as a major factor in Italian foreign policy and acted as the supporter of the Austrian government.

After the war Hungary was a monarchy in theory, governed by a regency acting for the permanently absent Hapsburg king. The Magyar landowning aristocracy has dominated postwar Hungary as it did the old monarchy, and the government has been frankly reactionary. Little satisfaction has been given to the peasants' desire for land, and all opposition to the dictatorial regime has been crushed. Since several million Hungarians were given in 1919 to Czechoslovakia and to Rumania, the main objective of Hungarian foreign policy has been to regain her lost areas and their inhabitants. The Little Entente⁸ had as its objective the blocking of Hungarian chauvinism, and Hungary naturally sought allies in the opponents of French and Little Entente policies. Fascist Italy has been uniformly friendly to Hungarian aspirations, and Hungary has relied, also, on Nazi Germany.

BALKAN PROBLEMS

The Balkan states have all been torn by internal political dissension during the postwar period and have given up the maintenance of democratic institutions. In Rumania King Carol II came to the throne in 1930. Determined to hold all of the territories granted by the peace treaties, Rumania was forced to play a cautious role between Russia and the aggressiveness of Hungarian nationalism. Rich in natural resources, especially oil, Rumania played a part, also, in the plans of Nazi Germany, a part that becomes increasingly important as German control is pushed eastward. As long as French influence was strong, Rumania was loyal to the Little Entente and ready to aid in blocking German aggression, although German economic penetration was increasingly apparent. With the weakening of French power, Rumania's position has grown more difficult. Distrusted and opposed by the National Peasant's party on the one hand and by the Fascist "Iron Guard" group on the other, King Carol has moved steadily toward a dictatorship. He would obviously like to maintain royal power and the independence of Rumania, but as Nazi pressure increases, the situation becomes more difficult.

⁷ See the excellent account of Austria since the war in *The Betrayal. Central Europe* by G. E. R. Gedyé.

⁸ See above, pages 790-91.

With mushroom growth Serbia expanded at the close of the war into Yugoslavia. The new state included Croatia and the Slovene area as well as Montenegro and part of Macedonia. Although the various elements of which it is made are all South-Slavs, Yugoslavia has not had internal peace. The Serbs endeavored to dominate the political life of the state, which might have been more easily governed as a federal state with autonomy for the widely differing areas. The Macedonian element has been bitterly discontented, and the outbreaks in Croatia have been violent. The friction between the Croatian and Serbian factions in Parliament reached such a pitch in 1928 that the Croatian leader and his aids were murdered during a debate. This outrageous episode led King Alexander to abolish the constitution and rule as a dictator. In 1934 he was himself assassinated by a Croatian nationalist while on an official visit to France. Since his son and successor, Peter II, is a minor, the government was put in the hands of a regency under Prince Paul, whose policy has been one of maintenance of the dictatorship but with conciliatory measures for the Croats. Yugoslavia had a great stake in the Little Entente, for she not only feared the aggression of Hungary and Austria, but she also had good cause for apprehending Italian chauvinism. The rise of Nazi Germany was not at first a direct menace to Yugoslavia, but the collapse of French influence in Eastern Europe in 1938 has made it necessary for Yugoslavia to conform, at least, to the economic policies of the Reich.

Bulgaria was greatly reduced in size as a result of her entry into the Great War on the side of the Central Powers. Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Rumania all profited by the weakness of Bulgaria and combined to prevent any revision of the terms of the treaties by which they benefited. Up to the present time (1939) Bulgaria has been excluded from the Balkan League, or entente, through which her neighbors have endeavored to protect their common interests. The menace to the economic and political life of the states of South-eastern Europe in the advance of German power has driven those states to sink their differences, however, and each of them has endeavored to ease its relations with Bulgaria. There is a possibility that Bulgaria will enter into the councils of the Balkan states whether or not any agreement is reached on the matter of the old treaties. Bulgaria has always been a poor state economically and has fewer economic resources and less industrial development than some of her

neighbors. The important agrarian problem cannot be satisfied by taking over the lands of great feudal overlords, for there are few large estates. Communist and Fascist parties have made Bulgarian political life turbulent, and King Boris has controlled the situation by the temporary suspension of the democratic constitution. Early in 1939 the constitution was put into operation again, but it is as yet impossible to state how permanent the democratic regime will be. German economic penetration has been a marked feature of the Bulgarian situation as it has of the economic life of the other Balkan states where the barter methods of German trade have bound the smaller states in economic servitude to Germany, albeit unwillingly.⁹

Albania has been in recent years virtually an Italian protectorate,¹⁰ although King Zog has attempted to play Italian and Yugoslav interests off against each other. The poverty and primitiveness of the Albanian people have necessitated the dependence upon outside assistance for the most elementary needs of the government. King Zog has endeavored to build roads, to develop the economic life of his people, and to establish modern administrative and legal institutions.

The Treaty of Lausanne was a deathblow to Greek hopes for the rewards promised her for her aid to the Allied Powers in the Great War. Shorn of Smyrna and of territory claimed in Thrace, Greece had the psychology of defeat and was torn by internal dissension. A revolution resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a short-lived republic. In 1935, the dynasty was reinstated in the person of King George II, but, in whatever form, the government has been a dictatorship, and a constitutional regime is as impossible in Greece as elsewhere in the Balkans.

THE SUCCESSION STATES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The Treaty of Lausanne¹¹ recognized the complete independence of the state of Turkey created by Mustafa Kemal out of the essentially Turkish parts of the old empire. The new state retained its foothold on the Continent of Europe, but a strip on each side of the straits was

⁹ For the Balkan problems see Richard Freund, *Zero Hour*, Chap. VI, and M. W. Fodor, *South of Hitler*, Chaps. V-XIII.

¹⁰ See above, page 841

¹¹ See above, page 772

demilitarized.¹² Although a liberal constitution was promulgated, the powers and functions of President Atatürk (the name taken by Mustafa Kemal) were those of a dictator. Upon the death of the president in 1938, one of his ablest assistants succeeded to the position without any diminution of powers. A vast cultural and economic revolution has been the main objective of the Turkish government. The first step was the elimination of the control of the Mohammedan religion by subordinating the church to the state and by substituting a system of public schools for those that had been under clerical domination. Westernization was imposed in every aspect of Turkish life. The administration of the government and of finance, the legal codes and court procedure, the conduct of economic affairs, and the social customs of the people were revolutionized. The scope of the changes made and the extent to which they have been successful are tributes to the ability of the dictator and the adaptability of the Turkish people. They are evidence, also, of the wisdom of the surrender of the non-Turkish areas and of the peaceful nonaggressive trend of Turkish foreign policy since 1923. Peace with Russia was secured through non-aggression agreements. Peace in the Balkans was safeguarded by a pact (1933) with Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, designed to prevent any attempt on the part of Bulgaria to revise the postwar treaties. Peace in the Mediterranean and in the areas that fringe Anatolia does not lie within the power of Turkey to determine, but with the remilitarization of the straits and with increasing armed strength Turkey has prepared herself to resist aggression. Since the rise of Nazi Germany the economic life of Turkey has been increasingly drawn into the German orbit, and, as the realization of German ambitions for a great *Mittel-europa* draws near, a new economic "Berlin to Bagdad" project is apparent.

THE ARAB LANDS AND NORTH AFRICA

The Arab lands of the Turkish Empire were taken out of Turkish control at the close of the Great War and were reorganized into several states with varying degrees of independence. The Arabian coastal

¹² As a result of the changed situation in the Mediterranean in 1936, and of the increased strength of Turkey, President Atatürk obtained, at an international conference at Montreux, the cancellation of the demilitarization clause and the right not only to fortify the straits but to close them to the warships of all countries if Turkey should be at war.

area was made into an independent kingdom, northern Syria became a French mandate, Palestine (southern Syria), Transjordan, and Irak went into British hands as mandated territories. The end of the war brought no peace to the mandated areas and little satisfaction to the two powers that have administered them. Arab nationalism, stirred up by war experiences, has swept like a fire across the whole region. The independent state of Arabia (the Hedjaz) has been enlarged to include much of the peninsula, and the independence of Irak was recognized by Great Britain in 1932.¹³ The Transjordanian desert area has remained relatively quiet under British control, but the Palestine region has long been in a turmoil because of conflict between the native Arabs and the Jews who flocked into the region in accordance with the terms of a wartime pledge (the Balfour declaration) which promised a "national home" for the Jews of Europe. With the immigration of many Jews, national and religious antagonism was sharpened by economic and social conflict. Wild riots were so frequent as to make the whole situation one of almost continuous civil war. Great Britain has had great difficulty in maintaining any sort of order, and carefully worked out plans for a compromise division of the area between the Arab and the Jewish populations have been rejected by both contestants. The problem, already difficult, has been aggravated by the fact that the anti-Semitic policies of the Fascist states have enormously increased the numbers of Jews in need of new homes, and by Italian pro-Arab propaganda designed to increase the trials of the British government.

North Africa, too, has been disturbed in the postwar period. Egyptian independence was conceded by Great Britain at the close of the war, but, because of the Suez Canal and the British possessions in the Sudan, that independence is complete only in name and so long as neither Egypt nor Great Britain is seriously menaced. The growing tension in the Mediterranean since 1935 has frightened even the Egyptian nationalists. Italy has increased both the size and the military establishments of her African colony of Libya, and with the acquisition of Abyssinia has greatly enlarged her stake in Africa. Both France and Spain had difficulties in their Moroccan colonies after the war, but the greatest difficulty faced by France has been due to the effect of Italian propaganda upon the large Italian population in Tunisia. The imperialistic policies of the Fascist powers have made

¹³ The son of the king of the Hedjaz had been its governor under the British mandate. He became king in 1930.

the preservation of North African peace problematical. Late in 1938 Italy's demand for the "return" of Tunisia and Corsica made probable a major international crisis.

SPAIN, 1919-1936

Spain remained neutral throughout the European war, but her immunity from that conflict was no pledge of a peaceful future, and "destiny had reserved for Spain a fate as bitter as that of any of the combatants."¹⁴ The army and the church had been the ruling castes in Spain for generations. The resources of the country were few and poorly developed, its industrial progress was slow and centered largely in the northeastern provinces, and the people were backward in social development and organization. The percentage of illiteracy was heavy—in 1930 more than 45 per cent for the whole of Spain and rising in some regions to 85 per cent. In the war and postwar years economic and material changes were rapid. In the cities, at least, new ideas came with great force to the awakening people. There was a strong anti-clerical movement, directed especially against clerical control over education, and the intelligentsia was inclined to be atheistic as well. The Bourbon monarchy had been unpopular during much of the nineteenth century, and neither Alfonso XIII nor his advisers had the support of the people. The prestige of the army was lessened by the disastrous defeats in Morocco up to 1925, when French aid was accepted to wind up the fruitless campaigns against the chieftains of the Riff. The tremendous expense of the Moroccan enterprise brought the army and the government into disrepute in the urban districts, especially in northeastern Spain where radical ideas were winning many adherents. At the same time an agrarian movement of the oppressed peasantry was being opposed by the landowning church and nobility. The combination of urban and rural unrest was the beginning of revolution. General Primo de Rivera endeavored, as prime minister, to maintain the monarchy and to hold the country together by an administration that gradually became a dictatorship. He ended the Moroccan revolt, with French assistance, and attempted extensive social and economic reforms. At the same time he tried to

¹⁴ William Oton, *Twenty Years' Armistice, 1918-1938*, p. 208 Chapter XVII of this recent book gives an account of the war in Spain. Other new books on Spain are *The Tree of Guernika* by George Steer and *The Politics of Modern Spain* by Frank Manuel.

maintain the traditional institutions and to uphold the monarchy, the church, and the feudal nobility. The people refused to be satisfied with halfway measures, and there was a rapid growth of republican sentiment. The municipal elections of 1931 showed a victory for the republicans in all the urban centers, and King Alfonso XIII abdicated.

The forces that brought about the Spanish Revolution were republican and socialistic. Obtaining a majority in the new parliament elected after the abdication, the radical groups attacked the church with a thoroughness that antagonized much of rural Spain. Church and state were separated, church lands were nationalized, the Jesuit organization was eliminated, Jesuit property was confiscated, and the power of the state over education, marriage, and divorce was established. New education laws were passed, as well as legislation to aid the urban and rural workers. For two years the reformers continued to legislate along drastic lines and to refuse to compromise with tradition and with the realities of the Spanish situation. The reforms were, however, in large part "sabotaged" in execution, for the government had little solid support.

The ideals of Azaña and his friends were of the purest—in terms of progressive, anti-clerical, mildly socialistic modernism. . . . Their reforms, however, instead of creating a new soul for Spain only served to reveal further strife and antagonism in the old one. . . . Instead of peace and harmony there was class war.¹⁵

The elections of 1933 brought a reversal of policy with a Center and Right majority in the Cortes. The change in government may have prevented revolution in the fall of 1933, but the inevitable conflict was only postponed. Spain shared in the economic distress of the rest of the world during the depths of the depression. The urban regions threatened revolt if any of the reform legislation should be repealed. The leftist elements laid in supplies of arms and munitions, while the Right prepared the army for civil war. Northeastern Spain was the scene of repeated strikes, and riots were the rule rather than the exception. In the general elections of 1936, a Popular Front party, made up of republicans and reformers drawn largely from the middle class, came into power on a program of moderate reform. The new government was assailed both by the socialist radicals and by the military leaders who belonged to the extreme Right in political affiliation.

¹⁵ Frank E. Manuel, *The Politics of Modern Spain*, p. 108. It has been stated that Dr. Manuel's book is the "finest study available to English readers."

Pressure from the Left led to the freeing of political prisoners and the admission of many agitators who had fled to Russia two years before. Direct action was taken both by the urban proletariat and the peasantry in attempts to hasten reform, and disorders were constant. The military leaders threatened to move if the government did not restore order and respect for property rights. When the government then proceeded to purge the army of its Fascist leaders, the military chieftains decided upon open revolt. In the early summer of 1936, General Francisco Franco began an armed rebellion that marked the initiation of a civil war which was, through the intervention of Fascist powers, to become of world significance—a war less broad in scope but much deeper in bitterness and in social implications than the world war twenty years earlier.

The abdication of King Alfonso and the early years of the Spanish Republic did not lead to any great alarm in Europe. The modernization of Spain was looked upon as a painful but inevitable process. Europe rested secure in the international co-operation that had come with Locarno and relied upon a vigorous League of Nations to settle minor difficulties. The greatest problems of the years immediately following 1929 were those connected with economic and financial questions. Reparations and war debts were interned together, and desire for relief from the burden of armament expenditures led to a hope that the disarmament conference might have some measure of success.¹⁶ Although the party of Adolf Hitler was gaining more votes with every German election, Europe had, as yet, no premonition of the reorientation of international affairs the Nazi victory would bring. The first of the series of great crises of the period of the 1930's came in the Far East rather than in Europe. The failure on the part of European statesmen to solve the Far Eastern problem led directly into the difficulties that were repeatedly to challenge and defeat their efforts.¹⁷

¹⁶ See above, page 795.

¹⁷ There is an excellent chapter (VIII) on the Far Eastern crisis in E. H. Carr's *International Relations since the Peace Treaties*; Richard Freund, *Zero Hour*, has four chapters (X-XIV) on China and Japan; and there is a recent and very useful monograph on the question by H. S. Quigley and G. H. Blakeslee, entitled *The Far East, An International Survey*. A. W. Griswold's *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* is a penetrating and critical study.

JAPAN AND THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS

The Great War was Japan's opportunity. An ally of England since 1902, Japan came into the war to take over German possessions in China and proceeded after that to take advantage of Europe's pre-occupation by forcing her hegemony over China through the famous Twenty-One Demands which would have given Japan a strangle hold on China's economic and political life.¹⁸ In 1915 China was helpless and had to accept most of the demands. After the war, the United States and the Allied Powers endeavored to block the triumphant Japanese imperialism by limiting Japan's gains at the Peace Conference and at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. Japan was forced to give up to China a part of the gains made at the expense of Germany. England and France each agreed to give up one of the ports acquired before the war. An "open-door" treaty, which was signed by nine powers, embodied the position the United States had long held and to which China, of course, subscribed. Had the principles of the Washington Conference and the Nine-Power Pact been carried into effect, China would have been emancipated from outside interference and would have been permitted to work out her own salvation. Japanese imperialism, however, was young and vigorous. The Japanese government was so organized as to permit its domination by militarists and nationalists. The army was responsible, not to the civilian authorities but directly to the emperor, and the rivalry between civilian Parliament and ministry on the one hand and military authorities on the other was a constant factor in Japanese political life. The civilian influence had forced the acceptance of the Washington Conference and for ten years held back the military clique from the realization of its hopes for Japanese domination of Eastern Asia.

The world depression cut Japanese trade in half and caused much unrest and a corresponding dissatisfaction with the civilian authorities. The unpopularity of the government, the distress of the capitalists and their inability to solve the economic problems of the country, and the unrest of the lower classes were all used by the military authorities in their efforts to obtain the acceptance of their program. In the summer of 1931, a Japanese officer was murdered in Manchuria by Chinese bandits. In September, near Mukden, there was a clash between a Japanese patrol and a few Chinese soldiers, and the Japanese army occupied Manchuria. Manchuria had been looked upon since

¹⁸ See P. T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, pp. 352 ff.

1904¹⁹ as almost a Japanese protectorate, and this "Mukden incident" was the excuse and the signal for the destruction of Chinese sovereignty. The Chinese governor was driven out; the modern mechanized Japanese army moved forward relentlessly, and by January, 1932, the Japanese reached the boundary between Manchuria and China proper. The Japanese authorities set up a "puppet" government in Manchuria with the former emperor of China as its ruler and announced the creation of the new "independent" state of Manchukuo—a state completely under Japanese control, in which Japanese military authority was supreme, and Japanese exploitation of economic resources was inevitable.

JAPAN AND CHINA

The issue was clearly drawn between Japan and China and between Japan and the Western world after 1931. Japan proposed to dominate the Far East, to control Manchuria and the northern provinces of China more or less directly, and to exert an ever-increasing economic control over the rest of China. From China, Japan expected to acquire raw materials essential to her industries, and to the countless millions of Chinese she expected to sell the products turned out by her factories.²⁰ This extension of Japanese control depended upon two things—the acquiescence of China, and a willingness on the part of the Western powers to be pushed out of positions they had worked for a century to obtain and to consolidate. Three European powers had vital economic stakes in areas that belonged, or had belonged, to China and could be expected to take an interest in Japanese progress—Great Britain in east central China, France in the region south of Canton, and Soviet Russia in Mongolia and in the northwestern provinces. The United States might be expected to resent any attempt at closing the "open door" upon which a valuable part of American trade depended.

Japan had first to reckon with China. The history of the Chinese Republic in the twenty years after the revolution had been stormy. By the end of the Great War the province of Canton was independent of the Peking (or Peiping) government. Civil war broke out in 1922 over much of China, and war lords set up little states of their own and

¹⁹ See above, page 676.

²⁰ In the manufacture of certain textiles, for instance, Japan was already exceeding the production of England. Japan could produce an infinite number of products used in the China trade so cheaply that she could undersell competitors

fought with one another to unify the provinces about them. South China, with its capital city of Canton, became the center of a nationalistic movement, or party, called the Kuomintang. Its head was Sun Yat-sen, the hero of the revolution, and its active agents were the young intellectuals who wished to reform and modernize the whole political, social, and economic structure of China. Endeavoring to stimulate the growth of Chinese nationalism, they were frankly antiforeign in their efforts to end the exploitation of China by outsiders. At first England was regarded as the chief offender, and they denounced the unequal treaties and extraterritoriality,²¹ but by 1926, the nationalists came to realize that the Japanese were the greatest menace to the China they were striving to create. They felt that the illiteracy, the poverty, and the pacifism of China's millions were the fundamental obstacles to the growth of a national spirit and to the economic independence of China. They worked, therefore, to advance education, to simplify the written language, to raise the standard of living, and to build up a feeling of Chinese solidarity against the rest of the world.

Sun Yat-sen took as an aide and adviser a Russian named Borodin, and a period of co-operation with communism was the result. Chinese communism was agrarian, nationalistic, and antiforeign; its chief bond with Russian communism was a common abhorrence of the exploitation of labor. Through much of south China, communism meant antilandlordism and a peasant people's desire for a share of the "Good Earth." The social reforms promised by the Kuomintang were retarded by the chaotic conditions and the lack of unity throughout the country. Civil disturbance was common, and civil war between the government of south China and the war lords of the north had to be fought before a central government for all China could be established. Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, and two years later the influence of Borodin came to a sudden end. The Kuomintang split into two sharply defined factions. The right wing, under the leadership of the anticommunistic General Chiang Kai-shek, established its capital at Nanking and wished to make agreements with Great Britain and other powers and to extend its control over all China. The left wing aimed at continuing the communistic policies of the earlier period and the co-operation with Moscow.

Gradually the Nanking government extended its control over all

²¹ See above, pages 674-75.

of eastern China. The war lords of the north succumbed one by one; local and provincial governments were reorganized; and outside trade was built up. The national government was an oligarchy, ruling without a parliament and without popular suffrage. Legislation was by executive decree, and Chiang Kai-shek came to bear some resemblance to other modern dictators. The regime depended upon a military force and a large group of bankers and landlords, and it functioned through young men trained in the universities. The most serious internal problem of the Nanking government was the constant warfare with the "Red armies" of the northwest where the left-wing leaders took refuge after 1927. The fundamental problem in international affairs was the aggressive policy of Japan.

The Kuomintang has been essentially a nationalistic movement. The party leaders may have been willing to compromise with Japan for the sake of peace and security, but the rank and file of the party has been increasingly anti-Japanese. Student strikes, anti-Japanese riots, and boycotts of Japanese goods increased the tension. The Japanese conquest of Manchuria was the signal for a surge of Chinese nationalism which soon grew so strong that the traditional decentralization, indifference, and pacifism of the Chinese people came to an end, and there was a genuine, widespread, popular anti-Japanese movement. China sought first (1931) the aid of the League of Nations in dealing with the violation of her sovereignty in Manchuria. Japan disclaimed any attempt to annex Chinese territory and claimed that her armies in Manchuria were conducting "police operations." The League Council discussed the Sino-Japanese question through the autumn of 1931 without reaching any conclusion. Japan blocked every suggestion and insisted that she would deal only with China and in direct negotiations. Avoiding open admission of failure by the appointment of a commission of investigation, the League postponed the consideration of the whole issue for the next year.

In the meantime, a Chinese boycott of Japanese goods so angered Japan that the military authorities retaliated (ostensibly because of the murder of a Japanese monk) by an attack upon Shanghai which lasted from January to May, 1932. The League commission, led by the British representative, Lord Lytton, made its careful survey and sent its report to the League in the winter of 1932. It rejected all of the Japanese pretexts in regard to the invasion of Manchuria, and denied flatly that Manchukuo was in any way an independent state. It recommended the creation of an autonomous state through nego-

tiations between Japan and China with the aid of the League. The great nations represented in the League were obviously unwilling to assume the responsibility of forcing the acceptance of the recommendations upon Japan and evaded any statement that Japan was an aggressor or had resorted to war in violation of her obligations to the League and of the Pact of Paris or the Nine-Power Treaty. No measure imposing sanctions against Japan was discussed, and the only penalty recommended in the League's statement on the issue was one which had been suggested by the United States—the nonrecognition of Manchukuo. Even that feeble reprimand was more than Japan would accept, and the Japanese government (March, 1933) gave notice of Japan's withdrawal from the League. The first great postwar crisis resulted, therefore, in the flouting of the League of Nations, and it was apparent for all who might wish to make the observation that the European powers were not willing to resist an "act of aggression committed by a powerful and well-armed state."

Freed from any apprehension as to the action of the Western powers, Japan proceeded to carry out her plans for the East. In April, 1934, she stated what has come to be known as the Japanese Monroe Doctrine: that Japan looked upon herself as responsible for the "maintenance of peace" in Eastern Asia and would permit no interference from other powers in the affairs of China. In 1936, she demanded naval parity with the United States and Great Britain, and, upon being refused, she considered herself free to build as large a navy as she wished. In the years after the withdrawal from the League, the Japanese advance into north China continued. Chinese coal and iron were desired, possible oil deposits were coveted, and Japan believed that cotton and wool could be produced to free her factories from dependence upon the United States and Australia. In 1937, Japan began the "undeclared war" by which she intended to acquire those advantages which she had not been able to persuade or bully the Chinese government to yield. According to Japanese reasoning, it was a step made necessary by China's refusal to "co-operate."

China had, however, learned one method of co-operation. Japanese imperialism and invasion accelerated the development of Chinese nationalism. The danger of national extinction forced the reunion of the two wings of the Kuomintang, and the communists of the north and west united with the armies of Chiang Kai-shek to repel the

invaders.²² When the Chinese chose to fight out the issue with Japan to the finish rather than to submit to the gradual encroachment upon their independence, they undertook, without outside assistance except for the infiltration of supplies, a stupendous battle in which the odds seemed to be with the adversary. Chinese resistance exceeded all Japanese calculations, and two years have been required for the capture of a large part of eastern China. Nowhere outside of the major cities and away from the main roads and railways has Japanese domination been complete, and all of the vast interior of China still defies conquest (March, 1939).

Incomplete though her victory has been, Japan has hastened to announce the exclusiveness of Japanese interest in China and the end of the day of the open door and of the dominance of Western economic interests. Whatever the outcome of the present struggle, it is evident that the old heyday of European imperialism in Eastern Asia is over. If Japan wins, Japanese economic and political domination of the East is certain. If Japan fails, a revived China will refuse to submit to control exerted by any outside power. If Japan wins, there are other areas for Japanese conquest: the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, and, above all, eastern Siberia and Mongolia. In those areas the Western nations will be faced with an issue they cannot evade. The "civilization" carried to the East in the kit bags of European traders has reacted against those who introduced it. Western control of 84 per cent of the territories of the earth has been challenged and is rapidly disappearing in the East.

THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF NAZI GERMANY

During the years of Japanese aggression in the Far East the clouds gathered in European international skies. The Disarmament Conference which had been heralded with such high hopes was forced to bring its futile sessions to an end in 1933 without any more notable accomplishment than the tacit admission that no compromise could be reached between the French demand for security and the German demand for parity.²³ The year of the failure of the Disarma-

²² Edgar Snow's *Red Star over China* gives a vivid picture of the western forces and of the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek in the winter of 1936 and the union of all China against Japan. *Inside Red China*, by Nym Wales, and *The Dragon Wakes*, by Edgar Ansel Mowrer, carry the story of the Sino-Japanese War to 1939.

²³ See above, pages 789-95.

ment Conference saw the rise to power of Hitler in Germany. The new leadership was quickly made manifest in the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations (October, 1933). The first major step in the revision of the Treaty of Versailles was taken with the announcement of Germany's intention to proceed with rearmament (March, 1935). In the same month the Saar plebiscite was taken in accordance with the treaty of 1919, and the vote was overwhelmingly in favor of return to Germany. Alarmed at the revival of German power, France turned to her old ally, Russia, and in May, 1935, a Franco-Soviet treaty of alliance was drawn up. This alliance was strengthened somewhat later by an agreement between Russia and Czechoslovakia. In the meantime, the British government wavered in its German policy. A large body of British opinion had long been convinced that Germany had a legitimate grievance and that some amelioration of conditions must be undertaken. This group had deplored the French attitude toward Germany and welcomed the possibility of a revival of Germany as a European market and also as a bulwark against Russia. England was antagonized, however, by Germany's withdrawal from the League and by the brusque repudiation of treaty terms. Hitler's anti-Semitic policy was condemned in England, also, and the British government hesitated as to what course to take. In June, 1935, the trend toward friendship with Germany was uppermost, and England condoned the German violation of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles by recognizing the right of Germany to ignore the naval restrictions of the treaty, up to 35 per cent of British strength, and to build the submarines which were expressly prohibited in the treaty. Germany met the challenge offered by the Franco-Soviet "encirclement" alliance by the movement of German troops into the Rhineland (March, 1936) and the repudiation of the clauses in the Treaty of Versailles that had demilitarized that area.

The balance of power created by the peace treaties was irrevocably altered by the revival of German power. The hegemony of France was challenged, and the position of England was seriously affected. The system by which France, through her chain of alliances, had been able to dominate Europe, as England withdrew largely from Continental affairs, while both of them acted together in procuring the action of the League of Nations for all minor questions, came to an end with 1933. The League of Nations was badly damaged by its failure to exert any real influence in the Manchurian crisis and

was further injured by the withdrawal of Germany and Japan. The imperialistic policy of Mussolini in 1935 delivered another shock to international relations and another damaging blow to the prestige of the League of Nations. The Italian dictator had been loud in his condemnation of the postwar settlement of colonial affairs, and had openly stated Italian needs and ambitions. So often had Italian grievances been aired that few European statesmen believed that the demands would be followed by action. In 1935, Mussolini put his threats into operation. In January there was a Franco-Italian agreement by which French acquiescence was secured for an Italian advance in Africa.²⁴ In October the Italian troops entered Abyssinia (Ethiopia), and the campaign to acquire "revenge for Adowa"²⁵ was under way.

THE ITALIAN CONQUEST OF ETHIOPIA

Since both Italy and Abyssinia were members of the League of Nations, the League was faced with the same problem it had failed to solve in the Sino-Japanese crisis of 1933. This time one of the powers involved was a great European state. The League hesitated but concluded that some action would have to be taken. Article 11, which had been invoked and had proved inadequate in 1933, provided only for Council discussion and recommendation. In 1935 the League appeared to be ready to use all the power with which it was invested in the application of Article 16, the clauses of which provided for economic sanctions against the party deemed to be the aggressor in the dispute.²⁶ In October, the Council of the League denounced Italy as an aggressor and issued instructions for the imposition of sanctions. A boycott was announced on all Italian exports, all direct and indirect loans and credits were to be refused, and an embargo was placed on a long list of articles, including rubber and scrap iron but not including oil. A number of states refused to co-operate or gave only qualified support, and the sanctions were of such partial effect that the Italians were irritated but were not deterred. Italian opinion was consolidated behind a project for which there had previously been little enthusiasm, and Mussolini announced that an embargo on oil would mean the danger of European war.

²⁴ France obviously hoped to secure Italian friendship in European affairs.

²⁵ See above, pages 773 ff.

²⁶ An unofficial "peace ballot" of the British electorate in 1935 gave an overwhelming majority of 12,000,000 votes in favor of sanctions against aggressors.

The sanctions went into effect in November, 1935, and lasted in a halfhearted fashion until July, 1936. Abyssinia pleaded for effective aid from the League, and even the United States, a nonmember state, indicated a willingness to co-operate in more stringent measures and passed a neutrality act providing for an arms embargo that might be extended to other commodities used in warfare. Upon France and England fell the responsibility of decision. Neither power wanted to endanger the peace of Europe. Mussolini's naval strength in the Mediterranean alarmed the British, who had been loathe to take energetic steps toward rearmament. France was anxious to win Italian friendship and to prevent any Italian-German accord. From that situation came vacillation. A British fleet was sent to the Mediterranean, but the Suez Canal remained open for the passage of Italian troop ships. Neither military nor naval sanctions were undertaken, and no embargo was put upon oil. In December, 1935, Great Britain and France endeavored to satisfy Mussolini and at the same time to save a remnant of Ethiopian territory and sovereignty. This new offer was the "Hoare-Laval" plan.²⁷ When the terms of the agreement leaked out there was such an uproar in England that the whole project was dropped and Sir Samuel Hoare resigned. The alternatives, however, were equally unsatisfactory, for England must either take armed action against Italy, probably without French support, or permit the extinction of Abyssinian independence. In May, 1936, Italy announced the conquest and the annexation of Ethiopia, and in July the League withdrew the sanctions which had long since proved ineffective. The last important independent native state of Africa was snuffed out, the League of Nations was hopelessly discredited, and the powers that had directed European affairs throughout the years since the war had been successfully defied by an aggressor state. The episode presaged ill for the future.

THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS

The most alarming phase of the Abyssinian crisis was the formation of what was later called the Rome-Berlin axis. Mussolini was a realist in international policy. The revival of German power meant a renewal of German interest in Austria. Nazi activity in Vienna

²⁷ Drawn up by Sir Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval, the foreign ministers of their respective countries.

was apparent as soon as Hitler was well established in Berlin, and the publication of *Mein Kampf* was a frank announcement of Nazi intention to assert control over Austria. Mussolini faced the situation squarely and decided that his interests in Austria were not large enough to warrant a war with Germany. He preferred that Austria remain independent but refused to take any action against Germany on that issue. Italian acquiescence in a German thrust eastward might mean German support for Italian projects. This was the beginning of the alliance between the dictator states. The first formal recognition of this Fascist combination came in October, 1936, with the signing of a treaty in Berlin by which Italy and Germany agreed to seek a four-power nonaggression agreement (Great Britain and France were to be asked to enter the agreement); to unite in a campaign against communism; to recognize the Spanish rebels; to make a trade agreement; and to divide Central and Southeastern Europe into two 'spheres of influence. A few weeks after the formation of the Rome-Berlin axis, a similar pact was signed by the representatives of Germany and Japan, pledging both powers to unite to stamp out communism. A year later Italy joined the Berlin-Tokyo entente, and the Fascist states presented a united front to the world.

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

The adventure in Abyssinia successfully over, at least so far as the initial conquest and annexation were concerned, Mussolini turned his attention to the field in which his major interests lay—the Mediterranean, the *Mare Nostrum* of the days of the Caesars and, if Mussolini could encompass it, the *Mare Nostrum* of twentieth-century Fascist Italy. A Fascist Spain under Italian direction would obviously be a great asset to a dictator bent on the domination of the Mediterranean. A Fascist Spain might render untenable the British position in Gibraltar and the French control over Morocco. From a friendly and debtor Spain might be obtained an island air and submarine base from which to menace British Gibraltar and the British "life line" to the Suez Canal. With Spain under Italian tutelage, France would be vulnerable on two fronts and subject to the joint attack of the dictator states. Economic motives influenced Mussolini, also, for Spain was rich in iron, coal, copper, and mercury. The army revolt in Spain in July, 1936, led by General Francisco Franco, received Italian good wishes from the beginning, if, indeed, it had not been

initiated in Italy. Using the Spanish Foreign Legion and Spanish-trained Moors from Africa, Franco took Seville and advanced against Madrid. Northwestern rebel troops under the pro-Nazi-pro-Fascist General Mola moved southwards from their headquarters in Burgos. The Spanish government held northeastern Spain and probably the allegiance of a great majority of the Spanish people. The Rebel leader early announced his intention of establishing a government similar to that of Italy and Germany. The pressure of war soon forced the reformist government further to the left, and the Loyalist war aims indicated a desire for a moderately socialistic regime.

Within a few weeks of the beginning of the civil war in Spain, it was apparent that Italian good wishes were being expressed in concrete form. Twenty-one military planes were sent from Italy to Spanish Morocco before the end of July, 1936, and from that time forward much of the superiority of Franco's forces in guns, tanks, planes, aviators, and even in troops was due to the presence of Italian—and later German—equipment and men. Italian and German submarines and naval forces played an active part in preventing supplies from reaching the Loyalist forces. Russian representatives had long been at work in Spain's industrial areas, especially in Barcelona, and French socialists extended much sympathy to Spain. From Russia and over the French border came supplies, experts, and volunteers. Anti-Fascist Italians and anti-Nazi Germans joined English and American idealists and soldiers of fortune in foreign brigades for the service of the Loyalists. From the beginning the Spanish War was a world war in miniature. When the Rebel forces were unable to capture Madrid, and it became apparent that no brief campaign could crush the spirit of the Spanish people, Fascist aid poured in to support Franco in such profusion that it was incomparably greater than any support given the Loyalists by anti-Fascist sympathizers. It is probable that, if at any time during the conflict all foreign aid could have been taken away from both sides, the Loyalists would have been able to bring the war to an end.

Afraid that out of the Spanish situation a general European war might result and at the same time alarmed at the threat of a leftist movement in Spain if the Loyalists should win, the Western powers regarded the Spanish situation as extremely dangerous. British opinion was hopelessly divided, with a large group of the Conservatives undoubtedly favoring Franco as the defender of the propertied classes, while other elements in the party considered that a Fascist victory

would be a devastating blow to the British Empire. English liberals were pro-Loyalist and in some cases preferred open clash with Italy to the desertion of Spanish interests. French sympathies were divided, also, with the weight of opinion on the side of the Loyalists, but with the government determined to avoid war. The net result of this confusion, of undeclared war, of unacknowledged assistance, and of intervention, alternately admitted and denied, was an outward adherence on the part of European powers to a nonintervention policy that preserved a semblance of international accord while it ignored the realities of the situation. In August, 1936, at French suggestion, a nonintervention committee was set up to prevent an international conflict and to bring about an arms embargo for both sides. England and France agreed to the policy at once; after much argument, Russia, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and twenty-one other European states joined the Nonintervention Committee. There was never the slightest real effort made on the part of the powers most concerned with the outcome of the conflict to put the recommendations of the committee into effect. Fascist and Communist governments asserted that each would enforce the embargo when the other did. Lip service to nonintervention elsewhere covered a confusion of sentiments in which fear and hypocrisy predominated. In 1937, the United States extended the Neutrality Act of August, 1935, to cover the civil war in Spain, and, in effect, joined the nonintervention policy of the European powers by which Franco was granted almost unlimited support while all supplies were gradually cut off from the Loyalists.

The "Little World War" has been a proving ground for new types of warfare, for forces, and for ideas. It has been, in a degree more apparent than in any other conflict, an ideological war, and it has been a warning that if it should develop into a great war the ideological struggle might well tear civilization asunder. At the same time it might be well to keep in mind that there are intensely material aspects of the conflict. Iron abounds in northern Spain, copper is plentiful there also. There are mercury and lead mines south of Madrid, and other mineral deposits of great value are known to exist. Spanish Morocco also has iron, lead, and manganese. Economically and strategically Spain is important, and, ideology aside, the conflict is a vital one in its material stakes.

The resistance of the Spanish Loyalists against overwhelming odds was a surprise to the whole world, especially to the Italian

Duce, and an embarrassment to the Nonintervention Committee and to the British government. Early in 1938 a treaty was drawn up between England and Italy which provided for British recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and the withdrawal of Italian assistance to General Franco. The agreement did not immediately go into effect since Italy hoped that a decisive Loyalist defeat might ensure a Fascist Spain. The Loyalists, however, refused to be crushed by Franco's advances, and the British government in November, 1938, permitted the agreement to go into effect without the withdrawal of Italian support, as a part of the policy of "appeasement" of the dictators.²⁸ Fascist interference with Loyalist trade, especially with attempts to obtain food and munitions, led to piratical activities in the Mediterranean in 1937. Vigorous protests from England and other powers caused a lessening of these submarine and air attacks, and the pro-Franco states turned their attention to securing a recognition of the belligerency of the Rebel forces, for such recognition would make it possible for Franco to establish a legal naval blockade of Loyalist ports and thus cut off the supplies on which the decreasing Loyalist areas depend. Air bombardment of urban areas was resorted to in an attempt to undermine Loyalist morale.

In October, 1938, the Loyalist government sent all of its foreign volunteers out of Spain, and Italy pretended to put the agreement with England into effect by the withdrawal of 10,000 men. Fresh Italian troops and an influx of supplies from the Fascist states early in 1939, however, made possible renewed attacks on the part of the Franco-Italian forces. With the French frontier closed and supplies from the outside world almost completely stopped, the Loyalist government fought with its back to the wall. Late in January Barcelona fell into Insurgent hands. The retreating Loyalist troops were driven across the border into France, and by the end of February the Spanish Republic seemed near its end. England and France recognized the Franco government regardless of the continuance of Mussolini's control in Spain and with only the vaguest of pledges of amnesty for the Loyalist supporters. The abandonment of Spain to the mercy of Fascism was implicit in the hypocritical nonintervention policy, and the blame for the defeat of the democratic Loyalist government must lie, in part, at the door of France, England, and the United States.

²⁸ See below, page 899.

The results of this phase of the "appeasement" policy remain to be seen. The menace to France of an Italian-dominated Spain across the Pyrenees frontier, and to England of hostile areas back of Gibraltar, may be counteracted by Spanish dependence upon French and English financial assistance for rehabilitation. Germany and Italy may be able to maintain Fascist domination in Spain, but the gratitude of Franco is problematical, and Spanish dislike for foreign control is traditional and deep-seated. The Spanish problem may long add to the complications of European international relations.²⁹

THE ANSCHLUSS BY FORCE

The Italian Duce secured German acquiescence and some German assistance for his Spanish enterprise by compliance in Herr Hitler's plans for Central Europe. Such compliance meant the abandonment of Italy's cherished policy of the maintenance of Austrian independence. Until the formation of the Rome-Berlin axis, Mussolini's influence in Austria was predominant, and the buffer state between the German nation and the Tyrolese Germans was considered essential to Italy's welfare. Mussolini encouraged the suppression of trade unionism and socialism in Vienna and the organization of an Austrian Fascist government. Chancellor Dollfuss was under both Italian protection and Italian pressure until his death in 1934. The progress of Hitler, from the days when he consciously copied the tactics of the Italian dictator to the moment when he claimed equality and the recognition of his interests in Southeastern Europe, will perhaps not end until the Duce admits that the pupil has become the master, and that Italy, as a German newspaper has dared to state, has become an outpost of Nazi Germany. In 1934 the Austrian Nazi party, with secret assistance from Germany, attempted to seize control of the government in Vienna. The attempt failed, but Chancellor Dollfuss was assassinated during its brief period of violence. His successor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, directed every effort from 1934 to 1938 to prevent further attempts against Austrian sovereignty and independ-

²⁹ It is difficult to list reading material for the events of the last two or three years. The annual surveys by A. C. Eurich and E. C. Wilson entitled *In 1936* and *in 1937* are good and will, presumably, be followed by other volumes. The little monthly magazine, *Events*, to which many well-informed historians and political scientists contribute, is one of the best and most readable of the periodical accounts.

ence.⁸⁰ He placed his reliance upon the Fatherland Front⁸¹ and refused to permit the activities of any other political parties and of any private semimilitary organizations. He refused to tolerate any socialist ideas or activities but welcomed former socialist workers into the Fatherland Front and conciliated them by dismissing the pro-Italian officials who had aided in the attack upon the socialists of Vienna in 1934. He tried to build up Austria's army and introduced universal conscription in violation of the Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye. He bought tanks and airplanes and other materials to mechanize the army. Young Austrians were wooed by a great State Youth movement, and the workers were conciliated by a promise of "a fairer division" of the national income. Every effort was made to obtain the co-operation of the Catholic Church and of the peasantry.

Austrian pride had been injured by the abortive Nazi *Putsch* of 1934, and loyal Austrians backed Schuschnigg's nationalistic program of defense, unity, and independence. Relations between Germany and Austria were bad, trade fell off, tourist intercourse declined, and Austrian Nazis were suppressed. In July, 1936, an agreement was made between Schuschnigg and the German ambassador in an effort to relieve the strained relations. The German government expressly recognized the independence of Austria and her right to deal with the Austrian National Socialists as "exclusively an Austrian question." Austria on her part agreed to pursue a friendly policy and economic co-operation. Schuschnigg later agreed to an amnesty for political prisoners and at some later time to take into the Austrian government some Nazi representatives. These arrangements failed to produce good relations, and Hitler decided early in 1938 to revert to the violent *Putsch* measures that had failed in 1934. In January a Nazi conspiracy was nipped in the bud by the vigilant Austrian police, and a month later, after Hitler had consolidated his control over the German army, Schuschnigg was summoned to Berchtesgaden to receive a German ultimatum, the exact terms of which are not known. Upon his return to Vienna, he issued an amnesty for those arrested in the January conspiracy and appointed several Nazis to cabinet posts. The most important of these was Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart who,

⁸⁰ Schuschnigg's own account of his years in office, entitled *My Austria*, has recently been translated into English.

⁸¹ A party which Dollfuss had originated, composed largely of conservative Catholic, pro-Fascist but anti-Nazi elements. It was broadened by Schuschnigg to include all Austrians who were willing to join it.

as minister of the interior, obtained control over the Austrian police. Seyss-Inquart went at once to Berlin to confer with Hitler and with Himmler, the head of the German secret police.

Chancellor Schuschnigg made a great public address to the Austrian people in which he asserted that, in the Berchtesgaden conversations, Hitler had again pledged to respect Austrian independence, and he followed the speech by the announcement of a plebiscite in which all Austrians over twenty-four years of age would be asked to approve or disapprove his policy of independence for Austria. It is probable that between 30 and 40 per cent of the population favored a Nazi *Anschluss*, while approximately the same number was violently opposed to it. The plebiscite was to be protected by such restrictions that the Austrian Nazis were furious and appealed to Germany for aid. Hitler responded by an ultimatum demanding that the plebiscite be postponed and later further demanded that Schuschnigg resign. Troops were massed on the Austrian frontier, and a threat of force was used to back the ultimatum. Feeling that resistance was useless and certain that no aid could be expected from any European government, Schuschnigg resigned on March 11. His last words to the Austrian people were spoken over the radio and announced his forced withdrawal, his farewell, and affection, and ended: "God protect Austria." Seyss-Inquart was then appointed chancellor; his first radio speech to the Austrian people ended on the note, "One people, one Reich, one Leader. Hail to our Leader! *Heil* Hitler!" Early the next morning German troops and police poured into Austria, and on March 14 Hitler made his triumphal entry into Vienna. Independent Austria came to an end, and the European powers that had created it twenty years before stood by without protest at its demise.

Austria was the first great objective of the German Führer as announced in the book *Mein Kampf*, which European statesmen have at last come to take as the serious platform of the policy of the Third Reich. This policy of absorbing into the Reich the ten million European Germans who had been left outside the boundaries of postwar Germany made notable advance in the annexation of Austria. The next area considered vital for the realization of Nazi plans was the Sudeten German districts of the republic of Czechoslovakia. The Sudeten problem was not new; it was as old as the republic itself, and, indeed, even then it was just a reversal of the Czech problem of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. But it had not been allowed

to become a crucial one until Nazi Germany was ready to meet the crisis that would inevitably accompany an incitement of Sudeten passions.

THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CRISIS

The republic of Czechoslovakia had been created out of the old province of Bohemia with the addition of a long strip of territory lying to the eastward, including Slovak, Polish, Ruthenian, and Hungarian peoples. In the long years when the peoples and territories of the republic were within the Austro-Hungarian Empire there had been a mingling of populations and considerable moving about so that it was difficult in 1920 to draw a boundary that did not create a number of minority problems. Czechoslovak minorities, like those of other countries, were protected by a minority treaty and had the right of appeal to the League of Nations. Next to the Slovaks, the German minority was the largest, numbering about three million and constituting about 23 per cent of the population. These Germans lived largely along the German border on the northwest and along the Austrian border on the southwest. In the years after 1919 there were many causes for friction between the dominant Czechs and the minority groups. The author of a recent book on Czechoslovakia states:

It is not difficult to understand the mistakes which have been made by Czechoslovakia since 1919; often it is difficult to see how they could have been avoided . . . It is really remarkable to find that Sudeten Germans who have consistently preached treason against the Republic in many cases live free and unmolested in its midst; no dictatorship would allow such a thing.⁸²

The grievances of the Sudeten Germans were political, economic, and cultural. They claimed that Czechs were appointed to office in Sudetenland, that the policy of settling agrarian difficulties led to the expropriation of the property of the German landlords, and that the constitution and parliamentary procedure of the republic favored the Czech majority. Parts of the Sudeten area had been in economic distress before the war, and conditions there did not improve in the postwar period. The Sudeten textile industries were insolvent during much of the history of the republic, and their distress was increased by the tariffs imposed by all of the succession states. Before the war

⁸² Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans* (Oxford University Press), p. 273.

the textile and other industries of the Sudeten Germans had had the whole Austro-Hungarian Empire as a market; after the war the trade was hampered by countless restrictions, and the industrialists blamed the Czech government for all their woes. The great iron and ammunition works were Czech-owned and were given special governmental support. The coming of the world depression increased the economic unrest and gave rise to numerous complaints of favoritism in the distribution of employment in government works and in the matter of relief. The cultural difficulties were perhaps the most irritating and arose from the questions of language, schools, the theatre and the opera, and even of support of religion. To all of these complaints the government listened, and for many of them it endeavored to find a solution. Undoubtedly, however, there was some discrimination and injustice, just as there had been discrimination against the Czechs and Slovaks in the days when a dominant German Magyar majority had ruled the empire. The Czechoslovak government was democratic, and the Germans had civil and political rights in the republic. They were no more aware of the censorship, or of the police than were the Czechs, and had the same position in the courts as Czech citizens. Had it not been for the situation in the German Reich it might have been possible for Czechs and Germans in co-operation to have worked out a system under which they could have lived together in concord.

The National Socialist revolution in Germany meant a profound change in all Central Europe, and the announced intention on the part of the Nazi leader of aiding all Germans outside the Reich made impossible an amicable solution of the Sudeten problem. With the advent of Hitler and his emotional appeal to the German people both within and outside the Reich and his remarkable use of every agency of propaganda, there was a psychological union with Germany and a psychological war against the alien majorities that controlled the state in which the Sudeten Germans lived. A Nazi party was formed in Sudetenland early and at once began its attacks upon the government. Nazi activities in Austria and the plebiscite by which the Saar returned to Germany in 1935 increased the activity of the Sudeten Nazis. A leader was found in Konrad Henlein, and the party organization kept in close touch with German Nazi authorities.

With the increasing Nazi menace, the Czech government under President Benes³³ increased its fortifications, made an alliance with

³³ President Masaryk retired in 1935

Russia, and concentrated power in the hands of the central government by a comprehensive defense law. The Czech-Sudeten German relations after 1935 reflected clearly the trend of international affairs. As Germany grew more powerful, the demands of Henlein and his party were more vociferous and more extreme, and the Czech government grew more apprehensive as it was placed more and more on the defensive. It became evident that Germany wished to force a surrender of the Russian alliance and the admission of Henlein and some of his party leaders into key posts in the government. The Czech government in 1937 tried to compromise with grants of limited self-government to the Sudeten Germans, only to have Slovaks, Poles, and Ruthenians demand the same concessions. In April, 1938, Henlein listed eight points in what came to be known as his Karlsbad program, and refused to be content with less. The "program" presented a demand for an autonomy so complete that Sudetenland would have become a "state within a state" and Czechoslovak sovereignty would have been at an end in a district ruled from Berlin. The German-controlled press fulminated against Czech "persecution" and "atrocities" and threatened direct action if all Sudeten demands were not met.

The fate of Czechoslovakia depended upon the support of the states with whom she had alliances—France, the Little Entente, and Russia. Back of France stood Great Britain, and in the last analysis, the continued existence of Czechoslovakia depended upon Great Britain. Between April and September, 1938, the crucial question in European relations was whether Great Britain and France would furnish the support the Czech government needed and whether, if that support should be forthcoming, the German threats would eventuate in war. On September 12, 1938, the German Führer made his long-awaited, frenzied, hate-filled, fear-inspiring speech at the Nuremberg Nazi party celebration, and the world awaited in intolerable tension the choice of peace or war. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain made his dramatic air journeys to Godesberg and to Berchtesgaden. In the end, he and Premier Daladier of France chose peace for the moment and the appeasement of Germany, and refused to test the sincerity of the Führer's warlike threats. Czechoslovakia was deserted in her hour of need, and "war by blackmail" was once more successful. The Munich pact left Czechoslovakia to dismemberment at the will of Germany. Sudetenland was taken over and "Nazified." Poland and Hungary were given their compensation, and a defense-

less and sadly shrunken Czech Republic was left to bring her economic and political system into accord with Hitler's designs. The German way to the East lay open. Southeastern Europe heard the voice of fate and began to make what terms were necessary to conform to the dominant will. The advance of Germany into the Sudeten areas not only made Czechoslovakia indefensible, but at the same time deprived Europe of the possible use of the fortifications and armies of the Czech Republic in case of a general European war.

England and France, in the hands of conservative leaders, gave evidence of their unwillingness to defend democratic states from the aggressive policies of the Fascist powers. Feeling that German strength was too great to be denied a large measure of satisfaction and reluctant to risk a general war or to depend upon the assistance of Soviet Russia, the British and the French prime ministers stood aside and left open the way for Germany's progress eastward. Such progress would pit Germany against Russia, and a possible future conflict between those powers was regarded as far less dangerous to the interests of the Western states than any other form of satisfaction of German ambitions. Both in Spain and in Central Europe, two of the main considerations for the British and French ruling classes were the preservation of their own power and the prevention of any increase of strength in the ranks of the radicals within their respective states.

It is too soon to make any estimate of the ultimate consequences of the surrender to the policy of appeasement, and far too near the emotional strain of the crisis to form any judgment of the motives or the reasons back of the action of the so-called democratic powers. The air is filled with the tales of those who claim to know the inside story and of those who are ready to praise or condemn without full information. Suffice it to say that one more crisis was faced, and the solution reached was another surrender. Peace was preserved for the moment but at a great cost. Peace at any price is an understandable doctrine to those who hate and dread war. Will the price ever become too great? Can war ever be preferable to even a dearly purchased peace? And, indeed, is there any assurance that it is peace which has been so dearly bought? The future, perhaps the near future, contains the answer to those questions. For the present it is "peace within our time." The road to Armageddon is a hard one to travel, but once upon that road it is difficult for weary feet to find a bypath to peace and freedom. The events of the recent years lead one to

agree with the words of a former British prime minister who said, "I will not write myself down a pessimist, but I will say that at times I feel that I am living in a madhouse."

READINGS

GENERAL ACCOUNTS. The reading for the recent years is scattered. The correspondents for the Associated Press, the United Press, and the great metropolitan papers furnish the best source of information. Richard Freund's *Zero Hour* (1937) is excellent. John Gunther's *Inside Europe* (1938 edition) is extremely interesting. Walter Millis's *Viewed without Alarm Europe Today* (1937) takes an entirely different point of view. The title of Douglas Reed's book, *Insanity Fair: A European Cavalcade* (1938), is sufficient indication of its character. William Orton's *Twenty Years' Armistice* and F. H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, *The Great Powers in World Politics* (1937), cited before, are still useful. Liddell Hart's *Europe in Arms* (1937) describes the armed strength of European states. The annual publications of Alvin Eurich and Elmo Wilson, *In 1936* and *In 1937*, published early in each year are useful summaries. The first months of 1939 have seen the publication of a number of extremely interesting books by well-informed writers. *The Betrayal: Central Europe* (1939) by G. E. R. Gedye carries the story of Austria from 1922 to 1938 and ends with the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia. Vera Micheles Dean's *Europe in Retreat* (1939) is a concise, informative account of the recent years, while *Europe on the Eve: The Crises of Diplomacy 1933-1939* (1939) by Frederick Schuman is a bitter, disillusioned indictment of European nations and statesmen. *South of Hitler* (1939) by M. W. Fodor is in large part a compilation of brilliant articles which have appeared in the *Manchester Guardian*. *Days of Our Years* by Pierre Paassens is the work of a newspaper correspondent with a philosophical approach to the problems he discusses. Nora Waln, a Quaker, has written *Reaching for the Stars* (1939) in which she makes a sincere attempt to understand Nazi Germany. *Men Must Act* (1939) by Lewis Mumford and *When There Is No Peace* (1939) by Hamilton Fish Armstrong are contributions to the subject of the European crisis.

SPECIAL AREAS. M. W. Childs's *Sweden: The Middle Way* (1936) is an interesting account of Sweden's solution of many social and economic problems. Elizabeth Wiskemann's *Czechs and Germans* (1938) is a recent and authoritative account of the minorities problem of Czechoslovakia from 1919 to 1938. Hans Kohn's *Western Civilization in the Near East* (1936) is interesting. William Miller's *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors* (1934) carries the Turkish succession states to that date. Two very

recent books on Spain are *The Politics of Modern Spain* (1938) by Frank Manuel and *The Tree of Guernika* (1938) by George Steer. A. E. Zimmern, *The Third British Empire* (1934) deals with the British Empire, while C. H. van Tyne's *India in Ferment* (1923) and Sir V. Chirol's *India* (1926) discuss the affairs of one of the oldest parts of the empire. Vincent Sheean's *Personal History* (1937) is useful for the Spanish war in Morocco and for the brief communist regime in China. Two very valuable books on the Far East came out in 1938: A. W. Griswold's *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*, and *The Far East: An International Survey* by H. S. Quigley and George H. Blakeslee. Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China* is an absorbingly interesting first-hand account of the communistic and nationalistic regime in northwest China. Nym Wales and Edgar Ansel Mowrer, the authors of *Inside Red China* (1939) and *The Dragon Wakes* (1939), continue the journalists' accounts of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

General accounts include such books as Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe*, 2 vols. (1932); Harry Elmer Barnes, *The History of Western Civilization*, Vol. II (1935); C. D. Hazen, *Europe since 1815*, 2 vols. (1923); J. S. Schapiro, *Modern and Contemporary European History 1815-1928* (1929); E. Achorn, *European Civilization and Politics since 1815* (1934); E. Fueter, *World History, 1815-1920* (1924); Preston Slosson, *Europe since 1870* (1935); G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919* (1923); F. L. Bennis, *Europe since 1914* (1931); W. E. Langsam, *The World since 1914* (1935).

Among the source readings which the student will find of especial value are James Harvey Robinson, *Readings in European History*, 2 vols. (1904); J. H. Robinson and Charles A. Beard, *Readings in Modern History*, 2 vols. (1908-1909); H. Webster, *Readings in Medieval and Modern History* (1917), *Readings in Modern History* (1926), and *Historical Selections* (1929); A. N. Cook, *Readings in Modern and Contemporary History* (1936); F. M. Anderson, *Constitutional and Other Select Documents Illustrating the History of France, 1789-1901* (1904-1908); J. F. Scott and A. Baltzly, *Readings in European History since 1814* (1930).

Economic histories richly supplement any study of the modern period. Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe* (1936); Clive Day, *History of Commerce* (Revised edition, 1922); and W. Bowden, M. Karpovich, and A. P. Usher, *An Economic History of Europe since 1750* (1937) are all recommended.

Of the encyclopedias, *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (1930-35) and *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* (14th ed., 1929) are standard and authoritative. The student should acquaint himself with W. R. Shepherd, *Historical Atlas* (Revised edition, 1921) and Putnam's *Historical Atlas* (1927).

Magazines useful for the recent period include *The Living Age*, *Time*, *The Nation*, *The New Republic* (weekly), *Events*, *Current History* (monthly), and *Foreign Affairs*, *The Yale Review* (quarterly). Especially good is the foreign news service of *The New York Times*; *The Chicago Daily News*; *The Christian Science Monitor*.

THE MAJOR COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND THEIR RULERS DURING VARIOUS PERIODS SINCE 1500

FRANCE

Louis XII, 1498-1515	Louis XVI, 1774-1792
Francis I, 1515-1547	<i>Republic</i> , 1792-1804 (under Napoleon as First Consul after 1799)
Henry II, 1547-1559	Napoleon I (Emperor), 1804-1814
Francis II, 1559-1560	Louis XVIII, 1814-1824
Charles IX, 1560-1574	Charles X, 1824-1830
Henry III, 1574-1589	Louis Philippe, 1830-1848
Henry IV, 1589-1610	<i>Second Republic</i> , 1848-1852
Louis XIII, 1610-1643	Napoleon III (Emperor), 1852-1870
Louis XIV, 1643-1715	<i>Third Republic</i> , 1870—
Louis XV, 1715-1774	

ENGLAND AND IRELAND, 1485-1603

SCOTLAND ADDED IN 1603

Henry VII (King of England), 1485-1509	William III and Mary II, 1689-1694 (William III to 1702)
Henry VIII, 1509-1547	Anne, 1702-1714
Edward VI, 1547-1553	George I, 1714-1727
Mary I, 1553-1558	George II, 1727-1760
Elizabeth, 1558-1603	George III, 1760-1820
James I (James VI of Scotland), 1603-1625	George IV, 1820-1830
Charles I, 1625-1649	William IV, 1830-1837
<i>Republic</i> (as Commonwealth and Protectorate), 1649-1660	Victoria, 1837-1901
Charles II, 1660-1685	Edward VII, 1901-1910
James II (James VII of Scotland), 1685-1688	George V, 1910-1936
	Edward VIII, 1936
	George VI, 1936—

AUSTRIA AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Maximilian I (Archduke), 1493-1519	Ferdinand III, 1637-1657
Charles I (Charles V in the Holy Roman Empire), 1519-1556	Leopold I, 1658-1705
Ferdinand I, 1556-1564	Joseph I, 1705-1711
Maximilian II, 1564-1576	Charles II (Charles VI in the Holy Roman Empire), 1711-1740
Rudolph II, 1576-1612	Maria Theresa, 1740-1780
Matthias, 1612-1619	Joseph II, 1780-1790
Ferdinand II, 1619-1637	Leopold II, 1790-1792

Francis I (Francis II in the Holy Roman Empire, after 1806 Emperor of Austria), 1792-1835	Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary)
Ferdinand I, 1835-1848	Charles I, 1916-1918
Francis Joseph, 1848-1916 (after 1867	<i>Republic</i> , 1918-1938
	<i>Anschluss</i> with Germany, 1938

THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

Maximilian I, 1493-1519	Leopold I, 1658-1705
Charles V, 1519-1556	Joseph I, 1705-1711
Ferdinand I, 1556-1564	Charles VI, 1711-1740
Maximilian II, 1564-1576	Charles VII, 1742-1745
Rudolph II, 1576-1612	Francis I, 1745-1765
Matthias, 1612-1619	Joseph II, 1765-1790
Ferdinand II, 1619-1637	Leopold II, 1790-1792
Ferdinand III, 1637-1657	Francis II, 1792-1806

PRUSSIA

Frederick William, 1640-1688	Frederick William II, 1786-1797
Frederick III, 1688-1713 (King as Frederick I after 1701)	Frederick William III, 1797-1840
Frederick William I, 1713-1740	Frederick William IV, 1840-1861
Frederick II, 1740-1786	William I, 1861-1888 (merged with German Empire in 1871)

GERMANY

Part of Holy Roman Empire to 1806	William II, 1888-1918
German Confederation, 1815-1866	<i>Republic</i> , 1918— (since 1933 the
William I (Emperor), 1871-1888	Nazi dictatorship)
Frederick III, 1888	

ITALY

Victor Emmanuel II, 1861-1878 (King of Sardinia, 1849-1861)	Victor Emmanuel III, 1900— (under Fascist Dictatorship since 1922)
Humbert, 1878-1900	

THE PAPACY

<i>During the Renaissance and Reformation</i>	<i>After 1800</i>
Alexander VI, 1492-1503	Pius V, 1566-1572
Pius III, 1503	Pius VII, 1800-1823
Julius II, 1503-1513	Leo XII, 1823-1829
Leo X, 1513-1521	Pius VIII, 1829-1830
Adrian VI, 1522-1523	Gregory XVI, 1831-1846
Clement VII, 1523-1534	Pius IX, 1846-1878
Paul III, 1534-1549	Leo XIII, 1878-1903
Julius III, 1550-1555	Pius X, 1903-1914
Marcellus II, 1555	Benedict XV, 1914-1922
Paul IV, 1555-1559	Pius XI, 1922-1939
Pius IV, 1559-1565	Pius XII, 1939—

RUSSIA

Ivan III, 1462-1505	Ivan VI, 1740-1741
Basil IV, 1505-1533	Elizabeth, 1741-1762
Ivan IV, 1533-1584	Peter III, 1762
Theodore I, 1584-1598	Catherine II, 1762-1796
Boris Godunov, 1598-1605	Paul, 1796-1801
Michael, 1613-1645	Alexander I, 1801-1825
Alexius, 1645-1676	Nicholas I, 1825-1855
Theodore II, 1676-1682	Alexander II, 1855-1881
Ivan V and Peter I, 1682-1689	Alexander III, 1881-1894
(Peter I, alone, to 1725)	Nicholas II, 1894-1917
Catherine I, 1725-1727	<i>Republic</i> , 1917
Peter II, 1727-1730	The U.S.S.R., 1923—
Anna, 1730-1740	

SPAIN

Ferdinand and Isabella, 1479-1504	Charles III, 1759-1788
(Ferdinand and Philip I, 1504-1506)	Charles IV, 1788-1808
(Ferdinand and Charles I, 1506-1516)	Joseph Bonaparte, 1808-1813
Charles I (Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire), 1516-1556	Ferdinand VII, 1813-1833
Philip II, 1556-1598	Isabella II, 1833-1868
Philip III, 1598-1621	<i>Republic</i> , 1868-1870
Philip IV, 1621-1665	Amadeo, 1870-1883
Charles II, 1665-1700	<i>Republic</i> , 1873-1875
Philip V, 1700-1746	Alfonso XII, 1875-1885
Ferdinand VI, 1746-1759	Alfonso XIII, 1886-1931
	<i>Republic</i> , 1930—

INDEX

- Aaland Islands dispute, 777
 Abdul Hamid II, 629, 637
Actes des Apôtres, 336
Adages, 92
 Adams, John, 270
 Adams, John Quincy, 448
 Adams, Samuel, 266
 Adowa, Battle of, 665
 Africa, partition of, 660 ff.
Against the Thievish Murderous Hordes of Peasants, 102
 Agriculture, commercial, 29, laborer in, in England, 29, decline of, in Spain, 66, effect of expansion of, 82, feudal, 29, revolution of, 290, in Russia, 592-93, 608, 817-18, effects of revolution of, on working classes, 481-82, in industrial civilization, 684-85
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Congress of, 443; Treaty of, 203, 220, 256
 Albania, 739, 874
 Albany, Plan of Union, 267
 Albert, of Belgium, 665
 Albert, of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, 508
 Alcabala, 133
 Alexander of Battenburg, Prince of Bulgaria, 636
 Alexander I, of Russia, and Napoleon, 410, 415-16, and Congress of Vienna, 424, and Holy Alliance, 430, and Metternich system, 438, and reaction, 449; reign of, 583-85
 Alexander II, reforms of, 590 ff., 597
 Alexander III, of Russia, 633
 Alexander, king of Yugoslavia, 873
 Alfonso XIII, of Spain, 877
 Algeciras Conference, 670
 Algiers, 515, 660
 Alsace-Lorraine, 685, 711, 767
 Alva, Duke of, 132-33
 American Revolution, 265, 275
Ami du Peuple, 336
 Amiens, Peace of, 391
 Anabaptists, 102
 Anarchism, theories of, 494-95
 Anglo-Dutch rivalry, 246
 Anglo-French Entente, 669
 Anglo-French rivalry in India, 252-53
 Anglo-German Agreement, 1890, 663
 Anglo-Russian Entente, 640
 Anne of Austria, regent of France, 182
 Anne, queen of England, 175-79
 Annates, 91
An Open Letter to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation, 97
Anschluss, 693 ff.
 Anti-Semitism, Russian, 598, Hitler and German, 851
 Antwerp, banking center of Northern Europe, 71
 Arabia, since 1919, 876
 Arakchey, Count, 584
Arbetsfront, 859
 Argonne Forest, 756
 Arkwright, Richard, 468
 Armenians, 50, 637
 Arras, League of, 134
 Asia, imperialism, 671 ff.
 Assignats, 336-37, 341, 345, 357, 358; decline of, 1793, 363, 369, Directory, 375, Napoleon, 387
 Associations Law of 1901, 700
 Ataturk, President Kemal, 874
 Auerstadt, Battle of, 402
 Augsburg, Confession, 103, Diet of, 1518, 97. Diet of, 1530, 103, Peace of, 104, 145
Ausgleich, 538, 694-95, 711-12
 Austria Treaty of Westphalia, 182; Treaty of Utrecht, 218, partition of Poland, 240, war with Turkey, 240; Treaty of Campo Formio, 373; Second Coalition against France, 1799, 377-78; Treaty of Lunéville, 391, Treaty of Pressburg, 401; Treaty of Vienna, 411; reforms in, 1809, 414; Congress of Vienna, 423 ff.; Metternich system, 437; intervention in Italy, 1821, 446; failure of Metternich system, 532-33; nationalities in, 532-33; defeat of Hungarians

- at Világos, 528, Francis Joseph, 538, isolation after Crimean War, 546, unification of Italy, 550 ff., Austro-Prussian rivalry after 1848, 557, Austro-Prussian War, 565-66, extent after 1919, 770, Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 771; postwar economic conditions, 782, since the Great War, 871 ff., Nazi *Putsch*, 1934, 871, revolt, 1934, 894, absorbed by Germany, 1938, 895
- Austro-Hungarian Empire: formation, 569; League of Three Emperors, 602, 714; neutrality in Russo-Turkish War, 629, Dual Alliance, 1879, 632; Triple Alliance, 633, Treaty with Serbia, 1881, 634, Treaty with Rumania, 1883, 634; annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 641, government, 694-95; trouble with nationalities, 711-12, 720, ultimatum to Serbia, 724; Great War, 724 ff.
- Australia, 271
- Auto-da-fé*, 115
- Avanguardisti*, 838
- Avanti*, 824
- Avignon, 344, 373
- Azaña, Manuel, president of Spain, 878
- Azov, 232, 236, 240
- Aztecs, 60
- Babeuf, François Noel, 372
- Babylonian captivity, 40
- Bach, Johann Sebastian, 224, 298
- Bacon, Roger, 41
- Bailly, Jean Sylvain, 334
- Bakunin, Mikhail, 495, 596
- Balance of power, 202
- Balfour Declaration, 876
- Balilla, 838
- Balkan League, 1912, 643; since the Great War, 874
- Balkan Pact, 1933, 875
- Balkan States since 1919, 872 ff.
- Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, 643-44
- Bank of England, 177
- Baptists, 102
- Bardi firm, 62-63
- Barras, Paul François, 383
- Barrot, Odilon, 519
- Basel, Treaties of, 1795, 369
- Bastille, 330-31
- Batavian Republic, 377
- Batoum (Batumi), 631, 802, 819
- Bayonne Decree, 409
- Beauharnais, Hortense, 517
- Beauharnais, Josephine, 396
- Bebel, August, 706
- Beethoven, Ludwig van, 298
- Béla Kun, 771
- Belgium independence guaranteed, 453; Neutrality Treaty, 1839, 453, Congo, 665; disputes between church and state, 704, German invasion of, 726, industrial, constitutional state, 511, suffrage, 690; trade unionism, 708; reconstruction after Great War, 781
- Benedetti, Count Vincent, 571
- Beneš, Eduard, 770
- Bentham, Jeremy, 433, 441, 477, 486, 647
- Berchtold, Count Leopold, 720
- Beresford, Marshal, 445
- Berlin Academy of Science, 225
- Berlin, Congress of, 631-32
- Berlin Decree, 405
- Berlin-to-Bagdad Railway, 615, 639, 660, 875
- Berlin-Tokyo entente, 889
- Berlin, Treaty of, 631-32
- Bernadotte, General Jean Baptiste, 387, 415
- Berri, Duke of, 450
- Bessarabia, 589, 624, 625, 630
- Bill of Rights, 1689, 177
- Bishops' Trial, 176
- Bismarck, Otto von early life, 558-60; chancellor, 562; victory over liberals, 1862, 562-63; doctrine of "Power State," 563, unification of Germany, 564 ff.; German Confederation, 567; attitude toward Russia, 603; Congress of Berlin, 631; "alliance system," 632-33; colonies, 650; *Kulturkampf*, 701-2; trade unionism, 708, social legislation, 709-10; international relations after 1870, 713-14
- Black, Joseph, 293
- Black Shirts (SS), 852
- Blanc, Louis, 492, 514, 521
- Blanqui, Louis Auguste, 574
- "Bloody Assize," 176
- Board of Trade and Plantations, 249-50
- Boccaccio, Giovanni, 44
- Boers, South African problem of, 666 ff.
- Boer War, 667
- Bohemia, medieval, 18; enthusiastic nationalism, 533
- Boleyn, Anne, 110-11

- Bolshevik, organization of, 600
 Bolshevik Revolution, 1917, 800
 Bonaparte, Jerome, 403
 Bonaparte, Joseph, 401
 Bonaparte, Louis, 517
 Bonaparte, Lucien, 378
 Bonaparte, Napoleon. *See* Napoleon
 Boris, king of Bulgaria, 874
 Borodin, Alexander, 580, 882
 Borodino, Battle of, 416
 Bosnia, 619-20, 627-28, 641
 Bossuet, Bishop, 185
 Boston Tea Party, 266
 Boulton, Matthew, 469
 Bourgeoisie, French before Revolution, 317-18. *See* Middle class
 Boxer Rebellion, 677
 Boyars, 228, 582
 Brandenburg: early history, 211-13, in Reformation, 212, Prussia in Dutch War, 1672-1678, 213
 Brazza, Savorgnan de, 664
 Brest Litovsk, Treaty of, 769-70
 Briand, Aristide, 700, 706, 793
 Brienne, Loménie de, 323
 Bright, John, 455
 Brissot, Jean Pierre, 349
 British Commonwealth of Nations, 867
 Brook Farm, 491
 Brown Shirts (S.A.), 852
 Bruning, Dr. Heinrich, 855
 Bryan, William Jennings, 744
 Bucharest, Treaty of, 1913, 644; Treaty of, 1918, 757, 769-70
 Budé, William, 115
 Buffon, George Louis, 294
 Bulgaria: rise of nationalism, 627 ff.; Treaty of San Stefano, 630; Congress of Berlin, 630-32; after 1878, 635, union with Eastern Rumelia, 635; crisis, 1885, 636, independence, 641; World War, 726, Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, 643-44; Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, 1919, 771; boundary disputes, 778; since 1919, 874
 Bullionist theory, 85
Bund Deutschen Madel, 861
Bundesrath, 567, 693
 Buonaparte, Carlo, 382
 Buonaparte, Letizia, 382
 Burke, Edmund, 261
Burschenschaften, 438
 Buzot, F. N. L., 349
 Byron, Lord, 435
 Byzantine Empire, 23
 Cabot, John and Sebastian, 61
 Cadoudal, Georges, 395
Cahiers, 326
 Cajetan, Cardinal, 97
 Calonne, M. de, 322-23
 Calvin, John, 106 ff.
 Calvinism, 107, 108, 117-18, 131-33
 Cambacérès, Jean Jacques, 385
 Cambon, Paul, 669
 Campo Formio, Treaty of, 373, 394
 Canada, dominion status of, 510
 Canning, George, 441, 447, 623
 Cape Colony, 271, 666
 Capitalism, rise of, 35; and Protestantism, 108, requires government intervention, 482-83, and Marxism, 493 ff.
 Capitation, 314
 Caporetto, Battle of, 755, 825
Carbonaria, 432, 437, 445, 450, 534
 Carlsbad Decrees, 439
 Carlos, Don, 510
 Carlyle, Thomas, 505
 Carnot, Lazare, 360, 364, 371
 Carol I, of Rumania, 626
 Carol II, of Rumania, 872
 Castlereagh, Lord, 424, 426, 446-48
 Cateau-Cambrésis, Treaty of, 1559, 117
 Catherine de' Medici, 136-39
 Catherine of Aragon, 110
 Catherine II, of Russia: alliance with Frederick II, 223; reign of, 238-41; partitions of Poland, 239-40, wars, 240-41; as enlightened despot, 277; and the French Revolution, 344, 381; organization of local government, 580
 Catholic Action Organization, 840
 Catholic League, of France, 137, 139; of Germany, 146-47
 Catholic Reformation, 118-19
 Caulaincourt, Duke of, 416
 Cavaignac, General, 523
 Cavalier Parliament, 173
 Cavell, Edith, 734
 Cavendish, Henry, 293
 Cavour, Camillo di: sale of Italian bonds, 473; early life, 547; struggle with Catholic Church in Piedmont, 547-48; at Paris Conference, 545-46, unification of Italy, 549-53; estimate of work, 553

- Chaillu, Paul du, 664
 Chamberlain, Joseph, 687
 Chamberlain, Neville, 898
Chambres des Réunions, 204
 Champ de Mars, 342, 367
 Charles Albert, king of Sardinia, 535-36
 Charles, Duke of Burgundy, 22-23
 Charles I, emperor of Austria-Hungary, 746
 Charles I, king of England, 1625-1649
 and Parliament, 161-62; personal rule, 162-63; Civil War, 163-67, execution, 167
 Charles II, king of England personality, 172, Restoration, 172 ff; religious settlement of Restoration, 173-74; foreign affairs, 174-75, constitutional changes, 175-76
 Charles V, elected emperor of Holy Roman Empire, 16, 99; resistance of Turks, 23; and Reformation, 98-100, imperial policy, 99-100; French wars, 117, 127-28; relations with the Netherlands, 128-30; empire of, compared with Turkish, 617
 Charles VII, emperor of Austria, 218-19
 Charles IX, king of France, 1560-1574, 138
 Charles X, king of France, 450, 512, 516
 Charles XII, king of Sweden, 235-36
 Charlotte, empress of Mexico, 555-56
 Charter, English, 504-5
 Charter, French, of 1814, 419, 440
 Chartism, 492, 504-6
 Chateaubriand, 435
 Chaucer, Geoffrey, 42
 Chaumont, Treaty of, 418
 "Chesapeake" and "Leopard" affair, 408
Cheka, 803
 Chekhov, Anton, 580
 Chiang Kai-shek, General, 882
 China: opening to Western trade, 674-75; war with Japan, 1894, 676; Boxer Rebellion, 677; revolution, 1911, 677; after Great War, 880 ff.; and Japan since 1931, 880 ff.; Nanking government, 883
 Christian IV, of Denmark, 146
 Church of England, formation of, 111; settlement under Elizabeth, 112-14
 Church: Roman Catholic, and medieval business, 37; Carolingians, 38; growth of, 38-39; feudalism in, 39; power of popes, 40; Babylonian captivity of, 40; temporal power of, 40; the Schism, 40; heresy, 40-41, Franciscan order, 56, sixteenth century, 89-91, corruption within, 91, reforms within, 91-92, 119-20, Jesuit Order, 120-21, reforms of Pius IX, 534-35, unification, 536, 548, after 1871, 700-4, and Fascism, 839-41
 Cisalpine Republic, 373
Cité-révolutionnaires, 365
 City-states, 21-22, 49
 Civil Constitution of the Clergy, 337-38, 341
 Civil liberties, in wartime, 735
 Clarendon Code, 173
 Clemenceau, Georges, 763 ff
 Clergy, condition of, in France in age of Louis XIV, 189
 Cleves, Duchy of, 212
 Clive, Robert, 253, 257
 Coalitions against France, First, 354; Second, 377-78, Third, 400, Fourth, 401; Fifth, 411, Grand Coalition, 1813, 417
 Coal tar products, 470
 Cobbett, William, 441, 455
 Cobden, Richard, 455, 506, 648
 Cockerill, William, 282
 Coeur, Jacques, 33
 Colbert, Jean Baptiste, 192-96, 309
 Colet, John, 92, 110
 Coligny, Admiral Gaspard, 118, 137-38
 Columbus, Christopher, 59, 81
 Commercial Revolution, 49
 Communes, Philippe de, 42
 Committee of Public Safety, 358, 360-61, 368
 Commonwealth, The, 168-70
Communards, 575
 Commune, Paris, 349; Commune of 1871, 575-76
 Communist party, in China, 882-83; in Russia, 809-10
Compte rendu, 321
 Concordat of 1516, 116
 Concordat of 1801, 390
 Condorcet, Marquis de, 349
 Confederation of the Rhine, 401
 Congo Conference, 1885, 664-65
 Congo Free State, 665
 Congo Question, 664-65
 Congress of Vienna, 423 ff.
 Conservatism, influence of, in Europe throughout nineteenth century, 484-85
 Constantinople in Middle Ages, 23, 50-51

- Constantinople Conference, 1885, 636
 Constantine, Prince, of Russia, 449, 586-87
 Constitution of 1791, in France, 338-40
 Constitution of 1793, in France, 359
 Constitution of 1795, in France, 369-71
 Constitution of 1799, of Consulate, 384-85
 Constitution of 1812, in Spain, 444
 Constitutional Democratic party, in Russia, 601
 Consulate, French, achievements of, 384-90
 Continental system, 403-6, 412 ff.
 Convention, of French Revolution, 346 ff.
 Co-operatives, in England, 503-4; in Russia, 610, 817
 Copernicus, 46
 Corday, Charlotte, 363
 Cordeliers Club, 335-36
 Corn Laws, repeal of, 506
 Corneille, Pierre, 187
 Corot, Jean Baptiste Camille, 437
 Corporative State, in Italy, 836-38
 Corsica, French, 1768, 383
 Cortez, Fernando, 60
Corvée, 314
 Council of Blood, 133
Coup d'état of 1799, French, 378-79
 Court of High Commission, 162
 Court of the Star Chamber, 162
 Courts, medieval, to administer commercial code, 32-33
 Couza, Colonel Alexander, election as Rumanian prince, 626
 Cranmer, Archbishop, 111
 Crete, insurrection, 1896, 638
 Crimea, annexed by Catherine the Great, 1783, 240
 Crimean War, 544-45, 590, 625
 Crisis of 1908, 641-42
 Crispi, Francesco, 666
 Croats, nationalism, 711
 Crompton, Samuel, 468
 Cromwell, Oliver: 166-72; Commonwealth under, 168-70; religious settlement under, 169-70; Lord Protector, 170-72
 "Crown in Parliament," 691
 Crusades, effect of, on growth of trade, 50
 Curie, Marie, 496
 Custozza, Battle of, 536
 Czechoslovakia, 767, 770, 791, 896 ff.
 Czechs, nationalism, 711-12
 Daladier, Premier Édouard, 898
 d'Alembert, Jean, 297
 d'Angoulême, Margaret, 115
 Danish-Prussian War, 564-65
 D'Annunzio, Gabriele, 828-29
 Dante, Alighieri, 42
 Danton, Georges Jacques, 335-36, 349, 365, 366
 Danzig, administered by League of Nations, 777
 Dardanelles campaign, 739
 Darwin, Charles, 496
 Dawes plan, 786
 d'Azeglio, Maquis, 548
 Deák, Francis, 532-33, 537
 Decembrists, 450, 587
 Declaration of Independence, U. S., 267, 272
 Declaration of Paris, 1856, 736
 Declaration of the Rights of Man, 332-34
 "Defenestration," 145
 Deism, 296
 Delcassé, Théophile, 669
 "Delegations," 695
 Demarcation, line of, 60
 Democracy, linked with liberalism, 486; influence of American, 499-500; advance of, after 1870, 690, and English system of government, 691-92; and French system of government, Third Republic, 692, 693
 Denikin, General Anton, 802
 Denmark: Constitution of 1849, 511; Danish-Prussian War, 564; accession of Christian IX, 565
 Descartes, René, 188, 293, 295
 Desmoulins, Camille, 349, 366
 d'Étapes, Jacques Lefèvre, 92, 115
Deutsche Kindschaft, 861
 Diaz, Bartholomew, 58
 Diderot, Denis, 238, 297
 Diplomatic revolution, 1756, 221
 Directory, French, 1795-1799, 370-78; problems of, 371-72; and United States, 373-74; financial troubles of, 375-77; moral standards of, 375-76; and Egyptian campaign, 376-77; and Second Coalition, 377-78; overthrow of, 378-79
 Disarmament Conference, 795, 858
 Discovery, Age of, 58 ff.

- Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield), 631
 Dobrudja, 630
 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 871, 894
 Dominion of New England, 178
Dopolavoro, 839
 Dostoevski, Feodor M., 580
 Dover, Treaty of, 175
 Drake, Sir Francis, 61, 65, 73, 155
 Dreyfus, Alfred, 699 ff.
 Dryden, John, 174
 Dual Alliance, Austro-German, 1879, 632
 Dual Alliance, Russo-French, 1894, 634
 Dual Entente, England and France, 243, 669
Duce, II, 831
 Ducos, Roger, 378-79
 Dufferin Report, 661
 Duma, Russia, First, 607; Second, 608; Third, 609, Fourth, 749
 Dumas, Alexandre, 435
 Dumouriez, General Charles, 351, 354, 356
 Duplex, Joseph François, 253
 Durham, Lord, 510
 Dutch Beggars, 132

 East India companies, 74 ff.
 Eastern Question, 544
 Ebert, Friedrich, 758, 846
 Eck, John, 97
 Economic problems following 1919, 779-82
 Edict of Nantes, 1598, 140, 143, revocation of, 143
 Edict of Resitution, 147
 Education, in Middle Ages, 38; in Spanish colonies, 69; in eighteenth century, 301; in Russia, 595, demand for free, 479-80, 496, 497, in Germany, 555, 702, in England, 480, 696; and struggle between church and state in France, 697-98
 Edward VI of England, 112
 Edward VII of England, 669
 Egmont, Count of, 131-32
 Egypt and imperialism, 660-62; since 1919, 876
 Eighteenth century, commercial development, 284-87; industrial development, 287-88; fine arts, 298-99; philosophy, 294-95; religion, 296-97; social structure, 283-84
 Eliot, Sir John, 161
 Elizabeth of England: profits on "ventures," 73, religious settlement of, 156; marriage projects, 113, education, 154; commerce, 155, foreign policy, 155-56; and Mary of Scotland, 156, Poor Laws, 157, power of Crown, 157
 Elizabeth of Russia, 221
 Embargo Act, 408
Émigrés, 337, 344, 345, 368-69, 431, 450
 Ems telegram, 571
Encyclopedia, 297
 Engels, Friedrich, 492
 Enghien, Duke of, 395
 England and Great Britain. medieval, 10-12, 29, voyages of exploration, 61; commerce in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 63-74, war with Spain, 65, Spanish Armada, 72; founding of North American colonies, 75-77, competition with France in India, 79; Reformation, 109-14; characteristics of sixteenth century, 153, Puritans, 158, Stuarts and Parliament, 161-62; Nonconformists, 162, Civil War, 163-65, Commonwealth, 168-70; Protectorate, 170-72; Restoration, 172-74, Revolution, 1688, 176, later Stuarts, 177-79; Board of Trade and Plantations, 178, policy of ministerial responsibility, 179-80; Hanoverians, 179 ff., 259-61; relations of the classes in seventeenth century, 190, War of League of Augsburg, 205, War of Spanish Succession, 207; War of Austrian Succession, 219-20; treaty with Prussia, 1756, 221, Seven Years' War, 222 ff., balance of power in Europe, 240, politics after 1763, 258, colonial development, 162, 243, 248, 253, 255, 257-58, 262-70; imperial finance, 264-65; war with France, 354 ff.; Jay Treaty, 374; Second Coalition, 377-78, Peace of Amiens, 391, Continental system, 403-6; War with United States, 1812, 409; Congress of Vienna, 423; Treaty of Vienna, 426-27, Reaction after 1815, 440 ff., Six Acts, 1919, 441; break with Quadruple Alliance, 446; Monroe Doctrine, 448; Greek Revolution, 449; Reform Bill, 1832, 454, 477, 485, 502; economic and social, in nineteenth century, 466 ff., population in nineteenth century, 475; Public Health Acts, 477; first British Factory Inspection Act, 479, 502; Education Act of 1870, 480; work-

- house system, 481; agricultural revolution, 481-82; labor unions legal, 483; unemployment, 1935, 488; Chartism, 492, 504-6, Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, 502; abolition of slavery, 502, religious tolerance, 502-3, trade unionism, 503-4, Corn Laws repealed, 506; Ten-Hour Bill, 507, Queen Victoria, 507-8; nationalism within the empire, 508-10; Irish Home Rule, 509, 712-13; Treaty of Berlin, 632; Anglo-Russian entente, 640, English colonies, nineteenth century, 649; Egypt, 1880, 661 ff, African colonies, 662-68; Boer War, 666-67; Anglo-French Entente, 669; India, nineteenth century, 672 ff.; Far East, 676, Parliamentary Reform Bill, 1867, 690, system of government, 691, trade unionism, 707; social legislation, 710; commercial rivalry with Germany, 714; World War, 726 ff, war aims, 729; Mesopotamian campaign, 740; Coalition Cabinet, 762, reparations problem, 784; Locarno, 792, postwar situation, 866, Spanish Civil War, 891; Czechoslovakian crisis, 898
- Enlightened despots, 278 ff.
- Enlightenment, Age of, 278, 304
- Enragés*, 357, 364
- Erasmus, Desiderius, 92-93, 105, 109
- Erfurt, Conference of, 410
- Ericsson, Leif, discovery of America by, 55
- Erzberger, Matthias, 845, 850
- "Essex" incident, 407
- Estates: Estates-General, 1614, 142; 1789, 323-27, First Estate, France, 316; Second Estate, France, 316, Third Estate, France, 316, 318; Third Estate, May-June, 1789, 327-29
- Estonia since 1919, 870
- Ethiopia, war of, with Italy, 665; inefficiency of League of Nations toward crisis of, 778; Italian conquest of, 887
- Ethnic divisions of Europe, 7-8
- Eugene, Prince of Savoy, 207
- Eugénie, Empress, 542
- European climate, 7
- Extraterritoriality, 675
- Eylau, Battle of, 402
- Falkenhayn, General Erich von, 740
- Fascism: origins, 829; methods of control, 831-33; organization of government, 833-34; organization of industry, 837; youth movements, 838-39, and Catholic Church, 839-41, anti-Semitism, 840, foreign policy, 841-42, and Latin America, 868-69
- Fascist "Iron Guard" of Rumania, 872
- Fascist party, 834-35
- Fascist theory, 709
- Fashoda incident, 668
- Favre, Jules, 573
- Fawkes, Guy, 159
- Federal Act of Switzerland, 512
- Feltre, Vittorino da, 44-45
- Ferdinand I, of Austria, 144
- Ferdinand II, of Austria, 144
- Ferdinand III, of Austria, 148
- Ferdinand VII, of Spain, 410, 438, 444, 510, 538
- Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, 636
- Ferry, Jules, 674, 698
- Ferry laws, 698
- "Fetes of federation," 336
- Feudalism, 25-28, abolition of, in Austria, 537, in nineteenth-century Russia, 580
- Feuillants*, 342
- Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 414
- Finland, 755, 777, 802, 870
- Fiume, 827, 828
- Five-Mile Act, 173-74
- Five-Year Plan, 816-17
- Flemings, quarrels with Walloons, 711
- Florence, republic of, 21
- Forster Education Act, 696
- Fort Duquesne, 256
- Fouché, Joseph, 386, 411
- Fourier, François Charles Marie, 491, 588
- Fourteen Points, 756, 763, 766
- Fox blockade, 404
- Fox, Charles James, 261, 402, 455
- Fox, George, 297
- France: medieval, 13-15; commerce and colonies, 72-79; wars of Francis I, 116-17; Huguenots, 117-18, 136-43; religious wars, 138-39; Edict of Nantes, 140; Thirty Years' War, 148-49, 201; Treaty of Westphalia, 182; Treaty of the Pyrenees, 182; Louis XIV, 182 ff; War of the *Fronde*, 183; culture of age of Louis XIV, 187-88; social classes in age of Louis XIV, 189-90; centralization of government, 192, Colbert, superintendent of royal finance, 192-96; religion under Louis XIV, 196-200; foreign affairs under Louis XIV, 200-8; war with Spain, 1667, 203; Dutch War, 204; War of League of Augsburg, 205; Treaty of

- Ryswick, 205; War of Spanish Succession, 207, colonies in eighteenth century, 247-54; and American Revolution, 268-69, background of French Revolution, 306-8, government in 1789, 309-10; taxation, 1789, 314-15; social structure, 1789, 316-18; finances, 1789, 318-24, effect of American Revolution, 321; Estates-General, 324-27, National Assembly, 327-40; constitution, 1791, 338-40, Legislative Assembly, 1791, 342-43; Convention, 347-69, Directory, 369-79, relations with United States under Directory, 373-74; Consulate, 384-94, treaty with United States, 1800, 392, First Empire, 396; campaigns, 1805-1807, 399-402; industry and commerce under Empire, 412; Charter of 1814, 419; Treaty of Paris, 1814, 422, Congress of Vienna, 423; reaction after 1815, 439 ff., Greek Revolution, 449, Revolution of 1830, 451-52; industrialization, 471, 513, reign of Louis Philippe, 512-15, foreign affairs under July Monarchy, 515; Algiers, 515; ministry of Guizot, 515-17; February Revolution, 518-20; provisional government, 1848, 520; Louis Blanc and socialistic reform, 521-22; National Assembly, 522-23; Second Republic, 523-24, *coup d'état* of 1851, 524; Napoleon III, 541 ff.; Crimean War, 544-45, Second Empire, 554 ff.; Franco-Prussian War, 571-72; Paris Commune, 1871, 575-76, Third Republic, 577; alliance with Russia, 1894, 634, nineteenth-century imperialism, 649, 667-69, 674; Third Republic, 689 ff.; Law of 1875, 692; party politics, 692-93; Dreyfus case, 699; separation of church and state, 700-1, labor, 708, 710, Three Years' Military Law, 715; Great War, 723 ff.; reconstruction after Great War, 781 ff.; occupation of Ruhr, 785; postwar alliance system, 790; Franco-Belgian Alliance, 1920, 790; problems of French "security," 790; Franco-Polish Treaty, 1921, 791; Locarno, 792-93; Popular Front, 866; treaty with Russia, 1935, 886, Czechoslovakian crisis, 1938, 898
- France, Anatole, 699
- Francis I, of France, 115-17, 127-28, 136
- Francis II, of Austria, 401, 424
- Francis II, of France, 137
- Franciscans, missionaries to Mongols, 56
- Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 721-22
- Francis Joseph, of Austria, 538, 722
- Franco, General Francisco, 870, 890
- Franco-Soviet Treaty, 1935, 886
- Frankfort, Treaty of, 572
- Franklin, Benjamin, 265, 301
- Frederick, elector of the Palatinate, 145
- Frederick I, of Prussia (Frederick III of Brandenburg), 217
- Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia: education and training, 217, War of Austrian Succession, 218-20, Seven Years' War, 221-23; First Partition of Poland, 223; domestic policies, 224-25; enlightened despot, 276
- Frederick the Wise, elector of Saxony, 97
- Frederick William, elector of Brandenburg, 213
- Frederick William I, of Prussia, 215-17
- Frederick William II, of Prussia, 343-44
- Frederick William III, of Prussia, 424, 528
- Frederick William IV, king of Prussia, 528, 531
- Freedom of the seas, in Great War, 736-37
- Free Masons, 322
- French and Indian War, 256
- French Revolution, the great, 324 ff.; of 1830, 450-52, of 1848, 518 ff.
- Friedland, Battle of, 402
- Fronde*, War of the, 183
- Fructidor, *coup d'état* of, 376
- Fugger family, 33, 63
- Fuhrer*, *Der*, 842, 857
- Fulton, Robert, 469
- Gabelle*, 314
- Galileo, 46, 188
- Gallican Liberties, 116, 199-200, 390
- Galloway, Joseph, 267
- Gama, Vasco da, 58, 72
- Gambetta, Leon, 572, 573
- Gandhi, Mahatma, 868
- Gapon, Father, 606
- Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 536-37, 552
- Gastein, Treaty of, 565
- Genêt, Citizen Edmond Charles, 355
- Geneva Naval Conference, 1927, 794
- Geneva Protocol, 1924, 792
- Genghis Khan, 56, 227
- Genoa, 21, 54
- Geographical knowledge, increase of, 57
- George I, of England, 179

- George I, of Greece, 623
 George II, of Greece, 874
 George III, of England, 201, 260-61, 270, 290, 440
 George IV, of England, 507
 George William, elector of Brandenburg, 212
 German Confederation, 428, 439, 452, 557
 German Confederation, North, 567-68
 German East Africa, 663
 German Equatorial Africa, 663
 German National Union, 558
 German West Africa, 662
 Germanies, desire of, for unity, 525 ff.; *Zollverein* in, 526-27; demand for reforms in, 527-28, Revolution of 1848 in, 530 ff
 Germany, establishment of empire, 572; League of Three Emperors, 602, 714, Reinsurance Treaty, 633; Triple Alliance, 633; colonies, 662 ff.; Algéciras Conference, 670; industry and government, 686 ff., protective tariffs, 687; government of empire, 693-94, Dual Alliance, 1879, 632, crisis of 1908, 641-42; imperialism in Far East, 676, *Kulturkampf*, 701-2; Social Democratic Labor party, 706; trade unionism, 708, social legislation, 709-10; nationalities problem, 711, commercial rivalry with England, 714; military system, 715; Great War, 725 ff.; loss of African colonies to England, 740, effects of blockade, 741-42, proposed alliance with Mexico, 746; Treaty of Brest Litovsk, 754, collapse of Central Powers, 757; Treaty of Versailles, 766-70; withdrawal from League of Nations, 774; postwar economic problems, 782-84; economic recovery after 1923, 786, Locarno, 792-93; revolution, 1918, 844 ff.; Weimar Constitution, 845 ff.; Hitler's rise to power, 851 ff.; policies of Hitler, 857 ff.; Hitler youth movements, 861-62; Rome-Berlin axis, 888; and Spanish Civil War, 890; *Anschluss* with Austria, 1938, 895; relations with Czechoslovakia, 898-99
Gestapo, 862
 Ghent, Treaty of, 409
 Gibbon, Edward, 301-2
 Gibraltar, 207
 Giers, Nicholas de, 633
 Gilbert, Sir Humphrey, 61
 Gioberti, Vincenzo, 534-35
Giovane Italiana, 838
 Girondists, 342, 345-46, 350, 352-53, 357, 363
 Gladstone, William, 546, 648, 712-13
 Glorious Revolution, 1688, 176-77
 Goebbels, Dr Paul, 862
 Goering, Hermann, 856
 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 224
 Golden Horde, 227
 Gortchakoff, Prince Alexander, 631
 Goya, Francisco José, 298
 Gramont, Duke of, 570
 Grand Remonstrance, 165
 Grand Trianon, Treaty of the, 771
 Great Britain, *see* England
 "Great Fear," 331
 Great Northern War, 235-36
 Great War, 1914-1918 724 ff.; chauvinism, 719, mobilization, 731-32; use of propaganda, 732-34, civil liberties, 735; problems of neutrality, 736-37, weapons, 737-38, hospitalization, 738, military and naval campaigns, 738-41, effects of blockade, 741-42; submarine *vs* blockade, 742-43; part played by United States, 747-48; end of war, 755 ff.; collapse of Central Powers, 756-58; costs, 759-61
 Greece influence of physiography on history, 616, Turkish government in, 616; revolution, 1821-1829, 449, 620 ff., George I becomes king, 623; war with Turkey, 1897, 638; Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, 643-44; neutrality and entrance into Great War, 740, war with Turkey, 772
 Grey, Sir Edward, 455, 668, 721, 725, 728
 Grotius, Hugo, 150, 202, 773
 Guilds, 32-33
 Guise, Francis, Duke of, 137
 Guise, Henry, Duke of, 139
 Guizot, François, 515-18
 Gunpowder Plot, 159
 Gustavus Adolphus, 147, 201, 235
 Gustavus Vasa, 17
 Habeas Corpus Act, 175-76
 Hague Peace Conference, 1899, 604
 Haiti, 392
 Halley, Edmund, 293
 Hamilton, Alexander, 355
 Hampden, John, 165

- Hampton Court Conference, 158-59
 Handel, George Frederick, 224, 298
 Hanover, 394
 Hanseatic League, 31
 Hapsburg, possessions of House of, 207
 Hardenberg, Charles Augustus, Prince of, 414, 424
 Hardie, Keir, 706
 Hargreaves, James, 468
 Hastings, Warren, 271
 Havana, 257
 Hawkins, Sir William, 155
 Hay, John, 677
 Haydn, Franz Joseph, 298
 Hébert, Jacques René, 358, 365
 Hedjaz, 876
 Heine, Heinrich, 514
 Heligoland, 663
 Helvetic Republic, 377
 Henlein, Konrad, 897
 Henrietta Maria, queen of England, 161
 Henry II, of France, 136
 Henry III, of France, 138
 Henry IV, of France. reforms of, 140; economic policies, 141, French colonies, 142; Edict of Nantes, 150, 196-99
 Henry VII, of England, 12-13
 Henry VIII, 110 ff.
 Henry, Patrick, 266
 Henry the Navigator, 59
 Herzegovina, revolt against Turkey, 1875, 627, annexed to Austria, 641
 Herzen, Alexander, 588
 Hummler, Heinrich, 862
 Hindenburg, Marshal Paul von, 742, 854
 Hitler, Adolf: roots of power, 842; early career, 851, Munich *Putsch*, 852; rise to power, 853-56; made chancellor, 856; policies of, 857 ff.; economic organization, 859-61; revision of Treaty of Versailles, 886; Czechoslovakian crisis, 1938, 896
 Hoare-Laval plan, 888
 Hobbes, Thomas, 295
 Hohenlinden, Battle of, 391
 Hohenzollern, House of, 211-25
 Holy Alliance, 430, 589
 Holy Roman Empire, 19, 20, 98-100, 401
 Holy Synod, 234
 Hoover moratorium, 787-88
 Hötzenndorf, Conrad von, 720
 House, Colonel Edward, 719, 744
 Hubertusburg, Treaty of, 1763, 222, 257
 Hudson Bay, 254
 Hugo, Victor, 435
 Huguenots, 143, 196
 Hull, Cordell, 789
 Humanism, 43-45, 93, 115
 Hundred Days, the, 419
 Hungary Mohács, Battle of, 18, revival of national spirit 532-33, revolution of 1848, 537, defeat at Világos, 538, communist regime, 771, agrarian problem, 782, since 1919, 872
 Hus, John, 88, 97
 Huygens, Christiaan, 293

Il popolo d'Italia, 824
Il Risorgimento, 547
Imitation of Christ, The, 94
 Imperialism early development of, 646 ff.; balance sheet, 680-81; factors in modern, 652 ff., new terminology, 656; fields for modern, 658 ff., Near East, 659, 662, partition of Africa, 662 ff.; Far East, 674 ff., Latin America, 678-79
 India, 672 ff., British imperialism in, 672 ff., National Congress in, 867; after Great War, 868
 Industry, effects of expansion on, 82; Industrial Revolution and, 459 ff.; organization of, in nineteenth century, 472, development of, results in breakdown of laissez faire, 483; development of, after 1870, 683-85; relations of, with government, 686-87
 Inquisition, 68
Institutes of the Christian Religion, 107
 Intelligentsia, Russian, 594
 Intendants, 310-11
 Inter-Allied debts, 788-89
 International African Association, 664
 International Court of Arbitration at the Hague, 719
 International, First, 574; Third, 820-21
 International Labor Organization, 776
 International Office of Public Health, 719
 International organization in eighteenth century, 276-77
 Intolerable Acts, 266
 Irak, 876
 Ireland, 509, 713, 717
 Iroquois, 254
 Isnard, 358
Italia irredenta, 633, 712
 Italy. and Holy Roman Empire, 19, 20-21;

- Renaissance, 21, northern Italy center of medieval trade, 31, commerce of city-states, 49, cities acquire wealth in trade, 51-54; revolution, 1820, 445, Young Italy movement, 533; growth of nationalism, 533-34, revolution, 1848, 534-36, reforms of Pius IX, 534-35; Italian Question, 546, Cavour's struggle with Catholic Church, 547-48; unification, 550 ff., acquisition of Venetia, 553, Triple Alliance, 633, suffrage reforms, 690, antagonism to Catholic Church, 703-4, Great War, 726, 727, 729, withdrawal from League of Nations, 774, Locarno Pacts, 792-93; treaties of friendship, 1924-1927, 792; Treaty of London, 825, Treaty of Versailles, 825 ff.; postwar economic unrest, 823, 825-26, threat of Bolshevism, 827, Fascism, 829 ff.; Concordat, Mussolini and Catholic Church, 839; African imperialism, 665 ff., 876; conquest of Ethiopia, 887; and Spanish Civil War, 890
- Ivan III, 227, 228
Ivan IV, 228-29,
Ivan, brother of Peter the Great, 230-31
- Jackson, Andrew, 409, 501
Jacobins, 335, 346, 350, 359, 368
Jamaica, 76, 251
James I, of England, 158-60
James II, of England, 176
Jameson Raid, 667
Jansenism, 197
Japan Russo-Japanese War, 604; opened to Western trade, 675, Westernization of, 676; war with China, 1894, 676; Great War, 726, war aims, 729; acquisition of Kiaochow, 740, and China after 1931, 880 ff.; Manchurian crisis, 880, withdrawal from League of Nations, 774, 884; Japanese Monroe Doctrine, 884, Sino-Japanese War, 1937, 884 ff.
- Jaurès, Jean Leon, 706
Jay Treaty, 374
Jefferson, Thomas, 395
Jellachich, Colonel Joseph, 537
Jena, Battle of, 402
Jenkins's Ear, War of, 256
Jesuit Order, 120, 197
Jeunesse dorée, 375-76
Jews. Dreyfus case, 699; political standing in England, 503; Russia, pogroms, 598, 606, Russia, after Revolution, 751; German anti-Semitism, 851
- Jingoism, 630
Johnston, Sir Harry, 663
Joint-stock companies, 73-74
Joseph II, of Austria, 279-81
Jugoslavia, 791, 873
July Ordinances, 451
Junker class, 558-59
Junot, Marshal Andoche, 406
- Kant, Immanuel, 224, 295, 414
Kapp-Lüttwitz *Putsch*, 849
Karageorge, 618
Kars, 631
Kaunitz, Wenzel Anton, Prince von, 222
Kay, John, 467
Keats, John, 435
Kellogg, Frank B., 793
Kemal, Mustafa, 772, 828, 874
Kempis, Thomas à, 94
Kerensky, Alexander, 751, 754, 799
Kiev, 226
King George's War, 256
King William's War, 254
Kitchener, Lord, 668
Knox, John, 158
Koch, Robert, 496
Kolchak, Admiral, 802
Korea, Japanese protectorate over, 676
Kosciusko, Thaddeus, 241
Kossuth, Louis, 533, 537
Kotzebue, August F., 439
Kruger, Paul, 667
Kublai Khan, 56
Kuchuk Kanardji, Treaty of, 240
Kulaks, 601, 805, 878
Kuomintang, 882
- Labor: in later Middle Ages, 33-35; eighteenth century, 289; effect of industrialization, 477-79, child labor, 478; women in nineteenth century, 478; and agricultural revolution, 481-82; and *laissez faire*, 482-83; unions in England, 483, 503-4; London Workingmen's Association, 504; French labor, 514; Louis Blanc's plans, 521-22
Lafayette, Marquis de, 330, 334
Laissez faire, doctrine of, 286; after 1815, 433; fallacy of, 482-83, 687
Lamarck, Jean Baptiste, 436, 496

- Lamartine, Alphonse, 435, 517, 518, 520, 522
 Landtag, 530
 Landwehr, 561
 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 706
 Latin America, field for modern imperialism, 678-79
 Latvia, after 1919, 870
 Laud, William, Archbishop of Canterbury, 162
 Lausanne Conference, 1932, 787
 Lausanne, Treaty of, 771, 840, 874
 Lavoisier, Antoine Laurent, 294, 496
 Law of the Maximum, 358
 Law of Papal Guarantees, 703
 Law of Suspects, 361
 Law of 22nd Prairial, 367
 Lawrence, Colonel T. E., 740
 League of Augsburg, 204
 League of Nations organization and functions, 765 ff., achievements, boundary disputes, and plebiscites, 776-79, Manchuria, 778, Ethiopia, 778, 887; Spain, 778, Disarmament Conference, 792, German withdrawal from, 858, Manchurian crisis, 1931, 883-85, Japan's withdrawal, 884, after 1933, 886
 League of Three Emperors, 602, 632-33, 714
 Lebrun, Charles François, 385
 Ledru-Rollin, A. A., 520, 523
 Lefort, François, 233
 Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 188
 Leipzig, Battle of, 417
 Lenin, N (Vladimir Ulianov), 597, 600, 608, 752, 800, 803, 804, 810
 Leo X, Pope, 96
 Leo XIII, Pope, 702
 Leopold, emperor of Austria, 281, 343
 Leopold II, king of Belgium, 664-65
 Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, 453, 511
 Lepanto, Battle of, 100
Letters of Eminent Men, 93
Letters of Obscure Men, 93
Lettre de cachet, 312-13
 "Levelers," 170
Le Vieux Cordelier, 366
 Levy, *en masse*, 360
 Liaotung Peninsula, 604
 Liberalism, in nineteenth-century Western Europe, 486-89, in Germany, 557, 562-63; in Russia, 584
 Libya, 661
 Liebknecht, Karl, 844
 Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 706
 Ligurian Republic, 373
 Lima Conference, 1938, 869
 Linnaeus, Carl (von Linné), 294
 List, Friedrich, 651, 687
 Lister, Lord, 496
Lit de justice, 184, 313, 323
 Lithuania, united with Poland, 17-18; Russification of, 588-89, since 1919, 870
 "Little Englanders," 647
 Little Entente, 791
 Livingston, Robert, 395
 Livingstone, David, 664
 Lloyd George, David, 710, 755, 762, 765
 Locarno Pacts, 792-93, 848
 Locke, John, 295, 303
 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 768
 London Conference, 1912-1913, 644
 London Co-operative and Economic Society, 503
 London Naval Conference, 1930, 1934, 794
 London Naval Treaty, 841-42
 London Workmen's Association, 504
 Long Parliament, 163, 172
 Lorraine, Cardinal of, 137
 Lorraine, Francis of, 220
 Loubet, Émile François, 699
 Louis XI, of France, 14-15
 Louis XIII, 142
 Louis XIV king of France, 185 ff., wars of, 200 ff.; effect of wars of, 319
 Louis XV, 319-20
 Louis XVI accession, 313; personality, 319-20; Estates-General, 324-27; recalled Necker, 330; Civil Constitution of the Clergy, 337-38, flight to Varennes, 341, vetoes of, 345, deposition of, 347-48, trial and execution of, 352-53
 Louis XVIII, 418, 440, 450
 Louisa, queen of Prussia, 402
 Louisburg, capture of, 256
 Louis Philippe, king of France, 452, 512, 517, 520
 Louvois, François, 202
 Lowlands, 29
 Loyalists, of American Revolution, 268
 Loyola, Ignatius, 120-21
 Ludendorff, General Erich, 742, 757
 Lunéville, Treaty of, 391, 394
 "Lusitania," sinking of, 743-44
 Luther, Martin, as a young priest, 95; Ninety-five Theses, 96-97; tracts, 97;

- excommunication, 97; Edict of Worms, 100; Peasants' Revolt, 101-2, humanists and lower classes, 102, death, 103
- Lutzen, Battle of, 147
- Luxemburg, Rosa, 844
- L'vov, Prince Georgi, 751
- Lyell, Sir Charles, 496
- Lytton Commission, 883-84
- MacDonald, Ramsay, 706
- Macedonian question, 640
- Machiavelli, Niccolò, 12
- Machinery, application to industry, 35
- Magellan, Fernando, 60
- Magna Carta, 10
- Mahan, Admiral Alfred, 255
- Maintenon, Madame de, and Huguenots, 198
- Manchukuo, 883
- Manchuria, and inefficiency of League of Nations, 778
- Mandates, 657, 876
- Manila, 257
- Manin, Daniele, 549
- Marat, Jean Paul, 322, 335, 339, 358, 363
- "March on Rome," 830
- Marchand, Colonel Jean, 668
- Marengo, Battle of, 391
- Maria Theresa, 218-20, 277
- Marie Antoinette, character of, 320, 363
- Marie Louise, of Austria, 413, 418
- Marlborough, Duke of, 207
- Marne, Battle of the, 738
- Marston Moor, Battle of, 166
- Marx, Karl, 492-95, 800 ff.
- Mary of Burgundy, 129
- Mary of Modena, 176
- Mary of Scotland, 113, 137, 156
- Mary Stuart, queen of England, 177
- Masaryk, Thomas, 770
- Massachusetts Bay Colony, founding of, 76
- Masséna, André, 391
- Mather, Cotton, 300
- Matteotti, Giacomo, 832
- Max, prince of Baden, 757
- Maximilian of Bavaria, 145
- Maximilian, emperor of Austria, 98-99
- Maximilian, emperor of Mexico, 555-56
- May laws, 702
- Mayflower Compact, 248
- Mazarin, Cardinal, 149, 182, 192, 198
- Mazzini, Joseph, 533, 549
- Mechanization of industry, 459 ff.
- Medici family of Florence, 21-22, 33, 44; Catherine de' Medici, *see* Catherine, queen of France, Marie de' Medici, 142
- Mehmet Ali 515, 623
- Mein Kampf*, 851, 895
- Melanchthon, Philip, 98, 103
- Melikov, Loris 597
- Memel, problem of, 773
- Mendelssohn, Felix, 437
- Menelik, King, 665, 666
- Meenonites, 102
- Mensheviks, 600
- Mercantilism, 70, 85-86, 194-96, 243-47
- Mercator, Gerhard, 57
- Métayers*, 317
- Methuen Treaty, 254
- Metternich, Count early career, 411, Congress of Vienna, 423 ff., system, 426, 437, Quadruple Alliance, 424, influence of, 442, Congress system, 446 ff.; revolution of 1820, 445, Greek revolution, 449, revolution of 1830, 453; failure of his system, 532-33, end of regime, 537-38
- Mexico, 60, 555, 746
- Michael, grand duke, refused throne, 750
- Middle class, rise of, in Middle Ages, 8, 9, 14, 36; and Renaissance, 43; importance of, in France in time of Louis XIV, 183-89, and French Revolution, 316-18; struggle of, with radicals in France, 1848, 520, slow development of, in Russia, 581, 593
- Milan Decree, 406
- Mihukov, P. N., 605, 751
- Mill, James, 455
- Millerand, Alexandre, 706
- Milton, John, 169
- Minorities and Mandate Commissions, 776
- Minority rights, 771
- Mir, Russian, 592, 608
- Mirabeau, Comte de, 329, 334, 341
- Mittel-Europa*, 729, 875
- Mirandola, Pico della, 92
- Mohács, Battle of, 100
- Mola, General Emilio, 890
- Molasses Act, 1733, 265
- Moldavia and Wallachia, 410, 500, 624, 625
- Molière (Jean Baptiste Poquelin), 187
- Moltke, Count Helmuth von, 571
- Money, and disappearance of serfdom, 281; increased supply of, after 1450, 83

- Moniteur*, 336
 Monk, General George, 172
 Montagnards, 358
 Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de, 92, 116
 Montenegro center of Serbians, 620, war with Turkey, 628, World War, 726; under Austrian control, 739
 Montesquieu, Baron de, 303
 Montevideo Conference, 1933, 869
 Monroe Doctrine, 448, 678
 Monroe, James, 374, 448
 Montreal, Battle of, 257
 Moors, 58, 59, 66
 More, Sir Thomas, 92, 110, 111
 Moreau, Jean Victor, 391, 395
 Morny, Duke de, 524
 Morocco, 669-71, 714, 877
 Moscow, principality, 226
 "Mountain," 349
 Moussorgsky, Modest Petrovitch, 580
 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 298
 Mukden incident, 880
 Munich Pact, 898
 Munich *Putsch*, 852
 Murat, Joachim, 402, 417
 Mussolini, Benito early years, 824; and origin of Fascism, 829, rise to power, 830-31; treaty with church, 1929, 839; armament, 841, foreign policy, 841-42; Ethiopian crisis, 887
 Mystics, 94
 Nanking, Treaty of, 674-75
 Naples in the Middle Ages, 21; Second Coalition, 377-78; Revolution, 1820, 445, constitution, 1848, 535, unification of Italy, 552
 Napoleon I: saves Convention, 371; first Italian campaign, 372; Egyptian campaign, 376-77, end of Directory, 378-79, *coup d'état*, 1799, 378-79; early life, 382-84, reforms of Consulate, 386-90; Concordat, 1801, 390, second Italian campaign, 391, colonial projects, 392; consul for life, 1802, 393, sale of Louisiana, 395; emperor, 396; educational system, 397-98, financial and economic policies, 398-99; campaigns, 1805-1807, 398-402; Trafalgar, 400; king of Italy, 400; Treaty of Pressburg, 401; Prussian and Russian campaigns, 1806-1807, 402; Treaty of Tilsit, 402-3; Continental system, 403-6; Papal States, 406; relations with United States, 407 ff.; and Spain, 410 ff., marriage to Marie Louise, 413; son, 413, height of Empire, 413; Russian campaign, 416, retreat from Moscow, 417, end of Empire, 418, abdication and Elba, 418, the Hundred Days, 419, Napoleonic legend, 421, Napoleonic tradition, 517-18
 Napoleon III early life, 517; president of France, 523, *coup d'état* of 1851, 524, emperor, 541 ff., public works, 542, marriage, 542, international affairs, 545, failure of foreign policy, 554 ff., capture by Germans and end of reign, 571; interest in Rumanian autonomy, 626, colonial enterprise, 649
 Napoleonic legend, 421
 Napoleon, Prince, 550
Narodnaya Volya, 597
Narodniki, 597
 National Assembly, *see* France
 National Guard, France, 330-31, 513, 520
 Nationalism the Netherlands, 130-33, as companion of liberalism, 487-88; development in industrialized states, 487; New World republics, 499-500; in Germany, 529-31, in Austria, 532-33; revived in Hungary, 532-33; in Poland, 533; in Bohemia, 533, in Italy, 533-34; growth in Near East, 618, and the modern state, 711-13; in Turkey, 772-73
 Nationalities, Austrian problem of, 532 ff.; in Russia, 582
 National Socialism in Germany, 852
 Nation-states, development of, in medieval Europe, 9-10; Oriental commerce of, 55-56, war as instrument in building of, 201-2
 Naval disarmament, 794
 Navarino, Battle of, 623
 Navarre, Henry of, 118, 137
 Navigation, in period of expansion, 81
 Navigation Act, 1651, 168
 Nazi Germany development of, 842 ff.; labor front, 860, problem of church, 862, foreign policy, 885 ff.
 Near East, problem of, 613 ff.; and imperialism, 659-60
 Near Eastern crisis, 1908, 641-42, 714
 Necker, Jacques, 321-22, 327-30
 Nelson, Lord Horatio, 377, 392, 400
 N.E.P., 804-5
 Nepotism, 91
 Netherlands: French-English rivalry in, 22-23, in Hapsburg hands, 23; develop-

- ment of interregional trade, 71; Amsterdam becomes financial center, 71; Dutch East India Company, 74, infractions against Spain's trade restrictions, 75; colonies in North America, 78, successor to Portugal in the East, 78; under Charles V, 120-30, religious revolt, 129-33; and Philip II, 130-32; nationalism, 130-33; revolt from Spain, 132-35; pacification of Ghent, 133-34; union of Utrecht, 134; recognized, 1648, 134, colonial development, 135; government of the Republic, 135, war with France, 1672, 195; Peace of Nimwegen, 204, War of League of Augsburg, 205, and American Revolution, 269; kingdom of, 423; revolution, 1830, 453; prosperous under constitutional monarchy, 511; manhood suffrage, 690
- Neuilly-sur-Seine, Treaty of, 771
- Neutrality, of North, Armed, 1780, 269, 286, Neutrality, League of Armed, 392; difficulties of, 202; problems in Great War, 736-37
- Newcomen, Thomas, 469
- New Deal, 789
- Newfoundland, 77, 254
- "New Model Army," 167
- Newton, Sir Isaac, 188, 293, 295
- Nicholas I, of Russia, 450, 510, 586
- Nicholas II, of Russia, 604, 606, 749-50
- Nicolson, Sir Arthur, 725
- Nilism, 596, 600
- Nile, Battle of the, 377
- Nimwegen, Treaty of, 204
- Nine Power Pact, 880
- Nineteenth century, nature of changes in, 460
- Noblesse de la robe*, 313, 317
- Nonintercourse Act, 409
- Nonintervention Committee, 891
- Norway, 511, 711
- Notables, Assembly of, 323
- North German Confederation, 567-68
- Novara, Battle of, 536
- Novibazar, Sanjak of, 631 f.
- Novgorod, 227
- NSD.A.P. (National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei), 842 n.
- Nystad, Treaty of, 236
- Obrenovich, Milosch, 619
- October Manifesto, 606
- Octobrists, 607
- Octroi, 315
- O G P U, 803, 808
- Ollivier, Emile, 556
- On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church of God*, 97
- On the Freedom of a Christian Man*, 97
- On War and Peace*, 150
- "Open Door," 675, 677
- Opium War, Anglo-Chinese, 674
- Orange Free State, 666
- Orders in Council, 404
- Orlando, V E., 765
- Orthodox Russian Church and revolution, 813
- Owen, Robert, 477, 491, 492
- Pacification of Ghent, 133-34
- Pacifism, in United States, 744
- Page, Walter Hines, 744
- Palestine, 876
- Pan-Serb movement, 640
- Pan-Slav movement, 611, 627, 639
- Papacy, sixteenth century, 89-91
- Papal infallibility, doctrine of, 701
- Papen, Franz von, 855
- Paris Commune, French Revolution, 349; 1871, 575-76
- Paris, Pact of, 1927, 793
- Paris, Treaty of, 1763, 222-23; 1783, 257, 270; 1814, 418, 422, 1856, 625
- Parlement of Paris, 184, French Revolution, 311-13
- Parlements, *see* France
- Parliamentaries*, 323
- Parliamentary Act of 1911, 692
- Parma, Alexander Farnese, Duke of, 134
- Parthenopean Republic, 377
- Particularism in Germany, 209
- Pascal, Blaise, 197
- Pasteur, Louis, 496
- Paul I, tsar of Russia, 391
- Paul III, Pope, 121
- Peace, agencies for, 718-19
- Peasants' Revolt, 101-2
- Peasants, French, before Revolution, 317
- Peninsular campaign, 410, 417
- Penn, William, 177-78
- Père Duchesne*, 336
- Permanent Court of International Justice, 776
- Perry, Commodore Matthew, 675
- Pershing, General John J., 748
- Persia, English and Russian economic penetration in, 611

- Peter I, of Montenegro, 620
 Peter II, of Yugoslavia, 873
 Peter the Great youth, 232, Western trip, 233, Westernization of Russia, 233-34, wars, 235-36, results of reign, 236-37, 579, interest of, in Western culture, 580
 Petition of Right, 161
 Petrarch, Francesco, 43
 Philip II, of Spain accession to throne, 128, personality, 131, Dutch Revolt, 132, French wars of religion, 137-39
 Philip V, of Spain, 207
 Philosophes, 291 *passim*
 Physiocrats, 262-63, 291
 Physiography, of Europe, 3 ff; influence of, in Near East, 614 ff.
Piccole Italiane, 838
 Pichegru, Charles, 395
 Picquart, Georges, 699
 Piedmont, 377, 444, 546
 Pilsudski, General Joseph, 790
 Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 256, 261
 Pitt, William, the younger, 354, 402, 455
 Pius IX, Pope, 534, 548, 701-2
 Pizarro, Francisco, 60
 Place, Francis, 455
 Plebiscites, Italian, 1859-1860, 552; post-war, 767, 768, 778
 Plehve, Venceslas von, 598, 605
 Plevna, fall of, 629
 Plombières meeting, 1858, 550
 Pluralities, 91
 Plymouth Colony, 248
 Pobyedonostsev, Constantin, 598
 Pogroms, 598
 Poincaré, Raymond, 781, 784
 Poland medieval, 17-18; Great Northern War, 235-36, partitions of, 239-42; Congress of Vienna, 426, nationalism, 533, revolt of 1862, 594, nationalism of Poles in Austria-Hungary, 711; Treaty of Versailles, 767, postwar, 870
 Poincaré, Jules Auguste Armand, Prince de, 451
 Polish Election, War of, 1733-1738, 218
 "Polly" incident, 407
 Polo (Maffeo, Nicolo, Marco), 56
 Pompadour, Madame de, 222
 Pope, Alexander, 174
Popolo d'Italia, II, 824
 Population, changes in nineteenth century, 465, 474, 475
 Populism, Russia, 596
 Port Arthur, 604
 Portugal voyages of discovery, 16-17, 58, under Spain, 17, division of New World by pope, 60, *Casa da India*, 64, commercial empire, 66-67, independence from Spain, 67, loss of spice trade to Netherlands, 78, trade with England, 254-55; partition plan, 405-6, revolution, 1820, 445, dynastic struggles of, 511
 Pragmatic Sanction, 219
 Prague, Treaty of, 566
Praise of Folly, 93
 Prefects, Napoleonic, 387
 Pressburg, Treaty of, 401
 Price rise of sixteenth century, 83-84
 Pride's Purge, 167
 Priestley, Joseph, 293-94
 Prieur de la Côte d'Or, 360, 364
 Princip, Gavrilo, 721
 Propaganda, use of, in Great War, 732-34
 Protectorate, England, 170-72
 Protest, 1529, 103
 Protestant sects, German Reformation, 102
 Proudhon, Pierre Joseph, 494; opposition of, to socialists, 574
 Provence, Count of, 369
 Prussia kingdom of, 214, East Prussia to Brandenburg, 212, government under Frederick William I, 215, Frederick the Great, 217 ff, partitions of Poland, 223, French Revolution, 345, 351, Treaty of Basel, 1795, 369; Jena, 402; Treaty of Tilsit, 402-3; reforms of Stein, 414, *Zollverein*, 526-27; Frederick William IV, 528; liberalism, 557, William I, 560 ff, Austro-Prussian War, 565-66; annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, 566; Franco-Prussian War, 571-72, Revolution of 1848, 528 ff; Constitution of 1850, 530
 Ptolemaic system, 46-47
 Pushkin, Alexander, 580
 Pym, John, 161
 Pyrenees, Peace of, 1659, 149
 Quadruple Alliance, 429, 430, 443
 Quebec Act, 264
 Quebec, Battle of, 257
 Queen Anne's War, 254
 Quesnay, François, 302
 Quiberon Bay, 257
 Quintuple Alliance, 443

- Rabelais, François, 116
 Racism, Nazi Germany, 851
 Racine, Jean, 187
 Radetsky, General Johann Joseph, 535
 Raleigh, Sir Walter, 61
 Rambouillet Decree, 409
 Rasputin, 749
 Rathenau, Walther, 850
 Reaction, age of, 429 ff
 Reason, age of, 278, 317
 Red Cross, 719, in Great War, 738
 Reformation: German, 95 ff, Martin Luther and revolt, 95-103, effect of Turkish invasions, 100; Knights' Revolt, 101; Peasants' Revolt, 101, Protestants, 102; Switzerland, 104 ff, Calvinism, 106 ff, in England, 109-13, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, 114-15, France, 115, Huguenots, 117-18; Counter Reformation, 118-19; results of, 122-24
 Reform Bill, 1832, 455, 456
 Reichsbank, 786
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss, 394
 Reichstag, 567, 693
 Reinsurance Treaty, 633
 Religion wars of, 126-45; in France under Louis XIV, 188, 196, toleration in England and Germany, 198, Gallican liberties, 199-200; revival of, after 1815, 432-33; quarrel with theory of evolution, 497, slow growth of tolerance in England, 502-3, religious wars in the Netherlands, 129-33; religious wars in France, 141 ff
 Renaissance, 41-47; effect of Reformation on, 122-23
 Reparations Commission, 783
 Reparations problem, 782-84
 Representatives on Mission, 358
 Republic of Virtue, 366
 Requesens, Don Luis, 133
 Reuchlin, John, 93
 Revolt of German knights, 101
 Revolutions, 1830, 451, 452
 Revolutionary Tribunal, 361, 367, 368
 Revolutions, 1820, 444 ff
 Rhode Island Charter, 178
 Rhodes, Cecil, 667
 Richelieu, Cardinal Armand de, 143, 148, 149, 201
 Riga, Treaty of, 790
 River capture, 6
 Rivera, Primo de, 877
 Robespierre, Maximilien, 334, 349, 360-68
 Roland, Madame Manon Phlipon, 349
 Roland, Jean Marie, 349
 Romanov, Michael, 229
 Roman Republic, 377
 Romanticism, 429 ff
 Rome, city-state, 20-21, and unification of Italy, 553
 Rome-Berlin axis, 888, 889
 Roon, Count Albrecht von, 571
 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 789
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 670
 Root and Branch Bill, 165
 RSFSR, 806
 Rothschild, House of, 529
 Rothschild, Solomon, 535
 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 300-4
 Ruhr, 785
 "Rule of 1756," 356, 407
 Rumania formation, 624 ff; religion, 624; Napoleon III and Rumanian autonomy, 626, Couza elected prince, 626; Carol I, 626, treaty with Austria, 1883, 634; nationalism, 711, in Great War, 726-27, 729, 740; Little Entente, 791; since 1919, 872
 Rumania, Eastern, 635
 Rump Parliament, 167
 Russell, Lord John, 455
 Russia struggles against Tartars, 18, medieval, 226-27, Greek element in Russian civilization, 226; Tartar invasions, 227, Orthodox Church, 228, expansion before Peter the Great, 229, 230, Peter the Great, 232-38; Great Northern War, 235-36, under Catherine the Great, 239 ff, Second Coalition against France, 377-78, Treaty of Tilsit, 402-3; Campaign of 1812, 416; Russo-Turkish War, 416, expansion in North America, 448; Greek Revolution, 449, "frozen," 510; aid to Austria, 537; Near East, 544; dispute over defense of Christian shrines in Holy Land, 544; Crimean War, 544-45, 590; extent at opening of nineteenth century, 579, civilization before nineteenth century, 580 ff; Slavophil movement, 583, Alexander I, 583 ff; ministry of Arakcheev, 584; Nicholas I, 586 ff, Union of Salvation, 586; Decembrists, 587; desire for reform, 587-88, Saint-Simon and Fourier, 588; Russification of Lithuania and West Russia,

- 588, Holy Alliance, 589, War for Greek Independence, 589; Alexander II, reforms, 590 ff., growth of intelligentsia, 594, Polish revolt, 1863, 594-95, reaction after 1862, 595, nihilism, 596, populism, 596, *Narodniki*, 597, Alexander III and repression, 597-98, industrialization, 598-99, Marxian socialism, 600; Bolshevik party, 600, foreign policy to 1905, 601 ff., Treaty of Paris of 1856, 602, League of Three Emperors, 602; sale of Alaska, 602; Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878, 603, Russo-Japanese War, 604, 676, Revolution, 1905, 605; October Manifesto, 606, First Duma, 607, agrarian reforms, 608, reasons for failure of Revolution of 1905, 609-10; Bessarabia, 625, Russo-Turkish War, 628-29; Treaty of San Stefano, 630; League of Three Emperors, 632, Reinsurance Treaty, 633; Dual Alliance, 634; Anglo-Russian Entente, 640, Crisis of 1908, 641-42; defense of Serbia, 725; Great War, 725 ff., Revolutions of 1917, 748-55; Treaty of Brest Litovsk, 759; nonaggression treaties after 1921, 791; Civil War, 1918-1921, 801-2; Red Terror, 803; N.E.P., 804-5; famine, 1921, 805; Russo-Chinese Treaty, 1924, 806; R.S.F.S.R., 806; Constitution of 1918, 807; Constitution of U.S.S.R., 807; Constitution of 1936, 808-9; organization of Communist party, 809-11; achievements of Soviet Russia, 811-12; youth movements, 812; religion under Soviet rule, 813, social change, 814-16; Five-Year Plan, 816-17, agriculture, 817-18, industrialization, 818-20; League of Nations, 821; foreign relations, 820-21; French Treaty, 1935, 886
- Russification, 588, 605
- Ruthenians, nationalism, 711
- Rykov, Alexei, 801
- Ryswick, Peace of, 205
- Saar Valley, 685, 767
- Sadowa, 566
- Saint Augustine, 95
- Saint Bartholomew's Day, Massacre of, 138
- Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Treaty of, 771
- Saint Helena, 419
- Saint-Just, Louis de, 349-50
- Saint Mihuel, 756
- Saint-Simon, Count Claude Henri de, 491, 588
- Salisbury, Lord, 714
- Sanctions, in Ethiopian crisis, 887
- San Stefano, Treaty of, 1878, 630
- Santo Domingo, 319
- Savoy, House of, 351, 535
- Scandinavia: Union of Kalmar, 17, industrialized, constitutional monarchies, 511, manhood suffrage, 690-91, trade during Great War, 736-37; since Great War, 869
- Schacht, Dr Hjalmar, 859
- Scharnhorst, Gerhard von, 414
- Schiller, Johann Christoph von, 224
- Schism, in Catholic Church, 90
- Schleicher, Kurt von, 856-57
- Schleswig-Holstein, 564-65
- Schmalkaldic League, 103
- Schubert, Franz, 436
- Schumann, Robert, 436
- Schuschnigg, Kurt von, 894
- Schwarzenberg, Count Felix, 538, 557
- Science: in Middle Ages, 46-47; in France under Louis XIV, 188, in eighteenth century, 291-94; in nineteenth century, 496-97; the social sciences and evolution, 497; and imperialism, 654; union with industry in Germany, 688
- Scotland, war with England, 1640, 163
- Scott, Sir Walter, 435
- Second Continental Congress, 267
- Secularization of society, 37
- Sedan, Battle of, 571
- Sepoy Rebellion, 672
- September Massacres, 346
- Serajevo, 722
- Serbia: rise of, 618 ff.; Bosnia center of Serbian population, 619-20; Austrian treaty, 1881, 634; Bulgarian war, 1885, 636; crisis, 1908, 641-42, Balkan Wars, 643-44; nationalism, 619, 711; assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, 721-22; response to Austria's ultimatum, 724; Great War, 739; Yugoslavia, 873
- Serfdom, in Middle Ages, 26; abolished by Joseph II, 280, abolished by Stein, 414, abolished in Russia, 591-93
- Sergius, Grand Duke, assassination of, 605
- Seven Years' War, 222

- Sèvres, Treaty of, 771
 Seyss-Inquart, Dr. Arthur, 895
 Shelburne, Lord, 270
 Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 435
 Ship money, 163
 Short Parliament, 163
 Sickingen, Franz von, 101
 "Sick Man of Europe," 543
 Sieyès, Abbé, 328, 350, 378, 384
 Silesia, 220, 778
 Simony, 90
 Sino-Japanese War, 1894, 676
 Six Acts, 1819, 441
 Slavery, abolished in British Empire, 502
 Slavophiles, 583
 Slovaks, nationalism, 711
 Smith, Adam, 263, 433
 Snowden, Philip, 706
Social Contract, 303-4
 Social Democratic Labor party, 706
 Social Democrats, Russia, 600
 Social Honor Courts, 860
 Socialism development of, 489-95, Utopians, 491-92, Marxian theories, 492-95; increase of Marxian socialists in France, 574, First International, 574, Paris Commune, 1871, 575-76, Marxian socialism in Russia before Revolution, 596, 600; in Europe after 1871, 705-7; General Workingmen's Association, 706; Russian Revolution of 1917, 748-50
 Social legislation, 709-10
 Social Revolutionary party, Russia, 601
 Social services of modern state, 704-5
 Society of Friends of the Constitution, 335
 Society of the Exterminating Angel, 432
 Somme, Battle of the, 739
 "Sons of the Wolf," 838
 Sophia, sister of Peter the Great, 230-31
 Soviets, of Workers' Deputies, 606; All-Russian Congress of, 800
 Spain Middle Ages, 15-16, discovery of America, 59; founding of colonies, 60-61; *Casa de Contractacion*, 64, commercial advance, 65; decline of agriculture, 66; Council of the Indies, 68; Inquisition, 68; colonial policies, 69-70; Armada destroyed, 72; Treaty of the Pyrenees, 1660, 182; war with France (1667-1668), 203; extent of empire, 206, War of the Spanish Succession, 207, and American Revolution, 269; Treaty of Basel, 1795, 369, Treaty of 1795, 374; cession of Louisiana to French, 392, revolution of 1820, 444, social unrest, 510-11; Hohenzollern candidacy, 570; attack on orthodox church, 704, inefficiency of League of Nations in Spanish Civil War, 778, revolution of 1931, 878, Civil War, 1936, 878, 889-90, Nonintervention Committee, 891; Loyalists defeated, 891
 Spanish Armada, 72, 134, 156
 Spanish colonies, 68-70
 "Spanish Fury," 133
 Spanish Inquisition, 115
 Spanish Revolution, 1931, 878
 Speranski, Michael, 585
 Spinoza, Benedict, 295
Squadristi, 830
 Stadion, Count, 411
 Stalin, Joseph, 752, 801, 810 ff.
 Stambulov, Stefan, 635
 Stamp Act, 265-66
 Stanley, Henry, 664
 "Steel Helmets," 850
 Stein, Baron Heinrich von, 414, 424
 Stockholm, Treaty of, 1720, 236
 Stolypin, P. A., 608
 Strafford, Earl of (Sir Thomas Wentworth), 162, 164
 Straits, Question of the, 590, 603, 614, 628-29, 721
 Streltsi, revolt of the, 233
 "Strength through Joy" movement, 860
 Stresemann, Gustav, 785, 793, 845
 Succession states, of Russia, 869, 870, of Austria-Hungary, 871 ff; of Ottoman Empire, 874 ff.
 Sudan, 661-62
 Sudeten Germans, 895
 Suez Canal, 661-62
 Suffrage. manhood suffrage in United States, 500-1; English Reform Bill, 454-55; manhood suffrage in France, 1875, 577, in Russia, 607; extension of, in European countries after 1870, 690 ff.
 Sugar Act, 265
 Suleiman the Magnificent, Sultan of Turkey, 100, 617
 Sully, Duke of, 141-42
 Sun Yat-sen, 882
 Suspects, Law of, 361
 Sweden: independence under Gustavus Vasa, 17; contacts with trade through

- Russia, 50, Reformation, 147; Thirty Years' War, 147; ally of France in Dutch War, 204, and Baltic powers, 235, Bernadotte as king, 415, union with Norway, 427, separation from Norway, 711, Aaland Islands dispute, 777
- Switzerland Federal Act, 512; Act of Mediation, 512, *Sonderbund* crushed, 512, Helvetic Republic, 512, government, 695
- Syllabus of Errors*, 701
- Syndicalism, 708
- Syria, 660, 876
- Toulle*, 14, 314
- Talleyrand Charles Maurice de, and the X, Y, Z affair, 374, Consulate, 386, sale of Louisiana, 395; at Vienna, 402, 403, 411, 424
- Tartar invasions, 3
- Technology, increase of, 684
- Ten Hour Law, England, 507
- Terror, the Reign of, 361-63
- Tetzl, John, 96
- Thermidorian reaction, 368-69
- Thiers, Adolphe, 452, 515, 519, 523, 572
- Thirty-nine Articles, the, 113
- Thirty Years' War. Bohemian period, 144; Danish period, 146-47; Swedish period, 147; French period, 148-49; results of, 150, 210-11
- Thompson, Benjamin, 282
- Three Emperors' League, *see* League of the Three Emperors
- Tilly, Count John von, 145, 147, 201
- Tilsit, Treaties of, 402-3, 625
- Tithe, 316
- Tocqueville, Alexis de, 518, 520
- Toleration, Act of, 1689, 177
- Tolstoy, Leo, 580
- Tories, in England, 175-76
- Totalitarian state, under Napoleon, 398; Fascist Italy, 836 ff.; Germany, 859 ff.
- Townshend Acts, 1767, 266
- Townshend, Charles, 290
- Trade: Hanseatic League, 31; medieval fairs, 31; growth in Middle Ages, 32; rise of merchants' guilds, 32-33, commercial revolution, 49; in Byzantine Empire, 50; effect of crusades, 50; effect of discovery of New World, 54-55; organization of, 62; Low Countries develop interregional trade, 71, evolution of stock companies, 73-74, effect of expansion, 80, development of modern business techniques, 82, in France under Colbert, 194-96, system of business law developed, 483
- Trade unionism, 707-9
- Trafalgar, Battle of, 400
- Transjordanian, 876
- Trans-Siberian Railroad, 604
- Trent, Council of, 121
- Tribun du Peuple, Le*, 372
- Triple Alliance, 1668, 175, 1881, 633, 720
- Triple Entente, 714
- Tripoli, 643, 660-61
- Troppau-Laibach, 446
- Trotsky, Leon (Isaac Bronstein), 606, 752, 800, 810 ff
- Tschaikovsky, Peter Ilitch, 580
- Tudor line, 12
- Tudor, Mary, 110, 112
- Tull, Jethro, 290
- Tunisia, 650, 660
- Turgenev, Ivan, 580
- Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques, 301, 302; finance minister, 320-21
- Turenne, Henri, Viscount de, 202
- Turkey. domination of Southeastern Europe by, 9, Constantinople, 23, trade routes, 55; invasion of Holy Roman Empire, 100, turned back at Vienna, 204, wars with Peter the Great, 236, war with Catherine II, 239-40; Second Coalition, 377-78, Greek Revolution, 449; dispute over Christian shrines, 544; Crimean War, 544-45; Russo-Turkish War, 589-90, revolts in Balkans, 603, decline of power in Near East, 614 ff; subject states in nineteenth century, 616; Greek revolt, 622; regains Moldavia and Wallachia, 1812, 625; Bulgarian nationalism, 627 ff; Russo-Turkish War, 628-29; Treaty of San Stefano, 630; Turkish-Bulgarian treaty, 1886, 636; Turkish-Greek war, 1896-1897, 638; Turkish Revolution, 1908, 641; Balkan Wars, 643-44, Turko-Italian War, 1911-1912, 643 reforms after Great War, 720, and Great War, 726; defense at the Dardanelles, 740; Treaty of Lausanne, 771, 772, republic, 772-

- 73; National Pact, 772; war with Greece, 1922, 772; since 1923, 875
- Turnverein*, 438
- Twenty-one Demands, 880
- Ukraine, Republic of, 755, 802
- Ulm, Battle of, 400
- Ultramontanists, 197
- Ultra-revolutionaires*, 365
- Unemployment, in England, 710
- Union of Communist Youth, 812
- Union of Kalmar, 17
- Union of Salvation, 586
- Union of South Africa, 667
- Union of Utrecht, 134
- United States ally of France, 1793, 355-56, Jay Treaty, 374; X, Y, Z affair, 374; Pinckney Treaty, 374; treaty with France, 1800, 392; purchase of Louisiana, 395; Napoleonic Wars, 407-8 ff, War of 1812, 409; Monroe Doctrine, 448, Utopian socialists, 491, industrialization, 500, democracy, 500-7, immigrants from Germany, 1848, 531, Civil War, 555, defeat of France's program in Mexico, 555, abolition of slavery, 592, purchase of Alaska, 602, imperialism, 678-79, protective tariffs, 687; social legislation, 710; Great War, 731, 743, 746, 747 ff; refusal to ratify Treaty of Versailles, 768; refusal to join League of Nations, 774; depression of 1921, 780; inter-Allied debts, 788-89, Washington Conference, 794; and Latin America, 868-69; Neutrality Act, 1935, 892
- Universal Postal Union, 719
- Urban life, development in Middle Ages, 30
- Urbanization, 476-77, 704-5
- USSR. (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics), 806 ff.
- Utopias, 491
- Utrecht, Treaty of, 1713, 207
- Valla, Lorenzo, 45
- Valmy, Battle of, 346, 351
- Valois, Marguerite, 138
- Varangians, 226
- Vauban, Marquess Sébastien le Prestre de, 202
- Vendée, revolt in the, 356-57, 369
- Venice, 21, 51, 55
- Venizelos, Eleutherios, 726, 740
- Verdun, Battle of, 739
- Vergennes, Charles Gravier, Count of, 270
- Vergniaud, Pierre, 349
- Verrazano, Giovanni, 61
- Versailles Peace Conference, 761-66
- Versailles, Treaty of, 766-70, "war guilt" clause in, 783, Hitler and, 858
- Viborg Manifesto, 608
- Victor Emmanuel II, of Italy, 536; and Cavour, 547
- Victoria, of England. accession, 507-8; marriage, 508, Schleswig-Holstein question, 565, Empress of India, 672
- Vienna, Congress of, 423 ff., 499
- Vienna, Treaty of, 1809, 411; of 1815, 427 ff
- Vikings, 17
- Villafranca, Battle of, 551
- Villon, François, 42
- Vilna, 777
- Vinci, Leonardo da, 46
- Vingtème*, 314
- Virginia, first royal colony, 76
- Vladimir, prince of Kiev, 226
- Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de, 283, 296-97
- Wagram, Battle of, 411
- Waldeck-Rousseau, P. M., 699
- Wallachia, 624
- Wallenstein, Graf Albrecht von, 146-47, 201
- Walloon, 711
- Walpole, Horace, 282-83
- Walpole, Robert, 255
- "War of the Three Henrys," 139
- War, military practices in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 201
- Warsaw, Duchy of, 403
- Wartburg Festival, 438
- Washburn, George, 627
- Washington Conference, 1921-1922, 794, 880
- Washington, George, 201, 256, 269
- Waterloo, Battle of, 419
- Watt, James, 469
- Webb, Sidney, 706
- Weimar Constitution, 846-47
- Weimar Republic, 785, 847-50
- Wellington, Duke of, 417, 419, 447, 455, 505
- Weltpolitik*, 714

- Wentworth, Sir Thomas, 161-62
 Wesley, Charles and John, 297-300
 West Indian Colonies, 251-52
 Westminster, Statute of, 867
 Westphalia, Kingdom of, 402-3
 Westphalia, Treaty of, 1648, 148, 212
 Whig party, formation of, 175
 "White Man's Burden," 655
 Wiclif, John, 88
 William I, of Germany, 571, proclaimed emperor, 572
 William II, of Germany, 639, 714, 757-58
 William II, of Holland, 511
 William III, of England, 177
 William and Mary, 177, 205
 William of Ockham, 109
 William of Orange, 131-34
 Wilson, Woodrow, 745, 756, 763, 765 ff
 Windischgratz, Prince Alfred zu, 537
 Witte, Count Sergius, 599, 606
 Wolsey, Cardinal, 110
 World Economic Conference, 1933, 789
 World War *See* Great War
 Worms, Diet of, 1520, 99
 Wrangel, General Friedrich, 802
 X, Y, Z affair, 374, 392
 Yorktown, Battle of, 270
 Young, Arthur, 290
 Young, Owen D., 786
 Young Pioneers, 812
 Youth movements. Russia, 812-13, Italy, 839 ff, Germany, 861
 Yudenich, General Nikolai, 802
 Zemstvo, 593, 595, 601, 610-11
 Zimmerman Note, 746
 Zog, king of Albania, 874
 Zola, Émile, 699
 Zollverein, 526-27
 Zwingli, Ulrich, 104-5